More on Utopia
Author(s): Brendan Bradshaw
Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1981), pp. 1-27
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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TheHistorical
2,1., 1 (I98I), pp. I
Journal,
in GreatBritain
Printed
MORE
27.
ON UTOPIA*
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
Queens'and GirtonColleges,Cambridge
I
J. H. Hexter's brilliantanalysis ofMore's Utopiain the Introductionto theYale
edition of the text in I965 was favoured by a resounding endorsementfrom
Quentin Skinner in a no-less-brilliantanalysis of the Yale edition in Past and
Presentin I 967.1 Given the statusof both scholars as interpretersof the political
thoughtofthe early modern period, Skinner'spredictionthat Hexter's analysis
would 'cause a reorientationof [the] entire historiography'of the subject was
prophecy.2 Skinner, in any case,
bound to be something of a self-fulfilling
clearly considers the claim to have been justified in the event. In his recent
masterlystudy of the historyof political thought in the early modern period
his treatmentof Utopia is especially - and avowedly - indebted to Hexter's
work.3 Meanwhile, the most stimulating challenge presented to Hexter's
thesis- by Dermot Fenlon in the Transactionsof theRoyal HistoricalSocietyin
1975 - servesin its way to vindicate Skinner's prediction. Fenlon is concerned
not to contradictHexter's basic hypothesisbut to stand it on itshead.4 Fenlon's
thesisin turn was assimilated into the survey literaturewhen it was adapted
by G. R. Elton to hammer Christian humanism in his Reformand Reformation
in 1977.
It looks, therefore,as if the Yale edition succeeded not only in producing
a definitiveversion of More's text but also in establishing a new framework
forits interpretationby means of Hexter's introduction.In the circumstances
it may now seen an embarrassmentthat the edition came furnishednot with
one but with two interpretations of the text. Hexter shared editorial
* I am grateful
to Professors
G. R. Eltonand QuentinSkinnerofCambridge,and toDr Dermot
ofearlierversionsof
Fenlon,now ofthe Beda College,Rome, forgenerousand helpfulcriticism
thisstudy.
1 The complete
ofSt ThomasMore,iv, ed. Edward Surtz,Sj. and J. H. Hexter (New
wvorks
cited as Yale Utopia),xv-cxxiv.QuentinSkinner,'More's
Haven and London, I965: hereafter
xxxviii (1967), 153 68.
Utopia', PastandPresent,
2
3
'More'sUtopia',p. I57.
Skinner,
(2 vols.,Cambridge,I978),
ofmodern
politicalthought
QuentinSkinner,Thefoundations
I, 223,
n.i; 255, n.i.
4 DermotFenlon,'England and Europe: Utopia and its aftermath',
T'ransactions
oftheRoyal
see belowpp. 5,
Society
xxv (I 975), I I5- 35. For a discussionofFenlon'sinterpretation
Historical
i8,
20.
(London, I977),
andReformation
G. R. Elton,Reform
(Cambridge,I973), pp. 4-5, I58.
6
ooi8-246X/8o/2828-3730$o2.50
I980
pp.
42
andrenewal
7. Cf. Elton,Reform
Press
CambridgeUniversity
1
1-2
2
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
responsibilitywith the Jesuit, Edward Surtz, and the latter provided an
introductionofhis own as well as an extensivetextual commentary.' The work
ofthetwoeditorswas intendedto be complementary,and froman organizational
point of view that was indeed the case. But, as Skinner's critique brought
brilliantlyto light in I967, the editors differedin interpretativemethod and
provided diverging approaches to the interpretationof the text.7He leftno
doubt about which route he considered led into the heart of Utopia.The present
writeris less convinced. I shall argue, in fact, that despite all the light which
Hexter's analysis throws on the text it is founded on an unsustainable
hypothesis. Conversely, despite the many irrelevancies with which Surtz's
analysis is lumbered, his hypothesis is basically sound. It should be said,
however, that the primary purpose of the present study is neither to refute
Hexter nor to vindicate Surtz. It is rather to attempt the hazardous voyage
to Utopia yet again, profitingfromthe exerience of those earlier expeditions,
fromtheir positive achievements no less than fromtheir mistakes.
The debate about the meaning of Utopia comes down essentially to the
question ofwhat is to be made ofbook II where the fictitiousnarrator,Raphael
Hythloday, gives an account of the island of Utopia, which he claims to have
discovered on his travels,and of the way of lifeofits inhabitants. The problem
of interpretationis twofold: what does More here intend to describe and what
is his purpose in describingit?8 In relation to the firstquestion the established
frameworkof interpretationbeforeHexter wrote took Utopia more or less at
face value. It was assumed to depict how reasonable human beings might
organize theirsociety relyingon the powers of natural reason unenlightened
by the divine revelation available to Christiansin scripture.The debate about
Utopia, then, related to the second question - More's purpose in depicting
Utopian society. No dispute existed, of course, about its ironic and satirical
function:the folliesof Christian societycastigated by More in book I stood out
all the more when juxtaposed with the good sense of the Utopian life-style
depicted in book II. But did More's purpose go beyond satire and irony?Here
consensus broke down on the precise relationshipwhich the author envisaged
between Utopia and real life.
Borrowing from the vocabulary of literaryanalysis - after all, Utopia was
writtenas a literarywork - the traditional debate about Utopiacould be said
to hinge on whether the Utopian commonwealth was proposed by More as
an idyll or as an ideal. The mainstream tradition took Utopia in the former
sense. On thisreading the concept of Utopia was nothingmore than a literary
conceit designed to heighten the reader's perception of the real world in the
way already described, and in doing so to prick the conscience of Europe by
Yale Utopia,pp. cxxv-clxxxi, 267 570.
Skinner,'More's Utopia'.
8 The distinction
I have in mindherewould be describedin scholastictermsas thatbetween
thefinisoperisand thefinisoperantis.
For a recentdemonstration
of the relevanceof the author's
intentions
and purposesto the interpretation
of literarytexts,see Quentin Skinner,'Motives,
intentions,
and the interpretation
of texts',New Literary
History,
iii (1972), 393 408.
6
7
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
3
pointingout thatthevalues by whichit lived- self-interest,
power,wealthstoodcondemnedevenbythestandardsofvirtuouspagans.Thisinterpretation
has thespecialadvantageofpreserving
UtopiaforChristianorthodoxy
despite
itsapparentcommendation
ofa wayoflifethatinvolvestheabolitionofprivate
property,radical social egalitarianism,divorce and euthanasia. On this
accountsuchradicalfeatures
can be explainedas elementsofa fantasycreated
by More in an attemptto portraythesocial orderthatmightobtainshould
societyexit,perimposibile,
in a stateof perfectnature,i.e. lackinggrace and
divinerevelation
butinthefirm
controlofreason.The alternative
interpretation
rejectedtheconsignment
ofUtopia to therealmoffantasyin orderto claim
More's work for what mightbe called the Old Testamentcanon of the
literature
ofsocialrevolution.
The imaginativetour
deforce
ofbookII was taken
to refernotto whatmighthave beenin a hypothetical
worldofperfect
nature
but what oughtto be in the real one. Its purposewas to showhow existing
societymustbe organizedin orderto accordwiththenormsofsocialjustice.
As such it providedboth a radical challengeto the existingorder and a
blueprintforrevolutionary
change.In a word,book II of Utopiapresentsnot
an idyllbut an ideal.9
Againstthis historiographical
backgroundthe interpretative
framework
establishedby Hexterappears bothdaringand plausible.This is based on a
hypothesis
about bookII whichenablesUtopiato be readas theworkofa man
who was at the same time a deeply committedChristianand a social
The keyto theunderstanding
revolutionary.
of the text,he argues,is to set
it in its ideologicalcontext.And he demonstrates
in a manneraltogether
convincingthatthisis providedneitherby medievalCatholicorthodoxynor
ofsocial revolution.The contextin whichUtopiamustbe
by the'pre-history'
set is thatof Erasmianhumanism.The two major preoccupations
of Utopia,
as Hextershows,also constitutethe two major preoccupationsof Erasmian
humanistsin 1515-I6: the sterility
and formalism
of contemporary
religion
withtheconsequentneed forreligiousrenewal;theinjusticesof thecontemporarysocio-politicalcultureand the need forsocial and politicalreform.1?
as a
The Utopiancommonwealth
mustbe interpreted
ofbookII, therefore,
leads
Christianhumaniststatement
aboutreligionand society.Thisperception
Hexter to postulate the startlinghypothesisthat- the textual references
- bookII wasintendedtoportray
notwithstanding
a Christian
commonwealth,
9 For a bibliographicalnoteon thesetwo traditions
ofinterpretation
see Skinner,Foundations,
257, n.i. To the workscited by Skinneradd D. Baker-Smith,
ThomasMoreandPlato'svoyage
(Cardiff,I978). ApproachingUtopiafroma base in literary
studiesProfessor
Baker-Smith
makes
no reference
to the currenthistoriographical
discussion.His treatment
is also ratherlimitedin
scope: it constitutes
an inaugurallecturedeliveredat Cardiffin I978. Nevertheless,
his central
theme,indicatedin his title,drawsattentionto an inadequatelyexploreddimensionof Utopia's
intellectualprovenance,about whichmoreanon. Meanwhile,Professor
Baker-Smith's
workmay
be associatedwiththeconservative
traditionofinterpretation
whicharguesforan 'idyllic' rather
thanan 'ideal' understanding
ofbook II, see Baker-Smith,
Plato'svoyage,
pp. I4 -17. I am grateful
to Dr David StarkeyoftheLondon School ofEconomicsfordrawingthisstudyto myattention
and forprovidingme witha copyof it.
10 Hexter,Introduction,
Yale Utopia,pp. xlv-cv.Cf. Skinner,'More's Utopia', pp. 153 -4.
I,
4
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
existing
nota paganone.Morecontrived
theparadoxofa Christiancommunity
beyondtheambitof theinstitutional
Churchin orderto directattentionto
what Christianhumanistsregardedas the real substanceof christianity.
Christianityfor the individual consistsin virtuousliving, not in ritual
observances.
Hence theUtopians,despitetheirlackofChristianrituals,are true
ofEurope,despitetheirobservanceofChristian
whiletheinhabitants
Christians,
rituals,are not.Similarly,thecriteriafora Christiansocietyare moralrather
than institutional.
Utopia, foundedupon and livingby social justice- the
- is a ChristiansocietydespiteitslackofChristianinstitutions.
commonwealth
The nationsofEuropefoundedupon and livingbyegoism,powerand wealth
are not. In all of this,in its preoccupationwithreligionand society,in its
in itsnotionoftheessentialcontentof
criticism
ofcontemporary
christendom,
christianity,
Utopiais a typicallyChristianhumanisttext.However,Hexter
proceedsto argue, Utopiais somethingmore,and thereinlies its uniqueness
and theoriginality
ofitscontribution
to politicalthought.Seen in relationto
theliterature
ofChristianhumanistreform
it turnsout to be - to use Skinner's
neatsummaryofHexter'sargument- notmerelya humanistcritiqueoflate
medievalchristianity
but a critiqueof Christianhumanismas well.
The portraitofthevirtuousChristiancommonwealth
presentedin book II
of Utopia,Hextersuggests,exposestheinadequacyof thechristianhumanist
and thesoft-centred
conceptofreform
qualityofitsideology.The humanists
of
analysedtheillsofcontemporary
societyin termsofthemoralbankruptcy
its religious,social and politicalculture.However,theirstrategyforreform
oftheirownanalysis.They
showedthattheyjibbed at theradicalimplications
by
pinnedtheirhopeson an innertransformation
ofmindand hearteffected
the inculcationof correctmoralvalues throughexhortationand education.
More'suniquenesslayingraspingtheinadequacyofthisformulation.
The false
valuesfromwhichtheinjustices
oflatemedievalsocietysprangwereenshrined
notonlyin men'sheartsbut in theverystructures
oftheirsocietythatupheld
thepre-eminence
ofpower,wealth,lineageand degree.WhatsetsUtopiaapart
- thejust society- notsimplyas a virtuous
is itsconceptofthecommonwealth
butas a virtuouscommunity
foundeduponajust socialorder.The
community
within
perceptionthat,beyondthe need fora radical moral transformation
society- a change of mind and heart- thereexistedthe need fora radical
transformation
also - a changeofsocial and politicalinstitutions
structural
makesUtopiauniquein thegenre
ofhumanistreform
literature.
Converselythe
a strategy,
ofsocial
accordedto structuralreformas an instrument,
priority
as a workofpolitical
reform
earnsUtopiaa place 'on themarginsofmodernity'
is a triumphforrationalplanningand
theory.The Utopian commonwealth
social engineering.
was twofold,
of Hexter'sinterpretation
The historiographical
significance
therefore.
It raisedthequestionof what More intendedto describein book
II by postulatingtheislandofUtopia as a Christiancommunity.
In thisway
framework
forthediscussionofthework.
Hexterprovideda newinterpretative
Secondly,hisown expositionofthemeaningof Utopiawithinthatframework
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
5
gave a new twist to the old debate about More's polemical purpose. As he
explains it, Utopia is not simply an imaginative reconstructionof society as it
mighthave been in a state of perfectnature. It is rather More's conception of
how a just society could be created, human nature being what it is. Communist and egalitarian Utopia is not a pagan idyll. It is a Christian ideal.11
As mentioned earlier, the most stimulating challenge to this thesis, that
provided by Fenlon's paper in 1975, and by the treatmentof Utopia in the
recent work of G. R. Elton, served incidentally to entrenchthe interpretative
frameworkestablished by Hexter. Although it relates more to the spiritual
rather than to the narrowlymoral concerns of Christian humanism, Fenlon's
argumentis constructedwithinthe broad frameworkofHexter's interpretative
scheme. More's preoccupations in Utopiaemerge in the context of a humanist
reformingethos. Book II provides a humanist critique of late medieval christianity from the perspective of a model Christian commonwealth. But the
ultimate significanceof book II - as of the work as a whole - lies in its critique
of humanism itself.The substantive differencebetween Hexter and Fenlon
concerns thisfinalcrucial aspect. Both agree that More's criticismofhumanism
is by way of a clear-headed response to humanism's naive strategyof reform.
However, Fenlon does not see More's response as an attempt to improve the
humanist scheme by reformulatingit along more rigorous and more radical
lines. More's message is rather that the humanist programme is misdirected,
literallybound for nowhere. When More wrote Utopia,according to Fenlon,
he had come to believe that the humanist strategywas based upon an illusion:
the assumption that the political powers of Europe and the institutionsof
secular governmentcould be made the instrumentof Christian renewal, of the
creation of a trulyChristian commonwealth. More pin-pointed thisfallacy by
directing attention in book I to the single-mindedegoism of secular politics,
and in book II to the single-mindedaltruism which secular politics would be
required to display for the humanist scheme to work. The reader was thus
enabled to perceive the chasm between. To emphasize the point More called
the model commonwealth of book II 'Utopia', i.e. 'Nowhere', and he located
it on a remote island: ... the humanists and their books were stranded in
Utopia upon an island'.12 By means of thisingenious reformulation,Hexter's
thesisis made to turn somersault. Utopia is indeed the model of a Christian
commonwealth, but a model which More wishes to expose as an illusion.
Thus Fenlon succeeds in reviving within the new interpretativeframework
the old historiographicaldebate about whether More proposes the Utopian
commonwealth as an idyll or as an ideal.
With that debate this study will ultimatelyengage. However, it will do so
" Hexter,'Introduction',pp. c-cxxiv.Skinner,Foundations,
I, 255-62.
Fenlon,'England and Europe', especiallyp. I27. Elton,loc. cit. (n.s). It shouldbe said that
forDr Fenlon and Professor
Elton Utopia seemsto be endowedwitha studiedambiguity.On
theone hand it represents
'an urbanizedextensionofMore's household,whichtogether
withthe
LondonCharterhouse,
was thebestmodelofa Christiansocietyknownto him',Fenlon,'England
and Europe', p. I 22. On theotherhanditis 'the bestformofsocietyimaginablewithoutChristian
revelation',ibid. p. I 24.
12
6
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
by challenging in the firstinstance the interpretativeframeworkproposed by
Hexter in I 965. Necessarily,therefore,it bringsunder reviewthe 'reorientation
of [the] entirehistoriography'which Hexter's Introduction to the Yale edition
brought about. In this connexion it should be pointed out that despite the
scepticism that will frequentlybe voiced in what follows, this study stands
indebted to Hexter's work in one fundamental respect. That is, his identification of the humanist ideology of reformas the ethos fromwhich the Utopian
polemic emerged. The interpretationof Utopiapresentedhere suggests,in fact,
that despite the correctnessof his starting-pointHexter set offin the wrong
direction.His mistake,it will appear, was twofold.He misconceived the nature
of the humanist ideology of reformin its religious aspect, and that of its
polemical stance in I5I5-i6
when Utopiawas written.Considerable attention
is here devoted to this topic since Hexter's mistake illustratesa more general
confusionwhich the presentstudy may go some way to correct. Secondly, he
failed to take sufficientaccount of what must be regarded as basic data forthe
purpose of an exercise which attempts to recover the author's intentions,the
meaning which he wished to convey to the reader. I referto theguidance which
More provided for the reader within the text itself.In fact the present study
is largely an attempt to focus attention on that guidance and to elucidate its
meaning by referenceto the humanist ethos fromwhich the Utopian polemic
emerged.
II
Such an interpretativemethod raises an immediate problem for Hexter's
centralhypothesisabout what book II of Utopiadescribes.For the textpurports
to describe the Utopian communitypriorto its conversion to christianity.It
is true that Hexter faces this difficultyhead on by arguing that More here
intended to present an ironic paradox: their way of life stamps the nominal
pagans of Utopia as true Christians while the way of life of the nominal
Christians of Europe brand them as the worst kind of pagans.13 More's
insistence on the paganism of the Utopians heightens the ironic effectsince
irony works by paradox. This explanation is open to criticism in the first
instance on purely formal grounds. It is true that irony works by inference.
To explain the point of the paradox is to blunt its ironic edge. On the other
hand, ironydoes not workby confusion,least ofall when itspoint is a polemical
one. Thus, More, by portraying the Utopians as virtuous pagans without
enabling the reader to perceive his ironic intent,was not heighteningthe effect
of his paradox but, it would seem, renderingit inscrutable.
This brings us to the second leg of Hexter's argument and to the crucial
question of the message which Utopia conveyed as a humanist polemic. If
Hexter's expositionofthe humanistideology ofreformis correct,contemporary
readers would have needed no special assistance fromthe author to recognize
who the Utopians really were and to grasp the point of More's paradox. One
13
Hexter,'Introduction',pp. lxxiv-lxxviii.
Cf. Skinner,Foundations,
I, 232
3.
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
7
of Christianhumanism'scentraltenets- one withmajorimplicationsforits
- was that true
programmeof ecclesiastical,educationaland social reform
whichcharacterized
christianity
consistedinvirtuouslivingnotin theritualism
Church.Viewed in the contextof
the religionof the late-fifteenth-century
Hexterargues,the functionof the
Christianhumanistpolemics,therefore,
Utopian commonwealthis clear. It enables More to state in a highly
challengingformtheChristianhumanistpositionregardingtheessentialand
theperipheralaspectsoftheChristianreligion.Lyingbeyondtheambitofthe
a trulyChristiansocietybecause
institutional
ChurchUtopia is, nevertheless,
it is devoted to the one thingnecessary,the cultivationof virtuousliving.
on theotherhand,is a thoroughly
unchristian
society
So-calledchristendom,
because it neglectswhat is essential in the Christian religion,the lifeof virtue,
and concentratesinstead on inessential religious paraphernalia.
Superficiallythis view seems plausible. It seems less so, however, when its
implications are considered. For if,on the one hand, the Utopian community
was happily devoted to virtue and free from the ritualism of late-medieval
christianity,on the otherhand, it lacked scriptureand thesacramentson which
depended the Church's claim to be theunique source ofrevelationand ofgrace.
If, therefore,Utopia representsMore's model of true christianityit must be
accepted that he did not consider scripture,the sacraments, the cult ofJesus
himself,to be essential features of a truly Christian existence. Hexter and
Skinner seem to accept this implication since they argue that the point of
More's paradox - the authorial motive - was the assertion that virtue constituted the essence of the Christian life.14 It looks as ifsome anomaly has crept
in here, however, since Hexter's own exposition of the humanist ideology of
reformshows that it was not only virtue-orientatedbut also emphatically
christocentricand evangelical. Is it possible that the Erasmus who laboured
to produce in the same year as Utopiahis Greek New Testament - a work of
scarcely less epochal significance- could have contemplated a model of truly
Christian living which had no place in it for the New Testament or for the
historical figureofJesus Christ?
This considerationdraws attentionto the inadequacy of Hexter's exposition
of the humanist formula for the reformof religion in 1515-I6. The answer
which Erasmus gave to the 'paramount question of what constitutesa true
christian' was, according to ProfessorHexter, 'not firstand foremostto assent
to a creed, or to participate in a particular routineofpious observances; it was
to doas a Christian'.15Consequently to live virtuouslywas to be a trueChristian
even ifone knew nothingof scriptureor the historicalJesus forit was 'to have
God in Christat the bottomof [one's] heart'.16Despite itsstrongtextual echoes
is misleading for one
this statement of the Erasmian position in i5I5-i6
reason: it fails to reflectthe Platonist mould in which the humanist discussion
of Christian renewal was cast. This means that while Erasmus and More and
Christian humanists generally emphasized 'doing' as the ultimate testof true
14
Ibid.
16 Ibid. p. lxxvi.
15
Hexter,'Introduction',p. lxviii.
8
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
to be dependentupon a trueknowledge
christianity
theysaw thatpossibility
And the unique sourceof such knowledgewas the lifeand
of christianity.
it was
teachingofJesusrevealedin scripture.In thehumanistview,therefore,
notthecase thatvirtuesomehowsubsumesthechristianrevelationas ifto say
betweendeeds
'virtueis Christ'.Such a propositionpostulatesa relationship
and knowledge to which the humanists,because of theirPlatonic epistemology,
would have been quite averse. In fact,theirpropositionwas ratherthat ' Christ
is virtue', in the sense that his life and teaching reveal definitivelywhat it is
to be truly virtuous. It was in terms of this conception of the relationship
between Christian revelation and virtue that the humanist discussion of
Christian renewal took place It was on this formula that the scheme of
was built.
Erasmus's classic spiritual manual, the Enchiridionmilitischristiani,
And it was in this conviction that he undertook the Herculean labours that
led to the publication of his Greek New Testament in 15i6.17 It follows that
the virtuouspagan, even the most noble, as Erasmus explicitlystates- and the
most noble were surelythe Utopians - could never be a truechristian,lacking,
as he did, the knowledge of divine revelation that alone would enable him to
be one.18 In the light of all of this it will be clear that when More depicted
the Utopians as a community that lacked knowledge of the Christian gospel
he could never have intended them to provide a model of a trulyChristian
commonwealth, nor could it have occurred to his humanist readers to suppose
that he had.
Utopia, therefore,must be taken for what the text tells us that it is, a
non-Christian community, organized in accordance with human values as
perceived by the lightof reason. If that is what More intended to describe what
was his purpose in describingit? How, on thisreading,can Utopiabe related - as
Hexter rightlyinsiststhat it must- to the concerns of Christian humanists in
the opening decades of the sixteenthcentury?
A usefulstartcan be made by reinstatingtheso-called Catholic interpretation
which Hexter summarilydismissed in 1965 on the grounds that it 'smacks a
little too strongly of the medieval schools'.'9 This was the view that the
heathenism of the Utopians gave a double edge to More's satire on the vices
of Christian Europe. As R. W. Chambers put it in 1935, 'The underlying
save reasontoguidethem,theUtopians
thought of Utopiaalways is, "With nothing
17 For a discussionof the Enchiridion
see below, pp. Ioff. For a statementof Erasmus's
convictionofthefundamental
and unique importanceofa knowledgeof the revealedteachings
of Christforchristianlivingsee his prefaceto his editionof the New Testamentin I5I6, the
Paraclesis,
ed. J. C. Olin, Christian
humanism
andtheReformation
(London, I965), pp. 92---I06. An
EnglishversionoftheEnchiridion
is providedin TheEnchiridion
ofErasmus,
ed. RaymondHimelick
(Bloomington,
Indiana, I963).
"I For Erasmus'sdistinction
betweenthe noble pagan and the christiansee Theeducation
ofa
Erasmus
christian
ed. L. K. Born (New York, I936), p. I52. Having made thatdistinction
prince,
was nota mattermerelyofcreedor ofritualbutofvirtue.
wenton to insistthattruechristianity
theessence
thatmere(pagan) virtueconstitutes
Erasmus,therefore,
excludesboththepossibility
ofchristianity
or thatcreedand ritualdoes so, ibid. p. I53.
19 Hexter,'Introduction',p, lxxv.
MORE
ON
9
UTOPIA
dothis;andyetweChristian
Englishmen,
weChristian
Europeans.
.. .!"'20 Scholastic
thoughthisapproach may seem to Professor
Hexterto be, thefactremains
thatpreciselythesame rhetoricalploy- appealingto themoralexcellenceof
- is
pagans to shame Christiansinto a liveliersenseof theirresponsibilities
Thuswhen
exploitedincessantly
byEramusinhisEducation
ofa Christian
prince.21
the Morean paradox is takento hingeupon theheathenismof theUtopians
it functions
as a rhetoricaldevicein preciselythesame way as theappeals to
classicalantiquityin the polemicsof Erasmus,More's esteemedfriendand
collaboratorat thisperiod.It need hardlybe said thata readershipschooled
on theworksofErasmuswas alreadyconditionedto read theMoreanparadox
in this way.
It seemsclear,however,thattheparadoxwas intendedby More to operate
at a leveldeeperthanrhetoric.
As Professor
Hexterrightly
pointedout,itposed
somefundamental
questionsabout thenatureofchristianity.
What werethe
questions and, more important,what were the answers, to which More wished
to lead his readers? As we have seen, Hexter's hypothesis, that Utopia
representsa truly Christian commonwealth, asserts much more - or much
less - about the nature of christianitythan humanistswould have wished. On
the otherhand, when Utopia is taken at face value, as a communityofvirtuous
pagans, it raises preciselythe issues about the Christian lifewhich were at the
heart of the humanist scheme.
The issue which Erasmus tried to get late medieval christendomto face by
confrontingit with the lore of classical antiquity hung upon a paradox which
bears obvious affinitiesto the Utopian one. Although lacking the resourcesof
divine revelation and externally mediated grace - the sacramental system,
etc. - classical antiquity provided outstanding examples of thought and conduct in harmony with the spirit of christianity. Conversely, despite its
possession of these resources, the thought and conduct of late medieval
christendomwas far fromthe spiritof christianity.To grasp the point of the
Erasmian paradox it is necessary to bear in mind its compound character. It
was by thismeans that Erasmus succeeded in reformulatinga question which
scholasticism had already posed and apparently answered. The scholastic
answer was contained in the Thomist adage which stressedin opposition to
Augustinian teaching the mutuality of the natural and supernatural dispenThe supernatural order did not supsations: gratianontollitnaturam
sedperfecit.
plant the natural one but enabled it to achieve a perfectionthat surpassed its
inherentpossibilities.One implication of the formulawas that non-Christians,
without the guidance of revelation or the assistance of externally mediated
grace, were capable of discerning by the light of reason their natural human
perfectionand of strivingtowards it. In thisway the achievements of classical
antiquity in the sphere of morality could be explained. However, the compounded paradox which Erasmus posed, by contrastingthe vices of contem2"
21
R. W. Chambers,ThomasMore(London, I935), pp. I26-8.
pp. I48, I52,
E.g., Born (ed.), Theeducation
ofa christian
prince,
i6o, i65,
I7I--2.
10
BRENDAN_BRADSHAW
porarychristendomwith thevirtuesofclassical antiquity,invertedthe problem
which the Thomist formula had answered. At the same time it removed the
discussionfromthe speculative sphere ofontology,with its categories ofnature
and grace, and posed it in termsof the existentialrelationshipbetween religion
and morality.In thisway, the Erasmian paradox formedpart of a satire upon
contemporary religion which remorselesslyexposed the inadequacy of the
scholastic formula.22
That grace had failed to bring late medieval christendom to any kind of
perfection whatever was the point from which Erasmus's critique of late
medieval religion began. The Church's treasuryof grace had never been so
freelydispensed or so eagerly availed ofby means of those 'supernatural works'
on which he turned so jaundiced an eye. At the same time divine revelation
had never been so minutelyscrutinized by means of the scholastic dialectic
upon which he looked no less coldly. The result of all of this supernatural
industrywas to produce, in ProfessorHexter's phrase, 'louts at living'. In this
way, the invidious comparison invited by Erasmus's flauntingof the moral
rectitude of classical antiquity highlighted the ineffectualnessof grace as
dispensed by the late medieval Church. Nevertheless, to say it again, the
conclusion to which Erasmus wished to lead his readers was not that the
resourcesofgrace and revelationwere incidental to a trulyChristian existence
or that Christian perfectionconsisted in the cultivation of virtue alone. Sola
virtute
was not the response of Erasmian humanism to the moral bankruptcy
of late-medieval religion- whatever the appeal of that formula to certain
rationalist and progressivestrands in post Enlightenmentchristianity.What
then was the nature of its polemic against late medieval ritualism? No better
way of elucidating thiscould be found than by examining the teaching of the
which is generally accepted as Erasmus's classic
Enchiridionmilitischristiani,
statement on christian living, whose vogue began with the publication of its
second edition two years afterthe appearance of Utopia.
The Enchiridion,
as the preface explains, is Erasmus's treatiseon Christian
formation,on 'how to achieve a character acceptable to Christ'.23 The key
to the interpretationof the work as a whole is provided by chapter 3, where
the thesisis set forthin summaryform.Having warned theaspirant to Christian
perfectionin chapter 2 that the task involves an incessantstruggleagainst evil,
he proceeds in chapter 3 to discuss the special means - the weapons - with
which the strugglemust be conducted. These, he explains, can be reduced to
two, prayer and knowledge.24The book is mainly concerned with the way in
which prayer and knowledge relate in the formationof a Christian. In this
regard Erasmus expresses two convictions which constitutethe essence of his
22 St Thomas Aquinas,Summa
Theologica,
I, 2 ae, Q. IO9, art. I-4. For a somewhatdifferent
account of the relationshipbetweenscholastictheologyand the Erasmian polemic see the
ofErasmus'sPraiseqffolly(HarmondsIntroduction
byA. H. T. Levi to thePenguintranslation
worth,I97I), pp. I6 -32.
23 Himelick(ed.), Enchiridion,
p. 37.
24 Ibid. pp. 38-44, 47-
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
II
thesis.Firstly,he believesthat prayerand knowledgemust be wielded in
to theother.Secondly,he believesthat
conjunction;theone is indispensible
while prayeris the more powerfulof the two, it depends forfruitionon
in thelightofthemeaning
knowledge.25
All ofthisassumesspecialsignificance
thathe employsthemin
whichErasmusattachesto his terms.It transpires
a genericsense to categorizewhat seem to him to be the two fundamental
aspectsoftheChristianlife.Prayerdescribestheproperlyreligiousdimension
of christianliving,the dimensionthatpertainsto 'communicationwiththe
byAaron,
Deity'. Emphasizingitsculticcharacter,Erasmusseesitsymbolized
other
the
on
hand, is
Knowledge,
thearchetypeof theJudaic priesthoood.26
in the
because
Erasmus,
by Moses, thegiverof the law. That is
represented
in
intellectual
than
purely
rather
inmoral
regardsknowledge
Platonictradition,
categorizesthe
terms:theobjectofknowledgeis virtue.Knowledge,therefore,
moraldimensionof thechristianlife.27
In thislightit is possibleto see how the thesispresentedin theEnchiridion
relatesto thepolemicsoftheErasmianparadox. In a worldin whichreligion
and moralityseemedto have becomedivorced,Erasmusassertsan integral
attemptingto
relationshipbetweenthe two. Further,in a worldfrantically
religion
to
ground
need
the
asserts
byreligiousworkshe
achievesanctification
in moralityforsanctifyingeffect.To be trulysanctifying,he argues, religion
must proceed fromwithin,fromthe mind and heart. To secure this interiorization is precisely the function of knowledge, of moral purposefulness.
Conversely, it was precisely the failure to ground religion in morality that
explained the formal and mechanistic quality of the devotional life of the
late-medieval Church as well as the legalism and sterile intellectualism of
scholastic theology.Conducted with 'unwashed hands', withouta purification
of mind and heart, religious practice and religious reflexionremain external,
superficial,unholy. Expressed in termsof the scholastic formula,the point of
the Erasmian paradox is that grace will perfect nature onlyif nature has
disposed itself,by moral endeavour, to receive grace.
It is the polemical thrustof Erasmus's teaching which has led to the modern
cliche'about the 'unsacramental' nature of his religious position, which, in
ProfessorHexter's exposition of it, amounts to an assertion of sola virtute.28
Erasmus was concerned to restore moral endeavour to the centre of the
Ibid. pp. 46-58; see especiallyp. 47.
Ibid. p. 47.
27 Ibid. pp. 48--50, 55-7, I32. On thePlatonicconceptofknowledge
see W. K. C. Guthrie,A
philosophy
(Cambridge,I975), IV, 24I-65.
history
ofGreek
whichfinds
28 For a recentexpositionof Erasmianism
and, in particular,of the Enchiridion,
and
seeJ. K. McConica, Englishhumanists
Erasmus'sperspective'emphaticallyun-sacramental',
politics(Oxford,I965), pp. I3-43, especiallypp. I9--23: A more nuanced view is
Reformation
concludesthat'the
hisexpositionoftheEnchiridion
providedby Roland H. Bainton.Nevertheless,
theoutwardapparatus
madeforrendering
despiteall disclaimers,
thrust[ofErasmus'sdiscussion],
ofChristendom
(NewYork,I 969), p. 67. Whilstnotarguing
ofreligionsuperfluous';Bainton,Erasmus
explicitlyagainst thispositionJohn B. Payne was able to extractfromErasmus'swritingsa
generallyorthodoxtheologyof the sacraments;Payne, Erasmus:his theology
qf thesacraments
(W. E. Bratcher,I 970).
25
26
BRENDAN
12
BRADSHAW
christian life in a situation in which, as he perceived it, the role of religious
endeavour had been overstressedand misunderstood.That is not to say that
he reduced christianityto a matterof morality.On the contrary,his teaching
in the Enchiridion
was that the christianmustjourney frombondage to freedom
under the leadership not only of Moses, the symbol of morality,but also of
Aaron, the symbol of religious cult, who, Erasmus explains significantly,has
charge of the holy sacraments. Indeed he held that even the naive popular
devotions to saints, images and relics had a positive contributionto make in
the formation of a Christian.29 If, therefore,Erasmus stressed the moral
dimension of the Christian lifehis purpose was not to eliminate its religiousor
cultic aspect but to enable cult to be exercised with trulysanctifyingeffect.30
In thislightit is possible to see how Utopiafunctionedas a humanistpolemic
concerned with the reformof religion. The constraintsof the formwhich he
employed provided More witha different
perspectiveon theproblem fromthat
of Erasmus. Whereas the latter was straightforwardlyconcerned with the
perfectionof the individual as a christian,More's treatmentof the subject was
set in thecontextofa discussionofthe perfectionofthecommunityas a political
entity.However, once the differentframeworkof the discussion is allowed for,
the correspondencebetween the argumentof Utopiaand that of the Enchiridion
on the subject of christian perfectionneeds little elucidation. The categories
of prayer and knowledge by means of which Erasmus conducts his analysis are
replaced by those of reason and revelation. But the burden of the polemic
remains the same: the integral relationship between moralityand religion.
The crucial episode in this respect is the account of what happened when
the Utopians who live in accordance with reason come in contact with the
teaching of Christ. In ProfessorHexter's account the response of the Utopians
at thispoint is simplyone ofhappy recognitionthat theyare already Christian,
possessingas theydo the one necessaryqualification - virtue.3'But that cannot
29 Himelick(ed.), Enchiridion,
pp. 47, 99--I00,
III
I2.
On thissee especiallyibid. pp. IO9--Io. The allegeddualismof theEnchiridion,
withwhich
theforegoing
expositiontakesissue,is oftenrelatedto theallegeddualismofPlatonicphilosophy
fromwhichthephilosophicalframework
oftheEnchiridion
derives.Thus, thesupposedlydualistic
ofthePlatonicuniverse,
in whichsensiblereality- thevisiblematerialworld- issetover
structure
againstintelligible
reality- theunseen,conceptualizedworldofthemind- is paralleledwiththe
supposedlydualistic structureof Erasmian religion: the externalreligionof cult and the
internalized
religionofvirtue.Such a formulation
notonlymisconceives
theconceptualstructure
oftheEnchiridion:
itmisconceives
ofPlatonismalso. The sourceoftheconfusion
thestructure
seems
to be a failureto distinguish
betweenPlato's epistemology
and hisontology.His disparagement
ofexternalrealityand ofsenseexperienceoccursat theformer
level.He is notconcernedto reject
materialrealitybutratherto ensurea properknowledgeofit. He is notconcernedto rejectsense
experiencebutratherto delimititsboundariesas a sourceofknowledge.On theotherhand,the
theharmoniousand
fundamental
postulateofPlato's ontology,farfrombeingdualistic,affirms
ofthe universe.In Plato's viewexternaland internalreality,thematerialand
unitivestructure
ofthisunitivedesign.This is preciselythe
thespiritual,are functionally
relatedin thefulfilment
ofErasmusin theEnchiridion.
He is not concernedto repudiateculticreligionbut to
perspective
repudiatemisunderstandings
about it and to showhow it relatesto theinnerlifeofvirtuein the
of God's designforhuman sanctification,
W. K. Guthrie,A history
fulfilment
ofGreek
philosophy
(Cambridge,I978), V, 44I-5.
31 Hexter,'Introduction',p. lxxvii.
30
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
13
be the message which More wished to convey. What he describes is a process
of conversion: evangelization, producing intellectual assent and followed by
sacramental initiation.32If christianityhad no more to offerthe Utopians than
they already possessed, why not rest content with Utopianism - and claim
the thrustof More's
Christ as a true Utopian? Like Erasmus in the Enchiridion,
polemic led him to concentrate on the affinitybetween Utopian reason and
Christian revelation. But that he did not regard the unevangelized Utopians
as perfectChristians is obvious fromthe account of their conversion. In this
respect one incidental feature of the conversion account is revealing,
particularly so in the light of the common misconception of the humanist
position. That is the concern which Hythloday displays to make the full
sacramental system of the Church available to the Utopians after their
conversion and the eagerness which the Utopians display to avail themselves
of it.33The purpose of Utopiaas a religiouspolemic is not, therefore,to reduce
christianityto a matter of morality. Nor is it concerned to demonstrate the
congruence of reason with revelation considered in objective termsas systems
of intellectual knowledge. That was the point of St Thomas. What Utopia
considers is the relationship between the two from the subjective point of
view, i.e. in termsof theirmutual action in enabling the individual to perceive
the truth.Herein lies the significanceof the conversionepisode and the key to
the Utopian paradox. Just as moralityis a precondition of spiritualityin the
practice of religion,so it is a precondition of revelation in the understanding
of it. More makes the point in a positive and in a negative way. On the one
hand the Utopians show themselvesremarkablyopen to the teachingof Christ.
Duly allowing forthe 'mysteriousinspirationof God' - thus guarding himself
against a charge of Pelagianism - More explains this openness in termsof the
affinitybetween a way of lifelived in fidelityto reason and the christianway
revealed in the New Testament.34On the other hand, the affinitywhich the
Utopians perceive between the gospel message and theirown rational idealism
emphasizes by contrast the incongruitybetween the religious idealism of the
gospel and the sterile cerebralism of late medieval theology.
This, then,was the polemic of Christian humanism against the mechanistic
and legalistic religious practice of late-medieval christendomand against the
moral and spiritualbankruptcyofits theology.Its purpose was not to promote
a doctrine of sola virtuteor to push creed and cult to the periphery of the
Christian life.Its purpose was not to destroybut to renew: to renew Christian
cult and Christian theology by reformulating the relationship between
moralityand religion. No doubt the religious polemic of christianhumanism
as presented here will seem less radical than recent writershave conceived it
to be. On the other hand, it places Erasmus and More at a considerable
distance from the scholastics on the theology of nature and grace. Gratianon
To that proposition Utopiaand the Enchiridion
tollitnaturamsedperfecit.
respond
that DroLress towards Derfectionin the order of nature is a condition, not a
32
Yale Utopia,pp.
2I8- i9.
33
Ibid.p.
2I9.
34
Loc. cit.
14
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
consequence, of progress towards it in the order of grace. Further, to neglect
the means of perfectionin the order of nature - rational moral endeavour - is
to render ineffectual the means of perfection in the order of grace. The
distinctivenessof the humanist position is emphasized when it is set in relation
to the teaching of that contemporaryAugustinian theologian who was also to
denounce the futile religious works of the late medieval church and the
bankruptcy of its theology, but who offered a very differentcritique of
scholasticism.The opposition of Erasmus and More to the solafidedoctrine of
Martin Luitheris not to be reduced to a matterofpersonalitytraits- supineness
in the one, aggressivetraditionalismin theother.The source oftheiropposition
is to be foundin the humanist conception of the relationshipbetween morality
and religion propounded in the Enchiridion
and in Utopia.
III
The themeof Utopiais not,ofcourse,ecclesiastical reformas such but the reform
of civil society. It is in that context that the polemic forthe renewal of religion
is conducted. The problems that agitate the dialogists in book I, the problems
that book II is designed to solve, are considered in relation to the civil rather
than to the ecclesiastical organization ofsociety.Accordingly,the moral norm
to which appeal is made is thatofsocialjustice. More specifically,thediscussion
is dominated by the notion which forthe humanists,followingscholastic and
classical commentators,constituted the norm ofjustice in the sphere of civil
government,the commonwealth. To the interpretationof Utopia specifically
as a treatiseon the commonwealth it is now proposed belatedly to turn.
Our concern here is not with ProfessorHexter's brilliant exposition of the
originality of Utopia in its approach to social reform by means of social
engineering. However, two comments suggest themselves in that regard.
Firstly,ProfessorHexter seems to underplay the fact that here Utopiadid not
so much invent the concept of 'social environmentalism' as revive it aftera
lapse of some eighteen hundred years: Aristotle's attack upon the original
version,Plato's Republic,having apparently killed the notion stone dead.35 As
we shall see, that earlier battle of the gods has an important place in the
intellectual pre-historyof Utopia.36 Secondly, to point out the obvious, that
aspect of Hexter's exposition is in no way related to the hypothesisthat book
II of Utopiadescribes a Christian commonwealth. It is significant,indeed, that
the featureswhich ProfessorHexter findsmost remarkable about the Utopian
commonwealth, the features which set it apart from the general run of
humanist political treatisesand which place it on the 'margins of modernity'
derive not fromitssupposed christianitybut fromitsrationality.What enabled
More to achieve this unremittinglyrational approach if not his adherence to
the concept of a society organized by the light of reason alone?
attackon theRepublic
see Politics,
bk ii,
35 Hexter,'Introduction',pp. cv-cxxiv.
For Aristotle's
260b-I 266b, and below,n. 43.
36
See below,pp. i6 -I7.
MORE
ON
15
UTOPIA
On the otherhand, whereHexter'shypothesisabout Utopia as a model
Christiancommonwealth
doesintrudeitcontinuesto be a sourceofconfusion.
on
In the firstplace, it seemsto have producedan elementof double-think
his own part.On theone hand he presentsUtopia to us as theembodiment
ofthehighestaspirationsoftheChristianrevivaloftherenaissanceperiod.It
is a politydesignedto establishthe kingdomof Christon earth,to createa
therootsofsinand builtupon
trulyChristiansocialorderaimedat extirpating
the gospel'sgolden rule of charity,love of God and love of all men forhis
oftheUtopianethos
sake.37When,however,he comestoassessthesignificance
in the lightof later intellectualhistorythe analogy he draws relatesthe
oftheeighteenth
equals
Utopiansto thephilosophes
century:'the equationreason
of
thedeismprecariously
nature
equalsvirtue,
perchedon rationalfoundations
doubtfulsolidity,the feeble and slightlyapologetic hedonismwavering
base and the psychologicalneed
betweenthe logicalneed fora this-worldly
- and
theUtopianphilosophy
forother-worldly
sanctions
'.38 If thisrepresents
it seemsto come close enoughto the mark- it is not easy to see how it can
oftheregnum
Christi
be reconciledwithan aspirationtowardstheestablishment
as describedearlier.
is thatitnotonly
However,themostseriousobjectiontoHexter'shypothesis
as we haveseen,
misrepresents
thenatureofMore'scasewithregardtoreligion,
it withregardto socialjusticealso. Here thematter
but thatit misrepresents
itscommunism.
at issueis thecentralfeatureoftheUtopian commonwealth,
In thisregardProfessor
of
Hexter'sanxietyto demonstratethe christianity
Utopia has resultedin a failureto relatethedebateabout commonownership
to its precisecontextin the historyof Christianmoral philosophy.This is
oftheargumentmountedin Utopia
important
becausea properunderstanding
of thepositionwhichit soughtto overthrow.
dependson an understanding
ProfessorHexter sees the contextof moral thoughtin which Utopian
is setas the'theorywhichreachedChristianity
bywayofStoicism
communism
'.39 This theoryvestedtheradical
throughtheChurchFathersoflate antiquity
ownershipof the world's goods universallyin all mankind.However, it
precludedthe logical corollary,a communistsocial system,by invokingthe
doctrineof the Fall. Communismwas possibleto man only in the state of
primevalinnocence.With thecorruptionof humannaturethroughsin,and
man'sconsequentvulnerability
togreedand pride,privateownershipbecame
a necessaryfeatureof the humancondition.Like thecurtailment
of human
ofproperty
was
freedom
bymeansofpoliticalauthority,
theprivatepossession
botha punishment
forsin and a remedyforit. RelatingUtopiato thatmoral
traditionProfessor
Hextersuggeststhat,as Marx did to Hegel, More turned
thetheoryupsidedown. Utopiaarguesthatprivatepropertyis not a remedy
commonownershipattacksat sourcethe
forsin but a cause ofit. Conversely,
sinsofgreedand prideto whichprivatepossessionsgive rise.40
37
39
Hexter,'Introduction',pp. cii, civ.
Ibid. pp. cxi, cxiii.
38
40
Ibid. p. cxvi.
Loc. cit.
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
Despite the apparent neatness of the fitthe patristicargumentdoes not seem
to be the one with which the exposition of communism in Utopiais primarily
concerned. The text itselfsuggests another context which also seems more
plausibleprimafacie.The factis that the argument about communismin Utopia
is not conducted within the theological frame of referenceemployed by the
Fathers. Hythloday's antagonist - More himself- does not defend private
propertyby appealing to a divine dispensationordained as a safeguardagainst,
and a remedy for,sin. Instead, the defence is mounted at the rational level
in termswhich situate it in an intellectual tradition more immediate to the
early sixteenth-centuryhumanists. The traditionin question is the scholastic
one which derived fromSt Thomas's adaptation of the philosophyofAristotle.
With theassistanceofAristotleSt Thomas was able to formulatean explanation
of private propertyin more positive terms than the Fathers. He removed its
origins fromthe realm of sin and as a divinely ordained prophylactic to that
of reason, human experience and positive law. He accepted a radical rightof
common ownershipfounded upon natural law. But he taught that thisdid not
preclude the practical organization of the material resourcesof society on the
basis of private ownership; further,that reason, vindicated by experience,
indicated the necessityofsuch a course on threegrounds - economic incentive,
efficientproduction and social harmony. Thus, scholasticismderived fromSt
Thomas a theoreticaljustification for private property as an ordinance of
positive law, devised by the wit of man for the common good, and grounded
in reason and experience.4'
That this was the tradition of thought with which Hythloday engaged in
Utopiais clear. As mentionedearlier,More himselfset up thediscussionin those
terms.In counteringHythloday's introductoryspeech on behalf of communal
ownership More rehearsed two of the Thomistic arguments: the necessityfor
an economic incentive, and for a means of defining'mine and thine' in the
interestsofsocial harmony. In place ofthe third,theorganizational advantages
ofprivate ownership,he exploited a structuralargumentthatwas to loom large
in the course of the century, and which ultimately derived from Aristotle's
advocacy of a political elite of property-owners,namely that political order
requiressocial degree - which in turnassumes degrees ofwealth.42At the same
time Hythloday made the intellectual traditionwithinwhich he stood explicit
by aligning himselfwith Plato fromthe outset.43In thisway he set his debate
ed. A. P. D'Entreves(Oxford,I959), pp. xxxi-xxxii, I66 .75.
Aquinas:selectedpolitical
writings,
bk. vii, I329a.
Yale Utopia,p. I07. Aristotle,
Politics,
43 Yale Utopia,
pp. 10 1, 105. HexterdetachesUtopiafromthePlatonictraditionbyarguingthat
a propercommunist
at all. Commonownership
systemis notfoundin theRepublic
is thereconfined
to the Guardianclass as a meansofsegregating
themfrom'the lumpishmass', 'Introduction',
p. cx. The situationis morecomplex.As Aristotlepointedout, it was not the case that Plato
specifically
confinedcommonownershipto theGuardians.Ratherhe neglectedtospecify
whether
criticism
of theRepublic
it was to apply to theotherclassesas well. In fact,Aristotle's
proceeded
on theassumptionthatPlato envisageda fullyfledgedcommunist
bk. II, 1261 a,
system,Politics,
in theLawsspeaksofa system
I 264a. Furthermore,
Plato's own cursorysummaryoftheRepublic
inwhichcommonownership
'is putintopracticeas widelyas possiblethroughout
theentirestate',
Laws,book 5, 739. Therefore,More was in good companyin supposingthat Plato advocated
communism
as theideal systemofsocio-politicalorganization.
41
42
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
I7
withscholasticism
on theissueof communalownershipin thecontextof the
earlierdebate betweenPlato and Aristotleon the same subject.SetLinthat
context, the strategyof his argument becomes clear. His ploy was, in fact, to
appropriate the Aristotelian argument to rout the scholastics. In the Politics
Aristotledefended thestatusquoagainst Plato's communistsystemby an appeal
to reason and experience.44It was preciselyon the same basis that Hythloday
proposed to reinstatetheradical argument.In book I he sought to demonstrate,
by appealing to the experience of the European nations, that a social system
based on private wealth is not conducive to social justice, the norm of which
is the common wealth. In book II he sought to demonstrate by recourse to
reason that a systemof communal ownership is so conducive.
Once again, therefore,the polemic of Utopiais seen to depend on accepting
book II at face value as the account of a purely rational societynot of a truly
Christian one. The rational defence of common ownership in this way also
servedanotherfunctionwithinthestructureoftheUtopian polemic. Strangely,
ProfessorHexter's exposition fails to relate Utopian communism to the moral
teachingoftheNew Testament. Indeed, he is dismissiveofany such relationship
beyond a vague inspirational influence.45Apart fromany consideration of his
own hypothesisthisseems odd indeed, given the ethos of Christian humanism
from which Utopia emerged and the explicit referencesin the text itself.In
his view, therefore,Utopia has no significance for the steady tradition of
interpretationfromthe Fathers onwards which relegated the New Testament
commendation of common ownership to the category of a 'counsel of
perfection'. According to this interpretation common ownership was not
presented in the New Testament as a moral norm operative in the ordinary
conduct of human affairs.On the contrary,its function,like that of celibacy,
was to set those who practised it apart as an 'eschatological witness', i.e. a sign
of the transienceof earthlyvalues and of the realityof the transcendentones
in which man's ultimatefulfilment
lay. In fact, Utopiaposed a challenge to this
entrenchedpositionpreciselyby arguing fromreason and experience. If reason
taught that common ownership was the system of social organization most
conducive to social justice, to the common wealth, then afortiorithe teaching
of the New Testament in the matter belonged not to the sphere of Christian
asceticism but to Christian morality. That is to say, the primitiveChristian
communitydepicted in Acts,who 'held all thingsin common', representednot
a model fora spiritual elite but the systemof social organization appropriate
to the ordinary Christian community.Thus, as noted in the previous section,
the argument moves in book II of Utopiafromreason to revelation. Having
undergone the purificatoryprocess of living in fidelityto reason, the Utopians
perceive the trueimportof the New Testament teaching. And thusHythloday,
having invoked Plato in his introductory speech in book I on behalf of
communal ownership, can in his peroration in book II invoke also the
authorityof Christ.46
44
46
Aristotle,
bk ii,
Politics,
Yale Utopia,
pp. ioi,
I
105,
260b- I 264b.
243. Above,p. I 3.
45
Hexter,'Introduction',pp. cx-cxi.
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
Professor Hexter argues persuasively that the achievement of Utopia in
linkingan egalitarian social gospel to the notion ofreformby social engineering
places the work at the source of modern secular radicalism. It is no less just
to claim that Utopia'sachievement in linkingan egalitarian social gospel with
the moral teaching of the New Testament places it at the source of modern
Christian socialism.
IV
If Utopia lies at the source of these traditionsis More to be regarded as their
patriarch? That is one way of posing the problem about More's ultimate
purpose in writing Utopia with which the final sections of this study will be
concerned. As we saw at the outset, the debate on that issue has centred on
the question of whether the Utopian commonwealth is to be regarded as
idealistic or idyllic, a question which, in turn,in the post-Hexterian historiography has been formulated in terms of the nature of More's critique of
humanism. By actualizing the humanist vision of a true commonwealth in the
communistsocietyofUtopia was More endeavouring, as ProfessorSkinnerhas
it, to bring the humanists to accept the radical implications of their own
ideology; to persuade them,that the task of achieving thejust societyentailed
not simplyeducating the ruling caste in virtue but abolishing a socio-political
structurebased on degree and propped up by wealth; that forMore, therefore,
the radical structuraltransformationdescribed in book II of Utopiaprovided
' the solution - the only possible solution - to the social evils already outlined
in book I'. Alternatively,by actualizing the humanist vision in the beautiful
isle of Nowhere, was More endeavouring, as Dr Fenlon has it, to bring the
humaniststo a realization that the enterpriseof renewingsocietyby reforming
the state was an illusoryone; that, therefore,the true commonwealth of book
II provided an impossible solution in view of the dynamics of European
politics- egoism, wealth, power - laid bare in book I ?4
It will be argued here that More's ultimatepurposes in relation to Utopiaare
revealed in the same way as his immediate intentions,by the guidance which
he provides for the reader in the text itself.The relevant guidance, in the
presentinstance, is provided by the very titleof the work and by the manner
in which Hythloday, the narratorof book II, is presentedin the introductory
part of the text. By these means More indicates both a philosophical tradition
and a prototypein termsofwhich Utopiamustbe understood.The philosophical
traditionis the Platonic one and the prototypeis the original 'ideal commonwealth', Plato's Republic.Hythloday, the text stresses,is not an explorer of
places but of political formsand ideas, and his ship is Platonic philosophy.48
Like Plato he believesthathe has discovered'the bestformofa commonwealth',
the ideal Res Publica. All of this received additional emphasis in the early
editionsthroughthe prefatorycontributionsofPeter Giles in conversationwith
Skinner,Foundations,
I, 255-62.
Above,pp. 3-5.
Yale Utopia,pp. 48-5 I. For an especiallyfineelaborationof More's use ofthemetaphorof
explorationin relationto Hythlodaysee Baker-Smith,
Plato'svoyage,
pp. 4-5.
47
48
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
I9
whom, as More acknowledges, the Utopian commonwealth took shape. In his
commendatory letter to Jerome Busleiden and his pseudonymous verse in
praise ofUtopia which appeared in the early editions,Giles claims that Utopia
not merelyemulated Plato's Republic
but excelled it.49Against thisbackground
More's presentationof Utopia as 'the best formof a commonwealth' acquires
a precise philosophical connotation. What this is must be elucidated by
referenceto Plato's Republic.
Plato explains within the dialogue itself how he intends the Republicto
function as a philosophical ideal. At the outset he makes it clear that the
philosophical cityhe is about to constructbelongs to the real world, not to the
world of fantasy. He does this by agreeing, in response to objections by his
interlocutors,to abandon the project of building in the idyllic conditions he
had firstproposed and to establish his commonwealth instead in the conditions
of the actual world, a world that possessed the amenities of civilization but
which, unlike the world of the idyll, was imperfectin itself:a world of wars,
of toil, of trade, a world in which people grew old and ill.50 Yet, as the
constructionof the philosophical cityproceeds Plato is forcedto agree that the
scale of perfectionon which he is building in theorymakes his project unlikely
of implementation in practice. Neverthelesshe insistson the practical utility
ofthe exercise. This is summed up in the famous passage which concludes book
IX, the last section of the Republicproper, in which Plato refers to his
brainchild as 'a patternlaid up in heaven where he who wishes can see it and
establish it in his own heart'.5' It is clear from the discussion that precedes,
a discussion that has developed over three chapters, that we are here in the
realm of the Platonic Form or Idea, the theory fundamental to Plato's
epistemology.According to this theorythe phenomena which we apprehend
throughsense experience in the historicalworld, the world of space and time,
are partial and imperfectrepresentationsof their paradigms or ideal forms
which existin thehigherrealityoftheworld ofideas which can be apprehended
only at the level of intelligible experience.52 The Republic
is, therefore,an
attempt to describe the paradigm of the commonwealth, a paradigm to which
all temporal commonwealths relate, as the imperfectto the perfect,and which
no particular commonwealth existing in historical reality can successfully
reproduce.
Bearing in mind that forPlato the respublica- the commonwealth - was a
moral and not a formal political concept, the practical utilityof the exercise
was twofold.To establish the paradigm of the commonwealth was to establish
the criteriaby which the moral quality of existingpolitical communitiesmust
be assessed. It was also to provide the ideal ofajust societyto which all existing
political communities must aspire and which their structuresmust seek to
enshrine. Thus in the Laws, when Plato faced the task of providing a
49
50
51
52
Yale Utopia,pp. 20- I .
Plato,Republic,
bk. II, 372-4. Guthrie,History
ofGreek
philosophy,
IV,446-9.
bk v, 47I-4, bk VI, 498, bk Ix, 592; Guthrie,loc. cit. pp. 483-6.
Plato,Republic,
Guthrie,ibid. pp. 338-65, 503 2I.
20
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
constitution
fora proposednewstate,he began byrecallingtheperfect
model
oftheRepublic
and enunciatedtheprinciplethatthetaskof theconstitutionmakerwas to framea set of laws and institutions
designedto establisha
commonwealth
thatwouldapproximateas nearlyto theparadigmas existing
conditionswould allow.53
Set in thisphilosophicalcontextneitherthethesisofSkinnernorofFenlon
seemsadequate. It is true,as thelatterargues,thatUtopia is Nowhere.That
is not to say,however,thatit belongsto a fantasyworldofidyllicperfection,
to theworldof historicalreality.Undoubtedly,
remotefromand indifferent
itcan have no existence
as a paradigm,as 'the bestformofa commonwealth',
in thehistoricalworld,theworldofsenseexperience.It belongsin therealm
ofideas. Nevertheless,
More likePlato constructs
hisphilosophicalcityin the
midst of 'real life': in the world of wars, of toil, of business,of illness and old
age. The name Utopia, therefore, serves to associate the work with a
philosophical genre,the Platonic paradigm, not with a literaryone, the idyll.
It follows that the purpose of More in contrastingthe ideal commonwealth
of book II with the world ofjungle politics depicted in book I was not, pace
Fenlon, to assert the futilityof the ideal in the light of the reality. On the
contrary,the utilityofbook II lay preciselyin providinga contrast.It provided
a standard by which to judge and a model by which to reformthe political
practice depicted in book I.
On the other hand, it followsalso that the purpose of the contrastforMore
was not,pace Skinner,to assertthe futilityof any othermeans shortof the ideal
by which to reformthe reality.Utopia was 'the best formofa commonwealth'.
As such its functionwas not to stipulate the essential preconditionsforreform
but to indicate what reformmightideally achieve. Book II, therefore,did not
represent'the only possible solution... forthe social evils depicted in book I'.
It representedthe best possible solution for them.54However, on the way to
Utopia Hythloday encountered other commonwealths which were in some
degree imperfectbut which, nevertheless,contained 'not a littleon which to
model the reformof our own cities,nations, peoples and kingdoms'. Thus, the
constitutionof the Polyleritesprovided a model of ajust criminal system; that
of the Achorians a means of safeguarding against the baneful consequences
of dynastic ambition; that of the Macerians - significantly,'a people not very
far from Utopia' - a way to curb royal avarice.55 Like Plato in The Laws,
Hythloday in book I of Utopia shows a readiness to commend the virtues of
second best which ProfessorSkinner fails to take into account when analysing
the notion of Utopian reform.Such an analysis must indeed provide for the
Plato, Laws,bk V, 739.
in hisprefatory
Erasmusmade precisely
thispointabout theRepublic
letterto the2ndedition
humanism
andtheReformation,
ed. JohnC. Olin (London,
forwhichsee Christian
oftheEnchiridion,
I965), p. I22. Again, Castiglionepresentshis courtieras a Platonic ideal, and he justified
ed. George Bull
the exercisein similartermsto thoseused by Plato, The bookof thecourtier,
(Harmondsworth,
I976, orig. I967), pp. 35-6. It is clear that thiswas the commonhumanist
of thefunctionof the'ideal type'.
understanding
pp. 54-5, 74-5, 88-9, 96-75 Yale Utopia,
53
54
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
21
radical thrustwhich the Utopian concept of reformacquires fromthe absolute
moral criteria it brings to bear, fromthe perfectionon which it insistsas an
ideal, and fromthestrategyofsocial engineeringwhichitemploys.Nevertheless,
true to the Platonic mould in which it was formulated the Utopian concept
of reformcombines its moral idealism and its radical thrustwith a calculated
pragmatism which is no less essential to the concept. For it is this readiness
to take account of the necessary imperfectionof the human condition while
urging the possibilityof progress that ultimatelydistinguishesUtopia as an
ideal and not an idyll.
V
It would seem from the foregoingthat More was committed.to the concept
of reformfor which Utopia stands. However, adherence to the interpretative
method employed in this study suggestsone final difficulty.It is necessary to
consider the significanceof the fact that More placed himselfin opposition
to the advocate of Utopia, Raphael Hythloday, on the two issues which serve
to frame the dialogue as a whole, i.e. the 'problem of counsel' and Utopian
communism. It is necessary to consider, therefore,whether Utopia offersa
critique of Utopianism within the text itself.
Professor Skinner dismisses this possibility by appealing once again to
Morean irony.56Ironically, he does so in order to protect Utopia'scritique of
humanism. He point out that Hythloday's steadfastrepudiation of the role of
princelycounsellor as well as his steadfastvindication of Utopian communism
ofhumanistpolitical literature.To take More's
set Utopiaoutside the mainstream
opposition to Hythloday on these issues seriouslywould seem to reduce him
and his work to humanist conventionality.
Leaving consideration of the question of communism until later, it may be
said at any rate that to rescue More on the subject of princelycounselling in
this way is hardly satisfactory.Firstly, the appeal to irony has no textual
warrant, which in itselfsuggests that More intended his observations to be
taken literally.Secondly, the ironic interpretationrescueshim fromScylla only
to forfeithim to Charybidis. For while More was supposedly denouncing royal
service in the loftymoral tones of Raphael Hythloday, he was in practice
ensconcinghimselfin officeunder Henry VIII - a turnin More's career which
ProfessorHexter does not hesitate to treat as the fall of a prophet.57In fact,
however, by accepting More's criticismof Hythloday at face value, the text
is found to yield an interpretationwhich both rescues More frominconsistency
and Utopiafromconventionality.
ProfessorSkinner'sformidablecommand of the textsof renaissance political
literature enables him to show the uniqueness of Hythloday's stand in the
context of the humanist discussion of princelycounselling.58However, having
situated Hythloday's argument ideologically, Skinner's contextual analysis
56
58
I, 218,
Skinner,Foundations,
I, 2I3-2
Skinner,Foundations,
259.
I.
57
civ-cv.
Hexter,'Introduction',pp. lxxxiv-xcii,
22
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
surprisingly
failsto situateit philosophically.
Surprisingly,
because the text
itselfdoes so explicitly.Like the notionof Utopia itself,the Utopian debate
in Plato's Republic.
on the problemof counselfindsits philosophicalreferent
A comparisonof the two revealsthatifHythloday'sstand is unique in the
It is, in fact,a
contextof the humanistdiscussion,it is not unprecedented.
restatement
oftheclassicalPlatonicargument.When More soughtto invoke
Plato on behalfof thenotionofprincelycounsellingHythlodaywas quick to
ofthatrolewasstrictly
mentor'scommendation
pointoutthathisphilosophical
conditionalupon the existenceof a consensusbetween the philosophercounsellor and the ruler.59
Plato's argument was firstlythat in any other circumstance, involvement
would prove futile. Unless government shared the moral values and the
rational approach of the philosopher it would not, because it could not, apply
his advice. To offerit would do thecommonwealth no good. Secondly, it would
do the philosopher harm. It would divert him to no purpose fromintellectual
pursuits,and it would be bound to compromise his moral integrity.In order
to findcommon ground with thosein high places who did not share his outlook
he would be obliged to conduct himself as a politician rather than as a
philosopher, which would mean deviating fromthe strictpath of reason (i.e.
truth)into 'mere' sophistryand 'empty' rhetoric.This, then,was the dilemma
of the Platonic philosopher. Morally and intellectually he was uniquely
equipped to participate in government but he was precluded fromdoing so
while governmentwas dominated by thefalsevalues and the cosmeticmethods
of politics. For Plato the resolution of that dilemma would be achieved only
when philosophersbecame rulersor rulersbecame philosophers.60The public
role of the philosopher meanwhile was to strive for moral and intellectual
change by propagating knowledge of the truephilosophy- hence The Republic.
Against this background Hythloday's stance on the problem of counsel needs
no elucidation. He perfectlyembodies the Platonic position: the intellectual
committed to the cause of social justice who neverthelessrefusedto place his
expertiseat the serviceof governmentbecause he can see no room formorality
and rationalitywhere government is directed to political ends; self-interest,
power and wealth. As he pointed out, the public dutyofthe intellectualin these
circumstances is to strive for a change in mentality by propagating his
ideas - hence Utopia.6'
More's criticismof this stance must be seen in relation to the conventional
humanist criticismof it. Here the soft-centrednature of the humanist ideology
is revealed. The conventional humanist response to the problem of counsel
59
60
Yale, Utopia, pp. 86--7.
an earlystatement
represents
bk VI, 497-502.
The discussionin theRepublic
Plato,Republic,
of Plato's repudiationof rhetoricand politicalactivityagainstIsocratesand the Sophists.His
in theGorgias
in moreconsidered
and finallyreiterated
positionwas to be putevenmortforcefully
philosophy,
IV, 4I2-I7.
Guthrie,History
ofGreek
tonesin thePhaedrus;
61 Yale Utopia,
pp. 87, I07. In his treatmentof thisepisode Baker-Smithdoes not seem to
appreciatethe relevanceof the debate about philosophy,rhetoricand politicsin the Republic;
pp. I6--I7.
Baker-Smith,
Plato'svoyage,
MORE
ON
U'FOPIA
23
in favourofa naiveconfidencein
entaileda repudiationofPlato's scepticism
alliancebetweenreasonand eloquenceto bring
thepowerofa reconstituted
the politicalbeast to heel- therebyresolvingthe intellectual'sdilemmaby
refusingto acknowledgeits existence.While humanistdiscussionsof the
questionoftenstressedthe corruptingpowerof politicstheydid so only to
powerofcounsel,i.e. philosophymediatedthrough
magnifythereformative
eloquence.62Castiglionemaintainedthat by means of wise counselvicious
rulerswould be broughtto virtue,virtuousones would be protectedfrom
withPlato thatthe
ThomasStarkeyurgedthatinsteadofpresuming
flatterers.
timeswere unpropitiousforenteringgovernmentthe intellectualought to
presumethemto be opportune,and thiswould,indeed,proveto be thecase.63
the Platonicdilemma
The noveltyof More's positionlay in confronting
whichconventionalhumanismrefusedto faceand in resolvingit in favourof
politicalinvolvement.More's criticismof the Platonicstanceis graphically
conveyedbyhisuse ofthemetaphoroftheshipofstateuponwhichPlato had
also drawn.What good can theskillednavigatordo, askedPlato,ifthecrew
willnotacknowledgetheneed forhisexpertisebutstruggleto gain controlof
in orderto pillage thecargo?64In contrast,More used
thehelm themselves
moralresponsibilities
themetaphorin a waythatemphasizedtheintellectual's
in
terms.'You
utilitarian
problem
whichPlato had obscuredby posingthe
you cannot
in
a
'because
he
declared,
storm',
mustnot abandon the ship
the
the
towards
moral
of
intellectual
obligation
controlthe winds'.65The
of
More's
case
in
essence
againstHythloday.
commonwealthwas, fact,the
Despite the personal inconvenience, despite the apparent futility,'nothing
more pertained to the duty of a good man than to serve the commonwealth'.66
Thus, More argued, Hythloday (Plato) claimed a freedomofchoice regarding
62
The cultivation
ofeloquence,as ofgoodletters,
was,ofcourse,a majorfeatureofthehumanist
revivalof rhetoric.The deeplyfeltconvictionabout the mutualityof eloquence and wisdom
derivedfromCicero. He had attemptedto harmonizerhetoricand philosophyfollowingtheir
betweenSocrates-divisionintoseparateand competingdisciplinesas a resultofthecontroversy
and
Plato and theSophists;Cicero,De Oratore,
especiallybk III, 52-73; JerroldE. Seigel,Rhetoric
philosophy
inRenaissance
humanism
(Princeton,I 968), passim:attention
mightbe drawn,incidentally,
ofthisconsideration
forrecentattemptstoidentify
hereto theimplications
Hythlodayas Erasmus.
In hiscommitment
toeloquenceand goodletters,
and in hisconviction
as totheirpublicutility- as
instruments
ofpublicreform
by persuasiveratherthancoercivemeans- Erasmuswas nothingif
nota Ciceronion.The anti-rhetorical
stanceofHythlodayis hardlyone withwhichhe wouldhave
sympathized.As to his attitudetowardsroyalservicein the precisehistoricalcircumstances
of
thatMore sensedErasmus'sdisapprovalof his decisionto enterservice
1515-1i6, thesuggestion
is based on thenecessarily
problematicevidenceofsilence.Againstit,thepositiveevidenceis of
Erasmus'sexpresseddelightat the prospectof humanistsfloodinginto the princelycouncilsof
Europe,and ofhishope,in consequence,forthedawningofthelongedforgoldenage. And,after
all, he became a royal councillorhimselfto the youngCharlesV, The epistles
ofErasmus,ed.
F. M. Nicholls(3 vols.,London, I90I-18), II, 4I2-2I; III, 45-7, 379-86, 42I-3.
63 Thebookofthecourtier,
Pole
ed. Bull,pp. 264-5. Thomas Starkey,A dialogue
between
Reginald
and ThomasLupset,
ed. K. M. Burton(London, I948), p. 38. Starkeysurvivedjust long enough
BrendanBradshaw,'The Tudor Commonwealth:reformand
to registerhis disillusionment;
XXII (1979), 467- 8.
revision', Historical
Journal,
64 Plato, Republic, VI,488.
65 Yale Utopia,
pp. 98-9.
bk
66 Ibid. pp. 56-7, 86-7.
BRENDAN
24
BRADSHAW
public servicewhich,morallyspeaking,the intellectualdid not possess.His
second criticismrelated to the inadequacy of Plato's conceptionof the
intellectual'srole.Givenunfavourable
conditionsit was as muchhis business
to endeavourto keeptheshipafloatas it was,in othercircumstances,
to speed
it towards its destination.Even if conditionswere not right for the
implementation
of Utopian schemes,the intellectualcould stillperforman
importantpublic service by contrivingto minimizethe consequencesof
irreformable
abuses: 'that whichyou cannotturnto good,so to orderit that
it be notverybad'.6 Thus, thedutyoftheintellectualto publicserviceand
thefunctionassignedto himin thatregardforcedhimto riskthehazardsof
ofthePlatonicstanceshowshow
More's thirdcriticism
politicalinvolvement.
fullyhe accepted the implicationsof his argument.Plato's fundamental
objectionto politics,as we saw, sprangfromhisdisdainforthetechniquesof
and rhetoric
- whichwereconcernedwithcosmetics,
with
politics- sophistry
illusion,insteadofthetruthto whichrationalphilosophyresolutely
adhered.
In, perhaps,the only passage in his debate withHythlodaywhichconveys
a realsenseofirritation
More inveighsagainstthisattitude.He scornstheuse
ofphilosophicalarguments
on politicians.He insistsinsteadon a 'morepolitic'
method.Anditisclearfromhisdescription
ofit- 'a philosophy
thatrecognizes
and adaptsitself
totheoccasion'- thathe hasin mindthemethodsofsophistry
and rhetoricwhichPlato spurned.Once again he justifieshis argumentby
appealingto theoverriding
claimsof thecommonwealth.
For, he urges,it is
onlybyrespecting
theconstraints
ofpoliticsand workingwithinthemthatthe
intellectualcan hope to achieveanythingforthecommonwealth
by meansof
his politicalinvolvement.68
The issuein the.debatebetweenMore and Hythloday,therefore,
concerns
the possibility
While More
of pragmaticpoliticsforthe Utopian reformer.
rejectsconventionalhumanistoptimismabout thecapacityoftheintellectual
themoralwastelandof politicsinto an environment
to transform
propitious
he also rejectsthealternativeproposedby theclassic
to radicalsocial reform,
to radicalsocial
radicalintellectual,
Plato,to opt out ofpolitics.Commitment
in
transformation the long term does not relieve the intellectualof the
responsibility
of strivingto amelioratethe situationin the shorttermby
in
engaging pragmaticpolitics.It followsthatwhenMoreenteredroyalservice
againstHythloday'sadvice in I5I6 he was not, as Professor
Hexterhas it,
succumbingto temptation.
it.69
Rather,he was resisting
In thelightoftheforegoing
Professor
Skinner'sdismissalof More's second
criticism
ofHythlodayseemslesspersuasivethanmightotherwisehave been.
If More's criticism
in the firstcase turnsout to be seriousafterall one finds
Skinner
oneselfless attunedto the note of 'desperateirony'whichProfessor
68
Ibid. pp. Ioo--IoI.
Ibid. pp. 96--IOI.
In thislightit is possibleto agree withProfessor
Elton that More enteredpublic service
willingly,thoughthisdoes not imply,as ProfessorElton tendsto argue, that he did so with
enthusiasm,G. R. Elton,'Thomas More Councillor',Studiesin TudorandStuartgovernment
and
politics(2 vols, Cambridge,I974), 1, I29-54.
67
69
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
25
detectsin thesecond.On theotherhand, to takeMore seriouslywouldseem
to involvehim in a frontalassaultupon the notionof Utopian reformsince
the object of his criticismin thiscase is commonownershipon which the
entireUtopian edificeis reared.
ProfessorSkinner'scase is based on the formwhich More's objectionto
commonownershipfinallytakes. Reflectingon Hythloday'sdescriptionof
Utopia in one of the concludingpassages of book II More notes that a
communistsystem'utterlyoverthrowsall the nobility,magnificence,splendour
and majestywhich are, in the estimationofthe common people, the trueglories
and ornaments of the commonwealth'.70 Now, since Utopia as a whole is
devoted to exposing the illusory nature of these so-called glories, Professor
Skinner argues that More's objection is not intended as an objection at all but
as a way of ironically endorsing the Utopian system which discards such
illusions.71 The difficulty
with thisexplanation is that it ignores the restof the
passage in which the observation about communism is made. More's remark
occurs in the course ofa long reflexionin which he indicates reservationsabout
quite a number of featuresof the Utopian system: the method of waging war,
ceremonial, religion, institutions.If the objection to Utopian communism is
ironic thenall the otherobjections mustbe ironic also. But thereis no indication
of thisin the text.It seems more reasonable to interpretthe passage as a whole,
therefore,as an indication of More's serious reservationsabout the ideal system
which Hythloday has just outlined. On that basis it is possible to place quite
a different
constructionon More's criticismofcommunism,one associated with
his earlier endorsementof pragmatic politics.
In this connexion the political perspectivefromwhich More offershis final
comment on Utopian communism is worthy of note. It is highlighted by
contrasting that criticismwith the case against communism propounded by
him when Hythloday firstcommended it in book I. By the end of book II two
of More's three objections have disappeared, the Thomistic ones concerning
the need of an economic incentive and of a means of apportioning use in the
interestsof social harmony. His criticismnow restsentirelyon the jeopardy
of removing the prop of political order: total equality would eliminate 'the
authorityof magistratesand respect for theiroffice
'.72 Therefore,by the end
of book II More seems satisfiedthat Hythloday has overthrownthe scholastic
case. Nevertheless, private property is the prop of the existing political
structure,and the practical man of affairs- the role in which More casts
himself in the dialogue - must consider the implications of the theoretical
argumentin the lightofexistingcircumstances.If,in theexistingstateofthings,
political order is maintained by social deference,the feasibilityof removingthe
basis of social deferencemust be questioned. From this point of view the fact
that the 'common estimation' was based on illusion is irrelevant. To put it
another way: Utopian communism seems to assume that society at large will
70
71
72
Yale, Utopia,pp. 244-51, 259, Cf. Hexter,'Introduction',pp. I-liv.
Skinner,Foundations,
Yale, Utopia,pp. I06--7, 244- 5. Above,p. i6.
26
BRENDAN
BRADSHAW
respond to radical reformwith the political maturityofHythloday himselfand
his few humanist colleagues. This is an assumption that the pragmatic
politician must question.73 Thus, despite More's delight in Hythloday's
burstingof the bubble of chivalryit does not followthat his reservationsabout
its disintegrationwere purely ironic.
However, the really important question is not what these final remarkson
Utopian communism mean forMore's view of private propertybut what the
concluding reflexionin which theyoccur means forthe interpretationof Utopia
as a whole. If ProfessorSkinner is correct the work ends with a resounding
endorsement of Hythloday's views. In that case it corresponds nicely to its
Platonic prototype. Utopia,like The Republic,
reaches a definitiveconclusion
regarding the nature of the ideal commonwealth. It is quite clear, however,
from the way Utopia ends that, unlike The Republic,the dialogue has not
concluded: it has simplybroken off.Having registeredhis mental reservations
about Hythloday's ideal commonwealth, More closes the conversation by
remarkingon the need for furtherreflexionand discussion on the matter in
hand. The conclusion is in keeping with the nature of the Utopian dialogue as
a whole. Unlike The Republic,the interlocutorsdo not exist simply to raise
spurious objections to be crushed by the inexorable logic of Hythloday's
argument.74The debate of book I like that of book II breaks off without
resolution.
The open-ended quality of the Utopian dialogue draws attentionto the real
ironyof More's finalcritical reflexionand to an aspect of Hythloday's polemic
which tends to be ignored. It is oftenoverlooked that Hythloday's peroration
in praise of the content of Utopian reformat the end of book II is matched
by a perorationin praise of the mentalityofUtopian reformat the end of book
I. 'This trait', he declares, 'is the chiefreason why, though we are inferiorto
them neither in brains nor in resources, their commonwealth is more wisely
governed and more happily flourishingthan ours'.75 The trait on which
Hythloday lavished such praise was the manner in which the Utopians
responded to new ideas. It was a response that combined criticaljudgement
with openness to change. The eagerness with which the Utopians picked the
brains of Hythloday and his companions was one manifestationof thiscritical
open-mindedness, as was the manner in which they had earlier availed
themselvesof the knowledge brought to them by some Roman and Egyptian
73 A precisely
parallelcase occursin ThomasStarkey'sDialoguebetween
Reginald
PoleandThomas
Lupset,
written
somefifteen
yearsafterUtopia.A longdiscussionaboutthebestformofgovernment
concludesthata systemofelectivemonarchyis mostappropriateto a community
'governedand
ruledby civilorderand reasonablelife,accordingto theexcellentdignityofthenatureofman'.
in England,and considering
On theotherhand,itis also concludedthatin existingcircumstances
oftheexistingsystemofhereditary
theturmoilthata changewouldbe likelytoprovoke,retention
is a morepracticableproposition.
CardinalPole makesthepointexplicitly
monarchy
Nevertheless,
thatto defendthestatusquoas thelesserof two evilsis not to maintainthatit is good in itself;
Thomas Starkey,Dialogue,pp. 99--105.
74 The samepointis made,and attention
in Baker-Smith,
drawnto itsCiceronianantecedents,
Plato'svoyage,
p. 12.
75 Yale, Utopia,
pp. io8 9.
MORE
ON
UTOPIA
27
travellersthrown upon their shores by chance.76 Indeed, Hythloday himself
perfectlyembodied this attitude in his qualified approval of the political
arrangementswhich he encounteredin the course ofhis philosophical voyage to
Utopia. That we are here concerned with a major polemic of the work is clear
from the way in which Hythloday emphasizes the closed and hidebound
mentalitywhich he observed everywherein the west,as well as by the factthat
Peter Giles, More's historicalcollaborator, drew attentionto it in his prefatory
verse that appeared in the early editions of Utopia.77
The message thus conveyed is clear. Reformin Utopia was notjust a 'once
forall' exerciseconducted by King Utopus. Rather it was a continuous process
made possible by the readiness of the Utopians to respond criticallyand yet
receptivelyto new ideas. The ironyof More's concluding critical reflexionon
Utopia is that it shows that he had learned the lesson well enough to apply
it to the teachings of the master himself.However, in view of the role which
More plays throughoutthe dialogue - that of the practically minded man of
affairs- the message has stilla deeper implication forthoseconcerned with the
reformof the commonwealth. It is that the possibilityofconstructivesocial and
political progressresidesneitherin the moral idealism of the intellectual alone
nor in the sceptical pragmatism of the politician, but in a constructiveand
continuing dialogue between the two.78
Ibid. pp. Io8-9, i8o-i.
Ibid. pp. i8-i9, 54-5, 58-9.
78 See DennisH. Wrong,Skeptical
formuchthesamethesisarguedfroma verydifferent
sociology,
demandsa continuing
explorationat thetheoretical
namelythatsteadysocialprogress
standpoint,
the'tragedythat
levelof'the limitsofthepossible',balanced by a scepticismthatcomprehends
is inherentin humanaspirationsand our inabilityto realizeideals'.
76
77