Tobin, Bell, Whiteford and Montz: Relocation Park Vulnerability
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August 2006, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 271–299
Examining the National Response Plan in Response to a
Catastrophic Disaster: Hurricane Katrina in 2005
Naim Kapucu
Department of Public Administration
University of Central Florida
HPA II Suite 238M,
Orlando, FL 32816-1395
USA
[email protected]
Over the years, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the
National Response Plan (NRP) have reflected policy learning
and changes that result from disasters. Since its initial release
in 1992 the FRP was amended twice then replaced by the NRP
in 2004. In the past, revisions to these plans have occurred in
response to Hurricane Andrew and the September 11 terrorist
attacks. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the state of
U.S. emergency management has been widely questioned. This
article examines developments in NRP and its implementations
in response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 from collaboration
and partnership perspectives. Information was collected from
a variety of print and electronic sources for the study.
Key Words: National Response Plan, disaster response, Hurricane
Katrina, catastrophic disaster, National Incident Management
System
Introduction
After 9/11, emergency management reached a high level of
salience in the US. Understandably, the focus tended to be on the
prevention of terrorism and, to a far lesser extent, on preparing for
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the consequences of terrorist attacks. We may begin to see attempts
to refocus efforts to be more inclusive of natural disasters, even
though terrorism will remain the “hot button” issue for years. We
might begin to see a renewed debate on the National Response Plan
(NRP), but suspect that the basic intergovernmental framework
shall remain intact. Slow Federal government response hampers the
ability of local, state and federal governments to work together in a
highly collaborative manner, at least in the early stages of a disaster.
A structural change in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may have
little impact on such events, unless there is some change to the
underlying, enabling legislation supporting emergency management
operations, accompanied by a more intensive education campaign
focused at senior political leaders at all levels.
Emergency operating centers, communications, healthcare
systems, and a host of other preparations, particularly training, are
crucial to fit state and local governments into a national response and
recovery system when catastrophic disasters occur (simultaneously
or in sequence). Catastrophic disasters include those events when
supply chains break down or are so seriously disrupted that our
traditional pattern of relying on the rest of the nation to generate
the capacity for supporting the stricken area(s) fails. Training
should extend en masse to the private-sector so that the emergency
manager’s disaster training, mitigation, planning, response, early
recovery and extended recovery will not make the kinds of seemingly
minor mistakes that cascade into huge impacts which imperil the
economic, societal, cultural, and political recovery from a disaster
(Lampen 2002; Fordham 1999; Perry and Nigg 1985).
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, much has changed
for emergency responders and emergency managers in the US. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 significantly revised the national
approach to terrorism and all other emergencies. It created the
DHS, which absorbed the much smaller FEMA. Suddenly, FEMA’s
mission of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery was
open to challenge and revision as a result of new money flowing
to this area. FEMA has historically been the coordinating agency
against all types of hazard (Waugh 2000). For DHS, previous
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emphasis on preparation for “all hazards” emergency preparedness
and response fell out of favor. Funding decisions illustrate that
traditional emergency management priorities take a back seat to
terrorism. In 2004, Federal grants supporting states’ antiterrorism
plans had jumped to more than $3 billion from $221 million in
2001. During the same period, FEMA’s principal grant program to
state and local emergency management, Emergency Management
Performance Grants (EMPG), was cut by Congress (at White House
urging) by some $90 million, to $180 million. For 2005, the budget
for EMPG was cut by an additional $9 million, and the focus of the
program was shifted towards terrorism (Selves and Braddock 2004).
Emergency management professionals have voiced that the current
EMPG funding is not adequate for strong state and local emergency
preparedness efforts. In a survey conducted by the Emergency
Management Association, EMPG funding is $264 million below
what it should be (Latham 2005).
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the state of emergency
management has been questioned in the US. While much of the
frustration is aimed at DHS/FEMA, much of it is misdirected (Walker
2006). Much of the frustration deals with the manner in which local,
state, and federal agencies interact in the framework of the NRP. Much
of the criticism appears to revolve around federal agencies’ inability
to be immediately available to coordinate the emergency response
activities. Other federal and state officials pointed to Louisiana’s
failure to measure up to national disaster response standards, noting
that the federal plan advises state and local emergency managers
not to expect federal aid for 72 to 96 hours, and base their own
preparedness efforts on the need to be self-sufficient for at least that
period. However, the first breakdown occurred at the local level. The
primary responsibility for dealing with emergencies does not belong
to the federal government. It belongs to local and state officials who
are charged by law with the management of the crucial first response
to disasters. First response should be carried out by local and state
emergency personnel under the supervision of the state governor
and his/her emergency operations center.
The article examines the following questions: What are the major
developments in the federal emergency response plans in the U.S.?
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How can FEMA be reconstituted and empowered within DHS so
it has not lost its coherence or pre-DHS jurisdiction and funding
programs? How can National Incident Management System (NIMS)
training be improved to ensure that state and local governments
are able to implement the NRP? What portions of the NRP were
not implemented, or improperly implemented during Hurricane
Katrina? How effective was the coordination of federal, state, local,
nonprofit, and private agencies, as outlined by the NRP, in response
to Hurricane Katrina? For this research, information was collected
from a variety of print and electronic sources including newspapers,
and government reports and documents. To compose a timeline
and description of Hurricane Katrina, a number of sources were
consulted, including online news articles and governmental agency
websites, such as NASA, DHS, the National Climatic Data Center
and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Data was also
collected from reports issued by private nonprofit organizations,
such as America’s Second Harvest. This article focuses on the
extent of policy lesson-learning in the emergency response plans
and compares the Federal Response Plan (1993 and 1999) and the
NRP. The article also examines the implementation of the NRP in
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Theoretical Background and Conceptual Framework
Catastrophic disasters pose an extraordinary test for public
agencies. Such incidents require coordination of actions among
multiple organizations, and require integration of multiple
agencies and jurisdictions into a functioning response system.
Reliable performance of emergency response systems depends
upon coordination among agencies and jurisdictions; coordination
depends upon capacity for information search, information exchange
and absorption of information (Weick and Sutliffe 2001; Comfort
1999). Elinor Ostrom (1998) explores the concept of collective
action and learning among organizations in dynamic environments.
Using the concept of self-organization and learning by a single actor
as an initial point of action, Ostrom observes that these processes of
learning and adaptation extend to a set of interacting organizations
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and agencies. These interactions are critical to understanding the
dynamics of complex systems, such as those characteristic of disaster
responses environments.
In the 21st century, complex problems—such as poverty, the
AIDS pandemic—have emerged and with them the proliferation of
collaborative efforts using any available resources to attack them.
Problems at this scale are outside the scope of any one agency and
require interaction for successful response (Wise and Nader 2002;
Kettl 2004). When an incident like Hurricane Katrina occurs, blame
is often placed on the local government, suggesting they were
completely responsible for system failures and actions that would
have strengthened system robustness. The emergence of the new
governance approach that combines the practices of traditional
government with market driven approaches of the private sector
and the resourcefulness of non-profit organizations (Agranoff
2004) questions this assumption. Blending the strengths and needs
of all levels of government agencies, and other sectors has created
a move from reliance upon a highly centralized, hierarchical
control mechanism to equally contributive growth mechanisms.
Subsequently, public managers must adapt their management styles
to include the skills needed to manage coordination and collaboration
efforts of emergency management in networked environments.
The growing number of horizontal relationships is a result of
complex issues requiring the use of management tools that fall
outside of the boundaries of the traditional vertical relationship
(O’Toole 2000). Organizations tasked with addressing issues that
have great scope, affect a large population, or require an immense
amount of resources have crossed traditional hierarchical boundaries
to collaborate with other public, private, nonprofit organizations,
and the media. The multi-level, multiple agency, boundary-spanning
activities organizations use to coordinate and implement their
programs are representative of this shift in governance. To a further
degree, multi-level coordination emphasizes “power-sharing between
levels of government with no center of accumulated authority…The
relations are characterized by mutual interdependence on each
others’ resources, not by competition for scarce resources” (Smith
2003, p. 619).
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The intergovernmental relations can be utilized to identify better
ways to respond to disaster situations. Agency leaders may redefine
their policy boundaries, their views about the role of government,
the interdependence between levels of government, public and
private interdependence, and their focus on performance. Networks
are emerging as a model of service delivery that incorporates loosely
formed associations of voluntary organizations. These networks are
“based on shared values, trust, solidarity or consensus” (Wollmann
2003, p. 595) and bargaining and negotiating are treasured qualities
(Agranoff 2004). In the following section, development of the NRP
from FRP will be presented in detail, answering one of the research
questions. It is also added to contribute to the relatively small body
of detailed scholarly documentation of the changes from federal
response to NRP.
From Federal Response Plan to National Response Plan
Fragmentation and lack of coordination has plagued the U.S.
emergency management system for years. In 1969, after Hurricane
Camille devastated the Gulf Coast, the outcry over the slow response
prompted the creation of an emergency management agency that
eventually evolved to become FEMA in 1978. Until the creation
of FEMA, emergencies were managed by seven federal agencies
(Waugh 2000). Depending on the nature of the disaster or emergency,
over 100 federal agencies would be involved. FEMA, authorized as
an independent federal agency in 1979, was intended to coordinate
emergency management functions among federal agencies. The
Federal Response Plan (FRP) was originally released in 1992; the
creation was triggered by Hurricane Hugo in 1989 (Harrald 2006;
Rubin and Harrald 2006; NAPA 1993). FRP was an all-hazards plan
that addressed the aftermath of a natural or human-made disaster—
any incident that would permit federal action as provided by The
Stafford Act of 1988. This 1988 Act gives the federal government
the authority “to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to
provide assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety,
and property” (FEMA 1992, p. 1). The main purpose of the FRP was
to provide a structured, coordinated response to support the efforts
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of state and local governments. Assistance provided by Federal
agencies is meant to supplement the actions of State governments.
The FRP provides fundamental assumptions and policies; as well
as an interagency coordination mechanism to facilitate the immediate
delivery of Federal response assistance. It identifies twelve Emergency
Support Functions (ESFs); each is headed by a primary agency,
and assisted by support agencies. ESFs are categories of Federal
response assistance that are most likely to be needed in preparation
or response to a disaster. Twelve ESFs are included in the original
FRP. Examples of ESFs include Transportation, Communications,
Public Works and Engineering; Hazardous Materials, and Food. Each
is headed by a primary agency, and assisted by support agencies.
The FRP assigns responsibilities (either primary or support), and
actions to twenty-six Federal agencies. Additionally, there are three
Support Annexes; these are functions that support the ESFs, though
they may not be directly involved in the disaster response. The
original three Support Annexes were Financial Management, Public
Information, and Congressional Relations (FEMA 1992, 1993).
It is significant to note that the original FRP does not specifically
address disaster mitigation or recovery. The FRP briefly mentions
local government and private nonprofit agencies, but does not
specify their role. Nonprofits are referred to in a section stating that
the Federal government encourages donations to private nonprofits,
and will only handle donations of goods or services that it chooses
to accept (FEMA 1992, p. 8). The American Red Cross (ARC) is the
only non-Federal agency included as the primary agency for ESF
#6, Mass Care, in RFP.
Hurricane Andrew devastated Florida shortly after the release
of the FRP in 1992. Because of the unsatisfactory response to this
disaster, FEMA lost its credibility, and changes to the FRP were
recommended by GAO and the National Academy of Public
Administration (Kapucu and Comfort 2005). The Plan was amended
in 1999 and 2003. In 1999, the Plan was updated to include
mitigation and recovery, and added four new functions, referred to
as Support Annexes, including Community Relations and Logistics
Management. When the FRP was revised in 1999, four agencies
were removed: the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the
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Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the United States Postal Service
(USPS), and the ICC (FEMA 1999). Three of these agencies, OPM,
TVA, and USPS, were re-introduced in the 2003 revision. In the
2003 FRP, FEMA was included with the newly created DHS. The
National Communication System (NCS) was also absorbed by DHS.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) was newly introduced
into the FRP, indicating a greater inclusion of the private sector
(DHS 2003).
Inter-organizational Coordination in the
National Response Plan
The September 11 attacks caused significant changes to the federal
and national emergency response coordination. It became apparent
during the response and recovery effort that the coordination of state,
local, federal, private, and nonprofit agencies was needed. September
11th influenced the 2003 revisions to the FRP, and the creation of the
new NRP. The incident spurred the creation of the DHS, and with it, a
new perspective on homeland security. This new perspective included
a stronger focus on intergovernmental networks among state, local
and federal levels, as well as an emphasis on homeland security being
a shared, national responsibility, not solely federal. Since September
11, 2001 there has been an emphasis on improving communication
across the levels of government, as well as between sectors.
Through Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 (HSPD-5),
the FRP was redeveloped as the NRP. This directive also called for
the creation of the National Incident management System (NIMS)
(Sylves 2006). Released in 2004, the NRP purports to “for the first
time … [tie] together a complete spectrum of incident management
activities to include the prevention of, preparedness for, response
to, and recovery from terrorism, major natural disasters, and other
major emergencies” (DHS 2004, p. i). It is intended to provide
“vastly improved coordination among Federal, State, local, and
tribal organizations to help save lives and protect America’s
communities by increasing the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency
of incident management” (DHS 2004, p. i). The NRP combines
the FRP, Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, Interim
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National Response Plan, and other federal plans to create “an alldiscipline, all-hazards plan that establishes a single, comprehensive
framework” (DHS 2004, p. i). The NRP is an improvement to the
FRP in that it includes state and local public agencies, as well as
private and nonprofit organizations in its response system.
Three new functions were added: Public Safety and Security, Long
Term Community Recovery and Mitigation, and External Affairs.
Also, five new agencies, or groups of agencies were included. These
include the Social Security Administration (SSA), and the United
States Army Corp of Engineers (DOD/USACE). The three other
additions are sub-agencies of DHS, including DHS Emergency
Preparedness and Response (EPR) combined with FEMA (DHS/
EPR/FEMA), the Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection
combined with the National Communications System (DHS/IAIP/
NCS), and the United States Coast Guard (DHS/USCG)(DHS
2004b). Some additional Homeland Security elements that were
added are the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the
Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), the Principal
Federal Official (PFO), and the Joint Field Office (JFO).
Historically, the private and nonprofit sectors have had an unsuitably
informal role in national disaster response. To date, the only nonprofit
that has been included in the FRP and NRP is the ARC in the NRP;
ARC is the primary agency for the ESF #6, Mass Care, Housing, and
Human Services. The NRP addresses the general roles that nonprofit
and private sector agencies play in the event of a disaster and briefly
delineates responsibilities, but does not name specific agencies (DHS
2004). However, the vital role that the private and nonprofit sectors play
has been gaining increasing recognition. A comprehensive approach
to emergency management, Hardenbrook argues, “especially critical
infrastructure security, cannot be accomplished if the private sector is
excluded from these efforts” (2005, p. 1). Approximately 85 percent
of the nation’s infrastructure is privately owned; this highlights
the need for partnerships between the public and private sectors to
ensure sufficient emergency preparedness. These partnerships should
be encouraged not only at the federal level, but especially at the local
and regional level. Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7 and 8
(HSPD-7, HSPD-8) address Critical Infrastructure Identification and
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Protection and National Preparedness. As a result of these directives,
a classified database is being compiled of over 80,000 infrastructure
assets, with the intention of prioritizing their protection. However,
many private entities are not participating in the database because of
liability concerns (Hardenbrook 2005). Critical infrastructure is just
one example of an area of emergency management where there should
be more collaboration between the public and private sectors.
Some issues that discourage private sector involvement in
homeland security and emergency management include the sensitivity
of revealing vulnerability information paired with governmental
disclosure policies such as state sunshine laws, and the lack of monetary
incentives to partner with the government (Hardenbrook 2005). DHS
claims that some efforts have been made to encourage private sector
inclusion. In 2002, the SAFETY Act was passed to encourage the
private sector to develop technology related to homeland security.
According to DHS’ Secretary Chertoff, this law protects these private
companies from possible financial losses in lawsuits related to these
newly developed technologies (Chertoff 2005).
National Incident Management System (NIMS) and NRP
HSPD-5, in addition to calling for the creation of the NRP,
called for the creation of the National Incident Management
Systems (NIMS) platform, which provides a standard approach
for preparation, response, and recovery for domestic incidents
(Rubin and Harrald 2006). NIMS is intended to facilitate Federal,
State, and local coordination and interoperability by providing
information on the incident command system (ICS), multi-agency
coordination systems, unified command training, identification and
management of resources, qualifications and certifications, and
the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and
incident resources. NIMS is to be used in all incidents, including
incidents of national significance, those that cause the activation
of the NRP (Harrald 2006). NIMS is thought to be beneficial in
both incidents that span local boundaries, and incidents that require
Federal assistance, because of its focus on “seamless transitions and
integration of resources.” The document provides a common strategy
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that can be used by all levels of responders, from first responders to
Federal Responders. This strategy includes two main components,
the Standard Resource Typing (SRT) and Standard Organizational
Structure (SOS). The SRT system is intended to allow for the timely
acquisition of needed resources during an incident. The SOS is
supposed to facilitate responders from anywhere in the country
working together in an organized manner.
Beginning in 2005, State and local government are required to adopt
NIMS in order to receive grants, contracts, or other federal assistance
for preparedness efforts (Rubin and Harrald 2006). NIMS was tested
in February 2004, in an exercise entitled “Unified Defense.” This was a
practice response to a category 4 hurricane in Texas, including federal
agencies, military, and Texas emergency management officials. It
seems that more training of State and local governments, and perhaps
more testing of the NIMS framework is needed, as evidenced by the
response to Hurricane Katrina (Walker 2006).
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #7 (HSPD-7), along
with HSPD-8, provides for the identification and prioritization of
critical infrastructure, with the intention of protecting these locations
from terrorist attacks. HSPD-8 calls for an all-hazards preparedness
goal, the National Preparedness Goal, to create measurable
objectives. HSPD-8 is intended to accompany HSPD-5 in the effort
to create a standard implementation of NIMS, and the NRP. HSPD8 aims to establish policies, procedures, and goals to strengthen our
Nation’s preparedness to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies. Specifically, HSPD-8
calls for a domestic all-hazards preparedness goal that establishes
measurable priorities and targets; creates mechanisms to improve
delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State, local, and tribal
governments; and outlines actions to strengthen the preparedness
capabilities of Federal, State, local, and tribal governments (DHS
2006; Rubin and Harrald 2006).
As part of this directive, the National Preparedness Goal (Goal)
is being created by DHS. An Interim National Preparedness Goal
was released in March of 2005 by DHS, the final version was
intended to be released in 2005. The purpose of The Goal is to
identify measurable targets and capabilities for State and local
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governments to determine how prepared they need to be, if they are
meeting that level of preparedness, and how they should prioritize
any preparedness gaps. There are seven main priorities of the Goal;
they are divided into two categories: overarching national priorities,
and capability-specific priorities. The overarching national
priorities include implementation of NIMS and the NRP, expanding
regional collaboration, and implementation of the Interim National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (INIPP). The capability-specific
priorities are strengthening information sharing and collaboration;
interoperable communications; chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive detection, response, decontamination; and
medical surge and mass prophylaxis. To help governments implement
the Goal, step by step instructions, the National Preparedness
Guidance, is provided by DHS. The following section presents NRP
implementation after the description of the Hurricane Katrina case.
Brief Description of the Catastrophic Disaster:
Hurricane Katrina in 2005
Hurricane Katrina originally developed as a tropical depression
in the Bahamas on August 23, 2005. On August 24, 2005, Katrina
was a tropical storm. Tropical Storm Katrina moved northwest
towards South Florida, and became a category 1 hurricane just
before making landfall near North Miami Beach, on August 25 at
6:30 AM (NCDC 2005). In South Florida, 1.3 million customers
experienced power outages as a result of the storm (NCDC 2005).
Moving west across the southern tip of Florida, Hurricane Katrina
entered the Gulf of Mexico and gained strength. The storm moved
northwest, and then north, heading towards Louisiana on August 26.
At this time, sea-surface and atmospheric conditions strengthened
the storm into a major hurricane. By August 28, Hurricane Katrina
was swirling in the Gulf as a category 5, with wind speeds over 170
miles per hour. On August 29, Katrina made landfall at Grand Isle,
Louisana as a category 3 hurricane with 125 mile per hour winds.
The central pressure of the storm was 920 mb, a record-setting third
lowest among Atlantic storms in the United States (NCDC 2005).
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As the storm hit land in Louisiana, winds were recorded at 140
miles per hour, and wind gusts in New Orleans reached over 100
miles per hour. Katrina made a second landfall on the border of
Louisiana and Mississippi, with wind speeds of 110 miles per hour.
The storm then moved inland and drenched the area from the Gulf
coast all the way through the Ohio Valley. Rainfall reached 2-4
inches in these areas, and produced tornadoes in Georgia. The worst
impact of Katrina was widespread and severe flooding. Two days
after landfall, 80 percent of the city of New Orleans was submerged
beneath floodwaters. Due to strong winds, heavy rainfall, and a storm
surge, the levee holding back Lake Pontchartrain was damaged,
causing the extensive flooding. Some parts of the city were left under
20 feet of water. Flood waters remained for two and a half weeks, on
September 15, 2005, some of the city was still flooded. During the
recovery, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers pumped approximately
380,000 liters of water out of the city every second. A storm surge
over 30 feet washed over Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi, causing
widespread flooding in that region as well (NASA 2005; NCDC
2005)
In South Florida, Eleven deaths were reported as a result of the
storm. A week following the storm, the official death toll was 656,
423 of those in Louisiana, and 218 in Mississippi. Thirty four of
those deaths were elderly people who drowned in a nursing home;
the owners were arrested and charged with negligent homicide for
failing to evacuate the residents.
The total estimated number of evacuees as a result of the hurricane
is 499,510 (Prives 2005). After the storm, travel to and from New
Orleans was virtually impossible; bridges along Interstate 10 exiting
the city were destroyed, and both airports were flooded (NCDC
2005). Within New Orleans, the Superdome served as the primary
shelter for approximately 25,000 people. Conditions were squalid;
there was a shortage of food and water, reports of rape and other
violence. Many evacuees were bussed to Houston; the American Red
Cross reported that the Astrodome soon filled to capacity with over
11,000 evacuees, and the remainder had to be housed in other shelters
throughout the city (Treaster 2005). In Dallas, Texas, approximately
17,000 evacuees took shelter at the Dallas Convention Center and
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Reunion Arena. The mayor complained of a lack of both state and
federal assistance in housing the large number of evacuees. Evacuees
were displaced for months; in Lafayette over 20,000 evacuees
passed through the city, and the Cajundome provided shelter for up
to 10,000 all the way until Thanksgiving (Morris 2006). The state of
Tennessee reportedly sheltered over 38,000 evacuees.
Damage estimates in South Florida alone are estimated at
over $600 million (NASA 2005). In Gulfport, Mississippi, initial
estimates for road and bridge repair were over $3 billion. Within
the city of New Orleans, the Army Corp of Engineers estimated that
160,000 homes would be unsalvageable; the damage outside the city
was estimated to be far worse (CNN 2005). The financial impact
of the storm has yet to be determined. DHS reports that FEMA has
provided almost $4.4 billion in aid to victims of Hurricane Katrina
(GAO 2006). Katrina also caused disruptions in the oil industry,
damaging oil refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. Oil production was
reduced by 1.4 million barrels per day; the price of gas hit a record
high as oil shortage fears spread. The Gulf Coast is an exporter of
oil products to the rest of the country, and 21 refineries in the region
were affected by the hurricane (GAO 2005; NCDC 2005).
National Response Plan in Response to Hurricane Katrina
NRP was tested for the first time in response to Hurricane Katrina.
Prior to the NRP being activated, a State governor must request that
the President declare a state of emergency. Then, the Secretary of
Homeland Security must declare the emergency to be an “Incident
of National Significance.” If the event is declared a catastrophic
event, additional measures are taken. In the meantime, the State
and local governments are responsible for implementing their own
emergency plans. In response to Hurricane Katrina, Mayor Nagin of
New Orleans and Louisiana Governor Blanco have been criticized
for not following the Louisiana State Emergency Plan. On August 26,
Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency, yet the mandatory
evacuation was not issued until two days later, August 28. President
Bush had issued an emergency declaration the day before on August
27 (Dyson 2006). The federal government’s response to the hurricane
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was equally slow. DHS’s Secretary Chertoff declared the hurricane
an incident of national significance on August 30, a day after the
storm made landfall. This activated the NRP; however, he did not
declare it a catastrophic event, which would have activated further
actions in the NRP, resulting in a more complete and proactive
response (GAO 2006). Prior to a disaster, a clear chain of command
and central leadership should be established. In this event, no one
filled the necessary leadership role. Neither the DHS Secretary, nor
the Principal Federal Officials designated by the DHS Secretary
served as the necessary central leader (GAO 2006).
The inadequacy of the local response and preparation is further
evidenced by situations such as the 200 school buses that were left
abandoned in downtown New Orleans and flooded by the storm.
These buses could have evacuated 13,000 people (Mulrine 2005).
FEMA’s response to the disaster seemed disorganized, and drew
criticism from many. The American Red Cross was turned away
twice by state officials when the agency requested entrance into
New Orleans to deliver relief immediately following the storm; the
state cited logistics concerns. It seems that “the failure to adhere
to pre-established administrative procedures clearly impeded the
response process during its critical early stages” (Schneider 2005,
p. 515). In addition to the denial of Red Cross assistance in New
Orleans mentioned earlier, FEMA also denied assistance from
volunteer physicians because they were not licensed in Louisiana
(Perrow 2005). There were reports that FEMA did not coordinate
its response with local governments, rather, its efforts hindered
local recovery efforts. The Director of the Mississippi Emergency
Management Agency, Robert Latham, testified to the Committee
on House Select Katrina Response Investigation that FEMA did
not deliver the needed food, water, and other supplies to the state
in the amount or time requested, though the state followed proper
procedures to request such supplies (Latham 2005).
Communications failures plagued the recovery efforts; many
cell phones and landline telephones were inoperable. Amateur
radio provided emergency communications and health and welfare
information to the public. Protection of critical infrastructure is an
area of homeland security that was apparently underestimated in New
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Orleans. Before Hurricane Katrina, the Army Corps of Engineers
warned that the levees surrounding the city may not withstand a
Category 3 hurricane. The construction of the levees themselves
increased the vulnerability of New Orleans, causing the city to sink
further below sea level. Budget proposals to restore and strengthen
the levees were cut by the Bush Administration from $14 billion to
$540 million over four years (Grunwald and Glasser 2005)
Critics of the NRP note the unwieldy nature of the document, “[t]he
size and complexity of the NRP inhibits its full implementation when
state and local governments who are relied upon to carry it out have
not been full partners in its creation and have little control”(Neuby
2005). Other concerns include lack of federal assistance to fund
activities required by the NRP. The federal grant process is slow, as
is the pass-through of money provided to States for the distribution to
cities. Also, it is claimed that State and local officials have not been
given enough access to intelligence available to Federal authorities
because of a lack of security clearance.
Reorganization or Retooling of FEMA in DHS
Before Katrina, in July of 2005, Chertoff had already announced
plans for structural changes to DHS. Some key points included
strengthening intelligence functions and information sharing,
improving coordination and efficiency of operations, and enhancing
coordination and deployment of preparedness assets (DHS 2005).
This disaster seems to have proven the need for a national response,
a federal form of leadership in emergency management.
Many are concerned that DHS is too focused on acts of terrorism
to devote sufficient attention to the management of natural disasters.
State and local practitioners are left with no national leadership
and no mentors. The centralized design of DHS, and the removal
of authority from FEMA has enfeebled the agency, reducing its
capability to respond to disasters. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, after
Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo wrought their devastation, there was
criticism of the governmental response. FEMA reacted by stepping
up and evolving to become a more effective agency.
A criticism of FEMA and DHS’s current structure is the line
Kapucu: Examining the National Response Plan in Katrina
287
of authority. Many, including Governor Bush of Florida, feel that
the FEMA director should have a direct report to the President,
they should not have to report first to the Secretary of Homeland
Security at DHS. This reporting structure, as well as the structure
of the divisions within FEMA need to be changed to allow for a
swifter, more efficient response in emergencies (Bush 2005).
President Clinton recognized the need for FEMA’s direct report,
and brought the agency up to Cabinet-level in 1996. FEMA had this
position until its absorption into DHS in 2003. In light of Chertoff’s
announcement to reorganize DHS and FEMA, it has been suggested
that Congress explore other options. One option is strengthening
FEMA, rather than weakening it. Another option is to re-examine
and perhaps change the authority of other emergency agencies not
within DHS. A third option that Congress has been encouraged to
consider is authorizing FEMA as an independent agency, outside of
DHS (Bea 2005).
Discussion: Lessons Learned
The response to Katrina, like many disasters preceding it, has
highlighted the inadequacies of state, local, and national emergency
management preparedness. There are many lessons to be learned
from the incident that can improve the NRP in the future.
Federal Budget Should Encourage Disaster Preparedness:
As evidenced by the cutting of funds to renovate and strengthen
the levees in New Orleans, there has been a lack of support in the
Federal budget for emergency preparedness. The Government
Performance Project of 2005 evaluated and graded all 50 states
on their ability to manage money, people, information, and
infrastructure. An examination of the infrastructure grades is telling,
and alarming. Twenty-one states, including the Southeastern states
of Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, South and North Carolina, and
Alabama received grades of C or below on their ability to manage
infrastructure. These states are prone to hurricanes, yet they are
evaluated as being inadequate in their daily management of roads,
bridges, and buildings. The performance of these states’ management
systems in disasters seems questionable (Kettl 2005).
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Currently, the receipt of Federal assistance is tied to NIMS; states
are supposed to meet a minimal level of preparedness before receiving
emergency preparedness funds. However, many local governments
complain that they are not receiving the needed federal assistance.
At the U.S. Conference of Mayors in 2004, 52 percent of 231 cities
surveyed across the U.S. reported that they have yet to receive any
money from the state-block grant program. This is a homeland
security program that provides funds for first responders at the local
level (Spears 2004). Additionally, many complain that the use of
federal funds by state and local governments is too restricted, and
focused on terrorism, while ignoring other, more common hazards
(Latham 2005). Perhaps, if more federal funds were made available
for emergency preparedness, and levels of preparedness at the state
and local level were more closely regulated, response plans could be
implemented more effectively.
Incident Command System and a Clear Leadership: The
current national response system is not well understood at all levels
of government. The post of Principal Federal Official (PFO) was not
filled during Hurricane Katrina (Walker 2006; LOHSEP 2006). One
lesson is the importance of a functioning incident command system.
There was a lack of communication and chain of command in and
around New Orleans. For instance, evacuees leaving New Orleans
on foot after the issuance of the mandatory evacuation were turned
away by police in an adjacent town, Gretna. Louisiana had a system
based on incident command but did not utilize it (Swope and Patton
2005).
After 9/11, Mayor Giuliani was a clear leader, and built a “network
of horizontal partnerships” (Kettl 2005). Four years later, Louisiana
and the city of New Orleans did not exhibit a clear chain of command
and leadership. The immediate response seemed to be a struggle
over which government official was responsible for the disaster. This
disorganization and lack of pre-planned structure likely increased the
negative impact of the disaster. Disasters do not occur within our preset jurisdictional lines. Our plans to handle emergencies must cross
boundaries, they must coordinate state, local, and federal jurisdictions,
and create a clear chain of command (Kettl 2005). To facilitate a
timely response to disasters and mitigate the loss of life and damage
Kapucu: Examining the National Response Plan in Katrina
289
to property, there must be “prearranged decision protocols” (Kapucu
and Wan Wart 2006, p. 294). These protocols must be repeatedly
rehearsed by the people who will be involved in the actual emergency
so that the response is as effective and efficient as possible. When
practicing emergency response scenarios, emergency plans must
take into account the very likely possibility that a percentage of
emergency responders will not be able to perform their duties. After
Katrina, 15 percent of New Orleans police officers did not report for
duty. Emergency management plans must be able to operate with a
reduced force of people.
Communication and Coordination:
During an emergency,
there will be breakdown in communication; both telecommunications
and information technology infrastructures will be disrupted (Kapucu
and Wan Wart 2006). Mayor Nagin of New Orleans and his staff did
not have communication for two days after the storm hit. Unable
to establish a communication system, Nagin sent messages through
CNN reporters, and eventually, was able to use an internet telephone
account set up for personal use by a staff member (Kettl 2005). The
GAO’s report on Hurricane Katrina regarding preparedness, response,
and recovery noted that communications and coordination among
first responders was lacking, despite previous recommendations in
GAO reports issued in 2003 and 2004 (GAO 2005). In a disaster,
the normal means of communication, cell phones, landline phones,
the internet, even radio frequencies will most likely be inoperable.
Emergency plans must include alternate methods of communication,
and plan ahead in the event that communication is impossible, so
that operations still run as planned.
Some states are utilizing innovative communications technology
to overcome this challenge. Florida uses a statewide radio system
that allows emergency responders to communicate in a disaster,
regardless of the frequency they normally use. Over 200 public safety
dispatch centers in every Florida county are able to connect to this
system (Bush 2005). Mississippi is working on improving satellite
communications in all of its county emergency management offices,
and distributes portable satellite phones to its state emergency
response team, as well as local authorities (Latham 2005). Global
Positioning Systems (GPS) are a tool that can improve coordination
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and pre-planning in response to emergencies. For instance, in the
event of a hurricane, GPS can help predict the path and strength of
the storm, and assist in the identification of which populations need
to evacuate, and which do not need to evacuate. Before a disaster
strikes, normal means of communication should be used for the
maximum benefit.
Besides technology, handling communication and coordination
begins with developing relationships between people. Public
officials must establish relationships between municipalities and
private nonprofit agencies before a disaster strikes. Pre-existing trust
is vital for effective coordination in an emergency. Among other
factors, high performance in disasters depends on the coordination
between and development of positive, trusting relationships between
emergency agencies and responders that allow for the “suspension of
rules because of unexpected needs” (Kapucu and Wan Wart 2006).
Training: A way to build relationships among emergency
responders is through training and exercises. The GAO notes that
though the NRP assumes a proactive national response, it does not
provide detailed delineated plans. State and local governments must
have these plans, and practice them to ensure that they have a clear
idea of what will be required in a disaster, how much assistance
will be needed, and how it will be coordinated (GAO 2006). In
2004 and 2005, FEMA, along with a private company, Innovative
Emergency Management, conducted the “Hurricane Pam” exercise
along with several parishes in Louisiana (Thomas 2005). This was
part of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning
Project, an effort to address the complexities involved in responding
to a hurricane in such a vulnerable area as Louisiana (Fairley
2006). This exercise was successful in identifying likely impacts
in the event of a category 3 hurricane, as well as capabilities that
would be needed, such as disposing of large amounts of debris, and
providing shelters for thousands of evacuees. The exercise involved
over 300 federal, state, and local government employees, including
responders and planners (Thomas 2005), However, many lessons
learned during this exercise were not able to be implemented in time
for Hurricane Katrina. Training and exercises help to clarify roles
and responsibilities under the NRP; the GAO notes that this is a
Kapucu: Examining the National Response Plan in Katrina
291
likely problem that may lead to delays and misunderstandings in a
disaster (GAO 2006). Scenario-based exercises could be successful
and effective in mitigating fatalities and damage in future disasters,
but only if adopted by federal, state, and local government.
Media & Public Response: The management of the media and
relaying messages to the public are important aspects of disasters that
need to be planned. The media can help or hinder disaster response,
depending on the level of cooperation with localities. For example,
after Katrina, the media saturated the news with images of looters,
dead bodies in the street, and people trapped on their roofs. Intense
images on the news can sway the public, as well as emergency
responders. In New Orleans, the media coverage of looters pressured
police to stop the looting, though this may not have been initially
the first priority for the police force (Swope and Patton 2005). The
media can be a tool to aid in the response to disasters, as evidenced
by the public’s contribution of 1.4 billion dollars in response to 9/11,
which was broadcast on national television as the event occurred.
The public sometimes does not listen, or act as expected, to
government warnings in response to disasters. Approximately
100,000 people remained in New Orleans, ignoring the mandatory
evacuation. According to a poll conducted by the Washington
Post, over half of evacuees admitted they could have evacuated
New Orleans before Katrina made landfall, but chose to stay. The
majority of these evacuees claimed they did not believe that Katrina
would be so devastating. State and local emergency managers need
to address this issue that people who remain in disaster situations
put themselves, as well as emergency workers in danger (Swope and
Patton 2005).
State and Local Governments are Initially Responsible:
Effective emergency management must come from the bottom up,
state and local governments must take responsibility. The federal
government also plays an important role, Jeb Bush’s Testimony to
the House Committee on Homeland Security stated that “FEMA
should serve as a conduit to the tremendous resources available
at the federal level”(Bush 2005). The NRP provides a structure in
which local governments must be prepared to sustain themselves for
up to 72 hours before federal aid can reach the disaster area. If a
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local government needs assistance in preparation or response to a
disaster, it is their responsibility to request assistance from their State
government. In the event that a State government needs assistance,
it must request such assistance ahead of time from the federal
government (DHS 2004). Some states, such as South Carolina, have
properly followed this procedure; the state recently admitted to DHS
that they will need outside help in the event of a disaster, detailing the
specific functions for which they will need assistance (Washington
2006). New Orleans and Louisiana were not prepared to respond to
and recover from the catastrophe without immediate federal aid.
Role of Private and Nonprofit Organizations: In the preparation
and response to Hurricane Katrina, several nonprofits and private
sector entities played key roles, though only one, the ARC, is
included in the NRP. Overall, the GAO found that volunteers and
donations from both the domestic and international community were
not well organized or distributed, and were poorly incorporated into
the response and recovery. For instance, federal agencies were not
prepared to handle international assistance, and the Salvation Army
and other small organizations were not coordinated well into the
effort (GAO 2006).
Nonprofits and private sector entities have many resources to
offer in a disaster, including volunteers, money, and food. In the
NRP, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the
Department of the Interior (DOI) are the primary agencies for ESF
#11, Agriculture and Natural Resources (DHS 2006). This ESF is
responsible for distribution of food, among other duties. During
hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the USDA distributed over
$151 million in food stamps to victims in Texas and Louisiana.
However, it was the nonprofit America’s Second Harvest Network
that provided 46 million meals valued at $84 million to victims.
This mass distribution of food was made possible by donations from
private retailers as well as the government (America’s Second Harvest
2005). The coordination of private, nonprofit, and the government
was vital to providing emergency food assistance in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina. However, there were still issues coordinating
the distribution of food; for instance, evacuees in the Superdome
scrounged for food and water. Strong public-private partnerships
Kapucu: Examining the National Response Plan in Katrina
293
should be developed and maintained in all areas of emergency
management. Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters can also
be utilized effectively in response operations as well.
Conclusion
As judged by its performance in Katrina, NRP failed even more
completely than the FRP failed in operations for Hurricane Andrew in
1992. Its primary mode of operation was still a hierarchical “command
and control” system that had no alternative plans if the hierarchical
command failed. Emergency management plans need to be living,
breathing, working, flexible documents. The NRP, as well as state
and local emergency plans, need to be continuously revamped, and
strengthened using the knowledge gained from each disaster. Plans
also need to be practiced, all of the players need to be aware of their
roles and responsibilities before a disaster occurs. Practicing a plan
reveals any gaps, any missing links, and develops relationships and
networks between first responders and all parties involved.
Plans cannot include every possible scenario, but they can be
comprehensive, include a clear chain of command, and be flexible.
Emergency managers and decision makers must have plans that are
flexible, they must be able to improvise in the event of unforeseen
incidents, and be able to adapt to the particular nuances of each
individual incident. There have been many efforts to increase planning
for emergency management, including the 2003 Catastrophic Planning
Initiative. This initiative was intended to link the federal, state and
local governments in the identification of vulnerable geographic
areas, predict impacts of disasters in those areas, examine the current
disaster management capabilities, identify shortfalls, and plan to
overcome these shortfalls. The ultimate goal of the Hurricane Pam
exercise was to develop a catastrophic planning document. This was
not accomplished in time for Hurricane Katrina, but other vulnerable
areas of the country may be able to implement Catastrophic Planning
Initiative efforts before another major disaster strikes.
Many are trying to sort through the critically ineffective response
to Hurricane Katrina. However, it is widely felt that it will take
several years to sort out responsibility for the tragic blunders of
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that effort. It may in fact take years, but policy learning can begin
occurring immediately. GAO will be recommending changes to
the NRP, as it has done following previous disasters. Accordingly,
academia, emergency management experts, and those in the field
should be working towards changing their emergency management
plans as well. Further research should be performed to gather first
hand accounts of responders involved in Hurricane Katrina, as well
as other emergency management professionals that assisted in the
response or recovery. Valuable information can also be gathered
from emergency management professionals that are implementing
innovative changes to their emergency plans as a result of Hurricane
Katrina.
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