RESENTMENT AND RIVALRY:
THE FAILURE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION,
1935-1938
Neville Chamberlain had
a personality with marked traits of inferiority that were
only assuaged by a litany of repeated compliments and
congratulations. This hunger for flattery nourished a
growing vanity and self-righteousness...[he was] invariably
optimistic and invariably wrong.1
Franklin D. Roosevelt continued
to befog his meanings and blur his definitions, retreating
thus into that swamp of ambiguity where he as politician so
often dwelt...it was for lack of the requisite resolve, nerve,
energy, and clarity of mind...that Roosevelt failed at this
2
crucial point to lead.
Despite these alleged deficiencies, these two statesmen, the “good man” and the “good
neighbour,” would be the principal defence of the democratic nations to fascist
aggression. While both acknowledged the importance of cooperation in the years leading
up to the Munich crisis, neither the President of the United States nor the Prime Minister
of Great Britain were able to achieve more than an intermittently parallel course in
foreign policy. The failure of Anglo-American cooperation in 1938 would create the
conditions necessary for the Munich settlement, which in Chamberlain’s view was “only
a prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace.”3 History, however,
would prove that this famous “sell-out of the Czechs” was only a prelude to further
German aggression, bloodshed and finally, the Second World War.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the foreign policy decisions of FDR and
Neville Chamberlain, in order to discern the causes of the failure of Anglo-American
cooperation in the years 1935 to 1938. Chamberlain only became Prime Minister in May
1937, but as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1931, and clearly the dominant force in
the British Cabinet, his relationship with FDR would begin significantly earlier. Their
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personal relationship needs to be inscribed onto a broader issue – the continuing,
competitive, and complicated relationship of the United States with its distant parent, the
United Kingdom. In other words, this was a “personality problem of both an individual
and a national character.”4 The paper will consider some of the principal challenges
faced by these states, including economic depression, and increasing fascist aggression in
Abyssinia, Spain, and the Far East, in order to discover some of the causes of the conflict
between them. It is clear that neither the United States nor Great Britain were able to
exploit the many opportunities presented in the 1930s to resist aggression effectively
through joint action, and that this failure of Anglo-American cooperation was the result
of a relationship marked by suspicion, selfishness, and contrary interests.
The United States and Britain occupied similar ideological positions in the early
1930s. Their `special relationship’ originated in strong commitments to liberal
democratic institutions and to world peace, and there was great “similarity in public
mood.”5 The policy of “exceptionalism,” emphasizing the uniqueness of a state due to its
geographical position, ideological foundation, economic and/or military strength, and
most importantly its role as a moral leader and arbiter for the rest of the world can be
“applied equally well to British and Americans.”6 Both states also had a strong tradition
of isolationism, amplified after a First World War that had shown that victory “gained
nothing.”7 Both societies hoped to avoid another conflict by emphasizing disarmament,
justice, moral imperatives, and, particularly from the British standpoint, collective
security through the League of Nations. Additionally, both states acknowledged that the
Versailles settlement was unfair to Germany. Americans sympathized and felt that peace
depended on creating conditions “to permit Germany to play its proper European role.”8
Britain went even further, basing much of its foreign policy on the principle that
Germany had real grievances that should be rectified.9 Though hoping for many of the
same goals, and arguing some of the same methods, they could not agree on specific
responses to specific events, beginning with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.
Consensus became difficult once the political, economic, and military interests of each
state were directly implicated. The conflict between the desire to follow one’s own policy
and the fear of breaking completely with the other explains much of the muddled nature
of British and especially American foreign policy in this period.10
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One historian stresses that the first key factor dividing the two states was
American failure to ratify the Versailles Treaty or join the League of Nations, through
which an “important arena of Anglo-American cooperation...automatically closed.”11
In the 1930s, the role of the Great Depression in further isolating these two states from
each other can not be exaggerated. Another historian wrote that the depression drove the
two countries into “a Hobbesian condition of each against all...the danger of militant
aggression paled before the much more immediate danger of domestic, economic, and
social collapse.”12 Their search for economic recovery revealed an important cleavage in
policy at an early stage. This cleavage became obvious at the London World Economic
Conference in 1933, which was perhaps, “the last opportunity of democratic statesmen to
work out a cooperative solution to common economic problems.”13
The first issue was a legacy of Versailles - the payment of reparations to Britain
and the payment of war debts to the United States. To relieve economic difficulties
everywhere, Sir Robert Vansittart suggested that “the United States should cancel the war
debts and the ex-allies would cancel reparations.”14 Britain had striven to restrain France
and reduce both the annual payments and the overall amount of reparations from
Germany, particularly at the Lausanne Conference in 1932. But from FDR came only a
stubborn refusal to discuss the matter at the Conference, followed by the Johnson Act of
1934, which barred any nations still in debt to acquire further loans from the United
States.15 Chamberlain saw this as America’s “selfish ignorance” of British sacrifices and
further obstruction of “attempts to revive faltering European economies.”16 A further
issue was that of currency stabilization. Chamberlain believed that FDR was “behaving
with frightening irresponsibility if not downright hostility by deliberately abandoning the
gold standard.”17 As “gold” and “sterling” blocs formed, the conference aimed to
negotiate a plan for international currency stabilization, led by that nation with the
strongest gold reserve and economic position, the United States.18 Though Roosevelt had
originally endorsed this idea, in July he suddenly delivered a “bombshell” message
proclaiming that “planned national currencies were superior to international monetary
agreements” and criticizing Europe for relying on antiquated views of finance.19
Chamberlain was not the only statesman to be left with “an enduring legacy of
bitterness” after “the experience of being lectured to by the American president.”20
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Perhaps the most important economic issue that divided the United States and
Great Britain was international trade and tariff law. Both nations had adopted highly
protectionist trade policies to combat the Depression. American tariffs were among the
highest in the world21 and Great Britain had enacted the Ottawa Agreements in 1932,
which set up a preference system to facilitate trade and recovery throughout the Empire.
The Americans, led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, proposed a massive reduction of
tariffs and the fostering of free trade to stimulate recovery. No agreement (on any of
these issues) could be reached at the Conference and it ended a dismal failure. But the
issue of trade remained central to Anglo-American diplomacy in the coming years. In
1934, FDR approved the Trade Agreements Act, which authorized him to raise or lower
tariff rates by as much as 50% with a reciprocating country. This “most-favourednation” approach created an ideological counter to the Imperial preference system and
though most of the nations involved had limited trade volume, FDR credited Hull for
“working miracles in breaking the fetters of international commerce.”22 This issue soon
became a focal point for Anglo-American disagreement. While recognizing the value of
an Anglo-American commercial alliance, they could not agree on the terms.23 In January
1936, Hull wrote to British ambassador Ronald Lindsey “only through the universal
acceptance of the United States’ commercial policy could the community of nations
restore prosperity.” His suggestions of duty reductions on many principal trade items
were rejected due to the “direct blow” this would have on the imperial preference
system.24 Chamberlain in particular was hostile to Hull’s proposals, stating that Britain
would not “sacrifice the Empire for American friendship,” particularly without any
American gestures on the war debts or currency stabilization issues. He was even more
reluctant to do so when American Neutrality legislation seemed to indicate that if Britain
went to war its trade with the United States would be cut off. Essentially, the United
States “demanded too much while offering too little.”25
This issue was so highly charged because economics were a central component of
both nations’ foreign policies. This rivalry reflected not only a purely economic concern,
but the central disagreement between how best to bring prosperity and peace to Europe.
Essentially, Cordell Hull, who provided “the semblance of a positive and consistent
foreign policy”26 in these years, worked from the basic assumption that “Britain and
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Germany were parts of the same problem, the problem of closed economic systems.” By
creating an open system, with equal access to raw materials and finished products, all
nations could become prosperous, which would diffuse any threat of war.27 As late as
April 19, 1938, with political conflicts raging in Spain and central Europe, FDR still
“urged the promotion of peace through the finding of means for economic
appeasement.”28 This economic policy also emphasized disarmament, since the largescale purchase of arms had a negative economic effect on the countries involved and
world trade generally. Roosevelt would not “abandon an active search for an agreement
among the nations to limit armaments and end aggression,” yet by 1938 was forced to
adopt a naval rearmament program, recognizing that his efforts had “failed up to the
present time.”29
Great Britain adopted a radically different policy in order to achieve those same
goals of prosperity and world peace. Chamberlain emphasized that political appeasement
of specific and legitimate grievances must be completed prior to any general settlement.
His policy focussed on direct communication with the dictators, resting “upon the view
that we and they are in a position each to make a contribution towards the objective we
both desire to obtain.”30 In other words, while both states would have agreed that “you
have got to find out what are the causes of war and remove them,”31 the United States
viewed these causes as fundamentally economic and general, while Britain perceived
them to be political, specific, and limited. Chamberlain believed that America was too
far distant to fully appreciate these causes and that its search for an economic settlement
was too self-interested. He thus took the view that “rather than become entangled in
what looked like one of Roosevelt’s bright, unthought out ideas, the British should get on
with positive appeasement.”32 In order to negotiate from a position of strength,
Chamberlain was committed to a dual policy of appeasement and rearmament, believing
that “one of the ways to ensure peace is to make ourselves ready for war.”33 In the early
1930s, the exaggerated fear of a “knock-out blow” from air power had prompted Britain
to concentrate on building a rival fleet of bombers. But by 1937, Chamberlain had
consolidated a policy that emphasized defensive capabilities, including modest increases
and updates to the Royal Navy’s Home and Mediterranean Fleets, and a focus on close
fighter defence for the Home Islands.34 Despite these ambitious plans, by 1938 most
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British officials were deeply concerned with the dubious gains of rearmament.
Chamberlain’s policy, informed by his experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer during
the Depression was a cautious one which “prevented an immediate expansion and
acceleration of the rearmament programme.”35
With this general understanding of the conflict between American and British
foreign policies in mind, it is now useful to analyze a few of the many events of the
1930s in order to get a sense of the development of these policies through an atmosphere
of growing distrust and uncertainty. The Abyssinian Crisis (1935-1936), the Spanish
Civil War (1936-1939), and the Far East crisis of 1937, demonstrate the gradual and
increasing divergence of American and British foreign policies.
One of the central questions during these events was how British and American
officials perceived the dictators and in particular Benito Mussolini. As the leader of
fascist Italy, Mussolini was regarded warily but not seen as having the same destructive
capability as Germany. Indeed, at first Mussolini was regarded as a mutual friend and a
key contributor to stability in central Europe. In April 1934 with the Rome Protocols,
Mussolini signed an agreement with Austria and Hungary to coordinate opposition to
German expansionism in their region. In July, when the Austrian Chancellor was
murdered by local Nazis encouraged by Hitler, Mussolini rapidly deployed several
divisions and air squadrons to the Brenner Pass to guard against a German military
move.36 These actions encouraged the British and French to cultivate Italian friendship,
culminating in the Stresa Front of April 1935 in which Mussolini affirmed the provisions
of Locarno, namely “the status quo in Europe.”37 Even after the invasion of Abyssinia,
intervention in the Spain, and the Rome-Berlin Axis, the western powers continued to
believe that Mussolini was a potential ally that could have a moderating influence on
Hitler. This perception of him as “cooperative and amenable” seems in retrospect a kind
of “wishful thinking in a strife-weary world.”38 Significantly, FDR would appeal directly
to Mussolini to intercede in the most desperate days of the Sudeten Crisis.
Even more surprising is the degree to which Chamberlain believed that Hitler was
simply a rational statesman caught between “extreme” and “moderate” forces. While
FDR was more doubtful of this, he had only very limited official and personal contact
with Hitler and so was inclined to follow the British lead in this respect – without
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endorsing the British position. The distances involved and the fact that both statesmen
had to rely on ambassadors made for incomplete pictures. Principal American officials
including Norman Davis, Joseph Kennedy, and William Bullitt all supported German
predominance and preferential treatment in Eastern Europe. A combination of factors
was at work here, including sympathy for Germany’s position after Versailles, an affinity
between American and German culture, and a preference for German leadership in
Europe over French and especially Russian domination.39 A healthy strain of antiCommunism ran through many of the ambassadors’ letters, all emphasizing the need to
contain the spread of Communism and the need for German strength to accomplish that
aim. Significantly, FDR did not attempt to create a stronger official presence or closer
relationship to Germany. Indeed, the sheer “absence of meaningful German-American
relations by 1938 was a constraining factor.” on Roosevelt’s ability to have an
independent foreign policy.40
The British position, as with Mussolini, was even more favourable towards Hitler.
Again, ambassadors played a key role. Both Sir Joseph Addison and Basil Newton were
highly sympathetic to the German position, and argued that only the Germans had the
sophistication and abilities needed to stabilize central Europe.41 Nevile Henderson
“pictured the Nazi leaders and particularly Hitler as moderates with limited aims and
argued right to the end that they were men with whom Britain could achieve a lasting
settlement.”42 Chamberlain agreed, believing that German political and economic
predominance in central Europe was desirable and natural, so long as it was
accomplished by peaceful means.43 Ambassador Kennedy explained to Cordell Hull that
Chamberlain blamed the difficulties of 1938 on the fact that “very little of the proper
information, so far as world peace is concerned, gets to Hitler any more; the ring around
him is keeping him high up on a mountain peak.”44 It is not hard to see how a simple
solution – a direct personal interview with Hitler – would result from this belief. Clearly,
British foreign policy was grounded in the conviction that the dictators were rational
leaders with limited aims. This is one reason why the British concluded a naval treaty
with Germany on June 4, 1935. Hitler had agreed to restrict his own navy to 35% of the
British fleet and suggested further negotiations on prohibiting gas and incendiary bombs,
even aerial bombardment.45 With typical lack of foresight, the British failed to realize
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that this would undermine the Stresa Front and further that its “symbolic recognition” of
Germany’s right to rearm would antagonize France and discourage America.46
Anglo-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean had gradually heightened in the 1930s,
beginning with the struggle in the Arabian Peninsula between the King of the newly
formed Saudi Arabia (backed by the British) and the Imam of Yemen, supported by Italy.
A secure British route to its principal African colonies in Egypt and Sudan, as well as the
vital oil wells of the Middle East, not to mention India and the Far East, all depended on
access to the Mediterranean.47 Despite the moves for cooperation with Italy, it was soon
obvious by the troop movements to Italian East Africa that Mussolini would invade
Abyssinia after the 1935 rainy season. Neither Britain nor America was willing to go to
war over Ethiopia, but both needed to react to this blatant aggression. Although their
methods were different they began as quite complimentary and had a similar effect –
creating an opportunity for greater Anglo-American cooperation.
The British responded quickly and in September 1935 led the League of Nations
in calling “for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.”48
Sanctions were declared on Italy, and British naval strength was massed in the
Mediterranean at Gibraltar and Malta. By 18 November, an embargo had been placed on
weapons and loans to Italy, on all Italian imports and on exports to Italy of rubber and
metallic ores. British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin even considered placing a crucial
oil embargo on Italy, but deferred it because of Hitler’s move in the Rhineland, the
imminent defeat of Ethiopia, and concern for an Italian “mad-dog attack.”49 British
public opinion, further, seemed solidly behind this collective action.
American public opinion also strongly supported Roosevelt’s policy in Abyssinia.
Their call for legislation to keep America out of world conflicts had been answered. The
Nye investigation of 1934 conducted a study on American involvement in World War
One and concluded that Americans fought “neither to save the world for democracy nor
to defend its own interests, but as the result of the intrigues of profiteers.”50 FDR
accepted the “temporary restrictions” on his control of foreign affairs, and enacted the
first Neutrality Law, after ensuring certain concessions to presidential discretion.51 This
Law decreed a mandatory embargo on arms, ammunition, and implements of war to all
belligerents and prohibited American vessels from transporting munitions to them. In
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February 1936, the Neutrality Act was extended for another year, and came to include a
prohibition on loans or credit to belligerents.52 On top of this, FDR and Hull ordered a
“moral embargo” on strategic raw materials to the belligerents. Overall, FDR believed
that he was assisting League Sanctions.53 He wrote to Cordell Hull that though America
“will not join other nations in sanctions” it “will go as far as laws allow to avoid giving
material assistance to belligerents.”54 Clearly, an impartial arms embargo in this conflict
would mainly hurt the aggressor (Italy) since “only Mussolini had the wherewithal to buy
and ship significant amounts of arms.”55 Even Chamberlain noted that America “had
already gone a great deal further than usual.”56
Though on the surface this seemed a clear example of at least Anglo-American
“parallel” action, all was not as it appeared. The strong British stand was a sham for the
benefit of its public who demanded “some action in support of the League.” The Peace
Ballot of January 1935 had revealed an especially strong public interest in collective
security and the League of Nations.57 Baldwin had concluded that British interests in
Africa were not seriously threatened by an Italian victory, and so hoped to avoid
antagonizing Italy into a more general conflict that would be harmful to British interests.
Still in awe of the potential of air power, the British particularly feared for their fleet at
Malta, and were unsure of how Germany would respond. This fear of antagonism, and
the healthy profits being made by some businessmen, prevented Britain from adopting a
sanction on oil that could have seriously harmed Mussolini. Oil was an essential item of
war production and thus a control measure.58 But there is substantial evidence that the
British already assumed the failure of collective action and deliberately worked through
the League so that it and not the British government would be seen to have failed.59 The
American “moral embargo” proved to be a dismal failure. By the end of 1935, oil
exports to Italy had tripled and exports of copper, iron, steel and cotton had all doubled.60
Suspicion grew as to the commitment and intentions of the other. Baldwin wrote “You
will get nothing out of the Americans but words. Big words, but only words.”61
The final blow was the “outrageous proceeding” of the Hoare-Laval Plan of
December 1935. This failed not-so-secret plan proposed handing over two-thirds of
Ethiopia to Italy in exchange for peace.62 Not only did this plan serve to “reconfirm
isolationists in their suspicion of European democracies,”63 but it also strengthened
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FDR’s belief in “British perfidy,” that Britain was motivated only by self-interest and
would betray America even as it betrayed the League.64 By June, after the “failure” of
the League to stop Mussolini, Chamberlain called for the lifting of sanctions.65 FDR
soon followed by revoking the Neutrality Proclamation. Neither side had been willing to
make the measures effective. The British in particular were left in the “undignified
position” of “vainly seeking face-saving concessions” for Mussolini’s “robbery.”66 By
the summer of 1936, the British government felt “depressed and defeated,” and mutual
hopes for cooperation had ended in disappointment. Even in 1938 this issue remained
antagonistic, as the United States’ refused to approve of Britain’s de jure recognition of
the Italian conquest. In the end, neither side had been willing (or able) to commit the
strength and support needed to stop Italian aggression. Neither side had time to recover
or reconsider the loss of this opportunity to work together, as almost immediately, that
summer of 1936, another crisis arose in Spain.
In July 1936, General Francisco Franco began what would become a protracted
and bloody civil war in Spain against the recently elected Popular Front Government. As
with the Abyssinian Crisis, British and American methods were roughly parallel and their
goals in agreement. The principal aim of both powers was to prevent the civil war from
becoming a general one in Western Europe. This became an increasing concern as
German and especially Italian intervention on the side of the Nationalists, followed by
Soviet intervention on behalf of the Loyalists, widened the scope of the conflict. Yet the
parallelism of method was chiefly a negative one, demonstrating that rather than an
active spirit of cooperation, common yet distinct feelings of paralysis, fear, and prejudice
were the prime motivators.
Britain emphasized a policy of complete nonintervention, giving political and/or
economic assistance to neither the Loyalists nor the Rebels. The British hoped that such
a policy by all European powers would ensure the peace of Europe by confining the war
to Spain.67 They then willfully ignored the increasing evidence that Germany and Italy
were in fact supporting the Rebels despite the Nonintervention agreement. By April
1937, German bombers had laid waste to Guernica, “a place of no military importance
whatever,” and France was reporting that Franco’s Army consisted of 60000 Italians,
15000 Moroccans and only 15-20000 Spaniards.68 Both military and ideological factors
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contributed to this stubborn insistence on nonintervention. From the military perspective,
the British concluded that “a friendly Spain is desirable, a neutral Spain vital.” The
creation of another hostile power to close the vise in Western Europe and the
Mediterranean could not be allowed. The British pragmatically chose to do nothing,
because if they “should back the losing Spanish horse, friendship and neutrality would
both be lost.”69 Ideologically, the British suspected that the Loyalist Regime was under
the control of communists, and the intervention of the Soviet Union did not help to
remedy this view. The British press emphasized the atrocities committed by Republican
forces, particularly at Barcelona.70 Cynically but perhaps all too realistically, one
historian has claimed that British nonintervention was “a deliberate pro-Franco” policy
that did not alienate France or public opinion.71 At the very least, it is clear that Britain
felt isolated and vulnerable, completely unwilling to risk any escalation in conflict. Even
the Nyon Conference of September 1937, in which “firmness” from the British and
French forced an agreement to patrol the Mediterranean against “pirates,” can be seen as
a move to prevent such escalation rather than to stand up to the dictators.72
Roosevelt concluded that the best policy for avoiding a wider war was another
invocation of the Neutrality Laws. The desire to remain neutral was very strong in the
American public, particularly among America’s 20 million Catholics who found
themselves torn by stories of atrocities committed against clergy and a desire to remain
distant from fascism. These individuals, a major component of FDR’s New Deal
coalition, protested heavily against any actions seen to aid the “communist” Loyalists.73
Fears of communism were widespread, most importantly within Cordell Hull and the
State Department, who tried to persuade FDR that the Spanish Republic was “little more
than a stalking horse for Bolshevism.”74 In his decision, Roosevelt was disregarding
“conventional international practice” that “allowed him to trade and freely send arms to
the recognized government of Spain.” But clearly FDR had few options once the British
path had been chosen and sentiment at home was clear. For America, as for Britain, “the
first priority was not saving Spanish democracy but preventing a European war.”75 A
pragmatic decision for FDR as well, it allowed him to please isolationists by staying out
of the struggle, and interventionists by following Britain and France. A movement by
several congressmen to lift the embargo on the Loyalists was defeated76 and in May
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1937, the Neutrality Legislation was officially amended to include as “belligerents” those
engaged in civil strife. This act “represented the most absolute form of neutrality and the
most complete program of isolation.”77
While Roosevelt was encouraged by the Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace held in Buenos Aires in November 1936, he found that
negotiations with Britain were often futile and self-serving. His chief ambassador in
London wrote “what is really in the back of their [British] minds is to try to work out
something which will not cost them anything.” He also noted that Chamberlain was set
to replace Baldwin and that this would be “a great mistake” as he “lives and breathes
only in the atmosphere of the money-changers of the city.”78 At first, FDR was more
optimistic about the effect Chamberlain could have in the Prime Minister’s office,
“knowing Chamberlain to be a stubborn and stalwart champion of peace.’79 It was not
long before resentment returned to the relationship. Chamberlain argued that the
American Neutrality legislation favoured aggressors, yet when Roosevelt suggested that
the embargo might be extended to Germany and Italy as obvious “belligerents’ in the
Civil War, Chamberlain would not support him.80 Chamberlain’s strict holding to his
own policy of appeasement (in which the United States counted very little) and his
unwillingness to consider American proposals, caused a real “paralysis of American
foreign policy.” The government did not have an alternative policy and feared what
would happen if a complete break with the “network of appeasement” was to occur.81
As with the Abyssinian Crisis, British and American interests were hardly
antagonistic at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, and yet little common ground was
found, due to lack of effort, lack of appreciation for the other’s position, and domestic
considerations. This second lost opportunity would condemn Republican Spain to defeat
and further encourage the dictators. Considering the exclusiveness of the British and
American presence in the Far East, and their common interest in naval strength, a quick
analysis of an event there might shed even more light on the Anglo-American
relationship at this time. As noted earlier, beginning with the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria in 1931, there had been great difficulty in organizing a joint Anglo-American
action in order to curb Japanese aggression. A Nine Power Conference held in Brussels
(October-November 1937) to discuss possible actions against renewed Japanese
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aggression against China ended in failure. The American delegation leader, Norman
Davis, indicated that the assorted powers were willing to consider serious sanctions but
the State Department replied that “coercive measures did not fall within the scope of the
conference.82 FDR was leery of becoming “a tail to the British kite,” and this was
matched by Chamberlain’s fear that “American assistance could result in Britain’s
displacement” at least in the Far East and perhaps generally.83
On December 12, 1937, Japanese bombers sunk the USS Panay and inflicted
serious damage to the HMS Ladybird. The outrage this sparked created a golden
opportunity for the two states to come together in condemning and curtailing further
Japanese aggression. It was one of the few occasions that Chamberlain was willing to
consider a strong display of force, provided that he was guaranteed American support.
The British asked FDR to hold off until a joint response could be coordinated. They
suggested that a British fleet of eight or nine capital ships including escorts might be
deployed to the Pacific if the United States was willing to make a similar commitment.84
FDR, while willing to discuss the idea, surged ahead, demanding an immediate apology
and compensation from Japan. Essentially, the president simply continued a policy that
preferred “cooperation on parallel but independent lines.” This policy ensured only
limited opposition, which suited FDR fine, as he feared antagonizing further Japanese
actions against China. He was not willing to impose the Neutrality Law on this
“undeclared” war because he recognized that it would hurt China (with its close
economic ties to America) much more than Japan.85 FDR did approach British
ambassador Ronald Lindsey on December 12 about an exchange of secret information
and plans for a naval blockade after the next outrage. But by December 17 he had cooled
off substantially, “instead of giving additional thought and substance to the blockade
idea, he decided simply to send an American naval officer to London for technical
discussions.86
By the time FDR warmed to the idea of increasing Anglo-American naval
presence in the Pacific (January 10, 1938), Chamberlain had substantially cooled to the
idea – the opportunity had been lost. In the light of recent reports conducted by the
Chiefs of Staff sub-committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence, he was unwilling
to weaken the naval presence in Europe, nor spark a conflict that might spread to the
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Mediterranean. The Chiefs of Staff had concluded that the achievement of stability in
Europe must come before dealing with Japan.87 A ‘Secret Memorandum’ had been
presented to the British cabinet in December. Its conclusions made clear the failure of
rearmament to this point:
From the above report it will be seen that our Naval,
Military, and Air forces, in their present stage of
development, are still far from sufficient to meet our
defensive commitments...We cannot therefore, exaggerate
the importance, from the point of view of Imperial
Defence, of any political or international action that can be
taken to reduce the numbers of our potential enemies and to
gain the support of potential allies.88
FDR’s inconsistency cost him any chance of cooperation with Britain in the Far East,
This episode only confirmed Chamberlain’s view of “Washington as an unreliable
associate”89 The impasse in this Far East crisis, symbolic of the general conflict, was that
Chamberlain feared that “Roosevelt might lead Britain into a joint confrontation with
Japan, only to abandon her under the impact of isolationist pressure” and that Roosevelt
was highly sensitive “to the possibility that British diplomacy might unduly entangle the
United States in its own affairs.”90
Looking lastly at the general situation in 1938, it is possible to outline the broad
“peace platforms” of the two leaders, platforms that had slowly developed through their
experiences in the previous events and with each other. Both states believed that they
were isolated and alone. To both FDR and Chamberlain, Russia was “weak militarily,
unstable politically, and unsound economically,” France was rife with “domestic
instability” and weakness, and neither trusted the other. Both concluded that “alliances
could result in unwanted entanglements” and sought their own path.91 The divergence in
their platforms could be noted as early as June 1937, after Chamberlain turned down an
invitation from FDR to visit him in Washington, and forbade Anthony Eden, his foreign
secretary, from visiting either. Chamberlain “saw discussions with Berlin as preliminary
to any visit to the United States.”92 This initial rebuff, the “almost instinctive contempt”93
they held for each other and the “legacy of suspicion and frustration in both economic
and political relations”94 made a closer cooperation impossible.
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On October 5, 1937, Roosevelt gave a stirring speech that called for aggressor
states to be “quarantined” by the community in order to preserve peace. The next day in
a press conference he toned down his statements considerably, denying any suggestion of
sanctions or military force. A British request for an “exact interpretation” of the
quarantine idea was ignored.95 Clearly, Roosevelt was not ready to announce his plans,
half-formed as they may have been. Chamberlain objected that the Americans, after
being so cautious, suddenly “jump in, without saying a word to us beforehand, and
without knowing what they mean to do.”96 Yet a few broad concepts can be isolated to
create a sense of FDR’s platform. First, a plan was being developed with Undersecretary
of State Sumner Welles to create a “world peace front” which would consist of ten nonGreat Power nations97 and an American representative. This committee would establish a
common ground for all of those who wished to resist aggression through agreements on
principles of international conduct, disarmament, and economic well being (in particular
equal access to raw materials). American involvement would be limited to moral
leadership and a heavy emphasis on economic recovery. The proposals emerging from
this community would then be presented to the world and agreed upon. If certain states
chose not to agree, the common ground for a united front would already exist. FDR
emphasized that he saw this plan as a “parallel” not a contrary action to Chamberlain’s
diplomacy with the dictators.
Chamberlain had a very different conception of the methods needed to achieve
world peace, as demonstrated by his initial rebuff to Roosevelt’s conference idea in
January 1938. He clearly saw himself “as the motive force in international affairs,” and
he resented Roosevelt’s efforts that seemed to intrude and interfere with his discussions
with Hitler.98 Though even France sought an American initiated conference or arbitration
of the central European crisis, Chamberlain remained committed to his notions.99 At the
Imperial Conference of June 1937, Chamberlain still advocated the “peaceful destruction
of Versailles” with “moderate revision” to satisfy Hitler. He had already agreed in
principle to all of the demands Germany would make in 1938:
Austria could be permitted to join Germany if Austrians
wished it; a few gestures would calm Hitler’s worries about
Czechoslovakia; German-Polish friendship (in a 1934 pact)
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would lead to amicable solutions over Danzig and stop
oppression of Germans in Poland.100
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement thus rested on the fundamental principle that
Hitler’s demands were reasonable and limited and should be allowed so long as they
could be accomplished by peaceful means.
The most unsettling fact that appears from a study of Anglo-American diplomacy
in this period is that neither side gave the other anything but the most limited support. As
Chamberlain aggressively pursued his appeasement policy in 1938, FDR increasingly
backed off, following only at a discrete distance. Another economic downturn and
slipping public popularity in 1938 had an effect to be sure, but FDR was most concerned
about tying the United States to a policy that he believed was doomed to fail. FDR had
recognized, by 1938, that Chamberlain’s fundamental principle was erroneous, and that
his eager mission of meeting Hitler’s demands by selling out the Czechs would only
encourage the dictator to take more. FDR tightened American control on British
propaganda in June with the Foreign Agents Registration Act that forced all agents to be
registered with the State Department and all literature from these agents to be labelled
plainly as “propaganda.”101 But he held out the vain hope that peace might be maintained,
believing that there was little the United States could do. This pragmatic outlook, the
finding of a path “between rejecting appeasement and not standing in its way,”102 can be
seen in his vague support for the Anglo-Italian Accord in April 1938. He refused to
approve of the settlement but encouraged the methods.103 Chamberlain was equally
guilty, refusing to even consider, much less support, FDR’s plans. As Britain and France
scrambled to avoid war in the midst of the Sudeten Crisis, FDR made clear in an address
on September 9 that not even a moral alliance existed with France and Britain. He then
informed France on September 15 that if they went to war the United States would apply
the Neutrality Legislation against them.104 FDR was clearly not a “good neighbour”105
and his classic remark that Chamberlain was a “good man” for going to Munich should
be noted for its brief and self-interested nature – not willing and perhaps unable to
endorse or support him, but willing to enjoy any benefit that might result.
There can be no question that the failure of Anglo-American cooperation in the
years 1935 to 1938 was a central origin of the Second World War. Conflict of both an
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individual and national nature existed between Britain and the United States and this
conflict could not be resolved even in the face of serious world crises like the Abyssinian
Crisis, the Spanish Civil War, and Japanese aggression in the Far East. This conflict had
deep roots in the history of diplomacy and relations between the two countries, but was
aggravated in the 1930s by a relationship marked by suspicion, selfishness, and contrary
interests. Given this atmosphere, an agreement was unlikely. As early as 1934,
Chamberlain had concluded that the “nation of cads” could not be relied upon.106 But
domestic forces constraining and pushing these statesmen can not be ignored. Both men,
dominating figures in their respective countries and on the world scene, and both
countries generally, deserve criticism as well as understanding in any useful evaluation of
the events leading up to the Munich Crisis.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
The Munich Conference of September 1938 exists as one of those principal
landmarks of modern history. Munich has been long reviled as an immoral deal with the
dictators that “sold-out” the Czechs, the culmination of a policy of appeasement that is
directly blamed for letting Hitler get out of control, and the ultimate evidence of weak
and corrupt leadership from the democratic nations. Revisionists have since attempted to
construct a more positive image of Neville Chamberlain, emphasizing his personal
strength and the difficult circumstances with which he was faced. In the last few years,
“post-revisionists” have begun to appear as well as this controversial debate continues to
be unresolved. Rather than re-telling the story of Munich itself, I have sought to explain
the informing factors in the development of British appeasement and American
“nonintervention” in order to emphasize that the biggest failure of the years leading up to
Munich was the failure of Anglo-American cooperation. Here I still walk upon welltrodden ground as over the last couple of decades a great interest has been shown by the
historical community in Chamberlain and Roosevelt and how Britain and America
worked (or didn’t work) together through the escalating crises in Europe and the Far
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East. While hardly able to represent all of the vast quality literature on these subjects, I
have sought to touch on most of the major works. I have sought a balance of secondary
sources focussing on specific events (e.g. the Spanish Civil War), those focussing on
Chamberlain and/or FDR personally, those focussing on the United States and Britain
generally, and relevant primary source material.
Primary Sources:
The historian of this subject is privileged to have extensive publications of
addresses, speeches, letters, and personal papers of both statesmen. In particular,
historical work on Chamberlain was revolutionized by the discovery of his letters to his
sisters, providing a glimpse of his true feelings about the events and people around him.
While I did not examine these diaries as separate sources, they were well documented in
several of the monographs highlighting Chamberlain. For speeches during his term as
Prime Minister up to 1938, I have relied on Arthur Bryant’s collection entitled In Search
of Peace: Speeches by the Right Honourable Neville Chamberlain (London: Hutchinson
& Company Publishers, Ltd., 1938).
There are many sources for primary documents on Roosevelt generally and
foreign policy specifically. For this paper I relied on two main series. The first, more
general, collection is The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New
York: Russell & Russell, 1941). The collection I used most was Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Foreign Affairs, edited by Edgar B. Nixon for 1935-1937, and the Second Series
edited by Donald B. Schewe for 1938.
Secondary Sources:
It is easy to become overwhelmed by the oceans of secondary literature that touch
in some way upon my topic. Of those I waded into, there are four general categories –
sources focussed on Chamberlain and Britain, sources focussed on FDR and the United
States, sources focussed on the Munich Conference or another major event, including
anthologies of essays, and finally sources that directly focus on the Anglo-American
relationship in this period.
The first category, those sources focussed primarily on Chamberlain and Britain,
cover a wide range of evaluative positions. One of the most balanced and in depth
accounts, and thus one of those heavily relied upon in my own essay, is that of R. A.
Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second
World War (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993). Ian Colvin conducts a valuable study
of British government power relationships in The Chamberlain Cabinet (New York:
Taplinger Publishing Company, 1971). A highly sympathetic or “revisionist” account of
Chamberlain is that of John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London:
Hodder & Stoughton, 1989). Of particular interest here is Charmley’s rational
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explanations of appeasement and his emphasis that Chamberlain was not the domineering
force in British politics that is often assumed. John Ruggiero’s very recent monograph,
Neville Chamberlain and British Rearmament (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999)
balances military, domestic, and foreign issues, countering Charmley by emphasizing
Chamberlain’s “overwhelming exercise in power”. A more exclusively military account
is that of Joseph A. Maido, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (London:
Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1998). A contemporary account that is useful for its depiction of
some British prejudices (it describes the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia as “not a
wrong, but the righting of a wrong”) is that of Collin Brooks, Can Chamberlain Save
Britain? (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1938). For a very critical examination of Chamberlain,
see Sidney Astor’s “Guilty Men: The Case of Neville Chamberlain,” in The Origins of
the Second World War Reconsidered. For a more balanced examination of
Chamberlain’s thoughts, see Erik Goldstein’s “Neville Chamberlain, the British Official
Mind, and the Munich Crisis,” in The Munich Crisis 1938: Prelude to World War II.
Williamson Murray’s The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The
Path to Ruin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) is an excellent source for
considering the results of Munich.
An even wider body of literature is available on the United States and Franklin
Roosevelt for this period. Like many American history students, I began with the
standard and still most influential text, Robert Dallek’s expansive Franklin D. Roosevelt
and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
For monographs primarily focussed on Roosevelt as president, I relied upon William E.
Leuchtenburg’s Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper
& Row Publishers, 1963) and Kenneth S. Davis’ FDR: Into the Storm, 1937-1940, A
History (New York: Random House, 1993). An older, though extremely valuable work
focussed specifically on American neutrality legislation was that of Donald F.
Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1955). John Wilz and Justus Doenecke add to this work with From Isolation to
War, 1931-1941, 2nd ed. (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson Press, Inc., 1968,
1991). Richard P. Traina emphasizes these issues in one major crisis in American
Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968).
For a look at Catholic Americans’ reactions and impact in this period, see George Q.
Flynn’s Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy (Westport, Conn:
Greenwood Press, 1976). A sharply critical study of American diplomacy is that of
Arnold A. Offner, American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany,
1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969).
A worthwhile study of American economic appeasement policy is that of Arthur W.
Schatz, “The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hull’s Search for Peace,
1936-1938,” Journal of American History 1970 57(1): 85-103. For American relations
with other European countries see, a good quick explication of America’s influence on
France during the Czech Crisis in John McVickar Haight, Jr.’s, “France, the United
States, and Munich,” Journal of Modern History 1960 32(4): 340-358, and GermanAmerican relations in Manfred Jonas’ The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic
History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
There were several anthologies of essays that I ruthlessly pillaged as I researched
my topic. These include Appeasing Fascism: Articles from the Wayne State University
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Conference on Munich after Fifty Years, eds. Melvin Small and Otto Feinstein (Lanham:
University Press of America, 1991). In this collection I particularly focussed on an
article by Offner, “Influence without Responsibility: American Statecraft and the Munich
Conference,” and Douglas Little’s “Architects of Appeasement: Franklin Roosevelt, the
State Department, and the Spanish Civil War.” Another fairly recent anthology is that of
Robert Boyce and Esmonde Robertson, Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the
Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1989). Boyce’s article “World Depression,
World War: Some Economic Origins of the Second World War” was particularly
valuable in understanding the impact of the Depression on the western powers. Steven
Morewood’s “Anglo-Italian Rivalry in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1935-1940”
assists the history student in understanding the complexity of British interests and their
effect on their foreign policy with Italy. Finally, Glyn Stone’s “The European Great
Powers and the Spanish Civil War” focuses on the military and ideological underpinnings
of nonintervention. A third anthology is that of Gordon Martel, The Origins of the
Second World War Reconsidered, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1986). Alan Cassels’
article “Mussolini and the Myth of Rome” and Brian Sullivan’s “The Ethiopian Crisis
and the Origins of the Second World War” explain the wishful yet not completely
unreasonable thinking of the West in seeing Mussolini as a potential ally and moderating
influence. Along with Astor’s article on Chamberlain (see above), this anthology was
particularly valuable to my study. The last anthology used was Igor Lukes and Erik
Goldstein’s The Munich Crisis 1938: Prelude to World War II (London: Frank Cass,
1999). Nicholas Cull’s “The Munich Crisis and British Propaganda: Policy in the United
States,” which examines American efforts to control British access to the American
people and Peter Nevile’s “Neville Henderson and Basil Newton: Two British Envoys in
the Czech Crisis, 1938,” which examines the role of ambassadors in distorting the
pictures Chamberlain used to create his policies were both highly valuable.
The last category and certainly that category most exclusively in line with my
analysis includes sources which focussed primarily on the Anglo-American relationship
in this period. These include Callum MacDonald’s The United States, Britain, and
Appeasement, 1936-1939 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981) which is quite critical of
the American position, suggesting that a weak policy of appeasement what as the heart of
their foreign policy, and the more balanced view of William R. Rock in Chamberlain and
Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the United States, 1937-1940 (Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1988). Together with Parker’s work, Rock was the most
influential in shaping my own understandings of British perspectives. A more critical
view of Britain is put forward by Telford Taylor in Munich: The Price of Peace (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1979). Finally, John Dizikes’ very
interesting work, Britain, Roosevelt, and the New Deal: British Opinion, 1932-1938
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979), examines British public opinion’s generally
admirable evaluation of Roosevelt and the New Deal, suggesting even a certain jealousy
on Chamberlain’s part.
0
Sidney Aster, “Guilty Men: The Case of Neville Chamberlain,” The Origins of the Second World War
Reconsidered, 2 n d ed., ed. Gordon Martel, (London: Routledge, 1986) 240-241.
0
Ken neth S. Dav is, FD R: Into th e Storm , 1937 -194 0, A H istory, (New York: Random House, 1993) 131.
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0
Neville Chamberlain, “Statement at Heston Airport, 30 Sept 1938,” In Search of Peace: Speeches by the
Right Hono urable N eville Cham berla in, ed. Arthur B ryant, (Londo n: Hutchinson & Co mpany Publishers,
Ltd., 1938) 302.
0
W illiam R. Roc k, Chamberlain and Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the United States, 1937-1940,
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1988) 25.
0
John Dizikes, Britain, Roosevelt, and the New Deal: British Opinion, 1932-1938, (New York: G arland
Publishing, Inc., 1979) 54.
0
Erik Goldstein, “Neville Chamberlain, the British Official Mind, and the Munich Crisis,” The Munich
Crisis, 1938: P relude to World Wa r II, eds. Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein, (London: Frank Cass, 1999)
277.
0
W illiamson M urray, The Chang e in the European Balance of P ower, 19 38-193 9: Th e Pa th to R uin,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 50.
0
Arnold A. Offner, “Influence without Responsibility: American statecraft and the Munich Conference,”
App easing Fascism : Articles from the Wayne State U niversity Con ference o n M unich After Fifty Years, eds.
Melvin Small and Otto Feinstein, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991) 53.
0
R. A. P arker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993) 71.
0
In the M anchurian case, while the U nited S tates condemned the Japanese action, B ritain searched for its
own agreement with Japan, in order to be able to focus on Europe. Significantly, Neville Chamberlain was
the fiercest proponent of an Anglo-Japanese settlement writing that “Japanese friendship for Britain was
more important for Britain than the friend ship of the United S tates.” B ut not desiring a break at this early
stage, the British continued to discuss with America a suitable response. See Parker, 43.
0
Rock, 2.
0
Robert Boyce, “W orld Depression, World W ar: Some Economic Origins of the Second World War,”
Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War, eds. Robert Boyce and Esmonde
Robertson, (London: Macmillan, 1989) 57.
0
W illiam E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940, (New York: H arper &
Row Publishers, 1963) 203.
0
Vansittart was the Permanent Undersecretary of the British Foreign Office and a powerful dissenting
voice against Chamberlain in later years, a fact that would cost him his job in 1937. See Parker, 15.
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0
John W ilz and Justus D oenecke, From Isolation to War, 1931-1941, 2 n d ed., (Arlington H eights, Illinois:
Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1991) 53. This Act was particularly ill-received as it made no distinction between
those nations which had not paid at all, and those which had tried to pay as much as possible.
0
Chamberlain had been noted for his efforts to pay as much of British debts as possible and so viewed
American inflexibility on this issue as a betrayal. See Dizikes, 65.
0
Boyce, 80.
0
Parker estim ates (p. 17) that by 1932 , the United S tates had 4 billion dollars in gold stocks as compa red to
only 590 million dollars for the UK.
0
Wilz and Doenecke, 33.
0
Boyce, 83.
0
For example, the American Smoo t-Hawley tariff law of 1930 d oubled tariffs to approximately 50% mo re
than the average rates on most import values. See Parker, 17.
0
Leuchtenburg, 205.
0
It is important to note that this alliance was only formed after the Munich Conference (Decemb er 1938).
0
Arthur W. Schatz, “The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hull’s Search for Peace, 19361938,” Journ al of Am erican H istory, 1970 57(1): 91-93.
0
Callum MacD onald, The United States, Britain, and Appeasement, 1936-1939, (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1981) 21.
0
Schatz, 102.
0
MacDonald, 13.
0
FDR, “Statement on Anglo-Italian Accord, April 19, 1938,” The Public Pape rs and Addresses o f Franklin
D. R oosevelt, Vol. 7, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1941) 249.
0
FDR , “Statement to Congress, 28 Jan 193 8,” in The P ublic Pa pers, 69.
0
Neville Chamberlain, “Chamberlain to FDR 14 Jan 1938 ,” Fran klin D. Roosevelt and F oreign Affairs,
Second Series, Vol. 8, ed. Donald B. Schewe (New York: Clearwater Publishing Company, Inc.) 83.
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0
Neville Chamberlain, “Address to Birmingham Unionist Meeting, April 9, 1938,” Speeches by the Right
Ho nou rable Neville Ch am berla in, 172.
0
John Charmley, Chamb erlain and the Lost Peace, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989) 41.
0
Neville Chamberlain, “Address to Birmingham Unionist Meeting, April 9, 1938,” in Speeches by the
Right Hono urable N eville Cham berla in, 177.
0
Joseph A . Maido, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939, (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1998)
146 .
0
Ian Colvin, The Chamb erlain Cabinet, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1971) 71.
0
Brian Sullivan, “The Ethiopian War and the Origins of the Second World W ar,” The Origins of the Second
World War Reconsidered, 179 . Chancellor Do llfuss had been a personal friend o f Mu ssolini.
0
Alan Cassels, “Mussolini and the Myth of Rome,” The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered,
62. M ussolini insisted on the “in Europ e” in blatant foreshad owing of his African co lonial adventures.
0
Cassels, 59.
0
Offner, “Influence without Responsibility,” 53-54.
0
Manfred Jona s, The U nited States a nd G erma ny: A D iploma tic History, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984) 229.
0
Peter Neville, “Nevile Henderson and Basil Newton: Two British Envoys in the Czech Crisis of 1938,”
The M unich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to Wo rld War II, 260. Addison was ambassador to Czechoslovakia from
1930 to 1936.
0
Murray, 60. Henderson beca me A mba ssado r to B erlin in 1937 after serving as A mba ssado r to Argentina.
Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, soon regretted the decision.
0
MacDonald, 79.
0
Joseph Kennedy, “Kennedy to Hull, 30 August 1938,” Fran klin D. Roosevelt and F oreign Affairs, Vol. 8,
109.
0
Parker, 27.
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0
Robert D allek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979) 107.
0
Steven Morewood, “Anglo-Italian Rivalry in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1935-1940,” Paths to
War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War, 168-171.
0
Sir Samuel Hoare, “Address to the League, Sept 1935,” cited in Parker, 50.
0
Parker, 52. In March, 193 6, Hitler ordered the Reichswehr to remilitarize the Rhineland, eliminating the
“buffer zone” betw een France and G erma ny.
0
Leuchtenburg, 217.
0
Dallek, 108. Under the Neutrality Act, FDR could define “implements of war” and decide when the
emb argo went into effect. He also c ut the ma ndatory time of the em bargo to six m onths. S till the overall
effect was in Leuchtenburg’s words “to manacle the President” (219).
0
Dizikes, 252.
0
Leuchtenburg, 220.
0
FDR, “FDR to Cordell Hull, 10 Oct 1935,” Fran klin D. Roosevelt and F oreign Affairs, Vol. 3, ed. Edgar
B. Nixon, (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969) 18.
0
Dallek, 106.
0
cited in Leuchtenburg, 221.
0
John Ruggiero, Neville Chamberlain and British Rearmament, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999)
26.
0
Breckenridge Long, Ame rican Ambassador to Italy, referred to an oil embargo as a potential “ace in the
hole.” “Long to FDR, 6 Dec 1935,” Fran klin D. Roosevelt and F oreign Affairs, Vol. 3, 115.
0
Parker, 48-50.
0
Dallek, 115.
0
Baldwin cited in MacD onald, 20. A sentiment to be later echoed almost precisely by Chamberlain.
24/27
0
Ethiopia was to be “compensated” by a small strip of land connecting what was left of it to the ocean.
0
Dizikes, 221.
0
Nicholas J. Cull, “The Munich Crisis and British Propaganda: Policy in the United States,” The Munich
Crisis, 1938: P relude to World Wa r II, 216.
0
Parker, 56.
0
Telford T aylor, Munich: The Price of Peace, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Coy, Inc., 1979) 535.
0
Neville Chamberlain, “Chamberlain to House of Commons, 25 June 1937,” In Search of Peace: Speeches
by the Rig ht Hono urable N eville Cham berla in, 26.
0
Davis, 120-121.
0
Taylor, 539.
0
Ibid., 537.
0
Glyn Stone, “The European Great Powers and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939,” Paths to War: New
Essays on the Origins of the Second World War, 215.
0
Mary Habeck, “The Spanish Civil War and the Origins of the Second World W ar,” The Origins of the
Second World War Reconsidered, 217.
0
George Q. Flynn, Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy, 1937-1945, (W estpo rt,
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1976) 40.
0
Dou glas Little, “Architechts of Appeasement: Franklin Roo sevelt, the State Dep artment, and the S panish
Civil War,” Appeasing Fascism: Articles from the Wayne State University Conference, 73.
0
Dallek, 127-131.
0
Ironically, the same Senator Nye who had led the commission investigating American entry into WW I,
and who had argued so strongly for the first Neutrality Legislation was the lead er of this m ovement.
0
Do nald F . Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941. (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1955) 45-46.
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0
Robert W. Bingham, “Bingham to Roosevelt, 13 Nov 1936,” Fran klin D. Roosevelt and F oreign Affairs,
Vol. 3, 486.
0
Davis, 128.
0
Dallek, 142-143.
0
Richa rd P . Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War, (Blo omington: Indiana University
Press, 1968) 101.
0
Wilz and Doenecke, 71.
0
Rock, 13.
0
Parker, 107.
0
Dallek, 147. Despite extensive mobilizations on both sides and heavy fighting in northern China, the war
remained undeclared.
0
Ibid., 155.
0
Rock, 55.
0
Colvin, 64. Its full name was “A Comparison of the Strength of Great Britain with certain other nations as
at January 1938”
0
Maido, 147.
0
Rock, 49.
0
Ibid., 10-11.
0
Dallek, 145.
0
Boyce, 85.
0
Rock, 4.
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0
Dallek, 150.
0
Chamberlain cited in Rock, 35.
0
The nations were to include Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
Turkey, and three Latin American governments. Chamberlain noted that it included everybody but “the
people who mattered,” cited in Parker, 115.
0
Goldstein, 277. It might also be emphasized here the attention historians pay to the influence of
Chamberlain’s family. Certainly his contempt for America and belief in Britain’s influence for peace and
stabilization are indivisible from that of his half-brother Austen Chamberlain, who had been Fo reign
Secretary in 1925.
0
On the French and in particular the work of American Amb assador to France W illiam Bullitt see John
McV ickar Haight, Jr., “France, the United States, and Munich,” Journ al of Modern History 1960 3 2(4):
340-358.
0
Parker, 79.
0
Nicholas J. Cull, “The Munich Crisis and British Propaganda: Policy in the United States,” The Munich
Crisis 1938: Prelude to World W ar II, 218.
0
Dallek, 158.
0
FDR, “Statement on Anglo-Italian Accord, 19 April 1938,” The Public Pape rs and Addresses o f Franklin
D. R oosevelt, 249.
0
Haight, 347.
0
On this see a speech by FDR at the San Diego Exhibition, 2 Oct 1935 in which he declared that “I am a
good neighbour” to the world. Cited in Fran klin D. Roosevelt and F oreign Affairs, Vol. 3, 14.
0
Cited in Parker, 44. Chamberlain went on to conclude that America “would give us plenty of assurances
of goodw ill, especially if we will pro mise to do all the fighting, but the mo ment she is aske d to contribute
something she invariably take s refuge behind Congress.”
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