ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY AMENDMENTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS OF THE 2013 CAP REFORM Prepared ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨͣTHE FIRST CAP REFORM UNDER THE ORDINARY LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE͟project Tender IP/B/AGRI/IC/2013-‐156, European Parliament Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels Final version ƌ͘&ZdS͕/ŵƌĞ [email protected] <Ks^͕ƚƚŝůĂ attila.kovacs4@uni-‐corvinus.hu Budapest, July 2014 1 T able of content I. Theoretical overview ....................................................................................................................... 4 1. The definition of institutional or legislative power ..................................................................... 4 2. From consultation to co-‐decision procedure .............................................................................. 5 3. Previous research in analysing EP amendments ......................................................................... 6 4. Inter-‐institutional relationships ................................................................................................... 7 II. Inter-‐institutional coalitions during the trialogue negotiations ...................................................... 7 1. Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 7 2. Patterns of coalition formulation ................................................................................................ 7 3. Winning institutional coalitions ................................................................................................... 8 III. Analysing EP amendments: calculating success rates ................................................................. 9 1. Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 9 2. Analysis by the type of EP amendments ................................................................................... 11 3. Regulation-‐specific thematic success rates ............................................................................... 13 IV. 1. Amendment analysis via the internal decision-‐making in the European Parliament ........... 15 Rates of distribution .................................................................................................................. 15 Distributions along the phase of decision-‐making ........................................................................ 15 Distributions along the type of amendment and the four CAP regulations ................................. 16 1.2. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Comparison with the consultation procedure .................................................................. 17 Analysing the aggregate number of amendments .................................................................... 18 2.1. The 2013 CAP reform ........................................................................................................ 18 2.2. Comparison with the consultation procedure .................................................................. 19 The role of rapporteurs: draft report and compromise amendments ...................................... 21 3.1. The 2013 CAP Reform ........................................................................................................ 21 3.2. Comparison with the consultation procedure .................................................................. 23 The role of open amendments .................................................................................................. 25 4.1. The 2013 CAP reform ........................................................................................................ 25 4.2. Comparison with the consultation procedure .................................................................. 26 The opinion giving committees ................................................................................................. 27 5.1. The 2013 CAP Reform ........................................................................................................ 27 5.2. Comparison with the consultation procedure .................................................................. 29 The COMAGRI-‐Plenary relationship .......................................................................................... 30 6.1. The 2013 CAP reform ........................................................................................................ 30 2 6.2. Comparison with the consultation procedure .................................................................. 31 7. The EP plenary: the relationship between the EP negotiation mandate and the Final Regulations ........................................................................................................................................ 32 7.1. The EP plenary amendments ............................................................................................. 32 7.2. Results of amendments during the trialogue negotiations ............................................... 33 7.3. Comparison with the consultation procedure .................................................................. 35 Literature ............................................................................................................................................... 37 Annex I. List of EP documents analysed ................................................................................................ 39 Annex II. Key institutional positions in the CAP trialogue negotiations ................................................ 50 Annex III. Tables .................................................................................................................................... 72 3 I. Theoretical overview The role and influence of the European Parliament in EU-level decision-making have long been a centrepiece of discussion in political science. Treaties in the last decades have significantly changed the institutional balance as well as the decision-making procedures of the European Union. To date, there is no definite conclusion on the evolution of the role of the European Parliament: some say that the EP has been empowered and given a bigger say in EU policy formulation in the last two decades; others are convinced that although given significant powers, the EP's ability to influence political decision-making and policy outcome has been unchanged or even narrowed. This research is a case study. It examines the four legislative instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy for the 2014-2020 EU programming period. Although the Common Agricultural Policy has always been the EU policy with the highest relative share of EU budget, research focusing on the factors influencing the legislative power of the European Parliament in the domain of CAP legislation has been limited. As the Treaty of Lisbon changed the decision-making procedure to be applied for the legislative instruments of the CAP - changing from consultation procedure to co-decision (ordinary legislative procedure) -, the comparison between these two periods provides a real opportunity for examining the change of legislative power of the EP. 1. The definition of institutional or legislative power In this research, the definition of legislative power shall be defined. Crombez (1997) defines an institution¶VSRZHU³DVLWVDELOLW\WRREWDLQDSROLF\WKDWLVFORVHWRLWVLGHDOSROLF\,WFDQEH measured by the distance between the equilibrium policy and its ideal policy, a smaller distance LQGLFDWLQJPRUHSRZHU´1 Crombez (1999)2 FDOOVSRZHUDV³WKH3DUOLDPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRREWDLQD SROLF\WKDWLVFORVHWRLWVLGHDOSROLF\´ 1 2 Crombez (1997), pp. 112. Crombez (1999), pp. 5. 4 ,Q FRPPHQVXUDWH ZLWK %DUU\¶V 3 GHILQLWLRQ RQ ³GHFLVLYHQHVV´ 6HOFN DQG 6WHXQHQEHUJ GHILQH SRZHU ³DV WKH FDSDELOLWLHV RI WKH SROLWLFDO DFWRUV UHIOected by their decisionmaking rights. These rights include the possibility to make the initial proposal (agenda-setting SRZHUDQGWRDPHQGDSSURYHRUYHWRDSURSRVDO´4 2. From consultation to co-decision procedure There are conflicting views on how the shift from consultation to co-decision procedure influenced the power of the European Parliament. As for the consultation procedure, Crombez (1996) claims that the Parliament is powerless under this procedure as its opinion to the Commission proposal is not binding. However, there is one tool in the hands of the EP: it can delay legislation by not issuing an opinion, and block other legislation if its opinion is ignored.5 Tsebelis and Garrett (2001)6 DOVRFODLPWKDW´«ZKHQ the consultation procedure appOLHVWKH3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQIOXHQFHLVOLPLWHGWRWKHWKUHDWRIGHOD\LQJ OHJLVODWLRQ´7 7KHVH SRVLWLRQV DUH LQ OLQH ZLWK /XFLF¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ /XFLF ZKR considers the role of the European Parliament as advisory, modest and limited under the consultation procedure.8 However, in their comparative analysis between the consultation and co-GHFLVLRQSURFHGXUHV6HOFNDQG6WHXQHQEHUJFODLPWKDWWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW³LV closer to the [final policy] outcome under consultation than under co-GHFLVLRQ´9 Regarding the co-decision procedure, scholars have divergent views whether the introduction of the co-decision procedure enhanced the legislative power of the EP. Steunenberg (1994) %DUU\Ä,V,W%HWWHUWR%H3RZHUIXORU/XFN\"´3DUWDQG Political Studies 28: 183-194 and 338-352. Selck and Steunenberg (2004): Torsten J. Selck, Bernard Steunenberg, Ä%HWZHHQ3RZHUDQG/XFN7KH(XURSHDQ Parliament in tKH(8/HJLVODWLYH3URFHVV´ European Union Politics, Vol. 5. pp. 40. 5 Crombez (1996): Crombez, Christophe, Ä/HJLVODWLYH3URFHGXUHVLQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\´ British Journal of Political Science pp. 205. 6 7VHEHOLVDQG*DUUHWW*HRUJH7VHEHOLVDQG*HRIIUH\*DUUHWW³7KH,QVWLWXWLRQDO)RXQGDWLRQVRI Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the (XURSHDQ8QLRQ´,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQL]DWLRQ6SULQJ 2001, pp. 357±390 7 7VHEHOLVDQG*DUUHWW*HRUJH7VHEHOLVDQG*HRIIUH\*DUUHWW³7KH,QVWLWXWLRQDO)RXQGDWLRQVRI ,QWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOLVPDQG6XSUDQDWLRQDOLVPLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ´,QWHUQDWLRQal Organization 55, 2, Spring 2001, pp. 372. 8 Lucic, (2004): The Power of the European Parliament in Cooperation Legislative Procedure, pp. 2. and pp. 8. 9 Selck and Steunenberg (2004): Torsten J. Selck, Bernard Steunenberg, Ä%HWZHHQ3RZHUDQG/XFN7KH European Parliament in WKH(8/HJLVODWLYH3URFHVV´ European Union Politics, Vol. 5. pp. 30. 3 4 5 claims that the co-decision procedure does not really improve the 3DUOLDPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQ10 and it GLGQ¶WLQFUHDVHWKHSRZHURIWKH3DUOLDPHQW*DUUHWWDQG7VHEHOLVDOVRFODLPWKDWFRGHFLVLRQDFWXDOO\ZHDNHQVWKH(3¶VHIIHFWLYHSRZHUVRYHUOHJLVODWLRQE\UHGXFLQJLWVDJHQGDsetting ability. On the other hand, according to Crombez (1997), Steunenberg (1994) overlooks the opportunity that the Parliament can amend the legislative proposals by agreeing on a joint text in the &RQFLOLDWLRQ&RPPLWWHH,QKLVDUWLFOH&URPEH]FRQFOXGHVWKDW³WKH3DUOLDPHQWEHFRPHV a genuine co-legislator under the co-decision procedure, and its role is shown to be as important DVWKH&RXQFLO¶V´11 Selck and Steunenberg (2004) also confirms that the EP can be regarded a genuine co-legislator under the co-decision procedure.12 3. Previous research in analysing EP amendments ,QKHUDUWLFOH.UHSSHODQDO\VHG(3DPHQGPHQWVLQRUGHU³WRGHWHUPLQHZKHQWKH(3LV VXFFHVVIXODQGZKDWYDULDEOHVLQIOXHQFH(3VXFFHVV´$FFRUGLQJWR.UHSSHODQDO\VLQJ WKH(3DPHQGPHQWV³SHUPLWVXVWRgain a better understanding of the empirical realities of the SURFHGXUHVWKHPVHOYHV´SS Although calculating success rates of amendments is a widely applied methodology to measure legislative power, there is also a view that aggregate number of adoSWHGDPHQGPHQWVGRHVQ¶W say much about the legislative influence and power of the EP, as it says nothing about the LPSRUWDQFHRIWKHDPHQGPHQW7VHEHOLVDQGRWKHUV7VHEHOLVHWDOFODLPWKDW³FRXQWLQJ success of amendments may not mean very much abRXW WKHLQIOXHQFHRIGLIIHUHQW DFWRUV´13 6KDFNOHWRQDOVRVD\VWKDWÄQXPEHUV>RIVXFFHVVIXODPHQGPHQWV@DORQHGRQRWRIIHUDQ DGHTXDWHYLHZRIWKHLPSDFWRIWKH3DUOLDPHQW´14 10 Cited in: Crombez, 1997, pp. 112. Crombez (1997), pp. 98. 12 Selck and Steunenberg (2004): Torsten J. Selck, Bernard Steunenberg, Ä%HWZHHQ3RZHUDQG/XFN7KH European Parliament in tKH(8/HJLVODWLYH3URFHVV´ European Union Politics, Vol. 5. (1): 25-46. 13 Tsebelis et al., (2001): Tsebelis, George, Jensen, B. Christian, Kalandrakis, Anastassios, Kreppel, Amie, Ä/HJLVODWLYHSURFHGXUHVLQ the European Union: An Empirical Analysis, British Journal of Political Science, 31, pp. 576. 14 6KHFNOHWRQ ³7KH 3ROLWLFV RI &RGHFLVLRQ´ 3DSHU SUHVHQWHG DW WKH (&6$ 6L[WK %LHQQLDO &RQIHUHQFH Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 11 6 4. Inter-institutional relationships 6FXOO\FODLPVWKDW³QHLWKHUWKHoretical nor empirical grounds can be found to support the contention that co-GHFLVLRQ GLPLQLVKHV WKH (3¶V OHJLVODWLYH LQIOXHQFH 7R WKH FRQWUDU\ FRGHFLVLRQHQKDQFHVWKH(3¶VSRZHUUHODWLYHWRWKHRWKHU(8JRYHUQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV´15 Concerning the inter-institutional relationships of EU bodies in the domain of CAP, Greer et al. (2012) set up four scenarios, mainly focusing on the altered role of the European Parliament after the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. II. Inter-institutional coalitions during the trialogue negotiations 1. Methodology In case of 93 key CAP policy issues in the 4 legislative proposals ± 43 cases in Direct Payment, 22 cases in EAFRD, 21 cases in SCMO and 7 cases in HR ±, we identified the respective institutional positions for all three EU bodies that participated in the trialogue negotiations. Then we compared these positions to see which EU bodies formed a coalition ± i.e. had the same position ± on these key CAP policy issues. The objective of this analysis was twofold: to see the coalition formulation patterns among the three institutions and also to see the winning coalitions, i.e. coalitions, whose position was finally approved in the trialogue negotiations. In all, the primary objective was to see the role of the European Parliament both in case of coalition formulation and in winning coalitions. 2. Patterns of coalition formulation The research outcome shows that more frequently the EP shared the same position with the Council (22,6% of the observed cases). The position of the EP was the same as of the Commission at 20,4%. The most frequent coalition was the Commission-Council coalition, in case of 43% of all the observed CAP policy issues. 15 6FXOO\Ä7KH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWDQGWKH&R-DeciVLRQ3URFHGXUH$5HDVVHVVPHQW´7KH-RXUQDORI Legislative Studies, Vol. 3. No. 3., Autumn 1997, pp. 59. 7 In case of 14% of the cases, there were no coalition formed, so the three institutions took three different positions ahead of the trialogue negotiations. T able 1. to be inserted here. 3. Winning institutional coalitions Winning coalitions are defined as institutional coalitions whose common positions are finally stipulated in the final regulations. When coalitions in case of all four CAP regulations are analysed, the main conclusion is that via its amendments, the EP managed to influence the final policy outcome in 65,6% of all observed cases (as part of an institutional coalition, solely or in a compromise form). In coalition with the Council, the EP managed to put through its position in 21,5%, together with the Commission in 5,4%. The EP alone ± without any coalitions ± managed to win in 24,7% of the cases. Although its concrete position has not been accepted, the EP managed to influence the final policy outcome in 14% of all cases: to bias the final outcome towards a compromise among the three institution, where the final agreement was in the direction of the (3¶VLQLWLDOSROLF\SRVLWLRQ When analysing the winning coalitions, it can be stated that the EP was the most powerful in case of the Single CMO Regulation and the Horizontal Regulation: in both cases the (3¶V position was finally incorporated (either in coalition, compromise form or solely) at 71,4%. The respective figures are for EAFRD (63,6%) and for the Direct Payment Regulation (62,8%), where percentage figures show if the EP managed to influences the final policy outcome either in coalition, in compromise form or alone. In order to evaluate if the European Parliament was an equal co-legislator with the Council, it is important to compare its power with the Council. The conclusion that can be drawn here is that Council managed to put through its position ± either in coalition, in a compromise form or alone ± in 57%, which is lower WKDQWKH(3¶VUHOHYDQWILJXUH65,6%). The Council managed to win alone in 16,1% of all observed cases, compared to 24,7% for the EP. T able 2. to be inserted here. When the success rates of the inter-institutional coalitions during the CAP trialogue negotiations are analysed, it can be concluded that the EP-Council coalition has the highest 8 success rate (95,2%), followed by the Commission-Council (32,5%) and the EP-Commission coalitions (26,3%). T able 3. to be inserted here The increased power of the European Parliament is also reflected by the numbers, which show that in case of a Commission-Council coalition ± 40 cases observed ±, the EP managed to put through its position in 27 cases, which is a 67,5% success rate. So even when the two other institutions had the same position, the EP managed to be a counterweight and to win. T able 4. to be inserted here Nevertheless, it can be noted that the EP is relatively weak ZKHQWKHÄ1RFRDOLWLRQ´FDVHVDUH analysed. Out of the 13 cases when no institutional coalitions have been formed before the trialogue negotiations, the EP managed to influence the final policy outcome in 6 cases (46,2%). The Council had the highest level of influence in these cases with an aggregate success rate of 69,3%. T able 5. to be inserted here T here are two conclusions to be highlighted: - The first one is that the EP-Council coalitions almost always win (95,2% adoption rate). It clearly reflects the codecision: if the two colegislators agree, no other factor ± including the European Commission ± is able to influence this agreement. - The second one is that in coalition with the European Commission, the EP and the Council have almost equal weight, as the success rate of the Commission-EP coalition (26,3%) is close to the Commission-Council figure (32,5%). III. Analysing EP amendments: calculating success rates 1. Methodology 9 In order to see the power of the European Parliament during the trialogue negotiations and to measure its success, success rates of EP amendments have been calculated. Ä6XFFHVV´ ± or acceptance/adoption of an amendment ± in this context means that an EP amendment has been ± at least partly ± adopted and ± depending on the stage of decison-making ± the amendment is either a part of an official position (COMAGRI adoption, Plenary adoption) or the text of the amendments is incorporated (built into) the text of the relevant Final CAP Regulation. The adoption rate or success rate is the ratio of adopted amendments to the total number of amendments. In order to make a sophisticated analyses, the amendments in the dataset have been categorised. Partly following Kreppel (Kreppel 1999 and 2002) categorisation, EP amendments are categorised as policy and non-policy amendments, this latter includes extension and clarification amendments. - In this report agricultural policy amendments are those policy amendments which are not legal amendments. - CAP reform amendments are defined as amendments tabled to the new CAP reform items like greening, young farmers scheme, small farmers scheme, etc., also when the (3¶VSRVLWLRQLVDVWHSEDFNIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQSURSRVDO - Institutional amendments in this analyses are amendments relating to the institutional and legal aspects of decision-making (comitology, delegated acts, implementing acts, delegated powers, etc.). - Recital DPHQGPHQWV DUH DPHQGPHQWV WDEOHG WR WKH ¶UHFLWDO¶ SDUW RI WKH OHJLVODWLYH proposal. - Compromise amendments: amendments tabled by the rapporteur in a compromise format. Unless otherwise stated, in this paper extracted compromise amendments are used and calculations are based on extracted compromise amendments. Extraction in WKLV FRQWH[W UHIHU WR WKH PHWKRGRORJ\ ZKHQ DPHQGPHQWV ÄEHKLQG´ RQH FRPSURPLVH amendment are taken into consideration (in official texts it is referred to as Ä&RPSURPLVH DPHQGPHQW UHSODFLQJ DPHQGPHQW ; < =´ ,I RQH FRPSURPLVH amendment is adopted, the amendments replaced are also considered to be adopted. This methodology makes it possible to apply a more sophisticated approach and to analyse some of the underlying tendencies in EP decision-making. Extracted compromise amendments also give a better picture on the role and influence of the EP amendments. However, it shall be noted that not all the compromise amendments are the merge of 10 previous ± Draft report, open or OGC ± amendments. These compromise amendments cannot be extracted and are analysed in their original form. - 'New' amendments: those amendments that are not aimed at changing the original Commission proposal, but to insert new elements and ideas into the legislative text (the wording 'new' is used in case of these amendments in the official EP documents). - 'EP position backward to Commission proposal' amendments: those policy amendments, which aim at decreasing the ambitions of the Commission proposal, most often in the form of a more incremental introduction of certain measures. - Among the amendments in the EP negotiating mandate there are some ± noncompromise ± amendments, which encompass previous amendments, but not in a compromise form. When analysing amendment success rates during the EP internal decision-making, these amendments are also extracted. This is the reason ± in some cases ± the seemingly contradicting figures between the calculation of thematic success rates and the success rates in the EP internal decision-making. - When analysing the amendments tabled by the opinion giving committees (OGC), only amendments stipulated in the final committee opinion had been taken into account (no draft opinion amendments, etc.). 7KHZRUG¶FRGHFLVLRQ¶LQWKLVUHSRUWDlways reflects to the Äordinary legislative procedure´DV stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon. In this report the dataset has been elaborated based on the EP amendments tabled to the four CAP proposals on Direct Payments, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, Single Common Market Organisations and the Horizontal Regulation.16 2. Analysis by the type of EP amendments For the four C A P regulations, 43,81% of the total number of amendments in the negotiations mandate have been accepted. T he highest acceptance ratios are in case of the E A F R D (47,18%) and the SC M O (47,28%) regulations, followed by the Direct Payment 16 See the full list of EP internal documents with the amendments in Annex I. The original tables containing the absolute number of EP amendments in the course of internal EP decisionmaking can be found in Tables 28-37. 11 Regulation (39,8%). T he lowest figure was in case of the Horizontal Regulation (37,11%).17 In sum, 51,2% of all agricultural policy amendments have been accepted. With this rate of acceptance, it can be stated that the EP became a real co-legislator with the Council, as if one player in a two-player decision-making process manages to make more than 50% of its position adopted, it can be considered to be a decision-maker on equal footing with the other. Also, the EP managed to reach higher acceptance rates in case of the EAFRD (56,99%) and the SCMO (54,71%) regulations. The figures for Direct Payments (49,15%) and the Horizontal Regulation (40,22) are lower. $VIRUÄ&$3UHIRUPDPHQGPHQWV´55,96% of all the amendments of this type has been accepted. The highest acceptance rates were in case of the EAFRD Regulation (65,71%), followed by the Horizontal Regulation (60%), the SCMO (52,38%) and finally the Direct Payment Regulation (48,84%). Conclusions: -‐ With around 50% of acceptance rates on average, the EP was able to influence the content of final CAP regulations effectively and decisively. -‐ In all cases, the amendment adoption rates for the Direct Payment Regulation were the lowest. It might be attributed to the fact that the most sensitive issues and amendments were tabled to the Direct Payment Regulation, so it might be one of the reasons for the lower performance of the EP. $QRWKHUFDWHJRU\RIWKHDPHQGPHQWVLVWKHÄQHZDPHQGPHQWV´,QDOORIDOODPHQGPHQWV in the EP negotiations mandate were new amendments. F inally, 33,47% of the new amendments have been accepted. T he highest adoption rate (40,26%) were in case of the SC M O Regulation. Preliminary hypotheses would state that it is easier for a Recital amendment to be adopted, as the Recital part of a legislative instrument mostly contains generally defined objectives, statements, emphases, while the non-recital part mostly contains the concrete, well-defined rules. 17 These figures are based on non-extracted compromise amendments. 12 :KHQGLYLGLQJWKHDPHQGPHQWVLQWRWKHJURXSV¶5HFLWDO¶DQG¶1RQ-5HFLWDO¶DPHQGPHQWVWKH following conclusions can be drawn: the aggregate acceptance rate is higher in case of the Nonrecital amendments (47,15%) compared to the Recital amendments (31,55%). For the Recital amendments, the highest adoption rate was in case of the Direct payments regulation (39,13%), while DP had the lowest level in case of non-recital amendments (40%). In this latter case, the figure for SCMO (51,56%) was the highest. It can be concluded, that the EP was somehow compensated for the relatively low number of adopted Direct Payment policy and CAP reform amendments by the relatively higher rate of Recital amendments. T able 6. to be inserted here 3. Regulation-specific thematic success rates In this sub-chapter, EP amendments tabled to the non-recital part of the four CAP regulations are analysed. This analyses, again, is based on the amendments that were tabled to the negotiation mandates of the EP for the four CAP regulations. As for the Direct Payment Regulation, the following conclusions can be drawn: -‐ The EP was the most successful in terms RIDPHQGPHQWVWR¶JUHHQLQJ¶100% of the greening amendments in the EP negotiation mandate were finally adopted. -‐ 7KH (3 ZDV VWURQJ LQ SXWWLQJ WKURXJK LWV DPHQGPHQWV LQ FDVH RI ¶\RXQJ IDUPHUV¶ VFKHPH¶ (50%) and in case of the Basic Payment Scheme (61,5%). This latter one covers the amendPHQWVWDEOHGWRWKHLVVXHVRI¶SD\PHQWHQWLWOHPHQWV¶¶FRQYHUJHQFH¶¶QDWLRQDO UHVHUYH¶DQG¶ILUVWKHFWDUHSD\PHQWV¶ -‐ 7KH(3KDVDPRGHUDWHSRZHULQFDVHRIDPHQGPHQWWDEOHGWR¶&RPPRQUXOHVRQGLUHFW SD\PHQWV¶ ZKHUH WKH DPHQGPHQWV VXFFHVV UDWH ZDV . These rules cover the ¶ILQDQFLDOGLVFLSOLQH¶¶DFWLYHIDUPHU¶¶FDSSLQJ¶DQG¶IOH[LELOLW\EHWZHHQSLOODUV¶ -‐ 7KH (3¶V SRZHU ZDV DOVR PRGHUDWH LQ FDVH RI ¶9ROXQWDU\ FRXSOHG VXSSRUW¶ ZLWK an amendment success rate of 20% DQGLQFDVHRIWKH¶6PDOO)DUPHU¶VScheme (25%) T able 7. to be inserted here As for the Single C M O Regulation, the main conclusions are as follows: 13 -‐ The EP was strong in putting through its amendments in case of the following policy domains (in bracket, the rate of adoption of the amendments tabled): o Milk and milk products ± 100% o Sugar sector ± 90,5% o Producer organisations ± 84,2% o School Fruit Scheme ± 80% o School Milk Scheme ± 75% o Aid in the fruit and vegetables sector ± 66,7% o Export refunds ± 66,7% -‐ The EP had a contradicting success regarding the adoption of amendments tabled to the ¶ZLQHVHFWRU¶SDUWVRIWKHUHJXODWLRQRIWKH(3DPHQGPHQWVWDEOHGWRWKH¶6XSSRUW SURJUDPPHVLQWKHZLQHVHFWRU¶SDUWRIWKH5HJXODWLRQKDYHEHHQDGRSWHG+RZHYHU, it was accompanied by low adoption rates for the following chapters: o Designation of origin, geographical indications and traditional terms in the wine sector ± 20% o Labelling and presentation in the wine sector ± 33,3% o Wine sector - 6,7% T able 8. to be inserted here As for the amendments tabled to the E A F R D Regulation, the E P had strong influence in: -‐ Rural Development Support ± individual measures ± investments in physical and human capital ± 88,9% -‐ Rural Development Support ± individual measures ± forestry ± 80% The EP had moderate power regarding the adoption of amendments tabled to the green measures under the 2nd pillar of the CAP. The adoption rate of amendments in this case was 44,4%. T able 9. to be inserted here As for the Horizontal Regulation, the E P had moderate success rates: 50% of the tabled DPHQGPHQWV KDYH EHHQ DFFHSWHG LQ FDVH RI ¶3D\LQJ DJHQFLHV¶ LQ FDVH RI ¶&URVV14 FRPSOLDQFH¶$PHQGPHQWVSURSRVHGWRWKH($*)DQG($)5'FKDSWHUVRIWKH5HJXODWLRQKDYe been adopted at a rate of 44,4% and 43,8% respectively. When interpreting the results of this sub-chapter, it shall be noted, that in some cases, the above conclusions are based on only a small number of amendments. However, high amendment rates also show that the EP negotiation mandate contained really powerful amendments that had a strong chance to be adopted during trialogue negotiations; and many of them have been finally adopted, too. T able 10. to be inserted here IV. Amendment analysis via the internal decision-making in the European Parliament 1. Rates of distribution 1.1.Total figures for all four CAP regulations Distributions along the phase of decision-making During the CAP reform process, the European Parliament tabled a total number of 8.606 amendments. 8,3% of these amendments were ¶'UDIW UHSRUW¶ DPHQGPHQWV % were COMAGRI ± open ± amendments. Opinion-giving committees tabled 6,2% of the amendments. 3,2% of the amendments were tabled in a compromise form. Plenary amendments are 3,9% of all amendments. In the EP Negotiations mandate, the distribution was as follows: out of the 1.495 amendments in total, ZHUH¶'UDIWUHSRUW¶DPHQGPHQWVZHUHRSHQDPHQGPHQWV$PHQGPHQWV of opinion-giving committees made up to only 3,7%, while plenary amendments only 1,5%. A very few number of ± non-extractable ± compromise amendments constituted 1,4%. In all, 885 EP amendments have been accepted and built into the final four CAP regulations. RIWKHPZHUH¶GUDIWDPHQGPHQWV¶RI WKHP¶RSHQDPHQGPHQWV¶ZHUHWKH 15 amendments of opinion-giving committees, while 1,1% plenary amendments. Non-extracted compromise amendments made up to 1,2%. T able 11. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ Rapporteurs played an active and successful role in tabling amendments: draft report amendments made up to almost 37% of all amendments in the EP negotiation mandate and in the final regulations. -‐ Amendments tabled by the opinion giving committees as well as plenary amendments had a minor role/part in the total number of amendments. Distributions along the type of amendment and the four CAP regulations 30,2% of all amendments have been tabled to the SC M O Regulation, followed by the Direct Payment Regulation (29,8%) and the E A F R D (28,7%). 11,3% of all amendments have been proposed to the Horizontal Regulation. $VIRUWKH¶GUDIWUHSRUW¶DPHQGPHQWVRIWKHPKDYHEHHQWDEOHGWRWKH6&025HJXODWLRQ followed by the Horizontal and Direct Payment Regulations (both 14,3%). 10,3% of the ¶GUDIW repRUW¶DPHQGPHQWVKDYHEHHQSURSRVHGWRWKH($)5'5HJXODWLRQ $VIRUWKH¶RSHQDPHQGPHQWV¶RIWKHPKDYHEHHQWDEOHGWRWKH'35HJXODWLRQ to the EAFRD, 26,6% to the SCMO and 10,6% to the Horizontal Regulation. Regarding compromise amendments, 63,1% of them were proposed to the SCMO Regulation. 13,6% of them were tabled to the EAFRD and Direct Payment Regulation each. 9,7% of the compromise amendments were proposed to the Horizontal Regulation. Concerning the amendments of opinion-giving committees, these committees tabled altogether 533 amendments. 49,5% of these amendments were proposed to the EAFRD Regulation, followed by the Direct Payment Regulation (26,3%) and the Horizontal Regulation (18%). 6,2% of the these type of amendments were tabled to the SCMO Regulation. As for plenary amendments, 47,9% of them were proposed to the SCMO Regulation, followed by the Direct Payment Regulation (29,9%), the EAFRD Regulation (12,3%) and the Horizontal Regulation (9,9%). 16 T able 12. to be inserted here The table also shows the distribution of amendments in the total number of adopted amendments. The main conclusion is that almost 40-40% of the adopted amendments were tabled to the EAFRD (37,9%) and the SCMO (39,8%) Regulations. The Horizontal Regulation has a share of 13,7%, while the Direct Payment Regulation has 8,7%. Adopted draft report amendments have the highest share in case of the SCMO Regulation (65,1%), while adopted open amendments have the highest share in EAFRD (51,6%). 1.2.Comparison with the consultation procedure When comparing the four CAP legislative instruments with those of under consultation procedure, the following Council Regulations ± more precisely, the amendments tabled to their original legislative proposals ± are analysed: -‐ COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy, -‐ COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), -‐ COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), -‐ COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers. In sum, 1.480 European parliamentary amendments were tabled to the above 4 CAP regulations. 12,5% of tKHP ZHUH ¶GUDIW UHSRUW¶DPHQGPHQWV RSHQ DPHQGPHQWV 2SLQLRQ JLYLQJ committees tabled 8,6% of the amendments, while the plenary amendments were 3,8% and compromise amendments 3% of the total. 17 Regarding the distribution for the final EP position ± EP plenary adopted amendments ± 20,8% RIWKH(3DGRSWHGDPHQGPHQWVZDV¶GUDIWUHSRUW¶DPHQGPHQWV69,7% open amendments, 4,4% amendments tabled by opinion giving committees and 3,4% plenary amendments. Concerning the distribution of EP amendments in the Final Regulations, 16,7% of them were ¶GUDIW UHSRUW¶ DPHQGPHQWV RSHQ DPHQGPHQWV Plenary amendments, compromise amendments and amendments of opinion giving committees all had a share of 1,4% in the Final Regulations. T able 13. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ the distribution for the total number of amendments under the consultation procedure is similar to that of the amendments during the 2013 CAP reform, however, the percentage of draft report amendments were lower (8,3%), while the share of open amendments (78,4%) were higher in the 2013 CAP reform. -‐ During the 2013 CAP reform, draft report amendments had a much higher share in the (3¶VSRVLWLRQWKDQXQGHUWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQprocedure (20,8%). It clearly shows the enhanced role of the rapporteur within the EP. -‐ The share of open amendments in the final EP position was lower under codecision (56,5%) than under consultation (69,7%). -‐ Among the amendments incorporated in the Final 5HJXODWLRQVWKHVKDUHRI¶GUDIWUHSRUW¶ amendments was 36,9% under codecision and only 16,7% under consultation. Again, it reflects the stronger position of rapporteurs under codecision. It was accompanied by the diminishing share of open amendments ± 77,8% under consultation, 58,1% under codecision -, so the rapporteur became more influential WRWKHGHWULPHQWRIÄQRUPDO´ MEPs proposing open amendments. 2. Analysing the aggregate number of amendments 2.1.The 2013 CAP reform 18 Taking into account the total number of amendments of all type in all four CAP regulations, 17,7% of the amendments were adopted by the COMAGRI, 17,4% by the plenary. 10,3% of all amendments were finally built into the final regulations. For the Direct Payments Regulation, the COMAGRI adopted 5,4% of the amendments, the EP plenary adopted 5% of them. 3% of all DP amendments were adopted in the end of the legislation: these amendments can be found in the final DP regulation. In case of the EAFRD Regulation, the both the COMAGRI and the EP Plenary adopted 18,6% of the amendments. 13,6% of the amendments are incorporated in the Final Regulation. Regarding the SCMO Regulation, both the COMAGRI and the EP plenary adopted 23,7% of the amendments. 13,6% of the amendments are incorporated in the Final Regulation. Concerning the Horizontal Regulation, 32,4% of all amendments have been adopted by the COMAGRI, 30% by the EP plenary. 12,4% of the amendments were incorporated in the Final Regulation. T able 14. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ 10,3% of the total number of EP amendments were finally incorporated in the four CAP regulations. This figure is 9,7% under the consultation procedure, meaning a slight LQFUHDVHLQWKH(3¶VSRZHUXQGHUFRGHFLVLRQ -‐ The Direct Payment Regulation has the lowest level of amendments adopted at all levels (COMAGRI, EP plenary, and Final Regulation). It might be concluded that the rapporteur ± Capoulas Santos ± was weak in this sense. -‐ The Horizontal Regulation has the highest level of adoption within the EP followed by the SCMO Regulation. Therefore La Via might be considered to be the strongest rapporteur within the EP, followed by Michel Dantin. -‐ Considering the adoption ratio of amendments in the Final Regulations, the SCMO Regulation and the EAFRD Regulation equals at 13,6%. Michel Dantin and Capoulas Santos are the strongest rapporteurs in this sense. 2.2.Comparison with the consultation procedure When analysing the amendments tabled to the 2007-2013 CAP legislation under the consultation procedure, the following statements can be made. 19 Under the consultation procedure, both COMAGRI and the EP Plenary adopted 33,4% of the total number of amendments. In the Final Regulation, 9,7% of the total amendments were incorporated. For the Direct Payments Regulation, the COMAGRI adopted 30,2% of the amendments, the EP plenary adopted 30,3% of them. 9,2% of all DP amendments were adopted in the end of the legislation: these amendments can be found in the final DP regulation. In case of the EAFRD Regulation, the COMAGRI adopted 36,9% while the EP plenary adopted 36,6% of the amendments. 11,5% of the amendments are incorporated in the Final Regulation. Regarding the SCMO Regulation, both the COMAGRI and the EP plenary adopted 51% of the amendments. 5,1% of the amendments are incorporated in the Final Regulation. Concerning the Horizontal Regulation, 28% of all amendments have been adopted by the COMAGRI and by the EP Plenary. 16% of the amendments were incorporated in the Final Regulation. T able 15. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ Under codecison, the ratio of successfully adopted EP amendments in the Final Regulations are slightly higher (10,3%) than under consultation (9,7%). Somewhat, it shows the increased influence of the EP. -‐ It is interesting to note that both at COMAGRI and EP plenary level, the ratio of adopted amendments (in the total) is much higher under consultation ± 33,4% ± than under codecision (17,7% and 17,4%). However, this should not lead to the conclusion of the decreasing power of COMAGRI under codecision, but might be attributable to the significantly increased ± by 480% (!!!) ± number of amendments under codecision. -‐ As for the specific legislative instruments, the adoption rates for the total number of amendments were higher under codecision in case of the EAFRD (13,6% under codecision, 11,5% under consultation) and SCMO (13,6% under codecision, 5,1% under consultation). In case of the other two legislative acts, adoption ratios for the total 20 number of amendments were higher in case of consultation: 9,2% for Direct payments (3% under codecision) and 16% for the Horizontal Regulation (12,4% under codecision). 3. The role of rapporteurs: draft report and compromise amendments 3.1.The 2013 CAP Reform In sum, the rapporteurs tabled 711 amendments in their draft reports to the four CAP regulations. It is 8,3 % of the total number of amendments. 78,6% of the draft report amendments have been adopted by the COMAGRI, and 77,5% by the EP plenary in March, 2013; therefore being a part of the EP negotiation mandates. 46% of the draft report amendments ± either solely or in a form of a compromise amendment ± have been finally built into the final regulations. T hese figures clearly indicate that rapporteurs had significant power in the internal E P decision-making and draft report amendments were powerful. ,QFDVHRIWKH'LUHFW3D\PHQW5HJXODWLRQRIWKH¶GUDIWUHSRUW¶DPHQGPHQWVKDYHEHHQ DGRSWHGE\WKH&20$*5,E\WKH(33OHQDU\RIWKH'3¶GUDIWUHSRUW¶have been incorporated in the Final Regulation. As for the EAFRD Regulation, 83,6% of the amendments in the Draft Report have been adopted by the COMAGRI and ± without any amendments turned down ± by the EP plenary. 67,1% of WKH¶GUDIWUHSRUW¶amendments have been incorporated in the final EAFRD Regulation. In case of the SCMO Regulation, 82,3% of the draft report amendments have been adopted both by the COMAGRI and EP plenary. 49,1% of the draft report amendments have been incorporated in the Final SCMO Regulation. Concerning the Horizontal Regulation 96,1% of the amendments in the Draft Report have been adopted by the COMAGRI, 93,1% by the EP plenary and 39,2% can be found in the Final Regulation. T able 16. to be inserted here 21 Conclusions: -‐ As for the draft report amendments, the highest adoption rates within the EP can be observed in case of the Horizontal Regulation, the lowest in case of the Direct Payment regulation. The strongest rapporteur within the EP was La Via. (I would not say that the weakest was Capoulas Santos, as he was also the rapporteur for EAFRD.). -‐ If the outcome of the trialogue negotiations is also considered, the EP was strongest in case of the EAFRD Regulation (67,1%) followed by the SCMO Regulation (49,1%). Based on this, Capoulas Santos and Michel Dantin can be considered the strongest rapporteurs. However, it shall be noted that Capoulas Santos is the last in the row based on the lowest level of adoption rate for the Direct Payment Regulation. It shall be noted that in the EP plenary, 63,9% of the draft report amendments were adopted in a compromise amendment form (352 out of 551 amendments). This ratio is even higher ± 75,5% (247 out of 327) - when the draft report amendments are analysed in the final regulations. It means that draft report amendments had a higher chance to be adopted in any stages of the decision-making ± plenary, final regulation ± in a compromise amendment form. T herefore, it might be supposed that rapporteurs deliberately packed a high number of their ¶GUDIWUHSRUW¶amendments in a compromise amendment form, giving them a bigger chance to be adopted. If compromise amendments are not extracted, the following key pattern can be observed. For the four CAP regulations, there were 279 compromise amendments. 93,9% of them were adopted by the COMAGRI, 92,5% by the EP plenary ± being SDUW RI WKH (3¶V QHJRWLDWLRQ mandate ± and 61,3% of them were adopted after the trialogue negotiations. T hese adoption rates are the highest compared to any kind of amendment categories. It means that almost two third of the compromise amendments can be found in the final C A P regulations. Again, as compromise amendments are managed by the Rapporteurs, it shows that Rapporteurs were powerful as they managed to formulate compromise amendments that have strong political support behind them. As for the DP Regulation, 97,4% of the compromise amendments were adopted by the COMAGRI, 92,1% by the EP plenary and 63,2% were incorporated in the Final Regulation. In case of the EAFRD Regulation, 94,7% of the compromise amendments were adopted by both the COMAGRI and EP plenary. 68,4% of these amendments can be found in the Final EAFRD Regulation. 22 Regarding the SCMO Regulation, 92% of the compromise amendments were adopted by both the COMAGRI and the Plenary, 62,5% were incorporated in the Final Regulation. Concerning the Horizontal Regulation, 100% of the compromise amendments were adopted by the COMAGRI, 92,6% by the EP Plenary and 40,7% were incorporated in the Final Regulation. T able 17. to be inserted here Conclusions -‐ At the level of COMAGRI, La Via (Horizontal Regulation) managed the build the most powerful compromise amendments (100% adoption rate!), followed by Capoulas Santos (Direct Payment, with 97,4% adoption rate). -‐ Capoulas Santos can be considered to be the most powerful rapporteur within the EP, as the compromise amendments tabled to the EAFRD regulation have been adopted at the highest rate (94,7%), followed by La Via (Horizontal Regulation, 92,6% adoption rate). -‐ As for the adoption rate of compromise amendments in the Final Regulation, again, Capoulas Santos has the highest adoption rate with 68,4%(EAFRD). In the Final Regulation, La Via is the least powerful rapporteur, with 40,7% adoption rate. -‐ La Via is getting less and less powerful as the decision-making progresses: he is the most powerful in COMAGRI, the second one in the EP plenary and the last one after the trialogue negotiations. It might be concluded that La Via was the least powerful during the trialogue negotiations. 3.2.Comparison with the consultation procedure In case of the four analysed CAP legislative act under the consultation procedure, there were 185 draft report amendments tabled to the proposals. The COMAGRI adopted 57,3% of them, the plenary 55,7%, while in the Final Regulations, 13% of the draft report amendments have been incorporated. Regarding the comparison between the Direct Payments regulations, the adoption rate in COMAGRI was 52,3%, at the Plenary 50%, then finally 9,8% was adopted under consultation. 23 As for the EAFRD Regulations, under the consultation procedure, both the COMAGRI and the EP plenary adopted 58,6% of the draft report amendments, while 24,1% were incorporated in the Final Regulation. Regarding the SCMO Regulation, under the consultation procedure, both the COMAGRI and the EP plenary adopted 94,7% of the draft report amendments, and 15,8% were adopted finally by the Council in the Final Regulation. Concerning the Horizontal Regulation, under the consultation procedure, both the COMAGRI and the EP plenary adopted 40% of the draft report amendments, while the Council adopted 20% of them in the Final Regulation. T able 18. to be inserted here There were only a very few number ± less than 1% of all amendments ± of compromise amendments tabled to the 2007-2013 CAP regulations, most of them tabled to the EAFRD Regulation. No compromise amendments were tabled to the SCMO and the Horizontal Regulations. Conclusions: -‐ Under codecision, the rates of adopted draft report amendments were higher at all stages of the decision-making procedure: at COMAGRI stage 78,6% (codecision) versus 57,3% (consultation), at the Plenary stage 55,7% (consultation) versus 77,5% (codecision). In the final regulations, 46% of the draft report amendments were incorporated under codecision and 13% under consultation. It shows the empowerment of the rapporteurs under the codecision procedure, and the growing importance of the draft report amendments in agenda setting. It might also reflect that rapporteurs need to come up with well-founded amendments in their draft reports that have a wider support behind them. This wider support then enables these amendments to be adopted at a higher rate under codecision. -‐ In the Final Regulations, the adoption rates for draft report amendments are higher under codecision than under consultation procedure: Direct Payments 24,5% versus 9,8%, EAFRD 67,1% versus 24,1%, SCMO 49,1% versus 15,8% and the Horizontal 24 Regulation 39,2% versus 20%. It shows the increased power of rapporteurs under the codecision procedure. -‐ The small number, or even the lack of compromise amendments under the consultation procedure might show that rapporteurs considered it unnecessary to build coalitions of MEPs around key amendments having known the expectedly low level of acceptance by the Council. 4. The role of open amendments 4.1.The 2013 CAP reform $VIRUWKHWRWDOQXPEHURI¶RSHQDPHQGPHQWV¶IRUDOOIRXU&$3UHJXODWLRQVRIWKHP were adopted by COMAGRI, 12,5% by the plenary. 7,6% of the open amendments were finally built into the final CAP regulations. In case of the DP regulation, 3,9% of the open amendments were adopted by the COMAGRI, 3,4% by the Plenary. 2,1% is incorporated in the Final DP Regulation. Regarding the EAFRD Regulation, 17,8% of the open amendments are adopted by the COMAGRI, 17,4% by the EP plenary and 12,9% is incorporated in the Final Regulation. In case of the SCMO Regulation, 13,6% of the open amendments are adopted by both the COMAGRI and the EP Plenary, and 7,5% is incorporated in the Final Regulation. As for the Horizontal Regulation, 27,6% of the open amendments have been adopted by the COMAGRI, 23,8% by the EP plenary and 9,5% is incorporated in the Final Regulation. T able 19. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ 7,6% of the total number of open amendments were finally incorporated in final CAP regulations. Compared to other categories of amendments, this is by far lower than the ILQDO DGRSWLRQ UDWH RI ¶GUDIW UHSRUW¶ DPHQGPHQWV RU FRPSURPLVH DPHQGPHQWV (61,3%). -‐ Open amendments tabled to the EAFRD regulation could influence the final policy outcome the most (12,9% of adoption rate), followed by the Horizontal Regulation (9,5%), SCMO Regulation (7,5%). 25 -‐ Open amendments tabled to the Direct Payment Regulation had the lowest level of adoption rate, 2,1%. 4.2.Comparison with the consultation procedure As for the open amendments, under the consultation procedure COMAGRI adopted 33,3% of all open amendments, the EP plenary 32,5% of them. In the Final Regulations, 10,5% of the open amendments were incorporated. For the Direct Payment Regulation, 30,9% of amendments were adopted by the COMAGRI, 29,8% by the Plenary and 10,8% by the Council in the Final Regulation In case of the EAFRD Regulation, these ratios are 37,4% in the COMAGRI, 36,7% in the Plenary and 11,8% in the Final Regulation. Regarding the Single CMO Regulation, both the COMAGRI and Plenary adopted 39% of open amendments, while 1,3% was incorporated in the Final Regulation. As for the Horizontal Regulation, both the COMAGRI and the EP Plenary adopted 25%, while in the Final Regulation, 18,8% was incorporated. T able 20. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ In general, the adoption rates of open amendments are higher under consultation procedure than under codecision procedure. -‐ In the Final Regulations, in case of three out of four legislative acts ± Direct Payments, EAFRD, and Horizontal Regulation ± the adoption rates of open amendments are higher under consultation procedure when compared to the codecision procedure. -‐ Under consultation the power of the EP to influence the final policy outcome was highest in case of the Horizontal Regulation (18,8% adoption rate in the Final Regulation), followed by the EAFRD (11,8%), Direct Payment (10,8%) and SCMO (1,3%). -‐ Both under the consultation and codecision procedures, open amendments were more powerful in case of the Horizontal Regulation and the EAFRD (being the first two in the row), while these type of amendments were less powerful in case of the Direct Payment and SCMO Regulations. 26 5. The opinion giving committees 5.1.The 2013 CAP Reform Opinion giving committees tabled 533 amendments to the CAP regulation, which is 6,2% of the total number of amendments. Regarding the total number of amendments tabled by the opinion giving committees, the calculations show that 10,5% of them were adopted by the COMAGRI and 10,3% by the EP plenary. 4,3% of the OGC amendments were adopted after the trialogue negotiations, therefore built into the final regulations. Conclusion: a bit more than 10% of the amendments tabled by the opinion giving committees were adopted by the COMAGRI and the EP plenary. 40% of them ± approximately 4% of the total ± were incorporated in the final regulations. Therefore, opinion giving committees had a minimal level of influence on the final policy outcome of the CAP reform. Analysis by CAP Regulation As for the DP Regulation, both the COMAGRI and the Plenary adopted 0,7% of the OGC amendments. Also, 0,7% of the OGC amendments can be found in the final Regulation. As for the EAFRD Regulation, COMAGRI adopted 11,4% of the OGC amendments, the Plenary adopted 11% of them. 5,3% of the OGC amendments are incorporated in the Final Regulation. In case of the Horizontal Regulation, both the COMAGRI and the EP plenary adopted 20,8% of the OGC amendments. However, only 8,3% of these amendments are incorporated in the Final Regulation. Regarding the SCMO Regulation, both the COMAGRI and the EP plenary adopted 15,2% of the OGC amendments. However, none of these amendments (0%) were finally incorporated in the Final Regulation. T able 21. to be inserted here Conclusions: 27 -‐ Opinion giving committees had the highest influence on the Horizontal Regulation with an amendment success rate of 8,3% in the Final Regulation. This is followed by EAFRD (5,3%), Direct Payments and Single CMO. -‐ Therefore, opinion giving committees influenced the CAP policy outcome in case of the HR and EAFRD Regulations the most. -‐ Practically, none of the amendments of the opinion giving committees were finally adopted in case of the Direct Payment and Single CMO Regulations. Analysis by opinion giving committee There were five opinion giving committees tabling amendments to the four CAP regulations: BUDG, CONT, DEVE, ENVI and REGI. 33,6% of their amendments were tabled by the ENVI Committee, followed by the CONT (25,7%), REGI (24,8%), BUDG (8,8%) and DEVE (7,1%) Committees. As for the influence of the opinion giving committees towards COMAGRI, COMAGRI adopted the amendments of DEVE at the highest rate (21,1%), followed by REGI (13,6%) and CONT (11,7%). This ratio for ENVI is 7,3% and for BUDG 2,1%. Regarding the incorporation of the amendments of opinion giving committees in the final CAP regulations, the most successful committee was DEVE, with 13,2% of its amendments in the Final Regulation, followed by CONT (5,8%) and ENVI (3,4%). During the trialogue negotiations, the EP was able to put through 41,8% of the amendments of RSLQLRQJLYLQJFRPPLWWHHVVWLSXODWHGLQWKH(3¶VQHJRWLDWLRQPandate. BUDG was the most successful in it ± 100% of its amendments in the EP negotiation mandate was finally incorporated in the Final Regulation ± ahead of DEVE (62,5%) and CONT and ENVI (both 50%). T able 22. to be inserted here The BUDG committee had the highest impact ± highest adoption rate of amendments ± on the EAFRD Regulation (4,35%). CONT and REGI had the highest level of influence on the Horizontal Regulation, with 16,22% and 3,13% of their amendments in the Final Regulation respectively. DEVE and ENVI were the most influential in case of the EAFRD Regulation, with 38,46% and 4,14% of adoption rates respectively. 28 Conclusions: -‐ ENVI was the most active opinion giving committee by tabling 33,6% of the OGC amendments. -‐ DEVE was the most powerful committee towards COMAGRI, as 21% of its amendments was adopted by COMAGRI. -‐ DEVE was the most successful opinion giving committee as 13,2% of its amendments can be found in the Final CAP Regulations. -‐ Opinion giving committees had the highest impact on the formulation of the EAFRD and Horizontal Regulations, with a very minor ± in most cases close to zero ± influence on the Direct Payment and SCMO Regulations. 5.2.Comparison with the consultation procedure Under the consultation procedure, there were 128 amendments tabled by opinion giving committees to the four CAP legislative acts analysed in this report. There were four committees tabling amendments: BUDG, CONT, REGI and ENVI. REGI was the most active committee with 65,6% of all amendments tabled, ahead of the ENVI committee (22,7%). Opinion giving committees tabled no amendments to the SCMO regulation under the consultation procedure. In all 21,09% of the amendments of opinion giving committees was adopted by the COMAGRI, 17,19% by the EP plenary and 1,56% by the Council in the Final Regulation. Opinion giving committees managed to influence the final policy outcome ± having the highest adoption rates ± only in case of the EAFRD Regulation. No amendments have been adopted in the final Horizontal and Direct Payment Regulations. The BUDG committee was the strongest in putting through its amendment towards the COMAGRI with 27,27% of amendment success ahead of CONT (25%), REGI (23,81%) and ENVI (10,34%). However, regarding the final regulations, only the REGI committee was able to put through its amendments to any of the final regulations: in case of EAFRD, its success rate was 2,38%. Conclusions: 29 -‐ Similar to codecision, opinion giving committees under the consultation procedure had a minor influence on the final policy outcome: they solely managed to make their amendments adopted in case of the EAFRD Regulation (2,38%). -‐ The most powerful opinion giving committee to COMAGRI under consultation was BUDG and CONT with slightly higher adoption rates (25-27%) than the DEVE committee under codecision (21%). -‐ However, REGI was the most powerful opinion giving committee when putting through its amendments to the final regulations. -‐ DEVE ± which was the most powerful under codecision ± GLGQ¶WWDEOHDQ\DPHQGPHQWV under consultation. 6. The COMAGRI-Plenary relationship 6.1.The 2013 CAP reform The following indents contain success rates, where the number of amendments adopted by the EP plenary is compared to the number of amendments adopted by the COMAGRI. Calculated on the total number of amendments tabled to all four CAP regulations, 96,4% of the COMAGRI adopted amendments were supported by the EP plenary. For the Direct Payment Regulation, this figure is 89,2%, for the SCMO 99,8%, for EAFRD 98%, for the Horizontal Regulation 90,5%. As for WKHWRWDOQXPEHURI¶draft report¶ amendments, the EP plenary adopted 98,6% of those adopted by the COMAGRI. As for the Direct Payment Regulation, the EP plenary adopted RIWKRVH¶GUDIWUHSRUW¶DPHQGPHQWVWKDWZHUHDGRSWHGE\WKH&20$*5, For both the SCMO and the EAFRD, this figure is 100%, for the Horizontal Regulation it is 96.9%. As for open amendments, the EP plenary adopted 94,8% of those amendments that were previously adopted by the COMAGRI. Concerning the Direct Payment Regulation, the EP plenary adopted 88,2% of the open amendments that were supported by the COMAGRI. Regarding SCMO, this figure is 99,6%, for EAFRD 97,8%, for the Horizontal Regulation 86,3%. 30 As for compromise amendments, the EP plenary adopted 98,5% of those adopted by the COMAGRI. For the compromise amendments in the Direct Payment regulation, this figure is 94,6%, for the SCMO and EAFRD it is 100% and 92,6%% for the Horizontal Regulation.18 As for the amendments tabled by the opinion-giving committees, the EP plenary adopted 98,2% of those adopted previously by the COMAGRI. In case of the Direct Payment Regulation, the SCMO Regulation and the Horizontal Regulation, this figure is 100%, while in case of the EAFRD Regulation, it is 96,7%. T able 23. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ Practically, the EP plenary adopted the COMAGRI position with a very few number of amendments turned down. -‐ The highest adoption rates of the plenary were in case of the draft report amendments (98,6%) and the compromise amendments (98,5%). It shows again the decisive role of the rapporteurs. -‐ The relatively lowest level of adoption rates at the plenary were for the open amendments (94,8%). 6.2.Comparison with the consultation procedure There is no real difference between the consultation and codecision procedure in this sense. T able 24. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ Also under the consultation procedure, the EP plenary practically adopted all the amendments that were adopted by the COMAGRI before. The adoption rates are in most cases in the interval of 90-100%. 18 For these figures, Compromise amendments are not extracted. 31 -‐ Only in case of the amendments of the opinion giving committees are the adoption rates lower varying between 43-100%. 7. The EP plenary: the relationship between the EP negotiation mandate and the Final Regulations 7.1.The EP plenary amendments In all, 334 amendments were tabled to the EP plenary. 47,9% of them were proposed to the SCMO regulation, 29,9% to the Direct Payment Regulation, 12,3% to the EAFRD and 9,9% to the Horizontal Regulation. The EP plenary adopted 6,9% of all plenary amendments. In the EP plenary, 100 amendments were tabled to the Direct Payment Regulation. 4% of them were adopted in the EP Plenary. In case of the SCMO Regulation, 1,9% of the plenary amendments were adopted. This figure is 22% for the EAFRD and 21,2% for the Horizontal Regulation. In the final regulations, 3% of all plenary amendments can be found. This ratio is 1% for the Direct Payment Regulation, 15,2% for the Horizontal Regulation, 9,8% for the EAFRD Regulation. None of the plenary amendments has been incorporated in the SCMO Final Regulation. T able 25. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ The EP plenary adopted 6,9% of all plenary amendments, while 3% of the plenary amendments can be found in the four final CAP Regulations. -‐ Plenary amendments tabled to the EAFRD and the Horizontal Regulations were adopted at the highest rates, 22% and 21,2% respectively. It might mean that the EP plenary wanted to make a more significant correction on these two regulations, before entering into the trialogue negotiations. -‐ Plenary amendments were the most powerful in case of the Horizontal Regulation (15,2% adoption rate in the Final Regulation), followed by the EAFRD (9,8%). 32 7.2. Results of amendments during the trialogue negotiations As for all the amendments tabled to the 4 CAP regulations, 59,2% of those adopted by the EP plenary were finally built into the final CAP regulations. In case of the Direct Payment Regulation, this ratio is 60,2%, 57,1% for the SCMO Regulation and 73% for the EAFRD. 41,4% of the amendments in the EP negotiation mandate can be found in the final Horizontal Regulation. Conclusions: -‐ The European Parliament managed to make almost 60% of the amendments in its position (EP plenary adopted amendments) adopted by the Council during the trialogue negotiations. It shows a significant increase during the codecision procedure, as compared to the consultation procedure, this figure is doubled (29,1% previously). -‐ In case of EAFRD, the EP negotiation mandate is the closest to the final policy outcome. In this case, the EP could the most effectively defend its position during the trialogue negotiations. -‐ After the EAFRD, the adoption rates in descending order are for Direct Payments (60,2%), SCMO (57,1%) and the Horizontal Regulation (41,4%). In this sense, the EAFRD and Direct Payments EP rapporteur (Capoulas Santos) and his negotiating team was the strongest during the trialogue negotiations, followed by Michel Dantin. La Via, the rapporteur of the Horizontal Regulation was the weakest during the trialogue negotiations. As for draft report amendments, 59,3% of the EP plenary adopted amendments ± amendments in the EP negotiation mandate ± were adopted after the trialogue negotiations and finally built into the Final Regulations. In case of the Direct Payment Regulation, this ratio is 65,8%, 59,7% for the SCMO Regulation, 80,3% for the EAFRD and 42,1 for the Horizontal Regulation. Regarding the open amendments, 60,8% of those adopted by the EP plenary were finally adopted during the trialogue negotiations and built into the text of the final regulations. This ratio is 61,3% for the Direct Payment Regulation, 55,6% for the SCMO, 74,2% for the EAFRD and 40% for the Horizontal Regulation. 33 Regarding compromise amendments, 66,3% of the amendments adopted by the EP plenary was finally incorporated in the 4 CAP final regulations. The ratio is 72,2% for EAFRD, 68,6% for Direct Payments, 67,9% for SCMO and 44% for the Horizontal Regulation. Concerning the amendments tabled by the opinion giving committees, 41,8% of those amendments supported by the EP plenary were finally adopted and became part of the final CAP regulations. This ratio is 48,3% for the EAFRD Regulation, 40% for the Horizontal Regulation. None of the amendments tabled by the opinion giving committees were incorporated in the SCMO Regulation, while on the other end, all of this type of amendments were adopted in case of the Direct Payment Regulation. As for the plenary amendments, 43,5% of those plenary amendments adopted by the EP plenary were finally adopted during the trialogue negotiations and built into the final regulations. This figure is 25% in case of plenary amendments tabled to the DP Regulation, 44,4% for the EAFRD and 71,4% for the Horizontal Regulation. None of the plenary amendments were built into the final SCMO Regulation. T able 26. to be inserted here Conclusions: -‐ When the aggregate success rates of the various types of amendments are analysed, it can be concluded that the EP was the most powerful towards the Council in case of the compromise amendments (66,3% success rate), followed by the open amendments (60,8% success rate) and the draft report amendments (59,3%). The high success rates both in case of the compromise and the draft report amendments highlight again the key role of rapporteurs. To the contrary, amendments of opinion-giving committees and plenary amendments have a low level of success rate (41,8% and 43,5% respectively), which means that these type of amendments had limited influence during the trialogue negotiations. -‐ In case of draft report amendments, the power of the EP towards the Council as colegislator ± in terms of adoption rates ± is EAFRD (80,3%), Direct Payments (65,8%), SCMO (59,7%) and Horizontal Regulation (42,1%). This descending order is the same when open amendments are analysed: EAFRD (74,2%), Direct Payments (61,3%), SCMO (55,6%) and the Horizontal Regulation (40%). When compromise amendments 34 are analysed, also the EAFRD (72,2%) and the Direct Payment Regulation (68,6%) top the list of regulations. -‐ Following the above list, the power of rapporteurs is as follows in descending order: Capoulas Santos (EAFRD and Direct Payment), Michel Dantin (SCMO) and Giovanni La Via (Horizontal Regulation). It shall be noted that also this list shows that La Via is the weakest rapporteur. 7.3.Comparison with the consultation procedure In this Chapter, the power of the EP is assessed towards the Council in order to see how much the amendments of the EP were taken on board by the Council. Regarding the four CAP regulations under the consultation procedure, 29,1% of the amendments tabled to these regulations were finally adopted by the Council and incorporated in the final regulations. In case of the Direct Payment Regulation, this adoption rate was 30,5%, in case of EAFRD 31,4%, for SCMO 10% and for the Horizontal Regulation 57,1%. By the type of amendments, when all the amendments are analysed, the highest adoption rates were in case of the open amendments (32,5%), followed by the draft report amendments (23,3%), the plenary amendments (11,8%) and the compromise amendments (11,1%). The amendments of opinion giving committees were adopted at a rate of 9,1%. Draft report amendments were adopted by 19,7% in case of the Direct Payment Regulation, 41,2% by the EAFRD, 50% in case of the Horizontal Regulation and 16,7% in case of SCMO. Open amendments were adopted at a rate of 36,2% in case of the Direct Payment Regulation, 32,2% for the EAFRD, 75% for the Horizontal Regulation and 3,3% for SCMO. Plenary amendments, amendments of opinion giving committees and compromise amendments were only tabled to some of the CAP legislative act analysed under consultation, making the comparison impossible with the codecision term. T able 27. to be inserted here 35 Conclusions: -‐ 7KH(3¶VSRVLWLRQWKHDPHQGPHQWVDGRSWHGE\WKH(3SOHQDU\XQGHUWKHFRGHFLVLRQ procedure is much powerful towards the Council: amendment adoption rate is 59,2% for codecision and 29,1% for consultation. -‐ The EP is also more powerful in putting through the draft report amendments: 59,3% of adoption rate under codecision and 23,3% in case of consultation. This, again, shows the stronger position of rapporteurs under the codecision procedure. -‐ In case of open amendments, the difference in case of the two legislative procedures is also huge: 60,8% of the EP plenary adopted amendments is incorporated in the Final Regulations under codecision, 32,5% under consultation. -‐ ,Q FDVH RI WKH GUDIW UHSRUW DPHQGPHQWV WKH (3¶V SRZHU WRZDUGV WKH &RXQFLO YDULHV among the regulation as follows in descending order: Horizontal Regulation, EAFRD, Direct Payments, SCMO. In case of open amendments, this descending order is Horizontal Regulation, Direct Payments, EAFRD, SCMO. While under consultation, the EP was strong in influencing the Horizontal Regulation, it changed under codecision (being the Horizontal Regulation the last in the row). -‐ There is one similar pattern between the consultation and codecision procedures: the (3¶VSRZHUWRZDUGVWKH&RXQFLOLQFDVHRIWKH($)5'DQG'LUHFW3D\PHQWUHJXODWLRQV was higher than that of in case of the SCMO under both procedures. -‐ Regarding compromise amendments, the EP was much more powerful under codecision (66,3% success rate) than under consultation (11,1%). -‐ Under both decision-making procedure, amendments of opinion-giving committees and plenary amendments had a minor influence. Nevertheless, the success rates of these types of amendments are much higher under codecision (43,5% for plenary amendments, 41,8% for OGC amendments) than under consultation (11,8% for plenary amendments and 9,1% for OGC amendments). 36 L iterature %DUU\Ä,V,W%HWWHUWR%H3RZHUIXORU/XFN\"´3DUWDQG 2. Political Studies 28: 183194 and 338-352. Crombez (1996): Crombez, Christophe, 1996, Legislative Procedures in the European Community, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 2. pp. 199-228 &URPEH]&URPEH]&KULVWRSKHÄ7KH Co-Decision Procedure in the European 8QLRQ´Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22. No. 1. pp. 97-119. Crombez (1999): Crombez, Christophe Ä,QVWLWXWLRQDO 5HIRUP DQG &RGHFLVLRQ LQ WKH (XURSHDQ8QLRQ´ Greer et al. (2012): Greer, A. and Hind, T.: Inter-institutional decision-making: the case of the common agricultural policy, Politics and Society, 31 (4). pp. 331-341. ISSN 1449-4035 .UHSSHO .UHSSHO $PLH :KDW $IIHFWV WKH (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW¶V /HJLVODWLYH Influence? An Analysis of the Success of EP Amendments, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3. pp. 521-538. Kreppel (2002): Kreppel, Amie: Moving Beyond Procedure, An Empirical Analysis of European Parliament Legislative Influence, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35 No. 7, September 2002, 784-813. Lucic, (2004): The Power of the European Parliament in Cooperation Legislative Procedure, Scully (1997): The European Parliament and the Co-Decision Procedure: A Reassessment, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 3. No. 3., Autumn 1997, pp. 58-73. 37 Selck and Steunenberg (2004): Torsten J. Selck, Bernard Steunenberg, Ä%HWZHHQ3RZHUDQG /XFN7KH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWLQWKH(8/HJLVODWLYH3URFHVV´ European Union Politics, Vol. 5. (1): 25-46. 6KHFNOHWRQ³7KH3ROLWLFVRI&RGHFLVLRQ´3DSHUSUHVHQWHGDWWKH(&6$6L[WK%LHQQLDO Conference, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 7VHEHOLV DQG *DUUHWW *HRUJH 7VHEHOLV DQG *HRIIUH\ *DUUHWW ³7KH ,QVWLWXWLRQDO Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism LQ WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ´ International Organization 55, 2, Spring 2001, pp. 357±390 Tsebelis et al., (2001): Tsebelis, George, Jensen, B. Christian, Kalandrakis, Anastassios, .UHSSHO$PLHÄ/HJLVODWLYHSURFHGXUHVLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ$Q(PSLULFDO$QDO\sis, British Journal of Political Science, 31, 573-599. 38 A nnex I. L ist of E P documents analysed T he 2013 C A P reform Direct Payment Regulation Draft Report DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625final/2 ± C7-0336/2011 ± 2011/0280(COD)), Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, Rapporteur: Luis Manuel Capoulas Santos, PE474.052v01-00, 30.5.2012 Open amendments AMENDMENTS 111 ± 282, PE491.238v01-00, 18.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 283 ± 611, PE492.791v01-00, 19.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 612 ± 939, PE492.792v01-00, 19.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 940 ± 1243, PE492.793v01-00, 20.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1244 ± 1580, PE494.483v01-00, 23.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1581 ± 1883, PE494.487v01-00, 24.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1884 ± 2218, PE494.491v01-00, 24.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 2219 ± 2292, PE494.604v01-00, 25.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 2293 ± 2297, PE497.986v02-00, 18.10.2012 Compromise amendments COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 ± 38, PE500.765v01, 18.12.2012 Opinions OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625 ± C7 0336/2011 ± 2011/0280(COD)); PE491.199v02-00, 16.10.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625 ± C7 0336/2011 ± 2011/0280(COD)); PE480.659v02-00, 10.10.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework 39 of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625 ± C7 0336/2011 ± 2011/0280(COD)); PE485.891v02-00, 25.6.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy, (COM(2011)0625 ± C7 0336/2011 ± 2011/0280(COD)); PE485.891v02-00, 25.6.2012; PE483.719v02-00, 24.9.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625 ± C7 0336/2011 ± 2011/0280(COD)); PE494.613v02-00, 17.10.2012 Plenary amendments AMENDMENTS 1, PE519.386, 14.11.2013 AMENDMENTS 2-4, PE519.386v01-00, 13.11.2013 AMENDMENTS 5-13, PE519.386v01-00, 13.11.2013 AMENDMENTS 14-18, PE519.386v01-00, 13.11.2013 EP negotiation mandate PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION ON THE OPENING OF, AND MANDATE FOR, INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS pursuant to Rule 70(2) and Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy, B7-0079/2013, PE503.600v01-00, 4.2.2013 EP Report REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy, A7-0362/2013, PE474.052v02-00, 5.11.2013 F inal Regulation REGULATION (EU) No 1307/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, Official Journal of the European Union 20.12.2013 E A F RD Regulation Draft report DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 40 Development (EAFRD), (COM(2011)0627 PE474.053v01-00, 24.5.2012 ± C7-0340/2011 ± 2011/0282(COD)), Open amendments AMENDMENTS 74 ± 274, PE489.640v01-00, 20.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 275 ± 700, PE492.797v01-00, 24.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 701 ± 1051, PE492.949v01-00, 24.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1052 ± 1396, PE494.479v01-00, 25.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1397 ± 1733, PE494.480v01-00, 25.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1734 ± 2063, PE494.481v01-00, 26.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 2064 ± 2127, PE494.602v01-00, 26.7.2012 AMENDMENT 2128, PE497.987v01, 18.10.2012 Compromise amendments COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 ± 37, PE501.948v01-00, 18.12.2012 Opinions OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); PE491.200v02-00, 17.10.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE489.357v03-00, 21.9.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE485.892v02-00, 21.6.2012 OPINION of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE486.102v02-00, 24.9.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE492.639v02-00, 16.10.2012 Plenary amendments AMENDMENTS 001, PE519.385/1, 14.11.2013, A7-0361/ 001-001 Amendment 2, PE519.385v01-00, 13.11.2013, A7-0361/2 Amendment 3, PE519.385v01-00, 13.11.2013, A7-0361/3 41 Amendment 4, PE519.385v01-00, 13.11.2013, A7-0361/4 EP negotiation mandate PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION ON THE OPENING OF, AND MANDATE FOR, INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS pursuant to Rule 70(2) and Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), B7-0081/2013, PE503.602v01-00, 4.2.2013 EP Report REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), A7-0361/2013, PE474.053v02-00, 5.11.2013 F inal Regulation REGULATION (EU) No 1305/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, Official Journal of the European Union, 20.12.2013 Horizontal Regulation Draft report DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, (COM(2011)0628 ± C7-0341/2011 ± 2011/0288(COD)), PE483.834v01-00, 30.5.2012 Open amendments AMENDMENTS 103 ± 424, PE492.777v02-00, 20.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 425 ± 769, PE494.482v02-00, 20.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 770 ± 779, PE497.774v01-00, 16.10.2012 AMENDMENTS 780 ± 789, PE497.977v01-00, 17.10.2012 AMENDMENTS 790 ± 816, PE498.000v01-00, 18.10.2012 Compromise amendments COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 ± 27, PE501.971v01-00, 17.12.2012 Opinions OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, PE491.202v02-00, 17.10.2012 42 OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, PE489.355v02-00, 21.9.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, PE485.889v02-00, 21.6.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, PE494.608v02-00, 17.10.2012 Plenary amendments AMENDMENTS 001-001, PE519.387/1, A7-0363/ 001-001, 14.11.2013 Amendment 2-5, PE519.987v01-00, A7-0363/2, 13.11.2013 EP negotiation mandate PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION ON THE OPENING OF, AND MANDATE FOR, INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS pursuant to Rule 70(2) and Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the CAP, B7-0082/2013, PE503.603v01-00, 4.2.2013 EP Report REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, A7-0363/2013, PE483.834v02-00, 5.11.2013 F inal Regulation REGULATION (EU) No 1306/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008, Official Journal of the European Union, 20.12.2013 Single C M O Regulation Draft report DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single 43 CMO Regulation) (COM(2011)0626 ± C7-0339/2011 ± 2011/0281(COD)), PE485.843v02-00, 5.6.2012 Open amendments AMENDMENTS 435 ± 737, PE492.801v01-00, 19.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 738 ± 1095, PE494.488v01-00, 20.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1096 ± 1415, PE494.486v01-00, 23.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1416 ± 1548, PE494.484v01-00, 24.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1549 ± 1848, PE494.588v01-00, 25.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 1849 ± 2094, PE492.804v01-00, 25.7.2012 AMENDMENTS 2095 ± 2227, PE494.489v01-00, 25.7.2012 Compromise amendments COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 ± 96, PE497.939v01-00, 20.12.2012 COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 97 ± 176, PE501.994v01, 20.12.2012 Opinions OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation); PE491.201v02-00, 17.10.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), PE485.893v02-00, 21.6.2012 OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), PE494.633v02-00, 8.11.2012 Plenary amendments AMENDMENTS 001-001, PE519.388/ 1, A7-0366/ 001-001, 14.11.2013 Amendment 2, PE519.388, A7-0366/2, 13.11.2013 Amendment 8, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/8, 13.11.2013 Amendment 16, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/16, 13.11.2013 Amendment 25, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/25, 13.11.2013 Amendment 30/rev., PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/30/rev., 18.11.2013 Amendment 31, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/31, 13.11.2013 Amendment 35, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/35, 13.11.2013 Amendment 37, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/37, 13.11.2013 EP negotiation mandate 44 PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION ON THE OPENING OF, AND MANDATE FOR, INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS pursuant to Rule 70(2) and Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), B7-0080/2013, PE503.601v02-00, 11.2.2013 EP Report REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), A7-0366/2013, PE485.843v03-00, 6.11.2013 F inal regulation REGULATION (EU) No 1308/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007, Official Journal of the European Union, 20.12.2013 MINUTES Meeting of 23 January 2013, from 9.00 to 12.30 and from 15.00 to 18.30, and 24 January 2013, from 9.00 to 12.30, BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2013)0123_1, PE502.270v01-00 EP Plenary Session, RESULTS OF VOTES, PE 506.441, 13/03/2013 T he C A P legislative instruments under the consultation procedure, 2005-2008 Direct Payment Regulation Draft report DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, (COM(2008)0306 ± C6-0240/2008 ± 2008/0103(CNS)), PE407.775v01-00, 25.6.2008 Open amendments AMENDMENTS 133 ± 242, PE407.776v01-00, 1.9.2008 AMENDMENTS 243 ± 391, PE412.042v01-00, 2.9.2008 AMENDMENTS 392 ± 495, PE412.053v01-00, 3.9.2008 AMENDMENTS 496 ± 601, PE412.054v01-00, 3.9.2008 AMENDMENTS 602 ± 680, PE412.067v01-00, 3.9.2008 AMENDMENTS 681 ± 739, PE412.069v01-00, 3.9.2008 AMENDMENTS 740 ± 789, PE412.081v01-00, 4.9.2008 Compromise amendments 45 COMPROMISE AMENDEMENTS 1 ± 41, PE413.949v01-00, 2.10.2008 Opinions OPINION of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, PE409.570v02-00, 16.9.2008 OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, PE409.507v02-00, 12.9.2008 OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, PE409.798v02-00, 7.10.2008 C OMAGRI documents Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, MINUTES, Meeting of 6 October 2008, from 15.00 to 18.30, and 7 October 2008, from 09.00 to 10.45 and from 15.00 to 18.30, BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2008)1006_1, PE414.020v01-00 REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, PE407.775v03-00, 21.10.2008 EP Plenary documents EP Plenary, Results of the votes, Annex, PE 416.039/1, 19/11/2008 Support schemes for farmers under the CAP, European Parliament legislative resolution of 19 November 2008 on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, P6_TA(2008)0549 F inal Regulation COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, Official Journal of the European Union 31.1.2009 E A F RD Regulation 46 Draft report DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, (COM(2004)0490 ± C6-0181/2004 ± 2004/0161(CNS)), PE 353.498v01-00, 24.2.2005 Open amendments AMENDMENTS 30-342, PE 355.724v01-00, 4.4.2005 Compromise amendments COMPROMISE PROPOSALS 1-3, PE 357.676v01, 21.4.2005 Opinions OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE 355.400v03-00, 22.4.2005 OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE 355.448v02-00, 22.4.2005 C OMAGRI documents Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, MINUTES of the meeting of 26 April 2005, from 9 a.m. to 12.30 a.m. BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2005)0426, PE 357.889v01-00 REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE 353.498v02-00, 12.5.2005 EP Plenary documents AMENDMENTS 1-129 tabled by the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, A60145/1-129, PE 357.465, 2.6.2005 AMENDMENT 130, A6-0145/130, PE 357.465, 1.6.2005 AMENDMENT 132/rev, A6-0145/132/rev, PE 357.465v02-00, 2.6.2005 European Parliament Plenary Session, RESULTS OF VOTES, ANNEX 1, PE 357.486/1, 07/06/2005 European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, P6_TA(2005)0215 F inal Regulation 47 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), Official Journal of the European Union, 21.10.2005 Horizontal Regulation Draft report DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, (COM(2004) 0489 ± C6-0166/2004 ± 2004/0164(CNS)), PE 353.479v0100, 24.2.2005 Open amendments AMENDMENTS 6-21, PE 355.726v01-00,5.4.2005 Opinions OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, PE 357.687v01-00, 21.4.2005 C OMAGRI documents Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, MINUTES of the meeting of 26 April 2005, from 9 a.m. to 12.30 a.m. BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2005)0426, PE 357.889v01-00, REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, PE 353.479v02-00, 2.5.2005 EP Plenary documents EP Plenary Session, RESULTS OF VOTES, ANNEX 1, PE 357.436/1, 26/05/2005 European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, P6_TA(2005)0193 Single C M O Regulation Draft report DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, (COM(2006)0822 ± C6-0045/2007 ± 2006/0269(CNS)), PE 384.346v01-00, 19.3.2007 Open amendments AMENDMENTS 20-96, PE 384.551v01-00, 17.4.2007 C OMAGRI documents 48 Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, MINUTES Meeting of 7 May 2007, from 15.00 to 18.30, and 8 May 2007, from 09.00 to 17.30 BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2007)0507, PE 388.534v01-00 REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, PE 384.346v02-00, 10.5.2007 EP Plenary documents EP Plenary Session, RESULTS OF VOTES, ANNEX 1, PE 389.514/1, 24/05/2007 European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 May 2007 on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, P6_TA(2007)0207 49 A nnex I I. K ey institutional positions in the C A P trialogue negotiations Direct Payment Measure Item EC position EP position Council Final Coalition* position Regulation 1 Financial discipline Threshold for application 5.000 EUR 5.000 EUR 2.000 EUR 2.000 EUR EC=EP Council 2 Active farmer Mandatory vs. Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory EC=EP EC=EP 3 Redistributive payments Mandatory vs. Voluntary N/a Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary EP=Council EP=Council 4 Redistributive Threshold for eligible payments ha N/a Threshold for funding Redistributive (% of national 5 payments average payment per ha) N/a Up to 50 or Up to 30 or Up to 30 or average average average farm No coalition farm size farm size size N/a 50 Max. 65% max. 65% No coalition Winner Council Council 6 Redistributive Maximum for annual payments national ceiling N/a Up to 30% Up to 30% up to 30% EP=Council EP=Council 7 Support for young farmers Mandatory vs. Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory EC=EP EC=EP 8 Support for young farmers Threshold for annual national ceiling Up to 2% 2% Up to 2% Up to 2% EC=Council EC=Council 9 Support for young farmers Threshold for eligible ha Up to 25 or average farm size up to 100 EC=Council EP 10 Support for small farmers The scheme is mandatory vs. voluntary for MSs Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary EP=Council EP=Council 11 Support for small farmers The scheme is mandatory vs. Voluntary for farmers Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary EC=Council EC=Council Support for 12 small farmers Maximum of annual payment 1.000 EUR 1.500 EUR 51 Up to 25 or between 25- average 90 farm size 1.000 EUR 1.250 Compromise, EP towards EC=Council final outcome Support for small farmers Amount of annual payment as a percentage of the national average payment per beneficiary Up to 15% Up to 25% Up to 15% up to 25% EC=Council EP Support for 14 small farmers Calculation of payment based on national average payment per ha Up to 3 ha Up to 5 ha Up to 3 ha Up to 5 ha EC=Council EP Maximum annual national ceiling 10% 15% 10% 10% EC=Council EC=Council No No Yes Yes EC=EP Council No No Yes Yes EC=EP Council 13 15 Support for small farmers 16 Support for Application for SAPS small farmers 17 Greening Equivalence of national environmental certificates 52 18 Greening - Crop diversification Lower threshold for crop rotation 3 ha 10 ha 10 ha 10 ha EP=Council EP=Council 19 Greening - Crop diversification 2 crops No 10-30 ha 10-30 ha 10-30 ha EP=Council EP=Council 20 Greening - Crop diversification 3 crops above 3 ha 30 ha 30 ha 30 ha EP=Council EP=Council 75% Compromise, EP towards No coalition final outcome Greening - Maximum threshold 21 Crop for one crop in term diversification of arable land 70% 22 Greening - Permanent Grassland Level of application/calculation of permanent grassland ratio At farm level 23 Greening - Permanent Grassland Permanent pasture part of permanent grassland No 80% national, national, national, regional or regional or regional or sub- sub- EP=Council sub-regional regional regional level level level Yes 53 75% No Yes EC=Council EP=Council EP 24 Greening - Ecological Focus Areas Greening - 25 Ecological Focus Areas Threshold above which EFA applies Percentage of farmland 0 ha 7% 10 ha 15 ha 3 %, up to 5% from 5%, up to 2016, up to 7% from 7% from 2018 2018 Same as EC position but with possibility Uniform to deviate unit value by 20% Internal 26 Payment entitlements have to be from this Convergence reached by value + 2019 2019 levels FDQ¶WEH more than 30% over 2014 level Uniform unit value have to be reached by 2019 + increase by 1/3 for payments whose unit value in 2014 is lower than 90 % of the national or regional unit value 15 ha 5 %, 7% from 2018 EP=Council Council, EP No coalition towards final outcome All farmers below 90% of national average must get a payment increase of at least 1/3 of the difference of the current payment to the 90%. All farmers shall No coalition receive at least 60% of the national or regional average. Option for Member States to OLPLWIDUPHUV¶ "losses" to 30%. 54 EP=Council EP MSs with direct payments below the level of 90% of the No MSs All MSs MSs shall average should should attain at should Council, EP External Convergence between receive less reach at least a level 27 close one No coalition towards final Convergence MSs than 65% least 196 of 196 euros third of the outcome of the EU EUR/ha by per ha by gap average. 2020 2020 between their current level and this level by 2020. 28 29 Voluntary coupled support Voluntary coupled support List of sectors Short list MSs applying more than 5% of their DP for coupled payments Up to 10% during at least one year between 2010- 2013 Long list Up to 15% 55 Short list Up to 10% Short list Up to 13 % EC=Council EC=Council Compromise, EP towards EC=Council final outcome MSs applying more than 10% of their DP for coupled payments more than No position No position during at least one 10% year between 2010- 2013 30 Voluntary coupled support 31 Voluntary coupled support 32 Voluntary coupled support Other MSs Up to 5% Up to 15% 33 Voluntary coupled support Protein crops 0 Plus 3% 34 Payment entitlements Reference year for BPS 2011 35 Payment entitlements SAPS expiry MSs applying SAPS Up to 10% Up to 15% EC=EP Other up to 13% Compromise, EP towards EC=Council final outcome Up to 5% up to 8% Compromise, EP towards EC=Council final outcome Plus 2% Plus 2 % Council, EP No coalition towards final outcome Up to 10% 2009, 2010 2012, or 2011 2013, 2014 2014 31/12/2013 31/12/2020 31/12/2020 31/12/2020 56 more than 13% No coalition Council EP=Council EP=Council 36 Capping and degressivity Mandatory vs. Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory 37 Capping and degressivity Maximum (capping) 300.000 EUR 300.000 EUR Capping and 38 degressivity Degressivity 20-70% 20-70% Mandatory No No maximum maximum EC=EP EC=EP EC=EP Council Fix percentage set by the MSs at least 5% EC=EP Council EC=EP Council 39 Capping and degressivity Exemption No No Yes MSs using at least 5% of ANC on redistributive payments 40 Flexibility between pillars From P1 to P2 for above-average MSs (in terms of DP per ha) Up to 10% Up to 15% Up to 15% Up to 15% EP=Council EP=Council 41 Flexibility between pillars From P1 to P2 for below-average MSs (in terms of DP per ha) Up to 10% Up to 15% Up to 15% Up to 15% EP=Council EP=Council 57 Voluntary 42 Flexibility between pillars From P2 to P1 for above-average MSs 0 0 Up to 15% Up to 15% EC=EP Council 43 Flexibility between pillars From P2 to P1 for below-average MSs up to 5% up to 10% Up to 25% Up to 25% No coalition Council *Coalition = institutions with the same position 58 EAFRD Regulation Measure Item EC position EP position N/a 25% for agri- environment and organic farming;; 30% for agri- environment, organic farming, LFA, Forestry measures, Natura 2000 payments, WFD payments in the Luxembourg compromise proposal 0% initially, 25% for agri- environment, organic farming, LFA, Forestry measures, Natura 2000 payments, WFD payments in the Luxembourg compromise proposal Final Regulation Coalition* 30% for: Agri- environment;; Organic farming;; LFA;; Forestry EC=Council payments;; Natura 2000 payments;; Environment- related investment;; Winner 1 Ring-fencing Share of for EAFRD and environmental measures payments covered 2 Greening under P1 and P2 Double funding No double funding No double funding Explicitly allowing double funding No double funding EC=EP EC=EP 3 Organic farming Double funding No exclusion of double funding No double funding No exclusion of double funding No double funding EC=Council EP 59 Council position EP 4 National distribution of RD resources Annual implementing breakdown act by MSs Annex to EAFRD regulation Implementing act Annex to EAFRD regulation EC=Council EP 5 Adjustments National due to inter- implementing distribution of pillar act RD resources transfers Delegated act Implementing act Delegated act EC=Council EP 6 Investments in physical assets and investments Support rates in new forestry technologies - Aegean islands 65% 75% 65% 75% EC=Council EP 7 Support rates 300 EUR/ha 450 EUR/ha 300 EUR/ha 450 EUR/ha EC=Council EP 8 Young Possibility to farmers increase the setting up;; support rates by Collective 20% under investments the and Support rates µ,QYHVWPHQWV integrated in physical projects;; assets, Agricultural Areas facing VHFWRU¶ natural measures constraints as referred Young farmers setting up;; Collective investments and EC=Council integrated projects;; Areas facing natural and other specific constraints EP LFA - mountain areas Young Young farmers farmers setting up;; setting up;; Collective Collective investments investments and and integrated integrated projects;; projects;; Areas facing Areas facing natural natural and constraints other specific as referred constraints as 60 to in Article to in Article referred to in referred to in 33.;; 33.;; Article 33.;; Article 33.;; Operations Operations Operations Operations supported in supported in supported in supported in the the the the framework of framework of framework of framework of the EIP;; the EIP;; the EIP;; the EIP;; Organic Organic farmers, farming, Natura 2000 agri- and WFD, environment;; Agri- environment 9 10 Fund contribution Percentage of eligible expenditure in less developed regions, outermost regions and Aegean islands 85% 85% 75% 85% EC=EP Solely EP as this was the only results that differs from the European Council conclusions of 8 February 2013 Fund contribution Percentage of eligible expenditure in other regions 50% 50% 53-75% 53-75% EC=EP Council 61 Fund contribution Agri- environment and climate measures 12 Fund contribution Operations receiving funding from funds transferred to EAFRD from P1 13 Areas facing significant natural constraints Eligibility threshold in terms of UAA 14 Areas facing Number of significant criteria to be natural fulfilled constraints 11 50-85% 55-90% 75% EC=Council, as the EC accepted the MFF EC=Council conclusions of 8 February 2013 50-85% 95% (MSs receiving FA) 100% 100% 66% EC was asked to table new delimitation by 31/12/2014 60% 60% EC=Council EC=Council at least 1 EC was asked to table new delimitation by 31/12/2014 At least one at least 1 EC=Council EC=Council 62 75% EC=Council, as the EC accepted the MFF EC=Council conclusions of 8 February 2013 EC was asked to table new delimitation by 31/12/2014 15 Areas facing significant natural constraints Percentage that criteria shall be fulfilled 16 Areas facing significant natural constraints Deadline for new delimitation No position 31/12/2014 17 Producer groups Eligible activity Setting up the PG 18 Young farmers Definition, eligible person Less than 40 years of age 19 Afforestation and creation of woodland Maximum period of support 10 years 15 years 15 years 12 years 20 Establishment of agroforestry systems Maximum period to cover the costs of maintenance 3 years 5 years 5 years 5 years 100% 100% No coalition No position 2018 EP, policy outcome EC=Council WRZDUGV(3¶V position Setting up and development of PG Setting up the PG Setting up the PG 40 years of age or less Less than 40 years of age 63 1 for 100% or 2 for 90% EC=Council No more than 40 EC=Council years of age EC EC=Council EP Compromise, EP position EP=Council towards outcome EP=Council EP=Council 21 Animal welfare payments Commitment period 1 year 22 Investments in irrigation Eligibility of new irrigation installations Only in new MSs 1-7 years In all MSs 1 year In all MSs 1-7 years EC=Council Compromise between the EP=Council three institutions *Coalition = institutions with the same position 64 EP Other Horizontal Regulation 1 2 Measure Item General provisions No double funding for environmental obligations both under P1 and P2 Transparency, publication of beneficiaries 3 Paying Agencies Threshold, under which beneficiaries are exempted Number of PA EC position No double funding Yes, equal to the amount of the SFS 1 per MS or 1 per region / type of support (reduction relative to status quo) EP position Council position Final Regulation Coalition* Winner No double funding Double funding is possible for agri- environment and organic farming No double funding EC=EP EC=EP No EC=Council 1 per MS or per region/type of support, with derogation to keep existing paying agencies (confirms status quo, Other, compromise close to the Council position, but no absolute victory 1 per MS or Restrict to 1 per the region necessary (even minimum stronger (allows reduction increase relative to relative to status quo) status quo) 65 Yes, equal to the amount Yes, equal to of the SFS or the amount 1250 Euro if EC=Council of the SFS SFS not applied in the MS EC=EP but limits further increase) 4 Cross- compliance Water Framework Directive Yes No No No EP=Council EP=Council 5 Cross- compliance Pesticide Directive Yes No No No EP=Council EP=Council 6 Cross- compliance GAEC 7 GAEC 7 included Deletion of GAEC 7 Deletion of GAEC 7 Deletion of GAEC 7 EP=Council EP=Council 0%, (reduction of basic payment not possible at all) Limited EP=Council reduction of (Both basic Max. 25% positions well payment (limited reflected in possible: 0% reduction of the final in the first No coalition basic outcome, with two years, payment smooth 20% for the possible) transition over third year, time from one 25% from to the other) the 4th year 7 Penalty for non- compliance with No limit the greening (unlimited requirements reduction of (%, additional basic to the 30% payment greening possible) payment) Penalties *Coalition = institutions with the same position 66 Single CMO Regulation Measure Item EC position EP position Council position 1 Export refunds Budget available Not defined in the CMO EUR 0 Not defined in the CMO EUR 0 EC=Council EP Export refunds Serve as a crisis management instrument Not only Yes only Not only Yes only EC=Council EP 2 3 Public intervention Products eligible 4 Public intervention Intervention period Common Common wheat, wheat, barley, EC barley, maize, proposal + maize, paddy rice, durum paddy rice, beef, veal, wheat, beef, veal, butter, sorghum butter, skimmed skimmed milk powder milk powder Varies by product Throughout the year 67 Varies by product Final Coalition* Regulation Winner Common wheat, durum wheat, barley, Compromise, maize, EC=Council EP towards paddy rice, final outcome beef, veal, butter, skimmed milk powder Varies by product EC=Council EC=Council not part of not part of the the part of the regulation, regulation, regulation defined later defined later by the by the Council Council 5 Buying-in Measures on quantitative limitations part of the regulation 6 Private storage aid Products eligible Olive oil Olive oil and table olives Olive oil 7 Private storage aid Products eligible No cheese Cheese No cheese 8 Private storage aid Conditions for granting aid include 9 School fruit Scheme Extended to vegetables Council Olive oil EC=Council EC=Council Cheese EC=Council EP EC=Council EP EC=Council EP Average recorded Union Average market recorded price;; Average Average Union reference recorded recorded market prices for Union Union price;; the market market reference products;; price;; price;; thresholds production reference reference and costs;; prices for prices for production impact of the products the products costs;; profit market margins in situation on the sector;; producers' profit margin No Yes 68 EC=EP No Yes 10 School fruit Scheme Aid in the fruit 11 and vegetables sector maximum aid per school year EUR 150 million EUR 150 million No definite No definite amount;; amount;; shall be shall be defined later defined later by the by the Council Council Timeframe of operational fund Not defined 3-5 years Not defined Less than one-third 40% Less than one-third Maximum expenditure for crisis Aid in the fruit prevention and 12 and vegetables management sector under the operational programme 69 EC=EP Council Not defined EC=Council EP Less than one-third EC=Council EC=Council Maximum Union financial assistance for associations of Aid in the fruit producer 13 and vegetables organisations in sector terms of the value of marketed products 14 15 16 Aid in the apiculture sector EU contribution to national apiculture programmes Sugar sector End of sugar quota system Wine sector 4,60% 5,00% Max 50% Max 60% Compromise, EP towards final outcome Equivalent to Equivalent to No coalition 50% 50% Council, EP towards final outcome end of the 2019/2020 30/09/2015 30/09/2017 marketing year 4,70% 30/09/2017 No coalition End of WPR End of WPR End of WPR End of by by by transitional 31/12/2015 End of WPR 31/12/2018 31/12/2015 wine planting with by the end + set up of + set up of right rights possibility of new vine new vine EP=Council (WPR) + set up for MSs to 2029/3030 authorization authorization of new vine extend up to marketing system from system from authorization 31/12/2018, year 1/1/2019 to 1/1/2016 to system no new 31/12/2024 31/12/2030 system after 70 EC=Council 4,60% Council, EP towards final outcome EP=Council 17 18 Producer Organisations Producer Organisations Mandatory vs. Voluntary recognition Mandatory Mandatory Competition rules POs shall not hold a dominant market position POs can hold a dominant market position Voluntary Voluntary EC=EP POs can hold POs can hold a dominant a dominant EP=Council market market position position EP=Council Non-Annex I. products shall not Not defined exceed 49% EC=Council of the total volume marketed EP 19 Producer Organisations Pre-requisite for the ratio of Non-Annex I. products Non-Annex I. products shall not exceed Not defined 49% of the total volume marketed 20 Associations of producer organisations Mandatory vs. Voluntary recognition Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary EP=Council EP=Council 21 Interbranch organisations Mandatory vs. Voluntary recognition Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary EP=Council EP=Council *Coalition = institutions with the same position 71 Council A nnex I I I. T ables Table 1. Inter-‐institutional coalition formation during the CAP trialogue negotiations EAFRD Coalition Number % EP = Council coalition 3 13,6% EC = EP coalition 3 13,6% EC = Council coalition 15 68,2% No coalition 1 4,5% Total number of items observed 22 100,0% Direct Payment Number % 11 25,6% 11 25,6% 12 27,9% 9 20,9% 43 100,0% SCMO Number % 4 19,0% 3 14,3% 12 57,1% 2 9,5% 21 100,0% Horizontal Reg. Number % 3 42,9% 2 28,6% 1 14,3% 1 14,3% 7 100,0% Total Number % 21 22,6% 19 20,4% 40 43,0% 13 14,0% 93 100,0% Table 2. Winning institutions during the CAP trialogue negotiations EAFRD Direct Payment SCMO Horizontal Reg. Total Winning institutions Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % EP = Council coalition 1 4,5% 11 25,6% 4 19,0% 4 57,1% 20 21,5% EC = EP coalition 1 4,5% 3 7,0% 0 0,0% 1 14,3% 5 5,4% EC = Council coalition 5 22,7% 4 9,3% 3 14,3% 1 14,3% 13 14,0% Compromise, EP towards final outcome 1 4,5% 5 11,6% 2 9,5% 0 0,0% 8 8,6% Council, EP towards final outcome 0 0,0% 3 7,0% 2 9,5% 0 0,0% 5 5,4% EP wins 11 50,0% 5 11,6% 7 33,3% 0 0,0% 23 24,7% EC wins 1 4,5% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 1 1,1% Council wins 1 4,5% 11 25,6% 3 14,3% 0 0,0% 15 16,1% Other (nobody wins, no compromise) 1 4,5% 1 2,3% 0 0,0% 1 14,3% 3 3,2% Total number of items observed 22 100,0% 43 100,0% 21 100,0% 7 100,0% 93 100,0% 72 Table 3. Success rates of inter-‐institutional coalitions during the CAP trialogue negotiations EAFRD Winning Coalition Total * EP = Council 3 1 EC = EP 3 1 EC = Council 15 5 Direct payments SCMO Success Success Winning rate Total Winning* rate Total * 33,3% 11 11 100,0% 4 4 33,3% 11 3 27,3% 3 0 33,3% 12 4 33,3% 12 3 Horizontal Regulation Success Winning rate Total * 100,0% 3 4 0,0% 2 1 25,0% 1 1 Total Success Winning rate Total * 133,3% 21 20 50,0% 19 5 100,0% 40 13 Success rate 95,2% 26,3% 32,5% * including when EP position is towards the final outcome Table 4. EP wins in case of EC=Council coalitions during the CAP trialogue negotiations EC=Council coalition EP wins EP success rate EAFRD 15 10 66,7% Direct payments 12 8 66,7% SCMO 12 9 75,0% Horizontal regulation 1 0 0,0% Total 40 27 67,5% 73 Table 5. Winners in case of "No coalition" No coalition EAFRD 1 Direct Payments 9 SCMO 2 Horizontal Regulation 1 Total 13 % EC EP Council 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 7,7% 7,7% 30,8% Winner Council, EP towards final outcome 0 3 2 0 5 38,5% Other 0 1 0 1 2 15,4% T able 6. Success rates of E P amendments tabled to C A P legislative proposals Direct Payments Tabled Adopted Success rate E A FRD Tabled Adopted SC M O Success rate Tabled Adopted Total Success rate Tabled Adopted Tabled Adopted Success rate A ll A M s 98 39 39,80% 142 67 47,18% 349 165 47,28% 194 72 37,11% 783 343 43,81% Agricultural Policy A M s 59 29 49,15% 93 53 56,99% 170 93 54,71% 92 37 40,22% 414 212 51,21% C A P reform A Ms 43 21 48,84% 35 23 65,71% 21 11 52,38% 10 6 60,00% 109 61 55,96% New A M s 28 9 32,14% 14 0 0,00% 154 62 40,26% 46 10 21,74% 242 81 33,47% Recital A M s 23 9 39,13% 18 7 38,89% 93 33 35,48% 34 4 11,76% 168 53 31,55% Non-Recital A Ms 75 30 40,00% 124 60 48,39% 256 132 51,56% 160 68 42,50% 615 290 47,15% 74 Success rate Horizontal Regulation T able 7. Direct Payments Regulation T hematic success rates Tabled Adopted Success rate Scope Amendment of Annex I. Definitions Net ceilings Financial discipline Active farmer Progressive reduction and capping of payment Flexibility between pillars Review Payment entitlements Basic payment scheme ceiling Regional allocation of the national ceilings First allocation of payment entitlements Value of payment entitlements and convergence Establishment and use of the national reserve Activation of payment entitlements Transfer of payment entitlements Delegated powers Scope and definitions 14 8 57,1% Common rules on direct payments 11 2 18,2% Basic Payment Scheme 13 8 61,5% 75 Complementary payment for the first hectares Greening - general rules Greening - Crop diversification Greening - Permanent grassland Greening - Ecological focus area Payment for areas with natural constraints Payment for young farmers Voluntary coupled support Small farmers scheme Notification requirements Measures to resolve specific problems Exercise of the delegation Transitional rules Payment for agricultural practises beneficial for the climate and for environment Payment for areas with natural constraints Payment for young farmers Voluntary coupled support Small farmers scheme Notifications and emergency Delegation of powers Transitional and final provisions Annex - National ceilings referred to in Article 6 Annexes T O T A L (Non-recital) Recital 76 4 4 100,0% 4 1 25,0% 2 1 50,0% 15 3 20,0% 4 1 25,0% 2 1 50,0% 2 0 0,0% 2 1 50,0% 1 0 0,0% 1 0 0,0% 75 23 30 9 40,0% 39,1% T able 8. T hematic success rates - SC M O Regulation Introductory provisions Public intervention and aid for private storage School Fruit Scheme School Milk Scheme Aid in the olive oil and table olives sector Aid in the fruit and vegetables sector Support programmes in the wine sector Aid in the apiculture sector Marketing standards Designations of origin, geographical indications and traditional terms in the wine sector Labelling and presentation in the wine sector Sugar Wine Milk and milk products Producer organisations and associations, interbranch organisations, operator organisations Trade with third countries - Import and export licences Import duties Tariff quota management and special treatment of imports by third countries Special import provisions for certain products Export refunds Competition rules State aid rules Exceptional measures Communications and reporting Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector Delegations of power and implementing provisions Transitional and final provisions Annexes T O T A L (Non-recital) Recital 77 Tabled Adopted Success rate 12 9 75,0% 18 8 44,4% 5 4 80,0% 4 3 75,0% 2 1 50,0% 6 4 66,7% 15 11 73,3% 3 2 66,7% 15 8 53,3% 25 5 20,0% 6 21 15 5 2 19 1 5 33,3% 90,5% 6,7% 100,0% 19 16 84,2% 8 15 4 4 50,0% 26,7% 7 4 57,1% 3 3 5 3 8 6 1 1 4 21 3 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 11 100,0% 66,7% 0,0% 0,0% 12,5% 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 75,0% 52,4% 256 93 132 33 51,6% 35,5% T able 9. T hematic success rates - E A F R D Regulation Objectives and Strategy Programming Rural Development support - individual measures investments in physical and human capital Rural Development support - individual measures ± forestry Setting up of producer groups Rural Development support - individual measures - green measures 9 8 88,9% 5 4 80,0% 1 1 100,0% 9 4 44,4% 6 5 83,3% 6 3 1 2 16,7% 66,7% Technical assistance and networking 16 8 50,0% Prize for innovative, local cooperation in rural areas 5 5 100,0% EIP for agricultural productivity and sustainability 4 1 25,0% Financial provisions Management, control and publicity Monitoring and evaluation Competition provisions Commission powers Annexes 5 2 6 3 1 8 2 0 2 1 1 6 40,0% 0,0% 33,3% 33,3% 100,0% 75,0% Rural Development support - individual measures - other measures Rural Development support ± LEADER Common provisions for several measures T O T A L (Non-recital) Recital 78 Tabled Adopted 18 6 17 3 Success rate 33,3% 17,6% 124 18 60 7 48,4% 38,9% T able 10. T hematic success rates - Horizontal Regulation Table Adopte d d Scope and definitions 5 4 Paying agencies and other bodies 10 5 Farm advisory system 5 2 EAGF 9 4 EAFRD 16 7 Clearance of accounts 17 9 Irregularities 5 5 Control systems and penalties 15 2 Integrated Administration and Control System 19 9 Scrutiny of transactions 1 1 Other provisions on checks 3 0 Cross compliance - Scope 7 4 Control system and penalties in relation to cross compliance 9 2 Communication 2 1 Use of the euro 2 0 Report and evaluation 5 4 Final provisions 2 1 Annexes 28 8 T O T A L (Non-recital) 160 68 Recital 34 4 79 Success rate 80,0% 50,0% 40,0% 44,4% 43,8% 52,9% 100,0% 13,3% 47,4% 100,0% 0,0% 57,1% 22,2% 50,0% 0,0% 80,0% 50,0% 28,6% 42,5% 11,8% T able 11. T he number and distribution of E P amendments tabled to the 4 C A P regulations 2013 C A P reform Draft Report Amendment Open Amendments Compromise amendments Amendments of opinion giving committees Plenary amendments Total Total - Initial COMAGRI phase adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Number % Number % Number % Number % 711 8,3% 559 36,6% 551 36,9% 327 36,9% 6749 78,4% 891 58,3% 845 56,5% 514 58,1% 279 3,2% 21 1,4% 21 1,4% 11 1,2% 533 6,2% 56 3,7% 55 3,7% 23 2,6% 334 3,9% n/a n/a 23 1,5% 10 1,1% 8606 100,0% 1527 100,0% 1495 100,0% 885 100,0% 80 T able 12. T he number and distribution of the proposed E P amendments by C A P regulation Draft Report Amendment Open Amendments Compromise amendments Amendments of opinion giving committees Plenary amendments Total Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 81 DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total 102 73 102 434 711 14,3% 10,3% 14,3% 61,0% 100,0% 2187 2055 714 1793 6749 32,4% 30,4% 10,6% 26,6% 100,0% 38 38 27 176 279 13,6% 13,6% 9,7% 63,1% 100,0% 140 264 96 33 533 26,3% 49,5% 18,0% 6,2% 100,0% 100 41 33 160 334 29,9% 12,3% 9,9% 47,9% 100,0% 2567 2471 972 2596 8606 29,8% 28,7% 11,3% 30,2% 100,0% T able 12. T he number and distribution of the proposed E P amendments by C A P regulation Draft Report Amendment Open Amendments Compromise amendments* Amendments of opinion giving committees Plenary amendments Total A dopted amendments in the final Proposed amendments regulations DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Number 102 73 102 434 711 25 49 40 213 327 % 14,3% 10,3% 14,3% 61,0% 100,0% 7,6% 15,0% 12,2% 65,1% 100,0% Number 2187 2055 714 1793 6749 46 265 68 135 514 % 32,4% 30,4% 10,6% 26,6% 100,0% 8,9% 51,6% 13,2% 26,3% 100,0% Number 38 38 27 176 279 4 3 0 4 11 % 13,6% 13,6% 9,7% 63,1% 100,0% 36,4% 27,3% 0,0% 36,4% 100,0% Number 140 264 96 33 533 1 14 8 0 23 % 26,3% Number 100 % 29,9% Number 2567 % 29,8% 49,5% 41 12,3% 2471 28,7% 18,0% 6,2% 100,0% 4,3% 33 160 334 1 9,9% 47,9% 100,0% 10,0% 972 2596 8606 77 11,3% 30,2% 100,0% 8,7% 60,9% 4 40,0% 335 37,9% 34,8% 5 50,0% 121 13,7% 0,0% 0 0,0% 352 39,8% 100,0% 10 100,0% 885 100,0% *compromise amendments extracted 82 T able 13. T he number and distribution of E P amendments tabled to the 4 C A P regulations 2007-2013 programming period - consultation procedure Draft report amendments Open amendments Compromise amendments Amendments of opinion giving committees Oral amendment (COMAGRI) Plenary amendments Total Total - initial COMAGRI phase adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Number % Number % Number % Number % 185 12,5% 106 21,4% 103 20,8% 24 16,7% 1063 71,8% 354 71,5% 345 69,7% 112 77,8% 45 3,0% 5 1,0% 5 1,0% 2 1,4% 128 8,6% 27 5,5% 22 4,4% 2 1,4% 3 0,2% 3 0,6% 3 0,6% 2 1,4% 56 3,8% n/a n/a 17 3,4% 2 1,4% 1480 100,0% 495 100,0% 495 100,0% 144 100,0% 83 T able 14. T he numbers and success rates of amendments by C A P regulation 2013 C A P reform Success rates - compared to the total DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Total number of amendments Total Initial COMAGRI Plenary Final COMAGRI Plenary Final phase adopted adopted Regulation adopted Adopted Regulation 2567 139 128 77 5,4% 5,0% 3,0% 2471 459 459 335 18,6% 18,6% 13,6% 972 315 292 121 32,4% 30,0% 12,4% 2596 614 616 352 23,7% 23,7% 13,6% 8606 1527 1495 885 17,7% 17,4% 10,3% T able 15. T he numbers and success rates of amendments by C A P regulation 2007-2013 - consultation procedure Success rates - compared to the total DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Total number of amendments Total Initial COMAGRI Plenary Final COMAGRI Plenary Final phase adopted adopted Regulation adopted Adopted Regulation 931 281 282 86 30,2% 30,3% 9,2% 426 157 156 49 36,9% 36,6% 11,5% 25 7 7 4 28,0% 28,0% 16,0% 98 50 50 5 51,0% 51,0% 5,1% 1480 495 495 144 33,4% 33,4% 9,7% 84 T able 16. T he numbers and success rates of draft report amendments by C A P regulation 2013 C A P reform Success rates - compared to the total DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Number of amendments Total Initial COMAGRI Plenary Final COMAGRI Plenary Final phase adopted adopted Regulation adopted Adopted Regulation 102 43 38 25 42,2% 37,3% 24,5% 73 61 61 49 83,6% 83,6% 67,1% 102 98 95 40 96,1% 93,1% 39,2% 434 357 357 213 82,3% 82,3% 49,1% 711 559 551 327 78,6% 77,5% 46,0% T able 17. T he numbers and success rates of compromise amendments by C A P regulation 2013 C A P reform Number of amendments DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Total Initial COMAGRI Plenary Final COMAGRI Plenary Final phase adopted adopted Regulation adopted Adopted Regulation 38 37 35 24 97,4% 92,1% 63,2% 38 36 36 26 94,7% 94,7% 68,4% 27 27 25 11 100,0% 92,6% 40,7% 176 162 162 110 92,0% 92,0% 62,5% 279 262 258 171 93,9% 92,5% 61,3% 85 Success rates - compared to the total T able 18. T he numbers and success rates of draft report amendments by C A P regulation 2007-2013 - consultation procedure Success rates - compared to the total DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Number of amendments Total Initial COMAGRI Plenary Final COMAGRI Plenary Final phase adopted adopted Regulation adopted Adopted Regulation 132 69 66 13 52,3% 50,0% 9,8% 29 17 17 7 58,6% 58,6% 24,1% 5 2 2 1 40,0% 40,0% 20,0% 19 18 18 3 94,7% 94,7% 15,8% 185 106 103 24 57,3% 55,7% 13,0% 86 T able 19. T he numbers and success rates of open amendments by C A P regulation 2013 C A P reform DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Total - Initial phase 2187 2055 714 1793 6749 Number of amendments COMAGRI Plenary adopted adopted 85 75 365 357 197 170 244 243 891 845 Success rates - compared to the total COMAGRI Plenary Final adopted Adopted Regulation 3,9% 3,4% 2,1% 17,8% 17,4% 12,9% 27,6% 23,8% 9,5% 13,6% 13,6% 7,5% 13,2% 12,5% 7,6% Final Regulation 46 265 68 135 514 T able 20. T he numbers and success rates of open amendments by C A P regulation 2007-2013 - consultation procedure DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Total - Initial phase 657 313 16 77 1063 Number of amendments COMAGRI Plenary adopted adopted 203 196 117 115 4 4 30 30 354 345 Final Regulation 71 37 3 1 112 87 Success rates - compared to the total COMAGRI Plenary Final adopted Adopted Regulation 30,9% 29,8% 10,8% 37,4% 36,7% 11,8% 25,0% 25,0% 18,8% 39,0% 39,0% 1,3% 33,3% 32,5% 10,5% T able 21. T he numbers and success rates of amendments of opinion-giving committees by C A P regulation 2013 C A P reform DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Number of amendments COMAGRI Plenary adopted adopted 1 1 30 29 20 20 5 5 56 55 Total - Initial phase 140 264 96 33 533 Success rates - compared to the total COMAGRI Plenary Final adopted Adopted Regulation 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 11,4% 11,0% 5,3% 20,8% 20,8% 8,3% 15,2% 15,2% 0,0% 10,5% 10,3% 4,3% Final Regulation 1 14 8 0 23 T able 22. T he numbers and success rates of amendments of opinion-giving committees by E P Committee 2013 C A P reform BUDG CONT DEVE ENVI REGI TOTAL Number of amendments COMAGRI Plenary adopted adopted 1 1 16 16 8 8 13 12 18 18 56 55 Total - Initial phase 47 137 38 179 132 533 Final Regulation 1 8 5 6 3 23 88 Success rates - compared to the total COMAGRI Final adopted Plenary Adopted Regulation 2,1% 2,1% 2,1% 11,7% 11,7% 5,8% 21,1% 21,1% 13,2% 7,3% 6,7% 3,4% 13,6% 13,6% 2,3% 10,5% 10,3% 4,3% Success rates Final to Plenary 100,0% 50,0% 62,5% 50,0% 16,7% 41,8% T able 23. Plenary to C O M A G R I success rates by C A P regulation 2013 C A P reform Amendment type Regulations DP EAFRD Draft report amendments HR SCMO Total DP EAFRD Open amendments HR SCMO Total DP EAFRD Compromise amendments* HR SCMO Total DP Amendments of EAFRD opinion-giving HR committees SCMO Total DP EAFRD Total HR SCMO Total COMAGRI adopted 43 61 98 357 559 85 365 197 244 891 37 36 27 162 262 1 30 20 5 56 139 459 315 614 1527 Plenary adopted 38 61 95 357 551 75 357 170 243 845 35 36 25 162 258 1 29 20 5 55 124 450 285 613 1472 Success rates (Plenary to COMAGRI) 88,4% 100,0% 96,9% 100,0% 98,6% 88,2% 97,8% 86,3% 99,6% 94,8% 94,6% 100,0% 92,6% 100,0% 98,5% 100,0% 96,7% 100,0% 100,0% 98,2% 89,2% 98,0% 90,5% 99,8% 96,4% *All type of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based on their original figures (non-extracted). 89 T able 24. Plenary to C O M A G R I success rates by C A P regulation 2007-2013 programming period - consultation procedure Amendment type Regulations DP EAFRD Draft report HR amendments SCMO Total DP EAFRD Open amendments HR SCMO Total DP EAFRD Compromise HR amendments* SCMO Total DP Amendments of EAFRD opinion-giving HR committees SCMO Total DP EAFRD Total HR SCMO Total COMAGRI adopted 69 17 2 18 106 203 117 4 30 354 41 4 0 0 45 7 19 1 0 27 281 157 7 50 495 Plenary adopted 66 17 2 18 103 196 115 4 30 345 41 4 0 0 45 3 18 1 0 22 267 154 7 50 478 Success rates (Plenary to COMAGRI) 95,7% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 97,2% 96,6% 98,3% 100,0% 100,0% 97,5% 100,0% 100,0% n/a n/a 100,0% 42,9% 94,7% 100,0% n/a 81,5% 95,0% 98,1% 100,0% 100,0% 96,6% *All type of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based on their original figures (non-extracted). 90 T able 25. T he numbers and success rates of plenary amendments by C A P regulation 2013 C A P reform DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total Number of amendments Total - Initial Plenary Final phase adopted Regulation 100 4 1 41 9 4 33 7 5 160 3 0 334 23 10 91 Success rates - compared to total Plenary Final Adopted Regulation 4,0% 1,0% 22,0% 9,8% 21,2% 15,2% 1,9% 0,0% 6,9% 3,0% T able 26. Success rates in the trialogue negotiations by C A P regulation 2013 C A P reform Final Regulations Plenary adopted Regulation DP 38 25 EAFRD 61 49 Draft report amendments HR 95 40 SCMO 357 213 551 327 Total DP 75 46 EAFRD 357 265 Open amendments HR 170 68 SCMO 243 135 845 514 Total DP 35 24 EAFRD 36 26 Compromise amendments* HR 25 11 SCMO 162 110 258 171 Total DP 1 1 EAFRD 29 14 Amendments of opinion-giving committees HR 20 8 SCMO 5 0 55 23 Total DP 4 1 EAFRD 9 4 Plenary amendments HR 7 5 SCMO 3 0 23 10 Total DP 128 77 EAFRD 459 335 Total HR 292 121 SCMO 616 352 1495 885 Total Amendment type Success rates (Final to Plenary) 65,8% 80,3% 42,1% 59,7% 59,3% 61,3% 74,2% 40,0% 55,6% 60,8% 68,6% 72,2% 44,0% 67,9% 66,3% 100,0% 48,3% 40,0% 0,0% 41,8% 25,0% 44,4% 71,4% 0,0% 43,5% 60,2% 73,0% 41,4% 57,1% 59,2% *All type of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based on their original figures (non-extracted). 92 T able 27. Success rates in the trialogue negotiations by C A P regulation 2007-2013 period - consultation procedure Final Regulations Plenary adopted Regulation DP 66 13 EAFRD 17 7 Draft report amendments HR 2 1 SCMO 18 3 103 24 Total DP 196 71 EAFRD 115 37 Open amendments HR 4 3 SCMO 30 1 345 112 Total DP 41 3 EAFRD 4 2 Compromise amendments* HR 0 0 SCMO 0 0 45 5 Total DP 3 0 EAFRD 18 2 Amendments of opinion-giving committees HR 1 0 SCMO 0 0 22 2 Total DP 15 2 EAFRD 2 0 Plenary amendments HR 0 0 SCMO 0 0 17 2 Total DP 282 86 EAFRD 156 49 Total HR 7 4 SCMO 50 5 495 144 Total Amendment type Success rates (Final to Plenary) 19,7% 41,2% 50,0% 16,7% 23,3% 36,2% 32,2% 75,0% 3,3% 32,5% 7,3% 50,0% n/a n/a 11,1% 0,0% 11,1% 0,0% n/a 9,1% 13,3% 0,0% n/a n/a 11,8% 30,5% 31,4% 57,1% 10,0% 29,1% *All type of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based on their original figures (non-extracted). 93 Table 28. a) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, All four CAP Regulations -‐ Compromise amendments not extracted Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary Adopted Final Regulation Draft Report Amendment 711 202 199 80 Open Amendments 6749 332 309 101 Compromise amendments 279 262 258 171 Amendments of opinion giving committees 533 49 48 20 Plenary amendments 334 n/a 23 10 Total 8606 845 837 382 Table 28. b) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, All four CAP Regulations -‐ Compromise amendments extracted Total -‐ Initial phase Draft Report Amendment 711 Open Amendments 6749 Compromise amendments 279 Amendments of opinion giving committees 533 Plenary amendments 334 Total 8606 94 COMAGRI adopted 559 891 21 56 n/a 1527 Plenary adopted 551 845 21 55 23 1495 Final Regulation 327 514 11 23 10 885 Table 29. a) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, Direct Payment Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments not extracted Final Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary Adopted Regulation Draft Report Amendment 102 16 16 4 Open Amendments 2187 46 45 10 Compromise amendments 38 37 35 24 Amendments of opinion giving committees 140 1 1 1 Plenary amendments 100 n/a 4 1 Total 2567 100 101 40 Table 29. b) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, Direct Payment Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments extracted Final Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary Adopted Regulation Draft Report Amendment 102 43 38 25 Open Amendments 2187 85 75 46 Compromise amendments 38 10 10 4 Amendments of opinion giving committees 140 1 1 1 Plenary amendments 100 n/a 4 1 Total 2567 139 128 77 95 Table 30. a) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, EAFRD Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments not extracted Total -‐ initial COMAGRI Plenary phase adopted Adopted Draft Report Amendment 73 9 9 Open Amendments 2055 110 102 Compromise amendments 38 36 36 Amendments of opinion giving committees 264 24 23 Plenary amendments 41 n/a 9 Total 2471 179 179 Final Regulation 5 43 26 12 4 90 Table 30. b) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, EAFRD Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments extracted Total -‐ initial COMAGRI Plenary phase adopted Adopted Draft Report Amendment 73 61 61 Open Amendments 2055 365 357 Compromise amendments 38 3 3 Amendments of opinion giving committees 264 30 29 Plenary amendments 41 n/a 9 Total 2471 459 459 96 Final Regulation 49 265 3 14 4 335 Table 31. a) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, Horizontal Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments not extracted Total -‐ initial COMAGRI Plenary Final phase adopted Adopted Regulation Draft Report Amendment 102 56 53 23 Open Amendments 714 104 91 35 Compromise amendments 27 27 25 11 Amendments of opinion giving committees 96 19 19 7 Plenary amendments 33 n/a 7 5 Total 972 206 195 81 Table 31. b) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, Horizontal Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments extracted Total -‐ initial COMAGRI Plenary phase adopted Adopted Draft Report Amendment 102 98 95 Open Amendments 714 197 170 Compromise amendments 27 0 0 Amendments of opinion giving committees 96 20 20 Plenary amendments 33 n/a 7 Total 972 315 292 97 Final Regulation 40 68 0 8 5 121 Table 32. a) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, SCMO Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments not extracted Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary Adopted Final Regulation Draft Report Amendment 434 121 121 48 Open Amendments 1793 72 71 13 Compromise amendments 176 162 162 110 Amendments of opinion giving committees 33 5 5 0 Plenary amendments 160 n/a 3 0 Total 2596 360 362 171 Table 32. b) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2013 CAP reform, SCMO Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments extracted Total -‐ Initial phase Draft Report Amendment 434 Open Amendments 1793 Compromise amendments 176 Amendments of opinion giving committees 33 Plenary amendments 160 Total 2596 98 COMAGRI adopted 357 244 8 5 n/a 614 Plenary adopted 357 243 8 5 3 616 Final Regulation 213 135 4 0 0 352 Table 33. a) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2007-‐2013, All four CAP Regulations -‐ Compromise amendments not extracted Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Draft report amendments 185 89 86 20 Open amendments 1063 244 235 35 Compromise amendments 45 45 45 5 Amendments of opinion giving committees 128 27 22 2 Oral amendment (COMAGRI) 3 3 3 2 Plenary amendments 56 n/a 17 2 Total 1480 408 408 66 Table 33. b) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2007-‐2013, All four CAP Regulations -‐ Compromise amendments extracted Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Draft report amendments 185 106 103 24 Open amendments 1063 354 345 112 Compromise amendments 45 5 5 2 Amendments of opinion giving committees 128 27 22 2 Oral amendment (COMAGRI) 3 3 3 2 Plenary amendments 56 n/a 17 2 Total 1480 495 495 144 99 Table 34. a) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2007-‐2013, Direct Payment Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments not extracted Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Draft report amendments 132 53 50 11 Open amendments 657 107 100 6 Compromise amendments 41 41 41 3 Amendments of opinion giving committees 48 7 3 0 Plenary amendments 53 n/a 15 2 Total 931 208 209 22 Table 34. b) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2007-‐2013, Direct Payment Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments extracted Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Draft report amendments 132 69 66 13 Open amendments 657 203 196 71 Compromise amendments 41 2 2 0 Amendments of opinion giving committees 48 7 3 0 Plenary amendments 53 n/a 15 2 Total 931 281 282 86 100 Table 35. a) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2007-‐2013, EAFRD Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments not extracted Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Draft report amendments 29 16 16 5 Open amendments 313 103 101 25 Compromise amendments 4 4 4 2 Amendments of opinion giving committees 76 19 18 2 Oral amendment (COMAGRI) 1 1 1 1 Plenary amendments 3 n/a 2 0 Total 426 143 142 35 Table 35. b) The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2007-‐2013, EAFRD Regulation -‐ Compromise amendments extracted Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Draft report amendments 29 17 17 7 Open amendments 313 117 115 37 Compromise amendments 4 3 3 2 Amendments of opinion giving committees 76 19 18 2 Oral amendment (COMAGRI) 1 1 1 1 Plenary amendments 3 n/a 2 0 Total 426 157 156 49 101 Table 36. The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2007-‐2013, Horizontal Regulation Total -‐ initial phase COMAGRI adopted Plenary adopted Final Regulation Draft report amendments 5 2 2 1 Open amendments 16 4 4 3 Amendments of opinion giving committees 4 1 1 0 Total 25 7 7 4 Table 37. The number of adopted EP amendments by amendment category 2007-‐2013, SCMO Regulation Draft report amendments Open amendments Oral amendments Total Total -‐ initial phase 19 77 2 98 COMAGRI adopted 18 30 2 50 102 Plenary adopted 18 30 2 50 Final Regulation 3 1 1 5
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