The “China Dream” in the PRC’s Propaganda Regime in the Digital
Era: Case Study of the Constitutional Debate during 2012-2013
Dr. Chin-fu Hung & Mr. Xinshan Si
Department of Political Science & Institute of Political Economy
National Cheng Kung University
TAIWAN
Abstract
At such a time a new “fifth-generation” leadership, led by Xi Jinping, was installed at
the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th National Congress in November 2012. The
“China Dream,” put forth by the General Secretary Xi Jinping when he visited the
exhibition “The Road to Revival” at China’s National Museum in Beijing in late
November 2012, has ever since become his governing ideology by which his
generation will achieve what is officially proclaimed as “Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics.” In the wake of Xi’s further elaborations on “China Dream” in a
keynote speech at the National People’s Congress in March 2013, forcibly
propagating the “China Dream” as a leading patriotic education campaign has
apparently been the core duty of the propaganda regime at all level. The official
slogan－China Dream－has, however, confronted by alternative discourses both
mediated in Chinese cyberspace and physical space, leaving an increased fierce
conflict over the seizure of discourse rights between the Chinese propaganda
government and the governed, epitomized as Netizens and elites in this work. Both
the Chinese Communist Party and the public intellectuals are seizing and expanding
their respective discourse power which is coined as “sovereign discourse rights” in
this work. Applying the notion of “sovereign discourse rights” into the study of
“China Dream” campaign, with a special reference to the controversial constitutional
debate, we find it helpful to comprehend conceptually and analytically the transitions
as well as dynamics between the Chinese propaganda regime and the new empowered
Chinese blogosphere in this global information age. This will in turn bear far-reaching
social and policy implications for China in the long run as this bottom-up force may
facilitate and reinforce a favorable social basis of the twin effects: the dynamic
civic-oriented agenda and enhanced discourse rights. Both of them will serve as a
precondition for a dynamic Chinese civil society, which in turn are the core
foundation and a necessary ingredient of any future political transitions in Communist
China.
Keywords: propaganda, Internet, China Dream, sovereign discourse rights,
agenda-setting
Fist draft; No quotation without permission.
1
IN 1793 a British envoy, Lord Macartney, arrived at the court of the Chinese emperor, hoping
to open an embassy. He brought with him a selection of gifts from his newly industrializing
nation. The Qianlong emperor, whose country then accounted for about a third of global GDP,
swatted him away: “Your sincere humility and obedience can clearly be seen,” he wrote to
King George III, but we do not have “the slightest need for your country’s manufactures”.
The British returned in the 1830s with gunboats to force trade open, and China’s attempts at
reform ended in collapse, humiliation and, eventually, Maoism.1
Introduction
China convened its 18th Party Congress in November 2012, designed to usher in
the fifth generation of leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who will
govern in the decade ahead onto the 2020s. Unlike Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) predecessor
Jiang Zemin (江澤民) who remained head of the Central Military Commission for
two years after he stepped down at the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Hu handed over
both the Party General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission
positions to Xi Jinping, marking a full power transition in CCP history. The way Hu
Jintao stages a “luo tui” (裸退, literally translated as naked retreat, or full retirement)
has conferred upon full mandate throughout his ruling in his era in a decade.
Soon after Xi Jinping took office, he and his six newly appointed Politburo
standing committee members, including Li Keqiang (李克強), Zhang Dejiang (張德
江), Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲), Liu Yunshan (劉雲山), Wang Qishan (王岐山), and
Zhang Gaoli (張高麗), made a public debut in late November 2012 on a visit to the
“Road to Revival” (復興之路) exhibit at the National Museum in Beijing. On this
occasion, Xi delivered a speech, pledging for the revival of China into a strong and
wealthy nation. As such, the exhibition is very patriotic that recalls a century of
Chinese modern humiliating history that dates back to the Opium War in 1840. In
what is called the “China Dream,” (中國夢) the nation, according to Xi, has gone
through on the road to revival, and he considers:
…achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the greatest Chinese
dream in modern times. Because the dream carries a long-cherished wish of
generations of Chinese people, it reflects the interests of the Chinese people as a
whole, and it’s a common expectation of the Chinese nation. History tells us that
1
“Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream,” The Economist, (May 4, 2013), p. 11.
2
the personal future and destiny of each one of us are closely connected with the
future of this country. The people can live well only when our country and nation
develop well. This glorious dream requires tireless efforts of generations of
Chinese people.2
Xi Jinping was later confirmed by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in
March 2013 as the new state president and chairman of the State Central Military
Commission, making him the Communist Party chief, head of state and
commander-in-chief. Following his first talk on “China Dream” in late November
2012 with respect to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, Xi vowed to
arduously press ahead with “China Dream” at the closing meeting of the first plenary
session of the 12th NPC in March 2013. Different from his previous vague but grand
vision of realizing the “China Dream,” this time he elaborated on this notion
systematically and comprehensively in greater detail.3 In addition, Xi at various
venues repeatedly articulated “China Dream” in relation to its distinct tasks, practical
strategies, and work objectives,4 home and abroad, making it a nationwide patriotic
education campaign.
Effectively, the Chinese authorities have aggressively launched a series of new
nationwide propaganda campaigns that are under instructions of the Propaganda
department at all levels since Xi took power. A nationwide barrage of propaganda
posters as well as learning activities that went up starting December 2012 gives a
clearer connotation of what the Chinese party and government organs, including states
enterprises and universities authorities, are up to since then. The call for action to
realize the cause of national rejuvenation and unity as well as prosperity has been on
the top agenda of the new Xi-Li administration.
2
Zhang Jianfeng, “Xi Pledges ‘Great Renewal of Chinese Nation’,” China Central Television (CCTV)
[on-line], (30 November 2012), http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20121130/100019.shtml
(accessed 16 March 2014).
3
This speech delivered at the closing meeting of the first plenary session of the 12th NPC in March
2013 is deemed as the second time Xi Jinping interprets the “Chinese Dream.” Xi repeated the words
“Chinese Dream” nine times in this speech. See “Spotlight: Xi Jinping talks about ‘Chinese Dream
nine times,” (Texie: Xi Jinping jiuti Zhongguomeng) Xinhua News Agency [on-line], (17 March 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013lh/2013-03/17/c_115054547.htm (accessed 16 March 2014).
4
According to official information, Xi Jinping has talked about “China Dream” fifteen times for the
purpose of advancing the cause of patriotism and national unity. See “General Secretary Xi Jinping
delivers fifteen systematical speeches to elaborate on the ‘Chinese Dream’,” (Xi Jinping zong shuji
shiwupian jianghua xitong chanshi Zhongguomeng) People’s Daily Online [on-line], (June 19, 2013),
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0619/c40531-21891787.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
3
Apart from the top-down “China Dream” propaganda campaign, we have also
seen the rise of the Internet-mediated public opinions and debates from below that
from time to time run against the official agenda. Ever since China launched its first
global Internet connection in 1994, the Internet population has grown exponentially
after two decades of development, with its current Internet population up to six
hundred million. 5 The innovative Internet application such as new social media
Chinese microblogging (weibo, 微 博 ) has already posed unprecedented and
formidable challenges to China’s propaganda-like mediaspace as well as the
propaganda regime itself. Coupled with the conservative and authoritarian Chinese
regime, the increasingly unfettered cyberspace and blogosphere has highlighted the
“networked socialism with Chinese characteristics” (有中國特色的網路社會主義)
wherein Chinese citizens may have enjoyed relatively more freedom than they were
before in communicating horizontally and disseminating alternative information and
debating in a more swift, interactive and convenient way on the one hand. But still,
there are political taboos and red lines in both cyberspace and physical life in
constraining complete communications freedom and liberty on the other. One of the
direct consequences is that it is becoming obvious and prominent to note the Chinese
propaganda is confronting soaring “reactionary” opinions from the general public and
the virtual world that they are undermining, challenging, or revising and replacing
alternative “discourses” and “agenda-setting” which were traditionally considered as
the monopolized power of the privileged propaganda machine.
Consequently, Xi Jinping has repeatedly remarked at several meetings to vow for
greater initiative in the publicity and ideological work to ensure a correct political
direction in the information era. He, for example, stressed at the “national conference
on the publicity and ideological work” (全國宣傳思想工作會議) in Beijing in
August 2013 that the Party-State is now “facing unprecedented challenges and
hardships, [and] we must persist in consolidating mainstream ideology and opinion.”6
In this vein, he identifies the Internet as the country’s “unruly” media and issues calls
5
See China Internet Network Information Center, The 33rd Statistical Report on Internet Development
in China [on-line], (January 2014), p. 15,
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201403/P020140305346585959798.pdf (accessed 16
March 2014).
6
“Xi demands greater initiative, innovation in publicity work,” Xinhua News Agency [on-line], (20
August 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/20/c_132647639.htm (accessed 16
March 2014).
4
for the Party’s propaganda machine to build a strong army to seize the ground of new
media. To be specific, instead of being passive, the propaganda government would
however be more combative and take an initiative to wage a war to win over Chinese
public opinion, which may be symbolized as “positive propaganda, public opinion
struggle.” (zhengmian xuanchuan, yulun douzheng, 正面宣傳，輿論鬥爭) The
former propaganda chief and Politburo standing committee member, Liu Yunshan, has
hence urged strengthened efforts to continue to tackle the “China Dream campaign, a
truly calculated initiative from the top. In his words, “The publicity of the ‘Chinese
dream’ and socialism with Chinese characteristics should be conducted thoroughly so
as to consolidate people’s confidence in China’s socialist path and system.”7
Against this backdrop, incorporating the top-down patriotic education of “China
Dream” campaign, this article raises the fundamental question on how and to what
extent the Chinese propaganda system may be able to achieve its privileged discourse
rights and set its Party-State agenda in the global information age. To further
empirical discussions, special attention will also be paid to the constitutional debate
with regard to the “China Dream” campaign. This article argues that the propaganda
regime is increasingly and constantly confronted by the alternative discourses
mediated in Chinese cyberspace, leaving an increased fierce conflict over the seizure
of discourse rights between the Chinese propaganda government and the public
intellectuals and Netizens. While both the Chinese Communist Party and the public
intellectuals are seizing and expanding their commanding heights of discourse rights
which is coined in this work as “sovereign discourse rights,”8 (話語主權) there will
be far-reaching social and policy implications for China in the long term as
information and ideological control is usually believed as one of the strong pillars for
this Party-State.
This article begins with a brief review of the literature on the transitions of
Chinese propaganda system, dating back from Lenin to the post-Mao era. It then turns
to propose the notion of “sovereign discourse rights” as an analytical concept to
explore the dynamics between the propaganda regime and the Chinese general public,
mostly the public intellectuals and the Big Vs in this work, in current constitutional
7
See note #5.
There will be more discussions about the notion of “sovereign discourse rights” in the ensuing
section.
5
8
debate with regard to the “China Dream” campaign. The exploration of this
constitutional debate will help serve as an empirical evidence to answer on how and to
what extent the Chinese propaganda regime may achieve to (re)gain its commanding
height in strengthening its discourse rights when increasingly confronted by opinion
leaders as well as elites on the one hand, and in setting its top-down agendas in this
global information age on the other.
Chinese Communist Party Propaganda in Transition
Essentially the Party’s propaganda department occupies a key part in Chinese
Communist Party’s governing structure; it is mainly in charge of overall
ideology-related thought work. The reason why ideology and thought work matters
much for Communist Party is that they are per se the fundamental basis building up
for the rationale of its very existence, activities, and moral ground. 9 Since the
inception of the Chinese Communist Party, Marxism, and later Marxism-Leninism,
has been the guiding ideology for all its actions. In accordance with Lenin’s dictation
on what the Communist Party needs and ought to serve as the vanguard of the
proletariat, the CCP has from the 1920s principally maintained and practiced what
Lenin has prescribed: the party-run and government-operated newspapers ought to
work for “a solid ideological unity” and to supply “complete and timely information”
for a mighty political force.10
Mao Zedong himself is actually a propagandist. During Mao’s rein, he had
extensively incorporated every possible means to enhance propaganda techniques and
to strengthen thought work. Mao in particular laid out his plan for the role of art and
literature in Chinese society in his notable talk at Yan’an Forum (延安文藝座談會),
in which he highly credits the “pen” as the key to the success of Chinese people’s
liberation:
In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people there are various fronts,
among which there are the fronts of the pen and of the gun, the cultural and the
9
Hua Gao (高華), Hongtaiyang shi zenyang shengqi de: Yanan zhengfeng yundong de lailong qumai
(How the red sun is rising: the sequence of The Yan’an Rectification Movement; 紅太陽是怎樣升起
的－延安整風運動的來龍去脈) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), p. 301.
10
Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, The Birth of Bolshevism: Lenin’s Struggle Against Economism, Volume 1
(Chippendale: Resistance Book, 2005), p. 69.
6
military fronts. To defeat the enemy we must rely primarily on the army with guns.
But this army alone is not enough; we must also have a cultural army, which is
absolutely indispensable for uniting our own ranks and defeating the enemy.11
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949,
China’s central propaganda Department adjusted to new political situations and
expanded its roles to carry out economic and sociopolitical tasks assigned by the
Party-State. However, during what is officially termed as the “Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution,” propaganda system was seized by and served for only Mao and
his close associates. Over this chaotic period, “a de facto national propaganda
department operated, under the control of the Cultural Revolution Leading Small
Group, which has usurped the powers of the CCP Central Committee.”12 Propaganda
worked for Mao and his closest allies had eventually turned into a personal tool for
him to advance the world revolutionary movement on the one hand, and to get
engaged in fierce power struggle on the other hand.
Entering in to the post-Mao era, the propaganda machine was then tasked with
the publicity and promotion of economic restructuring that was from a command
economy into a more socialist market economy, with a vague media line on
continuously upholding the “Four Cardinal Principles” (四項基本原則).13 In the
mid-1990s, with the rise of new information and communication technologies (ICTs),
the Chinese government intended to harness the potential of ICTs to stimulate
economic growth and to promote national competitiveness in a global economy, while
simultaneously constraining the ICT’s capability to foster what the authorities deem
undesired sociopolitical liberation and democratic transition. 14 Given that the
Party-State recently called for a “comprehensive deepening of reforms” (全面深化改
革) at the Third Plenary Session of 18th CCP Central Committee, 15 we have
11
Mao Tse-Tung, “Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung
(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), p. 69.
12
Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary
China, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), p. 38.
13
Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 18-52.
14
See a more general discussion in, for example, Yongnian Zheng, Technological Empowerment: The
Internet, State, and Society in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); and Christopher R.
Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, eds., China and the Internet: Politics and the Digital Leap Forward
(London and New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2003).
15
See the full text of the Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the
7
nonetheless continued to witness the Chinese media and mass communication sectors,
both of which are essentially administered and regulated by the CCP’s Central
Propaganda Department (中共中央宣傳部), swing for the spectrum between more
autonomy in management and political obedience, that are largely depending upon the
volatility of China’s current political climate. 16 More specifically, the Chinese
propaganda is and should be subsumed within the Party-State, and it ought to both
strengthen “positive propaganda” and engage in “public opinion struggle” (zhengmian
xuanchuan, yulun douzheng; 正面宣傳，輿論鬥爭) by all possible means.17
While Chinese President Xi Jinping vows to deepen its economic reforms and
opening-up in all respects at the key Third Plenum meeting, the Chinese media sector
has undoubtedly been increasingly affected by the interplay of the forces of
globalization and digital revolution. In fact, prior to the introduction of the ICTs in the
early 1990s, mass media in the propaganda-oriented Party-State virtually had a direct,
immediate and powerful effect on its Chinese audiences. This is usually described as
the “hypodermic needle effect,” in that media messages are injected straight into a
passive audience which is normally influenced by the message very shortly.18 Simply
put, the media’s message is like a bullet that fires from the “media gun” into the
viewer’s “head”.19 This has resulted in the general overlook of public’s right to know
(知情權), right to participate (參與權), right to freedom of speech (表達權), and the
right to serve as watch of government policies (監督權). However, this article holds
that the conventional propaganda apparatus is not as effective as it used to be. This is
primarily the case when the propaganda regime vigorously promotes the patriotic
campaign of “China Dream,” a recurring theme throughout the incumbent Xi-Li
Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, Xinhua News Agency [on-line], (12 November
2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/12/c_118113455.htm (accessed 16 March 2014).
16
Chin-fu Hung, “Keji shidai xia zhongguo xuanchuan tixi zhi shanbian yu tiaoshi: yi wengan shijian
zhong de wangluo pinglunyuan weili,” (The Transitions and Adaption of China’s Propaganda System
in the Information Age: The Internet Commentator in the Case of Weng’an Incident; 科技時代下中國
宣傳體系之嬗變與調適：以「甕安事件」中的網路評論員為例)，Mainland China Studies (中國大
陸研究), Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 2013), p. 5; Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China:
Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998).
17
Li Congjun (李從軍), “Laolao zhangwo yulun gongzuo zhudongquan,” (Firmly grasping the
initiative in public opinion work, 牢牢掌握輿論工作主動權) People’s Daily Online [on-line], (4
September 2013), http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2013/0904/c1003-22797334.html (accessed 16
March 2014).
18
David R. Croteau and William D. Hoynes, Media/Society: Industries, Images, and Audiences
(London: Pine Forge Press, 2003), p. 240.
19
Arthur Asa Berger, Essentials of Mass Communication Theory (Thousand Oaks, Calif. and London:
Sage Publications, 1995).
8
Administration from November 2012 onwards. While the Party-State preserves in
requesting its media outlets to undertake the role of guiding and shaping public
opinion and to strengthen government-sponsored propaganda agendas, the media’s
credibility and government authorities have nevertheless been frequently challenged
and undermined, with the Chinese opinion leaders and intellectuals as well as the
general public going online and engaging in alternative discourses and policy
deliberation on this “China Dream” campaign. In the face of increased technological
modernization, social pluralization, and economic globalization, the Chinese
propaganda regime is yet giving in; rather, it seeks to restore its propaganda power
and efficacy by asserting and enhancing what is called “sovereign discourse rights” in
this work, so as to help stabilize its social and political situations and, more
importantly, to work for fundamental interests of the Party-State in the information
age.
Networked Sovereign Discourse Rights
This paper proposes the idea of “sovereign discourse rights” to explain and
reflect upon China’s propaganda in the digital era, with special reference to its most
recent nationwide patriotic campaign－China Dream. The notion of “sovereign
discourse rights” involves two interrelated strands: discourse rights and sovereignty.
To speak with the notion of “discourse rights,” it actually refers to its basic construct
of “discourse.” It was firstly rooted and developed in the field of linguistics but was
later expanded to a more widely usage with a broad indication in humanity and social
sciences, such as communication, literature, cultural studies, sociology and politics. A
discourse can be defined as a “system of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes,
courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and
the worlds of which they speak.”20 In a simpler term, discourses are embedded in
human communications and this is how we human being differs from the animal. Any
economic, social and political changes are to be inevitably bound up with changing
discourses which essentially reflect newer sets of value orientations, attitudes, and
identities.
20
Lara Lessa, “Discursive Struggles Within Social Welfare: Restaging Teen Motherhood,” British
Journal of Social Work, Vol. 36, No. 2 (February 2006), p. 285.
9
A postmodernist Michel Foucault has in this sense inspired on how we come to
term with discourse in modern human society. Foucault coins the phrase of
power/knowledge to suggest that power and knowledge are mutually constituted and
are so inextricably interrelated that they are in principle inseparable.21 For Foucault,
“negotiations or struggles within society are not essentially about the possession of
power, but rather the contested term of the deployment of power.”22 It is in this sense
that power is present in formation of any knowledge and calculation. Actually, “there
is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations.”23 Thereby, truth is inextricably articulated to power and thereby, power is
always present and can both produce and constrain the truth. 24 In this work,
discourses are simply beyond the forms and contents that language may convey.
Rather, it is a power relation that the privileged usually seek to monopolize and create
rules of exclusion. This is phrased in this article as “sovereign discourse rights” in
which it highlights multi-players competing to pursue and seize greater discourse
rights via their disproportionate, asymmetrical power dynamics.
In the Chinese Party-State, media-politics nexus is vividly symbolized in an
unwavering basic principle of Party control over the media (dang guan mei ti, 黨管
媒體) through a complex combination of Party monitoring of news content, legal
restrictions and punishments on journalists and editors, and financial incentives for
self-censorship.25 Underlying this Party-State media logic is that Party’s voices and
opinions are much more heard and represented in mass media in comparison with its
civilian and/or commercial counterparts. The general Chinese public is thus either
excluded from much of the discourse on public policies and current events or being
limited to a marginalized sphere of discourses. It is not until the new media, the
Internet and its affiliated weibo in particular, that it challenges and undermines the
21
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (Brighton:
Harvester Press, 1980).
22
Ann Brooks, Postfeminisms: Feminism, Cultural Theory, and Cultural Forms (London: Routledge,
1997), p. 57.
23
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1977),
p. 27.
24
Susan Strega, “The View from the Poststructural Margins: Epistemology and Methodology
Reconsidered,” in Leslie Brown and Susan Strega (eds.), Research as Resistance: Critical, Indigenous
and Anti-oppressive Approaches (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2005), pp. 199-235.
25
Ashley Esarey, Speak No Evil: Mass Media Control in Contemporary China (Washington, DC:
Freedom House, 2006).
10
Party-State ultimate dominance over the discourse rights. Both the Party-State and the
opinion leaders from the intelligentsia and cyberspace are fiercely contending and
competing against each other in seizing the commanding heights of discourse rights in
this digital era, leaving the old and conventional order of discourse system unstable
and re-adjusted as well as re-mobilized.
In the process of boosting re-adjustment and re-mobilization of the Chinese
Party-controlled media, the propaganda regime has repeatedly vowed to “firmly
grasping the initiative in public opinion work,”26 and “capturing the initiative in the
online public opinion struggle” 27 . Meanwhile, Xi Jinping gravely requests his
propaganda and ideology departments to bear full responsibility to protect well the
territory, and to be responsible for defending the territory, and to do everything they
can to defend the territory,28 (守土有責、守土負責、守土盡責), so as to realize the
“China Dream” of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This top-down request
is in consistent with the notion－“sovereign discourse rights” in this work.
In essence, networked sovereign discourse rights can be defined as a “virtual”
presence of traditional sovereignty in cyberspace wherein it has a supreme, exclusive
and interpretive power of discourses. In the virtual space, multiple actors, including
the state and non-governmental organizations as well as individuals are contending
and running against each other for maximizing their online sovereign discourse rights
in the hope that they may better promote and strengthen their agendas. In the Chinese
context, the discourse rights were traditionally dominated by the propaganda machine
of the Party-State. Nevertheless, the networked “sovereign discourse rights” in China
are now arguably under ever-increasing competition from its incipient civil society,
including the more “unruly” yet dynamic and “reactionary” Internet users. Thus far, it
has been an information-intensified battlefield in which the propaganda department
(the Party-State) and the Chinese general public (the emerging civil society) to vie
26
Congjun Li (李從軍), “Laolao zhangwo yulun gongzuo zhudongquan,” (牢牢掌握輿論工作主動
權, ) People’s Daily Online [on-line], (4 September 2013),
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2013/0904/c1003-22797334.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
27
Hua Chen (陳華), “Duoqu wangluo yulun douzheng de zhudongquan,” (奪取網絡輿論鬥爭的主動
權) Jiefangjun bao (解放軍報, People’s Liberation Army Daily) [on-line], (4 September 2013), web
site: http://www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2013-09/04/content_4464263.htm (accessed 16 March 2014).
28
Xi Jinping, “Xionghuai daju bawo dashi zhaoyan dashi, nuli ba xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo zuode
genghao,” (胸懷大局把握大勢著眼大事，努力把宣傳思想工作做得更好) Renmin Ribao (人民日報),
August 21, 2013, p. 1.
11
with each other for greater networked “sovereign discourse rights” in this digital era.
In so doing, they may better mobilize themselves to rally their followers and
supporters in pushing their preferred (policy) agenda forcibly ahead. In the case of
“China Dream” campaign under study, this article demonstrates how and to what
extent the “sovereign discourse rights” are fiercely contested between the Chinese
propaganda regime and the emerging civil society, with a special reference to the
constitutional debate.
Understanding “China Dream” Through “Sovereign Discourse Rights”
Xi Jinping firstly proposed his version of “China Dream” when he spoke at the
National Museum “Road to Revival” (復興之路) exhibition at Beijing on November
29, 2012, soon after he took over as the Chinese Communist Party chief. His vision
for the achievement of great renewal or rejuvenation of Chinese nation reflects a
long-cherished national aspiration for a “China Dream” about making the country
wealthier (fu, 富) and stronger (qiang, 強) from the aggressions and humiliations it
suffered in the past centuries.29 However, Xi’s proposal of “China Dream” is by its
nature not a fresh formula in realizing the so-called “socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” Rather, it is at its root the succession of preceding political causes
and glorious missions undertaken by Xi’s predecessors—Jiang Zemin and Hu
Jintao—in which both of them had in China’s 15th (1997) and 16th (2002) Party
Congresses vowed for the new “Three-Step Development Strategy”30 (新三步走戰略)
and “Building a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way” (全面建設小康社會),
respectively, to achieve a “prosperous, strong, democratic and culturally advanced
29
Xi Jinping, “Chengqian qihou, jiwang kailai, jixu chaozhe zhonghua minzu weida fuxing mubiao
fenyong qianjin,” (To build on the past and prepare for the future, and continuing to target the goal of
great renewal of the Chinese nation, 承前啟後，繼往開來，繼續朝著中華民族偉大復興目標奮勇前
進) Xinhua News Agency [on-line], (29 November 2012),
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1129/c64094-19744088.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
30
According to the new three-step development strategy, there are three development phases: Step One:
Continuing to maintain the rapid, healthy and sustained growth of the national economy. Per capita
GDP will be doubled on the basis of 2000, and the life of the Chinese people becomes more
comfortable. In particular, all rural areas in the country will enter a well-off society. Step Two: By 2020,
the rural population lives a prosperous life with the development of industrialization and urbanization,
while the urban population gets even richer. Step Three: From 2020 to 2050, per capita GDP will
largely reach US$4,000. China will then become a richer, more democratic and modernized socialist
country.
12
socialist country.” 31 Xi Jinping decidedly sums up what his predecessors have
previously pledged in the political reports and related development strategies and he
then puts forth his slogan of “China Dream” to posture the new era under his reign.32
At a later time, Xi delicately incorporated his edition of “China Dream” into his
speech delivered at the closing meeting of the First Plenary Session of 12th NPC in
March 2013. He vowed anew to press ahead with the “China Dream” along the path
of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” highlighting:
To achieve a comprehensively well-off society, to build a prosperous, strong, democratic,
civilized, and harmonious modern socialist country and to attain the Chinese dream of the
great renaissance of the Chinese nation is to achieve prosperity, revitalize the nation, and
bring about the happiness of the people…33
Stressing the slogan “China Dream” is not a dream for the nation alone, Xi
accentuates in the same speech that it is, after all, the dream of the people from all
sections of society. Xi in his rhetoric brings “China Dream” into the life of every
Chinese by stating Chinese nation shares the common destiny, and therefore, he urges
“1.3 billion Chinese people should bear in mind the mission, unite as one, and gather
into invincible force with the wisdom and power.”34
In addition to these two remarkable speeches, Xi has also reiterated “China
Dream” at several occasions, home and abroad, since he took the reins from
November 2012, to vigorously promote his slogan and strive to achieve the dream of
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.35 In particular, when Xi Jinping arrived in
31
Jiang Zemin, “Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement
of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to the 21st Century,” (高舉鄧小平理
論偉大旗幟，將中國特色社會主義事業推向二十一世紀) Xinhua News Agency [on-line], (12
September 1997), http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-04/29/content_1447509.htm (accessed 16
March 2014); Hu Jintao, “Build a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in
Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” (全面建設小康社會，開創中國特色社會主義事業
新局面) Xinhua News Agency [on-line], (17 November 2002),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-11/17/content_632260.htm (accessed 16 March 2014).
32
See more at “Chasing the Chinese dream,” The Economist, (4 May 2013), pp. 24-26.
33
“Xi Jinping Addresses at the First Plenary Session of the 12th NPC,” People’s Daily Online [on-line],
(17 March 2013), http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0318/c40531-20819774.html (accessed 16 March
2014).
34
See above.
35
See, for example, “Xishou hezuo, gongtong fazhan: zai jinzhuan guojia lingdaoren diwuci huiwu shi
de zhuzhi jianghua,” (Work hand in hand for common development: keynote speech by Xi Jinping at
the fifth BRICS leaders meeting, 攜手合作，共同發展：在金磚國家領導人第五次會晤時的主旨講
話) People’s Daily Online [on-line], (28 March 2013),
13
Indian Wells, California, to meet with U.S. President Obama on 6 June 2013, his
adopted catchphrase “China Dream,” was once more articulated at summit, in which
he elaborates,
By the Chinese dream, we seek to have economic prosperity, national renewal and
people’s well-being. The Chinese dream is about cooperation, development, peace and
win-win, and it is connected to the American Dream and the beautiful dreams people in
other countries may have.36
Xi Jinping has enthusiastically adopted the famous term of “American Dream” in
his remarks in the summit. It is primarily because that, on the one hand, Xi may win
broader support from its American and Western counterparts when he utilizes the
nuanced external propaganda (wai xuan, 外宣) techniques to emphatically point out
“Chinese Dream” as fully consistent with the dreams of other countries and their own
peoples, and on the other hand, this sort of wai xuan may in turn be skillfully shifted
by his propaganda apparatus on to an internal propaganda (nei xuan, 內宣) tactics
that it could ultimately help bolster the CCP’s legitimacy while promoting the “China
Dream” campaign. Amid this political climate, the propaganda machine has spun in
full motion to reinforce its nei xuan agenda in conducting a new wave of vigorous
propaganda to mobilize citizens and personnel as well as students from public
institutions and schools for this patriotic “China Dream” movement. Not only is the
mainstream media obliged to facilitate this new thought work movement, but also this
patriotic education enters into the classroom, and enters the Chinese students’
brains.37
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0328/c49150-20945826.html (accessed 16 March 2014);
“Gongtong chuangzao yazhou he shijie de meihao weilai: Xi Jinping zai Boao yazhou luntan 2013nian
nianhui shang de zhuzhi yanjiang,” (Working together toward a better future for Asia and the world:
keynote speech by Xi Jinping at the Boao forum for Asia annual conference 2013, 共同創造亞洲和世
界的美好未來：習近平在博鼇亞洲論壇 2013 年年會上的主旨演講) People’s Daily Online [on-line],
(7 April 2013), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0408/c64094-21048139.html (accessed 16 March
2014).
36
“Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China After
Bilateral Meeting,” The White House (Office of the Press Secretary) [on-line], (8 June 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jin
ping-peoples-republic-china- (accessed 16 March 2014).
37
“Liu Yunshan zai shenhua zhongguomeng xuanchuan jiaoyu zuotanhui shang qiangdiao, tuidong
xingcheng shixian zhongguomeng de qiangda jingshen liliang,” (Liu Yunshan stresses the importance
of great spiritual power in realizing the Chinese dream in the propaganda meeting, 劉雲山在深化中國
夢宣傳教育座談會上強調，推動形成實現中國夢的強大精神力量) Xinhua News Agency [on-line],
(8 April 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-04/08/c_115311559.htm (accessed 16 March
14
While the Party-State has extensively promulgated the significance of realizing
the “China Dream” of the great rejuvenation and economic prosperity through
collective strength and mass mobilization, the majority of people in a more outspoken
and dynamic Chinese society are wary of this new round of ideology campaign,
contending alternative version of their respective Chinese dream both on- and off-line.
The Chinese intellectuals and public opinion leaders, particularly those Internet-based
“public intellectuals” (公知) and the “Big Vs” (大 V)—verified accounts in China’s
popular social media Weibo (微博), have played a leading role in emancipating public
discourses on the official “China Dream” concept embodied in ongoing propaganda
work, mobilization, education and campaign.
As such, these public intellectuals and the Big Vs are playing a key part in
liberating Chinese public discourses through their alternative agenda-setting and
networked social/political mobilization, in the sense that neither the general public
would necessarily share the same dream with their Party-State counterpart, nor would
they be organized and mobilized to help collectively realize the official “China Dream”
as they were requested in the past. Rather, they are now competing against the
propaganda regime to seize the commanding heights for the networked “sovereign
discourse rights” in the threefold interplay of dynamic action, both in physical world
and cyberspace: First, they have disenchanted the official discourse of “China Dream,”
enlightening the public with their civilian discourses, and re-enlightening the public
when they are confronted by the official seizure of their re-gained discourse rights.
The interplayed actions and affection of the general public may be formulated as
“disenchanting” (祛魅)—“enlightening” (啟蒙)—“re-enlightening” (再啟蒙). Second,
they have subverted and de-constructed the official agenda of “China Dream,” and
instead, regain the discourse rights to set alternative civilian agenda. This dynamics of
interaction between the Party-State and the general public may also be formulated as
“subverting” (顛覆)—“de-constructing” (解構)—“re-constructing.” (再建構) Third,
they have also de-mobilized the official “China Dream” campaign by either
discouraging the mass or de-moralizing their participation and engagement in any
official activities. As a result, the Chinese public may instead be mobilized by those
2014).
15
public intellectuals and the Big Vs to stay on-line and become an “onlookers”38
(wei-guan, 圍觀) rather than acting as a motivated participant of the “China Dream”
in real-life activities. Once these onlookers follow online opinion leaders as long and
much as they can, they may be inclined to accept their agendas and be further
mobilized to rally around their doctrines/movements. The interplayed actions may be
formulated as “mobilizing” (動員)—“de-mobilizing” (去動員)—“re-mobilizing.” (再
動 員 ) Incorporating the threefold interplay of action, the case of China’s
constitutional debate will exhibit how the Party-State is defending against the general
public in seizing and restoring its commanding heights, symbolized as the “sovereign
discourse rights” in the “China Dream” campaign.
Case Study: Sovereign Discourse Rights in “China Dream”
—The Constitutional Debate
Soon after his high-profile visit to the national museum’s “Road to Revival”
exhibit on 29 November 2012, Xi Jinping openly marked the 30th anniversary of
China’s 1982 Constitution on 4 December 2012 by asserting:
No organization or individual has the privilege to overstep the Constitution and the law,
and any violation of the Constitution and the law must be investigated…We must
establish mechanisms to restrain and supervise power. Power must be made responsible
and must be supervised... We must ensure that the power bestowed by the people is
constantly used for the interests of the people.39
Xi’s affirmative message in promoting the faithful implementation of China’s
Constitution has coupled with what is widely touted as his “new” Southern Tour (新
南巡) on a nostalgic note of Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” in 1992. Xi visited
several southern cities, including China’s special economic zone of Shenzhen during
7-11 December 2012. Xi’s low-key tour of southern China has not only portrayed
38
“Wei-quan” literally meaning “surround and stare” is a phrase commonly used in Chinese forums
and Weibo when someone or an Internet user does something very eye-catching, it may result in others
watching and observing. It also connotes the willingness for those onlookers to get participated in
things they have closely followed.
39
Zhao Yinan, “Uphold Constitution, Xi says,” China Daily [on-line], (5 December 2012),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/05/content_15985894.htm (accessed 16 March 2014).
16
himself as a man of the people, but has also earned him a positive public image of
being anti-corruption and reformed-minded. 40 More importantly, his politically
calculated southern tour seems to suggest that he as a new Communist Party leader
would continue to push ahead with more comprehensive economic reforms as his
predecessor Deng, popularly dubbed as the “general designer of Chinese reform and
opening-up to the outside world.”
Both Xi’s assurance to defend the 1982 Chinese Constitution and his unbending
determination to deepen economic reforms had been warmly welcomed by many
Chinese citizens. Expectations had thereby run high for Xi Jinping to advance
political reform during his first term. In the wake of Xi’s encouraging remarks on
constitution and the assured gestures in his “new” Southern Tour, some outspoken and
liberal-minded scholars, intellectuals, Internet users, had been fevered to discuss and
debate over constitution and “constitutional governance” (xian zheng, 憲政) in
connection with the ongoing “China Dream” campaign. The Southern Weekend
(Nanfang Zhoumo, Southern Weekly, 南方周末), one of China’s most liberal and
outspoken newspapers, intended to publish its “New Year’s Greeting” (新年賀詞) in
early January 2013, with the title—Chinese Dream, Constitutional Dream (中國夢．憲
政夢). However, it was censored directly by the propaganda officials of Guangdong
Province without any acknowledgement of the Weekly’s editors. In their proposed
“Greetings,” they advocate:
Today, we absolutely do not only dream about material wealth, we also hope for
spiritual plenty; we absolutely not only dream that the country can become strong and
wealthy, we hope even more that its citizens can find self-respect. A new people and a
new country is saving the nation from extinction and enlightening it. No one can do
without others, no one can overpower others. Constitutional governance is the basis for
all beautiful dreams.41
40
Zhuang Chen, “The Symbolism of Xi Jinping’s Trip South,” BBC News [on-line], (10 December
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20662947 (accessed 16 March 2014); Keith B.
Richburg, “‘Fans’ of Xi Jinping Fawn Online over ‘Pingping,’ China’s New Leader,” The Washington
Post [on-line], (12 December 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-12/world/35789951_1_fan-club-top-job-leader (accessed
16 March 2014).
41
“Nanfang zhoumo yuandan xianci liangbanben bijiao,” (The comparison of the two versions of the
new year’s greetings, 南方周末元旦獻辭兩版本比較) BBC Chinese [on-line], (4 January 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/chinese_news/2013/01/130104_nanfangzhoumo_newyear.shtml?
(accessed 16 March 2014).
17
Parallel to the Southern Weekend, the Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黃春秋), another
liberal and outspoken political journal, had similarly published a bold yet significant
“New Year Message” ( 新 年 獻 詞 ) with the heading—“The Constitution is a
Consensus for Political Reform”—in its January edition in 2013. Inside this
“Message,” the Yanhuang Chunqiu calls for:
As the Constitution provides the consensus for political reform, we must all spring into
action, turning our voided Constitution into real political and legal systems — and that
means we must change all current systems, statutes and policies that violate the
Constitution, so that [laws and systems] accord with the Constitution.42
The “New Year Messages” both from the Southern Weekend and Yanhuang
Chunqiu were actually a pro-civilian agenda given that their media ownership
affiliation is either with the Communist Party of the Guangdong (廣東) Province or
with a close tie to the CCP. Yet, the “New Year Message” from the Southern Weekend
had nonetheless revised and furthered the official discourses from initially
“Constitution” (憲法) to “Constitutional Governance” (憲政), in the sense that
“Constitutional Governance” is not merely having and showcasing the “Constitution.”
What is more important is that the underlying political values, ideas, attitudes, and the
patterns of democratic practices that attach to the Constitution. Consequently, the
Southern Weekend linked the concept of “constitutional governance” with the ongoing
“China’ Dream” campaign. The defiant action by Southern Weekend for its 2013
“New Year’s Message” was truly aggressive in that it has indeed revised the official
discourses, attempted to compete with the propaganda regime to seize the
commanding heights, and profoundly challenged the Party’s monopolistic
agenda-setting power. In other words, Southern Weekend was deemed by the CCP to
contend with the propaganda machine to occupy the discourse power and seize the
“sovereign discourse rights.” Situated in the current political climate, the original
“New Year’s Message” was relentlessly censored by the propaganda department of
Guangdong Province a day before it could be released. Instead, the editorial team of
Southern Weekend was forced to add a “politically correct” commentary that glorifies
42
“Xianfa shi zhengzhi tizhi gaige de gongshi,” (The constitution is a consensus for political reform,
憲法是政治體制改革的共識) Yanhuang Chunqiu, No. 1 (January 2013), p. 1. For full text English
translation, please see David Bandurski, “A consensus for political reform,” China Media Project
[on-line], (2 January 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/02/30203/ (accessed 16 March 2014).
18
the CCP with its annual New Year editorial.43 In parallel, Yanhuang Chunqiu was
likewise instructed to close down their website on 4 January 2013 for the reason that
this journal failed to renew its registration information before it could publish any
messages.44
Both the 2013 New Year edition of Yanhuang Chunqiu and the Southern
Weekend incident indicate that there has been a surging expectation among
reform-minded Chinese intellectuals and Netizens that they tend to regard the official
“Chinese Dream” as the desirable “Constitutional Dream.” To them, to realize the
“Chinese/Constitutional Dream” would imply to carry out political reform. In fact,
there exists essential different perceptions between the propaganda government and
the Chinese general public, in particular those intellectuals, on the nature, role, and
meaning of constitution/constitutional governance. And these diverse perceptions
have driven some Chinese intellectuals and liberal media outlets, such as the Southern
Weekend and Yanhuang Chunqiu, to ponder on what exactly is the “Chinese Dream,”
and how the Dream should and could be realized. In one aspect, this is essentially
symbolized as a seizure of the “sovereign discourse rights” between the propaganda
government and the governed for both of them have their own presumptions,
interpretations, and agendas of the “China Dream.”
Soon after the official clampdown on the “New Year Message” of Southern
Weekend, Guo Shiyou (郭世佑), a respectable historian scholar, firstly argued on 25
January 2013, holding,
Constitutional governance is the method to govern the country at lower cost, and it is the
face of a country and its citizens… Different countries admittedly have different histories,
cultures and national circumstances, and different constitutional governance models and
democratic standards must be adopted. Nevertheless, safeguarding human rights and
restraining public power are implacable basic principles in any constitutional
43
See note #39 for the newly imposed piece of the New Year editorial. Besides, for the internal chatter
among Chinese journalists concerning Southern Weekend incident, please see Teng Chang (滕昶),
“Nanfang zhoumo xinwen zhiye lunli weiyuanhui shengming: youren yi xingzheng zhiling cubao
niuqu shishi,” (Statement of the Southern Weekend news ethics committee: someone is violently
distorting the truth through administrative directives, 南方周末新聞職業倫理委員會聲明：有人以行
政指令粗暴扭曲事實) IBTimes Chinese [on-line], (6 January 2013),
http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/18996/20130106/southern-weekly.htm (accessed 16 March 2014).
44
Verna Yu, “Yanhuang Chunqiu website closed down after editorial on constitution,” South China
Morning Post [on-line], (5 January 2013),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1120153/yanhuang-chunqiu-website-closed-down-after-editor
ial-constitution (accessed 16 March 2014).
19
45
governance country and region.
After Guo’s work on the reflection of China’s long-standing mistakes in
understanding “constitutional governance,” there indeed saw a surge of public debates
on the constitution and constitutional dream. Yet, the propaganda machine and those
pro-government scholars did not at first actively respond to the mounting public
discussions during that period of time in the early 2013. It was until in the early
March 2013 when the so-called “liang hui” (兩會, NPC－The National People’s
Congress, and CPPCC － National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference) was held, the new official agenda on “China Dream” and
“Constitutional Dream” was clearly set for future propaganda work. Xi Jinping again
pushed ahead the “China Dream” and further elaborated it in a more lengthy and
systematic way at the closing meeting of the first session of the 12th NPC congress on
17 March 2013. Henceforth, a series of Party and government organ papers have
lavishly covered nationwide campaign activities and released numerous editorials and
commentaries with respect to the “China Dream” campaign.
As soon as the official agenda on advancing the “China Dream” became clear
and focused, the propaganda machine has on the one hand spun in full motion to do
the thought work, and on the other hand to organize party members, workers and
students to conduct series of patriotic education movement. Notably, on 18 March
2013, for example, Renmin Ribao published an editorial to activate “a new journey of
dreams of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,”46 followed by nine
consecutive “commentator’s articles” (評論員文章) from 19 March 2013 onwards.
Renmin Ribao’s commentary series centers upon the theme of “unanimously built
together the Chinese Dream.” (同心共築中國夢)47 Qiu Shi (求是)－CCP’s political
45
Guo Shiyou, “‘Bainian xianzheng’ de renshi wuqu,” (Long-Standing Mistakes in Understanding “A
Century of Constitutional Governance,”「百年憲政」的認識誤區), Yanhuang Chunqiu [on-line], No. 5
(May 2013), http://www.yhcqw.com/html/cqb/2013/59/89G7.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
46
See “Kaiqi shixian zhongguomeng de xinzhengcheng—relie zhuhe shierjie quanguo renda yici huiyi
shengli bimu,” (開啟實現中國夢的新征程—熱烈祝賀十二屆全國人大一次會議勝利閉幕)，Renmin
Ribao, (18 March 2013), p. 4.
47
Commentator, “Manhuai xinxin zouhao zhongguo daolu: yilun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng,”
( 滿 懷 信 心 走 好 中 國 道 路 — 一 論 同 心 共 築 中 國 夢 ) Renmin Ribao, (19 March 2013), p. 1;
Commentator, “Gaoyang ningxin juli de zhongguo jingshen: erlun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng,”
( 高揚凝心聚力的中國精神 —二論同心共築中國夢) Renmin Ribao, (20 March 2013), p. 1;
Commentator, “Ningju buke zhansheng de zhongguo liliang: sanlun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng,”
20
theory periodical－published a commentary, claiming “China Dream” has been the
most “loudest voice” (最強音) in Chinese society by now.48 Renmin Ribao and many
other Party-run or government-operated mass media outlets have similarly establish
their respective feature websites for promoting the “China Dream,”49 with thorough
and extensive pages of covering campaign activities, the Party and government
leaders’ speeches, propagandists’ remarks, as well as remarks made by those
pro-government scholars. Some of the party officials and scholars have been
selectively invited to chat online with Internet users over the “China Dream”
campaign. A great deal of books on the “China Dream” has been published to join the
orchestrated propaganda efforts in publicizing this patriotic movement as extensively
as possible.
Again, while the Party-State has well geared up to advance renewed wave of the
propaganda work after the liang hui, it is, nonetheless, confronted by diverse public
discourses on how “China Dream” could be realized. Admittedly there are people and
Netizens in support for government’s agenda. Some of their online posts are sent
through the verified weibo accounts of government organizations. Yet, what is more
significant is that there exists intensified confrontation in both physical life and the
Chinese cyberspace between different views and agenda-setting on “China Dream.”
Take a Sina webbo user “datie weibao” (打鐵微寶) for example. He comments, “As
soon as I hear ‘Chinese Dream,” I am speechless. Improve the social security net
( 凝聚不可戰勝的中國力量 —三論同心共築中國夢) Renmin Ribao, (21 March 2013), p. 1;
Commentator, “Yi fazhan zhulao mengxiang genji: silun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng,” (以發展築
牢夢想根基—四論同心共築中國夢) Renmin Ribao, (22 March 2013), p. 1; Commentator, “Minsheng
gaishan shi mengxiang de zuihao quanshi: wulun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng,” (民生改善是夢想
的最好詮釋—五論同心共築中國夢) Renmin Ribao, (25 March 2013), p. 1; Commentator, “He shijie
gong fazhan, yu shijie tong fenxiang: liulun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng,” (和世界共發展，與世
界 同 分 享 — 六 論 同 心 共 築 中 國 夢 ) Renmin Ribao, (26 March 2013), p. 1; Commentator,
“Zhongguomeng guigen daodi shi renmin de meng: qilun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng,” (中國夢
歸根到底是人民的夢—七論同心共築中國夢) Renmin Ribao, (27 March 2013), p. 1; Commentator,
“Zai dang de yinling xia huiju yuanmeng liliang: balun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng,” (在黨的引
領下匯聚圓夢力量—八論同心共築中國夢) Renmin Ribao, (28 March 2013), p. 1; Commentator,
“Danqi women zhedairen de shiming: jiulun tongxin gongzhu zhongguomeng” (擔起我們這代人的
使命—九論同心共築中國夢) Renmin Ribao, (29 March 2013), p. 1.
48
Qiu Shi ( 秋 石 ), “Zhongguomeng huiju pangbo zhengnengliang” (The “Chinese Dream”
concentrates overwhelming positive energy, 中國夢匯聚磅礴正能量), Qiu Shi (求是) [on-line], No. 7
(April 2013), http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201307/201303/t20130328_219429.htm (accessed 16
March 2014).
49
See, for example, the feature web site of the People’s Daily [on-line] at
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/35404/index.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
21
before talking about dreams.” Another writer named “maomao yusi” (毛毛語絲) says,
“My Chinese dream is to have a blue sky and clean water, and I can rest assured to eat
meat and drink milk. My children can live and grow in a fair and happy
environment.”50
Moreover, there are heated debates over “China Dream” among scholars and the
public intellectuals. Among others, He Weifang (賀衛方), renowned scholar from
Peking University, bluntly criticizes the official discourse of
“China Dream,”
quoting, “This ‘Dream’ has overstressed on the great renaissance of the Chinese
nation, on the national revival, and on the economic development and its affiliated
economic indicators. Where is the Dream’s value-system? What exactly is our
objective for social development? It is not clear in this ‘Dream’ whatsoever.”51 Zhang
Lifan (章立凡), historian and the assignee of the Charter 08 (零八憲章), holds that
“The new deal in every ten years is always in the surname of the leaders… It is more
important to completely live up to the promises clearly stated in the constitution. It is
the key to China’s long-term stability and prosperity.”52 Ren Zhiqiang (任志強), one
of the Big Vs in Chinese weibo, talks that, “The task of economic structuring is to
tackle the housing problems. It is simply a dream if they are not well solved.”53
Against the backdrop of surged dissenting discourses on “China Dream,” the
Party-State has again responded them with an elaborate scheme of propaganda work,
in the hope that it can seize back the control of agenda-setting power and discourse
rights. In so doing, the propaganda department has proactively enlisted some of the
50
For the two posts, see “Zhongguo wangmin reyi Xi Jinping de zhongguomeng,” (Chinese netizens
passionately debate over Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream, 中國網民熱議習近平的中國夢) BBC Chinese
[on-line], (17 March 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/03/130317_xijinping_chinese_dream.shtml (accessed
16 March 2014).
51
“He Weifang: zhongguomeng jiazhiguan hezai?,” (賀衛方：
「中國夢」價值觀何在？) Deutsche
Welle Chinese [on-line], (26 March 2013),
http://www.dw.de/%E8%B4%BA%E5%8D%AB%E6%96%B9%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E6%A
2%A6%E4%BB%B7%E5%80%BC%E8%A7%82%E4%BD%95%E5%9C%A8/a-16698185
(accessed 16 March 2014).
52
Zhang Lifan (章立凡), “Huiwei bainian ‘zhongguomeng’: touzhi xinzheng buru chengdui
xianzheng,” (回味百年「中國夢」—透支「新政」
，不如承兌憲政), Souhu Boke (Sohu Blog, 搜狐
博客) [on-line], (30 March 2013), http://zhanglifan.i.sohu.com/blog/view/259279347.htm (accessed 16
March 2014).
53
“Ren Zhiqiang: zhuanxing jiushi zhuandao zhufang shang, fouze zhongguomeng shixian buliao,”
(任志強：轉型就是轉到住房上，否則中國夢實現不了) Wangyi Caijing (NetEase, 網易財經)
[on-line], (8 April 2013), http://money.163.com/13/0408/17/8RV2F57C00254TJN.html (accessed 16
March 2014).
22
Big Vs and several public intellectuals to work as members of the new online
propaganda team. Obviously, they are tasked with strengthening official agenda and
occupying government’s “sovereign discourse rights” in both Chinese cyberspace and
physical space.
First, new propagandists start by writing articles to “educate” citizens by
claiming there are many misconceptions about the constitution among people. For
instance, Yang Xiaoqing (楊曉青), a professor at the Faculty of Law, Renmin
University, has written article to refute the suggestion of intermarriage of “China
Dream” with “constitutional governance” (憲政) which are popularly shared by many
liberal-minded scholars and public intellectuals. To Yang, opposite to Chinese system
of “people’s democracy,” “constitutional governance” is per se an embodiment of
western ideology.54 She contends that,
…the key systemic elements and concepts in constitutional governance only belong to
capitalism and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and they do not belong to the
Socialist people’s democratic system…[thereby] the people’s democratic system cannot
be called “Socialist constitutional governance”55
The Global Times, a daily Chinese tabloid under the auspices of the Renmin
Ribao, has published an editorial to note that “People who know about
‘constitutionalism’ are fully aware that it is the notion that will ultimately undermine
and negate our Chinese patterns of political development... Advocating ‘constitutional
governance’ is fundamentally opposed to our current constitutional design.”56 An
important figure, Zheng Zhixue (鄭志學), publishes an article in Dang Jian (黨建), a
magazine sponsored by the CCP’s propaganda department, in which he loudly
denounces that “Advocating ‘constitutional governance’ is to abolish the CCP’s
leadership in China and to subvert the socialist regime. Therefore, constitutionalism
54
Zhou Zhaocheng (周兆呈), “Zhuangao: duihua He Weifang tan zhongguo xianzheng zhengyi,” (專
稿：對話賀衛方談中國憲政爭議) Lianhe Zaobao wang (聯合早報網) [on-line], (4 June 2013),
http://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/zbo/story20130604-212263/page/0/1 (accessed 16 March 2014).
55
Yang Xiaoqing (楊曉青), “Xianzheng yu renmin minzhu zhidu zhi bijiao yanjiu,” (憲政與人民民主
制度之比較研究) Hong Qi Wen Gao (紅旗文稿) [on-line], No. 10(21 May 2013),
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0522/c40531-21566974.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
56
“Shelun: xianzheng shi douquanzi fouding zhongguo fazhan zhi lu,” (社論：
「憲政」是兜圈子否定
中國發展之路) Global Times [on-line], (22 May 2013),
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-05/3957200.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
23
should never be China’s basic political concepts.”57
Above all, one of the most notable propaganda works under the renewed official
agenda is the controversial internal reference－Seven Speak-Nots (七不講), which is
usually referred to as “Document No. 9” (中辦發 2013 九號文件). It is allegedly a
directive entitled “Concerning the Current Situation of the Ideological Front” (關於當
前 意 識 形 態 領 域 情 況 的 通 報 ) distributed in May 2013 to (some) university
professors and cadres of local party committees. Reportedly, the Document No. 9
bans discussion of seven topics deemed by the Party-State as dangerous Western
influences, i.e., universal values, freedom of speech, civil society, civil rights, the
historical errors of the Chinese Communist Party, crony capitalism, and judicial
independence.58 In one sense, the Document No. 9 could be symbolized as political
motives of the propaganda regime that it desires to seize the commanding heights and
reframe its agenda lest the discourse rights swing to the public, in particular those
dissident public intellectuals and Big Vs. In other words, the Document No. 9 aims to
hold hack the already heated public discourses and foster its reframed official agenda
to publicize “China Dream.”
Second, the propaganda machine is also channeling public discourses into the
official framework, in a way to convince ordinary people and promote official agenda.
For example, Wang Weiguang (王偉光), Dean of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, explains to the public that, “China is now in an important strategic
opportunity period. China is more confident and capable than it was before to realize
the Chinese dream and its great mission.”59 Han Qingxiang (韓慶祥), another famous
propagandist from the CCP’s Central Party school explains to the general public that
“[we need] to dig out the real meaning of ‘China Dream’ and expound them to the
outside world in respect to its underlying political wisdom and a new way of thinking.
We also need to get to dispel people’s misunderstands and misconceptions though
57
Zheng Zhixue (鄭志學), “Renqing xianzheng de benzhi,” (認清「憲政」的本質) Dang Jian (黨建),
No. 5 (May 2013), pp. 29-31.
58
Chris Buckley, “China Warns Officials Against ‘Dangerous’ Western Values,” International New
York Times, (14 May 2013), p. A7.
59
Wang Weiguang (王偉光), “Huiju shixian zhongguomeng de zhengnengliang,”(The Chinese Dream
concentrates our positive energy, 匯聚實現中國夢的正能量) People’s Daily [on-line], (17 June 2013),
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0617/c112851-21867795.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
24
theoretical principle as soon as possible.”60
Third, there is another innovative way of enhancing official agenda-setting
power, which is through enlisting the public intellectuals and Big Vs in to the help for
propaganda work. One striking instance is the “Internet celebrity social responsibility
forum” (網絡名人社會責任論壇) which was held in Beijing in the mid-August 2013.
The forum agreed on the proposal of the “Seven Base Lines” (qitiao dixian, 七條底
線)－the base line of laws and regulations (法律法規底線), the base line of the
socialist system (社會主義制度底線), the base line of national interests (國家利益底
線), the base line of citizens’ legal rights and interests (公民合法權益底線), the base
line of public order (社會公共秩序底線), the moral base line (道德風尚底線), the
base line of information accuracy (信息真實性底線). The “Seven Base Lines”
require all Internet users, particularly those Big Vs (cyber celebrity) to consciously
follow specified guidelines for what constitutes acceptable online conduct in order to
help build a favorable and “healthy” online environment.61 In other words, the Big Vs
are now politically requested to abide by the agreed “Seven Base Line” on the one
hand, and to help the Communist regime advance their propaganda work on
promoting the “Cyber China Dream”
62
(網聚「中國夢」) on the other.
Admittedly, the Party-State has gradually learned to adapt to new informational
environment in enlisting and co-opting all possible (social) groups and/or big names
into their regime and work for their interests.63 At times, intimidating strategies are
masterly applied to those who are opposing or defiant in order to teach them a
lesson.64 This is usually referred to the Chinese proverb which goes “Kill the chicken
60
Han Qingxiang (韓慶祥), “Zhongguomeng beijing, shizhi yu neihan” (中國夢背景、實質與內涵)
People’s Daily [on-line], (17 June 2013),
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0617/c112851-21868421-2.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
61
“Wangluo mingren gongshi gongshou qitiao dixian,” (網絡名人共識共守「七條底線」) People’s
Daily Online [on-line], (11 August 2013),
http://society.people.com.cn/n/2013/0811/c1008-22522366.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
62
“Wangluo mingren jushou yangshi, taolun weibo da V de shehui zeren,” (網路名人聚首央視，討論
微博「大 V」的社會責任), People’s Daily Online [on-line], (12 August 2013),
http://media.people.com.cn/n/2013/0812/c40606-22528296.html (accessed 16 March 2014).
63
See, for example, David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley,
CAL. and London: University of California Press, 2008).
64
This argument can be evidenced in both China’s recent new measures to crack down on Net rumors
and the “Xue Manzi (薛蠻子) incident.” See “‘Lianggao’ ‘guanyu banli liyong xinxi wangluo shishi
feibang deng xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi’ quanwen,” (「兩高」
《關於辦理利用
信息網絡實施誹謗等刑事案件適用法律若干問題的解釋》全文) People’s Daily Online [on-line], (9
25
to warn the monkey.” (殺雞儆猴) In one regard, the carrot and stick approach can be
arguably dubbed as China’s “resilient authoritarian,”65 that is currently embodied in
the propaganda and thought work aspects in the information age. The Party’s ambition
seems unambiguous: the propaganda regime should and will remain in its master
position to fully control the agenda-setting power, and it will in turn help the regime
take a firm grip on the “sovereign discourse rights” in the digital era. Thus, it is
evident that while the general public may discourse on “China Dream,” but it is likely
that they are sleeping in the same bed, but dreaming different dreams.
Conclusion
Since Xi Jinping put forward the slogan of “China Dream” in late November
2012, it has been a focal point of study for both policy makers and academics at home
and abroad. It has become a governing ideology for the fifth generation of leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party by which his generation endeavors to achieve what
is usually referred as the “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” in the decade
ahead. Amid this context, the propaganda machine has spun in full motion to conduct
vigorous propaganda to mobilize workers and personnel mostly from the public
institutions as well as students from schools at all levels to participate in this patriotic
“China Dream” movement. While the “China Dream” campaign has been
continuously proceeding, do Chinese share the identical dream as the propaganda has
aggressively advanced? Alternatively, do Chinese simply sleep in the same bed, yet,
they are having different dreams?
It should be noted that this renewed wave of “China Dream” campaign is
actually being undertaken in the information age wherein Chinese citizens have
September 2013), http://legal.people.com.cn/n/2013/0909/c42510-22859612.html (accessed 16 March
2014); Zhang Qianfan (張千帆), “Xue Manzi shijian beihou de gongquan zhi bian,” (薛蠻子事件背後
的公權之辨) Financial Times Chinese [on-line], (6 September 2013),
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001052386#utm_campaign=1W110215&utm_source=EmailNewsletter
&utm_medium=referral (accessed 16 March 2014).
65
For classic discussions about the “resilient authoritarian,” see Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian
Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 6-17; Bruce J. Dickson,
“Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,” Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 115, No. 4 (Winter 2000), pp. 517-540; Cheng Li, “The End of the CCP's Resilient
Authoritarianism? A Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in China,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 211
(September 2012), pp. 595-623; Bruce Gilley, “The Limits of Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 18-26.
26
enjoyed more freedom than they were before in communicating horizontally and
disseminating information and debating in a more swift, interactive and convenient
way. Although China’s authoritarian regime readily embraces official propaganda as a
positive and favorable force for mass persuasion, mobilization and sociopolitical
control, nonetheless, Communist Party leaders increasingly find it hard, at least not as
easy as it was before, to promote and enhance their agenda. Partly it is because that
the new social media such as the Chinese weibo has already posed unprecedented and
formidable challenges to China’s propaganda-like mediaspace. Arguably the Chinese
propaganda machine is now confronting soaring “reactionary” opinions from the
general public and the virtual world that they are truly being undermining,
challenging, or revising and replacing by alternative discourses and agendas. It was
virtually impossible because the agenda-setting power and discourse rights were
traditionally considered as the absolute sovereign power of the privileged propaganda
machine. In a word, the Party-State’s “sovereign discourse rights” are indeed under
siege. In this regard, this article argues that the official version of “China Dream” is
not entirely the dream Chinese people have extensively shared; they may have same
beds and they usually have different dreams. It is primarily because the propaganda
regime is increasingly confronted by alternative discourses within Chinese cyberspace
and in the physical space, leaving an increased fierce conflict over the seizure of
discourse rights between the propaganda government and opinion leaders and elites.
While both the Chinese Communist Party and the public intellectuals are seizing and
expanding their commanding heights of discourse rights, there will be far-reaching
social and policy implications for China in the long term as this bottom-up force may
facilitate and reinforce a favorable social basis of the twin effects: the dynamic
civic-oriented agenda and enhanced discourse rights. Both of them will serve as a
precondition for a dynamic Chinese civil society, which in turn are the core
foundation and a necessary ingredient of any future political transitions in Communist
China.
27