Accepted Manuscript
Title: On experimental economics and the comparison
between the last two versions of Molière’s Tartuffe
Authors: Bertrand Crettez, Régis Deloche
PII:
DOI:
Reference:
S0167-2681(13)00003-6
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.002
JEBO 3077
To appear in:
Journal
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Accepted date:
30-10-2012
24-12-2012
2-1-2013
of
Economic
Behavior
&
Organization
Please cite this article as: Crettez, B., Deloche, R., On experimental economics and the
comparison between the last two versions of Molière’s Tartuffe, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization (2010), doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.002
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On experimental economics and the comparison between the last two versions of
Molière’s Tartuffe
Bertrand Crettez*
Régis Deloche**
[email protected]
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*Laboratoire d‟économie du droit, Université Panthéon-Assas, Sorbonne Universités, ERMES
**Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne Paris Cité, LIRAES
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[email protected]
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Key words: Cheap talk, Coordination, Experiments, Stag hunt games, Tartuffe
JEL Classification numbers: C72, C92, Z11.
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Abstract
Numerous papers show how game theory can improve our understanding of literature.
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There is no paper, however, using experimental economics to arrive at a new understanding of
a play. We fill this gap by using experimental evidence to compare the last two versions of
Molière‟s Tartuffe. In the final version of the play, there are two stag hunt games, one without
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pre-game communication and one with. In the first game players fail to coordinate to the
efficient equilibrium but in the second one they do, which is consistent with experimental
ce
pt
evidence. In the penultimate version of the play, there is pre-game communication in the first
stag hunt game but players fail to coordinate to the efficient equilibrium, which is not
consistent with experimental evidence. By removing the pre-game communication from the
first game, Molière adapted his play as if he had been a student of modern behavioral game
theory.
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Highlights
►We use experimental economics to compare the last two versions of Molière‟s
Tartuffe.►The penultimate version is not consistent with experimental evidence.►The final
version is consistent with experimental evidence.
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1. Introduction
Several plays/operas/drama (live performances) have been analyzed with game theory
(see, e.g., Brams, 1994 and 2011, and Chwe, 2013)1. By contrast, there is still a dearth of
papers using experimental economics to highlight the rational choices made by characters in
novels, short stories, poetry, plays and libretti. This paper fills this gap.
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By providing a framework to study the links between motives and actions in plot
construction, game theory can improve our understanding of drama. For instance, game
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theory has been used to study the strategic choices of characters and to justify the rationality
of seemingly irrational behavior. As explained by Brams (2011, p.16) in his account of
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Richard III, the tragic fate of characters may be “more, not less, poignant when [they] are
driven by an inexorable rationality toward some terrible end”. In addition, game theory has
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been used to draw comparisons between apparently different plays (see Chwe, 2009) 2 and to
explain the usefulness of the notion of miracle (see Harmgart et al., 2009)3.
There is, however, no paper that uses experimental evidence to arrive at a new
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understanding of a play. This is surprising for two reasons. First, as acknowledged by
Chrissochoidis et al. (2010, p.8) “one could understand drama as the first social science
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laboratory in history, a controlled space where human behavior is exhibited, observed, and
studied in optimal cognitive settings”. Second, over the recent decades the relationship
between game theory and experimental economics, whose history was “one of estrangement
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and resistance” (Schotter, 2009, p.2), has become very close (on this point, see, e.g.,
Chaudhuri, 2009, pp. 21-25). Specifically, experimental economics can be helpful to predict
the issue of a game with multiple equilibria.
This paper uses experimental economics to compare the last two versions of Molière‟s
Tartuffe. Molière (1622-1673) is the most important French dramatist. His work, which is the
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biggest common denominator of the French language world, is a major international concern
(see, e.g., Mc Bride, 2005, Norman, 1999, and Peacock, 2010). Tartuffe stands as Moliere‟s
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Game theory has been used as an interpretative tool not only by economists, but also by literary critics (see,
e.g., de Ley, 1988, Livingston, 1991, and Swirski, 1996, 2007).
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Chwe (2009) compares Beatrice and Benedick in William Shakespeare‟s Much Ado about Nothing with
Richard and Harrison in Richard Wright‟s Black Boy. By using game theory, he shows that both plays have
exactly the same structure. In both situations the game is a stag-hunt game, which has two Nash equilibria. In
Much Ado, the two people involved choose a risky action and the Pareto dominant equilibrium happens. In Black
Boy, the two people involved choose a safe action, and the risk dominant equilibrium happens.
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Harmgart et al. (2009) interpret the miracle as a random device, which if well designed satisfies two conditions.
First, the expected value of a potential sinner must be negative if he does not comply with a moral code. Second,
once he has sinned, there must be a small chance that the sinner be forgiven so as to encourage him not to sin
once more.
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crowning achievement. It is the drama of a bourgeois household that has lost its harmony and
balance through the abdication of the head of the house. The principal character of the play,
Tartuffe, attempts to destroy the domestic happiness of a citizen, Orgon, who has received
him as a moral censor.
There are three versions of Tartuffe. The first two versions have been lost, but The
Letter on the Comedy “The Imposter” (hereafter, L) affords us an account of the second
third version (hereafter T) is Tartuffe in the form we know it today.
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version (hereafter P because it has a main character titled Panulphe instead of Tartuffe). The
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In the absence of the first version (hereafter F), those henceforth known as the
Molièristes have compared T to the account of P provided by L. There is a debate among
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them as to whether there are or not significant differences between the structure of P and that
of T (see, e.g., Mc Bride, 1994).
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We shed new light on this debate by using experimental economics. First, we show
that T is consistent with experimental evidence that pre-game communication improves
coordination in “stag hunt” (hereafter SH) games. In T, there are two SH games, one without
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pre-game communication and one with. In the first one the players fail to coordinate to the
efficient outcome but in the second they do, which is consistent with experimental evidence.
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Second, we show that P is not consistent with experimental evidence. In P, there is pre-game
communication in the first SH game but players fail to coordinate to the efficient equilibrium,
which is not consistent with experimental evidence. By removing the pre-game
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communication from the first SH game in P, Molière adapted his play as if he had been a
student of modern behavioral game theory.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the
synopsis of T and the scholarly debate on the differences between P and T. In section 3, we
define the SH game that is the cornerstone of both P and T. In section 4, we show that T is
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consistent with experimental evidence. In section 5, we show that P is not consistent with
experimental evidence. Section 5 presents conclusions.
2. The problem
Molière was described by Voltaire as “the painter of France”. Through his picturing of
certain peculiarities and customs, Moliere is of the epoch in which he lived, but he belongs far
more to all time. By calling his comedies “public mirrors” (Norman, 1999), Molière himself
conceived of comic representations as a site of audience self-recognition.
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In this connection, Tartuffe is a key example. While standing on its own as a work of
art, this play presents images of daily life in the seventeenth century. The principal character,
Tartuffe, represents a social type (the “lay director”) that was especially common around the
middle of the seventeenth century. Tartuffe tries to trick Orgon who has received him as an
honoured guest, and a spiritual guide.
Orgon‟s family comprises six members and three generations: the father, Orgon; his
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mother, Madame Pernelle; his children by a deceased wife, Mariane and Damis; his second
wife, Elmire; Cléante, Elmire‟s brother. In addition, there are Dorine, Mariane‟s maid, and
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Valère, in love with Mariane. Orgon and his mother are locked into their vision of Tartuffe as
a saint, to the dismay of the rest of the family, who consider Tartuffe a fraud, and try to open
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Orgon‟s eyes.
The synopsis of T (see Appendix) is almost the same as the one of P. Thus, it has been
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commonplace for generations of Molièristes to repeat that there are virtually no differences
between P and T. “This view originated in the eighteenth-century with editors such as M.-A.
Jolly and A. Bret, who maintained that the main difference lay in the change of title” (Mc
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Bride, 1994, p. 145). More recently, Cairncross (1956, p.2), for instance, has claimed that “it
is clear that there is no material difference between Panulphe and Tartuffe”.
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By contrast, Mc Bride, after making a close scrutiny of L, lists “numerous significant
differences and changes in emphasis” between P and T (Mc Bride, 1994, Appendix I, p.
145)4. He highlights that P was a markedly different play from the final version. “It was
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cruder in its language, less concise and dramatic in organisation of scenes than the final
version” (ibid., p. 153). In addition, he shows that, in P, there are several family councils that
have been omitted in T (ibid., pp.146-149).
To make an original contribution to this long-standing scholarly debate concerning the
differences between P and T, we first present the game that is behind both P and T.
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3. The stag hunt game
P as well as T is the story of a communal effort aimed at opening Orgon‟s eyes. In
both cases, there are two key moments: Act II, Scene 2, and Act IV, Scene 3. In each of these
two scenes, Orgon informs Mariane that he wishes her to marry Tartuffe. In Act II, Scene 2,
Orgon faces Mariane (Player 1) and Dorine (Player 2). In Act IV, Scene 3, after silencing
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Mc Bride‟s reconstruction of P (Mc Bride, 1999) develops his edition of L (Mc Bride, 1994).
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Cléante and Dorine, Orgon faces Mariane (Player 1) and Elmire (Player 2). The two scenes
have exactly the same structure.
In Act II, Scene 2, as well as in Act IV, Scene 3, there is a SH game, which is quite
similar to the one described by Baliga and Morris (2002), whose normal form is given in
Player 2
R
x+m-c, x+m-c
N
x, -c
-c, x
0, 0
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Player 1
N
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R
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Table 1.
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Table 1: The normal form of the SH game
Each player has two moves to choose between: to resist (R) or not to resist (N). To
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play R means to utter words of dissent. To play N means to remain silent. Both players wish
to persuade Orgon to give up his plan. There is a positive cost c of resisting: a resisting player
draws on him the attacks of Orgon. There is a positive spillover x that one player receives if
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the other player resists independent of whether the first player resists: a resisting player makes
life easier for the other player. There are strategic complementarities: each player receives a
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return m, m>c, on his investment only if both players resist. In this latter case, Orgon is
disabused of his idolization of Tartuffe. If one player plays R and the other plays N, Orgon is
not disabused of his idolization of Tartuffe, and the efforts made by the resisting player are
costly for him and fruitful for the non resisting player. If both players play N, they don‟t
achieve anything.
This game has two pure-strategy equilibria, (R, R) and (N, N), and a symmetric mixed-
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strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium (R, R) is Pareto dominant, but (N, N) is much safer. In
the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, strategy i = R, N is played with probability pi
where pR = c/m and pN = (m-c)/m and each player gets the same expected payoff xc/m from
going either way.
In Act II, Scene 2, as well as in Act IV, Scene 3, the key question is the following:
which of these equilibria will occur?
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4. The consistency of Tartuffe with experimental economics
In T, there is a difference between Act II, Scene 2, and Act IV, Scene 3. In Act II,
Scene 2, Mariane and Dorine participate in a SH game without pre-game communication. In
Act IV, Scene 3, Mariane and Elmire participate in a SH game with a pre-game
announcement: in Act IV, Scene 2, they are indeed given a public, nonbinding suggestion by
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Dorine about which equilibrium to play.
Game theory does not provide clear-cut guesses about what will happen in both
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games. In each of the two cases (Act II, Scene 2, and Act IV, Scene 3), there are arguments
for and against the different equilibria (for an introduction to the literature on cheap talk about
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intentions, see, e.g., Farrel and Rabin, 1996, and Devetag and Ortmann, 2007).
By contrast, there is experimental evidence that provides likely guesses about what
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will happen in both games (for reviews of this literature, which starts from Cooper et al., 1990
and 1992, and Van Huyck et al., 1992, see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, Devetag and Ortmann, 2007,
Chaudhuri, 2009, and Ellingsen and Ostling, 2010). Building on these experimental results,
Act II of Tartuffe
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4.1.
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we study successively each of the two acts of T.
To study the SH game in Act II, we build on the experiments run by Cooper and his
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colleagues (Cooper et al., 1990 and 1992) to look at behavior in SH games without pre play
communication. In these experiments, “the vast majority of their participants failed to
coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome” (Chaudhuri, 2009, p.176).
In Act II, Scene 2, Orgon tells Mariane that she must marry Tartuffe. Mariane plays N,
and Dorine plays R. Dorine speaks to her master as a headstrong daughter might while
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Mariane remains silent.
In Act II, Scene 3, Dorine gives a key interpretation of Act II, Scene 2, when she says
sarcastically to Mariane5:
DORINE (Returning:)
Well, have you lost your tongue, girl? Must I play
Your part, and say the lines you ought to say?
Faced with a fate so hideous and absurd,
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All quotations of Tartuffe are from “Jean Baptiste Poquelin de Molière: The Misanthrope and Tartuffe”,
translated into English verse and introduced by Richard Wilbur, First Harvest edition 1965.
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Can you not utter one dissenting word?
MARIANE
What good would it do? A father‟s power is great.
We can summarize the preceding discussions by the following result:
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Result 1: In T, in Act II, Scene 2, there is a two-person SH game without pre-game
communication in which Mariane and Dorine fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium.
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This coordination failure is consistent with experimental evidence.
Act IV of Tartuffe
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4.2.
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We now turn to Act IV of Tartuffe.
To study the SH game in Act IV, we build on the experiments run by Van Huyck and
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his colleagues (van Huyck et al., 1992) to look at the role of an external arbiter in fostering
greater coordination among groups. In these experiments, there is an external arbiter who
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instructs the participants to choose a particular strategy in the game. The assignment is
common knowledge: the message given to the subjects is projected on the lab wall and also
read aloud by the experimenter. The result is clear-cut: “a simple announcement instructing
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the participants to choose the strategy commensurate with the payoff dominant outcome led to
coordination to this outcome in close to 100% of cases” (Chaudhuri, 2009, pp. 184-185).
In Act IV, Scene 2, Dorine entreats Cléante to intervene with Orgon on Mariane‟s
behalf, as the marriage to Tartuffe has been arranged for that evening:
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DORINE
Stay, Sir, and help Mariane, for Heaven‟s sake!
She‟s suffering so, I fear her heart will break.
Her father‟s plan to marry her off tonight
Has put the poor child in a desperate plight.
I hear him coming. Let‟s stand together, now,
And see if we can‟t change his mind, somehow,
About this match we all deplore and fear.
Mariane and Elmire are present on the stage when Dorine makes this speech. Dorine
has all the qualities needed to be an effective arbiter: she is bold-spirited, and she sees through
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all pretenses. The recommendation given by Dorine to Cléante is a “common knowledge”
assignment to play the risky strategy.
In Acte IV, Scene 3, Orgons tells Mariane that she must marry Tartuffe, and “mortify
her flesh”. In this scene, Dorine and Cléante try to make it clear to Orgon that they don‟t
agree with him, but Orgon quickly silences them. Then, following Dorine‟s nonbinding
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MARIANE (Falling to her knees:)
Spare me at least-I beg you, I imploreThe pain of wedding one whom I abhor;
And do not, by a heartless use of force,
Drive me to contemplate some desperate course.
…
Spare me, I beg you; and let me end the tale
Of my sad days behind a convent veil.
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efficient Nash equilibrium being played. They both play R.
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suggestion (“Let‟s stand together, now”), Mariane and Elmire take actions that lead to the
Elmire proposes an ambush to Orgon which amounts to a controlled experiment upon
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the piety of Tartuffe:
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ELMIRE
You‟ve been too long deceived,
And I‟m quite tired of being disbelieved.
Come now: let‟s put my statement to the test,
And you shall see the truth made manifest.
ORGON
I‟ll take that challenge. Now do your uttermost.
We‟ll see how you make good your empty boast.
The following result summarizes the preceding discussions and quotations:
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Result 2: In T, in Act IV, Scene 2, Dorine makes a non-binding suggestion “Let’s
stand together, now”, and in the SH game played by Mariane and Elmire, in Act IV, Scene 3,
both coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. This issue is consistent with experimental
evidence.
An animated scene ensues in which Orgon, hiding under a table to listen to the
conversation between Tartuffe and Elmire, learns that Tartuffe is a fraud. It is the turning
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point of the play. The pleading of Mariane and the perseverance of Elmire silence Orgon.
Next, the experiment upon the piety of Tartuffe made by Elmire opens Orgon‟s eyes. Orgon
witnesses Tartuffe‟s attempts to seduce Elmire and hears Tartuffe speak contemptuously of
him.
The act is brought to a close on a note of high dramatic tension. By the time Orgon is
made to see Tartuffe‟s duplicity, the latter is in a position to bring about Orgon‟s material
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ruin. The whole thing comes so close to a very unhappy ending that it takes Louis XIV
himself to save the day.
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Building on the above results, we can enrich the understanding of the comparison
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between P and T.
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5. The inconsistency of Panulphe with experimental economics
In the account of P provided by L, “the sequence of actions and the main speeches of
the characters are given in minute detail and with painstaking accuracy” (Mc Bride, 1994,
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p.8). With respect to pre-game communication and coordination in SH games, there is one
key difference between P and T (ibid., p. 147): in P, there is, in Act I, Scene 2, a family
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council involving Elmire, Mariane, Damis, Cléante, and Dorine, which is omitted in T. This
family council is a true “council of war” (ibid., p. 32) about the marriage of Mariane and
Valère, “all agreeing to press Orgon on it” (ibid., p. 147). Thus, in P, in Act I, Scene 2, both
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Mariane and Dorine announce that they will resist Orgon, and, in Act II, Scene 2, they
participate in a SH game with pre-game communication.
To study this game, we build on the experiments run by Cooper‟s group (Cooper et al.,
1990 and 1992) to look at behavior in SH games. In these experiments, “coordination failure
turned out to be endemic in the no-communication conditions and to still be significant with
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one-way communication, but was eliminated with two-way communication” (Devetag and
Ortmann, 2007, p. 336).
By confronting this experimental evidence with the first two acts of P, we have the
following result:
Result 3: In P, in Act 1, Scene 2, there is a family council that does not play its
reassurance role: in Act II, Scene 2, both Mariane and Dorine fail to coordinate on the payoff
dominant equilibrium. This issue is not consistent with experimental evidence.
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By removing the pre-game communication (the family council in Act I, Scene 2) from
the first SH game in P, Molière cleverly adapted his play. From the point of view of
experimental economics, the changes from P to T are convincing.
6. Conclusion
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We have used experimental evidence to compare the last two versions of Tartuffe. By
doing so we have enriched the toolkit developed by Chwe (2009) for making comparisons
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between different plays. First, we have shown that T is consistent with experimental evidence.
In T, there are two SH games, one without pre-game communication and one with. In the first
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one the players fail to coordinate to the efficient outcome but in the second they do, which is
consistent with experimental evidence. Second, we have shown that P is not consistent with
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experimental evidence. In P, there is pre-game communication in the first SH game, but
players fail to coordinate to the efficient equilibrium, which is not consistent with
experimental evidence. By removing the pre-game communication from the first game,
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Molière adapted his play as if he had been a student of modern behavioral game theory.
Our results support and deepen the comparison between P and T made by Mc Bride
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(1994), and we believe that further research concerning F could rely on the approach of the
present paper. In this connection, the main problem remaining to be solved is that of the
content of F: did its three acts correspond to any three in T and, if so, to which and how
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closely? A vast literature (for a survey, see, e.g., Mc Bride, 2005) answers these questions by
offering two main alternatives: the three acts of F corresponded closely to Acts I, II, and III of
T (see, e.g., Lancaster, 1923); the three acts of F corresponded closely to Acts I, III and IV of
T (see, e.g., Cairncross, 1956). Without any remnant of the text of F, both these
reconstructions of F are highly conjectural. However, our paper, by showing that
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experimental economics is useful to assess the differences between P and T, provides a new
method for investigating the riddle of the first Tartuffe.
Acknowledgements
We warmly thank the editor William Nelson for helpful comments and suggestions. We also
thank Susan Crettez, Philippe Mongin, and Hugh Rockoff for thoughtful feedback on earlier
versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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APPENDIX
Tartuffe: Characters
MADAME PERNELLE, Orgon‟s mother
FLIPOTTE, maid of Madame Pernelle
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ORGON, husband of Elmire, son of Madame Pernelle, and father of Mariane and Damis
ELMIRE, Orgon‟s second wife
DAMIS, Orgon‟s son and Elmire‟s stepson
MARIANE, Orgon‟s daughter and Elmire‟s stepdaughter
VALÈRE, Mariane‟s suitor
CLÉANTE, Orgon‟s brother-in-law
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TARTUFFE, a hypocrite
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DORINE, Mariane‟s maid
Tartuffe: Synopsis
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Act I. Tartuffe has wormed his way into Orgon‟s household. Orgon has become
infatuated with the fake piety of Tartuffe. All of Orgon‟s family, with the exception of
an
Madame Pernelle, considers Tartuffe as a fraud. Orgon confirms the rumor of the
postponement of Mariane's wedding. Act II. Orgon tries to force Mariane to marry Tartuffe,
breaking his promise to Valère. Mariane is speechless, but Dorine is not. Valère and Mariane
M
are arguing over nothing in particular. Act III. Elmire intercedes with Tartuffe to persuade
him to give up the plan of marrying Mariane. Tartuffe attempts to seduce Elmire. He is
ed
overheard by Damis, who tells Orgon what‟s happened. Orgon sides with Tartuffe. He throws
Damis out of the house. He makes Tartuffe his only heir. Act IV. Orgon appears, marriage
contract in hand. Mariane and Elmire plead with him. Elmire makes Orgon hide under a table.
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Tartuffe attempts again to seduce (and rape) Elmire. Orgon is made to see Tartuffe's duplicity.
He orders Tartuffe out of the house. Tartuffe replies that he has the rights to Orgon's property.
Act V. Just when it looks as though Orgon will lose everything, the King intervenes. He has
recognized Tartuffe as a scoundrel. He orders Tartuffe‟s arrest. Mariane will marry Valère.
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