Riding into the Sunset:
Richard Pound, Dick Ebersol, and Long-Term
Olympic Television Contracts
Stephen R. Wenn*
In December 1995, Richard Pound, Vice-President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Chairman of the IOC
Television Negotiations Committee, called a press conference in New York City. Flanked by a smiling Dick Ebersol, the National
Broadcasting Company’s (NBC) President of Sports, Pound revealed the terms of a long-term Olympic television rights agreement.
Ebersol obtained the U.S. television rights for the 2004 (Athens), 2006 (Turin), and 2008 Olympic festivals. The $2.3 billion d eal,
signed little more than two months after NBC had acquired the U.S. television rights to the 2000 Sydney Olympics and 2002 Salt
Lake City Olympic Winter Games for $1.25 billion, cemented NBC’s status as America’s Olympic network.
This paper will explore Richard Pound’s rationale for pursuing the second contract with NBC. It is well known that U.S. television executives covet Olympic television rights because of the challenge involved in producing the telecast of the world’s largest
sport gathering; the prestige associated with serving as the nation’s Olympic broadcaster; the profit potential; and, the opportunities
to promote the network’s programming to a captive audience. With respect to the initial agreement for Sydney and Salt Lake City,
“what NBC might lose on the swings (Sydney), they hoped to make up on the roundabouts (Salt Lake City),” observed Pound.1
NBC’s production of the 2000 Summer Olympics would require a healthy investment because of Sydney’s distant location from
the U.S., but, in Ebersol’s mind, the prospect of a winter festival at a U.S. location two years hence offset this fiscal challenge for
NBC. Therefore, having shown himself predisposed to a multi-festival contract (Sydney/Salt Lake City), one which offered the
possibility of developing some continuity in terms of his network’s Olympic coverage and advertising sales, Ebersol’s willingness
to discuss the second agreement, while not without risk, can be understood. However, the IOC’s interest in establishing a
long-term agreement without opening up the bidding to the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) officials is less obvious especially in light of the consistent escalation of the value of U.S. Olympic television rights
in the 1980s and 1990s.
An investigation of IOC archival documents and Richard Pound’s personal files reveals Pound’s three-fold motivation. First,
if successful, Pound believed that the NBC contract negotiations for the 2004, 2006, and 2008 festivals, labeled the “Sunset
Project,” might result in a template which could be applied to the world’s other major broadcast regions guaranteeing the Olympic
Movement’s financial security in the medium term. Second, the initiative was also seen as a means of establishing a partnership
arrangement with a number of the world’s television broadcasters analogous to the IOC’s relationships with multi-national corporations aligned with the Olympic Movement’s corporate sponsorship program (TOP - The Olympic Partners). Television executives appreciated the opportunity to bring continuity to their Olympic coverage and extend their promotional opportunities with
respect to cost recovery. Third, and no less important, was Pound’s desire to strengthen his hand in ongoing discussions with t he
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) concerning the distribution of U.S. television revenue. This paper will focus primarily
on the latter element of his motivation.
The USOC claimed exclusive ownership rights of the Olympic five-ring logo within U.S. territory. The Amateur Sports Act
(1978) passed by the U.S. Congress granted ownership of the logo to the USOC, and IOC legal opinion confirmed that the federal
statute superseded the Olympic Charter. In 1985, the USOC demanded compensation from U.S. television networks for the use of
a composite logo on Olympic broadcasts.2 Realizing the importance of the use of the rings to the networks, and the potential impact
on the value of future television rights if they were prevented from using a composite logo, the IOC accommodated the USOC’s
demands. The IOC granted the USOC $15 million in 1986 (a payment shared equally by the IOC, and the Seoul and Calgary
Olympic Organizing Committees) and 10% of the value of U.S. Olympic television contracts in perpetuity beginning with the 1992
*
Stephen R. Wenn is at Wilfred Laurier University, Canada
Bridging Three Centuries
Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research. pp. 37-50
38 Bridging Three Centuries
Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research - 2000
Albertville and Barcelona festivals. These terms represented the basis of the Broadcast Marketing Agreement (BMA) between the
IOC and USOC. The money compensated the USOC for waiving its exclusive ownership of the rings such that the U.S. Olympic
broadcaster and advertisers who purchased commercial air time could employ the five-ring logo. The USOC argued that if it
invoked its ownership rights, sponsors would be forced to align themselves with the USOC in order to obtain the advertising cachet
provided by the Olympic rings.3
The USOC settled for the terms of the BMA in 1986 in lieu of its demand for 20% of all U.S. television contracts, including
the one signed by ABC for the Calgary Olympic Winter Games ($309 million), and the one yet to be signed for Seoul (NBC - $401
million). In succeeding years, the USOC sought redress on a number of occasions through face to face discussions with Pound,
and in more clandestine fashion on Capitol Hill with Congressional allies who pursued changes to the Amateur Sports Act beneficial to the USOC’s financial interests. The USOC was committed to elevating its share of future U.S. Olympic television contracts
from 10% to 20%. If Pound signed a long-term deal for the 2004, 2006, and 2008 festivals while the USOC was still locked into
receiving 10%, his ability to deal with the financial claims of the USOC would be improved. Open negotiations with NBC and its
competitors, ABC and CBS, could not have been held without the USOC’s knowledge inviting the likelihood of the latter’s intervention in the proceedings at least with respect to the USOC’s percentage share of the contract. Even though the Sunset Project
was viewed by the media and casual observers as the IOC’s attempt to secure its financial future for the medium term, it was not
apparent to observers that Pound was also dedicated to countering the financial demands of the USOC. The Sunset Project provides one avenue to investigate the fractious relationship between the IOC and USOC with respect to Olympic television revenue
during the 1990s.
Setting the Scene for the Sunset Project: IOC Negotiations Policy and the USOC
As the value of Olympic television rights soared in the 1970s and 1980s, the conflict management skills of IOC officials such
as Lord Killanin, Jean de Beaumont, Monique Berlioux, Richard Pound, and Juan Antonio Samaranch were tested. The organization had to deal with the television networks and the various parties interested in the financial results of the negotiations process,
including the Olympic Organizing Committees (OCOGs), International Sport Federations (ISFs), and National Olympic Committees (NOCs). During the 1960s, the IOC struggled to find a means of distributing television revenue which would appease the ISF s
and NOCs, but slowly the steamier debates concerning television revenue shifted to the relative needs of the Olympic Tripartite,
represented by the IOC and the OCOGs who viewed their needs in terms of capital expenditure on telecasts in an age of burgeoning
technology as a lever to improve their share of the television money at the expense of the IOC, ISFs, and NOCs.3 The IOC experienced repeated problems when the negotiations with the television networks were managed by the Organizing Committees
(1955-1977) or by the Organizing Committees jointly with the IOC (1977-1985). 5 Cumulative frustration prompted the IOC to
assume control of the television negotiations for the 1992 Albertville and Barcelona cycle and beyond.
The IOC’s action reduced its troubles with the Organizing Committees pertaining to negotiations; however, the 1990s ushered
in a shift in the primary locus of conflict concerning television money to the continuing power relations struggle involving the IOC
and the USOC. The USOC employed a two-pronged approach in its attempt to enhance its authority in the negotiations arena and
add to its already substantial wealth. In the aftermath of the signing of the BMA, which established the USOC’s 10% share of U.S.
television contracts in perpetuity, beginning with the Albertville and Barcelona festivals, the USOC waged a persistent campaign
in discussions with IOC officials to elevate this share for future Games. Parallel to this lobbying effort, in surreptitious fashion, the
USOC supported two efforts on Capitol Hill which would have altered the rules for the negotiation of U.S. Olympic television contracts. The end game for the USOC was 20% of future U.S. Olympic television revenue. Richard Pound, the man entrusted by
Juan Antonio Samaranch to act as the IOC’s point person with the USOC on television matters, was adamantly opposed to granting
one-fifth of future U.S. television contracts to the USOC. However, if Congress would amend the Amateur Sports Act to the effect
that the privilege of negotiating the U.S. television contract passed from the IOC to the USOC, the elusive 20% figure that the
USOC thirsted for, could be realized without Pound’s consent or IOC approval.
The McMillen Bill: The Olympic Television Broadcast Act
While the world’s attention was riveted on President George Bush’s showdown with Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf in
January 1991, Richard Pound flew to Washington to discuss “The Olympic Television Broadcast Act” with its sponsor, Tom
McMillen, a Democrat member of the House of Representatives from Maryland. McMillen, a former National Basketball Association player, had been a member of the 1972 U.S. Olympic basketball team which lost the gold medal in one of the most controversial events in Olympic history. The bill, which had been introduced three months earlier, had three major thrusts. First, the
legislation, if passed, granted the right to negotiate U.S. television contracts to the USOC, thereby empowering it to determine its
share of Olympic television money from the U.S. territory. Second, the networks would be provided with an exemption from the
Sherman Anti-trust Act permitting them to form a consortium. Third, the consortium would be prevented from interrupting live
39
Riding into the Sunset
6
coverage with commercials.
All three components of McMillen’s bill concerned Pound. He had turned aside the USOC’s entreaties for an increase in its
share of U.S. television revenue in 1989 and 1990. The bill opened the door for the USOC to establish this percentage independent
of discussion with the IOC. The anti-trust exemption promised to provide a drag on overall revenue because the consortium of the
“big three” networks would be unfettered by any serious competitors and could control the bid process. Pound was puzzled that
the USOC did not grasp the harm to the IOC and the USOC from such an occurrence. Limitations on commercial advertising
would also have an effect on the negotiations because the networks would be justified in their claim that a reduction in potential
advertising revenue had to be factored into the offer.7
McMillen revealed his motivation to Pound during their meeting in Washington. He believed that U.S. consumers were shouldering excessive financial shares of global initiatives including ‘the current exercise in the Persian Gulf and other institutions such
as NATO.”8 A reduction in Olympic advertising costs, offered McMillen, would have a trickle down effect for U.S. citizens who
would no longer have to pay a premium on products sold by companies who purchased advertising time at exorbitant rates. The
transfer of control of negotiations to the USOC was designed to provide greater financial assistance to the USOC. The anti-trust
exemption had been suggested, not surprisingly, by a number of U.S. television executives who were concerned about spiraling
rights fees in the U.S. market.
In a memo to Juan Antonio Samaranch, Pound characterized his discussion with McMillen as “cordial” and “worthwhile.”
McMillen had been apprised of current financial concessions to the USOC, noted Pound, and the possibility of the bill’s negative
consequences for Salt Lake City’s bid for the 1998 Olympic Winter Games at the IOC’s upcoming session. In an effort to buy the
IOC a little time, Pound warned McMillen that Salt Lake City might feel the backlash from IOC members who were well aware of
the USOC’s unique television revenue-sharing agreement with the IOC and Olympic Organizing Committees. McMillen seemed
discomfited by the prospect of fielding part of the blame should Salt Lake City’s bid fail to win the final vote scheduled for June in
Birmingham, England.9
Pound viewed McMillen’s bill as a shot across the IOC’s bow. Inaction, Pound told Samaranch, was anathema. “My main
concern,” wrote Pound, “is that it would take very little, at this moment, for any process which may involve Congress, to acquire a
life of its own and become completely unmanageable.” The involvement of the U.S. networks and the USOC in the process was a
reflection of the balance sheet concerning global Olympic television revenue. “If the networks are really involved in this, then our
problem will be exacerbated and until we can show that other parts of the world are approaching U.S. levels on a per capita or other
appropriate measure, we can expect little sympathy from within the U.S.,” he concluded. Pound counseled Samaranch that the
IOC had to make inroads with respect to elevating television revenue in other major markets before officials in Lausanne could
expect the tension to subside.9
The European Television Market: Crux of the Problem
Pound understood, too well, that the IOC bore responsibility for the collaborative effort of McMillen, and officials representing the USOC and U.S. television networks. The gross disparity in rights fees paid by the U.S. Olympic broadcaster and the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) which had a privileged position in negotiations for European television rights had been a source
of aggravation for the U.S. television networks for years. While the American negotiators looked disdainfully at the money paid
by networks in other major markets, such as Japan, most of their agitation was focused on the European situation. U.S. television
executives believed that the IOC squeezed the U.S. market for every last dollar in a high stakes negotiations process, but awarded
the Western European rights to EBU for a paltry sum in the absence of a competitive bid process. Samaranch’s argument that no
other entity had the technological expertise to cover the Olympic Games in the European region was tired. While perhaps accurate
at one time, his defense of EBU’s privileged position on this basis fell on deaf ears in the U.S. European television negotiations for
the 1992 Albertville and Barcelona festivals and the 1994 Lillehammer Olympic Winter Games, managed exclusively by Samaranch and IOC Executive Board member, Marc Hodler, had provided the necessary impetus for the McMillen bill.
While Winter Olympians retreated from Calgary in February, 1988, negotiations for U.S. television rights to the 1992
Albertville Olympic Winter Games intensified. Within four months, Pound concluded a $243 million deal with Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) which returned to Olympic broadcasting for the first time since 1960.11 The sum represented a significant
drop from the $309 million contract which Pound and Calgary organizers had reached with Roone Arledge and his colleagues at
the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) five years earlier, but Albertville officials had been prepared for such an eventuality.
ABC withdrew from negotiations and NBC was committed to pursuing the rights for the Barcelona Olympics leaving CBS little
competition.12 Given the recent sale of Olympic television rights to EBU below market value, Albertville officials turned their
attention to the European market looking to offset the shortfall resulting from the U.S. negotiations.
In April 1988, Marc Hodler informed his colleagues on the IOC Executive Board that Albertville was seeking “higher rights
payments than were traditionally made by EBU.”13 The Albertville OCOG had hired former CBS executive Barry Frank to act as
40 Bridging three Centuries
Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research - 2000
a consultant in the negotiations, and he had advised Samaranch and Hodler that the discussions should be delayed for 30 months in
order to reap the benefits of a changing European television market. He hoped that the delay would offer the possibility of tangible
competition for EBU by the end of the period.14 EBU negotiators were not blind to Frank’s strategy and offered Samaranch and
Hodler the opportunity to negotiate an agreement for Albertville and Lillehammer. They understood that the price of delayed
negotiations might be steep. Pound, who recognized that EBU was angling to suppress the value of European rights in the short
term, dismissed the idea. He told Samaranch and Hodler that such an agreement would compromise future U.S. negotiations and
stall any benefits to the Olympic family from the rapidly evolving competitive market in Europe.15 For a number of years, he had
encouraged Samaranch to seek more revenue from the European market. In fact, he might have preferred to manage the negotiations himself, but Samaranch, realizing Pound’s agenda, maintained an iron grip on the negotiations in Europe, along with Hodler.
EBU’s position remained secure.
Even though the IOC’s new rules for negotiations had given the IOC exclusive authority to act, the OCOGs retained a consultative role. The logic of this decision is readily apparent when considering the financial commitment at the local level in staging an
Olympic festival. The OCOGs required, and had been granted, the opportunity to sit at the negotiations table. And, while Samaranch was not wedded to EBU’s proposal for a two-festival package, he was interested in eliminating the consultative role in negotiations aceeded to OCOG personnel. Hodler concurred with Samaranch. They were having, difficulty with Albertville officials
because of a $75 million bid for Western European television rights from UfA, a German network. Not surprisingly, Albertville
representatives had not fallen over themselves looking for a pen when EBU tabled its most recent offer of $11 million, approximately 4.5% of the value of the previously negotiated CBS agreement, and less than 15% of UfA’s offer. Samaranch was resolute
in his commitment to a contract with EBU and expressed his concern about the interference of OCOG officials who sought maximum revenue, ignored EBU’s proven record, and discounted the IOC’s need to maintain a positive relationship with the television
networks in the future.”16
Growing weary of Samaranch and Hodler’s defense of EBU’s resource situation due to its status as a government-funded
agency and their argument that the difference in the acceptability of commercial advertising in the U.S. and European markets prevented more financially lucrative contracts, Pound reiterated his belief that EBU was being given sweetheart deals. He was less
than impressed by the $18 million contract eventually granted by Samaranch and Hodler to EBU for the Albertville Games considering the existence of UfA’s offer ($75 million). EBU, noted Pound, had pots of money for American television programming, but
the cupboard was always bare when the IOC opened Olympic television negotiations. “The amount EBU paid to cover the Games
[was] derisroy in comparison with large amounts made available for events comparatively less important,” he opined.17
Pound was opposed to banishing OCOG personnel from the negotiations table as their presence forced IOC negotiators to seek
the best possible agreements.18 As the entities assuming the financial risk of hosting the Games, Pound believed that their continued presence was vital.19 Samaranch’s proposal offered the possibility that their exclusion might damage relations between the
IOC and the OCOGs. Pound understood that the OCOGs were required to expend significant energies in providing the technical
infrastructure for the broadcasters. In the event that they did not perform this task well, in part, because of not being involved in
the process of negotiating the shared responsibilities of the OCOG and the broadcaster, future negotiations with the networks
would be compromised.20 Pound’s view proved to be the minority opinion and the Executive Board approved the change in future
host city contracts.21
The IOC’s decision to stage the Olympic Winter Games and Summer Olympics on a two-year cycle beginning with the Lillehammer festival in 1994 necessitated a flurry of negotiations in 1989. EBU acquired the Western European rights to the 1992 Barcelona Olympics for $66 million plus an additional payment of $9 million in technical services fees. The $75 million package
paled in comparison to the $401 million shelled out by NBC for U.S. television rights, but represented a noticeable increase on the
$28 million contract signed by EBU with the IOC and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee. Meanwhile, CBS, in an
attempt to carve out a niche as America’s Winter Olympic network by building on its upcoming Albertville commitment, agreed to
a $300 million contract for the Lillehammer Games, EBU was granted the European rights to the Lillehammer festival for $24 million, a marginal increase on the Albertville deal. The drag on European television rights did not go unnoticed in Washington, D.C.
and Colorado Springs, prompting McMillen’s collaboration with the USOC and U.S. television officials.
The McMillen Bill Fades from the Legislative Agenda on Capitol Hill
When the IOC Executive Board convened in June, 1991, the McMillen bill provided one subject for discussion. Samaranch
quizzed fellow Executive Board member (and USOC President) Robert Helmick on the status of the U.S. television market. Helmick offered his opinion on McMillen’s initiative. He explained McMillen’s bill by alluding to the dissatisfaction in the U.S. concerning amounts paid by U.S. networks for Olympic television rights compared to sums paid by networks in other regions. Recent
data, noted Helmick, indicated that when the populations of the U.S. and European markets were compared, “revenues from the
USA relating to the Summer Games were about four and a half times greater per household and for the Winter Games they were
41
Riding into the Sunset
22
23
approximately ten times greater.” Helmick called for the IOC and USOC to work together to find a solution. He was critical of
Pound’s suggestion that the IOC consider hiring a professional lobbyist to safeguard the IOC’s interests, and presumably keep an
eye on the USOC’s activities.24 It was important for the two organizations to cooperate, noted Helmick. As for the U.S. market, he
believed it was in a recovery phase with satisfactory revenue for Atlanta expected.25 Perhaps the USOC had realized the potential
impact of the anti-trust exemption and limitations on commercial advertising, mused Pound silently.
At a meeting of the IOC Executive Board in Berlin three months later, Pound sensed that Samaranch and Hodler were prepared to adopt a “business as usual” approach to negotiations for European television rights to the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. Samaranch spoke in glowing terms of the IOC’s long-term relationship with EBU and that the IOC should avoid abandoning “EBU for
private companies which would not cover the Games properly.” 26 Hodler, too, desired more revenue from Europe, but emphasized
the need for “full coverage.” Pound scolded his colleagues in highlighting the “disproportionate” amount of money paid by the
U.S. networks compared to EBU. The newly competitive market in Europe could not be ignored, stated Pound. “The worlds of
television and business had changed, everything had changed, except for the IOC, which was still selling TV rights as in the
1960s,” observed Pound. He also raised the prospect of U.S. government legislation if this inequity, which had precipitated the
McMillen bill, was not addressed.27 The combination of Pound’s call for change, the spectre of the McMillen bill and the whopping $300 million offer from UfA for European television rights to the Atlanta Olympics pushed Samaranch and Hodler’s hand
and forced EBU to structure a realistic, and more competitive offer ($250 million).27 The McMillen bill faded from Washington’s
legislative agenda in 1991.
The USOC and Desired Changes to the BMA in the Aftermath of the McMillen Bill
The USOC considered the IOC’s decision to grant it 10% of the U.S. television contracts beginning in 1992 in order to conclude a $300 million deal with NBC for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games as an entering wedge to pursue its financial aspirations. In
1989 and 1990, in the months preceding the introduction of the McMillen bill, the USOC lobbied the IOC for an increase in its
share of future U.S. television money.29 The USOC then employed the McMillen bill as a means of squeezing the IOC for further
concessions, but without immediate dividends.
Discussions concerning the USOC’s share of U.S. Olympic television revenue continued though 1991 and 1992. A meeting
between the IOC’s Marketing Director, Michael Payne, and USOC Secretary General John Krimsky in February 1991 failed to
bring the parties to an agreement.30 Talks percolated for another 18 months. Pound believed that the two sides arrived at a solution
prior to the USOC Olympic Congress in Miami in October 1992, but Harvey Schiller, the USOC’s Executive Director, informed
Pound that the USOC would not sign the agreement. The USOC was intent that revisions to the BMA include increases in the
shares of the U.S. television contracts for the 1998 Nagano Olympic Winter Games and the 2000 Summer Olympics. Pound
replied that the USOC’s refusal to conclude an agreement in timely fashion precluded any new provisions concerning revenue distribution from being included in the host city contracts which had already been signed by Nagano, and circulated to the bid cities
for the 2000 Summer Games. Schiller’s demand for a 20% share of U.S. television revenue beginning in 2004 also did not meet
with Pound’s approval. He responded that the IOC might be willing to consider a shift to 15%.31
To Schiller’s counter-proposal for additional revenue from the 1998 and 2000 U.S. television contracts which involved paying
the USOC an additional fee for acting as a television negotiations consultant in the U.S. market, Pound offered a shell game. It was
not possible to deduct money from the OCOGs, ISFs, NOCs, or the IOC, he stated. However, it might be possible to pull some of
the money from the TOP revenues because it was difficult to retain the current method of distributing corporate sponsorship mon ies which granted the USOC more money than received by all of the other NOCs combined. The history of IOC-USOC interaction
with respect to revenue distribution of TOP money also reveals evidence of strained relations and contestation concerning the
IOC’s role in the U.S. market.32 Pound’s response was destined to agitate USOC officials in Colorado Springs, and could be interpreted as his method of tweaking the noses of Schiller and his col1eagues.33
Not satisfied with Pound’s approach, and his unwillingness to capitulate to USOC demands, Schiller pulled an end run and
directed a letter to Samaranch outlining the USOC’s proposal; however, this communication took no account of Pound’s earlier
comments. Pound sent a blistering memorandum to Schiller. He took him to task for going over his head. A reading of the memorandum leaves little to one’s imagination concerning Pound’s dwindling patience with respect to Schiller and the USOC.34
Pound elaborated on why he was troubled by the USOC’s demand for a larger share of U.S. television revenue. When the IOC
and USOC signed the BMA, the IOC accepted the USOC’s claim that its sponsorship program was adversely affected by the U.S.
Olympic network’s ability to sub-license the use of the IOC-approved composite logo to Olympic broadcast advertisers. “You persuaded us,” Pound wrote Schiller, “that the broadcasters were, in effect, thus able to offer competing sponsorships and that there
was a diversion of sponsorship funds which might otherwise go to the USOC.” It was the sole basis of the USOC’s claim, noted
Pound. Now, the IOC, observed Pound, was willing to accept the USOC’s request that third party use of the composite logo be
prohibited. “In the circumstances,” he wrote, “I am sure you can appreciate the difficulty which I have in understanding why the
42 Bridging Three Centuries
Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research - 2000
USOC should have any share of U.S. television revenues, when the only basis for requesting a share has now been removed as a
problem for the USOC in its sponsorship efforts.”35 Pound’s fall back position remained the fact that the designation of the
USOC’s 10% share of U.S. Olympic television revenue had an unlimited shelf life. The BMA was a legal and binding agreement.
Privately, Pound realized that the USOC would have to be accommodated, but he was not prepared to do so on Schiller’s terms.
Pound and Schiller came to loggerheads as a result of Pound’s refusal to grant to the USOC 20% of the revenue from future U.S.
Olympic television contracts and Schiller’s insistence that this percentage be established as the bench mark in any agreement.
Talks ground to a halt as the working relationship between the IOC Marketing Department and the USOC deteriorated further in
1993, 1994, and 1995. While Samaranch and USOC President LeRoy Walker enjoyed a good relationship, Pound, Payne, and
USOC officials such as Schiller and Krimsky were uneasy lunch companions as marketing issues provided the grist for conflict.
The Sunset Project
Overview
Some Olympic observers consider NBC’s contract for Sydney ($705 million) and Salt Lake City ($545 million) for a combined sum of $1.25 billion signed in 1995, to be the first long-term television rights contract signed by the IOC.36 With respect to
the provenance of long-term Olympic television rights agreements, three points warrant attention. First, Pound considered selling
the 1996 Atlanta and 1998 Nagano rights for the U.S. territory as a package based on a suggestion from Barry Frank. With the
negotiating environment for the Atlanta television rights less than favourable, Frank believed that rolling the two festivals into one
contract might result in enhanced revenue because the networks could envision an extended cost recovery program. However,
Pound decided to stay the course.37 Second, EBU, as discussed earlier, approached Samaranch and Hodler about the prospect of
purchasing the 1992 Albertville and 1994 Lillehammer rights at the same time. Third, in early 1995, Channel 7 acquired the Australian television rights for the Atlanta ($30 million) and Sydney ($45 million) festivals for $75 million.37 The NBC/IOC/Sydney/
Salt Lake City negotiations process represented neither the first time that the IOC considered signing a multi-Games television
deal, nor in fact, did it result in the first such agreement consummated.
However, the Pound/Ebersol discussions regarding Sydney and Salt Lake City did set into motion a process referred to by
Pound as the “Sunset Project.” While reflecting on the success of their recent negotiations over a drink and cigars, Pound and
Ebersol discussed the possibility of structuring a U.S. television contract for the 2004, 2006, and 2008 festivals when the host cities
for the events were unknown, but were assumed to be non-U.S. sites. Pound and Ebersol agreed to devise their own lists of concerns with respect to any negotiations process dedicated to such an initiative.39 Negotiations moved forward at an accelerated pace.
In mid-December 1995, within two months of their initial ruminations on the subject, Pound and Ebersol revealed the terms of the
$2.3 billion contract for the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics ($793 million), 2006 Turin Olympic Winter Games ($613 million),
and 2008 Summer Olympics ($894 million). The momentum stemming from the consummation of this deal touched off a spate of
similar contract signings in other markets in 1996 and 1997.
Building Blocks for the Sunset Project
In April 1995, Pound believed that the U.S. market might yield as much as $600 million for the Sydney Olympic Organizing
Committee (SOCOG) and the Olympic Tripartite. Even though CBS was not projected as a serious bidder, Rupert Murdoch and
the Fox Network had stepped up their pursuit of U.S. Olympic television rights, pushing executives and accountants at NBC and
ABC to keep pace. Pound had employed Fox as a lever to improve the bids forwarded by the “big three networks” for the 1998
Nagano Olympic Winter Games. CBS, unaware of Pound’s nervousness about Fox’s fitness for the task of covering the Olympic
Games, but realizing the lukewarm interest of ABC and NBC, still offered $375 million in order to fend off Murdoch for the
Nagano rights.40 Now, Fox had acquired the U.S. television rights to the 1999 Winnipeg Pan American Games as a means of demonstrating to the IOC that the network possessed the capability of covering a multi-sport festival. Murdoch had even held informal
discussions with SOCOG concerning the prospect of purchasing the worldwide television rights for Sydney; however, it appears
that SOCOG initiated the discussion.41 Neither Pound nor Samaranch desired a situation in which one company possessed the
worldwide television rights.42
In late June, Pound and Samaranch discussed the possibility of awarding the U.S. television rights for Sydney jointly to NBC
and ABC.43 Pound believed that such an arrangement might enhance overall revenue and increase the total hours of coverage in
the U.S. Even though Fox had shown an ability to deliver quality sports programming, he harboured some reservations that its
“territorial reach” could not match a collaborative effort by ABC and NBC.44 For the IOC, maximizing the amount of coverage
was a concern in light of NBC’s decision to restrict coverage of the Atlanta Games to its main network thereby limiting the total
number of hours of coverage.45 Pound, Ebersol, Dennis Swanson (President, ABC Sports), and Barry Frank met in New York on
10 July. Ebersol and Swanson “professed to be bullish” on the proposal.46 The networks hoped to prevent Fox from raiding the
Riding into the Sunset
43
Olympic market in similar fashion to the manner in which it had entered the arena for professional baseball and football property
rights. Also, a collaborative effort promised a reduction in the rights fee that each network would have to pay if it was the sole
Olympic rights holder.
As Swanson and Ebersol continued deliberations during the summer months, it became clear to Pound that the plan was not
workable. The difficulties in coordinating the advertising sales and marketing initiatives were insurmountable. Even though
Swanson and Ebersol reached a tentative agreement for one network to cover the Opening Ceremony and the other to televise the
Closing Ceremony, decisions concerning how the event coverage could be divided proved e1usive. 47 Ebersol then moved to solve
the impasse.
Ebersol decided to make a pre-emptive bid, without Fox or ABC’s knowledge, for the U.S. television rights to Sydney and
Salt Lake City. He tendered this offer less than a week after Murdoch discussed the prospect of purchasing the U.S. rights for the
Sydney Olympics for $700 million. Ebersol perhaps feared that ABC’s recent purchase by the Disney Corporation might alter the
network’s long-term approach to the purchase of Olympic television rights, or he was motivated by a need to respond to the rece nt
sport property acquisitions completed by CBS and ABC. The IOC accepted the $1.25 billion offer and Pound subsequently determined the distribution of the total sum to the two festivals.48
NBC’s offer satisfied the IOC’s major concerns for the sale of the Sydney rights and provided the network with interesting
opportunities to recoup its investment. From a revenue standpoint, the IOC was pleased especially when one considers that Pound
had speculated, as recently as April, that $600 million might be realizable. Second, NBC pledged to cover the Games on the main
network and its two cable channels (CNBC and MSNBC) thereby expanding the number of hours of coverage. 49 The IOC was
heartened by this prospect which had served as part of Pound’s motivation in discussing a joint initiative with Ebersol and Swanson. The IOC was seeking to expand the number of hours of Olympic coverage beyond that which was possible when the U.S.
broadcaster, as was the case with NBC’s planned coverage of the Atlanta Olympics, restricted its telecasts to the main network.
For its part, NBC could package its advertising sales and coordinate its promotional efforts for the two festivals, offset the travel
and production costs for Sydney through the reduced bill for producing Olympic coverage in a domestic site in 2002, rely on an
experienced team of producers and announcers, and expect that inflation over the course of the six-year deal would reduce its
expense in “real” dollars.50
At the IOC Executive Board meeting in Lausanne in September 1995, Pound floated the idea of negotiating long-term television deals for Olympic festivals for which the site had not yet been determined. Pound believed that this negotiating policy would
secure the financial position of the Olympic Movement and its fiscal health in the medium term. Bid committees, reasoned Pound,
would have a firm grasp on available money from the sale of television rights which would assist them in devising their budgets. If
the OCOGs were removed from the negotiations process, noted Pound, the IOC “would be spared the haggling with which the
OCOGs tended to trammel TV rights negotiations.”50 He had been won over to Samaranch’s view on the role of the OCOGs in the
negotiations process. The majority of members of the Executive Board supported Pound’s suggestion with only Kevan Gosper
expressing reservation about the opportunity to negotiate the best offer so far in advance of a festival.52 Pound and Samaranch took
the tenor of the discussion as a signal for Pound to investigate the possibility of a long-term deal with a U.S. network.
Much more debate was stirred when the Executive Board considered Samaranch’s proposal to reduce the share of Olympic
television revenue distributed to future OCOGs (beginning with the 2004 Summer Olympics) from 60% to 49%, thereby increasing the Olympic family’s portion of the available money from 40% to 51%. 53 Pound did not agree with the proposal for two reasons. First, this decision would not be viewed well by the public. “An important contribution to public sympathy for the Games,”
noted Pound, “lay in the IOC’s being able to say that most of the revenue went towards organizing the Games.” The IOC needed
to ensure a well-organized festival and in the event that this proposed formula deprived an OCOG of revenue to guarantee this
eventuality, “this would reflect badly on the IOC.”54 Samaranch replied that the “IOC was putting on the show, and it had to have
the majority of the rights.”55 Anita DeFrantz labeled the plan to reduce the OCOGs’ share of future revenue as a “punitive gesture.”56 Pound also opined that a shift in the IOC’s share of Olympic television revenue would be a red cape to the USOC’s bull, as
it would invite an approach from the USOC for a change in its current 10% share. 57 Pound and DeFrantz’s opinion proved the
minority view as the Executive Board approved Samaranch’s plan by a narrow margin (5-4, with 1 abstention).58 This decision
would have future implications for the IOC with respect to its troubles with the USOC concerning its demands for an increase in its
share of U.S. Olympic television revenue.
Pound and Ebersol Strike a Deal
Throughout October and November 1995, Pound and Ebersol worked towards finalizing a second long-term contract. Samaranch and Pound were the only two IOC officials aware of the advanced nature of discussions. By the end of November, the basic
elements of the agreement were in place. The Sydney/Salt Lake City contract provided the foundation for the financial components of the second deal. For 2004, they agreed to apply a 3% year-over-year increase to the figure contracted for the Sydney
44 Bridging Three Centuries
Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research - 2000
Olympics ($705 million), resulting in a sum of $793 million. This inflation formula was extended through 2008 which established
a sale price of $894 million. The same principle was employed with respect to the 2006 Olympic Winter Games, but the Salt Lake
City component of the first contract ($545 million) served as the base figure thereby producing a figure of $613 million. The $2.3
billion deal was supplemented by a 50:50 revenue-sharing agreement between NBC and the IOC for each festival on NBC advertising revenue exceeding the sum of its rights fee and production costs.59
When the IOC Executive Board convened in early December in Nagano, Pound and Samaranch sought their colleagues’
approval of the contract. Even though the IOC would sacrifice the opportunity to take advantage of the market, conceded Pound,
the deal provided the IOC with financial security and offered the organization a means to complete long-term financial planning.
He also believed the timing was propitious because the USOC was still locked into a 10% share of U.S. television revenue. “This
percentage would certainly not decrease, and there was a chance that they would ask for more,” Pound observed. Members of the
Executive Board were impressed, and even a little startled, by the financial terms of the contract. “It [is] unbelievable,” exclaimed
Ashwini Kumar, “that hard-headed businessmen should wish to guarantee the future of the Olympic Movement for at least a
decade.”60 On 12 December, Pound held a press conference with Ebersol and other NBC officials in New York to announce the
terms of the U.S. Olympic television rights agreement for the 2004, 2006, and 2008 festivals. Long-term contracts were soon
signed in Australia, Europe, and Japan.61
The USOC and the Sunset Project
Perhaps in private conversation USOC officials expressed grudging admiration for Pound’s negotiating efforts; however their
overriding reaction was one of indignation. Pound, after having consulted the USOC on occasion during past negotiations, kept the
USOC “out of the loop” regarding the Sunset Project. The deal, negotiated without the USOC’s involvement, was seen by the
USOC as a setback with respect to its domestic authority.62 The USOC’s Executive Director, Dick Schultz, soon issued a claim for
an increase in the USOC’s share beyond the $230 million prescribed by the BMA. He envisioned elevating the share to 20% with
the possibility of a further increase after 2008.63 As a means of pressuring the IOC, and Pound, who was cool to the thought of
transferring $460 million to the USOC, Schultz refused to grant the USOC’s approval of the contract whose consent was necessary
by virtue of the terms of the Amateur Sports Act.64 Even though the BMA was legally binding and was of unlimited duration, the
USOC remained adamant that it deserved more money. Pound understood that the USOC would need to be appeased, but he was
not prepared to cede 20% of the U.S. television contract to the USOC.
Samaranch was determined to ease the tension between the IOC and USOC and engaged in preliminary discussions with
Schultz concerning modifications to the BMA. Before the opening of the Atlanta Olympics, Schultz indicated that the USOC
would accept a shift to 15%.64 Samaranch soon learned first-hand about Pound’s frustrations concerning the methods of USOC
negotiators. Unbeknownst to Samaranch and Pound, the USOC was pursuing a parallel agenda on Capitol Hill.
An alert NBC staff member, whose job it was to identify any proposed legislation prejudicial to NBC’s interests, warned NBC
and the IOC of the USOC’s attempt, in Pound’s words, “to sneak through some very important changes to the Amateur Sports Act
during the last days of the legislative session, without a hearing and attached as an amendment to a completely unrelated bill.”66
The USOC sought to remove the authority from the IOC to conduct television negotiations in the U.S. “We went bananas,”
recalled Pound.67 Schultz was confronted by Samaranch, Pound, and IOC Director General Francois Carrard in Atlanta during the
course of the Games, Schultz denied any knowledge of the proposed changes to the Amateur Sports Act under discussion in Washington. When Pound produced a copy of a memo sent to Schultz by the USOC’s Washington lobbyist which provided an update on
the progress of the bill, Schultz had been defrocked. Still, he dismissed the changes as “housekeeping amendments.”68 Pound,
Samaranch, and Carrard highlighted the troublesome nature of the USOC’s proposals. Schultz was strongly advised by an agitated
Samaranch to remove the amendments from the bill. He complied.
IOC officials and USOC representatives gathered in Cancun in October 1996 to effect some form of repair to the soured working relationship between the two organizations. Pound, long frustrated by the USOC’s conduct concerning television and marketing policies, understood the long-term importance of the meeting. This was no time for Samaranch to waffle and yield to USOC
demands. He advised Samaranch and his colleagues that a hard line was required. “The IOC is tolerated [by the USOC], barely,
because it has the power to award the Games to U.S. cities on occasion,” Pound concluded. “In all other respects,” he continued, it
is denigrated by officials and staff members of the USOC at virtually every possible opportunity to try to undermine the role of the
IOC. To give some flavor to this attitude, the IOC is often referred to as ‘Eurotrash.’ It would be unwise to underestimate the
degree of antipathy to the IOC which exists in the USOC,” he warned.69
In the end, Samaranch and his colleagues employed the carrot and stick approach with the USOC. Samaranch, Pound, Payne,
Carrard, Gosper, DeFrantz, Thomas Bach, and the IOC’s Director of Legal Affairs, Howard Stupp, met with USOC officials
including Walker and Schultz. First, Samaranch applied the stick. The Olympic Movement, he observed, was comparable to a
club. “Being a member was not compulsory,” he added, “but members had to abide by the rules.”70 The IOC, Samaranch told
Riding into the Sunset
45
71
Walker and Schultz, “could get along without the USOC and was prepared to do so.”
DeFrantz later noted that Samaranch’s
approach had set the tone for the meeting.72 Even though the Olympic Movement would have been scarred without the USOC,
officials realized the consequences of Samaranch’s threat to their organization, if acted upon. However, IOC officials also recognized the unique nature of the U.S. market and the benefit of successful U.S. teams in terms of driving the IOC’s revenue generation program. Samaranch then offered the USOC a carrot in the form of an increase to its share of U.S. television revenue in 2004
and beyond from 10% to 12.75%.73 Pound had lobbied Samaranch for this offer.74 With the Olympic family due to receive 51%
(as opposed to the current 40%) of the global television revenue in 2004 and beyond as a result of the change effected at the Executive Board meeting in Lausanne a little over a year earlier, the financial impact of the decision on the IOC, ISFs, and NOCs was
softened. Having lost an opportunity to realize an increase to 15% as a result of the IOC’s discovery of the USOC’s activities in
Washington, it was likely the best that Schultz and his associates could expect. The USOC accepted the IOC’s offer.
The Sunset Project has confirmed the collective wisdom of Pound and Samaranch who first explored the possibility, and
Pound’s acumen as the chief negotiator representing the IOC’s interests in discussions with television networks. The collection of
contract signings it prompted has improved the IOC’s relationship with television networks because both parties (the IOC and the
individual network in each region) share a long-term commitment to the Olympic Movement. The networks also relished the
enhanced opportunities for cost recovery. Second, advancing the time line for the negotiation of television deals permitted the IOC
to provide financial data to prospective host cities which has been an important tool for the individuals responsible for constructing
budget forecasts. Cities which competed for the 2004 Olympics (Athens), 2006 Olympic Winter Games (Turin), and those such as
Beijing, Paris, and Toronto which are vying for the right to host the 2008 Summer Olympics factored this information into their
bids. Third, these deals also provided financial security for the IOC and the Olympic Movement in the medium term. No doubt
Salt Lake City officials caught in a maelstrom of controversy in 1999 were relieved that all major television contracts had been
consummated. Last, Pound’s decision, approved by Samaranch and the Executive Board, to conclude negotiations with NBC for
U.S. television rights to the three festivals in 1995 before the debate concerning the USOC’s share had been resolved, proved
astute. The BMA outlined a payment of 10% of the U.S. television contract to the USOC in 1992 and beyond in perpetuity. Pound
improved the IOC’s negotiating position with the USOC which was still hungering for 20%. With respect to television rights
negotiations, Pound served the IOC well in its efforts to establish a position of financial security in the 1990s.
In the 1990s, escalating friction between Pound, who acted as the IOC’s point person in negotiations with the USOC concerning television issues, and former USOC officials Harvey Schiller, John Krimsky, and Dick Schultz, can be attributed, in part, to a
clash of egos. These individuals represented the two most powerful organizations in the Olympic Movement during discussions
which centered on the distribution of hundreds of millions of dollars. USOC officials were disturbed by the amount of money paid
by U.S. television networks relative to the sums negotiated by the IOC in Europe and a number of other large markets including
Japan. They were unwilling to accept the extent to which U.S. networks were bankrolling the development of competitors to U.S.
Olympians through the IOC’s distribution of television money to the NOCs. Pound’s skirmishes with Schiller and Schultz also
concerned the USOC’s concept of its role in television negotiations. In order to compensate the USOC for the IOC’s unwillingness
to extract fair market value from major non-U.S. regions, and as a result of its rights enshrined in the Amateur Sports Act, argued
USOC executives, the USOC was entitled to 20% of the U.S. television revenue. Pound disagreed.
Pound and his USOC counterparts shared a desire to protect their turf. The USOC was interested in centralizing the administration of all Olympic matters in the U.S., especially those involving finance, in its Colorado Springs headquarters. Pound understood the Americans’ motives and methods. “The basic position of the USOC is that, in the United States, the IOC has no role and
that it is the USOC which controls and runs all things Olympic,” he observed in a ‘fire and brimstone’ letter to the IOC team prior
to its departure for the summit meeting with USOC representatives in Cancun. “The fundamental attitude of the USOC toward the
IOC,” he added, “is that the IOC knows nothing about the Olympic Movement in the United States and that the IOC should not be
carrying on any activity in the United States, including the sale of television rights.”75 Pound, for his part, wanted to maintain the
IOC’s right to “do business” in the U.S. The Sunset Project was one means of reining in the ambition of USOC officials pertaining
to television revenue and television negotiations policy in the medium term.
Driven by a desire to increase its revenue base and authority, the USOC played off its face-to face negotiations with Pound and
Michael Payne against its legislative agenda in Washington. The McMillen bill served as one example of this tactic. Schultz’s
effort to finesse changes to the Amateur Sports Act without the IOC’s knowledge in 1996, largely in response to the results of the
Pound/Ebersol negotiations, was a gamble. If Schultz had been successful in obtaining the right to negotiate U.S. televison contracts (for the USOC), the IOC would have been drawn into a public confrontation with the USOC. IOC officials were unsure
about the prospect for a favourable verdict in a court action in the U.S. despite the seemingly valid argument that the IOC’s intellectual property rights (the television rights) had been usurped. Schultz’s decision to pursue amendments to the Amateur Sports
Act, while at the same time discussing changes to the BMA with Samaranch, backfired when an NBC employee discovered the bill
moving through the Senate. The USOC was placed on the defensive. Any hope for 15% of future U.S. television contracts, or control of negotiations had been dashed. The Cancun meeting resulted in an agreement on the USOC’s share of future television
46 Bridging Three Centuries
Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research - 2000
money (12.75%); however, the process also reflected both the massive fissure between the IOC and USOC in terms of inter-organizational trust and the unique and important nature of the U.S. market concerning Olympic revenue generation.
Epilogue
Avery Brundage, who served as USOC President, and later headed the IOC (1952-1972) correctly predicted the ramifications
of television and television money for the Olympic family. Even though the new industry afforded the possibility of promoting the
Olympic Movement on a global basis, Brundage did not trust that his fellow Olympic administrators could avoid conflict over who
got what.76 The Olympic Games have become the pre-eminent televisual sport spectacle in the world. Television brings the excitement and drama of Olympic competition into our homes through the use of a panoply of state-of-the-art devices designed to maximize one’s enjoyment. A record-setting cumulative audience of 19.6 billion, perhaps to be eclipsed by the telecasts from Sydney,
witnessed the Centennial Games from Atlanta. The “Olympic Dream,” despite recent scandal, still exists throughout the youth
population of the world. While television has been a wonderful promotional tool for the Olympic Movement, a review of the
IOC’s involvement with the USOC on television matters, especially in the context of the Sunset Project, demonstrates that not all
of the most intriguing Olympic “battles” have taken place on the track, in the pool, or on the slopes. Some of them have occurred
in boardrooms.
Endnotes
1.
Personal Communication, Richard W. Pound (IOC Vice-President and Chairman, IOC Marketing Commission) to the author,
12 May 1999.
2.
A composite logo is one designed by the network, and approved by the IOC, that combines the five rings with the logo of the
Olympic broadcaster.
3.
This episode can be studied by viewing a collection of documents at the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland. Key
documents include: Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 26 September 1985, Seoul-1988 TV General 1985 II File,
International Olympic Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland [hereafter cited IOCA]; Richard Pound to Juan Antonio
Samaranch, 30 September 1985, Seoul-1988 TV General 1985 II File, IOCA; George D. Miller (Secretary General, United
States Olympic Committee [USOC]) to Roone Arledge (President of Sports, American Broadcasting Company [ABC]), 29
October 1985, Calgary-1988 TV General 1985 File, IOCA; Juan Antonio Samaranch to Richard Pound, 1 October 1985,
Seoul-1988 TV General 1985 II File, IOCA; Howard Stupp (IOC Director of Legal Affairs) to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 2
October 1985, Seoul-1988 TV General 1985 II File, IOCA; Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 11-12 February 1986, Lausanne, pp. 5, 7, IOCA; and Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 22-24 April 1986, Seoul, p. 4,
IOCA. The author would like to extend his appreciation to Rowland Smith, Vice-President: Academic, Wilfrid Laurier University and Barry McPherson, Dean, Graduate Studies and Research, Wilfrid Laurier University, whose respective offices
have provided money in support of this research.
4.
For detailed examination of this era, refer to Stephen R. Wenn, “An Olympian Squabble: The Distribution of Olympic Television Revenue, 1960-1966,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies, Volume Ill - 1994, pp. 27-48; Stephen R.
Wenn, “Growing Pains: The Olympic Movement and Television, 1966-l972,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies, Volume IV - 1995, pp. l-22; Stephen R. Wenn, “Television Rights Negotiations and the 1976 Montreal Olympics,” Sport History Review, Volume 27 (2) 1996, pp. 111-138; and Stephen R. Wenn, “A Turning Point for IOC Television
Policy: U.S. Television Rights Negotiations and the 1980 Lake Placid and Moscow Olympic Festivals,” Journal of Sport History, Volume 25 (l), 1998, pp. 87- 118.
5.
The reader should note that Organizing Committees did not adjust well to the IOC’s decision to act as a joint negotiator beginning with the 1984 Sarajevo/Los Angeles cycle. The Sarajevo Organizing Committee, led by Ahmed Karabegovic, tried to
conduct negotiations without IOC involvement, and the Los Angeles Organizing Committee (LAOOC), led by Peter Ueberroth, applied for, and received, a waiver from the IOC concerning the joint negotiation policy. Ueberroth argued that the
importance of the revenue stream to the LAOOC based on the need to fund the Games exclusively through private monies,
necessitated independent action on the part of the LAOOC at the table. The IOC retained an advisory role. Stephen R. Wenn,
“Conflicting Agendas: Monique Berlioux, Ahmed Karabegovic and U.S. Television Rights Negotiations for the 1984 Sarajevo
Olympic Winter Games,” in Robert K. Barney, Kevin B. Wamsley, Scott G. Martyn, and Gordon H. MacDonald (eds.), Global
and Cultural Critique: Problematizing the Olympic Games - Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium for Olympic
Riding into the Sunset
47
Research (London, Canada: International Centre for Olympic Studies, 1998), pp. 115-127. Troubled negotiations concerning
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games prompted the IOC to assume control of the negotiations process for the 1992 festivals and
beyond. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 10-11 October 1986, Lausanne, p. 40, IOCA. The contract with
the 1992 candidate cities presented in December, 1985 included the provision that the IOC would negotiate television agreements in consultation with the OCOGs.
6.
Congressional Record - Extension of Remarks, 101st Congress, 2nd Session (136 Cong Rec E 3452), Volume 136, No. 148,
Thursday, October 25, 1990.
7.
Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 27-29 August 1989, Puerto Rico, p. 31, IOCA; Minutes of the Meeting of
the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 April 1990, Belgrade, p. 49, IOCA; “Notes of Meeting with Congressman Tom McMillen,
Washington, D.C.,” 17 January 1991, IOC-USOC File, Personal Computer Files of Richard Pound [hereafter cited PCFRP] ,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada; and Richard Pound to Edward J. Markey (Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance), 30 December 1991 [draft], IOC-USOC File, PCFRP. The author would like
to extend his appreciation to Richard Pound for making these files available.
8.
“Notes of Meeting with Congressman Tom McMillen, Washington, D.C.,” 17 January 1991, PCFRP.
9.
Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 July 1988, Lausanne, p. 23, IOCA.
12. Minutes of the 92nd Session of the IOC, 9-12 May 1987, Istanbul, p. 45, IOCA; and Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 July 1988, Lausanne, p. 23, IOCA.
13. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 25 April 1988, Stockholm, p. 37, IOCA.
14. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 July 1988, Lausanne, p. 23, IOCA.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., pp. 23-25.
17. Ibid., p. 26.
18. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 7-8 December 1988, Vienna, p. 29, IOCA.
19. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 22-24 January 1989, Courcheval, p. 37, IOCA.
20. Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 23 June 1999.
21. This change took the form of a two-step process. While the role of the OCOGs was revised at this time, the language was
tightened further in 1995 in preparation for the distribution of host city contracts to bid cities for the 2004 Summer Olympics.
Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 September 1995, Lausanne, p. 46, IOCA.
22. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 10-11 June 1991, Birmingham, p. 43, IOCA.
2 3 . Ibid.
24. “Marketing Report to the Executive Board, June 1991,” Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 10-11 June 1991,
Birmingham, Annex #12, p. 108, IOCA.
25. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 10-11 June 1991, Birmingham, p. 6, IOCA.
26. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 17-19 September 1991, Berlin, pp. 41-42, IOCA.
2 7 . Ibid.
48 Bridging Three Centuries
Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research - 2000
28. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, 25 November 1991, Lausanne, p. 12, IOCA; and Minutes of the
Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 4-6 December 1991, Lausanne, p. 43, IOCA.
29. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 27-29 August 1989, Puerto Rico, p. 31, IOCA; and Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 April 1990, Belgrade, p. 49, IOCA.
30. “Marketing Report to the IOC Executive Board, 14-16 April 1991, Barcelona,” Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive
Board, 14-16 April 1991, Barcelona, Annex #15, p. 127.
31. Richard Pound to Harvey, Schiller (draft), 11 November 1992, IOC-USOC File, PCFRP.
32. For a thorough examination of this issue, see Scott G. Martyn, “The Struggle for Financial Autonomy: The IOC and the Historical Emergence of Corporate Sponsorship, 1896-2000,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 2000; and Scott
G. Martyn, “Towards an Impasse: An Examination of the Negotiations Behind the Inclusion of the United States Olympic
Committee in TOP (The Olympic Program),” in Robert K. Barney, Scott G. Martyn, Douglas A. Brown, and Gordon H. MacDonald (eds.), Olympic Perspectives: Third International Symposium for Olympic Research (London, Ontario: International
Centre for Olympic Studies, 1996) pp. 107-120.
33. Richard Pound to Harvey Schiller (draft), 3 December 1992, IOC-USOC File, PCFRP.
34. Richard Pound to Harvey Schiller (draft), 12 April 1993, IOC-USOC File, PCFRP.
35. Ibid.
36. Each contract included an additional $10 million in advertising on NBC’s broadcasts, or in the form of pre-event promotion.
Therefore, the value of the individual elements of the contract was $715 million (Sydney) and $555 million (Salt Lake City).
37. “Memorandum Regarding Possible Strategy to Maximize U.S. Television Rights for Both the 1996 and 1998 Olympics,” IOC
1996 TV File, PCFRP. It is interesting to note that in considering Frank’s proposal, Pound believed that an $800 million contract for the two festivals was achievable. On the basis of the value of past Winter rights in comparison to Summer rights,
Atlanta would have received approximately $500 million, while Nagano would have been assigned the remaining $300 million. While Atlanta was forced to settle for $456 million in July 1993 because of its need to push forward with negotiations
due to budgetary requirements in a less than favourable environment, Nagano received $375 million from negotiations staged
in early 1994. Of the “big three” U.S. networks, CBS was the only serious bidder for the Nagano rights, but the emergence of
Fox as a bidder provided Pound with a lever to maximize the sale rights. The NBC/lOC/Atlanta contract included a 50:50
money sharing agreement between NBC and the IOC on NBC advertising revenue exceeding $615 million.
38. “Marketing Report to the IOC Executive Board, Monaco, 2-4 April 1995,” Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, 2-4 April
1995, Monaco, Annex #6, p. 71, IOCA.
39. Richard Pound to Dick Ebersol, 2 October 1995, IOC Sunset File, PCFRP.
40. Richard Pound to Makato Kobayashi (Director General, Nagano Olympic Organizing Committee), 12 January 1994, IOC
1998 TV File, PCFRP.
41. Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 13 April 1995, IOC 2000 TV File, PCFRP.
42. Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 29 April 1995, IOC 2000 TV File, PCFRP. Pound had not eliminated Fox for consideration as the U.S. broadcaster. See, Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 13 April 1995, IOC 2000 TV File,
PCFRP.
43. Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 26 June 1995, IOC 2000 TV File, PCFRP.
44. Richard Pound to Dick Ebersol and Dennis Swanson, 27 June 1995, IOC 2000 TV File, PCFRP.
45. Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 12 May 1999.
46. Richard Pound to File, 10 July 1995, IOC Sunset File, PCFRP.
Riding into the Sunset
49
47. A number of issues proved difficult for all parties including; whether the two networks would establish a joint unit for the
project, the number of composite logos, copyright ownership of the Olympic film, arbitration procedures in the event of a dispute between ABC and NBC, and event scheduling. Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 12 May 1999; and
Richard Pound to Dick Ebersol, Dennis Swanson and Barry Frank, 10 July 1995, IOC Sunset File, PCFRP.
48. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 September 1995, Lausanne, pp. 3, 20, IOCA; and Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 12 May 1999.
49. National Broadcasting Company, Inc. to International Olympic Committee, 4 August 1995, IOC Sunset File, PCFRP. In June,
1999, NBC announced that American viewers would be provided with 330 hours of coverage across the three channels. This
figure represents a substantial increase on NBC’s 169 hours of coverage from Atlanta. “Olympics: NBC has big plans,” Toronto Sun, 23 June 1999, p. 112; and “Marketing Matters: The Olympic Marketing Newsletter,” Winter 1996/97 (10), p. 5. In
the most recent issue of “Marketing Matters,” it was noted that NBC has decided to further enhance the number of hours of
coverage (across the main network and cable channels) to 437.5 hours. “Marketing Matters: The Olympic Marketing Newsletter,” May, 2000 (16), p. 11.
50. Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 12 May 1999.
51. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 September 1995, Lausanne, p. 3, IOCA.
52. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
53. The 60:40 spilt had been first used for the Atlanta Olympic Games, replacing the 66.6:3.33 traditional formula. Minutes of the
Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 30 August, 1 September 1989, Puerto Rico, p. 29, IOCA.
54. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 24-26 September 1995, Lausanne, p. 45, IOCA.
55. Ibid., p. 46.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 45.
58. Ibid., p. 46.
59. “Notes for Remarks by Richard W. Pound: Olympic Television Announcement re 2004, 2006, 2008: New York, December 12,
1995,” IOC Sunset File, PCFRP.
60. The discussion appears in Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 4-6 December 1995, Nagano, pp. 63-65,
IOCA, Brackets mine.
61. “Draft Press Release: Australian Television Rights,” 17 January 1996, Lausanne, IOC Sunset File, PCFRP; “Marketing Report
to the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 4-6 March 1996,” Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 4-6 March
1996, Lausanne, Annex #6, p. 93, IOCA; and Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 14-16 November 1996,
Cancun, p. 5, IOCA. In January 1996, the IOC reached a long-term agreement (2002-2008) with Australia’s Channel 7 for
$140,825,000. When the Executive Board convened in March 1996 members studied the results of negotiations with EBU.
The EBU deal covered Sydney ($350 million), 2004 ($394 million), 2008 ($443 million), Salt Lake City ($120 million) and
2006 ($135 million) festivals for the combined sum of $1.442 billion. Un Yong Kim closed a deal on behalf of the IOC in
Japan before the end of the year which covered the Sydney ($135 million), 2004 ($155 million), 2008 ($180 million), Salt
Lake City ($37 million) and 2006 festivals ($38.5 million).
62. “Briefing Memorandum: IOC-USOC Meeting October 8 1996,” IOC-USOC File, PCFRP.
63. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 4-6 March 1996, Lausanne, p. 33, IOCA; and “Marketing Report to the
IOC Executive Board, Atlanta, July 11-13 1996,” Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 11-13 July 1996,
Atlanta, Annex #9, p. 106, IOCA.
64. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 4-6 March 1996, Lausanne, p. 33, IOCA.
50 Bridging Three Centuries
Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research - 2000
65. “Briefing Memorandum: IOC-USOC Meeting October 8 1996,” IOC-USOC File, PCFRP.
66. Ibid.
67. Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 12 May 1999.
68. Ibid.
69. “Briefing Memorandum: IOC-USOC Meeting October 8 1996,” IOC-USOC File, PCFRP.
70. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 8-10 October 1996, Lausanne, p. 15-16, IOCA.
71. Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 12 May 1999.
72. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 8-10 October 1996, Lausanne, p. 16, IOCA.
73. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
74. Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 14 June 2000.
75. “Briefing Memorandum: IOC-USOC Meeting October 8 1996,” IOC-USOC File, PCFRP.
76. Stephen R. Wenn, “Lights! Camera! Little Action: Television, Avery Brundage and the 1956 Melbourne Olympics,” Sporting
Traditions: Journal of the Australian Society for Sports History, Volume 10 (1), 1993, pp. 38-53; and Wenn, “An Olympian
Squabble: The Distribution of Olympic Television Revenue, 1960-1966.”