x
BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WES T
Mrs. Raeffa Miller. my secretary in the InstitUle fo r International
Studies . took dictation and typed several versions of some of the
chapters with patience and accuracy. Her help with manuscripts over
many years has been invaluable . The personnel of the Word Process­
ing Center of rhe University of Notre Dame. a group of wonderfully
patient and experienced typists . Cheryl Reed. MargaretJasiewicz and
their colleagues handled the final version .
Heartfelt thanks for all this most kind assistance . I have been par­
ticularly grateful for critical comments and suggestions . and carefully
considered them . but confess that in rhe end I followed my own
counsel. sometimes perhaps erroneously. The text reflects thoughts
and experiences through many years of involvement in affairs of Dan­
ubian Europe . To be sure. definitive evaluation of some of the events
mentioned herein will not be possible until opening of the archives
of the Soviet Union.
I dedicate this book to the memory of Philip E. Mosely . one of the
finest human beings I have ever known. Although the Department
of State did not participate in major policy decisions during the Sec­
ond World War , Mosely , in his work in the Department and in the
European Advisory Commission in London and in his advice to the
highest American officials- foreseeing the impending tragedy of East
Central Europe-tried to restrict and mitigate the catastrophic course
of events .
Introduction This book sets forth the vicissitudes of an ex-enemy state . Hungary.
at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 and analyzes the intricacies of
preparations for peace in the shadow of the Swastika and the Red
Star. Although inter-Allied strategic and political decisions had set­
tled the fat e of the Danubian countries well before the end of the
war. this fac t was not known. and the cognoscenti in Hungary dis­
counted such rumors . It seemed incredible that after a victorious war
the Western powers would allow simply a "changing of the guard ."
the installation of Soviet domination after German occupation . Hun­
garian emissaries established contacts with British and United States
representatives in neutral countries in 1942-43, and the Western
negotiators did not contradict the Hungarian assumption that British
and American forces would reach Hungary and occupy the mid­
Danubian basin.
Although in several chapters I discuss events in which I took a part ,
I did not intend to write a memoir. I describe events as I observed
them as an actor or witness. In the process of research and writing.
I sought to use official publications , memoirs. and archives . in­
cluding m y private papers . Because I participated in peace prepara­
tions in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1943-44. headed the peace
preparatory division after the war , and served as secretary-general of
the Hungarian peace delegation in 1946. I have included my personal
experiences as well . In these years Hungary's destiny was like a Greek
tragedy. German occupation in early 1944 was followed by Soviet in­
vasion later in the yea r. Most pans of the COUntry became battlefields
and for nearly tWO months Budapest was under constant siege.
In the first chapter a personal account helps to explain the abrupt
transition from the Horthy regime to the postwar era - the chaotic
conditions during the last stage of the Nazi occupation. the siege of
Budapest. and rhe first phase of the Soviet occupation. In similar
XI
XII
BET WEEN RUSSI....
A~D
THE WEST
fashion . I relate from my vantage point rhe peace preparations in
posrwar Hungary and events ar rhe Paris Conference . hoping to con­
vey a d irect and realistic sense of rhe many strange happenings during
this period of seemingly whimsical changes . Chap rer Two unfolds the
domestic polirical transformations and rhe interplay of Sovier and
Western diplomacy in postwar Hungary. These events influenced Our
preparations for peace . Chapters Three and Eighr sum up Allied
policies rhat led to the division of Europe and to postwar peacemak­
ing. The rest of the chaprers discuss Hungary's international political
problems and rhe afrermarh of peace negoriarions.
Peace preparations in Hungary during and after rhe war assumed
rhar rhe United Stares wou ld play a major and probably decisive role
at the peace rable. This assump rion seemed realistic because the
Unired States was the only Great Power not affected by wartime
destruction. Irs industry and productive capacity was immensely
strengthened during the hostilities. and its military power reached an
unparalleled peak in the last stage of the war. Ir was not known in
Budapest that by this time Danubian Europe had become the dark
side of the moon for the Western allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had
decided in the autumn of 1943 that the United States should take no
responsibilities "in the area of the Balkans . including Austria ." The
political implications of this mi litary ruling foreshadowed the future .
Another assumption during our peace preparations was that the
convocation of a comprehensive p eace conference would establ ish a
new international order. This assumption seemed plausible in the
context and perspective of European history. In modern times. after
major wars. belligerent countries had negotiated at a peace confer­
ence to establish a generall y recognized poli tical and territOrial order.
The Congresses of Westphalia . Utrecht. and Vienna we re m ilestones
not only in the art of peacem aking but also in formulating diplomatic
and juridical rules for a developing state system. After the Napole­
onic wars . the sertlement worked Out by the Cong ress of Vien na
secured general peace in Europe for a century . The informal coopera­
tion of the continental G reat Powers and the onl)' world power . Great
Britain - known as the Concert of Europe - solved international issues
and isolated wars . Even major changes. such as the unification of
Germany and Iraly . were achieved through isolated wars . But this
system began to deteriorate afrer the Congress of Berlin (1878). when
the form arion of rhe Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente brought
about a rigid bipolar balance of power in Europe . The fa ilure of
diplomacy in 1914 was a major immediate cause of the outbreak of
one of the most irrational wars in history . which in turn triggered a
INTRODUCTION
XUI
eries of catastrophic events and fundamental transformations in in­
:ernational relations . The war demonstrated to the world the break­
down of solidarity among the European Great Powers and showed rhe
weaknesses of Western civilization .
At the Paris Conference in 1919, the three great Western democ­
racies _ the United States. Britain , and France- formed the core of
peacemakers; Italy and Japan participated in some of the delibera­
tions. A momentOUS result of the war was the temporary eclipse of
twa European Great Powers , Germany and Russia . and the dissolu­
tion of Austria-Hungary. The Congress of Vienna could not serve as
a model ror peace in 1919 because the traditional state system of
Europe was destroyed and world conditions were in a stage of rapid
transformation. Social and technological changes had a large impacr
on diplomacy. and revolutionary events and ideologies became again
factors in world politics . Talleyrand was an influential participant at
the Congress of Vienna , but after the First World War , Germany and
rhe other defeated countries were excluded from the peace negotia­
tions. Russia, still torn by civil war, was not invited to attend the con­
ference . Insread of creating a democraric federation in the Danubian
gateway ro Western Europe . the peacemakers replaced rhe Austro­
Hungarian monarchy by small quarrelsome states.
Few serious conflicts of interest existed among the major victOrious
powers in 19 19. and their visions about the futute were compatible .
Under President W oodrow Wilson's leadership they sought to replace
the bala nce of power with a system of collective security built around
a League of Nations. The Covenant of the League was incorporated
in each peace treat y. and the treaties established the territorial status
quo and juridical order rhe League was obligated to defend . Yer rhe
League could not replace the Concert of Europe in power politics
because resolutio ns were nOt effective for the maintenance of order
and law .
As long as France was the dominant power and the guardian of the
status quo in Europe . the new system seemed to work satisfactorily.
But in the 193 0s Fre nch power sharpl y declined . and rhe lack of
political leadership in Brirain and France increased disagreements
between the m and paralyzed their effectiveness in European politics. '
There were no "international policemen" to maintain law and p unish
aggressors. Isolat ionist policies and neutrality legislation in the Uni ted
States contributed to international conditions which made Europe a
safe place for dictatorship and war. The safety valves of the traditional
European system no longer existed. and the old order and society
disintegrated .
XIV
BETWEEN RUSS IA AND THE WE ST
Hider's aggressions and declararions of war creared a de facto
alliance between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union.
Stalin endorsed the Adantic Charter and in his speeches praised the
virtues of democracies, dissolved rhe Comintern. foughr a "Great
Patriotic War." and ar Yalta accepred the Declaration on Liberated
Europe. In Roosevelt·s "Grand Design" for the posrwar world. the
USSR was one of rhe four policemen. Leaders of the United States.
particularly Secretary of State Cordell Hull . assumed that wartime
cooperation wirh Moscow would continue as a partnership in peace.
This belief still prevailed when the Conference of San Francisco ap­
proved the Chaner of the United Nations in June 1945 and at the
Potsdam Conference. Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations.
the Charter was not pan of a peace setdement. Peace treaties were not
concluded with the major enemy states. Germany and Japan. and an
internationally recognized starus quo was not established . Major
Western states signed a peace treaty with Japan only in 1951. and the
Western and Communist countries later concluded patchwork agree­
ments with the two Germanys. but this rortuous procedure was a poor
substirute for a comprehensive peace setdement -the declared pur­
pose of American foreign polic),. In 1945 an unprecedented method
of peacemaking began . Conclusion of peace treaties was restricted to
the five less important ex-enemy states. The plan for a major peace
conference was not abandoned explicidy but rather unwittingly with
the acceptance of a gradual approach to the conclusion of peace.
At the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three in July-August 1945.
the American delegation proposed and the conference accepted a
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the five principal victors-the
Soviet Union. United Kingdom . United States. France. and China.
It was agreed that in drawing up treaties with the ex-enemy states
each treaty should be drafted by the nations thar signed the armistice
wirh rhat panicular enemy . This meant that Britain and the Soviet
Union prepared the treaty for Finland. For the three Danubian coun­
tries it was Britain. the Soviet Union . and the United States. The
French government accepted the invitation to participate in the
Council of Foreign Ministers and emphasized that France was "in­
terested in all important questions concerning Europe in any region
of Europe ." For the Italian setdement France was to be regarded as
a signatory to the armistice . and so for Italy. France and the Big Three
prepared the peace treaty. Here was the origin of the 4-3-2 formula
of peacemaking. Western expeCtation was that the Council of Foreign
Ministers at an initial meeting would consider these drafts ad decide
controversial questions. Texts prepared by the council would be sub-
INTRODUCTION
xv
mitted to "the United Nations." and their recommedations would be
considered when the council approved the final version of the five
treaties.
Secretary of Stare James F. Byrnes noted in his memoirs that he
rhought at the time of the Potsdam Conference that a start should
be made prompdy. and he hoped experiences with the five minor
peace treaties would make it easier to agree on a treaty for Germany .
He supposed that after agreement on principles. the foreign ministers
would appoint deputies to draft the detailed provisions . The peace
treaties then "would be presented to all the United Nations for con­
siderations and amendment ." He contemplated that a similar course
would be followed later for Japan . When the meaning of the refer­
ence to the United Nations was discussed at Potsdam . Stalin remarked
[hat [he inclusion of such a phrase in the document made no dif­
ference as "'the rhree powers would represent the interest of all ."
Byrnes had assumed that "at rhe end of hostilities an era of peace
would be so deeply desired by those nations that had fought the war
in unity that the inevitable differences of opinion could be resolved
without serious difficulty .'" In this spirit Byrnes believed that the
peace treaties could be prepared in a few months.
The gradual approach to peacemaking might have worked during
[he nineteenth century. the era of the Concert of Europe . and even
afrer the First World War when the Great Powers had the same view
of [he world. and their aspirations and expeCtations were compatible .
Bur [he Western and Soviet visions of political and juridical order to
be established by the peace setdement differed gready. In the war
against Napoleon . Russian trOOps had marched across Europe , and
the Czar himself had arrived in Paris with his army. But at the subse­
quent Congress of Vienna , Russian ambitions had received satifaCtion
with award of Polish territories. and the Russian arm)' withdrew from
other European countries . Although Western nations hoped in 1945
that the Soviets would imitate this precedent . Stalin had no such in­
[emion . In addition to the differences in political goals and interpre­
[ation of agreements. the compromise-inclined British and Ameri­
cans were surprised by the Soviet code of conduct in negotiations.
The piecemeal approach to peace after the Second World War
might have worked better . had the Big Three included in their design
a lteaty with Austria. The Moscow Declaration of 1943 had recog­
nized that Austria was an occupied country to be liberated. A state
lteaty with Vienna should have preceded the conclusion of peace
treaties or should have been concluded simultaneously with them .
This procedure would have made possible the simultaneous evacua­
XVI
INTRODUCTION
BETW EEN RUSSIA AND THE WES T
tion of foreign troops from Italy and the Danubian countries. At the
time of the Potsdam Conference the United States was in an over­
whelming position of power. Stalin undersrood the meaning of power
and could have been persuaded to accept an Austrian treaty. With
rapid American demobilization aftet the close of hostilities , the power
equation in Europe changed drastically. The United States proposed
in February 1946 that the Austrian treaty be prepared along with the
other treaties , and Byrnes submitted a treaty draft to the CFM in
April "For the Reestablishment of an Independent and Democratic
Austria." Molotov was unwilling to discuss it. Byrnes argued politely
but did not insist, and the occasion was lost . When the CFM decided
that Italian sovereignty should be restored on the conclusion of peace,
and foreign troops withdrawn, Molotov reluctantly agreed to with­
draw Soviet troops only ftom Bulgaria.
The expectation for a speedy conclusion of the five peace treaties
proved to be an illusion. The first session of the CFM met in London
in September 1945 and ended in three weeks without accomplish­
ing its task. The council was unwilling to consider far-reaching Soviet
aspirations inJapan , the Mediterranean , and the Balkans, and Molo­
tov retaliated with procedural demands that the other participants
could not accept. After this failure, the definitive pattern of peace­
making was worked out in December 1945 at the Moscow meeting
of the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain. and the Soviet
Union. There rhe Big Three resolved that draft treaties prepared by
the foreign ministers on the basis of the 4- 3-2 formula should be sub­
mitted to a conference consisting of the five members of the council
and the sixteen other Allied nations that had fought in Europe with
substantial contingents. The conference was to meet in Paris not later
than May 1. 1946, to discuss the draft treaties, express opinions, and
make recommendations. The Soviet government had opposed a peace
conference with wider jurisdiction and would have preferred a peace
settlement exclusively by the Big Three. After the conference riruals ,
the council was to establish the final text of the treaties and forward
them to the other victorious and ex-enemy states.
At the insistence of the Wesrern governments it was decided rhat
adequate opportuniry should be given to the ex-enemy states to
discuss the treaties and present their views at the Paris Conference.
France was particularly anxious to avoid even the appearance of dicta­
tion , in view of its experiences with "dictated" peace treaties after the
First World War.
The deputy foreign ministers began their deliberations in London
in Januray 1946. and the Council of Foreign Ministers held tWO ses-
XV II
sions in Paris. where the peace conference duly assembled at the end
of July 1946 and concluded its deliberations in mid-October.
Prepa rat ions for peace in postwar Hungary were made difficu lt by
the heritage of the past, the Soviet occupation and restrictions of the
armistice agreement , and the lack of agreement among the coalition
parties on peace aims. Within one generation Hungary found itself
on the losing side in two cataclysmic world wars. After the First
World War the Peace Treaty of Trianon had shifted large territories
with three million ethnic Hungarians-almost one-third of the Hun­
garian nation - to neighboring states , and in the ensuing situation a
revisionist policy hindered friendly relations with those countries.
The tWO Vienna awards delivered by Germany and Italy in 1938 and
1940 returned to Hungary some of these territories from Czechoslova­
kia and Rumania; Hungarian trOOpS occupied Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia
in March 1939 and Yugoslav rerritories in April 1941, following the
German agg ression on Yugoslavia and the declaration of Croatian in­
dependence . The armistice agreement ofJanuary 20. 1945. then obli­
gated Hungary to evacuate all Hungarian troops and officials within
the fro nt iers existing on Decem ber 31, 1937.
Although Hungary as an ex-enemy state was not a partner at the
peace negotiations . peace preparatory notes between July 1945 and
May 1946 presented Hungarian views and proposals concerning the
futu re of the Danubian nations. The notes were addressed to
representatives of the three Great Powers in Budapest and subse­
quently were submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers and the
Paris Conference. The nOtes disapproved the antagonistic relations in
Danubian Europe and emphasized the need of close economic and
cultural cooperation and political reconciliation of neighboring na­
tions and made specific proposals in these fields . These "peace aim"
notes posed the general problems of Danubian Europe in construc­
ti ve te rms, advocating regional economic reorganization, freedom of
navigation on the Danube and revival of international control over
the river, deemphasis of narrow nationalism. "spiritualization" of
frontie r~, self-determination of peoples, and protection of national
mmOflues.
But duri ng the armistice period Hungarian sovereignty was subor­
dinated to the Soviet-dominated Allied Control Commission (ACC).
The Soviet envoy in Budapest. Georgi]. Pushkin. expressed dissatis­
faction with the Hungarian proposals . In countries under Soviet occu­
pation, Russia n policy was nO t the reconciliation of nations but "divide
an d rule ." When Philip E. Mosely. a member of the American dele­
gation at the Paris Conference . later appraised the volumes published
XVUl
BETWEEN RUSS IA AN D TH E WEST
INTR O D UCT IO N
in 1947 by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on peace preparations and
the Conference of Paris , he concluded that
ian government was forced to conclude a population exchange agree­
ment with Czechoslovakia in February 1946. Through this exchange ,
as well as expulsions and persecution , over 90 ,000 Hungarians left
Czechoslovakia for Hungary.
Peacemaking in 1945-47 was not much more than recasting the ar­
mistice agreements into peace treaties . This implied the recognition
of an unprecedented division of the Old Continent, an iron curtain
that still exists throughout Central Europe. Soviet troops remained in
Hungary and Rumania to maintain the lines of communication with
the Soviet zone in Austria . While geography played an important
role in military decisions, it is true that Britain and the United States
did not have vital economic or other interests in any East European
or Danubian country , and this fact influenced their wartime and
postwar policies. Yet the shift to Russia's Eutope of a substantial part
of the continent with over a hundred million people , affected their
power position, greatly reducing the rim land necessary for the de­
fense of the Western world .
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and American troops in
Europe later reestablished a military balance , which in more recent
years has been perilously affected by new weapons systems and rap­
idly changing military technology . Despite this gloomy picrure, as an
optimist by nature I do not agree with doomsday predictions. I hope
that the precarious military balance and the makeshift postwar ar­
rangements will be replaced one day by a worldwide cooperative state
system for the benefit of alJ mankind. Although human folly has few
limits , it seems futi le to contemplate the alternative to negotiated
settlement on the basis of self-determination of peoples and respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms . For centuries war was
considered diplomacy by other means. In our time, the military
resolution of a major international conflict would almost inevitably
result in the mutual suicide of the superpowers , atomic devastation
of the northern hemisphere with far-reaching global side-effects and
with benefit to no one .
The general impression left by the three volumes so far published is
that the Hungarian government had prepared its case with care on the
assumption that the issu es would be treated on their meri ts by the
Great Powers , all of them concerned primarily with promoting peace
and stability in the Danubian region . In the procedural and substan­
tive tussles of the Paris Conference this assumption proved ill­
founded. The struggle over the formal terms of the treaty was merdy
one aspect of a more general struggle to extend or confine Soviet
power in Europe . In that struggle Hungary had linle
much
to
to
hope for and
fear .)
By the time the peace conference convened in Paris, the Council
of Foreign Ministers had formulated most provisions of the peace
treaties , and members of the council were obligated to suppOrt them
at the conference table . Consider the result for Hungary in connec­
tion with its territorial claims on Rumania. Transylvania had been a
major bone of contention during the war and in the armistice period.
Despite Soviet encouragement given to postwar political leaders in
Budapest concerning Hungary's territorial claim in Transylvania, at
the London session of the CFM the Soviet delegation was unwilling
to consider an American proposal even to study the possibility of a
modest revision of the Hungarian-Rumanian boundary along ethnic
lines. In view of the unyielding Soviet opposition, Secretary Byrnes,
in a period of East-West concessions in May 1946, proposed in the
CFM the reestablishment of the Trianon boundary between Hungary
and Rumania.
The greatest immediate threat to Hungarian interests at the Paris
Conference was a Czechoslovak proposal for the expulsion of 200,000
Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. Since the proposal was an amend­
ment to the draft treaty accepted by the CFM , only a unanimous ap­
proval of the Big Three would have made possible its inclusion in the
treaty. The United States opposed the punishment of an ethnic group
on the basis of collective responsibility , and in the last stage of the
debates Great Britain joined American opposition . The peace treaty,
instead of the original amendment , obligated Hungary to enter into
bilateral negotiations with Prague to solve the problem of Magyar in­
habitants of Slovakia. This incident was one of the consequences of
the Czechoslovak policy of expelling all non-Slavic inhabitants. In
the spirit of Hitlerite legislation, Hungarians were deprived of their
citizenship, of all political and elementary human rights, and they
were persecuted by a series of administrative measures. The Hungar-
XIX