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Table of Contents
Conflict Factsheet
Dispute over Water in the Nile Basin............................................................................................... 2
Disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)....................................................11
Security Implications of Growing Water Scarcity in Egypt...........................................................19
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Conflict Factsheet
Dispute over Water in the Nile Basin
Type of conflict
Intensity
Main
1
Conflict Locality
Time
Africa
1944 –ongoing
Countries
Resources
S. Sudan, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Uganda, Congo (Kinshasa), Egypt, Sudan
Agricultural / Pastoral Land, Water
Livelihood
insecurity
and migration
Sea-level rise
and coastal
degradation
Conflict Summary
The Nile basin features significant conflict over access and rights to the Nile water resources among
its eleven riparian countries. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), founded by 9 out of 10 riparian countries
in 1999 with backing from major donor institutions, has achieved some successes in its attempts to
strengthen cooperation. Yet, since 2007, diverging interests between upstream and downstream countries
have brought the negotiations on a Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) to a standstill, pitting
Egypt (and to a lesser extent Sudan) against upstream riparians, especially Ethiopia. In 2015, trilateral
negotiations between these three countries on a major dam under construction in Ethiopia led to a
framework agreement that may in time prepare the ground for a broader agreement.
Water-stressed Area
Power Differential
Political Transition
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Agricultural / Pastoral Land, Water
Context Factors
Conceptual Model
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Conflict History
The Nile, though probably the longest river on the planet, moves only limited amounts of water. The
region’s demographic and economic growth and the need to sustain the livelihoods of hundreds of millions
of people have put increasing pressure on a river basin shared by eleven countries. Although cooperation
within the basin has made significant progress, it is still overshadowed by a fundamental conflict between
upstream riparians insisting on their right to develop their water resources, which could significantly
impact downstream river flows, and Egypt striving to maintain current downstream flows. Tensions came
to a high-point in 2011 when Ethiopia announced the construction of a 6.000 MW hydroelectric dam on the
Blue Nile - the main tributary of the Nile basin (see Dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam).
Description of the Nile basin
The Nile basin, including its main tributaries the White Nile and the Blue Nile, is shared by eleven countries,
namely Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The White Nile originates in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.
It flows north through Tanzania, Uganda and South Sudan. The Blue Nile begins in Ethiopia and flows
into Sudan from the southeast. The two rivers meet near the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, from which
the Nile flows through the Sudanese desert to Egypt. With a length of approximately 6.700 km, the Nile,
together with the Amazon River, occupies the top spot on the list of the world’s longest rivers. However,
in relative terms, it does not transport much water: approx. 84 billion cubic meters per year (BCM/year)
as compared, for example, to 5.518 BCM/year for the Amazon and 1.250 BCM/year for the Congo River
(Swain, 2011). Moreover, the Nile is characterized by strong inter-annual flow variation as the greatest part
of its water comes from highly variable, monsoon-driven rain on the Ethiopian highlands.
Upstream ambitions
Throughout the 20th century, economic constraints, external pressures and internal strife have precluded
upstream countries of the Nile basin from developing their water resources, allowing Egypt to take full
advantage of downstream water flow. However, upstream countries have experienced considerable
population growth, economic development and political consolidation over the last decade. They have also
profited from geopolitical changes in the form of alternative sources of capital for major infrastructure
investments (IDS, 2013). Facing improved opportunities to harness their water resources, but also
an increased demand for energy and arable surfaces, these countries have embarked on ambitious
development projects along the Nile and its tributaries (Link et al., 2012).
Within this group of countries, Ethiopia holds a particularly important position, as the Ethiopian highlands
provide nearly 86% of the Nile’s water (Swain, 2011). Confronted with rising population numbers and a
fast growing economy (on average almost 8% over the last 8 years), the country has the incentive and the
means for developing its largely untapped potential for hydro-energy and irrigation (Gebreluel, 2014).
While current water development plans in Ethiopia and other upstream countries require only a small
portion of the Nile’s water, the prospects for increased water utilisation in the near future raise serious
concerns among the downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan (Pearce, 2015; Link et al., 2012; Swain,
2011).
Downstream efforts to protect the status quo
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Owing to increasing population numbers, the water needs of downstream countries are also rising.
This pertains especially to Egypt, where water consumption could reach almost 87 BCM/year in 2025
(Farrag, 2005). As Egypt receives only very limited amounts of rain, it is highly dependent on irrigation by
the Nile for sustaining its agricultural production. It therefore opposes any upstream project that could
reduce downstream river flow. While the construction of hydro-power facilities on the Nile tributaries does
not necessarily lead to lower downstream flows, the government of Egypt is nevertheless worried that
upstream damming projects might open avenues for irrigation projects and water diversion in the future
(Swain, 2011; Link et al., 2012).
Egypt’s distrust of upstream development projects is further compounded by its loss of political influence.
For most of the last century, Egypt has occupied a hegemonic position within the Nile basin, using its
economic, military and political power to prevent upstream development projects. But this is set to change.
As other riparian countries are catching up economically and Egypt is facing internal conflict, power in the
Nile basin is gradually shifting southwards. This makes it harder for Egypt to counterbalance its vulnerable
position as a downstream country (IDS, 2013; Gebreluel, 2014).
In view of the 2011 uprising, there are also fears that significant reductions in downstream flow and
resulting dents in agricultural production could compromise Egypt’s political stability and lead to further
insecurity in the region (see Security implications of growing water scarcity in Egypt).
The role of Sudan
As the second major downstream country in the Nile basin, Sudan has traditionally sided with Egypt
against upstream development projects and both countries are bound by a treaty of 1959 to act in
concert on Nile water issues. Like its northern neighbour, Sudan is highly dependent on the Nile’s flow for
sustaining its economic development and growing population (Swain, 2011). Yet, the country is likely to
benefit from cooperating with Ethiopia and harnessing its own water resources along the Blue Nile. Given
the weakened position of Egypt, this could incite Sudan to realign with its upstream neighbours (Cascão,
2009; Link et al., 2012; Hussein, 2014).
One additional complication has arisen since 2011 from the independence of South Sudan, the new,
eleventh basin riparian. Its territory, which includes an enormous wetland area called the Sudd, has long
been seen by Egypt as a potential source of additional water. Currently, some 20 BCM of White Nile water
evaporate there, which could be drastically reduced by channelling the Nile. The gigantic Jonglei canal,
begun in the 1980s and never completed, was an attempt to generate additional water, but its expected
huge environmental and social costs were among the grievances that led to the renewed outbreak of civil
war in the 1980s. The position of the South Sudanese government on such efforts is currently reluctant,
but Cairo is intensifying diplomatic relations with Juba in view of harnessing lost water resources on the
White Nile (Salman, 2011; Aman, 2014; see The Role of Water Resources in the Sudan-South Sudan Peace
Process).
The role of climate change
The situation in the Nile basin is further complicated by high uncertainties regarding future water
availability. Detailed climatic predictions vary across emission scenarios and employed models, but
experts generally agree that the Nile region will experience further warming, with higher increases in
the north of the basin than in the south (Elshamy, Sayed & Badawy, 2009; Kim & Kaluarachchi, 2009).
Ceteris paribus, warmer temperatures will increase irrigation needs. Moreover, sea-level rise is going to
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put pressure on agriculture in the Nile delta, Egypt’s bread basket. Due to intensive irrigation, the Nile’s
environmental flows are already very limited, contributing to salinization and making the delta more
vulnerable to seawater intrusion with detrimental effects on agricultural productivity.
On the other hand, changes in precipitation are harder to predict and the results of existent studies remain
inconclusive (see Link et al., 2012; Niang, Ruppel, Abdrabo et al., 2014). As a result of higher temperatures
and evaporation, total runoff in the Nile basin could decline by the end of the century. Yet, this effect could
be compensated by growing precipitations and the cooling effect of increased humidity and an expanded
cloud cover (Elshamy, Seierstadt & Sorteberg, 2009; Conway & Hulme, 1993). While the future effect of
climate change on the Nile basin remains uncertain, the possibility of a further reduction in Nile flows
currently looms over the relations between riparian countries.
Resolution Efforts
The Nile Basin Initiative
In an effort to find a mutually acceptable basis for cooperation in the Nile basin, the riparians
established the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999, an intergovernmental partnership with the objective of
developing 'the river in a cooperative manner, sharing substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promoting
regional peace and security' (NBI, 2015). External third parties, especially the World Bank, played a crucial
role in bringing all riparian countries together, and almost all basin states joined the NBI, except for Eritrea
which has an observer status. Most riparians were motivated by the expectation that a cooperative
framework would facilitate substantial investments in large (hydraulic) infrastructure projects in the basin.
Rather than focusing primarily on the highly divisive issue of water allocation, the NBI was purposely set up
with a complementary investment programme based on benefit-sharing (Mekonnen, 2010). The NBI was
conceived as a transitional institution until the negotiations around a permanent Cooperative Framework
Agreement (CFA) could be finalized and a durable institution created. The CFA aimed to be inclusive of
all the Nile riparians, deciding on principles, structures and institutions to jointly govern the Nile water
resources (Swain, 2011; Mekonnen, 2010).
A political deadlock?
Despite more than 10 years of negotiations, this objective has still not been reached. Since 2007, an ongoing dispute over the CFA has brought the negotiations in the Nile basin to a stalemate. The essence
of the dispute is about whether or not the CFA should recognise current water use of the downstream
countries and colonial-era treaties, specifically an agreement between Egypt and Sudan from 1959, which
precludes upstream countries from developing their water resources without the consent of downstream
countries. Whereas downstream countries have been insisting on an explicit recognition of what they
consider their historic water use and rights, upstream countries vehemently oppose these treaties,
to which they were not sovereign parties (Mekonnen 2010; Swain, 2011). More recently, downstream
countries have appealed to the more moderate principle of the “obligation not to cause significant
harm” from Article 7 in the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, whereas upstream countries emphasize the principle of “equitable use”, also derived from
the same UN convention (Gebreluel, 2014).
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Whilst Egypt, and intermittently Sudan, withdrew from the NBI in 2010 in protest against the decision by
upstream countries to start the ratification of the CFA in the absence of agreement on a 'water security'
clause, the multilateral cooperation among the other riparian countries continues. However, unilateral
developments of water projects continue in parallel, with a potentially negative effect on the prospects of a
comprehensive agreement (IDS, 2013; Link et al., 2012; Pearce, 2015).
Mediation and negotiations
There have been various attempts by both the riparian countries and third parties such as the World Bank,
the USA, the EU and Switzerland to overcome the CFA stalemate and to re-engage Egypt (and Sudan).
These included both formal high-level talks in 2011 and informal talks at ministerial level. A lot of work has
focused on finding an alternative formulation to the most contentious article of the CFA. In March 2015,
Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia signed a declaration of principles on the disputed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam (GERD), which may pave the way towards broader cooperation.
Negotiations between the leaders of up- and downstream countries are nevertheless constrained by
domestic pressures and the highly symbolic nature of the dispute over the Nile waters. On one hand,
the river holds a special and entrenched role in the history and identity of many Egyptians. On the other
hand, the recent capacity of upstream countries to utilise the Nile waters epitomises their emergence
from years of political and economic marginalisation. The GERD in particular has taken on a significant
role in Ethiopian ‘nation-building’ (see GERD case). The dispute over the Nile is therefore a ‘political
minefield’ where overly generous concessions might encounter strong domestic opposition (Gebreluel,
2014). Beyond the ‘core conflict’ between Egypt and Ethiopia, there is also a regional political struggle for
allegiance and a leadership position. Ethiopia has managed to unite the African upstream countries (which
also resented Egyptian dominance) in support of its position on ratifying the CFA in spite of Egyptian
opposition and invested significant political capital. This makes it anything but easy to find a solution that
would allow both Egypt and Ethiopia to claim victory and justify a putative compromise domestically.
Opportunities for basin wide cooperation
Despite these difficulties, opportunities for cooperation and more efficient use of the Nile’s water exist.
Water resources could be used more efficiently in a basin-wide approach, where the riparian countries take
full advantage of economic integration and comparative advantages in natural and societal conditions (e.g.
more efficient hydro energy production in Ethiopia and better conditions for agriculture in Sudan paired
with the financial investment capabilities of Egypt) (Whittington et al., 2014). This way, evaporation losses
could be avoided by storing water in cooler regions upstream, rather than in downstream desert regions.
The Egyptian economy could shift from agriculture to other sectors, thereby reducing its dependency on
the Nile’s water (see Link et al., 2012; IDS, 2013). Moreover, Ethiopian hydro-power could provide muchneeded energy to Egypt, whose demands are bound to rise, not least for air conditioning in order to counter
increasingly ferocious heat waves.
However, increased regional integration also requires trust building measures and the credible
commitment of all basin countries in order to promote mutually beneficial inter-dependencies.
Furthermore, civil society actors need to have a say in basin-wide development strategies as dam
construction and irrigation projects along the Nile and its tributaries are certain to have important
implications for riparian ecosystems and the livelihoods of local communities living along the river banks
(Kameri-Mbote, 2007; Hussein, 2014). Third parties might be able to support this process by facilitating
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a multi-track negotiation that allows (key) basin governments to identify mutually beneficial solutions,
and/or to extend various types of guarantees to these governments (Subramanian, Brown, & Wolf, 2012).
This could be supported by targeted investments that assess, or underpin, the realization of cooperative
ventures and which support informed transnational debate on this issue.
Intensities & Influences
Resolution Success
Reduction in geographical scope
INTENSITIES
There has been no reduction in geographical scope.
International / Geopolitical Intensity
Increased capacity to address grievance in the future
Human Suffering
The capacity to address grievances in the future has
increased.
INFLUENCES
Grievance Resolution
Grievances have been partially addressed.
Environmental Influences
Causal Attribution of Decrease in Conflict Intensity
Societal Influences
Diplomatic Crisis
Note of diplomatic crisis in case history, conflict purely
verbal
Fatalities
0
Violent Conflict
No
Mass displacement
None
Cross Border Mass Displacement
No
Conflict resolution strategies have been clearly responsible
for the decrease in conflict intensity.
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Conflict Resolution Strategies
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE CONFLICT
Increased coordination
The strategy is an important part of the conflict resolution process
2
Reduction in conflict potential of scarcity through better management
institutions
The strategy is present, but only attempted weakly
1
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADAPTATION
Reduction in scarcity through changed resource consumption habits
This strategy is applicable because a shift from agriculture could effectively
reduce demand for water, as shown by <a href="https://www.cairn.info/
revue-l-europe-en-formation-2012-3-page-99.htm">Link et al., 2012</
a>.
0
Shift of livelihood bases
This strategy is applicable because agricultural livelihoods are being threatened
by dam building.
0
THIRD PARTY TOOLS
External Support for Capacity Building
The strategy is present, but only attempted weakly
1
Peacemaking / Mediation
The strategy is present, but only attempted weakly
1
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Resources and Materials
Conflict References
Disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
The Role of Water Resources in the Sudan-South Sudan Peace Process
Security Implications of Growing Water Scarcity in Egypt
References with URL
Aman, A. (2014). Egypt tries to woo South Sudan in Nile water dispute
Cascão, A. (2009). Changing Power Relations in the Nile River Basin: Unilateralism vs. Cooperation? Water Alternatives 2(2). 245-268
Conway, D. & Hulme, M. (1993). Recent fluctuations in precipitation and runoff over the Nile sub-basins and their impact on main Nile
discharge. Climatic Change 25(2). 127-151
Elshamy, M.E., Sayed, A. & Badawy, B. (2009). Impacts of Climate Change on the Nile Flows at Dongola Using Statistical Downscaled
GCM Scenarios. Nile Basin Water Engineering Scientific Magazine 2. 1-14
Elshamy, M.E., Seierstadt, I.A. & Sorteberg, A. (2009). Impacts of climate change on Blue Nile flows using bias-corrected GCM
scenarios. Hydrol. Earth Syst. 13(5). 551-565
Farrag, A.A. (2005). The hydraulic and hydrochemical impacts of the Nile system on the groundwater in upper Egypt. Ass. Univ. Bull.
Environ. Res. 8(1). 87-102
Gebreluel, G. (2014). Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa's Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry? The Washington Quarterly 37(2).
25-37
Hussein, H. (2014). Egypt and Ethiopia spar over the Nile
IDS (2013). Churning waters: Strategic shifts in the Nile basin
Kameri-Mbote, P. (2007). Navigating Peace. Water, Conflict, and Cooperation: Lessons from the Nile River Basin
Kim, U. & Kaluarachchi, J.J. (2009). Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources in the Upper Blue Nile River Basin, Ethiopia. Journal
of the American Water Resources Association 45(6). 1361-1378
Link, P.M., Piontek, F., Scheffran, J. & Schilling, J. (2012). On Foes and Flows: Vulnerabilities, Adaptive Capacities and Transboundary
Relations in the Nile River Basin in Times of Climate Change. L'Europe en Formation 365(3). 99-138
Mekonnen, D.Z. (2010). The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a ‘Water Security’
Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac? The European Journal of International Law 21(2). 421–440
NBI (2015). Nile Basin Initiative [2015-12-01]
Niang, I., O.C. Ruppel, M.A. Abdrabo, A. Essel, C. Lennard, J. Padgham, and P. Urquhart (2014). Africa. In: Climate Change 2014:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Barros, V.R., C.B. Field, D.J. Dokken, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, T.E. Bilir, M.
Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S., P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1199-1265
Pearce, F. (2015). On the River Nile, a Move to Avert a Conflict Over Water
Salman M.A.S. (2011). The new state of South Sudan and the hydro-politics of the Nile Basin. Water International 36(2). 154-166
Subramanian, A., Brown, B. & Wolf A. (2012). Reaching across the waters. Facing the risks of cooperation in international waters
Swain, A. (2011). Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate. Hydrological Science
Journal 56(4). 687-702
Whittington, D., Waterbury, J., & Jeuland, M. (2014). The grand renaissance dam and prospects for cooperation on the eastern nile.
Water Policy, 16(4), 595-608
Further information
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Conflict Factsheet
Disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
Type of conflict
Intensity
Sub
1
Conflict Locality
Time
Ethiopia
2011 –ongoing
Countries
Resources
Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan
Water
Livelihood
insecurity
and migration
Sea-level rise
and coastal
degradation
Conflict Summary
There has long been a conflict over water rights among the riparian countries of the Eastern Nile Basin
(Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia). The dispute has escalated in recent years due to a shift in the balance of
power and Ethiopia's decision in 2011 to announce the construction of a major new dam, the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), in the absence of any agreement with downstream Egypt.
Whereas the last Egyptian government responded with belligerent rhetoric, the new Egyptian government
has embraced trilateral negotiation (including Sudan) that have, in March 2015, resulted in a framework
agreement.
Water
Context Factors
Conceptual Model
Water-stressed Area
Food Insecurity
History of Conflict
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Conflict History
The Eastern Nile Basin comprises Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The crucial leverage regarding Egypt’s water
security lies with the Blue Nile countries Ethiopia and Sudan, as the Blue Nile is the main contributor to the
Nile River’s flow downstream. In fact, about 85 % of the overall Nile flow originates on Ethiopian territory
(Swain, 2011). Ethiopia's determination to build a major new dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
(GERD), for hydropower purposes has been the flashpoint of current conflicts in the Eastern Nile Basin
(Gebreluel, 2014).
Geopolitical importance
The Eastern Nile Basin is of critical geopolitical importance to the Nile’s overall hydro-political regime. The
Blue Nile is Ethiopia’s largest river, with high potential for hydropower and irrigation. Ethiopia argues that
developing this resource is crucial to its economic development, and to overcoming poverty and famine,
that have plagued the country in the past. Ethiopia has the basin’s most suitable locations for hydropower
production, and its damming of the Blue Nile would significantly increase Sudan's potential for irrigated
agriculture. Ethiopia has never 'consumed' significant shares of the Nile’s water so far, as its previous
political and economic fragility in combination with a lack of external financial support, due to persistent
Egyptian opposition to projects upstream, prevented it from implementing large-scale projects. This
has now changed due to political consolidation over the past two decades and the advent of alternative
sources of external finance (to the traditional multilateral development banks), not least from China (IDS,
2013; Gebreluel, 2014).
Non-cooperative parallel developments
Ethiopia and Sudan are currently developing and implementing water infrastructure developments
unilaterally - as Egypt has done in the past and continues to do. These parallel developments appear to
be elements of a bigger hydro-political strategy wherein the riparian countries aim to increase their water
utilization to put facts on the ground (and underpin legal claims based on those uses) and increase their
bargaining position for renegotiations of volumetric water allocations. However, this threatens the basin's
long-term sustainability (as water use expands beyond what is environmentally feasible) and suboptimal in
terms of capital allocation (as higher water use upstream may make downstream projects uneconomical
(Swain, 2011).
The 1959 Agreement: an asymmetrical water-sharing arrangement
As stipulated by an Agreement of 1959 (see: Nile Main Conflict), Egypt and Sudan presented for several
decades a common position vis-à-vis other riparians regarding the utilization and management of
Nile waters. Despite the fact that newly independent Sudan in the late 1950s was literally forced by a
dominant Egypt into a highly asymmetrical water-sharing arrangement, Sudan has rarely challenged this
arrangement. However, Sudan’s future water requirements will likely exceed its water quota as defined
in the 1959 Agreement. This represents a new challenge to the basin’s current hydro-political regime and
status quo, as it may drive Sudan’s interest in renegotiating its current quota (Link et al., 2012; Whittington
et al., 2014).
Ethiopia's challenge to the 1959 Agreement
The unilateral decision taken by Ethiopia - which never recognized the 1959 agreement but had previously
not been able to challenge it in fact - to build the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2011
represents a major political challenge to the 1959 Agreement. It signifies that Egypt’s de facto veto
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power on major upstream dams has been broken, and it clearly demonstrates the political will of Ethiopia
to develop its water infrastructure even in the absence of a comprehensive basin agreement. Political
instability in Egypt played an important role as the announcement of the project coincided with the
resignation of President Mubarak during the Arab Spring. Ethiopia’s interests in developing its water
resources are driven by its growing population and high demand for socio-economic development
(Gebreluel, 2014).
The GERD potential benefits and disadvantages
The GERD has the potential to act both as driver for conflict, but also for cooperation. It provides clear
benefits to all three riparian, such as flood control, reduced flood damages and sediment control.
Moreover, with GERD, Ethiopia opts for a “hydropower” expansion strategy on the Blue Nile, and not an
“irrigation strategy”. This is good news for Egypt and Sudan as hydropower means little actual water
withdrawal. However, it also entails potential negative effects on Egypt, if not carefully managed (see also
Security implications of growing water scarcity in Egypt). The filling regime and operational methods of
GERD will affect Egypt, in particular through its impact on the operation of its Aswan High Dam (AHD)
which aims at mitigating the high variability of the Nile River flow. The filling time is estimated to take
about 10 years, during which the Blue Nile water flows would be reduced. The 10 year filling time of GERD
will likely contribute to fastened salinization in Egypt. If it were to take place during a sequence of years
in which the Blue Nile flow and the AHD reservoir itself was low, Egypt might not be able to withdraw
sufficient water supplies to meet all of its agricultural needs. Moreover, after the completion of the GERD,
Egypt could run short of water if the operation of the GERD was not carefully coordinated with that of the
AHD. Lastly, over-year storage facilities upstream in Ethiopia will allow Sudan to increase its water use.
While this means new opportunities to develop extended irrigation-based agriculture for the Sudanese, it
represents also a new threat for Egypt’s’ current Nile water utilization (Whittington et al., 2014).
Resolutions efforts have recently led to encouraging results in terms of cooperation.
Resolution Efforts
After announcing the dam's construction, and with a view to the increasing tensions, the Ethiopian
government invited both Egypt and Sudan to form an International Panel of Experts (IPoE) to solicit
understanding of the benefits, costs and impacts of the GERD. The IPoE report recommended two studies
to assess the environmental and socio-economic impacts of GERD and was interpreted by both the
Egyptian and the Ethiopian government as a vindication of their respective positions. Despite several
tripartite meetings between November 2013 and January 2014, no agreement was reached on the
implementation of the IPoE recommendations and controversies were evolving around the constitution
of a trilateral committee. The change of government in Egypt led to a more conciliatory approach (Von
Lossow & Roll, 2015).
Egypt's new stance
Egypt’s original goal was to have the project purely and simply cancelled. Given the advancement of
the dam construction - the GERD being, as of March 2015, 40 percent complete, according to Ethiopia Egypt had good reason to reconsider its position (Nazaret, 2015). Tripartite negotiations resumed three
weeks after Al-Sisi took office in June 2014. Between August and October 2014, a tripartite National
Committee (TNC) was constituted, consisting of national experts. Rules of procedure of the TNC and
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Terms of References for two studies were agreed and an international tender organized. The study results
are expected for 2015. The new Egyptian government seems to deal with the dam more as a matter of
fact issue. Upon signing a framework agreement in March 2015, Al-Sisi and Ethiopian Prime Minister
Hailemariam Desalegn hailed the agreement as a 'new chapter in relations between Egypt and Ethiopia
… based on openness and mutual understanding and cooperation' (Nazaret, 2015).
Towards a political agreement
A political requirement will be to agree on rules for filling the GERD reservoir and on operating rules for the
GERD, especially during periods of drought. All three countries have a vested interest in a properly operated
dam. Egypt wants control and guarantees for its share of Nile waters. Ethiopia needs regional customers
for its hydropower to ensure the economic feasibility of the GERD. Sudan’s agricultural and hydropower
interests align with those of Ethiopia while it has a strong interest in not alienating its 'big brother' and
northern neighbour, Egypt, with whom it shares a long and partly contested border (Whittington et al.,
2014). The situation seemed to improve in the beginning of 2015 when tripartite negotiations were held
in order to determine principles of cooperation. In March 2015, a 'Declaration of Principles' was signed by
the leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, setting the foundations for an initial cooperation (Sudan Tribune,
2015a). This agreement could pave the way for a more detailed cooperation framework, and represents a
major step toward dispute resolution.
Significant hurdles still remain
However, there is still a lot of work ahead. The principles of cooperation have yet to be translated into
specific technical agreements on dam management (and more), in the context of difficult domestic politics
for both sides. Neither the Egyptian nor the Ethiopian leader received positive domestic feedback on
their agreement. Many historical grievances and distrust remain on the Ethiopian side regarding Egypt
(Gebreluel, 2014). Some Ethiopian journalists assess the 'declaration of principle' as being more in favour
of Egypt than Ethiopia (Zegabi East Africa News, 2015). On the other side, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
denounced a 'high treason' (Sudan Tribune, 2015b). The dispute, although deescalating, is therefore still
on-going between Egypt and Ethiopia, while Sudan has been acting as a mediator between the two states
(see Von Lossow & Roll, 2015).
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Intensities & Influences
Resolution Success
Reduction in geographical scope
INTENSITIES
There has been no reduction in geographical scope.
International / Geopolitical Intensity
Increased capacity to address grievance in the future
Human Suffering
The capacity to address grievances in the future has
increased.
INFLUENCES
Grievance Resolution
Grievances have been mostly addressed.
Environmental Influences
Causal Attribution of Decrease in Conflict Intensity
Societal Influences
Diplomatic Crisis
Note of diplomatic crisis in case history, conflict purely
verbal
Fatalities
0
Violent Conflict
No
Salience with nation
National
Mass displacement
None
Cross Border Mass Displacement
No
Conflict resolution strategies have been clearly responsible
for the decrease in conflict intensity.
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Conflict Resolution Strategies
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE CONFLICT
Increased coordination
Primary conflict resolution strategy
3
Reduction in conflict potential of scarcity through better management
institutions
The strategy is present, but only attempted weakly
1
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADAPTATION
Reduction in scarcity through (adoption of) technological innovation
Applicable, but not employed
0
Reduction in unequal access to resources
Applicable, but not employed
0
Compensation
Applicable, but not employed
0
THIRD PARTY TOOLS
Peacemaking / Mediation
Applicable, but not employed
0
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Resources and Materials
Conflict References
Dispute over Water in the Nile Basin
References with URL
Gebreluel, G. (2014). Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa's Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry? The Washington Quarterly 37(2).
25-37
IDS (2013). Churning waters: Strategic shifts in the Nile basin
Link, P.M., Piontek, F., Scheffran, J. & Schilling, J. (2012). On Foes and Flows: Vulnerabilities, Adaptive Capacities and Transboundary
Relations in the Nile River Basin in Times of Climate Change. L'Europe en Formation 365(3). 99-138
Sudan Tribune, 2015a
Nazaret, 2015
Sudan Tribune, 2015b
Swain, A. (2011). Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate. Hydrological Science
Journal 56(4). 687-702
Von Lossow, T. & Roll, S. (2015). Egypt’s Nile Water Policy under Sisi: Security Interests Promote Rapprochement with Ethiopia
Whittington, D., Waterbury, J., & Jeuland, M. (2014). The grand renaissance dam and prospects for cooperation on the eastern nile.
Water Policy, 16(4), 595-608
Zegabi East Africa News, 2015
Further information
https://factbook.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/eastern-nile-basin-dispute-over-millennium-dam-ethiopia
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Conflict Factsheet
Security Implications of Growing Water Scarcity in Egypt
Type of conflict
Intensity
Main
1.5
Conflict Locality
Time
Egypt
2013 –ongoing
Countries
Resources
Egypt
Water
Volatile food
prices and
provision
Conflict Summary
Egypt is currently using more water than its internal renewable resources, mainly based on Nile fresh
water inflows, supply. Water stress in Egypt is expected to further increase in the future as a result of rapid
population growth, rising temperatures and increasing water consumption in Egypt and other Nile basin
countries. If not properly dealt with, growing water scarcity will put severe strains on Egypt’s economy and
make the country more vulnerable to renewed internal strife.
Water
Context Factors
Water-stressed Area
Overreliance on Specific Supplies
Dysfunctional Resource Management
Inadequate Infrastructure
Political Transition
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Conflict History
Egypt is currently using more water than its internal renewable resources supply and is expected to use
even more water in the near future. According to the Egyptian statistics agency CAPMAS, the country’s per
capita water resources have fallen from 2,526m3/year in 1947 to less than 700m3/year in 2013, which is
well below the 1,000m3/year threshold deemed necessary by the United Nations to provide enough water
for drinking, agriculture and nutrition (Masr, 2014). This trend is expected to continue, leading to a possible
figure of less than 350m3/year by 2050 (see UNEP, 2014).
Similarly, aggregate water consumption is expected to increase by more than 20% in the next few years
(El-Gindy, 2011; MWRI, 2014), while upstream development projects on the Nile risk to reduce the amount
of water flowing down to Egypt. As a result of growing water scarcity, Egypt could face rising food
insecurity and unemployment, which, in turn, could revive anti-state grievances or even lead to political
instability in the Nile basin region (See Dispute over water in the Nile basin).
Growing demand for water
In Egypt, rapid population growth increases water stress by augmenting water requirements for domestic
consumption and increased irrigation water use to meet higher food demands (Dakkak, 2016). Egypt has
one of the highest population growth rates in the Middle East. Between 1970 and 2001 the number of
people living in the country has doubled from 35.3 million to 69.8 million and is expected to reach about
100 million by 2020 (Roudi-Fahimi, et. al., 2002; UNEP, 2014).
Although Egypt is already importing the major part of the food it consumes, rising population numbers are
contributing to an intensification of water use for domestic crop production, which accounts for nearly 86%
of water withdrawals (ci:graps, 2015; Power, 2014). Water demand is also expected to increase as a result
of ambitious projects to expand agriculture, industrial activities and urban centres into the Egyptian desert
(see Swain, 2011; El Bedawy, 2014). Mismanagement and degradation of water resources
Wasteful irrigation practices, deficient water delivery infrastructures and pollution are additional factors
reducing the amount of available water in Egypt. Only 6% of total irrigated areas use improved irrigation
systems. This places Egypt at the bottom 10% of MENA countries in terms of irrigation efficiency (Soussa,
2010; Power, 2014). In fact, it is estimated that most of Egypt’s irrigation systems operate at only 50%
efficiency (El-Gindy, 2011). Additional water is lost due to leaking pipes and drains (IRIN, 2011). Due to a lack of water treatment
facilities and lax regulations, agricultural runoffs containing pesticides, industrial effluents and untreated
sewage are being dumped in the Nile River, making its water gradually unfit for human consumption
(Dakkak, 2016; El Bedawy, 2014).
Upstream development projects
In addition to these internal pressures, water availability in Egypt could also be reduced by external factors,
such as the diversion of Nile water by upstream countries of the Nile basin, which are eager to harness
their potential for hydropower and irrigated agriculture. Given that the Nile provides almost 97% of Egypt’s
water, such development could affect Egypt’s water security in a significant way (See Dispute over water in
the Nile basin and Dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam).
Water resources under a changing climate
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Detailed climatic predictions vary across emission scenarios and employed models, but experts generally
agree that the Nile region and Egypt in particular will experience further warming, thus increasing irrigation
needs (Elshamy, Sayed & Badawy, 2009; Kim & Kaluarachchi, 2009; UNEP, 2014). Moreover, sea-level rise
is going to put pressure on agriculture and water resources in the Nile delta, home to more than 35 million
people and providing 63% of Egypt’s agricultural production (World Bank 2014). Due to intensive irrigation,
the Nile’s environmental flows are already very limited, contributing to salinization and making the delta
more vulnerable to seawater intrusion with detrimental effects on agricultural productivity and local water
resources.
Possible security implications
Agriculture accounts for 14.5% of GDP as well as for most youth employment in Egypt (CIA, 2015; Amin,
2014). Given that water is an essential agricultural input and in view of the fact that food price inflation and
youth unemployment were among the major grievances expressed in the 2011 uprising, scarcity-induced
agricultural downturns risk plunging the Egyptian state into a serious crisis of legitimacy (Reiter, 2015).
Dwindling water resources may further aggravate existing grievances related to deficient water
infrastructures, limited transparency and accountability in the water sector, as well as unequal distribution
of water (c.f. Cunningham, 2012). Recent years have already seen numerous violent and non-violent
protests in response to water shortages, excessive water pollution and water-intensive land reclamation
projects in the Egyptian desert (Swain, 2011; IRIN, 2010; Pacific Institute, 2015). Such protest could
intensify as available water resources are further depleted.
Eventually, water scarcity and political instability in Egypt may affect the entire Nile basin, whether as an
unintended effect of Egyptian instability or as a result of a deliberate exercise of blame deflection: the
Egyptian government may perceive fewer political risks in blaming or even punishing upstream countries
for the situation than in attempting to reform Egypt’s water sector in line with what is environmentally
sustainable (See Dispute over water in the Nile basin).
Resolution Efforts
Mounting water scarcities in Egypt have attracted the attention of various actors. The Egyptian Ministry of
Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) is mainly responsible for water allocation, but other bodies such
as the ministries of agriculture, environment or health also have important responsibilities with regard to
water allocation and water quality. In cooperation with international donors - in particular the World Bank and the private sector they are currently working on regulating water demand and improving water supply
(El Bedawy, 2014).
Reducing unnecessary losses
In an effort to limit wasteful irrigation practices, the Egyptian government is introducing innovative
techniques to surface irrigation such as land levelling, gated pipes or canal lining. These have the potential
to increase irrigation efficiency, but need to be backed by tedious interventions and firm policies (see
CEDARE, 2011; UNEP, 2014). On the other hand, efforts to reduce unnecessary losses at the household
level, for example by investing in water saving devices or introducing an efficient metering system and
applying rising tariffs to encourage users to save water, remain yet limited (UNEP, 2014). Technical
measures in the water sector are complemented by a public awareness program directed by the ‘Water
Communication Unit’ of the MWRI. The program promotes water saving in irrigation and domestic
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uses and informs citizens about the importance of water conservation via regular newsletters, media
announcements and public awareness campaigns (El Bedawy, 2014).
Improving water supply and quality
On the supply side, the Egyptian government has prepared a strategy for increasing the treatment and
reuse of drainage and waste water (UNEP, 2014). Yet, there are important obstacles: high treatment
costs, lack of political commitment and lack of public acceptance/awareness: due to important data gaps
and limited information many Egyptians are suspicious as of the quality of treated water (Abdel-Shafy
& Mohamed-Mansour, 2013). Egypt’s capacities for water reuse thus remain limited in comparison with
other MENA countries (Jeuland, 2015).
In addition, the government is attempting to curb water pollution in order to increase the amount of usable
water resources. Yet, outside the MWRI and the Ministry of State for the Environment, water quality
control is generally not a top priority in the different ministries and their departments dealing with the
issue often lack internal support. Moreover, the ministry of the environment has only limited influence in
the water sector and, more generally, few resources (about 0.4% of public expenditures) are devoted to
environmental protection (Luzi, 2010; UNEP, 2014).
Information and coordination challenges
Besides these measures, addressing Egypt’s water issues will also require a concerted effort of relevant
government bodies and the active participation of water users. Despite promises of improving cooperation,
mandates and objectives differ considerably across ministries. Organisational routines as well as conflicts
of interest between sectors and levels of government - prioritizing political stability or particular interest
groups - often challenge the MWRI’s ability to design and implement sustainable water development
strategies (Luzi, 2010).
Moreover, coordination between stakeholders is hampered by important data and information gaps
(UNEP, 2014). Data is collected over distant intervals and only for a few indicators. Data on municipal and
industrial water use is seldom accurate and water losses within distribution networks are hard to quantify.
Moreover, collected data is often not disseminated among different stakeholders, which constrains the
development of comprehensive water development plans (El Bedawy, 2014).
Need for increased cooperation with other Nile basin countries
Given that the large majority of Egypt’s water resources originate outside its territory, Egypt’s relations with
upstream Nile countries play a major part in any effort to address current and future water scarcity. There
are opportunities for improving the efficiency of basin wide infrastructures and increasing the yield of the
Nile, for example by completing the construction of a large canal through the South Sudanese Sudd, where
an important amount of water is lost to evaporation (UNEP, 2014; El Bedawy, 2014). A further benefit
from increased cooperation could be the transition to water saving crops, while importing more water
demanding crops from upstream countries, which can produce them more efficiently (UNEP, 2014; Reiter,
2015). In view of recent tensions between Egypt and its upstream neighbours, such measures will however
require a considerable diplomatic effort (See Dispute over water in the Nile basin).
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Intensities & Influences
Resolution Success
Reduction in geographical scope
INTENSITIES
There has been no reduction in geographical scope.
International / Geopolitical Intensity
Increased capacity to address grievance in the future
Human Suffering
The capacity to address grievances in the future has
increased.
INFLUENCES
Grievance Resolution
Grievances have been partially addressed.
Environmental Influences
Causal Attribution of Decrease in Conflict Intensity
Societal Influences
Manifest Crisis
Political Instability
Fatalities
0
Violent Conflict
Yes
Salience with nation
Regional
Mass displacement
None
Cross Border Mass Displacement
No
There has been no reduction in intensity
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Conflict Resolution Strategies
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE CONFLICT
Increased coordination
The strategy is present, but only attempted weakly
1
Reduction in conflict potential of scarcity through better management
institutions
The strategy is present, but only attempted weakly
1
REDUCING FRAGILITY AND INCREASING RESILIENCE
State Capacity Improvement
The strategy is an important part of the conflict resolution process
2
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADAPTATION
Reduction in scarcity through (adoption of) technological innovation
Primary conflict resolution strategy
3
Reduction in scarcity through changed resource consumption habits
The strategy is present, but only attempted weakly
1
Shift of livelihood bases
Applicable, but not employed
0
Restoration/Protection of environmental livelihood base
The strategy is present, but only attempted weakly
1
THIRD PARTY TOOLS
External Support for Capacity Building
The strategy is an important part of the conflict resolution process
2
CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS OR NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
An adverse environmental change leads to more cooperation between
stakeholders
Applicable, but not employed
0
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Resources and Materials
Conflict References
Dispute over Water in the Nile Basin
Disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
References with URL
Abdel-Shafy, H. & Mohamed-Mansour, M.S. (2013). Overview on water reuse in Egypt: Present and Future, Sustainable Sanitation
Practice, 14, 17-25
Amin, G. (2014). Egypt country report: Policies and mechanisms for integration into the workforce and job creation, prepared for the
2014 ministerial conference on youth employment, Abidjan, 21-23 July 2014
CEDARE (2011). Water use efficiency and economic approach: National study Egypt
ci:graps. Country fact sheet Egypt [accessed 2015-12-14]
CIA. The world Factbook: Egypt [accessed 2015-12-14]
Cunningham, E. (2012). Could Egypt run out of water by 2025?
Dakkak, A. (2016). Egypt’s Water Crisis - Recipe for Disaster
El Bedawy, R. (2014). Water Resources Management: Alarming Crisis for Egypt, Journal of Management and Sustainability, 4(3),
108-124
El-Gindy, A-G.M. (2011). Sustainable Use Of Agricultural Resources Program
Elshamy, M.E., Sayed, A. & Badawy, B. (2009). Impacts of Climate Change on the Nile Flows at Dongola Using Statistical Downscaled
GCM Scenarios. Nile Basin Water Engineering Scientific Magazine 2. 1-14
IRIN (2011). Egypt: Water challenges forcing a rethink on usage
IRIN (2010). Egypt: Growing protests over water shortages
Jeuland, M. (2015). Challenges to wastewater reuse in the Middle East and North Africa, Middle East Development Journal, 7(1), 1-25
Kim, U. & Kaluarachchi, J.J. (2009). Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources in the Upper Blue Nile River Basin, Ethiopia. Journal
of the American Water Resources Association 45(6). 1361-1378
Luzi, S. (2010). Driving forces and patterns of water policy making in Egypt, Water Policy, 12(1), 92
Masr, M. (2014). Water resources per capita drop 60 percent since 1970
MWRI (2014). Water Scarcity in Egypt: The Urgent Need for Regional Cooperation among the Nile Basin Countries, Cairo: Ministry of
Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI)
Pacific Institute. Water Conflict Chronology Map [accessed 2015-12-18]
Power, L. (2014). Death on the Nile: Egypt’s Burgeoning Food and Water Security Crisis
Reiter, T. (2015). In search of blue gold: How water scarcity in Egypt affects the country’s economy
Roudi-Fahimi, F., Creel, L. & De Souza, R-M. (2002). Finding the Balance: Population and Water Scarcity in the Middle East and North
Africa, Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau
Soussa, H.K. (2010). Effects of Drip Irrigation Water Amount on Crop Yield, Productivity and Efficiency of Water Use in Desert Regions
in Egypt, Nile Basin Water Science & Engineering Journal, 3(2), 96
Swain, A. (2011). Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate. Hydrological Science
Journal 56(4). 687-702
UNEP (2014). Green Economy Scoping Study: Egypt
World Bank (2014). Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience. Washington DC: World
Bank.
Further information
https://factbook.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/security-implications-water-scarcity-egypt