 EGYPT UPDATE NUMBER 13 
CHRONICLES OF THE CONTINUED EGYPTIAN
REVOLUTION OF 25 JANUARY 2011
CONTACTS
Tel:
+1 312.943.5797
Fax:
+1 312.943.2756

Email:
[email protected]
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI
Twitter:
@cherifbassiouni
Emeritus Professor of Law
DePaul University College of Law
Chicago, IL, USA
Facebook:
www.facebook.com/mcbassiouni
Web:
www.mcherifbassiouni.com

 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
Contents
I.
Dedication to the Memory of Lieutenant-General Abdel Moneim Riad .................................................................. 4
II.
The Forthcoming Presidential Elections ........................................................................................................................... 6
III.
The Parliamentary Election............................................................................................................................................... 14
A.
Leading up to the Egyptian Parliamentary Elections 2011/2012 ...................................................................... 14
B.
The People’s Assembly (2011 – 2012) – Majliss al Shaab ................................................................................. 19
C.
The Upper House of Parliament – Majliss al - Shura............................................................................................ 23
IV.
The Political Landscape ..................................................................................................................................................... 24
A.
Al Thaluf Al Dimuqrati (The Democratic Alliance for Egypt) ......................................................................... 24
B.
Al Kotla Al Masriya (The Egyptian Bloc)................................................................................................................ 26
C.
Al Tahaluf al Islamiya (The Islamist Alliance/ Alliance for Egypt) ................................................................ 27
D. Thawra Mostamira/ Istikmal al Thawra (The Revolution Continues Alliance/ The Completing of the
Revolution Alliance) ................................................................................................................................................................. 28
E.
V.
Other Alliances .................................................................................................................................................................. 29
Party Profiles .......................................................................................................................................................................... 32
Al Wasat (The Center Party)................................................................................................................................................... 32
Al Wafd (The Delegation Party)............................................................................................................................................ 34
Al Masry al Dimuqrati al Igtima’i (The Egyptian Social Democratic Party) .......................................................... 39
Al Nour (The Light Party) ....................................................................................................................................................... 41
Al Adl (The Justice Party) ....................................................................................................................................................... 45
Al Ghad (The Tomorrow Party/ The New Tomorrow Party) ....................................................................................... 49
Al Masriyeen al Ahrrar (The Free Egyptians Party) ....................................................................................................... 51
Al Hurriyya wa al ‘Adala (The Freedom and Justice Party)......................................................................................... 55
Al Gabha al Dimuqrati (The Democratic Front Party) ................................................................................................... 62
Hizb Al Ishtarakiya Al Souriya (The Revolutionary Socialist Party) ........................................................................ 64
Al Karama (The Dignity Party).............................................................................................................................................. 66
Hizb Al Amal Al Islamiya (The Islamic Labor Party) ................................................................................................... 67
The Egyptian Green Party........................................................................................................................................................ 68
Hizb Al Ishtaraki Al Masri (The Egyptian Socialist Party) .......................................................................................... 69
Al Hizb Al Sheo’ei Al Masry (The Egyptian Communist Party) ............................................................................... 71
Hizb Masr Al Arabi Al Ishtaraki (The Egyptian Arab Socialist Party) ..................................................................... 72
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
Masr al Hurreyya (Egypt Freedom Party) .......................................................................................................................... 73
Al Banna’ wa al Tanmiyya (Building and Development Party) .................................................................................. 75
Al Tayar al Masry (Egyptian Current Party) ..................................................................................................................... 77
Al Tahrir al Masry (Egyptian Liberation Party) ............................................................................................................... 78
VI.
Other Movements ................................................................................................................................................................ 80
A.
The 6 April Youth Movement ...................................................................................................................................... 80
B.
Al Gama’iya Al Watuneya Al Taghyeer (The National Association for Change)....................................... 81
C.
The Revolution Youth Coalition .................................................................................................................................. 82
D.
Al Gamaa Al Islamiya (The Islamic Group) ............................................................................................................ 84
VII.
The Salafi Factor ................................................................................................................................................................ 85
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
Egypt Update No. 13
March 2012
I.
Dedication to the Memory of Lieutenant-General Abdel Moneim Riad
1.
This update is dated 9 March to commemorate the anniversary of the death of LieutenantGeneral Abdel Moneim Riad, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, who was killed by
Israeli Defense Forces in 1971 when he was undertaking a military inspection at the front lines
of the Suez Canal. Though a formal cease fire existed between Egypt and Israel following the
1967 war, there was periodic exchange of shelling across the Suez Canal and on several
occasions Israel bombarded internal Egyptian positions including on one occasion the
bombardment of a civilian factory at Abou al- Zaabal, killing 71 civilian workers. The motive
for the deliberate attack on General Riad was because he was effectively modernizing the
Egyptian armed forces. It was his reorganization of the military that lead to the initial victory of
Egypt in the 1973 October/Yom Kippur war, when its forces successfully crossed the Suez
Canal and secured a foothold in the Sinai, which Israel had occupied since 1967.
2.
The late General Riad and I were second degree cousins, and though he was a few years older
than me, he took me under his wing and I considered him a beloved older brother. His
commemorative statue at one end of Tahrir Square has him pointing his hand to what the artist
intended to be the east side of the Suez Canal (the Sinai), which at the time of his death was
occupied by Israel. But in Tahrir square, General Riad’s finger is pointed at a street which is
exactly opposite his effigy. It is Mahmoud Bassiouni Street, which was named after my paternal
grandfather who was president of the Egyptian senate and who lead Upper Egypt in the
revolution of 1919 against the British Empire.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
3.
Years later, as I write these reports which chronicle ongoing events since the beginning of
Egypt’s January 25th 2011 revolution, I feel deeply moved by the symbolism of Tahrir Square
where a statue of General Riad is pointing at Mahmoud Bassiouni Street reminding me of my
days in the 1956 war as a second lieutenant in the Egyptian National Guard (which makes me
the third generation Bassiouni who fought for Egypt’s independence) and then of my house
arrest for seven months during the Nasser regime for opposing torture .
4.
For almost 700 years, the Egyptian people were dominated by the Turkish Ottoman Empire,
occupied by the British Empire, ruled by a foreign monarchy, and since 1952 subjected to a
military regime which produced dictatorships that lasted until February 2011. The January 2011
revolution removed Hosni Mubarak from the presidency and the oligarchy of his regime from
power, but it is not yet certain whether it will ultimately result in the removal of the military
regime which was its underpinning. Admittedly, the military regime is in the process of being
transformed as new democratic institutions and processes are being developed, but the ultimate
outcome of freedom and democracy for all the People of Egypt is still to be determined.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
II.
The Forthcoming Presidential Elections
5.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) established on 30 March 2011 the rules for
the forthcoming presidential election. The rules dictate the manner and time of the election and
were released as part of the Constitutional Declaration, functioning alongside the 2005
Presidential Election Law (No. 174 of 2005). The SCAF has received criticism and some
opposition. Similar criticism was conveyed by the public prior to the previously held
parliamentary election. However, in that case, the SCAF sought approval of the election plan
through a public referendum, which resulted in a popular positive outcome. The SCAF also
provided for the right of Egyptian expatriates to vote abroad for both the parliamentary and
presidential elections. In the parliamentary elections 4 million expatriates have registered to
vote abroad as of this date. The SCAF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the
Egyptian Consulates abroad deserve much recognition for this democratic initiative.
6.
As of 10 March 2012, candidates for the presidency were able to register. The period for
registration will be closed on 8 April1 (and that includes a period for allowing filing challenges).
So far some 300 persons have requested petitions though it is unlikely that many among them
will be able to satisfy the conditions needed to be on the ballot. The first round of elections will
be on 23 and 24 May and the final results are to be announced on 21 June. If no candidate has
obtained more than 50%, of the votes, there will be a second round among the two highest vote
getters. The runoff would take place on 16 and 17 June. Egyptian expatriates will vote from 11
May to 17 May. A ceiling for the campaign budget for each candidate has been set at LE10
million. 2
7.
The elections will be supervised by the Higher Presidential Election Commission (HPEC)
which is headed by the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court and also includes the
President of Cairo’s Appeals Court, the senior deputy chairman of the Supreme Constitutional
Court, the Senior Vice President of the Court of Cassation and the Senior Vice President of the
State Council. HCPE is given the power to oversee and monitor the election from the beginning
to the end, exercising full control of elections and ensuring that they are entirely supervised by
judges.3 The election will be supervised by members of the judiciary as was the case with the
parliamentary elections which proved to be transparent and fair. In fact they were the first
genuine elections in Egypt since 1951. Over 70% of the electorate participated, and that was
historically unprecedented. The election commission, the Egyptian people and the SCAF
deserve recognition for this outstanding democratic process.
1
http://news.egypt.com/english/permalink/90564.html
2 Egypt
Independent, “Update: Presidential election to begin on 23 May, results to be announced on 21 June“, 29 February 2012, available
from http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/688001.
Al Ahram Online, Gamal Essam El-Din, “Ahram Online presents: The Idiot's Guide to Egypt’s presidential elections 2012”, 15 March
2012, available from http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/7/36418/Egypt/Presidential-elections-/Idiots-guide-toEgypt%E2%80%99s-presidential-elections-.aspx.
3
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
8.
The eligibility conditions for the presidential elections have been established by means of
amendment to the 1971 constitution which was submitted by the SCAF to a public referendum
on 19 March 2011. It was based on a test prepared by a committee appointed by the SCAF. The
constitutional legitimacy of such an appointment is questionable. However, the public
referendum produced more than 14 million votes in favor and more than 4 million against,
giving the initiative a popular legitimacy.
9.
Another contentious issue regards Article 28 of the Constitutional Declaration which gives the
HCPE immunity and protects its decisions from judicial challenges. In late February the
People's Assembly refrained from amending Article 28 even though a number of MPs criticized
the article and demanded that the People’s Assembly request that the SCAF amend the article.
MP Abul Ezz al Hariry stated that “If the presidential election is held under Article 28, then the
election of Egypt’s next president will be void, as preventing the challenge of any
administrative decision is a violation of human rights and because the article which revokes
litigation is invalid.” Other MP’s such as Saad Aboud argued that the amendments to Articles
30 and 38 were inadequate in light of Article 28. 4
10.
The eligibility requirements for the presidential candidates are:

To be over 40 years of age.

To be born of Egyptian parents (both).

Not to have dual citizenship (though it is not clear whether that means never to have
held dual citizenship or not to be holding dual citizenship at the time of the candidacy).

Not to be married to a non-Egyptian (which implies that a nationalized non-Egyptian
born spouse is not excluded). The condition does not extend to having been previously
married to a non- Egyptian.

Not to have been deprived of his/her civil rights (which means not to have been
convicted of a serious crime).

No president is eligible for elections for more than 2 terms. The candidate will have to
present a petition signed either by 30 members of the People’s Assembly (Majlis al
Shaab) and the Consultative Assembly (Majlis al Shoura), or have obtained 30,000
powers of attorney from eligible voters nominating the candidate from 15 of the 26
governorates and with at least 1,000 nominations from each of the 15 governorates. The
In late February the People’s Assembly passed minor amendments on Articles 30 and 38 of the presidential elections law concerning the
polling stations, the counting of votes and the announcement of results by elections commission subcommittees. See Egypt Independent,
“Parliament refrains from amending controversial article on presidential election”, 27 February 2012, available from
http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/683811.
4
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
nominees must register a formal nomination with the public registry office of the
Ministry of Justice (al Shahr al ʿaqari), stating the full name of the candidate and if
possible his/her national registration card number. (This is likely to be the subject of
many subsequent challenges). The constitutional declaration issued by the SCAF in
March declares that only parties with representation in the parliament are able to
nominate a presidential candidate. The Free Egyptians party has demanded that the
SCAF should issue a new constitutional declaration changing this decision, making it
possible for any existing and established party to be able to nominate a presidential
candidate without representation in the parliament.5
11.
The constitutional declaration issued by the SCAF in March declares that only parties with
representation in the parliament are able to nominate a presidential candidate. The Free
Egyptians party has demanded that the SCAF issue a new constitutional declaration changing
this decision, making it possible for any existing and established party to be able to nominate a
presidential candidate, even without representation in the parliament.6
12.
The Brotherhood is seeking a presidential candidate with strong international credentials. In
doing so they also expect to placate the liberal secularists who will also surely get some posts in
the new cabinet established after the anticipated June / July presidential elections. The
Brotherhood’s strategy as described above will allow the movement to concentrate on domestic,
social, political, and economic issues, focusing particularly on the control of the judiciary, the
educational and health systems, and the police and security forces. Whether all these well laid
plans will come to fruition is still a matter of conjecture, but it now seems that the cards of most
players are on the table and there is little that is unknown about these major positions and the
role allocations that are foreseen by all four major groups.
13.
The field of candidates is constantly shifting. New
candidates appear on the scene while others announce their
intentions not to run. Egyptians on the streets are looking at
the exercise as a sporting event with as many as ten to
fifteen candidates. This is likely to turn into a two or three
candidate race to the finish. Among the present plausible
Figure 1 Amr Moussa
(Liberal/Independent)
are:

Amr Moussa (liberal/independent) former secretary
Ahram English, “Egypt's new elected parliament meets for 1st time”, 23 January 2012, available from
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/100/31300/Elections-/News/Free-Egyptians-party-announces-boycott-of-upper-ho.aspx.
5Al
Ahram English, “Egypt's new elected parliament meets for 1st time”, 23 January 2012, available from
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/100/31300/Elections-/News/Free-Egyptians-party-announces-boycott-of-upper-ho.aspx.
6Al
8
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
general of the League of Arab States and former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Amr Moussa
was previously a part of Mubarak’s regime and some argue that he does not represent the
clean break with the past which Egypt needs. Some are critical of the fact that he never
spoke out openly against Mubarak during his time in government and that he even once
appeared to support his son Gamal as a possible successor. However, some believe he was
removed from the government by Mubarak due to his increasing popularity and his vocal
criticism of Israel and the American invasion of Iraq, granting him support in some
Egyptian circles.7

Mansour Hassan (liberal Wafd candidate apparently
supported by the SCAF), was the former Minister of
Information and Culture under Sadat. He resigned in
1981 in protest over Sadat’s large scale arrests of
members of the democratic opposition after the signing
of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. He is an alternative
offered by the SCAF and the Islamists. On 8 September
2011, he was appointed by the SCAF as Chairman of the
Mansour Hassan (liberal Wafd
candidate
apparently supported
Constitutional Advisory Council established by the
by the SCAF)
SCAF. It is widely believed that Mansour Hassan is the
compromise candidate of the SCAF. Mansour Hassan allegedly turned down offers from
both the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood to stand in the elections, and only offered to
withdraw his public support for Moussa and give it to Nabil Al-Arabi,8 leaving the door
open for the possible candidacy of Al-Arabi. He has recently indicated that he was not going
to be a candidate.

Nabil Al-Arabi is currently the secretary general of the
League of Arab States and was formerly Minister of
Foreign Affairs. He is a highly regarded international
personality who also served as a judge at the ICJ and
before that was a career diplomat. The Brotherhood has
made it known that it would welcome Nabil Al-Arabi’s
candidacy. Al-Arabi issued press statements denying
that he will be running for the presidency, distancing
Nabil Al-Arabi
The Telegraph, “Calls for Amr Moussa to lead post-Mubarak Egypt”, 5 February 2011, available from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8306069/Calls-for-Amr-Moussa-to-lead-post-MubarakEgypt.html
7
Al Ahram Weekly, Dina Ezzat, “Waiting for Mr President”, 23 - 29 February 2012 Issue No. 1086, available from
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1086/fr1.htm.
8
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
himself from the rumors claiming he is the “nominated president” by the SCAF and the
Brotherhood. 9 According to some sources, Al-Arabi might, however, consider running for
president if it is for a one-year transitional presidency, allowing several pending matters to
be settled. 10 The Brotherhood also issued statements distancing themselves from the
rumors.11

Ahmed Shafiq (liberal/independent), last Prime Minister
under Mubarak and retired Chief of Air Force. Shafiq
resigned from the position as Prime Minister on 3 March
due to a mass protest calling for his resignation, as the
Egyptian people viewed him as a continued symbol of the
previous regime. 12 He is apparently proposed by the
Islamists. It is what the SCAF’s ultimate position on him
is, but at this point the SCAF is not supportive because it
seems to have another candidate (Mansour Hassan, as
indicated above). Shafiq, though recognized as an effective Ahmed Shafiq (Liberal/Independent)
administrator, is tainted by the fact that he was Mubarak’s last appointed Prime Minister. He
is highly regarded in the armed forces and among retired officers.

Dr. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Khirat al-Shater and Hazem Salah Abou Ismail
come from the Muslim Brotherhood. Dr. Mohamed Badie, the Muslim Brotherhood’s
General Guide, has denied support of the candidates as well as any deal between the Muslim
Brotherhood and Mansour Hassan. Aboul Fotouh was forced to resign from the
Brotherhood when he announced his candidacy for president. The Brotherhood had
previously announced that they would not field a candidate in the presidential elections and
Al Ahram Weekly, Dina Ezzat, “Waiting for Mr President”, 23 - 29 February 2012 Issue No. 1086, available from
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1086/fr1.htm.
9
Al Ahram Weekly, Dina Ezzat, “SCAF, Brotherhood to back El-Arabi in looming Egypt's presidential polls: Sources”, 17 February
2012, available from http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/34723/Egypt/0/SCAF,-Brotherhood-to-back-ElArabi-in-loomingEgypt.aspx.
10
Al Ahram Weekly, Dina Ezzat, “Waiting for Mr President”, 23 - 29 February 2012 Issue No. 1086, available from
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1086/fr1.htm.
11
Egypt Independent, “Brotherhood slams Shafiq”, 27 February 2012, available from http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/684356 In
addition, the Muslim Brotherhood has presented harsh criticism against Shafiq, describing him as a loyalist of Mubarak and accusing him
for corruption and the squander of public funds. He is accused of allowing corrupt ministers to transfer money abroad during his time as
Prime Minister and of appointing more than 600 army generals and brigadier generals for positions in the Ministry of Civil Aviation with
salaries counting more than LE9 million. Egypt Independent, “Brotherhood slams Shafiq”, 27 February 2012, available from
http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/684356. Shafiq has been accused by the Administrative Surveillance Authority of squandering
public funds during Shafiq’s term as Minister of Civil Aviation in the government of former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif (Nazif was
prime minister between 14 July 2004 and 29 January 2011). Issuing construction contracts worth millions to Mubarak’s in-laws; Magdy
Rashekh and Mahmoud al Gamal. Shafiq were also accused of retrieving high-end property that former Housing Minister Mohammed
Ibrahim Suleiman appropriated for him. Egypt Independent, “Brotherhood slams Shafiq”, 27 February 2012, available from
http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/684356
12
10
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
Fotouh’s candidacy fueled tensions between him and the party. 13 However, Aboul Fotouh
and al-Shater have grown in popularity. They have connections with non-secular parties yet
maintain a religious discourse seen by some as the missing link between Islamists and
secularists. Aboul Fotouh is more of a hard liner than al-Shater. He has publically criticized
the SCAF’s handling of the transitional period, which got him support amongst the youth
movements.14 Aboul Fotouh has openly contradicted the Brotherhood’s official position on
several issues, such as stressing that women and Copts should have the right to run for
president which other members of the Brotherhood reject.15
Abou Ismail’s star was on the rise with the Islamists because he advocated strict adherence
to Islamic law but it was recently discovered that his mother, who died in Los Angeles, had
acquired US citizenship and this disqualified him since it meant that his two parents were
not Egyptian. In anyone else’s case there would have been a hue and cry to have the
Supreme Administrative Court consider the constitutionality of this interpretation of
Presidential qualifications cine Egypt’s Nationality Law recognizes the right of a born
Egyptian to have a dual nationality without the acquired nationality constituting an
impairment of the original Egyptian nationality. Somehow it seems that in his case all
secularists and liberals are happy to find some type of a justification to rule him out.
Dr. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh
Khirat al-Shater
Hazem Salah Abou Ismail

A number of other candidates who have been well received include: Judge Hisham al
Bastawasi (liberal/independent), who is a Judge in the Court of Cassation; Professor
Mohamed Selim al Awwa (independent/Islamist, though not supported by the Muslim
Brotherhood or the Salafi) and Bothaina Kamel (liberal/independent/secularist), who is the
most prominent female candidate. She is a journalist and a TV and radio host, and has
Al Ahram Weekly, Dina Ezzat, “SCAF, Brotherhood to back El-Arabi in looming Egypt's presidential polls: Sources”, 17 February
2012, available from http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/34723/Egypt/0/SCAF,-Brotherhood-to-back-ElArabi-in-loomingEgypt.aspx; Egypt Independent, “Update: Presidential election to begin on 23 May, results to be announced on 21 June“, 29 February
2012, available from http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/688001.
13
Bikya Masr. “Egypt’s military says presidential elections in June”, 16 January 2012, avaiable from http://bikyamasr.com/53809/egyptsmilitary-says-presidential-elections-in-june/.
14
Egypt Independent, “Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh: A Witness to the History of Egypt’s Islamic Movement”, 4 November 2010,
available from http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/227099.
15
11
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
presented several programs addressing contentious and provocative issues in Egypt. Her
professional career has been controversial including repeated conflicts with authorities and
religious conservatives. She is also a political activist and was active in the protests in
Tahrir Square during the revolution.16
Judge Hisham al Bastawasi
(Liberal/Independent)
14.
Professor Mohamed Selim al Awwa
(independent/Islamist, though
not supported by the Muslim
Brotherhood or the Salafi)
Bothaina Kamel
(Liberal/Independent/Secularist)
Mohamed al Baradei was previously a favorite for the
presidential elections, with a broad support among liberals.
He has been a strong critic of the SCAF and is in the forefront
of the groups demanding for an accountable and democratic
government. Al Baradei has publically argued that the SCAF
seeks to preserve its power and privileges in the postrevolution era and that its repeated promises to surrender
Mohamed al Baradei
power to civilian rule at the end of June are a farce. As a
consequence he withdrew his name from any future presidential race under the SCAF, stating
that "My conscience does not permit me to run for the presidency or any other official position
unless it is within a real democratic system".17 Due to the rather harsh and critical rhetoric of al
Baradei he has been subject to scrutiny and smear campaigns. On 6 February during a
parliament session, MP Mostafa Bakry criticized al Baradei stating that protesters were
“America’s agents mobilized by Mohamed El Baradei” who wished to overthrow the Egyptian
state. Thirty-two MPs referred Bakry to a parliamentary investigation for insulting al Baradei,
but the motion did not attract sufficient support to proceed. Bakry later defended himself
claiming that he never called al Baradei a “traitor” or “agent” but that he said that he
“encourages traitors and agents”. He claimed that he had proof for this accusations and that he
had acquired documents that proved that al Baradei instigated unrest among the Egyptian
The New York Times, Abdalla F. Hassan, “Muslim Woman Seeks Egyptian Presidency, 15 June 2011, available from
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/middleeast/16iht-M16-EGYPT-KAMEL.html?hpw.
16
Reuters, “ElBaradei pulls out of Egyptian presidency race, 14 January 2012, available from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/14/us-egypt-presidency-elbaradei-idUSTRE80D0HQ20120114.
17
12
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
people. He claimed that the proof also listed financial transfers made to organizations working
in Egypt, without providing any further details on the matter.18
15.
The Muslim Brotherhood is a secular movement, though it includes some clerics, and has
always been controlled by non-clerical persons, mostly professionals of the middle and lower
income classes. Since its founding in 1928, the organization been very adept at playing the
game of politics with every regime from the monarchy in the 30’s to the succeeding military
regimes from the 50’s to date. It is likely to continue this game and will surely negotiate with
the SCAF, as well as the liberal/secularists and the Salafi. Its technique has historically been the
same as that of any political party willing to make compromises though, in their case, always in
the name of a higher ultimate purpose. For the time being, they are content with leaving the
military to occupy the position they now have, including control of an important sector of the
economy. The Brotherhood’s political strategy is to keep the military happy and busy while at
the same time circumscribed in its traditional areas of influence. The organization is likely,
however, to become more emboldened with respect to matters of foreign policy concerning the
U.S. and Israel. On the other hand, the military will do whatever
it takes to preserve its primacy in connection with matters
concerning Israel and the U.S. The negotiations, not to say the
bargaining that will go on between the SCAF and the
Brotherhood, will be preceded by many changing scenarios in
the next few weeks before the elections. Many in Egypt
speculate that at the last moment a compromise candidate will
emerge and it seems that the talk in the cafes occasionally goes
Omar Suleiman
towards a dark horse like retired general Omar Suleiman, who was the longtime head of general
intelligence and for two weeks Mubarak’s vice president. Suleiman’s assets in foreign relations
and his experience with Israel and the U.S. are very well known and respected, although he is
not liked by Field-Marshall Tantawi.
Egypt Independent, “Parliament refuses to investigate MP for alleged insult against ElBaradei”, 27 February 2012, available from
http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/683696.
18
13
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
III.
The Parliamentary Election
A. Leading up to the Egyptian Parliamentary Elections 2011/2012
i.
Constitutional Amendments
16.
In March the SCAF announced that a national referendum on constitutional amendments would
be held on 19 March where Egyptians would vote on amendments to the Constitution. The
referendum concerned amendments to articles 75, 76, 77, 88, 93, 139 and 149 and the
cancellation of Article 179.
17.
Articles 75, 76, 77 and 139 relate to the presidency. Article 75 was amended to guarantee that
Egypt’s president is born to two Egyptians parents and cannot be married to a non-Egyptian,
with 40 as the minimum age for the president. Article 76 was modified to ease restrictions on
presidential nominations and outlines three ways a candidate can be eligible to run for
president: first, the candidate should be endorsed by 30 members from the People`s Assembly
or the Shura; second, the candidate can receive 30,000 signatures from at least 15 Governorates;
or third, be a member of a party that holds at least one seat in Parliament. Article 77 limits the
president to two terms in office, each lasting for four years. Previously there were no term
limits, with each term lasting six years, thereby enabling Mubarak to hold five 6-year terms as
President of Egypt. Article 139 was altered so as to obligate Egypt’s president to appoint a Vice
President within the first two months of his presidency. In addition, if he is found unable to
perform his duties for any reason, a substitute must be appointed.
18.
Article 88 was revised to restore judicial oversight of elections during the entire electoral
process. In 2007 an earlier amendment to Article 88 had abolished judicial supervision. Article
89, which concerns mechanisms to amend the constitution, was altered as to ensure that the next
elected parliament would form a commission to draft a new constitution within the first six
months after its election. Article 93 was amended so that the Supreme Constitutional Court is
the sole arbitrator on contested memberships.
19.
Article 148, which relates to the State of Emergency, was amended so to require a public
referendum if the president wants to apply the Emergency Law for more than six months.
Previously a State of Emergency could be renewed by approval of the People’s Assembly.
20.
The official results showed that 77% of voters support the changes; 14 million people were
estimated to have voted in favor of the changes, while 4 million opposed them. The turnout was
estimated at 41.2 % of the 45 million eligible voters.
21.
The opinions concerning the amendments differed. A spokesman for the Freedom of Justice
Party (FJP) [which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)] Essam al Aryan, stated that
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
the result would allow the country to “turn a page and enter a new phase”. However, some
activists said the changes were not extensive enough and wanted the constitution to be entirely
rewritten before elections could be held. Established parties such as the FJP benefited the most
from holding an election quickly, while more newly founded parties (which indeed is the case
of the majority of the parties) needed more time to organize themselves. However, after the
results of the referendum, youth movements such as the Coalition of the Youth of the
Revolution, urged Egyptians to accept the result of the referendum and look forward in the
democratic process.
ii.
The New Electoral Law
22.
The last parliamentary elections were held in November/ December 2010 when Mubarak’s
National Democratic Party won almost all of the seats in the People's Assembly. The 2010
election was thought to be the most fraudulent under Mubarak's rule and is considered one of
the main triggers behind the uprising that forced him to step down on 11 February, 2011.
23.
The Upper House of Parliament, the Shura Council, was introduced in 1980 and is regulated by
Law 120. The law defines the mandate of the council, as well as the manner of selecting its
members. The role of the Shura Council is mainly advisory, preparing research material
concerning issues of national concern and revising government bills ahead of submission to the
People’s Assembly. In the 1980s, the members of the council were elected through a system of
proportional representation based on party lists. However, in 1990, the law was amended,
reinstating the single-seat system for a portion of the council’s members. On 23 July 2011, the
SCAF lowered the age requirement for candidates from thirty to twenty-five years. Of 270
Shura Council members, 90 will be appointed by the president, 60 will be elected through
single-seat system, and 120 through party lists. Similar to the People’s Assembly, each party list
in the elections must include at least one woman and must win at least half a percentage point of
nationwide valid votes.
24.
Law 28 of 1972, commonly known as “The People’s Assembly law”, governs the People’s
Assembly, Egypt’s lower house of parliament. It was introduced after President Sadat’s new
constitution in September 1971. The law regulates the relationship between parliament and the
government, explains the duties and responsibilities of elected deputies, and establishes the way
in which elections are to be held. In the 1980s the law was amended, and elections through
party lists were introduced. In 1990, the previous system of single-seat candidacy was
reinstituted.
25.
After the fall of Mubarak’s regime the SCAF took power, during what was called the
transitional period, until a democratically chosen government was to be put in place in 2012. On
29 May the SCAF proposed new amendments to the electoral law, introducing a mixed system
of individual candidacy and party-list proportional representation. The draft proposed that the
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
individual candidacy system would be adopted to elect two thirds of the Assembly’s seats,
while the party-list system would be used to elect the remaining third. The amendments adopted
a mix of two candidacy systems in order to allow independents and party-based candidates to
run in each district. In each district, independents would be allowed to run either individually or
on a list, while party-based candidates would run on lists of their own.
26.
The proposed amendments were subject to public discussion and most political forces were
opposed. Several parties threatened that they would boycott the elections; the FJP and 59 other
parties and groups threatened to boycott elections mainly because of its maintaining of the
individual candidacy system. It was argued that the system allowed individuals from the old
regime to use money and family affiliations in order to win promoting a monopolized political
life. In contrast, the proportional party-list system enables citizens to elect candidates according
to their platforms, ideology and programs, all of which are good for advancing a democratic
parliament. Amr Hashem Rabie, the Al Ahram political analyst and chairman of the national
dialogue committee on reform of the electoral system, argued that the next parliament should be
elected via the party-list system. This would help eliminate the corrupt practices caused by the
individual candidacy system.
27.
The 25 January Revolution’s youth movements also criticized the proposed amendments to the
individual candidacy system and argued that the SCAF repeatedly had gone against the will of
the major political forces in the country, as well as the revolution's youth movements by
“imposing its will and refusing to consult them on amendments of political laws”. It was argued
that amendments of political laws should be the result of a national dialogue and not exclusively
for members of the military. The individual candidacy system, once biased towards NDP,
would now produce a similar outcome but favoring the FJP, allowing them to dominate the
parliament completely. The mix of two electoral systems was also argued to make it
complicated for citizens, millions of whom are illiterate, to elect their preferred representatives
into parliament.
28.
The SCAF amended the Law 28 of 1972 on 20 September 2011. The women's quota which was
introduced in 2010 was abolished; instead at least one woman had to be included on the party
lists. The age of candidacy was lowered from thirty to twenty-five years. According to the law,
a party still had to win at least half a percentage point of nationwide votes in order to qualify for
membership in the assembly via the party list. The SCAF also announced that in accordance
with law 28 of 1972, half the seats would be reserved for laborers and farmers and fifty percent
of the seats would be elected through the single-seat system and fifty percent through the party
list, following a proportional representation system.
29.
Many political parties remained critical of the continued use of the single-seat candidacy,
arguing that it gave oligarchs of Mubarak’s ousted regime a chance to get reelected through
vote-buying and propaganda. As a response to the criticism, on 25 September the SCAF finally
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
amended the People’s Assembly law and lowered the number of seats elected through singleseat candidacy from 50 percent to 33.3 percent.
30.
The People’s Assembly has a total membership of 508 (10 seats less than the previous
Assembly), the number of elected seats are 498 and the number of seats appointed by president
(for time being the SCAF) is 10. The assembly seats elected via the proportional representation
list system is two-thirds, which amounts to 332 representatives from 46 constituencies, 166
seats from 83 constituencies elected via the individual candidacy system. 166 seats are open to
candidates running as individuals, who may run as individuals or be affiliated with political
parties, two per each of the 83 districts. At least half of the 166 seats must be "laborers" or
"farmers", while the "professionals" should constitute the rest. From each district at least one of
the seats must be allocated to a “laborer”.
31.
On 21 July 2011, the SCAF announced that the elections for the People's Assembly and the
Upper house would be held in three rounds in October, with 15-day intervals in-between. Due
to political and social instability the elections were later delayed to be held in November, and
then again in December. The upper house elections were initially scheduled to be held in three
stages ending on 12 March, but in December the SCAF announced that it would be reduced to
two stages, due to the public pressure to shorten the transitional period under military rule and
hand over the power to an elected government.
iii.
Amendments to the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights
32.
In 1956 a law was passed regulating the exercise of political rights in Egypt; the Law on the
Exercise of Political Rights (Law 73 of 1956). The law sets rules for the eligibility of candidates
and voters and describes how the elections are to be carried out. It has been amended on several
occasions prior to the 2011 revolution. On 20 July 2011, the SCAF amended articles 40, 43, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49 and 50 of the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights. Most of the amendments
were concerned with appropriate punitive measures for using violence, bribes, or religious
slogans in elections.
33.
Article 40 states that those who are eligible to vote yet abstain from voting will be fined up to
LE500. Other articles made voting more than once, voting under false identity, and voting
without being legally eligible punishable by serving one to five years in prison. Electoral
campaigns based on religious slogans or involving sexual or ethnic insults are punishable with a
minimum of three months in prison and a fine ranging from LE6,000 to LE12,000.
34.
Articles 43, 45, 46, 47 and 48 established the penalty for insulting election officials, damaging
election facilities, hiding or damaging voter lists, and registering names of voters through illegal
means at one to five years in prison and/or subject to fines from LE10,000 EGP to LE100,000.
Using force to prevent anyone from voting or forcing anyone to vote for a certain candidate, as
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
well as spreading rumors about the elections or candidates in an attempt to influence the
outcome of the elections are punishable by imprisonment. Even though the measures were
widely supported by the public, some human rights activists warned that the definition of some
of the offences are ambiguous and are up to the discretion of the judges.
35.
In the lead-up to elections, the chairman of the Supreme Electoral Commission (SEC) stated
that using religious slogans or obtaining money from foreign states or institutions would lead to
trial. However, certain Salafi groups such as the Islamic Group (Al Gamaa Al Islamiya)
maintained the right to use religious slogans, refusing to differentiate between religion and
politics.
36.
The authorities issued an executive memorandum explaining the implementation mechanisms
for the 1956 law with regards to the Supreme Electoral Commission (SEC). The SEC would
have the final say in matters related to supervising the parliamentary elections and was to be in
charge of the election process. The SEC included members of the judiciary; eleven judicial
members were to be led by the head of the SEC, Abdel Moez Ibrahim, the chairman of Cairo’s
Appeal Court. The SEC is entrusted with monitoring the elections and ensuring that they are
supervised by judges (a judge for every ballot box). The SEC also selects polling and votecounting stations, prepares voter lists and finally, regulates and supervises that election
campaigns are carried out in a way compatible with the law, upholding the ban religious and
racial slogans and symbols. The SEC introduced a LE500,000 ceiling for independent
candidates and a LE1 million ceiling for parties in campaign expenditure. Offenders of the
SEC’s regulations on election campaigns are subject to a prison sentences up to 15 years
imprisonment and/or a fine of maximum LE200, 000.
37.
The SEC welcomed international monitors and media to take part in “following”, rather than
officially “observing”, the upcoming parliamentary election. The SCAF did not allow
international monitors to observe the parliamentary elections, as such measures were considered
necessary to protect Egypt's sovereignty. The decision was swiftly criticized by the international
community and political activists, raising questions about transparency.
38.
The SEC formed three subcommittees and a database in order to prepare the voters lists. The
first subcommittee removed deceased and emigrants of the voter lists, the second compiled the
names of newly eligible voters, and the third finalized the list of voters and organized the
polling stations accordingly. The first subcommittee, headed by Samir Abul Maati, also added
the names of individuals stripped from exercising their political rights during the previous
regime. The voter list was exploited by the previous regime: individuals were removed from the
voter’s lists without transparency on the matter. Thus SEC’s announcement concerning the
executive regulations of the voters lists were welcomed by civil society organizations.
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iv.
Women in the Egyptian Parliamentary Elections 2011/2012
39.
On 21 July 2011, the SCAF announced that the women's quota system in the elections
introduced under Mubarak would be abolished. In 2009, the People's Assembly passed the law
that specified the women's quota, raising the presence of women in the assembly to more than
12 percent and a minimum of 64 parliament seats. The changes presented by the SCAF meant
that the parliamentary law obligated political parties to nominate one female candidate on its
proportional lists and does not clarify whether female candidates should be put at the top of
lists. The new system puts many obstacles before female candidates and may lead to a
parliament devoid of women since it does not guarantee that female representation.
40.
According to the Egyptian activist Nehad Aboul Qomsan, head of the Egyptian Center for
Women's Rights, women occupied on average the fifth place on lists, which meant that in order
for a female candidate to win; her list had to win 50 percent of votes. Women rights activists
called on the military council to allocate women 30 percent of the electoral lists, with a relative
distribution on each list. Qomsan stated that “This means that every three names would include
a female candidate, which could lead to representation of between 10 percent and 12 percent of
women in the next parliament”. An example of this can be seen in the province of Minya in
Upper Egypt where twenty-four women ran in the elections, ranked mostly third to eighth,
decreasing their chances of securing seats.
B. The People’s Assembly (2011 – 2012) – Majliss al Shaab
41.
The People’s Assembly elections were held in three stages: first stage: 28–29 November, runoff on 5–6 December including Cairo, Alexandria, Assiut, the Red Sea, Luxor, Fayoum,
Damietta, Port Said, and Kafr Al Sheikh, second stage: 14–15 December including Giza,
Beheira, Sohag, Aswan and Sharqiya, run-off on 21–22 December and third stage: 3–4 January,
run-off on 10–11 January, including Qalioubiya, Gharbiya, Dakhaliya, North and South Sinai,
Marsa Matrouh, Minya, New Valley and Qena.
42.
According to SEC, the number of party (or party-coalition) lists competing for People’s
Assembly proportional representation seats were 590 lists for 332 seats. The number of
candidates that ran for People’s Assembly individual candidacy seats were 6,591 competing for
166 seats. The total number of candidates running for individual candidacy seats in both houses
was 8,627 for 226 seats.
43.
In relation to the 1956 law, some parties appear to have used religious slogans while
campaigning. It was reported that the FJP used the slogan “Islam is the solution” in its elections
campaign. During elections some parties campaigned at polling stations, handing out pamphlets
and banners. This was the case in the province of Minya where the Al Nour party offered free
transportation to voters in buses with banners reading "We practice politics … and we don't
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
violate Sharia,” Supporters of the Al Nour Party used laptops to direct voters to their polling
stations and started campaigning in front of the polling stations. Monitors reported the incidents
and argued that it was a way to mobilize voters to choose for the party. On 9 January the Free
Egyptians Party announced that the party was going to boycott the upcoming Shura Council
elections due to the use of religious slogans and campaigning inside the polling stations during
the People’s Assembly elections, violations of the 1956 which were completely ignored by the
authorities.
44.
During the elections voters complained about logistical problems: some stations opened more
than an hour after the time scheduled as ink used to mark voters' fingers had not arrived.
However, the elections passed without any violent incident and only a few minor incidents were
reported such as in Minya where minor clashes took place between supporters of the secular
Egyptian Bloc and Islamists due to campaigning in front of the polling stations. At the polling
stations the security was generally extensive and armed navy troops and unarmed police
officers directed voters once they entered.
45.
Many Egyptians expressed enthusiasm for what they said would be Egypt's first truly free and
fair election. It was reported that in Assiut there had been an exceptionally high turnout by the
standards of the country's previous votes.
46.
In the first of three electoral phases, the Democratic Alliance led by FJP won 73 seats and the
Salafi Nour Party won 31 seats out of the 150. The highest scoring secular alliance, the
Egyptian Bloc, won 14 seats, while the Wafd Party won 11. The Revolution Continues
Coalition (RCC) won four seats, and the Adl Party won two seats.
47.
Finally, 498 representatives
were elected to the parliament
of 2012. The FJP earned 216
seats, the second largest party
being the Salafi Al Nour Party
which earned 109 seats. The
Delegation Party (al Wafd)
earned 41 seats, and the liberal
Egyptian Bloc earned 34 seats.
The remaining seats were
divided between approximately
a dozen parties and independent
delegates. The 10 representatives
appointed by the SCAF included
three women and five Copts.
Egyptian Parliament
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
48.
Some argue that the current parliament reflects the new political balance of power in Egypt, and
that it more fully represents the society. However, the “revolutionary parliament,” as it has been
called, underrepresents women only having 12 seats occupied by female electives. In addition,
the youth movement which initiated the uprising is not significantly represented. Youth
organizations played a key role in the uprising that led to the resignation of Mubarak. This
included groups such as the “We are all Khaled Said” movement that helped organize the first
protests in January and the Revolution Youth Coalition, which brings together representatives
of the Muslim Brotherhood, the FJP’s youth movement and the National Association for
Change, among others. Through their continued presence in Tahrir Square, the youth
movements in Egypt have pressed the SCAF to transfer power to a civilian government and
have attempted to stay involved in the political scene.
49.
Non-secular parties won with an overwhelming majority in most districts in Egypt in the
parliamentary elections. Some argue that this is due to that new groups such as the secular
youth groups have had little chance to organize themselves into coherent political parties before
the elections. Many parties and groups were new to the scene and struggled to create a
significant support base in time for the elections. Under Mubarak’s rule, Egyptians had
witnessed the systematic dismantlement of anything but the loyal and largely token opposition.
As a result, the political parties and groups were anything but prepared to stand in elections
following the removal of the Mubarak regime. The political expertise in the country had been
kept at a minimum and been under a one-party system. The political society needed to be
reconstructed. Many groups demanded that the elections should be postponed in order for new
parties to stand a better chance, creating more democratic and fair elections. Parties and
organizations that had had some sort of presence before the revolution became the main players
on the political scene. The Muslim Brotherhood was the most well organized opposition group
prior to the revolution giving them a clear head start in the elections. The group was already at
the time of the overturn of the regime in a position to start campaigning and the FJP were quick
to form people's committees in towns and villages promoting the FJP. Other groups organized
before the elections were some members of the former regime as well as some of the Salafi
groups.
50.
The People’s Assembly began its first session on 23 January and Saad al Katatny won the vote
to become the first head of the new Parliament. Katatny was the General Secretary of the
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and had to turn down his position within the party after
winning the election and becoming a member of the lower house.
51.
The first session began with the members of parliament reciting the Qur’an for those who died
during the revolution in 2011, and promising to “look after the revolution and its demands in
honor of the martyrs.” The Islamists’ dominance was obvious, not only due to the fact that
many representatives had beards but especially due to the chaotic scene that unfolded when
some lawmakers improvised religious additions to the text of the oath of office they were
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
taking. The additions provoked angry protests from the interim speaker, Mahmoud Al Saqqah
of the liberal al Wafd party. The oath ends with a pledge to respect the constitution and the law,
but several Islamist electives added “God’s law” or “as long as there are no contradictions with
God's law”. However, also pro-reform lawmakers made their own addition, two of them
pledging to “continue the revolution” and “be loyal to its martyrs”.
52.
While the newly elected parliamentarians read their oaths, thousands of Egyptians protested in
Tahrir and in the roads leading to the parliament building. The protesters wanted to remind the
newly elected parliamentarians of their duties and to warn them not to ignore the demands of
the people. Some protesters expressed their views that the People's Assembly was all Islamists,
others the need for the SCAF to hand over power. A young protester named Mina Samir stated
“Now we have a military power supporting a conservative power. That's why I am here.” Some
protesters commemorated the people killed during the uprising, wearing photos of the martyrs.
53.
Meanwhile, Muslim Brotherhood volunteers escorted FJP representatives into the parliament
building, others waited outside parliament with flowers for the electives. The atmosphere was
one of celebration, people chanting religious songs to the beat of drums. Adel Musbah, a
supporter of the Salafi Al Nour party stated that “Democracy brought the people (who are)
inside the building now. They were elected by the people”.
54.
Parliament has many challenging tasks ahead such as appointing a 100-member constituent
assembly that will draft Egypt’s new constitution. The parliament also has other critical changes
to implement: election of the president of the republic, transfer of all governmental powers to an
elected civilian leadership, dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and the
army’s return to its camps. It is perhaps too early to identify how the “new” order will be
carried out, but most likely it will be characterized by a long power struggle. Egypt continues to
face some dramatic changes which will affect the processes throughout the Middle East.
55.
The non-secular domination of Egypt’s parliament is argued to be setting a religious tone to the
new legislature, which will be tasked with forming a committee to write a new constitution. The
non-secular domination in parliament also facilitates a more religious interpretation of the
current legislation. Following the establishment of the new parliament two high-profile court
cases for insulting religion under arbitrary laws dating from the Mubarak administration have
been observed as a proof of the more “Islamic” interpretation of legislation. The world famous
telecommunications entrepreneur Naguib Sawiris, a Christian, was on two occasions accused of
showing contempt for religion, meaning Islam, but the cases were dismissed. The cases were
brought by Islamists belonging to the Al Nour party and the FJP.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
C. The Upper House of Parliament – Majliss al - Shura
56.
The first phase of the Upper House of Parliament (the Shura Council) elections commenced in
13 governorates on 29 January 2012. The Shura Council elections were held in two stages, with
the first on 29/30 January including Cairo, Alexandria, Gharbiya, Daqahaliya , Menoufiya,
Damietta, North Sinai, South Sinai, Fayoum, Assiut, Qena, the Red Sea and New Valley and
the second stage on 14/15 February including Giza, Qalioubiya, Sharqiya, Beheira, Kafr Al
Sheikh, Ismailiya, Port Said, Suez, Marsa Matrouh, Beni Suef, Minya, Sohag, Luxor and
Aswan. First-stage runoffs was held on 7 February and second-stage run-offs on 22 February.
57.
The Shura Council total membership is 270 (six seats more than the previous Shura Council),
180 elected via proportional representation list system from 30 constituencies and 60 seats
elected via individual candidacy system from 30 constituencies. The number of seats appointed
by president (at this point the SCAF) is 90.
58.
The number of candidates running for the Shura Council individual candidacy seats was 2,036
for 60 seats. The number of party (or party-coalition) lists competing for Shura Council
proportional representation seats were 272 lists for 130 seats.
59.
The turnout for the Shura Council elections was lower than that of the People’s Assembly. 25
million Egyptians were eligible to vote in the Shura elections yet only 10 per cent participated.
This is due to the advisory role of the Shura Council. The FJP won 58.8 percent of the seats in
the Shura Council elections; a total of 107 seats, including 57 seats in the party list races and 50
seats in the single-winner races, followed by the Al Nour party, which won 25.5 percent of the
seats which means 46 seats. The rest of the seats are shared by liberal parties.
60.
On 28 February, the FJP voted itself the chairmanship of nine of 13 Shura Council committees.
The Al Nour party won chairmanship of two committees and the liberal Democratic Egypt and
Hadara parties won chairmanships of one committee each. The FJP won the chairmanships of
the education, agricultural production, culture, media, tourism, transport and communications,
legislative, financial and economic affairs, Arab and foreign affairs, human development, local
administration and health committees. The Al Nour party won chairmanship of the housing
committee and the youth and sports committees, while the Democratic Egypt Party won
chairmanship of the human rights committee and the Hadara party won chairmanship of the
industry and energy committee.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
IV.
The Political Landscape
A. Al Thaluf Al Dimuqrati (The Democratic Alliance for Egypt)
61.
The Democratic Alliance was the first significant political bloc created after the revolution. The
alliance’s founding statement from 14 June states that the alliance is committed to the principles
of democracy and a civil state; one of the main objectives being to secure a representative
parliament that would lead to a government of national unity. The alliance included a broad
spectrum of parties with different orientations and was an attempt to bridge the gap between
Islamist, non-Islamist and leftist parties. When the alliance was first established in June 2011, it
included 28 parties and incorporated three ideological trends: Islamist parties, including the
FJP, the Building and Development Party, and the al Asala and al Fadila parties; liberal secular
parties, including the al Wafd party, al Ghad al Jedid, al Karama and al Ahrar; left-of-center
parties, including the Nasserite Party, the Egyptian Labor Party, the Arab Socialist Party and al
Geel. At its peak The Democratic Alliance included over forty parties. However, due to the
ideological differences and the power struggle between parties, the alliance experienced
considerable internal tension and several parties left the alliance. Despite this fact, the
Democratic Alliance does consistently well in the polls.
62.
By the time candidate registration closed on October 24 the alliance had shrunk to 11 parties:
the FJP, al Ghad al Jedid and al Karama, plus eight other small and virtually unknown parties.
The Islamist parties, including the Al Nour party, left the alliance leaving the FJP to be the
dominant force with the alliance. Its candidates account for about 70 percent of the names on
the Alliance’s list and 90 percent of those running for the independent seats. Al Karama party
nominated sixteen candidates, including three for single-winner seats, while al Ghad nominated
fifteen candidates.
63.
After the formation of the alliance, it soon saw the withdrawal of the al Adl Party, al Tagammu
Party, the Democratic Front Party, and the Egypt Freedom Party, which joined the Egypt Bloc
in August. Al Adl party withdrew from the party at an early stage, announcing that it did not
wish to cooperate with groups that had been loyal to the former regime. The Al Tagammu
announced it would exit the alliance in relation to a controversy during the demonstrations held
on 29 July 2011. The party claimed that during the demonstrations, Islamist activists failed to
adhere to the demonstrations’ formal demands which were agreed upon in advance, and instead
promoted slogans calling for the establishment of an “Islamic state” and the implementation of
Sharia law. The Democratic Front Party withdrew on grounds that a partnership with Islamist
groups is inconsistent with the party’s liberal principles. The Egypt Freedom party left the
alliance alleging that other the members of the grouping were not serious about developing the
principles that would guide constitution-drafting efforts.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
64.
On 15 October, a number of other minor parties also left the Democratic Alliance, including the
Arab Nasserite Party, the Building and Development Party, al Fadila and al Asala. In early
September, the Al Nour party left the alliance and later founded an Islamist alliance. The Al
Nour party had been concerned that the secular parties were too highly represented and that the
party would not top the electoral lists: al Wafd intended to run for 40 percent of the
parliamentary seats, and the FJP 33.5 percent which only left 26.5 percent for other parties in
the alliance. Al Asala and the Building and Development Party joined the Al Nour party’s new
Islamist Alliance, and with their departure the FJP became the only Islamist party in the
Democratic Alliance. The Al Nour party succeeded in convincing two other Salafist parties, the
Asala (Authenticity) and Fadila (Virtue) parties, to leave the Democratic Coalition as well.
Soon Al Gamaa Al Islamiya's Construction and Development Party also left the coalition due to
disputes over ranking in the lists, as well as the Islamic Action and Arab Unity Party. Thus on
the Egyptian political spectrum, the Muslim Brotherhood was on one side and all the other
Islamists were on another.
65.
The political split between the Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood became clear when the Al Nour
Party formed the Islamist Alliance, soon joined by other Islamist parties such as Al Asala and
Building and Development parties. Political observers believe that the Islamist Bloc and the
Democratic Alliance will compete for the votes in pro-Islamist constituencies such as
Alexandria. Nader Bakkar of Al Nour told Al Ahram Online that the parties made an agreement
to avoid competing for the same single-winner seats, something that FJP officials denied.
However, the FJP and the Al Nour Party signed a document that commits both sides to clean
and fair competition in their electoral face-off.
66.
The perhaps most damaging adjustment was the departure of the al Wafd party. The liberal al
Wafd Party was previously the main secular partner in the alliance and ended up in a power
struggle with the FJP. Al Wafd accused the FJP of reneging on the agreed-upon position on
constitutional principles. In July al Wafd left the alliance but the leadership of al Wafd was
deeply divided over the issue and some prominent members left the party in protest, including
Alaa Abdel Monem, Mostafa Al Guindi and Mona Makram Ebeid, who subsequently joined the
Egyptian Bloc. In October, al Wafd finally decided to stand on a different electoral list than that
of the FJP. Instead of the original electoral list formula, al Wafd and the FJP agreed to allow
members of the Democratic Alliance to run for parliament on either of two lists, one led by al
Wafd, and another by the FJP.
67.
The split between al Wafd and the FJP eroded the claim of the trans-ideological Democratic
Alliance and the original objective of bridging the gap between Islamic and secular parties.
Even though the official stand was that the split was due to the wish to run on two lists giving
more seats to each party, the underlying reason was most likely the incompatibility of al Wafd’s
secular platform and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist agenda. However, the al Wafd party
still withholds its alliance to the Democratic Alliance. The Democratic Alliance has been
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
diverted from the original objective, namely an all-encompassing alliance that seeks to unite all
political parties in guiding Egypt through the ongoing “transition.” The alliance now needs to
compete with both Islamist and secular groups. The domination of FJP candidates on the
electoral lists also suggests that the alliance no longer is a multiparty partnership, but a FJP
directed initiative.
B. Al Kotla Al Masriya (The Egyptian Bloc)
68.
The main liberal alliance was formed on 15 August and called the Egyptian Bloc. The Egyptian
Bloc originally included fourteen liberal and leftist political parties, which aimed to contest all
seats in the elections with a unified list of candidates. The bloc was fragmented, at one point
including 21 political groups, but today consists of three parties, the Free Egyptians Party,
which received 50 percent of the places on the lists, the Social Democratic Party, which got 40
percent, and al Tagammu, which got 10 percent. The bloc entered the lower house elections
with 412 candidates contesting all 332 party list seats available in the lower house, in addition
to fielding eighty out of 166 candidates for single-winner seat races.
69.
The primary founding members of the bloc included the National Association for Change, the
Free Egyptians Party, the Democratic Front Party, the Egypt Freedom Party, al Tagammu, and
the Sufi Egyptian Liberation Party, the only party in the Bloc with a religious orientation. Alaa
Eddin Abdel Moneim, Mostafa al Guindi and Mona Makram Obeid, three prominent members
of the al Wafd Party, broke off from al Wafd to join the Egyptian Bloc.
70.
Some parties left the bloc due to disagreement regarding party representation on the electoral
list. Another issue was the presence of former NDP members on the bloc’s list and the “lack of
transparency” in the candidate selection process. By 17 October, six parties had withdrawn
from the Egyptian Bloc including the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, the Sufi Egyptian
Liberation Party, the Egypt Freedom Party, the Egyptian Communist Party, the Equality and
Development Party, and the Union for Independent Farmers. The Democratic Front Party and
the Tahrir Sufi Party also left the Egyptian Bloc, announcing that they planned to contest the
elections on independent lists. The Egyptian Bloc’s officials and its High Commission for
Electoral Coordination denied that former NDP members where on the party lists. However, a
Free Egyptian Party official once stated that the bloc’s list included eight former NDP
members; however, none of them had been engaged in corrupt practices. The Socialist Popular
Alliance and the Egypt Freedom Party later formed the Revolution Continues Alliance.
71.
Hani Seri Al Din, the head of the Free Egyptians Party, stated that the three-party alliance was a
strategic alliance between the country's liberal parties fighting for a democratic country based
on equality between all citizens and a socially-oriented market economy. The Egyptian Bloc is
argued to be the most ideologically cohesive coalition in Egypt. The Bloc’s platform includes
realizing the revolution’s ideals of a democracy and emphasis on a “civil state” replacing the
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
debated “secular state”. The Egyptian Bloc opposes “exploitation of religion for political
purposes” and the transformation of Egypt into an Islamic state. However, the Egyptian Bloc
has not rejected Islam within the political system and has supported the al Azhar proposition of
constitutional principles, which declares Islam to be the official religion of Egypt and its main
source of legislation. However, the bloc also includes the unlikely combination of the Free
Egyptians Party, known for its pro-business orientations, and the socialist Al Tagammu which
in many aspects has an economic vision that the Free Egyptians opposes.
72.
The main competitor of the bloc is the Democratic Alliance which is often found on the
opposite sides of political debates; the Bloc stressed prior to the elections that the elections
should be delayed in order to allow parties to organize themselves, while the Democratic
Alliance argued for elections to be held as scheduled. The Egyptian Bloc has accused the FJP of
“hijacking” the elections using religious slogans in their campaigning, and aiming to dominate
politics even if it comes at the expense of national interests.
C. Al Tahaluf al Islamiya (The Islamist Alliance/ Alliance for Egypt)
73.
The non-secular parties formed a new coalition named the Islamist Alliance, many of them
being former members of the Democratic Alliance. On 29 September the formation of the
alliance was announced by the Al Nour party. The alliance also included the al Asala Party and
al Gama’a al Islamiyya’s Building and Development Party. The al Fadila and al Amal parties,
and the conservative Islamist al Tawheed al Arabi Party, was at one point expected to join the
Islamist Alliance but was unable to finalize an agreement by the end of the candidate
registration period. The Islamist Alliance also approached liberal parties including al Wasat and
al Reyada which both declined to join the alliance, allegedly due to time constraints.
74.
The alliance represents a more ideologically conservative Islamism than the FJP and the
ideological platform differs from that of FJP in terms of the “Islamic frame of reference” and
details of the application of Islamic law. They also differ with regard to foreign policy, the
Islamist Alliance having a more hardline stance with regard to the peace treaty with Israel and
relations with the West.
75.
The objective of the alliance was to run Salafi candidates in every province in order to
maximize the Islamist presence in the parliament. The Islamist Alliance had 693 candidates in
the parliamentary elections and announced that it would contest all seats available for election.
The Al Nour party presented 610 candidates to the alliance’s electoral lists, including 477
candidates for the parliament’s lower house, and 133 candidates for the upper house.
Menawhile, Al Asala and the Building and Development part competed for forty and forty-five
seats respectively; the alliance is clearly dominated by the Al Nour party.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
76.
The alliance will compete for seats in all of Egypt’s governorates, except for Sinai. The former
regime prevented Salafist movements from operating in Sinai and so the support for the Islamist
Alliance in the region is weak. The Al Nour party’s strongest support base is in Alexandria and
so the party competed for a considerable number of the parliamentary seats available in the
region, while Al Asala’s candidates focused on electoral races in the Cairo area. The Al Asala is
backed by famous Salafist figures such as Mohamed Hassan and Mohamed Hussein Yacoub,
attracting a strong support base from Salafists in the capital. The Building and Development
Party focused on Upper Egypt.
77.
The Islamist Alliance’s parties’ positions on women and minority rights are controversial,
which gained a lot of attention during the elections. The Al Nour party has emphasized that men
and women are equal with respect to human dignity, but also underscores “the importance of
maintaining differences in their human and social roles.” At a press conference, an Al Gamaa
Al Islamiya spokesperson told reporters: “Islam guarantees women their appropriate and
sufficient rights. [Former first lady] Suzanne Mubarak gave women [in Egypt] more than their
lawful rights and that is not acceptable.” The Islamist Alliance’s electoral lists include sixty
female candidates. The announcement that the alliance would have female electoral candidates
stirred considerable controversy among the party’s supporters since many Salafists do not
believe that women should vote, let alone run for office. The Al Nour leader Emad Abd Al
Ghafour responded by explaining that the move was more or less a strategic one and did not
represent the alliance’s position on women. He stressed that the decision to present female
candidates on the electoral list was stipulated by the electoral law but that female candidates
would remain at the end of the list and would therefore have a very small chance of securing
representation.
78.
Al Nour party has stated that it is willing to consider presenting Coptic candidates, as long as
those candidates represent the party’s platform. However, no Coptic candidates were fielded in
the elections.
D. Thawra Mostamira/ Istikmal al Thawra (The Revolution Continues Alliance/ The
Completing of the Revolution Alliance)
79.
The Revolution Continues Alliance is made up primarily of former members of the Egypt Bloc,
such as the Egypt Freedom Party and the Socialist Popular Alliance Party. The formation of the
alliance was announced in October 2011, and its members include the Socialist Popular
Alliance Party (which made up 50 percent of the coalition's candidates), Egypt Freedom Party,
Egyptian Current Party, the Sufi Egyptian Liberation Party, al Nahda, the Equality and
Development Party, the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, the Youth Movement for Justice and
Freedom, and the Union of Independent Farmers. The alliance includes socialist, liberal, and
moderate Islamist parties and the ideological platform tilts towards that of the youth parties.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
80.
The alliance nominated 300 candidates with 27 electoral lists, with three pending lists. In
addition to the lists, three candidates ran independently under the alliance: Nagwa Abbas in
Cairo’s Nasr City district, Ahmed Suleiman in Port Said and Anise Al Bayyaa in Demiat.
81.
According to Khaled Abdel Hamid, a member of the Revolution Youth Coalition, there are
three main principles attributed to the alliance. First, the goals of the revolution are not yet
achieved and so the revolution must go one by removing the remnants of the Mubarak regime
that are still ruling the country and transferring power from the SCAF as soon as possible.
Second, a need to focus on social justice, including setting a minimum and maximum wage,
obtaining freedom for labor unions, and providing job opportunities. Third, rejecting any person
who was directly or indirectly associated with the NDP or Mubarak’s regime.
82.
Members of the alliance such as Abdel Ghaffar Shukr, the founder of the Socialist Popular
Alliance Party, has argued that the alliance has a large numbers of women, Copts and youth
members, more so than any other alliance or coalition. The alliance’s ideological platform
focuses on issues of redistribution of wealth in order to narrow the socio-economic gap between
Egyptians, a democratic form of government with full equality for women and religious
minorities and the right to freedom of expression and assembly. Finally, the alliance expresses
concern over Egypt’s foreign policy and calls for ending Egypt’s dependence on the United
States.
E. Other Alliances
83.
Attempts have been made to form other alliances; in August, the al Adl party attempted to form
a third coalition called the “Third Way” or Center Coalition, as an alternative to the Democratic
Alliance and the Egyptian Bloc. The “Third Way” would support the establishment of a civil
state and a constitution affirming civil liberties, but be culturally conservative and put emphasis
on the Arab and Islamic identity of Egypt. Al Wasat, and the Egyptian Current Party, expressed
interest to join the alliance, but in the end declined to join.
84.
Many parties were unaffiliated with alliances and ran on their own independent electoral lists.
This included al Wafd, the Democratic Front Party, the Nasserite Party, and the Arab Labor
Party. Several new parties formed by former National Democratic Party (NDP) members also
ran on independent lists (or as independents), such as the al Itihad party which is affiliated with
the former secretary-general of the NDP, Hossam Badrawy. The moderate Islamist al Wasat,
the Salafi al Amal and al Tawheed al Arabi parties are also officially unaffiliated.
85.
Due to the domination of the FJP in the parliament, worries were heard across the political
spectrum that the party would sideline other parties. Talks between secular and non-secular
parties such as the Al Nour Party, the Free Egyptians and the al Wafd party began in response
to the fear that the FJP would monopolize key legislative positions including the positions for
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
the parliament president, the deputies and the heads of its 19 committees. The initiative began
with the Al Nour party, which reached out to rival secular and liberal political groups behindthe-scenes in an attempt to unify against the FJP. Such an alliance would be difficult to reach
and even harder to maintain, given the large differences in their ideologies. The Parliament is
not controlled by a unified Islamist front, but that Islamists are divided, making decisions not
purely on a religious basis. The Brotherhood and the Salafists, even though both are Islamist
movements and naturally would seem compatible allies, do not stand unified and on the
contrary have displayed frequent friction during the election campaign.
86.
During the second stage of the elections it was increasingly evident that the secular block and
parties would only achieve minimal representation in the new Parliament. Political analysts
argued that the loss might be attributed to the presence of numerous candidates with similar
ideologies, which split the secular vote, hindering the secular candidates from competing with
Islamist candidates. In the second stage of elections secular groups such as the al Wafd, the al
Adl, the Egyptian Bloc, the Revolution Continues Coalition (RCC) and others, met several
times in an attempt to coordinate in competition for some individual seats. Candidates from the
al Adl party and the Egyptian Bloc withdrew in favor of RCC candidate Khaled Talima in the
single-winner seat in Giza’s fifth district. An Egyptian Bloc candidate also withdrew from the
individual professional seat in Giza’s third district, in support of an independent candidate,
political scientist Amr Al Shobaki. Some of the parties also withdrew their candidates to aid
RCC candidate Islam Lotfy in Giza. The change of tactics was however too late and the parties
remained in competition in the remainder of single-winner and all list-based elections. Hala
Mustafa, editor-in-chief of Al Ahram Quarterly Democracy Review stated that “There should
have been complete collaboration before the start of the elections”.
87.
In addition, during the second stage of the elections some civil society organizations suggested
complete coordination on individual seats, but the secular coalitions rejected the initiative. Even
though the parties ranged in ideology from far-left to moderate liberal within every secular
alliance, ideological differences did not fully explain the reluctance to collaborate. Hala
Mustafa explained that personal political aspirations were also standing in the way and that the
idea of teamwork is not well-founded in Egypt.
88.
The FJP remains short of the 255 seats required for an overall majority, and will need to look to
for an alliance with other parliamentary forces in order to implement its decisions. In midJanuary Saad El Katatny, the FJP Secretary General, said that a meeting would take place
between the FJP and the al Wafd officials to discuss the possibility of coordinating the parties’
agendas in the upcoming parliament. Liberals are concerned that the FJP and the Al Nour party
are likely to unite, especially when it comes to pseudo-religious issues such as imposing stricter
censorship. However, the FJP has denied an alleged alliance with the Al Nour Party, and
confirmed that the only electoral alliance is with the Democratic Alliance. The FJP criticized
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
media of undermining the party and falsely accusing the FJP for attempting (together with the
Al Nour party) to form an “Islamist government”.
89.
However, when considering the two major parties in parliament closer it seems as if the gap
between them has actually increased. Both parties advocate implementing Islamic law in every
area of life, but they have different religious interpretations regarding the means to implement
such objectives. Before the revolution the Salafists objected to political participation and their
public activity was rather limited. Their achievements at the polls present a dramatic entry into
the arena of political parties and the al Nour party is today the second largest party in the
parliament. The Al Nour party and the FJP will have to compete for the conservative religious
votes. The FJP has gone out of their way to form a coalition without the Al Nour party.
However, this will not prevent ad hoc cooperation on parliamentary issues between the two
parties.
90.
Mohamed Zahran, an expert in Islamist movements, believes that the real reason behind al
Nour’s (as well as the other Salafist parties) departure from the Democratic Alliance was due to
ideological differences. One of the main contentious issues concerned the position of Copts in
the alliance and on the electoral lists. The FJP had indicated that it intended to field Coptic
candidates in the forthcoming elections, such as the Coptic thinker Rafiq Habib, the vicepresident of the FJP.
91.
Even though these events indicate a divide, Islamist declarations of solidarity can still be heard.
The Salafi leader Yasser Burhami said that Salafis should support Muslim Brotherhood
candidates in the parliamentary elections and his opinion was quickly seconded by another
major Salafi leader, Sheikh Mohamed Hassan, who announced on a satellite television program
that the Salafis would stand behind the Muslim Brotherhood in the forthcoming phase. The
Muslim Brotherhood is by many Salafis considered the political force that, apart from the
Salafi, is best equipped to lead the country and is the closest in terms of ideas and principle.
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V.
Party Profiles
Al Wasat (The Center Party)
Founded: 1995
Key Figures: Abul Al Ela Madi, Mohamed Selim El Awa
Religious Scale: Islamist
Ideological Scale: Moderate
92.
Al Wasat was founded in 1996 when a group of young members of the Muslim Brotherhood
left the group to form a new political party. Abu Al Ela Madi formed the party and was assisted
by Brotherhood defectors Salah ‘Abd al Karim and Essam Sultan. The party’s ideological
platform originates from the Wasatiyya (Centrist) school of thought, a liberal interpretive
tradition in Islamic thought which seeks to interpret its principles in a manner consistent with
the values of a liberal democratic system.
93.
Al Wasat applied for legal party status in 1996, 1998, 2004, and 2009, but was denied. Despite
its lack of legal status al Wasat cooperated with other parties and organizations in efforts to
bring about political reform. It was allowed to register in 2011 after fifteen years of
unsuccessful efforts. Al Wasat was first a member of the Democratic Alliance, but left on 2
October. The party joined talks with the Third Way Alliance and the Islamist Alliance but
finally competed in the elections on an unaffiliated independent list.
94.
Al Ahram’s Mohamed Hafez argued that the party attracts Islamist youth, with ambitions for
political involvement differing from a classical Islamist perspective, or who seek a party that
can reconcile authenticity with modernity along the lines of the Turkish Justice and
Development Party. The party has a sophisticated platform and an intellectual and strong social
structure of its leaders, organizers and ideologists.
95.
Platform:

No discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, race, color, status or wealth including for
selection of the President of the Republic

Respect for all human rights, including civil, political, social, economic and cultural
according to divine laws and international conventions

Respect peaceful transfers of power and implement term limits for core positions at the top
of the political structure

Abolish all laws restricting the freedom of press and media
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Free flow of information, including from international sources

Activate associations, unions, clubs, etc. to facilitate a healthy civil society

Secure the right to strike, protest and gather publicly and peacefully

Expansion of positions that are directly elected by the people

The market cannot achieve social justice, and therefore the state must implement some
political control over the market by implementing development projects to increase income
among the poor, not by a mere redistribution of wealth

Environmental protection cannot be achieved by the market, which does not consider
environmental gain and loss; only state enterprises can take into consideration the
environmental

An independent central bank is essential for stable monetary policy and price control

The state should invest in infrastructure and public works projects and provide incentives
for private investment

A balanced economy is essential, including manufacturing, construction, services and
especially agriculture

Egypt should be self-sufficient in key foods such as wheat

Insurance and pensions should be separate from the general state budget so that they cannot
be abused or used to cover deficits

Expand tax exemption to include more of the middle class

Guarantee equal citizenship rights to all Egyptians, regardless of religion, sex, race, status,
or wealth

Abolish all emergency laws and special courts, and limit the scope of such laws to actual
catastrophes

Impose term limits on the presidency and reduce the powers of the executive branch

Support free elections and allowing a peaceful transfer of power

Ensure the right to form political parties, associations and all civil society institutions

Promote transparency and accountability in government

Alleviate hardship for the lower and middle classes
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Control inflation

Achieve higher, balanced growth rates in all sectors of the economy to satisfy the basic
needs of the population

Support investment in the private sector

Encourage communities to fight poverty through local development projects and zakat
(alms) institutions

Reaffirm the social and moral characteristics of Arab-Islamic civilization

Introduce comprehensive educational reforms and combating illiteracy

Provide universal health insurance to all Egyptians and improving the quality of public
hospitals

Prioritize relationships with Sudan and Nile Basin countries

Support efforts to resolve the Palestinian question

Encourage cooperation between Arab countries in military, political, economic and cultural
affairs
Al Wafd (The Delegation Party)
Founded: 1978
Key Figures: Sayyid al Badawi (Party Chairman), Osama Heikal (Minister of Information,
former editor al Wafd newspaper)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Left
96.
Al Wafd (officially the New Al Wafd) has a long history and the well-established party is
seeking to find their place in the new revolutionary climate in Egypt. The party is the successor
of an organization Gamal Abdel Nasser disbanded in 1952 and was officially re-established in
1978 when President Anwar Sadat introduced limited pluralism into the political process. Al
Wafd has long struggled with internal divisions, aging leaders and lack of dynamism. The
situation worsened further when Ayman Nour resigned from the party and launched the al Ghad
Party in 2004, taking with him almost a quarter of the party’s members. The party consisted
mainly of members of the business elites and Copts. The party has had trouble holding on to
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
members as well as attracting new ones. The business elites later transferred to the National
Democratic Party and many Copts left when al Wafd entered into a short-lived electoral alliance
with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1984.
97.
During the protests in 2011 the secretary-general of the party, Monir Fakhri Abdel Nour,
accepted a position as minister of tourism in the new cabinet formed by Prime Mister Ahmed
Shafiq. The decision to join the new cabinet alienated many party members since it was
considered affiliated with the old regime.
98.
After the uprising in 2011the situation did still not improve, even though the leadership was
transferred from Fouad Siraj al Din to Noman Gomaa. Today the party is competing with new
liberal parties that cannot claim a historical name and legacy, but have younger and more
dynamic leaders.
99.
The party participated in the first round of voting, but then announced that it would not
participate in the second round because elections were fraudulent. In the first round the party
won only two seats but in the second round it went on to win six seats since the names of its
candidates were not removed from the ballot in time. Due to the party calling for an election
boycott the party was unable to claim its seats.
100.
Al Wafd was originally a member of the Democratic Alliance, but finally left the alliance on 7
October to run independently. Prominent party members recommended in August that the party
should leave the Democratic Alliance and join the Egypt Bloc. Some prominent members
switched alliances, further weakening the party and adding to the impression of uncertainty.
101.
Platform:

Impose a two-term limit on the presidency and decrease the power of the president

Enforce separation of powers between the three branches of government and ensure the
independence of the judiciary, particularly of the Supreme Constitutional Court

Ensure human rights and democracy

Abolishe all special security courts and repeal the emergency law

Require the nomination of a vice president

Enact a law allowing the prosecution of ministers and members of the executive branch

Eliminate corruption from judicial appointments, which should be based solely on the basis
of merit and service
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Give the parliament the right to accept or reject any bill without having to consent to
conditions or amendments mandated by the executive

Ensure free and fair elections without corruption

Repeal all laws that restrict the exercise of civil liberties

Guarantee freedom of expression for any idea that does not contradict public morality

Protect privacy rights, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and freedom to form
trade unions

Develop a free private sector and limiting the public sector to crucial areas that affect the
general welfare, including basic services such as health care, electricity, water, telephone,
roads and security

Forbid monopolies of all types

Ensure freedom of trade and commerce, allowing supply and demand, not the government,
to dictate the market

Deregulate the banking industry, especially by abrogating regulations that hinder investment

Improve the education of the Egyptian populace while not neglecting spirituality and
religion in the educational system

Promote alternative forms of education to increase literacy, including online and distance
education

Restore Egypt’s role as regional leader through its strategic position in the Arab world

Strengthen the Arab League and use diplomacy to mediate differences so Arabs can arrive
at common positions

Work to establish a common Arab market

Strengthen democracy throughout the Arab world by making Egypt a model for the region

Support a free and independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital

Reject the label of terrorism as applied to violent resistance to Israeli occupation

Pressure Israel through all means to withdraw from the occupied territories, but respect all
international agreements signed between the Palestinians and the Israelis
36
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Ensure that the strategic Egyptian-American relationship remains strong but that it is based
upon a balance of interests

Reject the U.S. bias toward the state of Israel and the use of U.S. aid to Egypt since the
peace treaty of 1979 to serve the interests of America or Israel

Reject the U.S. doctrine of preemptive and preventative wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

Condition normal relations with Israel on the return of the entire West Bank and Gaza to the
Palestinians, the Golan to Syria, and the remaining Lebanese territories to Lebanon and on
the closure of the nuclear reactor at Dimona

An economic open-door policy

The opening of foreign banks in Egypt

Price stabilization

Development of the production sectors

Introduction of a new lending policy

A strong public sector

Rationalized subsidies on staple commodities

A link between prices and salaries

A just and durable peace in the Middle East

That Israel stands in breach of the Camp David Accords which renders them invalid

To highlight and deepen Arab and Islamic relations

Solve the Palestinian question

Egyptian-Sudanese integration

To develop Egyptian-African relations

Promotes neutralism and non-alignment
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Al Tagammu (National Progressive Unionist Party)
Founded: 7 July, 1976
Key Figures: Rifaat Al Said (Secretary General), Mohamed Farag (Assistant Secretary General)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Left-wing
102.
Al Tagammu is one of the oldest Egyptian parties and was founded in 1976 by former Free
Officer Khaled Moheiddin. The party included a diverse coalition of former Nasserites,
Marxists and Arab nationalists, and advocated the establishment of a socialist society through
the process of popular participation. The party has since moderated its position and lost the
support it once had among intellectuals, labor union leaders and workers. It is in serious decline
under an aging leadership, struggling to find its place in a changing political scene. Prior to the
2011 uprising, it had become increasingly reconciled with the Mubarak regime.
103.
After the uprising, it first joined the Democratic Alliance but left to become a founding member
of the Egypt Bloc. The party left the Democratic Alliance after the Islamist-organized protests
in Tahrir Square on July 29, 2011. The Tagammu Party demanded an apology from the FJP and
the Salafi parties for their behavior during the protest.
104.
Platform:

Maintain a strong state to protect its citizens from economic exploitation

Advocate democracy as the only guarantor to stability and the peaceful transfer of power

Nationalize major industries and resources so that they belong to the Egyptian citizens

Support redistribution of wealth to achieve social justice

Oppose continuation of Mubarak-era privatization to push for economic reform

Solidarity amongst all Arab nations

Reject American and Israeli imperialism in the Middle East

Allow trade unions and NGOs to operate freely without government oversight or
intervention

Create social programs to empower youth and women
38
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Guarantee judicial supervision of elections

Abolish the state of emergency

Guarantee the independence of the judiciary branch

Protect civil liberties, including the right to form political parties and the right to stage
peaceful demonstrations

End government regulation of print and broadcast media and implement legal safeguards to
protect the freedom of the press

Expand employment opportunities in the public sector

Ensure that the government provides adequate public services

Guarantee reasonable prices for basic commodities and suppress inflation

Regulate water consumption and invest in the development of sustainable energy sources

Promote solidarity among the Arab states and strengthen regional institutions such as the
Arab League

Support the Palestinian cause and oppose the normalization of ties with Israel
Al Masry al Dimuqrati al Igtima’i (The Egyptian Social Democratic Party)
Founded: March, 2011
Key Figures: Mohamed Nour Farhat (Trustee, Director of the Department of Law, Zagazig
University), Mervat Tallawy (Trustee, diplomat, former UN Secretary of the Economic and
Social Commission for Western Asia), Makram Mehni (Trustee, chairman of Egypt’s largest
pharmaceutical company Global Napy), Hani Naguib (Executive Director)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Leftist, Social Democracy
105.
The Egyptian Social Democratic Party was founded in March 2011 following the January 2011
uprising and was given official recognition on 3 July 2011. It is a founding member of the
Egypt Bloc and the second largest party in the Bloc in representation on electoral lists.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
106.
The party is liberal emphasizing social-democratic principles in its platform. It is committed to
democratic principles in political, social and economic affairs. The party stresses the importance
of social justice and equality among citizens of every religion, race, gender and status.
107.
Amr Hamzawy was a founding member of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, but broke off
from the party in April 2011 due to a disagreement concerning a public statement made by the
party and later formed the Egypt Freedom Party.
108.
Platform:

Ensure civil, political, economic, and social rights for all individuals who will allow them to
reach their full potential and achieve their productive energies

Support a modern, civil, democratic state where all citizens are equal in rights and duties
regardless of seeks, color, religion, race, wealth, or political affiliation

Advocate a democracy based upon rule of law

Support a market economy with social justice

Advocate minimum guaranteed income

Ensure adequate healthcare and housing

Support equal opportunity and a fair distribution of resources including to all governorates
of Egypt

Ensure economic development through public infrastructure spending which will stimulate
the economy

Maintain a clean environment by preserving natural resources in a sustainable way for
future generations

Advocate a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians based upon the internationally
agreed upon resolutions leading to a Palestinian state

Support the right of self-determination for all peoples

Stop the arms race between regimes in the Middle East including making the region free of
Weapons of Mass Destruction

Respect for personal freedom

Citizenship regardless of political association, religion, gender or race
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

State-provided security, education and health insurance

Guaranteed political participation, even for those abroad

Equal opportunities, adequate housing and a minimum income

Decentralized government institutional power

Protection of the environment and natural resources

Free market that respects social justice

Raise spending on health, education and aid for the poor

The promotion of Egyptian and foreign investment

Equitable distribution of national good and income

Promote global and regional peace and the disarmament of nuclear weapons

Committed to the Palestinian people’s right to an independent state
Al Nour (The Light Party)
Founded: 2011
Key Figures: Emad el Din Abdel Ghany (founder)
Religious Scale: Salafi, Islamist
Ideological Scale: Right-wing, Conservative
109.
The Al Nour party was founded after the January 2011 uprising. It was the first Salafi political
organization to submit a request to be recognized as an official political party, in May 2011, and
the party was granted official status on 12 June 2011. The party was originally a member of the
Democratic Alliance, but left the alliance in September 2011, and became the founding member
and largest party of the Islamist Alliance. The party’s
stronghold is in Alexandria, where the Salafi Da’wa
organization has been preaching and organizing
supporters since the 1970’s.
110.
Al Nour Party’s platform rests on the Salafist ideology of
a literal version of Islam. The Al Nour party wants to
officially impose strict Islamic law in Egypt, which differs
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
from the FJP which have stated that they do not wish to impose an Islamic lifestyle on
Egyptians. Such ideological differences became clear on 12 December, when a spokesman for
the Al Nour party Nader Bakar, stated that the party wished to enforce a ban on serving
alcohol to foreigner nationals and Egyptian citizens. The party wished to establish hotels
functioning in compliance with Islamic Law where tourists would only be allowed to drink
liquor they brought with them from abroad, and in the privacy of their hotel rooms. He added
that the party did not wish to restrict tourism related to Egyptian antiquities and historical sites.
In contrast, Mohamed Morsi, president of the FJP stated that his party did not plan on banning
alcohol in hotels and at tourist resorts. The shift in the political sphere is likely to change laws
and provisions related to sectors such as tourism and talks have begun concerning the
enforcement of gender-segregated beaches with restrictions on bikinis and, as mentioned above,
alcohol. Such changes would surely affect Egypt’s economy further, tourism being a key pillar
of Egypt’s economy, previously accounting for 11.3 percent of Egypt’s gross domestic product.
111.
Since the Egyptian uprising the Salafists’ activity in Egypt has become increasingly noticeable.
Salafists have been active on the political scene and in promoting their objectives and goals for
the country. The Salafis demonstrated in Tahrir Square and they regularly hold seminars and
conferences, mostly in mosques and youth centers in Cairo and Alexandria, but also in the
capitals of other governorates. The Salafist are believed to have a strong influence on the
political debate in the country. The Salafis supported the recent referendum on the
constitutional amendments and the public opinion was influenced by the groups.
112.
The Salafis were divided into several various parties, the main one being the Al Nour party;
which holds one third of the seats in the parliament. The Al Nour party’s smooth entry into the
Egyptian political field was surprising to many since the political arena previously had been
shunned by the Salafists. There has been a profound ideological shift in the Salafist movement
with regard to political involvement. The Salafist movement reformed its ideological platform
in order to engage directly in politics. Previously, the ideology promoted nonpolitical
interference, the only way to reform society being to encourage people to pray, give alms,
perform the pilgrimage, fast, and conform with the Islamic duties and precepts.
113.
Al Ahram’s Mohamed Hafez argues that there were three chief trends among Salafists after the
25 January Revolution. One was a passive route continuing to focus on proselytizing work and
to stay out of politics, unless it is to support policies promoting the creation of an Islamic state.
The second advocated joining with one of the Islamist political parties formed under for
example the Muslim Brotherhood. A foremost proponent of this course has been Sheikh
Mohamed Hassan, who has argued that the Salafis and Muslim Brothers could form a powerful
party: “if the Islamist groups and trends can overcome their differences, they will be able to
create a powerful front capable of reviving the glories of the Islamic state and building a new
nation based on constructive dialogue.” The third tendency promoted direct political
involvement, advocating the establishment of an official Salafist political party. This
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
materialized in the shape of the Al Nour Party, headed by Sheikh Emadeddin Abd Al Ghafour
and the Al Fadila (Virtue) Party, headed by prominent Salafi proselytizer Mohamed Abdel
Maqsoud.
114.
In early March 2012 a Salafi Member of Parliament who advocated strict, fundamentalist rules
was literally forced out of the legislature when it was discovered by his companions that he had
had a nose job. In fundamentalist doctrine that would be an interference with human creation
and he was therefore forced to resign even though he claimed that he had been attacked and his
nose broken by his attackers.
115.
Platform:

Support Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution which states that Islam is the religion of the
state and the Islamic law is the main source of legislation

Preserve fundamental rights and public freedoms in the framework of Islamic law

Call for Islamic law to serve as the guiding principles for all political, social and economic
issues

Support separation between the legislative, judicial and executive powers and independence
of the judiciary

Preserve the right to private property and free economic competition as long as it does not
harm the interests of society

Reduce unemployment through state provision of jobs

Recognize health care as a basic human right

Call for the complete independence of al Azhar from the government and restoration of its
prominent role throughout the Islamic world

Improve education and establish training programs throughout Egypt

Advocate for a greater state role in the institutions of Zakat and Waqf

Support religious freedom for the Copts and separate personal status laws for non-Muslims

Conduct foreign relations on a basis of mutual respect and equality

Support a greater role for Egypt in the Arab and Islamic worlds as well as among the Nile
Basin countries, particularly Sudan

Stress the importance of a judiciary independent of the president’s influence
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Members of local councils should be chosen by direct election

Work towards independence in food and military production

Increase healthcare spending to 7-10% of the state budget

Raise salaries of doctors and healthcare workers

Launch public awareness campaigns against smoking and alcohol as the first phase of drug
addiction

Support environmental protection and crack down on pollution

Introduce Islamic specialists as teachers in public schools to instill morality and identity

Investigate the number of road accident deaths, which is alarmingly high

Separate prisoners based on whether their rehabilitation is moral, psychological or religious

Re-train and rehabilitate members of the security forces, who were corrupted under the old
regime

That Islam guarantees children the right to life, education, health and social care from the
time they are an embryo

Opposes women or Copts serving as president

Protect citizens form poverty and unemployment

Activate the institution of Zakat and involved the government

Increase spending on science and technology to at least 4% of GDP

Gradually expand Islamic finance, based on profit-sharing, rather than interest-collecting
which is done by most commercial banks

Institute strong anti-trust laws

Have Government provide fertilizers, seeds and water to agricultural industry

Integrate economically with Arab and Islamic states, including free trade zones

Maximum wage in government and public-sector jobs

Improve relations with Nile basin countries, especially Sudan

Improve relations with Arab and Islamic nations
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Islamic Sharia is the main source of legislation

Christians should have the right to arbitration under their own religious laws when they
contradict Islamic Sharia
Al Adl (The Justice Party)
Founded: May, 2011
Key Figures: AbdelgelilMostafa (General Coordinator of Kefaya), Mona ElBaradei (economist
and sister of presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei), Mostafa Al Naggar (democracy
activist), Amr Al Shobaky (political scientist)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Centrist
116.
Al Adl is a new party seeking a centrist position between the Islamist-dominated Democratic
Alliance and Islamist Alliance, and the liberal-dominated Egypt Bloc. The party has been
critical of the polarization of politics. The party attempted to create a “Third Way” coalition
which failed. The Egyptian Current Party and al Wasat showed interest in joining the Third
Way Coalition, but neither joined by the candidate registration deadline on 24 October.
117.
Al Adl, the Egyptian Current Party, and al Wasat are ideologically similar and have attempted
to portray themselves as being similar to the Turkish governing Justice and Development Party
which is by many Egyptians seen as a successful alternative in terms on uniting religion and
politics. The party has tried to take a centrist position between Islamists and liberals, arguing for
a civil state but noting that there is no separation of religion from the state in Islam.
118.
The party has formed by different youth movements that participated in the 2011 uprising,
including Kefaya and the 6 April Youth Movement, which has stressed the importance of
achieving the goals of the revolution. The party has rejected ideological labels and has stressed
that love for Egypt should override rigid ideological interests. Mostafa Naggar, a prominent
blogger and founding member of the party, argued that has insisted that electoral politics should
not be fought on competitive and ideological grounds but based upon cooperation between
parties to realize the goals of the uprising and prevent the resurgence of former members of the
ruling National Democratic Party.
119.
The Profile of an al Adl Member: The 29-year-old human rights activist Dalia Ziada is taking
part in the parliamentary elections. The young leader of Egypt’s Justice Party hoped to deliver
to the people what she felt they all fought for over the past few decades. Ziada stated that the
party has three main priorities. First, security without violating human rights and ending
45
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
excessive use of force on behalf of the security forces through legal procedures and the
constitution. Second, a valid economic environment where everyone will be equal allowing fair
competition. Third, the elimination of corruption, and the need for institutionalism and
monitoring. Civil society will be monitoring the action of the government, while the
government will be monitoring the military, the police and so on.
120.
Dalia Ziada is one of the few women taking part in the parliamentary elections, yet Ziada was a
popular candidate and the second on the list in her district. When asked about any problems she
encountered taking part in the elections she mentioned that some Islamists took offense by her
being a female candidate. She argued that even though Islamist parties had the most female
candidates, this was only for decoration, and disputed that the women would actually be
allowed some kind of influence in the party. Some people also criticized her previously working
with American organizations such as the American Islamic Congress. She rejected the view that
the US is trying to dominate the scene by trying to put people like Ziada in power. She argued
that her background as a civil society activist and human rights activist aiming to advance
democracy and human rights, should be considered an advantage.
121.
She believed in separating politics from civil society and strived for a minimum of human rights
being secured in the constitution. She argued that it is important to inform Egyptians that there
are other alternatives than the former regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. In relation to Sharia,
the Justice Party wanted a civil state and Sharia as a moral guide. Egypt is a diverse country,
both in terms of religion and culture. In rural areas they think differently than in urban areas and
so according to Ziada, it’s impossible to apply the “divine law” on everyone. She argued that it
makes no sense to fight against autocracy in order to bring in theocracy, both being a form of
dictatorships. When asked how Ziada's party combats the popularity of Islamists she stated that
this was done by honesty, avoiding false promises such as that voting for a certain party will
bring you to heaven or that they speak on behalf of God.
122.
Party Platform:

Affirm that people are the source of political power

Support the separation of powers, free elections, and the peaceful transfer of power

Support equal citizenship for all Egyptians without discrimination based on religion, race,
color, geographic location or income level

Affirm that all Egyptians can occupy any political position without exceptions

Respect freedom of religious belief and practice and the freedom of expression

Respect human rights as stipulated by divine laws and international conventions
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Uphold the rule of law and the principles of accountability and transparency

Promote the concept of decentralization and the importance of a leadership role for the
provinces in administration, security, development and investment

Support a free economy based upon social justice, equal opportunity and balanced growth
for all Egyptians

Advocate an economic system based in strong institutions subject to standards of
transparency and accountability, and free from corruption and monopolies

Exploit all of Egypt’s land from the western desert to the Sinai for economic development
but without harming the environment

Rely on new and renewable energy sources

Advocate a foreign policy governed by the values of justice, freedom, and human rights

Reject the imposition of values by force

Support cooperation and integration and exchange of expertise based on mutual respect for
state sovereignty and culture

Respect international law, covenants and conventions, and international agreements,
particularly on the Palestinian issue

Affirm the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny and build their
state with Jerusalem as its capital

Reject normalization with Israel

Establish close relations with all Arab states

Call for strong relationships with various powers, including Turkey and Iran, to build a new
Middle East

Establish strong relations with the various emerging powers, such as Brazil, India, and
Malaysia

Decentralize economic policy, focus on entrepreneurship and scientific research

Invest in renewable energy

Self-sufficiency in water and energy
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Respect all existing agreements in relation to the Nile basin and establish a mutually
beneficial relationship with Nile basin countries

Respect all existing treaties regarding the Palestinian issue

Palestine has the right to an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital

Strengthen relations with Arab League member states

Expand economic and political ties with the African continent

Restore the role of Al Azhar and the Coptic Church in enlightened religious leadership

Provide comprehensive health insurance

Adequate housing, healthcare and education is the right of every citizen, including children,
workers, the handicapped and the elderly

Increase state spending on education and scientific research

Secondary and University education in line with international standards

Provide low cost housing to those who cannot otherwise afford it

Encourage environmental and energy conservation in construction

Expand settlements beyond the narrow Nile valley

Create green spaces within cities

Reduce construction in agricultural areas

Reduce the spread of slums

Women have the right to hold top positions in any organization or business including the
Presidency

No discrimination against women

Women should be guaranteed equal opportunities

Egyptians abroad should be participants in the political system and vote in elections
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Al Ghad (The Tomorrow Party/ The New Tomorrow Party)
Founded: 2004
Key Figures: Ayman Nour (President al Ghad al Jedid), Mousa Mustafa Mousa (President al
Ghad)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Liberal/Centrist
123.
Al Ghad broke away from Al Wafd and was founded in 2004 by Ayman Nour, a former Wafd
parliamentarian who resigned in 2001 due to a dispute with its leader, Noman Gomaa. Nour
brought a considerable amount of Wafd members with him when leaving the party. The
Mubarak regime considered the new party as a threat and the tensions increased when Nour
announced he intended to run for president in 2005. The previous regime attempted to discredit
Al Ghad and Nour. He was accused of forging thousands of membership applications in order
to obtain registration. Nour nonetheless ran as Al Ghad’s candidate in Egypt’s first
multicandidate presidential elections in 2005, and came in second behind Hosni Mubarak with
7.6 percent of the vote. Later the same year, Nour was convicted of forgery and sentenced to
five years in prison. He was released on health grounds in January 2009.
124.
Today the party is split into two parts, the al Ghad al Jedid Party controlled by Ayman Nour,
and the al Ghad Party, controlled by leaders Nour claims were installed by Mubarak such as
Moussa Mustafa Moussa. Nour has been attempting to regain control over the original al Ghad
Party license, while at the same time pursuing official recognition of his new al Ghad al Jedid
Party. On 10 October, 2011, a Cairo court granted a Ghad al Jedid legal recognition as a party.
However, on 16 October, Cairo’s Court of Cassation upheld Nour’s 2005 forgery conviction,
hindering him to run in the presidential elections.
125.
The party has maintained its liberal orientation but has joined the Democratic Alliance rather
than the more liberal Egypt Bloc.
126.
Platform:

Support a representative and parliamentary system of government

Revive religious tolerance through protecting freedom of religion and belief

Protect the equal rights of all Egyptians regardless of faith or race

Support women’s rights and reforming laws to give women equal rights with men, including
repealing marriage laws which do not grant citizenship rights to foreign husbands married to
Egyptians
49
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Support a democratic system which solves conflicts peacefully through elections and the
democratic process

Protect civil rights and liberties

Eliminate the state’s monopoly on the media which destroys clear thought

Support a social market economy

Call for social justice

Make social insurance in education, health care and retirement a national project

Reject terrorism, racism and hateful ideologies, and welcome all ideologies which support
freedom, democracy and tolerance

Maintain a strong regulatory role for the state, which is to be held responsible for the
implementation of a comprehensive development strategy in rural and urban areas

Pursue environmentally sustainable solutions to the water scarcity crisis

Establish a development bank to help alleviate poverty

Eliminate corruption in the bureaucracy by toughening anti-bribery laws

Introduce educational reform and reevaluating outdated classroom curricula

Support a strong, independent, and developed Egypt

Safeguard Egypt’s national security interests

Improve cooperation with the Nile Basin countries

Resolve the Palestinian issue in a just way that satisfies the legal rights of the Palestinian
people

Oppose the American occupation of Iraq and prevent America from occupying any other
Arab lands

Amend the Camp David Accords provision on private control of the Egyptian forces on the
Sinai

Further develop the Arab League and establish an “Arab Court of Justice” and an Arab
common market

Support economic cooperation with European countries
50
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Resolve international disputes through mutually respectful dialogue

Promote reconciliation between rival Arab nations

Support a representative and parliamentary political system that equally protects all
Egyptian citizens and provides an environment of religious and political freedom

Eliminate Corruption

Eliminate state control of media

Educational reform

Support a social market economy

Develop comprehensive development plans for both the rural and urban settings.

Creat a development bank to reduce poverty rates

A strong and developed Egypt capable of protecting its national interests.

Solvethe Israeli/Palestinian issue in a peaceful and legal manner

Strengthen relationships between all Arab states

Denounce American occupation of Iraq and the prevention of future American occupation
in other Arab nations

Develop stable, cooperative relationships with Europeans countries.
Al Masriyeen al Ahrrar (The Free Egyptians Party)
Founded: 3 April, 2011
Key Figures: Naguib Sawiris
Religious Scale: Unknown
Ideological Scale: Liberal
127.
The party was launched in April 2011 by Egyptian telecommunications mogul Naguib Sawiris,
former chairman of Orascom Telecom Holding. The founder’s background enables the party to
draw on large financial resources and management expertise. The founder, Sawiris, is a Copt
and has made it clear that the party is for all Egyptians, not only Copts.
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
128.
The party is firmly pro-business and pro-trade, and focuses on economic development based
upon a free economy, strong state institutions and the rule of law. It accepts Islam as the state
religion but advocates religious freedom in a civil state and stresses equality of all citizens
regardless of creed.
129.
The Free Egyptians Party has become increasingly popular and has 100,000 registered
members. In terms of organization and potential, political analysts argue that the party is the
second after the FJP. The Free Egyptians Party is a main member in the Egyptian Bloc alliance,
and is in terms of its platform the most liberal of the Egypt Bloc members.
130.
Platform:

Support separation of religious and state affairs in a civil, non-religious state

Affirm full equality of all citizens regardless of differences in religion, sex, wealth, race,
region, color and culture

Support democracy, freedom of speech, expression, thought and conscience, and the right of
citizens to organize freely and to express their opinions peacefully

Believe in the role of women in society and the need to enable them to participate in all
areas and public offices

Provide the rule of law and judicial independence

Support a market economy to achieve prosperity.

Restructure the tax system to favor economic development

Support responsible levels of government spending

Support competitive bidding for government contracts

Provide a minimum wage and the expansion of micro-credit programs

Implement tax credits for Zakat and tithe to reward social cooperation

Eradicate poverty to improve the standard of living of 70 percent of Egyptians

Defend the national interests of Egypt at all times

Support a fair and just resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict which involves a twostate solution with a Palestinian state on 1967 borders and Jerusalem as its capital and an
Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories in Syria and south Lebanon
52
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Respect the Camp David Accords international agreement between Egypt and Israel

Reform the system of the Arab League in order for it to become a true reflection of the
hopes and aspirations of Arab peoples and a mechanism to ensure peace, security and
stability in the region

Work to free the Middle East from all Weapons of Mass Destruction

Develop stronger ties with both Turkey and Iran

Increase cooperation with both Sudan and South Sudan and the rest of the Nile Basin
countries for mutual security and development

Rebalance Egyptian-American based upon mutual respect, balance and parity

Strengthen trade ties with the United States

Strengthen economic relations and trade with Russia and China

Supports a civil state, founded on the principles of democratic representation and religious
freedom

Supports the second article of the Constitution and recognizes Islam as the foundational
religion of the state, which guarantees justice, freedom and equal rights for all citizens

Against the establishment of any militia or paramilitary force, only official armed forces to
defend the country’s borders

All citizens should have the right to publish newspapers, TV and radio stations, blogs and
websites without discrimination

Eliminate illiteracy in five years and poverty in twenty years

Eliminate the state of emergency and ban the trial of civilians before military courts

Ensure the independence of the judiciary and separate its budget from the Ministry of
Justice

Codify land ownership for the people of Sinai

Guarantee the right of return for displaced people of Nubia

Encourage the development of wind, solar and biofuels energy

Maximize water conservation by improving ties with Nile basin countries, improving
processes for desalinating sea water, and invest in facilities for recycling wastewater
53
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Double the state’s education budget in less than five years

Modify the secondary school system’s final examination process and issue high school
diplomas

Include civic education in the secondary school curriculum

Double the state’s healthcare budget in less than five years

Require healthcare insurance companies to cover all medical needs with no limits on the
amount of care to be paid for

Reform laws concerning people with disabilities to improve their conditions, care and
opportunities

Provide land for low-income housing accommodations to provide an alternative to the
propagation of unplanned slums

Encourage scientific investigation of air pollution and create plans for proper waste
management

Supports a free market economy with controls to ensure social justice

Activate a partnership between the private and public sectors by creating a competitive
bidding system for public works

Maintain current tax rates, with more tax exemptions for low-income citizens

Gradually reduce tariffs on imports to encourage global economic integration

Increase free flow of information and transparency of financial data to reduce transaction
costs in the private sector

Continue the process of privatization in a manner that is fair, equitable and transparent

Criminalize infringement on agricultural land, especially infringement for the purpose of
urban expansion

Provide credit and production inputs at reasonable prices to farmers

Provide more autonomy to the central bank in monetary policy

Decentralize state management and ensure an equitable distribution of resources among the
governorates
54
 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Phase out subsidies in oil, gas and electricity for companies that sell their products at market
prices

Eliminate subsidies on gas 95 and 92 while retaining subsidies for gas 90, bread, LPG and
diesel

Expand micro-finance systems for low-income citizens’ credit needs

Unemployment benefits should be 60% of the last salary earned (maximum of LE1,750 per
month) for a limited time only

Set a national minimum wage

Establish an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its
capital and the withdrawal of Israel from the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon

Secure the rights of Egyptians abroad, including the right to vote

Establish respectful relations with Iran and Turkey as major players in the Middle East

Eradicate weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East, especially nuclear weapons

Improve relations with Nile basin countries, especially North and South Sudan, and other
African countries

Reform Egypt’s relationship with the United States to be based more on trade and
cooperation, rather than economic aid

Improve relations and economic ties with Russia, China and India
Al Hurriyya wa al ‘Adala (The Freedom and Justice Party)
Founded: 6 June , 2011
Key Figures: Saad Katatni (Secretary General), Mohammed Morsy (President)
Religious Scale: Islamic
Ideological Scale: Right-wing
131.
Even though Egyptian law forbids religious parties, Islamist movements have found a way
around this by restructuring and adopting nominally secular platforms in order to run for
parliament during the elections of 2011/2012. Candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood ran as
members of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) which was formed in May 2011. After the
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
2011 uprising, the law on political parties was modified, even though political parties with a
religious identity were still banned. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to register the Freedom
and Justice Party, presenting it as a “civil” party. Today it is the dominant Islamist party in
Egypt. The party has formed the Democratic Alliance with a number of liberal and leftist
parties.
132.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood underwent a long period of ideological transformation and
under the influence of younger, reform-minded leaders, and the Brotherhood came to accept
that democratic processes were compatible with Islam. In the parliamentary elections of 1984,
the Muslim Brotherhood began presenting some candidates. The Egyptian law banned religious
parties and when forming a political party, the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to present its
candidates either under other parties or as independent candidates. In 2005, Muslim
Brotherhood members that ran as independents won 20 percent of the lower house seats. The
popularity of the group made its members especially targeted by the Mubarak regime and the
repression by the government ensured that such success was not repeated.
133.
The Muslim Brotherhood was officially banned and excluded from participating in politics prior
to the 2011 uprising. Its members could stand in parliamentary elections as individuals, and
managed to hold 18 seats in the People's Assembly in the 2000 elections and 88 seats in those
of 2005. In the 2010 elections the Muslim Brotherhood withdrew alluding to fraud. The Salafis
could operate more freely in comparison to the Brotherhood, running official satellite channels
and preaching openly in mosques. As mentioned above, the Salafis avoided getting involved in
politics and were thus less of a threat.
134.
The party’s platform remains controversial and the fear of an Islamist victory prevails in many
sectors of Egyptian society. In 2007 an extremely controversial platform for a political party
was discussed by the Muslim Brotherhood, proposing the creation of a clerical committee to
review legislation for compliance with Islamic law, and to prohibit women and non-Muslims
from running for president.
135.
Steps have been taken to strengthen its political footing and the party has begun to engage with
other political and social forces. Party members have for example, opened a dialogue with
Coptic youth movements from Cairo and in Qena; the Federation of Christian Youth Party
(under formation) and the International Federation of Christian Students and the General
Organisation of Christian Youth Associations. Due to this initiative, the first youth coalition
comprised of both Muslim Brotherhood and Coptic members. Cooperation with other Islamist
groups have been encouraged, such as the Jihad, the Al Gamaa Al Islamiya, and Salafist and
Sufi groups, in order to establish common ground or a unified vision that would strengthen their
collective political leverage.
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136.
The Muslim Brotherhood differs in its ideological platform from the Salafi movement,
believing that change can only be accomplished by participating in all activities of society,
including politics and the electoral process. The ideological trends of Salafis have been to reject
political involvement which was considered a deviation from the truer path. The FJP has said
publicly that it does not seek to force its views of an Islamic lifestyle on Egyptians and that it
does not seek to use its majority in parliament to turn Egypt into a religious state. The FJP
aimed to be a civil group with a broad electoral platform and has attempted to distance itself
from the fears of an Islamist parliamentary majority, showing willingness to co-operate with
secular parties.
137.
The group’s leaders declared that their policy will be based on the religious principle of
ensuring the public good, which will guarantee the rights of all Egyptian citizens and a policy
that takes into account all national interests. The FJP seeks to form a parliamentary coalition
based on “national consent,” and not necessarily religious consent. FJP leaders are seeking to
include in this coalition as many representatives as possible from the liberals and the youth, but
the gaps in positions are quite wide. Many in the liberal al Wafd Party, for example, claim that
differences of opinion on the issue of religion and state should not be swept under the rug, and
that it is better to lead the opposition in parliament and expose their Islamist rivals’ inability to
govern. Other delegates believe that joining a coalition will aid them in promoting goals they
will have difficulty in achieving from the opposition.
138.
The FJP caused a lot of controversy by adopting its position on the candidacy of women and
Copts for the country's presidency. In addition, the FJP party was one of the parties which had
the most nominated 46 women on its lists for parliamentary elections 2011/2012. The party
does not have any Copts on the lists, though there are two in the Democratic Alliance.
139.
Ahram’s Mohamed Hafez argues that in spite of the FJP’s official non-opposition stand to a
civil state, their reassurances have been mostly unconvincing. He argues that the FJP work
against the principles and aims of the liberals. Even though FJP has pledged not to field a
candidate for president, there are already four presidential candidates holding Islamist positions.
140.
The FJP has found itself caught between the Islamist and secular blocs and has been trying to
recruit prominent independent candidates from outside the party to run on its lists. Hassan Nafa,
a prominent political scientist, public figure and former coordinator of Mohamed al Baradei’s
National Association for Change, accused the FJP of opportunism. Hassan Nafaa was allegedly
approached by the FJP and asked to run on one of their electoral lists in Cairo and was assured
that he would not have to officially join the party in order to run on its electoral lists. According
to Nafaa, after accepting the FJP’s offer, the party went back on its promise and asked him to
fill out a membership application in order to process the paperwork for his candidacy.
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141.
The Muslim Brotherhood is believed to have refused to support the cause of the 25 January
Revolution coalitions. The Muslim Brotherhood was cautious in its approach to the January
revolution, neither calling on members to attend the demonstrations nor instructing them not to
attend. If members participated it might be seen as an Islamist revolution and if it did not
participate, it risked being left behind. Such caution continued even after the fall of the regime,
the FJP not taking part in the second Friday of Anger demonstrations on 26 May, only showing
up briefly on the Day of Reckoning demonstrations on 8 July and boycotting the protests in
September against the SCAF. The refusal to support the youth movements in their open
criticism against the SCAF is argued by Hafez to indicate that Islamists are working together
towards the same objective: to come to power in Egypt and establish an Islamic state. This has
been an objective of Islamist movements for decades and seemed impossible until just recently.
142.
Platform:

Support a civil state, defined as one that is neither run by the military nor a theocracy, with
Islam as the state religion and Islamic law as the source of legislation covering all aspects of
human life

Grant the Supreme Constitutional Court the right to oversee legislation in order to ensure its
compatibility with Islamic principles of justice

Support the goals of Islamic law in governance with the understanding that non-Muslims
will be under their own laws in terms of personal status and religious worship

Affirm the belief in nondiscrimination among citizens in rights and duties

Guarantee freedom of expression while maintaining the fundamental values of society

Support women’s rights by passing legislation that criminalizes favoritism towards men

Strengthen local governments by giving them the power to approve their own budgets for
their own projects and by holding periodic local elections

Protect the freedom of belief and worship for Muslims and non-Muslims

Establish a parliamentary system for Egypt with a government headed by a prime minister
and only a symbolic role for the president

Support judicial independence and maintain the principle that the executive branch is
accountable to the legislative branch

Call for the abolition of all special courts and supporting the exclusive jurisdiction of civil
courts
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
Build state institutions and the rule of law

Support a market economy with social justice under the framework of Islamic law

Develop a national plan for integrated development by a “Higher Council of Planning” to
achieve balanced, sustainable, and comprehensive economic growth and human
development

Stress the responsibility of the state to maximize economic growth through cooperation with
the private sector and civil society

Secure citizens’ basic needs and services including food, clothing, housing, health care,
education, transportation, security and entertainment

Eliminate poverty, unemployment, fraud, corruption and monopolies

Raise the standards of education and scientific research

Support environmental conservation and sustainability and reducing pollution and the
depletion of resources

Spread and deepen of the concepts and values of Islamic law in Egyptian society

Focus on Arabic language training in the early years of education

Strengthen national security and restoring Egypt to its leadership role in Islamic, Arab,
African and global affairs

Build a new pattern of international relations which achieves cooperation between peoples
and international institutions, and opposing all forms of domination

Call for the public release of national security documents after twenty-five years

Acknowledge the Islamic principle of justice and nonaggression in international relations,
and uphold international treaties including the Geneva Conventions

Oppose the neoliberal policy of interference in other nations’ affairs through the promotion
of free markets and democracy

Reform the United Nations to increase its impartiality

Strengthen the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League and promote
unity between all Islamic and Arab countries

Secure the sources of the Nile River
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
Build a strong Egyptian army to increase national power

Affirm the need to confront the aggressive and expansionist Zionist entity

Uphold the principle that all peace treaties with Egypt can only be valid if passed by a
referendum of the people

Support the Palestinian right to self-determination, including the right of return for all
refugees and Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state

Oppose tyranny all over the world and supporting the right of self-determination for all
peoples

Egypt should be a civil state with an Islamic reference

No beach tourism, no drinking alcohol in public places

Copts and women have an equal right as Muslim men to hold the office of president

Focus the public budget on healthcare, education and human development

Reduce the options for divorce, and create institutions for prevention of divorce for the sake
of children and the strength of the family

Initiate a national project, in cooperation with UNESCO and other regional institutions, to
eliminate illiteracy in five years

Prohibit child labor, and punish enterprises that employ children

Focus on scientific technology as the cornerstone of Egypt’s development

Education should be conducted only in Arabic in the early stages

Encourage community involvement and Waqf to bridge the funding gap in education

Increase funding for higher education, and provide tax breaks for individuals who contribute
to funding higher education

Healthcare for all, regardless of financial status or place of residence

Health insurance coverage for all citizens

Increase doctor and nurse efficiency and raise their wages

Relocate polluting factories to areas far from populated areas and provide financial
incentives for clean industries
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
Integration with other Arab, Islamic and African states

Support free market with open competition and economic independence, while the state
ensures social justice for the poor and disadvantaged

Financial institutions that follow Islamic principles such as profit and loss sharing and real
risk

Completely reject conditional aid from foreign countries and promote a policy of selfreliance

Equitable distribution of economic projects across all Egyptian governorates

Continue food and energy subsidies, but restructure them to avoid leaking benefits to nontarget groups

Stress the importance of an independent central bank to control money supply, exchange
rate, rate of return and inflation

Minimum wage should be linked to inflation rates

Maximum wage for senior management in institutions, companies and public bodies

Prevent senior management from taking more than one job, so that they cannot sit on the
board of more than one company at the same time

Combat unemployment by encouraging economic expansion, matching education with
market demands for labor, and encouraging labor-intensive enterprises with funding
schemes and government incentives

20 percent of the revenues from oil and mineral ores should be given as Zakat to help the
poor

Principles and regulations established by the international community to prevent and resolve
conflict, including aggression, are consistent with the principles of Islamic Sharia

Reform the United Nations to make it more effective at protecting the principles it stands
for, including eliminating veto power from the Security Council and making it more
representative of the General Assembly

International treaties should be approved by the people

Protect water source by improving relations with Nile Basin countries, especially Sudan

Eliminate weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East
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
Palestinians deserve a self-determination, the right of return and the establishment of their
own state with Jerusalem as its capital

“The Zionist entity is an aggressive, expansionist, racist settler”

Non-Muslims are entitled to litigate in regard to personal status cases in accordance with
their own laws

Correct the negative perception against women, and encourage a culture of gender equality

Develop social and healthcare institutions specially for mothers and children

Criminalize and prosecute all forms of harassment or assault of a woman’s reputation or
physical being

Upgrade the role of young women by establishing additional educational programs
especially for them
Al Gabha al Dimuqrati (The Democratic Front Party)
Founded: 24 May, 2007
Key Figures: Saeed Kamel (President), Osama Gazali Harb (Chairman), Sakina Fouad
(Founding member and vice president)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Liberal
143.
The Democratic Front Party is part of the liberal spectrum and defines itself as a civil party.
However, it recognizes that Islam is an important part of the Egyptian state. The party was a
founding member of the Egypt Bloc until it was denied representation on the Bloc’s lists. It is
now running on an unaffiliated independent list.
144.
The Democratic Front Party was formed in May 2007 by Osama al Ghazali Harb, a law
professor and former member of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). He resigned his
post after attempting to unsuccessfully reform the NDP from within and was joined by Naguib
Sawiris who financed the party in its early days.
145.
The party seeks to establish a democratic and civil state based upon the respect of human rights,
rule of law, constitutionalism, the separation of powers, and the peaceful transfer of power. It
has profound disagreements with the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP but believes Islamists
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 
have a right to participate in Egyptian politics and even briefly joined the Muslim Brotherhoodled Democratic Alliance.
146.
Platform:

Support a presidential system with less concentration of executive power and a bicameral
parliament

Advocate for a judiciary independent from both the executive and the legislative branches

Call for the immediate repeal of all emergency laws and the abolition of the State Security
Court

Support civil liberties, including freedom of assembly, religion, and speech

Demand an end to arbitrary detention and violations of due process

Enforce the main United Nations conventions on human rights

Limit the powers of government expressly through clauses in a constitution approved before
elections

Call for a market economy tempered by social justice

Establish a minimum wage

Provide government programs for health care, social security, and pensions, unemployment
benefits, and disability insurance

Affirm an independent, sovereign, and strong Egypt and rejecting the meddling of foreign
powers

Encourage engagement with the Arab, Nile Basin, African and Islamic communities

Call for greater independence from the United States, including opposing its policies when
it colludes with Israel against Egyptian interests

Support the realization of “stable relations” with Iran

End emergency law and discontinue the trials of civilians in military courts

New constitution should limit the power of the president, including granting parliament the
ability to withdraw confidence should the president fail in performing his/her duties

Abolition of state-owned newspapers
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
Political, administrative and financial decentralization, granting more power to regional and
local authorities, trade unions, associations and civil society groups

Freedom to establish political parties, unless a state committee determines that the party’s
principles are in violation of the constitution

State health insurance to cover all citizens, with private health insurance available; those
with income equal to or less than minimum wage receive free healthcare, those with higher
incomes pay 5%-30% of treatment costs, depending on income

Expand housing projects beyond the Nile River Valley and protect agricultural land

Increase state spending on education and find new sources of education funding to raise
teacher salaries and provide more resources for students

Lower tax rates, deregulation and reliance on a market economy to produce high growth
rates

Unemployment and low income levels should be fixed not with government jobs and
programs, but by increasing the capacity of the national economy

Work towards ending Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, and all weapons of mass
destruction in the region

Rally Arab states to support the right of the Palestinian people to a home

Promote Arab integration, working towards and Arab free trade zone, and eventually a
Mediterranean free trade zone
Hizb Al Ishtarakiya Al Souriya (The Revolutionary Socialist Party)
Founded: 1995
Key Figures: Hossam Al Hamalawy, Sameh Naguib, Kamal Khalil, Gigi Ibrahim
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Far Left, Marxist, Revolutionary Socialism
147.
The Revolutionary Socialist Party has existed since the 1980’s, but took its current name in
1995. The Revolutionary Socialist Party is a member of the Coalition of Socialist Forces, which
includes the Popular Socialist Alliance, the Egyptian Socialist Party, the Workers Democratic
Party and the Egyptian Communist Party.
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148.
The party has been a consistent promoter of revolution, protest and agitation against both the
previous regime and the current SCAF-led transitional government. It has cooperated with the
Muslim Brotherhood in support of the Palestinian cause.
149.
The Party’s most prominent members include American University in Cairo Professor and
Sameh Naguib and journalist Hossam Al Hamalaw, along with Kamal Khalil, the founder of the
Center for Socialist Studies in Egypt. Gigi Ibrahim is a young activist who recently became a
popular face for the party and the Egyptian Revolution of January 2011. The international
media featured her in number of stories, including on the cover of Time magazine and
interviews with BBC, Al Jazeera and the Daily Show.
150.
Platform:

Rejects the formation of a party based on paper, but one based in the power of workers (i.e.
the Workers Democratic Party, which has not been granted official registration status
because of political party legislation that prevents the establishment of a party on the basis
of class)

Members of the SCAF were responsible for the violence against demonstrators during and
after the January 2011 uprising and should be removed from office and put on trial

Encourages workers to use their collective power of general strike to fight economic and
political injustice

Follows a classic Marxist doctrine with a primary goal of dismantling the capitalist system
through permanent revolution

State-owned, worker-controlled industry

Push for the reclamation of state-owned industries that were sold to private investors

Solidarity with the Palestinian struggle

Condemns NATO’s intervention in the 2011 Libyan civil war

Solidarity with other global socialist movements
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Al Karama (The Dignity Party)
Founded: 1996
Key Figures: Hamdin Sabbahy (Founder), Amin Iskandr (Chairman)
Religious Scale: Unknown
Ideological Scale: Leftist, Socialist, Nationalist, Pan-Arabist
151.
The Dignity Party was founded by Hamdin Sabbahy, a former member of the Arab Democratic
Nasserist Party. The party has socialist leanings and focuses its platform on Arab unity. The
Dignity Party is a member of the Democratic Alliance.
152.
Platform:

End state of emergency, and revise emergency law to allow a state of emergency to exist for
only 30 days in extreme circumstances

Limit presidential term to four years, renewable once

Gender equality in employment and public office

Restore balance in the separation of powers, which currently gives too much power to the
president

Centrally planned economy to promote technological development and all aspects of
economic growth and social justice

Equitable distribution of national income

Independence from Western-dominated financial institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank

Rejects all previous agreements with Israel, including the Camp David Accords

Calls for liberation of the Palestinian nation

Calls for unity among all Arab nations, including formation of “Parliament of the Arab
People,” an Arab Monetary Fund and an Arab Free Trade Area

Openness to Western civilization in terms of technology and science, but with a focus on
using those elements to build a stronger, independent Arab civilization

Arab identity is the unifying factor between Muslims and Christians, who should have equal
rights as Egyptian citizens
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Hizb Al Amal Al Islamiya (The Islamic Labor Party)
Founded: 11 December, 1978
Key Figures: Magdi Hussein (Secretary General), Ibrahim Shoukry (Founder)
Religious Scale: Islamist
Ideological Scale: Leftist, Socialist
153.
The party was originally named the Socialist Labor Party and changed its official name to
reflect a change in the focus of its political platform from socialism to a platform based on an
Islamic system, fully embracing an Islamic doctrine in the 1980’s. The main pillars of the
party’s platform are support for the working class, adherence to Islamic principles and a
rejection of Western domination in favor of Arab and Islamic unity. The party produces a
newspaper called Al Shabab, which is notoriously critical of Israel, the U.S. and corruption in
Egypt. The Islamic Labor Party is a member of the Democratic Alliance.
154.
Platform:

Constitution should include a reference to Islamic principles as a foundation of legislation

Revise laws concerning illegal gifts and gains for public officers to prevent corruption

Revitalize plans for the development of the Sinai Peninsula and relocate millions of
Egyptians to live there to strengthen the area and prevent Zionist threats

Public hospitals must increase efficiency and commit to free healthcare

Make science and technology a national priority

Establish an economic system based on Islamic Sharia

Aggressive regulation of market forces by the state apparatus

Equal distribution of investment throughout all governorates

State should administer welfare programs and essential public services

Shield domestic industry from western competitors

Establishment of an independent zakat (alms) institution charged with administering
charitable contributions to the poor
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Reform the tax system to increase direct taxes on consumers with high incomes, as well as
the tax on luxury goods, while easing taxes on those with limited incomes to achieve social
justice

Raising the minimum wage for government employees and the public sector with cost of
living increases adjusted for inflation

Promote unity with Libya and Sudan

Liberation of the occupied Palestinian lands

Resist U.S. hegemony and influence over Egyptian policy by prohibiting the U.S. from
having any special accommodation in Egypt, including forbidding military bases and
exercises and prohibiting access to any classified information

Reject all normalization of relations with the Israel, including stopping the sale of natural
gas to Israel and any other economic ties

Membership is open to Muslims and Copts
The Egyptian Green Party
Founded: 14 April, 1990
Key Figures: Abdel Monem Ali Ali Al Aasar (President)
Religious Scale: Moderate Islamic foundation
Ideological Scale: Liberal
155.
The party is still a relatively small movement in the political spectrum, but occupies an
important niche. The Egyptian Green Party originally limited its activities to promoting
environmental protection, but broadened its platform to include issues of social welfare and
development.
156.
Platform:

Balance environmental priorities with Islamic principles of governance

Lower the voting age to sixteen

Reform the legal system to ensure the independence of the judiciary

Provide health care and social services to all citizens, especially children
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
Guarantee equal opportunity for all citizens in the political and economic realms

Protect the environment from contamination and raise public awareness of environmental
threats

Address environmental challenges through programs that alleviate poverty and promote
sustainable development

Supporting free market principles and reducing the state’s role in regulating prices

Strengthening the integration of the public and private sectors

Halt nuclear proliferation

Prioritize the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Improve diplomatic ties between Egypt and Sudan
Hizb Al Ishtaraki Al Masri (The Egyptian Socialist Party)
Founded: 16 June, 2011
Key Figures: Ahmed Bahaa Al Din Shaaban (Chairman), Karima Al Hefnawy
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Far left, Socialist
157.
The Egyptian Socialist Party supports a completely socialist economic system and rejects all
elements of a capitalist system. The Egyptian Socialist Party is a member of the Coalition of
Socialist Forces, which includes the Workers Democratic Party, the Egyptian Communist Party,
the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Popular Socialist Alliance. The party leader, Ahmed
Bahaa Al Din Shaaban, was the founder of the Kefeya movement. Another prominent party
member is Karima Al Hefna who also is a Kefeya supporter and a longtime activist.
158.
Platform:

Preserve the environment and conserve natural resources

Increase healthcare to be 15 percent of the state budget and provide a universal health
insurance system free of cost for the needy

New democratic constitution for a parliamentary republic based on full equality for all
citizens regardless of ethnicity, color, gender or religion
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 EGYPT UPDATE 13 

Set a maximum limit on land ownership, issue deeds of ownership to farmers and stop
encroachment on arable land

Rent and interest rate ceilings for agricultural land and loans

More emphasis on science and technology in education

Reverse the damage done by capitalist globalization, which is responsible for catastrophic
results in Egypt and elsewhere through a system that leads to accumulation of wealth in the
hands of a corrupt minority and a loss of national sovereignty through imposition of foreign
debt and economic restrictions by institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the
World Trade Organization

Transform the economic structure from one based on services promoting speculation and
rent to one promoting agriculture and industry

Provide agricultural inputs at subsidized prices and promoting cooperative marketing of
crops

Renationalize companies that suffered from corrupt privatization practices and all major
projects

Fully control all foreign economic relations and exchange transactions, so as to prevent
speculation on Egyptian currency

Equal distribution of development amongst the governorates, especially rural areas

Support Egyptian and foreign capital investments, so long as they comply with national
development plans

Government should support all unemployed workers with 50 percent of the minimum wage

Minimum wage and minimum pension of 1500 Egyptian Pounds per month, scaled to the
rate of inflation, and maximum wage of fifteen times the minimum wage

Strengthen ties with people of the Third World to combat the forces of imperialism
represented by the U.S., the European Union and Japan

Support the struggle of the Palestinian people and all Arabs against Israeli colonialism
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Al Hizb Al Sheo’ei Al Masry (The Egyptian Communist Party)
Founded: 1 May,1975
Key Figures: Salah Adly (Chairman)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Leftist, Communist
159.
The Egyptian Communist Party was first established in 1921, and has existed in some form
(mostly illegally) since then. The most recent branch of the party was founded in 1975. The
party represents Egypt’s most leftist group and promotes a communist ideology. In May the
Egyptian Communist Party joined the Coalition of Socialist Forces. The coalition consists of
the Popular Democratic Alliance, the Revolutionary Socialists, the Socialist Party of Egypt, the
Workers Democratic Party and the Egyptian Communist Party. The coalition was reported to
have included around 5,000 members. In August, the Egyptian Communist Party joined the
Egyptian Bloc.
160.
Platform:

Minimum and maximum wage

Equal opportunities in health, education, housing and employment for all citizens

Eliminate unemployment by providing subsidies to those who cannot find work

Create a strong public sector

Establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and eliminating all
Israeli settlements

Rid the region of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction

Reduce differences between Egypt and countries of the Nile basin

Complete separation of religion from politics

Equal rights to all citizens, regardless of sex or religion
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Hizb Masr Al Arabi Al Ishtaraki (The Egyptian Arab Socialist Party)
Founded: Founded 1978, re-established and registered 7 July, 1997
Key Figures: Wahid Fakhryal Uksory (Chairman)
Religious Scale: “Adherence to Islamic law as a source essential to legislation”
Ideological Scale: Left-wing, Socialist
161.
The Egyptian Arab Socialist Party was originally founded in 1978, and held the majority of
seats after the first parliamentary elections, until it was absorbed into Sadat’s National
Democratic Party. In its current form, the party advocates preserving the principles associated
with the 1952 revolution. The Egyptian Arab Socialist Party is a member of the Democratic
Alliance.
162.
Platform:

Reserve 50 percent of parliamentary seats for low-income citizens and workers

Promote national unity by discouraging intolerance and sectarianism

Cultivate political pluralism and supporting opposition groups

Protect freedom of expression

Protect national industries

Equal distribution of investments among the Egyptian governorates

Promote ties with developing countries

Advance the interests of the working class

Improving the quality of public services

Support the activities of labor unions

Positive neutrality and non-alignment

Promote unity and solidarity among the Arab states

Liberate the occupied Palestinian lands

Establish a balanced foreign policy that is consistent with the strategic interests of Egypt as
well as the broader Islamic community
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
Support freedom of religious affiliation

Support Islamic Sharia law as the foundation of legislation
Masr al Hurreyya (Egypt Freedom Party)
Founded: 11 May, 2011
Key Figures: Amr Hamzawy (Founder and President,) Anji Maseehi (Founding member), Jilan
Aouf (Founding member)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Liberal
163.
The Egypt Freedom Party is a social-democratic party, balancing between free enterprise and
social justice as well as between secularism and willingness to cooperate with Islamists. The
party advocates the transformation of Egypt into a democratic civil state rather than an Islamic
one. It was a founding member of the Egypt Bloc but left on 15 October. This due to disputes
with the Social Democratic Party and concerning presenting former members of the National
Democratic Party on party lists. It is now a member of the “Completing the Revolution”
Alliance.
164.
The Egypt Freedom Party was formed on 11 May, 2011 by the popular Egyptian intellectual
Amr Hamzawy. Hamzawy had resigned from the Egyptian Social Democratic Party after it
released a statement condemning violence used against protesters by the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces. Hamzawy rejected the condemnation of the military as an institution. The
party is similar to other liberal parties, but places greater stress on social justice and a
functioning welfare state. However, the Egypt Freedom Party does not favor nationalization of
industry and Hamzawy has defended capitalism and the market economy. The party has
officially supported marches in Tahrir Square against military trials and for promoting a civil
state in Egypt.
165.
The party remains officially unlicensed.
166.
The Profile of a Freedom of Egypt Member: 26-year-old Shaheer Ishak was a candidate in the
November 28 elections in Egypt, running in Cairo’s Heliopolis district as a member of the
Egypt Freedom Party, Ishak was an oddity in Egyptian politics; he’s Coptic and the son of one
of the most known figures in the country, George Ishak. He was active in Kefaya and then the
National Association for Change but states to media that he never fitted into the structure of the
organization. He was critical of the movements not being able to have strategic goals or
concrete visions. He argued that this proved true when the revolution happened and that there
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was no organized structure that represented the people. Political parties must emerge and offer
clear programs and policy solutions, rather than just talking about reform in the banners and
titles.
167.
When asked what separates FJP from other parties Shaheer Ishak mentioned two things; the aim
to create an innovative internal structure of democratic structures, such as decentralized
structures in the governorates both fiscally and management wise. Secondly, to ensure there are
no businessmen monopolizing the political party. The party puts a ceiling on annual funding at
200,000 Egyptian pounds, which he argued is very important for the internal democracy so that
the decision-making process is dependent on members and leadership of the party rather than
money. The party has a large board consisting of 20 members which determine party policies
through majority vote.
168.
It is a liberal party which is not skeptical or scared of the Islamists or Muslim Brotherhood.
Shaheer Ishak argued that out of the true conviction of liberal values the members believe in the
right for every political ideology and idea to be represented in the political scene as long as they
are committed to the democratic process. The Egypt Freedom party promotes pluralism and
Shaheer Ishak stated that because of this conviction, the party entered into an alliance, called
the Revolution Continues, which is from every sector of society. “We have the left; we have
those who might be affiliated with Islamic thought; but our key battle now is the revolution, to
sustain the revolution and bring it forward.”
169.
In relation to the military Shaheer Ishak argued that the problem is their monopoly on
decision-making. The military have been able to monopolize the scene due to the lack of
national consensus and that the next parliament must create a platform for national consensus in
order to have a strong elected body.
170.
Platform:

Ensure the citizenship rights of all Egyptians with full equality and without discrimination
on the basis of religious affiliation, gender, or social background

Reduce the discrimination faced by the Egyptians with special needs, particularly with
regard to employment and living conditions

Enforce human rights standards, especially those in international treaties to which Egypt is a
signatory

Maintain the values of pluralism, tolerance, and respect for the freedoms and rights of all
citizens and a common commitment of citizens to participate in public affairs

Support a market economy combined with a commitment to social justice
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
Call for government-established regulations to reduce monopolies

Ensure a decent life for all Egyptians by supporting a minimum wage and government
programs for health care, social security and pensions, unemployment benefits and
disability insurance

Advocate an active role for Egypt in the Arab world, Africa, and the international
community

Support an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital

Call for positive engagement with both Turkey and Iran
Al Banna’ wa al Tanmiyya (Building and Development Party)
Founded: June 2011
Key Figures: Tareq al Zumr, Safwat Abd al Ghani, Al Shazli al Sagher, Ashraf Tawfiq,
Mohammed Essam Derbala (President of the Shura Council of the Egyptian al Gama’a al
Islamiyya), Osama Hafez (Vice president of the Shura Council of the Egyptian al Gama’a al
Islamiyya)
171.
The Building and Development Party is the official political party of the Egyptian al Gama’a al
Islamiyya (the Islamic Group). The party was founded in 2011 by a number of prominent
members of al Gama’a Islamiyya in Egypt, including Tareq al Zumr and Safwat Abd al Ghani.
Tareq al Zumr was released from prison along with Aboud al Zumr, after the two spent thirty
years in prison for planning President Anwar al Sadat’s assassination. The party’s founders
stated that their group has accepted the principles of political pluralism and equality and has
renounced all forms of violence.
172.
Due to al Gama’a al Islamiyya’s controversial background, on 19 September the official
political parties’ registration committee initially refused to license the Building and
Development on grounds that it advances a religious program in violation of Egyptian law. The
party appealed the decision in court and the court ruled in favor of the Building and
Development Party, granting a license to operate in October 2011.
173.
Al Banna’ wa al Tanmiyya was a member of the Democratic Alliance until it left on 14
October, accusing the FJP of monopolizing the political process and is now a member of the
Islamist Alliance.
174.
The BDP has its strongest concentration of supporters in Upper Egypt. However, several cities
like Asyut and Minya in the Upper Egyptian also enjoy a large Coptic population. Even though
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the founder of the BDP, Al Gamaa Al Islamiya, has renounced violence, the group was
allegedly at the forefront of some violent attacks in Upper Egypt in the 1990s. Political analysts
argued that Coptic candidates in the region contested the elections on three party lists in the first
constituency, which lead to splitting their votes in front of the Islamists’ lists. Copts were
expected to vote for the secular Egyptian Bloc in the second constituency against lists of the
FJP and Al Nour.
175.
The spectrum and it political composition in Upper Egypt remains polarized and its
complexities lead to tension and uncertainty. The prominent Christian minority in the region
affects the political discourse. The Essam Derbala, who is on the consulting committee of the
Al Gamaa, has asked about assurances to the Coptic community in Minya and said such
assurances should be mutual. “Assurances on our part that we will [protect] the rights of our
Christian partners in this country are not the only thing required,” he said. “We also demand
assurances from the church to all Muslims that it won’t promote for the calls made by the
extremists of the Coptic Diaspora, who calls for foreign intervention in Egypt and establishing a
Christian state.”
176.
Platform:

Support a new political system based on the principles of freedom, justice, plurality,
equality, and peaceful rotation of power

Promote legal, constitutional, and political reform, such as greater judicial oversight over
the national security apparatus

Support solutions to social, political, economic, and strategic challenges that come from
Islam and the modern application of Islamic law

Preserve Egypt’s Islamic and Arab identity and challenging any attempts at Westernization
and secularization

Establish strong Islamic values in society to combat injustice, corruption, and moral decay

Establish Islamic hudud or criminal punishments including the cutting off of hands for theft,
stoning to death of adulterers, and lashing of those who drink alcohol

Support the roles of the family and women in society in accordance with Islamic principles

Sprea the political concepts and values of Islam and combating smear campaigns against
Islam

Affirm Egypt’s role as a leader of the Arab world and the Islamic community

Support the right of occupied peoples to their land, especially in Palestine
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
Establish stronger political and economic relations with the Nile Basin countries
Al Tayar al Masry (Egyptian Current Party)
Founded: June 2011
Key Figures: Mohamed al Kassas, Islam Lotfy, Ahmed Abd al Gawad
177.
A moderate Islamist party, the Egyptian Current Party was founded by prominent members of
the Muslim Brotherhood youth wing. In June 2011, amidst tensions between the youth and
leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed al Kassas, leader of the movement’s youth
wing, declined to join the Brotherhood’s official Freedom and Justice Party, announcing his
intention to form the Egyptian Current Party. Shortly after the announcement, the Brotherhood
expelled al Kassas. Ahmed Abd al Gawad, another member of the Brotherhood’s youth wing,
joined the party and was also promptly expelled from the Brotherhood. Mutazz Abd al Fattah
and Sayf al Din Abd al Fattah, two moderate Islamist intellectuals, are leading members of the
party. Al Fattah has stressed the need for Egypt to “be like Turkey.”
178.
The party currently has roughly 5,000 members, including 200 dissident Muslim Brotherhood
members. It is a member of the Revolution Continues Alliance but was formerly in talks about
joining the Third Way Alliance with al Adl and al Wasat.
179.
The part supports a civil state and the protection of individual civil liberties, embracing Islamic
values without the enforcement of Islamic law. One of its founders, Islam Lofty, has described
the party as “pragmatic and non-ideological.” Although on paper the position of the Egyptian
Current is very similar to that of the Freedom and Justice Party, its leaders have criticized the
Muslim Brotherhood for its archaic values and for opposing diversity.
180.
Platform:

Embrace democracy for and political participation of all Egyptians

Provide equal rights to all citizens regardless of creed, race, or social status

Call for a civil state in Egypt with Islamic values, not an Islamic state

Advocate for good governance and the development of civil society

End military trials of civilians

Make Egypt one of the ten wealthiest and most scientifically advanced countries in the
world by 2030
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
Advocate for social justice and the fair redistribution of wealth

Invest in education to increase social capital

Guaranteeing equal opportunities to all Egyptians regardless of background

Provide adequate housing and universal health insurance for all Egyptians

Decrease poverty

Affirm Egypt’s identity as Islamic, Arab and African, and work to strengthen its ties with its
sister countries

Give priority to promoting reform in the Islamic, Arab, and African worlds
Al Tahrir al Masry (Egyptian Liberation Party)
Founded: January 2011
Key Figures: Ibrahim Zahran, Mohamed Ala’a al Din Abu al Azayem, Ashraf Jaber, Ahmed
Helmi Refaat
181.
The Egyptian Liberation Party is an Islamist party with a strong Sufi influence. The party was
founded by Ibrahim Zahran following the January 2011 uprising and gained the support of a
number of prominent Sufi leaders, including Mohamed Ala’a al Din Abu al Azayem of the
Azamiyya Sufi Order. The Egyptian Liberation Party was a member of the liberal Egyptian
Bloc alliance but left on 16 October and is currently a member of the Completing the
Revolution Alliance. The Egyptian Liberation Party gained official recognition as a political
party in September 2011 and stated its intention to run for 150 out of 504 contested seats in the
2011 parliamentary elections.
182.
Ibrahim Zahran characterizes it as a reformist civil political party. The party includes
Armenians, Muslims, Copts, Nubians and a significant number of Sufis, primarily from the
Azamiyya Sufi Order lead by Mohamed Ala’a al Din Abu al Azayem. The Azamiyya Sufi
Order is historically one of the most political Sufi orders and was opposed to the Mubarak
regime. Al Azayem has argued that a Sufi-oriented party like the Egyptian Liberation Party is
necessary to protect the interests of the Sufi orders and the Egyptian Supreme Council of Sufi
Orders. Despite its Sufi orientation, the party says that it is for all Egyptians and is independent
of the Azamiyya and other Sufi orders.
183.
There has long been tension between Sufi and Salafi communities in Egypt, the two groups
being at the opposite sides of the Islamist spectrum. Salafis consider Sufis to be heretics and
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Sufis accuse Salafis of destroying their shrines. The Egyptian Liberation Party has made
numerous statements directly challenging the increasing influence of Salafi parties. The party
took part in the planning of a “For the Love of Egypt” march with Coptic and secular groups on
12 August to oppose sectarian hatred allegedly encouraged by some Salafi and radical
preachers. However the party later cancelled its participation in the rally.
184.
Platform:

Support a civil state that respects equal citizenship, human rights, pluralism and
fundamental freedoms

Adhere to the principles of Islamic law as the main source of legislation and spiritual values,
while also respecting the special personal status laws of other monotheistic religions

Reject all forms of violence, terrorism, and extremism in thought

Establish a free market economy with a social dimension

Support the right to health care, education, employment and housing

Spread a culture of peace and respect in Egypt

Increase the role that Sufis have in the Egyptian state and society

Oppose attacks on places of worship including Sufi shrines and Coptic churches

Maintain Egypt’s national security by securing its borders and the Nile as a primary water
source

Support full cooperation with all peoples, civil society organizations, and international
institutions
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VI.
Other Movements
A. The 6 April Youth Movement
Founded: Spring 2008
Key Figures: Asmaa Mahfouz (Founding Member), Ahmad Maher (Founding Member), Israa
Abdel Fattah (Founding Member), Tareq al Khouli (Founding Member), Mohammad Adel Amr
Ali (Leading Member/Blogger), Waleed Rashed (Founding Member)
Religious Scale: Secular
Ideological Scale: Liberal
185.
The 6 April Youth Movement is an Egyptian Facebook group established in the Spring 2008 by
youth activists organizing strikes and public debates, critical of the Egyptian regime. The group
played an active role during the uprising in 2011 and is reported to have called for mass
demonstrations in Tahrir Square in January.
186.
The movement started with the invitation to people to join a strike against Egypt's rising food
prices by using Facebook in April 2008. The strike overlapped with a textile workers' strike
planned for the 6 April over low wages in the industrial town al Mahalla al Kubra. The previous
regime struck down hard on the movement and two of the groups founding members, Ahmed
Meher and Israa Abdel Fattah, were arrested. Ahmed Meher alleged to have been beaten and
abused by security forces during his arrest. The movement continued to organize protests in
Cairo during 2009 against the Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza strip and the detention of Egyptian
journalists. At least eight members of the group were detained by security forces in January
2009.
187.
The movement has used social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, blogs as well as other
types of media to report on events, alert their networks about police activity, organize legal
protection and draw attention to their efforts. The movement has also encouraged its members
to use spray paint and banners to advertise the strikes and in order to stir debates. Another way
used by the movement is to spread the message on currency, choosing small notes in order to
better reach the poor and vulnerable Egyptians.
188.
As of January 2009, it had 70,000 predominantly young and educated members with limited
political experience. The group has continually maintained that it is not a political party. The
core concerns include free speech, corruption, nepotism in government and the country's
stagnant economy. Their discussion forum on Facebook offers intense discussions, touching
upon contentious issues and The New York Times has identified the movement as the political
Facebook group in Egypt with the most dynamic debates.
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189.
By organizing online, movements like the 6 April movement have managed to avoid some of
the “pitfalls of party politics in Egypt”, such as censorship and bureaucracy. The movement is
an example of how important the social media has become as a tool to help facilitate the Arab
uprising.
B. Al Gama’iya Al Watuneya Al Taghyeer (The National Association for Change)
Founded: February, 2010
Key Figures: Mohammed al Baradei (The President of the Association), Hassan Nafaa (General
Coordinator), Hamid Qandil (Spokesman)
190.
The National Association for Change (NAC) is a political pressure group founded in 2010 in
order to promote reforms to the Egyptian political system, especially the electoral process. The
platform of the group includes a list of reforms that are essential for the future success of the
Egyptian political system. Al Baradei who founded the association, is by some considered to be
the reason behind the revived political opposition in Egypt.
191.
A number of opposition parties including the Tomorrow Party, the Center Party, the Arab
Democratic Nasserist Party and the Democratic Front Party have supported the National
Association for Change prior to the uprising in 2011. Notably, the New Wafd Party has refused
to join the NAC.
192.
The NAC is a member of the Egyptian Bloc and was previously a member of the Revolution
Coordinating Committee but withdrew in July, objecting that some of the committee members
used the committee’s name to incite against revolutionaries and demonstrators. The Revolution
Coordinating Committee was established after the uprising in 2011 and included several activist
movements, including the 6 April youth movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Democratic
Front Party (DFP)'s youth wing, the Revolution Trustees Committee and the Revolution Youth
Coalition.
193.
Platform:

End the state of emergency

Ensure judicial oversight over the entire election process

Allow local and international civil society groups to monitor elections

Allow equal access to media for all candidates, particularly during presidential elections
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
Give Egyptians living abroad the right to vote at Egyptian embassies and consulates

Ensure the right to run for president without arbitrary restrictions in accordance with
Egypt’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as
limit the president’s service to two terms

Vote by the National ID.

Achieve some of these procedures and guarantees necessitates the amendment of articles 76,
77 and 88 of the constitution as soon as possible
C. The Revolution Youth Coalition
Founded: February, 2011
Key Figures: Khalid Al Said (Spokesman), Shady GhazaliHarb (Activist and nephew of Osama
Gazali Harb, leader of the Democratic Front Party)
Ideological Scale: Left-wing
194.
Young activists formed the coalition in February 2011 in order to represent the youth which
played an important role in the revolution and guard their interests to the SCAF. The coalition
had an inclusive approach welcoming all players on the political spectrum in Egypt. Ten
representatives were originally selected to meet with the SCAF shortly after Mubarak stepped
down in order to discuss the end of the emergency law, the release of political detainees, the
electoral law, and the future trials of corrupt officials and those responsible for the violence
against the protesters during the uprising.
195.
The coalition includes representatives from the 6 April Youth movement, the FJP and its youth
group, The Popular Democratic Movement for Change (HASHD), The Democratic Front and
the Khaled Saeed Facebook group. Important figures included Ahmed Maher and Mahmoud
Samy from the 6 April Youth movement, El Baradei supporters Ziad Alimy and Abdel Rahman
Samir, Islam Lotfy and Mohamed Abbas from the Muslim Brotherhood, Shady Ghazali Harb
and Amr Salah from the Democratic Front Party, Khaled Sayed and Mostafa Shaki from the
FJP and Wael Ghoneim, one of the founders of the Facebook group “Kolona Khaled Said” (We
are all Khaled Said). Other independent activists that are part of the coalition are Naser Abdel
Hamid, Abdel Rahman Faris and Sally Moore.
196.
The platform of the coalition consists of a list of demands which includes the call for political
reform and a liberal democratic system that ensures the protection of individuals’ freedoms of
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speech, belief, and religion regardless of race, sex, or belief. Some of the demands of the
coalition have been met.
197.
In late June 2011 the Revolutionary Youth Coalition called for a massive protest in Tahrir
Square in order to put pressure on officials with regard to retribution. The coalition demanded
the immediate dismissal of Interior Ministry leaders involved in corruption cases and accused of
oppression and the suspension of any officers accused of harming protesters pending
investigations. The demanded that officials should track, investigate and put on trial all those
who killed protesters in January 2011 and that the trials should be made accessible to the public.
Actions are also called for against loyalists of the former regime such as the former Interior
Minister Habib al Adly. The coalition has also mentioned the need for compensation offered to
those who were injured during the uprising and the families of the deceased.
198.
Platform:

Abolish the old constitution

Write a new popular and democratic constitution following the formation of the new
parliament which paves the way for a parliamentary republic, which would include reducing
the powers of the President of the Republic, the separation of powers and specific rules for
the electoral process.

Cancel the state of emergency and of special courts and martial law

Form a transitional government of technocrats headed by a civilian national figure that has
confidence and credibility with the public within a month at most

Lowering the age to run for parliamentary elections to 25 years, and presidential elections to
35 years

Establish newspapers and other media with no restrictions other than accountability to a
competent judicial authority

Establish trade unions, student unions and other associations

Release all political prisoners from before and after January 25

Dissolve the ruling National Democratic Party and confiscate all of its assets

Abolish the Egyptian State Security and the stop assigning draftees to the central security
forces
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
Implement all final judgments issued in the previous period, such as, the expulsion of the
university guards, stopping the export of gas and the abolition of Law 100 governing the
trade union elections

Repeal of the law on political parties within ten days and the development of a new law for
the exercise of political rights within a month.

Dissolution of all current local councils.
D. Al Gamaa Al Islamiya (The Islamic Group)
199.
The group arose in the 1970s as a response to the former president Anwar al Sadat's strategy of
encouraging the Islamist trends as a way of counterbalancing the Egyptian left. Some members
later left the group and established the Egyptian Jihad during the roundups of Islamist
extremists in Egypt in 1981. The group was considered an extremist organization and Al Gamaa
Al Islamiya was allegedly linked to some of the most violent attacks in Upper Egypt in the
1990’s and attacks against touristic areas in Upper Egypt, Cairo and Sinai in the 2000’s. In 2005
the group was officially deemed a terrorist group by the international community. In 2006
members of the AL Qaeda movement claimed that the group had joined the network, a
statement which was immediately reputed by the Al Gamaa.
200.
Some members of the Al Gamaa were imprisoned and after their release in 1983 the movement
spread rapidly. The group soon became one of the country's most powerful Islamist force with
its main support in Upper Egypt and as well as in Cairo. The group also spread throughout the
governorates of Lower Egypt, though it never became as strong in the north as it did in the
south.
201.
The new revolutionary climate in Egypt has affected the group and its executive body has been
forced to make changes in order to balance between its founding generation and senior
leadership and its mid-level leadership and youth members. It is estimated that 200,000
members of the group took part in the demonstrations in Tahrir Square in February 2011. There
have been discussions concerning the drafting of a new charter for the group, as well as changes
in its hierarchical structure. In addition, there have been calls for the internal elections to be
supervised by civil society. The group’s previously extremist views concerning women,
tourists, police and religious minorities have undergone changes and moved towards a more
mainstream position. During the group's first legal conference on 8 April in Luxor, Copts were
referred to as “partners in the nation and humanity".
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202.
About 12,000 members of the Al Gamaa Al Islamiya were freed from prison in relation to the
25 January Revolution. Two of those released where Aboud and Tareq Al Zomor, convicted in
1982 for their involvement in the assassination of Sadat.
203.
It has been argued that the greatest challenge facing the group is that the majority of the group's
12,000 members have been released from prison are now unemployed and have no means of
support. The group needs to continue formulating a program consistent with its renunciation of
violence, applicable in the revolutionary climate and adapting to the formal political process.
204.
Al Gamaa announced its intention to form a political party that would represent its vision of
social justice and address the particular concerns of its members. The Building and
Development Party was established in 2011 by members of the group but is defined being
organizationally separate from the Al Gamaa Al Islamiya. The party has an Islamic outlook.
The party has announced that membership is open to Copts, and women are allowed to assume
leadership positions. The group presented candidates in the elections in most constituencies in
coordination with other Islamist movements, mainly in the form of a unified list.
VII.
The Salafi Factor
205.
Most Westerners see Salafis as the fundamentalist faction within a larger fundamentalist
movement. With the exception of a few experts and some intelligence experts, the general
public almost everywhere in the world was unaware of the existence of Salafi organizations
before what is commonly referred to as the Arab Spring. As the Salafis became visible and
entered the political realm they surprised many with their successes, especially in Egypt and
Tunisia. More importantly, they surprised outsiders both due to their numbers, and their
linkages both domestically and internationally. Salafi groups who had operated for years in
countries in countries such as Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt,
Lebanon, Indonesia and Malaysia, suddenly became assertive and a political force to be
reckoned with.
206.
There seems to be no organizational links between the various different Salafi movements,
whose origin goes back to a 12th century Syrian movement which aimed at returning to the
simpler days of Prophet Muhammad in Medina. Since then a number of divergent doctrinal
groupts emerged within the Salafi, but they all focused on issues of Fiqh and other legal/illegal
or permissible/impermissible behavior. Their doctrinal views centered on rituals, manner of
prayer, dress codes, and the nature of good and bad in every aspect of daily life. These
movements flourished mostly in Saudi Araia, the Emirates and Kuwait, and to a lesser extent
throughout the rest of the Gulf States, including Iraq. From their origins in the Gulf, Salafi
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movements and groups spread to the Arab, African and Asian countries mentioned above, as
well as others.
207.
There is no doubt that the Salafi are essentially anti-modernists, though they have no issue with
driving cars, using computers, speaking on cell phones, watching television or benefitting from
modern technology in general. In a sense one can understand the sentimental harkening back to
the early days of Islam when the world was far less complicated than it is today. However,
Salafi views do not necessarily simplify the complexities of a world about to enter an era of
globalization whose realities will inevitably be far more complex to deal with than the present
world.
208.
The Salafis are not the only ones to walk into the future while looking at the past if not living in
the past. Their counterparts can be found among Christians and Jews. Many other religions and
philosophies adhere to the simplicities of life and shun the acceptance of the realities of modern
times. Whether they are Tibetan Buddhist monks or Hindu ascetics, they all share something
which is both spiritual and laudable. However, many Salafi and the extreme fundamentalists in
various Christian and Jewish movements and sects are not necessarily so laudable as they seek
to impose their views on others, using force if necessary. They are intolerant towards others,
and above all intolerant and without compassion for their own.
86