Psychological Bulletin
2007, Vol. 133, No. 1, 46 – 64
Copyright 2007 by the American Psychological Association
0033-2909/07/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.46
Comprehending Envy
Richard H. Smith and Sung Hee Kim
University of Kentucky
The authors reviewed the psychological research on envy. The authors examined definitional challenges
associated with studying envy, such as the important distinction between envy proper (which contains
hostile feelings) and benign envy (which is free of hostile feelings). The authors concluded that envy is
reasonably defined as an unpleasant, often painful emotion characterized by feelings of inferiority,
hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a desired attribute enjoyed by another person or
group of persons. The authors examined questions such as why people envy, why envy contains hostile
feelings, and why it has a tendency to transmute itself. Finally, the authors considered the role of envy
in helping understand other research domains and discussed ways in which people cope with the emotion.
Keywords: envy, social comparison, social emotions
conservative philosopher, struck a similar chord with an especially
vigorous denunciation of envy, which she claimed dominated the
latter part of the 20th century. In this “age of envy,” the impulse to
begrudge the advantages and heroic strength of the few led to
“hatred of the good for being good” (Rand, 1971, p. 130). Envy is
also a frequent theme of philosophers who focus on the motivation
for people’s desire for social equality (e.g., de la Mora, 1987;
Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971), and it is an inscrutable quandary in
fictional attempts by novelists to imagine utopian societies free of
discord caused by inequalities (e.g., Hartley, 1960; Lowry, 1993).
The sociologist Schoeck (1969) laid out an especially sweeping set
of claims about the far-reaching role of envy at all levels of
society. He argued that envy is the foundational explanation for
pan-cultural norms that serve to maintain social stability, although
this process often leads to the unfortunate stifling of creativity and
to various personal vices. More recently, the Christian philosopher
Aquaro (2004) made the case for envy being the core emotion
driving most sinful behaviors and thus creating the need for the 10
commandments to combat these sins.
Remarkably, despite the many plausible claims for the powerful
influence of envy in everyday social interactions and for its role in
shaping societal norms, psychological research on envy is only in
its early stages. But there are a number of helpful studies on envy
that have emerged. In this article, we review this empirical literature. In doing so, we discuss a set of definitional and conceptual
challenges to understanding envy in the context of the many
scholarly claims that have been made about the emotion, and we
also outline a way of thinking about envy that aims to capture its
core features. We then describe an example of an area of research
in social psychology, prejudice and intergroup relations, in which
envy has been shown to play an important role in advancing
understanding. We also describe another area of research, psychosocial predictors of mental and physical health, as an example of
an area in which there is no existing research on envy but which
would profit from efforts to incorporate this factor. Finally, we
discuss the important problem of how people can cope with envy
and suggest how understanding this problem has implications for
coping with negative emotions in general.
Envy, the unpleasant emotion that can arise when we compare
unfavorably with others, is a common experience for most people
regardless of culture (e.g., Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969; Teitelbaum, 1976; Walcot, 1978). One reason that envy is important to
understand is that it appears to be a hostile emotion that often
prompts aggressive behaviors. Its antagonistic nature is exemplified by the many publicized crimes (e.g., Schoeck, 1969; Thernstrom, 1998) and intergroup conflicts (e.g., Beck, 1999; Glick,
2002) attributed to it; the countless literary tales of assassination, murder, and sabotage provoked by it (e.g., de la Mora,
1987; Schoeck, 1969); its generative role in many Biblical
events ranging from Lucifer’s evil nature, to Cain’s slaying of
Abel, to Christ’s crucifixion (e.g., Aquaro, 2004); its presence
in two of the 10 commandments in the Old Testament; and by
psychoanalytic claims that it is a destructive, life-denying instinct characterized by rage (e.g., Klein, 1957). Envy is also
characterized by its link with an assortment of pernicious tendencies, such as a willingness to sacrifice one’s own outcomes
in order to simply diminish the envied person’s relative advantage
(e.g., Berke, 1988; Parks, Rumble, & Posey, 2002; Thernstrom,
1998; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001), a desire to destroy good things if
the alternative is that others have them (e.g., Klein, 1957; Scheler,
1915/1961; Schimmel, 1993), or a feeling of malicious joy when
the envied person suffers (R. H. Smith et al., 1996) or when an
envied group fails (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003),
even if the suffering is undeserved (Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, &
Smith, 1997).
Claims for the importance of understanding envy go beyond its
being a hostile emotion. Nietzsche (1887/1967) argued that envy is
the prime cause for the egalitarian morality inherent in Christianity
in which the strong are brought down by the weak using principles
of morality sanctified by religion. Rand (1971), the ultra-
Richard H. Smith and Sung Hee Kim, Department of Psychology,
University of Kentucky.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Richard
H. Smith, Department of Psychology, Kastle Hall, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, KY 40506. E-mail: [email protected]
46
COMPREHENDING ENVY
Defining Envy
Definitions of envy emphasize that it is an unpleasant, often
painful emotion characterized by feelings of inferiority, hostility,
and resentment produced by an awareness of another person or
group of persons who enjoy a desired possession (object, social
position, attribute, or quality of being; e.g., Parrott, 1991; Parrott &
Smith, 1993). These blended features of inferiority, hostility, and
resentment generally persist in most definitions, although as Parrott (1991) noted, envy also has more controversial contours than
other emotions such as anger or sadness. Envy is also considered
as one of a group of related emotions (e.g., envy, shame, jealousy,
relative deprivation, and indignation) characterized by negative
affective reactions to the superior fortunes of others (e.g., Heider,
1958; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988).
Once one moves from generally characterizing envy to establishing its distinctive and consistent features, a number of definitional challenges rise up to confound the task. Some of these are
semantic, and others stem from confusing associations with other
emotions. In the first section of this article, we address these two
challenges.
Envy Proper and Benign Envy
Scholars are quick to point out that people use the word envy in
at least two partially contradictory senses (e.g., Foster, 1972; Neu,
1980; Rawls, 1971; Silver & Sabini, 1978). One sense, “envy
proper,” is the meaning found in dictionary definitions and is the
main focus of scholarship on envy. The other meaning, referred to
as “benign envy” (Rawls, 1971) or “nonmalicious envy” (Parrott,
1991), is different from envy proper in at least one core aspect:
being free of hostile meaning. When people use the word envy in
this latter sense, they can actually be using it to mean an emotion
closer to admiration than to envy (e.g., Foster, 1972; Silver &
Sabini, 1978).
Perhaps it is useful to grant a type of envy that is essentially free
of hostile feelings (e.g., Parrott, 1991). Envy undoubtedly requires
that the envying person recognize something of value in the envied
person (though, as a coping response, devaluation may be the
result, as we outline more fully later), and this recognition would
seem to inspire at least a modicum of admiring goodwill. This type
of envy may be more common than envy proper and may often
bring about constructive, emulative actions rather than ill will and
its possible destructive consequences. Yet, the acceptance of a
benign form of envy may obscure the nature of envy. The absence
of hostile feelings in benign envy may render the emotion fundamentally different from envy proper both in terms of the felt
experience and in terms of its likely consequences. Also, it is
important to emphasize that benign envy, if it is to be called envy,
is not the emotion that is typically the focus of scholarly attention,
however much it may be the understood use in many instances of
everyday language and however much it may be an important
response to be studied in its own right. In our view, benign envy
is envy sanitized (Ashwin, 2005) and lacks a core ingredient of the
emotion, namely some form of ill will.
Envy and Longing
Studies examining the content of envy episodes show that it
involves a longing for or a coveting of what another person has
47
(Parrott & Smith, 1993; R. H. Smith, Kim, & Parrott, 1988). It is
hard to imagine envy without such a longing. But it is probably
unwise to equate longing with envy, however necessary it may
seem to be for envy to arise. People certainly use the term envy in
this sense alone, but as with admiration, its character seems harmless and free of feelings of inferiority or hostility. Unlike envy
proper, longing appears to focus on the thing itself that one would
like to possess, rather than on the person possessing it. It seems to
entail an appreciation for what is desired, decoupled from any
obvious antagonistic implications following from the fact that
another person currently enjoys it. Thus, it is claimed that people
use this form of envy in a free and open sense (e.g., Foster, 1972;
Heider, 1958; Silver & Sabini, 1978) without worry that others
will misconstrue their feelings as hostile. Envy proper, however, as
most scholarly opinions emphasize (e.g., Foster, 1972; Heider,
1958; Schoeck, 1969; Silver & Sabini, 1978) and research supports
(Heikkinen, Latvala, & Isola, 2003), is often kept secret. Some
claim it is the very last emotion that people will admit to feeling
(e.g., Schoeck, 1969; Silver & Sabini, 1978). Longing may have
negative connotations, especially if it becomes inordinate and
grasping, thus turning into greed as Schimmel (1993) argued. But
though some scholars argue that greed can produce ugly, sometimes hostile behaviors (e.g., Ashwin, 2005; Waska, 2004), it does
not appear to involve a desire to destroy the thing that is desired.
Envy and Jealousy
Another definitional challenge concerns how envy differs from
jealousy (Foster, 1972; Guerrero & Andersen, 1998; Neu, 1980;
Parrott & Smith, 1993; Russell, 1930; Salovey & Rodin, 1986;
Schoeck, 1969; Silver & Sabini, 1978; R. H. Smith et al., 1988).
Although envy is often confused with jealousy, research shows
that these two emotions are actually quite different (e.g., Parrott &
Smith, 1993; R. H. Smith et al., 1988). Envy typically involves two
people and occurs when one lacks something enjoyed by another.
The target of envy may be a person or a group of persons, but the
focus of envy is that one lacks something compared with a specific
target, whether it be a target individual or target group. Jealousy
typically involves three people and occurs when one fears losing
someone to another person. Envy and jealousy result from different situations, generate distinct appraisals, and produce distinctive
emotional experiences.
Semantic confusion. Research comparing envy and jealousy
isolates three reasons why they can appear more similar than they
actually are. First, people often use the terms envy and jealousy
interchangeably (Salovey & Rodin, 1986), and this naturally encourages the view that they are more or less equivalent emotions.
But this overlapping usage is asymmetric. In a study by R. H.
Smith et al. (1988), participants wrote short descriptions of situations in which they felt either strong envy or strong (romantic)
jealousy. Coders rated each description for whether it conformed
to standard definitions of envy or jealousy. Envy accounts corresponded to the standard definition of envy in almost all cases.
Jealousy, by contrast, evoked envy and jealousy descriptions
equally. Thus, the linguistic ambiguity of the term jealousy can
contribute to a false sense that envy and jealousy are equivalent
emotions.
The co-occurrence of envy and jealousy. A second reason for
envy and jealousy appearing more similar than they are is that
48
SMITH AND KIM
these emotions often co-occur (Parrott & Smith, 1993). A rival can
be threatening exactly because he or she has enviable qualities,
which may then increase jealousy as well (DeSteno & Salovey,
1996). Participants in DeSteno and Salovey’s research were presented with a series of rivals for their partners’ attentions. Descriptions of the rivals varied in ways that would be expected to create
more or less envy by virtue of the relevance of the characteristics
for the participants’ self-definition. Greater jealousy was reported
when the domain of a rival’s achievements was also the one in
which envy would be expected. DeSteno and Salovey measured
jealousy rather than envy, which could only be inferred from the
manipulation of the relevance of the characteristics for the participants’ self-definition.
Parrott and Smith (1993) also demonstrated this tendency for
envy and jealousy to co-occur and included measures of both envy
and jealousy as well. Participants wrote accounts of situations in
which they experienced either strong envy or strong (romantic)
jealousy. Coding of the accounts for the presence of both emotions
revealed that 59% of the jealousy accounts included envy. Again,
this makes sense as romantic rivals often become rivals because
they may have enviable attributes, thus attracting the attention of
one’s partner. Also, the very fact that they have the attention of
one’s partner might produce envy in itself. It is interesting that
only 11.5% of the envy accounts also involved a threatened relationship. A threat to a relationship may frequently evoke a focus on
someone who seems superior as well (hence, envy), but a focus on
someone who seems superior typically should not evoke a threat to
a relationship.
In a second study, Parrott and Smith (1993) showed that despite
the frequent co-occurrence of envy and jealousy, it is nonetheless
possible to isolate distinctive affective components. They composed hypothetical scenarios designed to evoke either envy or
jealousy independently. Participants rated these scenarios in terms
of how the protagonist was likely to feel using affect terms
distinctively characteristic of either envy (e.g., inferiority, longing,
and resentment) or jealousy (e.g., anger, fear of rejection or loss,
distrust, and anxiety). One situation involved a college freshman
trying out for a varsity tennis team. In the high-envy versions, the
rival made the team, whereas the protagonist did not; these fates
were reversed in the low-envy versions. In the high-jealousy
versions, the protagonist saw the rival flirting with the protagonist’s boyfriend or girlfriend. In the low-jealousy versions, the
protagonist observed a similar scene but the identity of the person
with whom the rival flirted was unspecified. Jealousy-related feelings were strongly affected by the identity of the rival’s romantic
partner, whereas envy-related feelings were strongly affected by
the superiority of the rival.
Jealousy and its greater intensity. A third reason why envy
and jealousy can seem similar follows from a feature that often
makes them distinct, namely that jealousy is typically more intense
than envy, as a series of studies by Salovey and Rodin (1986)
demonstrate. Important qualitative differences between the felt
experience of two emotions can be masked by this intensity.
Parrott and Smith (1993) addressed this issue by examining the
relative salience of different affective components within each
emotion in addition to comparing raw scores. Analysis of raw
scores showed that jealousy was indeed more intense than envy on
almost all affective components. But, a second analysis used
participants’ ratings after they were adjusted for between-
participant differences in elevation and scatter. This adjustment
was achieved by subtracting each participant’s mean rating from
each of his or her individual ratings and then dividing this by the
standard deviation of the participant’s ratings. When these adjusted
scores were used, the pattern of difference between jealousy and
envy was consistent with predictions for qualitative differences.
Those affective components more salient in envy than in jealousy
were as follows: longing for what another has, feeling inferior,
harboring resentment and ill will, and feeling that the ill will is
wrong or unsanctioned. Those components more salient in jealousy than in envy were as follows: fear of loss, distrust, righteous
anger over betrayal, and uncertainty about the circumstances.
These results confirmed qualitative differences between the experiences of envy and jealousy and indicated that the higher intensity
of most cases of jealousy compared with envy can mask these
differences.
Envy and Resentment
A final definitional challenge in understanding envy involves its
particularly complex associations with resentment, another emotion often triggered by a social comparison with someone or some
group of persons enjoying an advantage. It is often claimed that
when we envy, we feel that the envied person does not quite
deserve his or her advantage (e.g., Heider, 1958; Scheler, 1915/
1961; R. H. Smith, 1991) or at least that our disadvantage is
undeserved (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). Heider (1958) argued that envy
often contains a sense of injustice because it will typically occur
between people who are similar in terms of background, class, and
the like. Psychological “balance forces” require that similar people
should have similar outcomes, a principle that Heider called an
“ought” force. Heider reasoned that the envious person often feels
a sense of injustice because the envied person’s advantage violates
what “ought to be.”
But envy is not the same as resentment proper, strictly speaking,
as philosophers such as Rawls (1971) argued. Generally, if the
advantage is unfair, especially in terms of objectively derived and
agreed on standards, the full-blown emotions of resentment proper
and indignation rather than envy should result, unalloyed with
envy, as others have also argued (e.g., D’Arms, 2002; Neu, 1980;
R. H. Smith, 1991; Walker & Smith, 2002) or have tried to
demonstrate empirically (R. H. Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz,
1994). Indignation and feelings of resentment proper arise, by
definition, from unfair treatment. Invidious resentment occurs
when the advantage is painful but fair by such objective standards
(R. H. Smith, 1991; R. H. Smith et al., 1994). To the extent that
envy contains a sense of injustice, it is argued to be qualitatively
different from the kind that produces indignation and resentment in
their pristine forms (R. H. Smith, 1991; R. H. Smith et al., 1994).
It is subjectively derived. In many instances of envy, additional
evidence of unfairness is probably nurtured quickly and more so
over time so that the feelings seem more legitimate, as suggested
by R. H. Smith (1991, 2004). But, as Heider (1958) asserted, the
envying person is probably aware that his or her sense of injustice
is far from fully legitimate. For one thing, as Heider (1958) also
argued, people are usually taught to rejoice in other people’s
successes. In a sense, envy violates social conventions that usually
require supportive rather than competitive, begrudging reactions to
another person’s success. In most cultures, envy is considered a sin
COMPREHENDING ENVY
and thus shameful (e.g., Foster, 1972; Heider, 1958; Schoeck,
1969; Silver & Sabini, 1978).
Some psychologists (e.g., Feather & Sherman, 2002) and philosophers (e.g., Rawls, 1971) argue strongly against blending resentment
with envy. They claim that to the extent that justice-related feelings
arise resulting from unflattering social comparisons, these feelings
are, ipso facto, resentment, not envy. Furthermore, the co-occurrence
of resentment and envy may be due solely to the tendency for envying
people to rationalize the cause of their envy. To the extent that the
offending superiority in another person can be perceived as unfair,
one’s envy is transformed into resentment proper even if an outside
observer might label the feeling as mere envy.
Other scholars argue that envy emerges from a basic desire for
equal treatment present from a very early age. Bertrand Russell
(1930) claimed that children deeply resent “the very slightest
appearance of favoring one child at the expense of another” and, as
a result, “distributive justice, absolute, rigid and unvarying, must
be observed by any one who has children to deal with” (p. 82). He
found little difference between children and adults, fundamentally, in
their reactions to advantages enjoyed by others. A recent Freudian
interpretation of envy by Forrester (1997) takes up this claim and
suggests that the “call for justice and equality is founded on the
transformation of envy” (p. 20). Children, in their desire for equal
treatment with their siblings, insist that such treatment is just and
fair. In a sense, envy creates the desire for justice; without envy,
“there would be no desire for justice” (Forrester, 1997, p. 20).
In any event, a sense of injustice seems prevalent enough in
experiences of envy that this sense usually makes its way into
definitions of the emotion. Even if its initial presence could be
shown empirically to be the result of a quick defensive maneuver
triggered by envy, to the extent that it happens typically in envy,
one can argue that a sense of injustice is a core feature of the
experience of envy.
The only direct empirical attempt to address this difficult issue
can be found in a study by R. H. Smith et al. (1994). These authors
argue that justice concerns of some sort may need to be part of
envy because without such concerns the hostile aspect of envy is
absent. Feelings of inferiority alone, without a subjective sense of
injustice, may lead only to a self-focus on one’s inferiority, the
affective outcomes being depressive rather than hostile. Participants wrote accounts of experiences in which they felt strong envy
and then completed measures assessing whether the invidious
advantage was objectively (e.g., “Anyone would agree that the
envied person’s advantage was unfairly obtained.”) or subjectively
unfair (e.g., “It seemed unfair that the person I envied started out
in life with certain advantages over me.”), whether it produced a
sense of inferiority (e.g., “The discrepancy between the person I
envied and me was due to my own inferior qualities.”), and the
degree to which they felt hostile toward the envied person and
depressed because of this person’s advantage. Inferiority strongly
predicted depressive feelings but not hostility, which indicated that
feeling inferior, by itself, is insufficient for the full range of affects
associated with envy. Beliefs about objective injustice predicted
hostility but not depressive feelings, which indicated that objective
unfairness should create hostility but should have no obvious link
with feeling inferior (and therefore feeling depressed). Subjective
injustice beliefs predicted both depressive feeling and hostility,
which indicated that this kind of sense of injustice may be important in bringing about these defining features of envy.
49
R. H. Smith et al. (1994) speculated that one reason for subjective injustice beliefs being part of envy is that many of the
invidious advantages enjoyed by others are unfair, at least in the
sense that the envying person cannot be blamed for his or her
inferiority. Attributes such as intelligence, physical attractiveness,
and musical ability can seem arbitrarily bestowed, and envying
people can feel unfairly handicapped by how they stand on the
distributions of such attributes. However, societal norms disallow
claiming an injustice because of these handicaps; in fact, these
attributes appear to contribute to many socially agreed upon standards of merit. Yet, from the subjective point of view of people in
the grip of envy, they can feel unfairly treated by life and thus
resentful even though this resentment seems far from legitimate
and thus far from righteous indignation or resentment proper. Few
people wish to be labeled envious; therefore, envious resentment is
likely to be privately held and subjectively valid at best, giving it
a different quality from feelings of resentment and indignation that
enjoy social validation.
The question of whether envy should be partly characterized by
a sense of injustice is an especially difficult one not easily resolved
by either argument or empirical focus. We shall suggest more fully
below that the question may be best explored by understanding the
experience of envy as a process that can take several paths, one
being in the direction of furthering a sense of injustice already
present in some form when envy first arises. There may come a point
in this process in which a sense of injustice so dominates the emotional experience that the initial envy is quite transformed into resentment proper and the emotion label of envy no longer makes complete
sense. Nonetheless, even this kind of justice feeling, inspired by envy
in its incipience, might still be distinguished from outright indignation, never tainted by any question of its legitimacy.
Summary of Definitional Issues
On the surface, envy seems easy to define. However, in everyday use, the term envy is often confused with its more benign
forms, which are closer to admiration and longing. In our view, it
is crucial to recognize that envy, by proper definition and scholarly
tradition, contains hostile feelings that can lead to hostile actions.
Envy is also often confused with jealousy, because of its semantic
overlap in the use of the term jealousy, the tendency for both
emotions to co-occur, and the typically higher intensity of jealousy. But envy involves cases in which another person has what
we want but cannot have, whereas jealousy involves the threat of
losing someone to a rival. Finally, envy has especially complex
associations with resentment, as many definitions incorporate
some sense of injustice within the initial experience of envy and
certainly as a common means of coping with the emotion. Good
arguments can be made that separating envy from a sense of
injustice in the full-blown sense but ridding resentment from
definitions of envy seem to miss an important ingredient. In sum,
how should we define envy? In terms of an overall characterization
of how envy is experienced, envy is an unpleasant and often
painful blend of feelings characterized by inferiority, hostility, and
resentment caused by a comparison with a person or group of
persons who possess something we desire. This seems a reasonable
working definition.
SMITH AND KIM
50
Important Questions Concerning Envy
Why Do We Envy?
Envy is an unpleasant emotion, but why is it so? Before proceeding with an analysis of other aspects of envy, it is worth
stepping back and considering this basic question. Why is it that
another person’s advantage can make people feel this painful,
socially abhorrent feeling?
Perhaps the most telling answer to why we envy is that the
advantages enjoyed by other people often have potent consequences for the self, as a long tradition of empirical work shows
(e.g., Buunk & Gibbons, 1997; Festinger, 1954; Mussweiler, 2003;
R. H. Smith, Diener, & Wedell, 1989; Suls & Miller, 1977; Suls &
Wheeler, 2000). Relative standing usually contributes much to
deciding who gains the prized things in life. Social comparisons
also help form the foundations for inferences about the self (Festinger, 1954). They also contribute to ability assessments—for
example, superior relative performance indicates success (and high
ability) and inferior performance indicates failure (and low ability;
e.g., Kelley, 1967). Because of the usually potent consequence of
social comparisons for tangible outcomes and for self-evaluation,
noticing another person’s relative advantage, logically, should lead
to some sort of negative feeling (R. H. Smith, 2000). Although
motivational variables and various self-serving construals of social
comparison information may blunt the perceived effects of social
comparisons (e.g., Collins, 1996; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997;
Wood & Wilson, 2003), many experiments provide empirical
demonstration of how important this information can be in influencing people’s emotions (e.g., see Suls & Wheeler, 2000, for
recent reviews). Envy is perhaps the most important marker for
when these social comparisons reflect poorly on the self in ways
that personally matter.
Whom Do We Envy?
Similarity. Schoeck’s (1969) and Foster’s (1972) reviews of
the anthropological literature on envy make a strong case for its
universal nature. But envy is hardly the inevitable response to
unflattering social comparisons (e.g., Collins, 1996; Lockwood &
Kunda, 1997). Scholarly claims (e.g., Aristotle, 322 BC/1941;
Heider, 1958) as well as empirical findings (e.g., Parrott, 1991;
Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Salovey & Rothman, 1991; Schaubroeck
& Lam, 2004; Tesser, 1991) suggest that we envy people who are
similar to ourselves, save for their advantage on the desired domain. As Aristotle phrased the point, when it comes to envy it is
usually “potter against potter.” This is generally true of how social
comparisons operate (e.g., Festinger, 1954). We seek out, attend
to, and are affected by social comparisons with people who share
comparison-related attributes, such as gender, age, and social class
(Goethals & Darley, 1977), as a number of studies show (e.g.,
Gastorf & Suls, 1978). Studies also show that similarity testing
appears to be the default strategy when we first make social
comparisons (Mussweiler, 2003). Without such similarities, social
comparisons can seem irrelevant, and our reactions may be indifferent and detached.
Schaubroeck and Lam’s (2004) recent field study shows the
importance of similarity in predicting envy in an effective way.
Participants were female bank employees in small work units who
had been passed over for promotion. Months before receiving this
news, they had rated their perceptions of similarity to each person
in their unit, including the person who was ultimately promoted.
Perceptions of similarity with this promotee predicted the degree
of envy felt toward her.
Self-relevance of the comparison domain. Sharing
comparison-related similarities with the advantaged person is important for envy to arise, but research also shows that the domain
of comparison in which the envied person enjoys an advantage
should be self-relevant (e.g., Salovey & Rodin, 1984, 1991; Silver
& Sabini, 1978; Tesser, 1991). A core part of one’s self-worth
must be linked to doing well on the domain of comparison. Unless
doing well matters, it is unlikely for a social comparison to create
an emotion of any kind, as emotions in general arise because they
are linked to a person’s important goals, a point that most emotion
researchers stress (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins,
1988). As many theorists claim (e.g., James, 1890/1950; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schmiel, 2004; Tesser,
1991), most people are motivated to maintain a positive selfconcept. Furthermore, most people’s self-worth will be invested in
doing well in certain areas more than in others (e.g., James,
1890/1950; Tesser, 1991). In the Schaubroeck and Lam (2004)
study just noted, one likely reason why participants felt envious
toward the promotee was that being promoted was important and
self-relevant to them.
A study by Salovey and Rodin (1984) provides strong evidence
for the importance of both similarity and self-relevance in envy.
Participants received feedback on a career aptitude test that suggested that their career prospects in their preferred field were either
outstanding or poor. They were then given the career prospects of
another student who had done better or worse than they had on
either the same career domain or a different (less self-relevant)
career domain. Envy occurred only when participants, having
received negative feedback, compared themselves with the student
who had done better on a career domain relevant to them.
The Question of Perceived Control
We envy similar others who otherwise enjoy an advantage in an
area linked to our self-worth. But there is another important feature
of the comparison situation to consider. It is usually claimed that
people feeling envy must believe that the desired attribute is
beyond their power to obtain (e.g., Elster, 1998; Neu, 1980;
Scheler, 1915/1961; R. H. Smith, 1991; Vecchio, 1997). Empirical
evidence for the importance of perceived control in envy can be
inferred from the more general research on social comparisons.
Participants in a study by Testa and Major (1990), after learning
that they had done poorly on a task, were exposed to a superior
performing comparison person. Half of the participants were told
that they could improve their performance (high control), and the
other half were told that they could not improve (low control).
Participants in the low-control conditions showed the highest
depressive and hostile reactions to the superior performing comparison person. Given that envy is characterized by a mixture of
depressive and hostile feelings, these results suggest that the participants would also have reported envy.
In terms of self-evaluation, a set of studies by Lockwood and
Kunda (1997) shows that perception of control also predicted
whether a comparison with a superior person would negatively
affect self-views. In one study, 1st-year undergraduate participants
COMPREHENDING ENVY
were exposed to information about another student who was doing
very well on a self-relevant domain. This student was either a
1st-year student as well or was a 4th-year student. Exposure to the
1st-year student tended to be deflating, whereas exposure to the
4th-year student was self-enhancing. Analyses of open-ended responses showed clearly that the 4th-year student was often inspiring to 1st-year participants, as this person gave them a sense of
what their own possibilities might be if they took similar emulous
actions. However, comparisons with the 1st-year student seemed
to highlight what the participants had not done and tended to be
debilitating rather than inspiring. An additional study measured
participants’ beliefs about whether their own abilities could increase over time. Participants with malleable, optimistic beliefs
about their abilities found exposure to the similar but more successful fellow student to be more self-enhancing than did those
with fixed beliefs. These studies focused on self-evaluation, and,
because envious feelings are directly linked to self-evaluations, we
can suppose that invidious feelings would parallel the pattern
found for self-evaluations.
Similarity and its complex role in perception of control. Although the research on reactions to unflattering social comparisons
appears to confirm that low perceived control should be an important factor in envy, the issue is complex. If it is true that we are
more likely to envy those who are similar in background characteristics, would not this similarity suggest the capacity to obtain the
desired attribute as well? Similarity should lead to a higher sense
of control. Elster (1998) suggested a resolution to this puzzle by
claiming that the envying person must be able to imagine the
possibility of enjoying the desired attribute. As he put it, envy
“presupposes that I can tell myself a plausible story in which I
ended up with the envied possession” (p.169), which is why
“princes may envy kings and starlets envy stars, but most people
envy neither, or, only weakly” (p.169). Elster emphasized that the
envying person’s imagining the possibility is more abstract than
real. It is a frustrated desire. In Elster’s words, the envying person
believes it “could have been me” rather than it “will be me.”
Elster’s analysis parallels what would be predicted by research on
the simulation heuristic (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In
general, emotional reactions are more intense if participants can
more easily imagine alternatives to a particular emotion-inducing
situation than if they cannot.
Relative deprivation and perceived control. Research on relative deprivation (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Folger, 1987; H. J. Smith &
Kessler, 2004) is also instructive with regard to the role of perceived control in envy. A precondition for relative deprivation is
that another person’s advantage be perceived as undeserved, and
so the feelings associated with relative deprivation largely entail
varieties of resentment. As already noted, envy has complex connections with a sense of injustice, and, therefore, factors associated
with relative deprivation have potential relevance for understanding envy as well. One of the important factors predicting relative
deprivation concerns the feasibility of obtaining the outcomes
enjoyed by the advantaged person. It is interesting that some initial
research (Crosby, 1976) suggests that relative deprivation is more
likely if the desired outcome is feasible to obtain; hence, there is
high perceived control. However, later research suggests it is the
lack of feasibility that predicts relative deprivation (Folger, 1987;
Walker, Wong, & Kretzschmar, 2002). The inconsistency in these
findings may suggest the general difficulty of capturing how the
51
issue of control affects emotional reactions to another’s advantage.
Even when the outcomes enjoyed by the advantaged person seem
undeserved, an extreme sense of low control may lead to depressive, helpless feelings. An extreme sense of high control may lead
to indignation, anger, and corrective action. Conditions leading to
envy may inhabit a territory in between these two extremes where
a sense of control is low but where the desired outcome can be
imagined and where the deservingness judgments are subjective
rather than objective.
In sum, the role of perceived control in envy is complex. One of
the reasons why envy is painful may be that similarity with the
envied person creates a sense of possibility together with a realization that this possibility will be frustrated. There is a sense that
the outcomes or attributes enjoyed by the advantaged person could
be the things that one should also have by virtue of this similarity.
In this sense, there is an expectation of that it could, even should,
happen. On the other hand, the facts suggest otherwise when
considered with realism; what seems possible is actually unlikely.
This coming together of both expectation and frustration may help
explain why unflattering comparisons with far superior others are
not thought to create envy. People who are vastly superior to us
seem in a different category, and this dissimilarity may quell any
sense of expectation.
The Hostile Nature of Envy
Schoeck (1969) detailed many examples of crimes in which
perpetrators, victims, witnesses, or investigators attributed a crime
to envy or made statements consistent with an envy motive. These
crimes range from a case of arson that led to the deaths of a group
of exceptionally talented Ph.D. students at Cornell, to the slashing
of the tires of a group of private cars in an incident in Germany,
and to the false accusations of crime directed at the physically
attractive before World War I. We also alluded earlier to the many
other historical or literary instances of hostile behavior claimed to
be at least partly caused by envy. But what is the empirical
evidence for the hostile nature of envy?
The perception of hostility in other people’s envy. Silver and
Sabini (1978) considered the question of hostility in envy by
examining the conditions in which people perceive envy in others.
Participants watched videotaped interactions between two students. One of these students learns that he has been admitted to
Yale for graduate school, and a friend of this student is seen
reacting to this news by making a comment to a third person. In the
condition considered prototypical of envy, the friend has failed to
get into graduate school himself or has only gotten into a poor
quality school. Furthermore, his comment is inappropriately negative (e.g., “. . . did you see the way he went on about it? Think he
was the only person that ever got into graduate school . . .”).
Almost all participants attributed the friend’s inappropriately derogatory comments to envy. Variations in this core condition
reduced attributions of envy: (a) if the friend had been admitted to
an equally prestigious graduate school, such as Harvard (eliminating the necessary condition of an advantage); (b) if the advantaged
student in fact acted in an arrogant, boastful way (lessening the
inappropriateness of negative comment); (c) if the comment was a
depressive acknowledgement of lowered worth (highlighting feelings of inferiority without accompanying hostility); and (d) if the
comment appropriately focused on how much the student deserved
52
SMITH AND KIM
his success (eliminating any sense of ill will). Silver and Sabini
concluded that most people believe that envy is a hostile feeling
(implied by the derogatory comment) linked to the envying person’s painful experience of another person’s advantage. Whereas
the nonenvious response might range from admiration to depression, the tell-tale sign of envy is hostility, even in the absence of
boasting on the part of the advantaged person. From the nonenvying person’s perspective, the hostility seems uncalled for but
still understandable when envy is its root cause. By contrast, when
boasting is present, then the envy attribution is unnecessary; the
hostility implied by the derogatory remark seems appropriate,
legitimate, and envy free.
Silver and Sabini’s (1978) study does not include a measure of
invidious hostility, and one might question whether the negative
remark in the envy condition is a true indicator of hostility, but
their results are instructive. The average person appears to believe
that a defining ingredient of envy is some form of inappropriate,
arguably hostile reaction caused by another person’s advantage. It
is interesting that, as Parrott (1991) asserted, this belief does not
necessarily entail that the envying person recognizes that his or her
hostile reaction is inspired by envy, an issue that we address in
more detail later. The envying person might label his or her feeling
as indignation and might see arrogance in the advantaged other,
whereas the nonenvious person sees appropriate confidence. Possibly, it does not require that the envied person do anything to
deserve the hostile reaction either. In fact, Silver and Sabini’s
(1978) results suggest that, from an observer’s perspective, the less
the apparent hostility seems deserved, the more envy will seem the
cause. Most important, in terms of understanding the nature of
envy, some sort of negative reaction, reasonably described as
hostile, is a signature feature of envy.
Hostility and narrowing relative differences at own expense.
Recent findings in behavioral economics (e.g., Sanfey, Rilling,
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001) typify
another way of characterizing the hostile nature of envy. As noted
earlier, scholars often claim that envy is destructive in nature, so
much so that people feeling envy would just as soon have the
desired advantage destroyed (or the person or persons enjoying the
advantage) if they themselves are denied it. Furthermore, people
feeling envy appear willing to compromise their own outcomes if
this means that the advantaged person will suffer. This suggests
that relative outcomes matter more than absolute levels when envy
is involved. Zizzo and Oswald’s (2001) research is especially
consistent with such claims. Participants in groups of 4 were
initially given nearly equal amounts of money and then played a
computerized game against each other. During the game, 2 of the
participants received an extra amount of money, giving them an
advantage over the others. At the end of the game, each participant
was allowed a chance to “burn” some of the earning of the other
participants. But, this chance came at a price. For each dollar
(U. S.) they burned, they had to pay between 2 cents and 25 cents.
Disadvantaged participants tended to burn more of the earnings of
the advantaged participants, even when the costs of burning increased. The precise motivation behind this tendency to “burn the
rich” appeared to be a blend of both envy and a concern for
fairness. It is interesting that even advantaged participants burned
the outcomes of the others, but they did so indiscriminately.
Arguably, envy partly spurred the disadvantaged participants’ behavior. Its particular, hostile quality was indicated by the price to
the self that participants were willing to incur in order to burn the
outcomes of the advantaged other.
Envious hostility in the workplace or in group settings. The
workplace is a competitive, often hierarchical domain in which
envious hostility may often play an important role (Vecchio, 2000,
2005). A clear empirical example of this is the study by Schaubroeck and Lam (2004) cited earlier. Envy mediated the dislike of
fellow employees who had the advantage of being promoted. This
study is particularly convincing with regard to envy because its
measure of envy was well-informed by theoretical perspectives on
envy and was differentiated from other similar concerns, such as
objective feelings of injustice. Research in workplace settings by
Vecchio (2005) also provides supportive evidence. Participants’
invidious concerns were negatively correlated with self-esteem
and job satisfaction and positively correlated with Machiavellianism and propensity to quit, outcomes that may also have been
caused by envy-related hostility.
Group settings in general can also be breeding grounds for
envious hostility. Duffy and Shaw (2000), using small work
groups, showed longitudinally that self-reports of invidious concerns were negatively related to group performance. They also
found that, through an increase in social loafing and a decrease in
group potency and cohesion, these concerns were indirectly related
to absenteeism and group satisfaction. Envious hostility may have
precipitated some of these outcomes.
Envy and schadenfreude. A number of studies also suggest the
hostile nature of envy by showing that envy predisposes a person
to feel pleasure, schadenfreude, when a misfortune befalls the
envied person (Brigham et al., 1997; R. H. Smith et al., 1996). In
the R. H. Smith et al. (1996) study, participants viewed a videotaped interview of a student who was intending to apply to medical
school. Details about his academic achievements and activities that
emerged in the interview were manipulated to suggest someone
with either enviable superiority or average qualities. At the end of
the tape, an epilogue informed participants that the student had
been arrested for stealing amphetamines from a lab where he was
working, and, as a result, he had to delay plans for medical school.
Envy created by the manipulation of invidious superiority (measured while the tape was paused toward the end of the interview)
mediated schadenfreude (measured after the epilogue). A second
study by Brigham et al. (1997) indicates that the link between envy
and schadenfreude is especially robust. In the R. H. Smith et al.
(1996) study, the misfortune was “deserved,” and therefore one
could argue that envy produces only malicious emotions such as
schadenfreude when the advantaged person contributes to his or
her own misfortune. However, in the Brigham et al. (1997) study,
which also used the videotaped interview procedure, envy mediated schadenfreude even when the advantaged person was not to
blame for this misfortune and thus had suffered undeservedly.
These studies linking envy and schadenfreude capture some of
the distinctive features of envious hostility. Schadenfreude, especially in response to an undeserved misfortune, clearly suggests an
underlying hostility on the part of the person feeling envy. Although there may be circumstances in which people express it
openly, schadenfreude is a socially undesirable emotion. Social
norms and the average person’s internalized values would seem to
work against both the private feeling of schadenfreude and certainly its public expression, at least when the feeling is inspired
simply by another person’s advantage and particularly when the
COMPREHENDING ENVY
misfortune is undeserved. In this regard, envious hostility appears
to resist being subdued despite its abhorrent nature, suggesting its
intractable influence and power. From the perspective of the envying person, events that reduce or, better yet, fully remove the
envied person’s advantage should serve that part of the self that
fears the consequences of inferiority and wishes to enjoy the fruits
of superiority.
In sum, there are a variety of studies suggesting that envy is a
hostile emotion. Whether it emerges as dislike, as various negative
outcomes in the workplace or in group settings, as the willingness
to give up one’s own highest outcome so that another person’s
advantage can be lessened, or as pleasure when an envied person
suffers a misfortune, even if it is an undeserved one, the hostile
nature of envy manifests itself.
Why is Envy a Hostile Emotion?
It is understandable that another’s superiority might be disconcerting given the likely consequences of inferiority that we outlined above. But why should another’s invidious advantage create
hostility as well? Why not adapt quickly to one’s inferiority and
capitulate to this fact? Also, as we emphasize, social norms usually
dictate that we express pleasure at another’s advantage; doing
otherwise is sinful in most cultures (e.g., Aquaro, 2004; Emmons
& McCullough, 2004; Schimmel, 1993; Silver & Sabini, 1978).
Adaptive reaction to low ranking. Submissive reactions to
another’s superiority make evolutionary sense, as failing to act
submissively to others who possess superiority can result in being
harmed (e.g., Allan & Gilbert, 2002; Buss, 1999; Campos, Barrett,
Lamb, Goldsmith, & Sternberg, 1983). But, it also makes sense
that disadvantaged people should be on the constant lookout for
opportunities for self-assertion, a point that Silver and Sabini
(1978) emphasized. Envy may serve as a kind of call to action, and
its hostile nature may make the impulse more resolute. Not only
may hostility provide motivation, but it may also give one’s
motivation a focus, as emotion researchers such as Plutchik (2002)
have argued. A touch of invidious anger and resentment may break
the envying person free of a prevailing submissive frame of mind,
override worry about the possible social reprisal, and help focus
energy on the source of the problem.
Beck (1999) argued that hostility may also be a natural, reflexive response to perceived inferiority. Given that people appear to
have a strong and probably adaptive desire to maintain a positive
self-evaluation (e.g., Beach & Tesser, 2000; Silver & Sabini,
1978), any unflattering social comparisons undermining this goal
and the resulting emotional sting may prompt a natural lashing out.
Frank (1999) made the argument that it should be adaptive to be
oriented toward bettering one’s condition. This enhances the likelihood of one’s having a competitive advantage over others. But
the algorithm “do the best you can” has a problem. It is unclear
when you can relax and feel that you have done enough. By
contrast, the algorithm “do better than your nearest competitor”
solves this problem in an efficient way. You have done enough
when you have done better than a particular person. The adaptive
goal should not be to better yourself but rather to be better than
your competitor. Once this is achieved, further effort is unnecessary, except the effort to ensure our continued high status. Possibly, the discontent that is part of envy is the emotional recognition
of inferiority; the hostility is the goad for action.
53
Frustration, injustice, and hostility. The frustration inherent in
invidious comparisons may also contribute to hostility in envy.
Research traditions linking frustration to aggression go back to the
monograph by Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, and Sears, (1939)
and find support in some recent studies as well (Berkowitz, 1989,
1990; Dill & Anderson, 1995). As envy is argued to arise from a
frustrated desire for an attribute enjoyed by another person, such
frustration might therefore lead to hostility and aggression.
Empirical work shows that undeserved frustration is more likely
to produce aggression than deserved frustration (e.g., Kulik &
Brown, 1979; Pastore, 1952; Rule, Dyck, & Nesdale, 1978). If a
sense of injustice characterizes the envious response, then anger
and hostility should be all the more likely as well (e.g., R. Brown,
1985; R. H. Smith et al., 1994). Unjust treatment is a sure trigger
for anger (e.g., R. Brown, 1985). Many claim that it is the prototypical cause for revenge, for example (e.g., Kim & Smith, 1993;
Kim, Smith, & Brigham, 1998). Recent work in neuroeconomics
by Sanfey et al. (2003) using the ultimatum game paradigm is
consistent with this linking of unfair treatment with emotion. In
this game, 2 participants split a sum of money; 1 player has the
power to propose the split and the other can either accept or reject
it. It is a useful paradigm for examining social emotions having
social comparison origins, because judgments about whether the
proposal is fair (in a relative sense) seem to govern participants’
reactions as much as opportunities for gaining money in an absolute sense. The rational solution is for the proposer to offer the
smallest possible share and for the responder to accept it, because
any sum is more than what the responder possessed going into the
experiment. But actual solutions tend to be closer to sharing the
money equally; otherwise, the unfairness of a less equal offer leads
to rejection. Participants in Sanfey et al.’s study responded to fair
and unfair proposals. Functional magnetic resonance image scanning during these responses showed that unfair offers elicited
heightened activity in brain areas related to emotion compared
with fair offers, showing that unfairness, defined by being disadvantaged compared with another person, is a clear source of
emotion.
We also argued earlier that invidious resentment is likely to be
subjective in kind. The envying person may believe that the
advantage enjoyed by the envied person is unfair, but the basis of
this belief is unlikely to provide the means to claim unfairness to
others openly. An existential grievance may often drive this subjective sense of injustice. As Parrott (1991) noted, “One’s place in
the world, one’s lot in life, is not quite what one wants, and it all
seems the luck of the draw” (p. 14). We cited the study by R. H.
Smith et al. (1994), which demonstrated that such subjective sense
of injustice predicted not only depressive reactions but also hostility. Thus, it appears that the sense of injustice that we argue is
part of envy may provide another factor that may help explain its
hostile nature.
Envy and shame. Another possible explanation for the hostile
nature of envy follows from the connection between envy and
shame. Shame is the “painful feeling of having lost the respect of
others because of the improper behavior, incompetence, etc., of
oneself” (Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, 1982, p. 1308). Shame appears similar to envy in the sense
that it also involves a sense of inferiority (e.g., Cheung, Gilbert, &
Irons, 2004; Gilbert, 1998; Kaufman, 1989). However, envy is
caused by an actual unflattering social comparison, whereas shame
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SMITH AND KIM
may be caused by feelings of inferiority in a more generalized
sense. Shame may also be different from envy in that it involves a
more constant focus on a defective, inferior aspect of the self (e.g.,
Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), whereas
envy, arguably, has a dual focus on both inferiority and hostility
directed at the advantaged person (R. H. Smith, 2000).
One might predict that persistent focus on inferiority would
create largely depressive reactions in which anger is directed
inward. The existing evidence cited earlier on the inferiority component of envy would suggest so (R. H. Smith et al., 1994). Also,
part of the shame response appears to be of this kind. However, the
course that shame takes seems to lead outward as well. Research
suggests that people feeling shame will tend to lash out at others
(e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Salovey, 1999), the
ultimate result being what Scheff and Retzinger (1991) characterized as a “shame–rage” spiral.
If shame is a typical response to having a devalued self, then it
follows that any case of envy, which by definition involves a sense
of inferiority, can create shame as well. By this logic, a component
of envious hostility is shame based. What may make envy the best
label for the emotion is when the cause of the sense of inferiority
results from an explicit social comparison.
A second way that shame may help explain envious hostility
stems from the socially undesirable nature of envy. We have
emphasized that envy is typically regarded with extreme disapproval (e.g., Foster, 1972; Heider, 1958; Parrott & Smith, 1993;
Schoeck, 1969). As N. H. Anderson (1968) found, out of 555
personality-trait words, envious ranked 425th in terms of likeability. This means that when we feel envy we should tend to be
ashamed of it, potentially aggravating feelings of inferiority that
much more. We may even feel ashamed of our shame. Thus, one
possible outcome resulting from the blending of envy and shame
should be a more acute sense of inferiority together with the
enactment of processes making hostility feelings more likely.
The interconnections between envy and shame and the hostile
aspects of both emotions are highlighted in Montaldi’s (1999)
analysis of envy. In contrast to theoretical views of envy that argue
for justice feelings in the emotion, Montaldi argued that hostile
feelings in envy can sometimes result from the combination of
feeling inferior and feeling responsible for one’s inferiority. The
failure to match the envied person’s advantage is placed at one’s
own doorstep, giving a damning quality to one’s inferiority. “Merit
envy” is the label Montaldi used for envy of this kind. Such
deserved inferiority might be expected to create a depressive focus
on one’s defective self, but Montaldi suggested that in most cases
this is a too threatening an outcome. Envious hostility arises as a
defense against the withering implications of blameworthy inferiority. It is shameful to be inferior especially if you are partly to
blame, it is shameful to feel hostile toward another person simply
because of his or her deserved advantage, and, finally, it is shameful to be a person suffused with shame. It is a demoralizing
mixture. Derogating a rival (usually on moral dimensions that lend
themselves to biased perception) then serves as a defense against
the threat to the self as negative feelings about the self become
projected onto the advantaged person. This possibility is consistent
with research in other domains showing that the self-image threats
lead people to denigrate others as a means to restore a favorable
self-image (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997).
In sum, the hostile nature of envy may seem puzzling at first.
However, there are reasons to expect an unflattering social comparison to produce more than depressive feelings. Invidious hostility can be understood as a self-assertive, immediate response to
inferiority, a natural result of frustration (especially perceived
unfair frustration, however subjectively derived), and a likely
product of how people cope with the shame associated with their
envy-causing inferiority and with the additional shame linked to
their shame.
Private Awareness and Public Acknowledgement of Envy
Despite envy’s capacity to cause discontent and despite its
assumed presence in many human interactions, most scholars
claim that people deny feeling it. People’s tendencies to misreport
or be mistaken about their emotions are a general feature of many
emotions (Platman, Plutchik, & Weinstein, 1971; Plutchik, 2002;
Watson, 2000), but the nature of envy may amplify such tendencies. Many scholars claim that people not only avoid admitting the
feeling to others but that they are also loathe to acknowledge the
feeling in private as well (e.g., Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969; Silver
& Sabini, 1978). These presumed tendencies may largely be because envy is so painful and self-threatening (e.g., Foster, 1972)
and because societal norms reinforce its repugnant nature (e.g.,
Silver & Sabini, 1978).
Competitive axis of envy. Foster (1972) argued that there are at
least two distinct axes along which envious reactions can fall. The
competitive axis is more or less out in the open and is governed by
certain rules through which people can affect their own envy and
the envy of others. At least in Western culture, advertising takes
advantage of envious feelings to encourage people to “keep up
with Joneses” and, through buying various products, literally to
become one of the Joneses. People arrange their status among
others by doing various socially acceptable things, such as consuming products in conspicuous ways (Veblen, 1989/1994). Also,
societies find ways to minimize the possibility that envy felt along
this competitive axis would cause winning and losing to lead to
disruptive behavior. Foster concluded that this type of envy is
largely benign in nature and will be readily confessed.
Fear axis of envy. Foster (1972) claimed, along with Schoeck
(1969), that the second axis, the fear axis, is largely hidden from
view and usually emerges in symbolic forms. Because of the acute
threat to the self implied by envy and the abhorrent hostility that
comes with the emotion, Foster argued that people operate on the
basis of the following set of fears and resulting concerns: (a) fear
of being envied for the advantages one enjoys and concern over
shielding oneself from the hostile actions that envy can cause, (b)
fear of being accused of envying others and thus being seen as
believing oneself inferior and having hostility toward others, and
(c) fear of recognizing one’s own actual envy and admitting the
implications of this feeling. According to Foster, these latter two
fears lead people to deceive others about envy they recognize in
themselves and to deceive themselves about their own envy
through rationalizations and exculpatory psychological strategies.
Foster (1972) made the case that many social behaviors, which
may seem unrelated to envy on the surface, can be attributed to
these envy-related fears. One example Foster gave of symbolic
behavior is particularly illuminating. He claimed that in Western
European society, the principal way that people express envy is
COMPREHENDING ENVY
through its opposite, namely, through compliments. This claim is
almost shocking until one considers the possibility that “most
societies discourage compliments and praise, because they recognize them for what they often are–aggressive behavior” (p. 172).
The very fact that people can become uncomfortable when they
receive a compliment implies that they are wary of the envy that
may partly motivate it. Despite their surface friendliness and
warmth, compliments can be warning signs that the person making
the compliment would very much like to take away what we enjoy.
Foster emphasized that this does not mean that every time a person
gives a compliment, it carries the opposite unconscious aggressive
meaning. Furthermore, there is no research that confirms Foster’s
claim. But it is worth entertaining the possibility that compliments
commonly represent behaviors “stemming from envy at a deep
psychological level” (Foster, 1972, p. 173). Clearly, the possible
symbolic character of envy-inspired behavior should make it difficult to recognize where envy resides and how it manifests itself.
Implications for measuring envy: Direct and indirect measures
of dispositional envy. The tendency for people to avoid admitting
their envy to others and even to themselves presents challenges for
researchers who try to study the emotion. For example, one approach to studying envy has taken a dispositional perspective that
typically involves participants giving retrospective assessments of
their tendencies to feel envy and associated feelings. A recently
developed dispositional envy scale (DES; R. H. Smith, Parrott,
Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999) consists of eight items, four of which
ask respondents to indicate the degree and frequency of their
experiences of envy. It is certainly possible that many respondents
who complete the scale tend to underreport their feelings because
of the socially undesirable nature of the term envy. This problem
may have been partially addressed by additional items designed to
assess reactions tied to envious reactions without containing the
word envy (e.g., “It somehow does not seem fair some people seem
to have all the talent”). Another measure of enviousness developed
by Gold (1996) uses a number of items containing familiar idioms
that were argued to encourage truthful responses. A facet of the
scale measures spitefulness over another person’s enjoyment of a
desired attribute. Instead of asking whether participants felt spiteful, an item reads, “It makes me feel good to rain on someone’s
parade.” Both the DES and the measure developed by Gold have
proven reliable and are correlated with other measures in ways that
suggest their construct validity. In the case of the DES, it also
predicted envious reactions to target persons beyond measures of
self-esteem and neuroticism. Nonetheless, both scales probably
fail to capture all aspects of envy, especially those aspects associated with its more self-threatening features.
The inherent weakness found in a more or less direct measure of
dispositional envy has prompted empirical efforts by Montaldi
(1999) to measure envy in a much less direct way. In his unpublished Survey of Values scale, Montaldi avoided items having any
clear face validity as a self-report measure of envy. The goal was
to use items that tap envy by assessing beliefs or schemas, which
reflect envious feelings indirectly. The items covered an assortment of domains (e.g., grades, intelligence, money, physical attractiveness) and focused on a number of what Montaldi suggested
are envy-related schemas. These schemas entailed zero-sum beliefs that the world is structured such that only some can have the
good things in life, leveling beliefs that the world would be a better
place if no one could have good things rather than if only a few
55
have good things, derogation beliefs that advantaged people usually lack moral character, nondesert beliefs that fortunate people
are undeserving of their good fortune, causal-delusion beliefs that
advantaged people cause others to be deprived, imagined improvement beliefs that life would be improved by having other people’s
advantages, and pessimism beliefs that good fortune is unlikely to
be obtained. Although this scale is still in its developmental stage,
preliminary evidence supports the idea that it taps aspects of envy
not captured by an envy scale having high face validity. The DES
(R. H. Smith et al., 1999) was positively correlated with three of
the envy schemas: leveling, improvement, and pessimism. Derogation and nondesert, two features clearly linked with definitional
features of envy, were unrelated to the DES. Thus, being willing to
admit to envy does not necessarily mean that one will admit to, or
be aware of, all the feelings that envy might actually entail. People
feeling envy wish to avoid concluding that their envy comes with
hostility and resentment, which may help explain why they can
report envy in the first place. Montaldi’s research suggests that
assessing envy schemas may be an important way of tapping
envious feelings that evade awareness or self-report.
Research on envy and schadenfreude. Researchers studying
envy cannot ignore the problems of awareness and accurate reporting. A case in point is the research on envy and schadenfreude
described earlier. Although two studies have found that envy
creates the conditions for schadenfreude (Brigham et al., 1997;
R. H. Smith et al., 1996), two other studies fail to support this link
(Feather & Sherman, 2002; Hareli & Weiner, 2002). The supporting studies differ from the nonsupporting studies in three arguably
critical ways. First, the supporting studies created actual envy
using target persons who were perceived as real by participants,
whereas the nonsupporting studies asked participants to imagine
their reactions to hypothetical situations. Second, the supporting
studies manipulated and measured envy using a cover story that
successfully convinced participants that the focus of the research
was on issues unrelated to envy. The measures of envy were placed
among filler items that probably served to distract participants
from the actual focus as well. Finally, the supporting studies used
multiple items to measure envy that covered the range of affects
theoretically associated with envy (such as feelings of inferiority,
hostility, and invidious resentment), whereas the nonsupporting
studies used items that probably tapped benign aspects of envy.
Given the nature of envy and the problems of awareness and social
desirability, it is unlikely that the nonsupporting studies either
manipulated envy or measured it effectively. Even the supporting
studies are probably tapping a fraction of the envious affect that
may actually be present in many participants, either because of
these participants’ lack of awareness of their envy or their preference to let their envy go undetected.
Possible insights using a psychoanalytic perspective. Grappling with the implications of people’s lack of awareness of their
own envy raises complexities that may suggest the usefulness of
taking into account psychoanalytic perspectives. Psychoanalytic
traditions (e.g., Etchegoyen & Nemas, 2003; Klein, 1957;
Laverde-Rubio, 2004) are often associated with forms of envy
focused on the penis, womb, and breast (Klein, 1957), and many
contemporary psychologists have probably found such entry points
into understanding envy difficult places to start. Also, the testability of psychoanalytic ideas presents hard challenges (e.g., Clarke,
2003). Nonetheless, the literature on this approach is vast and still
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evolving (e.g., Ashwin, 2005; Etchegoyen & Nemas, 2003), and,
given its emphasis on unconscious processes, a psychoanalytic
perspective may be worth considering. For example, the contemporary psychoanalytic researchers Etchegoyen and Nemas (2003)
have suggested that envy can involve an unconscious projective
identification with the envied person, who represents the image of
whom the envying person would want to be in the ideal sense. But,
because feelings of inferiority partly motivate such identification,
this idealization is blended with resentment and derogation. Identification works because people feeling envy can praise the idealized envied object (deflecting the attribution of envy) and yet find
room to be critical as well (thus appeasing their envy). This
process, which is presumed to operate unconsciously, although
difficult to capture empirically, might indeed help characterize the
full range of ways that envy can operate. It is worth noting that
Foster’s (1972) claim that compliments are often symbolic examples of unacknowledged envy fits the psychoanalytically guided
perspective. “Against whom is that eulogy directed?” (Unamuno,
1917/1996, p. 103, cited by Foster, 1972, p. 173) says the envious
protagonist in one of Unamuno’s classic Spanish stories, when he
hears someone speak well of another. Possibly, one can sometimes
detect undercurrents of envy-inspired hostility in high praise.
The Transmutational Nature of Envy
Because envy usually reflects painful inferiority and an inappropriate hostility aimed at another person, we agree with scholarly views that it is also likely that people suppress its public
expression and even deny the feeling to themselves. As Farber
(1966) argued, these features probably give envy a protean (Farber, 1966, p. 36) character that should make it exceedingly difficult
to locate and follow its course. Indeed, for the greater part of
the time it may be “. . . suppressed, preempted, or transmuted to
some other emotion” (Elster, 1998, p. 165). Its “talent for disguise” (Farber, 1966, p. 36) may trick the observer as well as
“. . . the envious one himself, whose rational powers may lend
almost unholy assistance to the need for self-deception” (Farber,
1966, p. 36).
Arguments for the transmuting and protean character of envy
suggest that it is an emotion that is best understood as an episode
“unfolding in time” (Parrott, 1991, p. 12). People feel envy when
they notice an advantage enjoyed by another person or group of
persons. This advantage creates envy because this person or group
of persons is similar in most respects except for the advantage
itself, because the advantage is on a domain of high self-relevance,
and because the advantage seems unobtainable. This coming together of similarity, high self-relevance, and low control creates a
set of likely cognitive– emotional appraisals and reactions (e.g.,
recognition of inferiority, frustration over the low likelihood of
achieving a desired goal, a subjective sense of injustice, and
adaptive self-assertion) that then produces the blend of inferiority,
hostile, and resentful feelings often given the label of envy. These
blended feelings are, arguably, the first pangs of envy. But, these
incipient feelings start a process that can take different paths as the
envying person copes with the threatening nature of the emotion.
The outcome of this process is likely to evolve quickly into
displayed emotions and felt emotions that can be described by
labels quite different from envy.
Some people will probably recognize their envy in the traditional sense of how it is defined (that is, envy proper rather than
benign envy). They will realize that their envy is the basis for their
hostile feelings, and they will sense that their private, subjective
sense of injustice and resentment is probably a weak basis for this
ill will and for their begrudging the envied person’s advantage.
Although this acknowledgement of envy and its causes is threatening, positive and constructive responses are possible. People
feeling envy might select other domains to link with their self
worth, as Tesser’s (1991) self-evaluation maintenance theory predicts, and begin to feel appreciation for the initially envied attribute and admiration toward the person or group of persons
enjoying the attribute. Eventually, they may feel grateful for their
own advantages on other domains, and enhanced subjective wellbeing might result.
Efforts to cope may also lead to a chronic focus on their
inferiority, which might exacerbate shame and ultimately lead to
depression. However, as would be expected by evidence for defensive processes in other domains (e.g., Aronson, 1992; HarmonJones, 2000; Miller & Ross, 1975; Montaldi, 1999; Paulhus,
Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon,
2005; Tesser, 2000), defensive reactions are probably more common. If scholarly opinions are correct, people feeling envy will
tend to find ways to justify their hostility, such as by making
downward comparisons (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Wills, 1981),
especially on moral domains (Montaldi, 1999), thus rendering the
advantaged person or persons undeserving of their advantage by
virtue of their perceived moral failings. This downward comparison process may also be an alternative path from shame in some
cases and may contribute to a shame–rage spiral, a path consistent
with Scheff and Retzinger’s (1991) analysis mentioned earlier.
In general, defensive responses might be expected to be the rule,
leading to an almost immediate transmuting of the feeling as soon
as it arises. In this “transmutation zone,” people feeling envy are
likely to nurture and feed the initial subjective sense of injustice
and find ways to perceive the envied as undeserving of their
advantages because of their moral failings. The label of envy for
their feelings might be avoided because this undermines the legitimacy of their envy-based hostility. Over time, if a focus on the
undeserved advantage of the envied dominates their thinking
rather than their own contribution to the situation, people feeling
envy might be able to convince themselves that they have an
increasingly legitimate cause for feeling hostile, although they may
still be wary of publicizing their feelings. This seemingly legitimate but largely private grievance should tend to give free license
for envious people to engage in a variety of indirectly hostile
behaviors (e.g., negative gossip and backbiting). As the brute fact
of inferiority lingers in consciousness despite feelings of private
grievance, however, a whole set of negative outcomes may ensue.
These might include an array of subrosa actions designed to
undermine and sabotage the advantaged person’s position, actions
only slightly tainted in any conscious way by their invidious roots
and largely colored by a cynical, hateful outlook on life.
Alternately, people experiencing this transmutational process
might find additional ways to focus on both the moral baseness of
the target of their envy and on the seemingly unfair process
through the advantage came about. This process might begin to tip
the transmutational process toward indignation and resentment
proper together with the possibility of convincing others of the
COMPREHENDING ENVY
validity of their sense of injustice. And, finally, if people then find
a way to gain a degree of increased control, the end state will be
righteous indignation and full-blown resentment and the open
aggression that this state of affairs can grant.
Applications and Future Directions
Existing research on envy has begun to isolate its main features
and its consequences for the envying person and for the envied.
However, many questions about envy remain to be addressed.
Speculations about its capacity for transmutation have little confirming evidence. Also, the role of envy in various phenomena,
such as the behaviors that Foster (1972) claimed are symbolic of
envy, is largely untested. Many of the claims for envy’s role in
aggression beg for more extensive examination, although the challenges inherent in doing so are substantial. For the remainder of
this article, we describe two examples of research domains in
which envy is either beginning to play a role in theoretical and
empirical advances or might be expected to do so. We offer these
as examples for how a better understanding of envy and the use of
this understanding to examine other areas have the potential to
yield great dividends. We also review efforts aimed at understanding the ways people cope with envy.
Envious Prejudice and Intergroup Relations
Early theoretical and empirical work on stereotyping and prejudice tended to examine emotional reactions to outgroups in
general terms (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Although research
reflected the great varieties of stereotype content (e.g., Asians are
“hardworking” and “clannish”), people’s emotional reactions to
outgroups relied on terms such as dislike or like (e.g., Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005). More recent research reveals a marked change in
approach. Several groups of researchers have outlined and begun
testing models that suggest a set of specific, rather than general,
emotional reactions to outgroups that reflects the variety found in
stereotype content (Alexander, Brewer, & Livingston, 2005; Esses,
Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002;
Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Furthermore, these qualitatively
distinct reactions seem to capture well the range of theoretically
important evaluations people should have about outgroups and
suggest the functional value of these reactions (e.g., Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005).
Envious reactions are important explicit or implicit ingredients
in these new models. For example, Fiske et al. (2002) provided
evidence for the role of two factors that they argue play a particularly important role in intergroup relations: status and competition. When outgroups possess stereotypical high status or competence but are not perceived to be in competition with one’s own
ingroup, then members of such outgroups produce emotions such
as respect and admiration. By contrast, when high status outgroups
are perceived to be in competition with one’s own group, then
envy is a common result. The implications of these distinct emotions are profound. Whereas respect and admiration should produce benevolent reactions, envy should produce antagonism and
begrudging attitudes toward the outgroup’s high status.
Construing prejudicial attitudes in terms of emotions such as
envy has the potential to elucidate more precisely the nature of
intergroup reactions. Intergroup emotions theory (e.g., Mackie,
57
Silver, & Smith, 2004) emphasizes that intergroup emotions arise
in situations in which group members psychologically identify
with an ingroup in the context of events that bear on the relative
well-being of the group. Intergroup emotions are thought to regulate behavior toward outgroups. As with the other recent models,
the theory assumes that emotions will be particularly good predictors of action tendencies toward outgroups. Identification with the
group is key because this identification links group outcomes to
the self, which then makes any intergroup event (such as a comparison of superiority or inferiority) something that might give rise
to emotions. Although research testing this theory has yet to
examine envy, the work that has been done shows that intergroup
emotions such as anger and fear mediate appraisals of strength
(i.e., implied superiority or inferiority) and a desire to take action
against the outgroup (anger) or to move away from the outgroup
(fear; Mackie et al., 2000). The model lends itself to incorporating
variables such as status differences. Presumably, envy would be all
the more acute in cases of status inferiority when the individual
identifies with the group. Some sort of hostile action directed at the
outgroup would be predicted.
Research on intergroup emotions theory suggests a powerful
role for intergroup emotions in prejudice. In fact, another study
(E. R. Smith, Miller, & Mackie, 2002) showed that the direct
effects of either positive or negative emotion on prejudice were
more powerful than the effects of stereotypes, which were minimal. These results are consistent with the claims of early theorists
such as Allport (1954) and the contemporary approach of Alexander, Brewer, and Livingston (2005) that stereotypes often
emerge as products of the emotions that the outgroup elicits.
Because of the threatening nature of envy, it is exactly the kind
of emotion that should lead to defensively inspired construals of
the advantaged outgroup that might serve to reduce this threat.
Displays of confidence by envied outgroup members would be
seen as arrogance, frugality would be seen as stinginess, and the
gathering together of outgroup members would be labeled clannishness. Also, one would predict that envious prejudice will tend
to be disguised or successfully transmuted into a more socially
palatable and more readily justifiable emotion, such as indignation.
Hostile actions caused by such prejudice might actually be more
extreme than if caused by an emotion less threatening to the self.
Ironically, by being extreme, these actions may serve to justify
themselves and deflect an awareness of the disreputable origins of
the actions in envy.
Glick (2002) outlines an example of how envy can be applied to
understanding historical examples of anti-Semitism exhibited in
Nazi Germany. According to Glick’s analysis, many Germans
blamed Jews for the frustrating set of conditions in Germany
following World War I and hated them in part because they were
perceived as the cause of these conditions. Glick argued that
stereotypes about Jews provided the means for attributing blame.
On the one hand, because of their apparent disproportionate influence in various areas of German life, Jews were perceived to have
considerable power. On the other hand, they were perceived to
have a set of inferior traits (such as deceitfulness and cunning),
suggesting that they had taken advantage of, and would continue to
take advantage of, their influence in ways detrimental to Germany.
This combination of both perceived power and inferior morally
defective traits created the ingredients for envy as well as the
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means to justify hatred toward Jews in such a way that the envy did
not need to be acknowledged.
Glick (2002) argued that this “envious prejudice” explanation
has a number of advantages over other explanations. For example,
the traditional scapegoating hypothesis would suggest that hatred
of Jews would have resulted in the German people’s venting their
frustrations on an innocent but weak target. The focus on a weak
target would result from a displacement process as aggression
against the actual, more powerful causal agent might bring about
punishment. This displacement might also flow from internal
conflict in the Freudian sense as well. Frustration originating from
built-up inhibited aggressive and sexual impulses might cause
one’s own negative traits, or negative traits in general, to be
projected on the weak target. One of the points that Glick made to
counter this kind of explanation is that Jews were hardly powerless, and, clearly, were not the weakest target that the Nazis could
have selected. Also, why would Jews continue to be the target of
hatred even after Germany had regained its military and economic
power? Glick’s model suggests that frustration can lead to scapegoating when the target is more plausibly linked with a perceived
cause of the frustration. The German’s particular stereotypical
views of Jews fostered a belief that they were both powerful (and
therefore envied) and also ill intentioned (and therefore a threat
that needed to be dealt with). The plausibility of the Jews as a
cause for Germany’s woes, together with processes such as selfprotective motivations that envy inspires to avoid inference of
ingroup inferiority and to rationalize invidious hostility, allowed
the Nazis to target Jews with especially vigorous zeal. Furthermore, the mixture of both powerful and negative stereotyping
made it more likely that the envious grounding for this hatred
could go unacknowledged. Yet, because the motivation was invidious, it could lead to actions that were destructive both to Jews and
the Germans themselves.
Glick’s (2002) analysis highlights the rich potential for examining intergroup relations in terms of conditions likely to produce
envious prejudice. The Nazis’ treatment of Jews has features that
make it unique, and yet one can predict that broadly similar
conditions exist in other countries that put certain groups at risk for
envious prejudice (Glick, 2002). Also, envy is likely to help
explain many examples of international conflict, such as the ill will
felt between poorer and richer nations. Unrest between groups
within nations may also have envy lurking as a causal force, as
Schimmel (1993) argued. One can guess about the role of envy in
various examples of communist takeovers in Russia, China, North
Korea, and Cambodia where there were mass killings of people
who had held any sort of prior power, whether they were the
wealthy or the educated. It is also possible that some examples of
global Islamic terrorist activities are partly due to envy of Western
power and influence, which then becomes transmuted into justified
resentment (Zakaria, 2001). The recent models of prejudice focusing on specific stereotype contents and the specific emotions they
evoke herald a new generative phase in research on stereotyping
and prejudice, and fully understanding the role of envy is likely to
be an important aspect of this research.
Envy and Mental and Physical Health
Envy and mental health. Many scholars over the centuries and
across cultures claim that envy has a special capacity to create
unhappiness (e.g., Schimmel, 1993). Part of the reason for this
claim is that envy implies that one’s principal standard for determining self-worth is relative (e.g., Russell, 1930; Sullivan, 1956).
This seems a likely road to unhappiness because, for most people,
one can argue that there will always be others who compare better.
Scholars contend that another downside of envy is that the desired
attributes themselves may increasingly seem unworthy of one’s
desire as they remain beyond one’s reach over time and may even
become a source of destructive contempt (e.g., Scheler, 1915/
1961; Schimmel, 1993; Schoeck, 1969). Those qualities in others
that could actually provide pleasure if appreciated for their intrinsic value, for example, become sources of pain and targets of
destruction. Thus, envy is claimed to have an enveloping, corrosive character that sours one’s view of life, a kind of “poison
spreading throughout the body” (Schimmel, 1993, p. 60).
Evidence suggests that envy may indeed be linked with a host of
negative mental health outcomes (R. H. Smith et al., 1999). Dispositional envy, as measured by a scale (DES) described earlier,
predicted invidious reactions to advantaged targets and did so
beyond other individual difference measures of self-esteem, neuroticism, depression, and hostility. This measure was also correlated with many indices of well-being. It was negatively correlated
with self-esteem and various measures of life satisfaction and
positively correlated with depression, neuroticism, hostility, and
resentment. The enviousness scale by Gold (1996), also described
earlier, was positively correlated with measures of inferiority feelings, trait anger, irritability, as well as measures of depression,
anxiety, phobic anxiety, somatization, and obsessive compulsiveness, suggesting that enviousness is characterized by general maladjustment. Additional research using the DES showed that it was
negatively correlated with dispositional gratitude (McCullough,
Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; McCullough, Tsang, & Emmons, 2004),
adding evidence to the claims that envy makes it less likely that the
good things about oneself and one’s circumstances will be appreciated. The tendency to feel grateful, in contrast to dispositional
envy, appears to have wide-ranging positive implications for subjective well-being (e.g., Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Watkins,
2004), suggesting that it is no small matter if envy works against
this tendency.
Envy and physical health. The harmful effects of envy may
extend to physical health. There appears to be a social gradient
effect such that people having lower status across the spectrum
(e.g., Krieger, Williams, & Moss, 1997) tend to experience more
stress (e.g., Stansfeld, North, White, & Marmot, 1995) and worse
health (e.g., Adler et al., 1994; N. B. Anderson & Armstead, 1995;
Gonzalez, Rodriguez, & Calero, 1998; Illesy & Baker, 1991). Low
status can reduce people’s ability to control and cope with chronic
stressors, which then takes it toll on physical health through a
variety of possible processes (e.g., Dohrenwend, 1973; Langer &
Michael, 1963; McLeod & Kessler, 1990; Stansfeld, Head, &
Marmot, 1998), some having to do with various negative
cognitive– emotional reactions to low status of the same type also
linked with unhappiness (e.g., Barefoot et al., 1991; Marmot,
2004; Matthews, 1989; Ranchor, Bouma, & Sanderman, 1996;
Taylor, Repetti, & Seeman, 1997). Thus far, this research has
focused on negative cognitive– emotional reactions such as depression, anxiety, anger and hostility, and hopelessness and their
harmful association with poor health. Arguably, a significant share
of the negative cognitive– emotional reactions to low status also
COMPREHENDING ENVY
involves envy, as envy implicates social comparison processes
more directly than most other reactions. Inferior status over which
one has low control, a main ingredient underlying the social
gradient effect on health, is a root cause of envy as well. Furthermore, because of envy’s conceptual links with other negative
cognitive– emotional reactions (i.e., depression, anger, and hostility), it may provide a partial explanation for these particular
reactions and suggest why they seem to cluster together in predicting poor health (e.g., Raynor, Pogue-Geile, Kamarck, McGaffery, & Manuck, 2002).
It is important to stress that envy contains a number of the
cognitive– emotional elements also thought to help explain the link
between low status and poor physical health. As we have noted,
people who are envious typically report depressive, unhappy feelings (R. H. Smith et al., 1999) and hostility. These negative
emotional states, both separately and in combination (see Gallo &
Matthews, 2003; T. W. Smith, Glazer, Ruiz, & Gallo, 2004, and
Suls & Bunde, 2005, for reviews), appear to set in motion processes that compromise health. It is possible that envious people
suffer because their hostile attitudes and behaviors make it less
likely that they will receive the benefits of social support, for
example (e.g., Cohen & Wills, 1985; O’Neil & Emery, 2002;
T. W. Smith, Pope, Sanders, Allred, & O’Keefe, 1988). Hostile
people who come to their hostility through an envious world view
may be especially unpleasant companions. As envious people are
more likely to see other people’s advantages as undeserved (R. H.
Smith et al., 1994), this attitude is liable to show itself through
inappropriate derogation of the envied person’s achievements, as
Silver and Sabini’s (1978) study on perceptions of envy shows,
and through unappealing backbiting, as Wert and Salovey’s (2004)
analysis of gossip suggests. As just noted, envious people are
probably less likely to appreciate qualities in others that might
cause delight in the nonenvious; rather, contempt and ill will may
be the typical and repellent reaction to these qualities. If the
envious feel delight, it may more typically come in the form of
schadenfreude when advantaged people suffer, as we noted earlier.
Such proclivities should make for fewer friendships and more
antagonistic interactions, which may then become even more negative over time.
Just as people avoid depressed individuals (e.g., Coyne, 1976),
envious people, whose underlying hostility may leak through their
attempts to disguise their emotions, may be similarly avoided.
What is more, those actually possessing the envied advantages
have cause to fear the actual effects of this hostility, as Foster’s
(1972) analysis suggests. Also, help offered to the envious person
may actually go unappreciated. The offer of help implies that the
envious person needs help, perhaps accentuating the contrast between the superiority of the offering person and the inferiority of
the one in apparent need. Considerable research on the “threat to
self-esteem” model of reactions to aid (e.g., Fisher, Nadler, &
Whitcher, 1982) shows the potentially double-edged nature of
help; for the envious, this may be especially true. Also, gratitude
from the envious is an unlikely result of being helped, as the
research showing a negative correlation between dispositional
envy and dispositional gratitude would indicate (McCullough et
al., 2002; McCullough et al., 2004). Whereas gratitude probably
breeds more help, social support should flow away from the
envious and ungrateful.
59
There is another way of thinking about social support that may
have potent implications for the influence of envy on both mental
and physical health. T. W. Smith et al. (2004) noted that giving
social support may be just as important in terms of health, if not
more important, than receiving it. In a recent study, the beneficial
health effects of receiving social support were absent when the
effects of giving social support were controlled for statistically
(S. L. Brown, Nesse, Vinokur, & Smith, 2003). An envious frame
of mind is unlikely to generate genuine beneficence toward others,
especially toward those who are envied. Envy probably inspires
taking away rather than giving. In sum, the envious person can be
expected to generate greater hostility from others and to feel more
hostility toward them through a transactional process that is far
from healthy.
Another point about the possible relationship of envy to poor
health is suggested by the research linking positive emotions with
enhanced physical health. Just as there are health costs associated
with negative emotions and cognitions, there appear health benefits associated positive emotions (e.g., Fredrickson, 2004). To the
extent that people are feeling envy, they will not be feeling the
kind of positive emotions that have been shown to build stable
personal and social resources important for good health, for example (e.g., McCraty & Doc, 2004; Watkins, 2004). Also, envy
may be incompatible with religious and spiritual worldviews of the
kind that appear linked with enhanced mental and physical health
(e.g., Emmons & McCullough, 2004; Schimmel, 1993).
It is important to highlight that, although the link between
hostility and other negative emotions and poor health outcomes is
solid (e.g., T. W. Smith et al., 2004), the evidence on mediational
processes is less strong (e.g., Gallo & Matthews, 2003). No research has thus far examined envy as a possible mediator of the
link between status and health, for example. In addition, no research has examined the possible role of envy in mediating other
health effects. Little can be claimed for sure about the role of envy
as a more distal cause of poor health, as might be the case with
individuals who are envious by disposition. However, the existing
research is certainly consistent with arguments suggesting the role
of envy in health outcomes.
With regard to hostility, T. W. Smith et al. (2004) argued for an
interpersonal perspective that takes into account variables such as
dominance–submissiveness and hostility–friendliness in predicting
the precise character of interactions and isolating the particular
reactions that have health implications. Tapping individual emotions such as envy will be an important part of a full understanding
of this kind of perspective. Once again, if envy is associated with
a particular health outcome, then this means that status issues are
likely to be playing a role, that the interpersonal situation is
creating a sense of inferiority, and that this inferiority is creating
hostility. We noted earlier the research suggesting that subjective
feelings of injustice were linked with both hostility and depressive
feelings. There is considerable research suggesting the association
between hostility and depression (Raynor et al., 2002) and a
number of suggestions for why they might be associated (e.g.,
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; T. W. Smith & Anderson,
1986; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). Especially in situations in
which there are variations in social status, understanding the nature
of envy with regards to justice feelings presents another way of
considering why hostility and depression covary.
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Explicating these processes is a great research challenge, as
many people do not recognize their own envy, and many people
who do recognize it will hide it. Furthermore, because envy
appears to easily transmute itself, as an object of study it presents
itself as a moving target. But there is reason to expect that the
successful incorporating of the emotion of envy into health models
should lead to a significant increment in our understanding of how
psychological processes can relate to health.
Coping with Envy
It is also important to further an understanding of envy because
doing so may lead to better ways to help people cope with envy.
Salovey and Rodin (1988) reported that a mail-in survey on
experience of both envy and jealousy completed by readers of
Psychology Today generated twice as many responses compared
with most other surveys done by the magazine. Most of the
respondents recounted efforts to cope with the emotions, and the
majority of these efforts were unsuccessful.
Types of strategies for coping with envy. Salovey and Rodin
(1988) followed up their survey by examining what strategies
people use to cope with envy and jealousy and to assess which
seemed most effective in doing so. Participants completed a questionnaire assessing their emotional reactions to envy-provoking
situations in a number of domains and the frequency with which
they used three distinctive coping strategies (self-reliance, selfbolstering, and selective ignoring). A number of important, suggestive findings emerged. Self-reliance, which included items tapping emotional control (e.g., “refrain from feeling angry”),
perseverance (“don’t give up”), and goal commitment (e.g., “become committed to the goal”), and to a lesser extent, selective
ignoring (“decide it isn’t so important”) were associated with
reduced envy. Self-bolstering (e.g., “think about my good qualities”) was unrelated to reduced envy; however, for those participants already experiencing envy, it was associated with less depression and, along with self-reliance, with less anger, both affects
associated with the experience of envy. Salovey and Rodin (1988)
interpreted these findings to mean that the more effective strategies
for reducing initial envy appear to be stimulus focused rather than
self-focused.
Salovey and Rodin (1988) speculated that the person who has
accumulated repeated envying-inducing situations, despite attempts to dismiss their relevance for the self, may begin to experience generalized feelings of sadness and anger along with various self-deprecating thoughts. Self-bolstering may be an effective
strategy for moderating these self-deprecating thoughts and muting
these negative affective reactions, as suggested by the research on
the buffering effects of having multiple valued aspects of the self
on the depressive effects of specific failure (Linville, 1987; Rothermund & Meiniger, 2004).
Challenges associated with studying coping strategies. More
research is needed to follow-up on the Salovey and Rodin (1988)
study. There may be other strategies, depending on the characteristics of the particular invidious encounter, that may need to be
considered (see Vecchio, 1997, for speculations about coping
strategies relevant for the workplace, for example). The findings
for different coping styles need to be replicated using prospective
methods in which coping styles can be shown to predict effective
coping. Also, self-report methods of assessing coping strategies
need to be combined with other measures. Given the likelihood
that many people will deny feelings envy in the first place or will
be unaware of their envy, it is unclear that they would accurately
report how they cope with the emotion. The combining of traditional self- and peer reports of envy and envy-coping strategies,
together with less direct approaches as suggested by Montaldi
(1999), may be a useful research strategy. Tapping coping reactions to envy-provoking situations using daily and momentary
assessment techniques might be used in conjunction with retrospective reports. This is because it is unclear whether people can
accurately recall their specific thoughts, emotions, and behaviors
that they may have used for coping at an earlier time, as recent
research has shown (e.g., Ptacek, Smith, Espe, & Raffety, 1994;
Stone et al., 1998). In the case of coping with envy, the mismatch
between retrospective reports and momentary measures may provide insight into the coping process itself, revealing the path that
defensive processes take. Coping is a complex process regardless
of domain (see Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004, for a recent review),
and understanding how people cope with envy may tax the limits
of available research methods. And yet, succeeding in the challenge may yield considerable dividends for understanding coping
processes in the particular case of envy and across other domains
in which people are confronted with strong negative emotions.
The research we have reviewed on the mental and physical
health implications of envy should make it clear that investigating
coping strategies for envy is an important research challenge. The
problems presented by envy are everywhere: for the average
person encountering frequent unflattering social comparisons
(R. H. Smith, 2000), for the psychotherapist (Salovey & Rodin,
1988) who must often help people in the throes of envy, for the
manager contending with the envy-based friction inherent in competitive workplaces (Vecchio, 1997), and for the powerful world
leader who must take into account envy emanating from weaker
countries, to name just a few examples. But the existing guidelines
for helping people with their envy-based problems seem rudimentary. For example, if a manager can promote only a single employee in a small work group, as was the case in Schaubroeck and
Lam’s (2004) study, what would be the best way to announce and
enact the promotion? Are there strategies that would reliably
forestall envy or mitigate its presence among those not promoted?
Vecchio’s (1997) analysis of workplace envy and jealousy speculates that praise and recognition would be effective unless they
were seen as manipulative. They might also help give the unpromoted employees “a greater sense of inclusivity in unit activities”
so as to avoid their feeling “left out” (p. 555). But these and other
possibilities are untested. The next generation of research on envy
has many issues to examine.
Summary and Conclusions
The empirical study of envy is only in its beginning stages.
However, the existing research largely supports centuries of scholarly attempts to characterize its main features and to suggest its
broad and important consequences for the interior life of the
person feeling envy and for interactions with others at the interpersonal and intergroup level. Envy occurs when a desired advantage enjoyed by another person or group of persons causes a
person to feel a painful blend of inferiority, hostility, and resentment. Envy is likely to arise when the advantaged person has
COMPREHENDING ENVY
similar comparison-relevant characteristics, when the domain of
comparison is important to the self, and when the prospects for
obtaining the advantage seem unlikely despite this similarity.
Although envy occurs when the advantage is fair by socially
proscribed standards, from the subjective private perspective of the
envying person, the advantage is likely to be perceived as unfair,
thus giving envy a resentful character. Because envy contains
self-threatening feelings of inferiority and hostility and is socially
repugnant, it is claimed that people tend not to acknowledge
feeling it, both publicly and privately. Furthermore, it may be that
people will often cope with their fears about the implications of
their envy by transmuting it into emotions more palatable to the
self and to others.
Although envy appears powerfully linked with an assortment of
human ills, it is hard to locate in full view and to measure in a
complete sense, probably because of its repugnant and threatening
nature. Much more research needs to be done on envy so that the
many untested assumptions about the emotion can be examined
empirically. Nonetheless, existing research already suggests that it
indeed plays an important role in numerous outcomes, from prejudice
to schadenfreude to personal unhappiness. Also, it may possibly play
a significant role in physical health. A case can already be made that
a vast, varied array of outcomes will be fully understood only when
the role of envy is incorporated into explanations.
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Received July 6, 2005
Revision received March 20, 2006
Accepted March 27, 2006 䡲