Global Democracy
Jonathan Kuyper
Background Report to “Connected Risks, Connected Solutions”
(2014)
April 2014
Contents
1.
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3
2.
History and Development ................................................................................................... 3
3.
Theoretical Approach.......................................................................................................... 5
4.
Tangible Institutional Solutions ......................................................................................... 7
5.
Interconnected Solutions .................................................................................................. 10
6.
Obstacles ............................................................................................................................ 11
7.
List of References ...............................................................................................................12
2
1. Introduction
Global democracy is concerned with realizing the general principle of ‘rule by the people’ in
transnational affairs. It is a common feature of the modern state that all affected persons
should have due say in the governance of their mutual situations. And following this
prominence, democracy has become the gold-standard of good governance: democratic states
rarely, if ever, go to war with one another; authoritarian regimes attempt to claim democratic
mandates for their rule and policies. As processes of globalization give governance a
profoundly more global character, it is necessary to rethink how ‘people’s rule’ can be
enacted. The emergence of supranational bodies – which remove decision-making capacity
from the nation-state – raises questions about the democratic legitimacy of that global
authority.
Related to questions of legitimacy, global governance is supposed to function as a vehicle to
engage (the management of) transnational risk. Yet international actors have seemed unable
– or unwilling – to tackle the most pressing problems. It is often suggested that democracy,
as a process of collective problem-solving, may have the ability to break cooperative gridlock
in global governance and provide a suitable framework to mitigate transnational societal
risks. This content analysis discusses the history of global democracy, its theoretic problems
related to risk, current institutional proposals, interconnected solutions which cut across
issue areas, and obstacles to the realization of global democracy.
2. History and Development
Given the essentially contested nature of democracy (Gallie 1956), it is of little surprise global
democracy has been manifest in different ways throughout history. The concept is closely
intertwined with ‘cosmopolitanism’: the idea that individuals are the ultimate unit of moral
and political concern (Pogge 1992). The roots of cosmopolitanism stretch back as far as
Diogenes of Sinope – the Ancient Greek philosopher – who proclaimed to be a ‘citizen of the
world’. Global democrats tie themselves to cosmopolitanism by suggesting that all individuals
– irrespective of their national background – deserve equal democratic standing in social,
economic, and political matters beyond the state.
The modern concept of global democracy begins with Immanuel Kant’s (1795) famous
treatise entitled Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Kant proposed a federation of
republican states which he saw as necessary to curtail (the risk of) international warfare.
Kant called for the abolition of national armies, universal hospitality between world citizens,
and respect for sovereignty between states. Kant stopped short of calling for a fully-fledged
world government which would remove national sovereignty and create a unitary, centralized
global government. These advocates, in both historic and current terms, demand a
democratic structure of world government in order to respect the fundamental cosmopolitan
maxim of equal personhood.
Recent discussion of global democracy has been propelled along by globalization and the
corresponding growth in global governance. Loosely, globalization refers to the increased
scope and intensity of social, political, and economic connections beyond the state. Although
states have always been interdependent in some senses, new forms of globalization
undermine national sovereignty in complex ways (Osiander 2001). As Jan Aart Scholte
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(forthcoming: 2) notes, “[P]eople have become substantially more interlinked with one
another on a planetary scale: through communications, consciousness, ecology, finance,
health matters, military affairs, organizations, production chains, travel and more.” But with
these interconnections come problematic forms of risk. As just one example, increased
transportation enables trade, business, and tourism while it simultaneously enables the
mobility of disease, illegal cargo, and terrorism.
In response to the opportunities and risks posed by globalization, international organizations
(IOs) with technical, regulatory, or moral capacity occupy transnational space and engage in
novel forms of governance. This means that inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and even private bodies wield forms of authority that
affect individuals across the globe. Authority exists when international actors – as rule
makers – make competent judgments and binding decisions which affect the lives of
individuals – who become rule takers. Although states remain the primary loci of authority,
regional and global authority is increasingly prevalent. Global governance therefore pulls
authority away from the state and portends a degree of risk to the traditional notion of
national sovereignty.
In standard democratic theory, a demos should take decisions which shape its joint
circumstances and common life-chances (Scholte forthcoming). Within a democratic state,
the citizenry is assumed to form a cohesive demos which is granted rights of political equality
and popular control. However, in a globalized world, authority crisscrosses borders: States
affect the lives of citizens in other states; IGOs set global standards with which individuals
must comply; and the supply chains of multinational corporations (MNCs) condition
individual working conditions. The relationships between rule makers and rule takers, if not
legitimately and properly governed, constitute a form of risk. And indeed, in these instances
(and many more), individuals are affected by transnational authority without a democratic
right or ability to partake in the formulation and exercise of that governance. This has led to
the much-discussed global democratic deficit (Moravcsik 2004).
Essentially, this deficit exists because rule makers who wield authority through regulatory
institutions and informal networks are removed from affected rule takers. This triggers a
democratic need to include rule makers in global governance. However, the complex nature
of international politics makes it difficult to identify the steps in a causal chain which link
rule makers with rule takers. Sorting out which individuals are affected by global authority,
and how to give those individuals democratic standing, becomes a demanding task (an issue
compounded by the fact that IOs generally operate with unaccountable and non-transparent
processes). The deficit is most pronounced when it comes to issues of risk. Authoritative
global governance is supposed to help curtail international problems through cooperation.
However current arrangements of transnational institutions seem incapable of tackling the
most pressing issues of global risk. Climate change, spread of infectious diseases, volatile
financial markets, overwhelming poverty rates, and unjust supply chains show little sign of
abating. To remedy the democratic deficit, individual rule takers deserve a say in how these
issues are tackled by global rule makers. This review focuses explicitly on the relationship
between global democracy and the governance of risk.
It was David Held in the late 1980s that first came to explicitly recognize the morally and
politically problematic nature of the global democratic deficit. Through a series of influential
texts, Held (1992; 1995) argued that a globalizing world would require global solutions. Held
married the democratic deficit to the notion of cosmopolitanism by suggesting that individual
4
autonomy – combined with collective rights to democratic agency – would require a form of
cosmopolitan democracy. This research agenda was propelled along by Daniele Archibugi
who also formulated a prominent proposal for cosmopolitan democracy. In a neo-Kantian
vein, Archibugi (2008) outlined how a federation (or ‘commonwealth’) of democratic nations
could be constructed. Both Held and Archibugi forcefully suggest that cosmopolitan
democracy is imperative to reduce the deficit between global rule makers and affected rule
takers in a way that respects individual autonomy and solves global problems.
Since the advent of cosmopolitan democracy, the literature has taken many distinct turns.
World government blueprints, deliberative conceptions, and statist alternatives are just a few
of the suggestions put forward to undercut the democratic deficit. With few exceptions, these
proposals all share a broadly cosmopolitan outlook and recognize the importance of
democratically curtailing international authority by giving individuals a chance to participate
in global governance. Whether this can happen, and under what conditions, remains heavily
debated.
3. Theoretical Approach
The democratic deficit is the primary theoretical motor behind calls for global democracy. If
citizens within a state are supposed to be given due democratic standing to determine the
course of their lives, there is no logical reason why being affected by authority exercised
beyond the state should not trigger the same normative (i.e. democratic) demands. This is an
intrinsic view of democracy in which autonomous individuals qua individuals deserve
democratic rights. Global democracy might also provide a set of tools to tackle global
problems. Several theoretical and practical issues connecting global democracy to the
governance of risk can be extrapolated.
First, it is increasingly evident that the current amalgamations of international actors are
incapable of fixing the most persistent issues of global risk. International negotiations in the
field of climate change and global warming have stalled over the past 25 years since the
success of the Montreal Protocol. With volatile temperatures, rising sea levels, increasing
levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and other environmental problems, the risks to
individual health and national economies are strained by a lack of international action. The
same could be said of many other issue areas. In economics, the 2008 financial crisis –
kicked started by the sub-prime mortgage collapse in the US – highlighted the dangers of an
interconnected world economy. National economies across the globe were pulled into
recession as stock markets plunged and unemployment rates rose. The World Trade
Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have been unable
to guard against, or roll back, this crisis.
The negotiation of the trade-related aspect of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) – as part of
the WTO accession package in 1995 – locked in a global one-size-fits-all system of high
intellectual property rights maximalism (Sell 2004). TRIPS, principally drafted by the US and
European states, set in motion a series of undesirable outcomes for developing states which
have directly limited access to essential (life-saving) medicine, software, and other
technology. Although some of TRIPS has been contested through the World Intellectual
Property Organization’s (WIPO) Development Agenda, citizens from all corners of the globe
remain removed from these governance structures. The war in Iraq also emphasized how
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states acting unilaterally – or through a willing coalition – can bypass international
governance (in this case, the United Nations (UN)) and start a decade-long military episode.
Common to these examples of risk management is gridlock in international negotiations:
national interests, economic demands, domestic lobby groups, and international
commitments all hamper the ability of global rule makers to reach agreement. These
negotiations are often shrouded in secrecy and accountability is extremely limited. In almost
all cases, citizens are removed from these processes, thus deepening the democratic deficit.
Climate change, for instance, affects individuals in myriad ways that do not correspond to
national borders. Levels of CO2, acid rain, and the hole in ozone layer are predominantly
caused by advanced and emerging economies, but affect individuals from developing states
disproportionately. The transnational response to global negotiating gridlock has been to
shift (back) toward minilateral agreements. This is exemplified by the current trans-pacific
partnership (TPP). In these fora it might be possible to respond to global risks, but the scope
of minilateralism reduces the ability to fix issues of global risk. Minilateralism might enable
the inclusion of affected citizens in decision-making, but rule makers are required to take
active steps to reduce the democratic deficit.
There are other reasons related to risk which make mitigating the global democratic deficit
essential. The field of global justice – which is primarily concerned with distributing the
burdens and benefits of national and global resources – draws upon a cosmopolitan
framework (Pogge 1992). To undercut global problems, actors need to be assigned their
appropriate portion of duties and rights. This enables action and helps secure compliance.
However, determining a just distribution between states and individuals is a complex and
contentious task. Many prominent global justice scholars have recently noted that processes
of global democracy might be essential to sort out ‘reasonable disagreements’ over how global
resource distribution should be determined (Pettit 2012; Valentini 2012). Because
disagreements often entail their own risks – from a lack of cooperation through to
international warfare – establishing a global democratic framework to channel issues of risk
would seem beneficial.
Just as relevantly, several scholars have suggested that the rise of global governance is
leading to politicization: increased knowledge of, and resistance toward, illegitimate forms of
authority beyond the state (Zürn et al. 2012). A key example of the risk of politicization – a
trope from the global democracy literature – is the 1999 Battle in Seattle. In November of
that year, roughly 50,000 protesters flooded the streets to protest the most ‘powerful,
secretive, and anti-democratic body’ in the world: the WTO. Under the weight of this protest,
the much-vaunted Millennium Round collapsed. It was, though, shifted to Doha in
subsequent years to evade such public scrutiny. In order to avoid wide-spread resistance,
Zürn et al. note that IOs necessitate legitimacy to maintain functionality. This requires a
degree of sociological legitimacy: belief in, and support for, the actions of a particular body by
affected individuals (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Many global democracy advocates have
suggested that democratic mechanisms will be essential to shore up support and mitigate the
risks of politicization.
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4. Tangible Institutional Solutions
There are myriad institutional solutions for instantiating ‘rule of the people’ at the global
level. These schemes are all supposed to ameliorate issues of transnational risk. Scholars
have elucidated several typologies to capture the differences between proposals. Scholte
(forthcoming: 2-3), for instance, categorizes global democracy schemes as either ‘statist’,
‘cosmopolitan’, or ‘postmodern’. Archibugi et al. (2012) suggest three different ideal types (in
the Weberian sense) to group proposals: federalism, cosmo-federalism, and polycentrism. It
would not be particularly helpful to introduce another analytically-stylized division.
However, there is a common thread running through much of the work. Most proponents of
global democracy have a tendency to think in terms of ‘models’ (Bexell et al., 2010). In
general, models can be understood as theoretical constructions designed to express the
normative and institutional qualities of a democratic system. In other words, models identify
a first principle (autonomy, utilitarianism, non-domination, etc.) which justifies why ‘rule of
the people’ should be sought, and then provides an institutional blueprint to engender this
normative goal. Models tend to fit together as whole pieces, and are supposed to provide a
‘terminal endpoint’ toward which theorists and practitioners can strive (Archibugi et al.,
2012). This review will briefly outline cosmopolitan, world government, deliberative, and
statist models and highlight their relationship to global risk.
As noted above, the most prominent response to the global democratic deficit – perhaps
because of first-mover advantage – is the model of cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1995).
Coming to the forefront at the conclusion of the Cold War and the demise of communism,
cosmopolitan democracy builds upon Francis Fukuyama’s famous ‘end of history’ declaration
that liberal democracy had become the sine qua non of modern governance. Drawing upon
this ideal, cosmopolitan democrats suggest that individual rights and autonomy should be
protected and promoted by new and existing IOs. Individuals – from the local to the global –
should be included in the decisions which affect their lives. In doing so, cosmopolitan
democracy seeks to lift familiar statist mechanisms to the world state: parliaments, courts,
charters of rights, and so on. These institutions should operate in conjunction with national
governments.
This model emphasizes a series of short- and long-term proposals required to undercut the
democratic deficit and problems of risk (Held 1995). In the short term, the UN Security
Council (UNSC) should be reformed to give developing states a more powerful voice,
enhanced regional powers, compulsory jurisdiction of the international criminal court (ICC),
and the creation of a small but effective international military force. In the long term, a global
parliamentary assembly should be established to give individuals direct voting in the matters
which affect their lives (c.f. Falk and Strauss 2001). A global charter of rights should also be
established, a balance of power between a global parliament, courts, and legislatures should
be fostered, and nation-states should be demilitarized. Finally, global civil society should
become a diverse and self-regulating force juxtaposed to international politics and
economics. These institutions should become the battlegrounds for international problem
solving and cooperation.
The cosmopolitan model thus seeks to replicate mechanisms from the national level beyond
the state to undercut problems of risk. The model is ambitious, but it remains unclear
whether global parliaments and courts could actually mitigate transnational problems. Even
with 1000 members of a global parliament, the constituency would cover more than 7 million
individuals straining the connection between rule makers and rule takers. Moreover, the
7
global system is characterized by deep pluralism and inequality between developed and
developing states. Within nation-states, it is historically clear that introducing parliaments
into fragile and unequal contexts leads to corruption and further breakdown (Goldstone
2010). There is good reason to think that a similar problem could emerge under a system of
cosmopolitan democracy which may exacerbate both the democratic deficit and issues of risk.
The cosmopolitan model stops short of a world government. Many notable proponents –
such as Hugo Grotius (the father of international law), Pierre Dubois, Abbé de Saint-Pierre,
and Jeremy Bentham – have all engaged with the notion of world government (Cabrera
2010). In the face of seemingly insurmountable global problems such as climate change and
illicit drug trafficking, world government proposals have become prominent again.
Proponents – from Luis Cabrera, to Raffaele Marchetti, and Alexander Wendt – argue that
cosmopolitan democrats do not do enough (institutionally-speaking) to secure democratic
rights and tackle global problems. Instead of balancing national interests against
cosmopolitan democracy, an overarching world government is needed to give all affected
individuals institutional standing. This entails, according to Cabrera (2004: 71)
“restructuring of the global system to bring states under the authority of just supranational
institutions”. Although subsidiarity would apply, world government institutions would have
formal supremacy over states. While this model also entails global parliaments and courts, it
also would necessitate a monopoly on coercion, a standing military, and a complete global
constitution. According to advocates, only a multi-level system of democratic world
government, in which current states and sub-state bodies are embedded in global
organizations, could remedy global risks.
While a world government might have the capacity to remedy some risks, it also entails
substantial risk itself. Kant specifically sought a democratic federation without formation of a
world government as he thought the latter would end in ‘soulless despotism’. By this Kant
meant that the absolute power necessary to establish and maintain a world government
would lead to power-mongering between elites, rather than democratic participation for
affected citizens. Although world government scholars rightly claim that problems of global
risk need to be addressed – and that affected citizens should have a democratic say in global
rule-making – it is not clear that a world government model could actually be designed and
enacted in line with preconceived (democratic) ideals. As historical institutionalists have so
forcefully noted, unintended consequences and the logic of path dependence often knock
institutions off their chosen trajectory (Pierson 2004). Given the large-scale and totalizing
nature of a world government, this point bears remembering. Moreover, if a world
government system was coopted by elites and powerful states who prefer the status quo,
international risks might be made less tractable.
In stark contrast to cosmopolitan and world government institutional solutions, deliberative
democrats offer their own model to remedy the democratic deficit (Dryzek 2000). In contrast
to the ‘vote-centric’ notion of democratic politics preferred by cosmopolitan democrats and
world government scholars, deliberative democracy offers a ‘talk-centric’ view. The ideal of
deliberative democracy is that inclusive, non-coercive, and reciprocal discussion on matters
of common interest should mold individual preferences and shape public policy. The model
suggests that individual rule takers should be allowed to deliberate over the rules and policies
to which global rule makers subject them. Institutions should be designed to mitigate
bargaining and coercion so that authentic deliberation can come to the fore. This requires
restructuring existing institutions – such as the WTO, UN, and other IOs – to minimize the
effects of power politics. Equal opportunity for participation should be open to all individuals
8
and states, irrespective of national resources or income. Specific institutions – such as a
global citizens’ assembly – could be constructed to enable rule takers to discuss their views
and inform rule makers of these preferences. Above all, deliberative democracy provides a set
of tools to open discussion about tackling global risk which highlights the give and take of
reasons.
The deliberative model places much faith in global civil society (GCS) as a vehicle of global
democratization. GSC – institutionally-composed of NGOs, interest groups, and even
individuals – is supposed to offer a free and unconstrained area of deliberation away from the
pressures of national governments and the market (Dryzek 2012). GCS often tackle issues of
risk which IGOs and states have proven impotent in resolving. In this realm, citizens can
discuss their views, transform their preferences, and seek influence over rule makers. This
can happen through the lobbying pressure of NGOs, social movements and protests, writing
letters to national representatives, and many other channels. James Bohman (2007) has
described how a model of global republicanism could ensure global democracy through
transnational deliberation between affected publics in GCS. This model is supposed to
provide an outlet for citizens to contest global authority and ameliorate issues of global risk.
However, the deliberative model – relying upon GCS – is not without its limitations. GCS can
be an unconstrained arena for deliberation, but it is also susceptible to coercive power
relations between individual citizens, NGOs, and rule makers. Elites can frame issues for GCS
to discuss. NGOs and individuals with more resources can influence rule makers to a greater
extent than individuals with fewer resources. These problems can often make civil society
deliberation coercive in nature, and undercut the notion of political equality considered
essential to ‘rule by the people’ (Erman forthcoming). Moreover, current problems – such as
global corruption, financial governance, and international warfare – have proven quite
unresponsive to deliberative mechanisms.
The final institutional solution comes from a diverse range of scholars that could loosely be
described as a statist model. In this prescription, the democratic deficit can be reduced by
strengthening the links between citizens and their national government, and by heightening
the role of national governments in global affairs. If rule takers have democratic control over
national rule makers who in turn direct global governance, the democratic deficit is
essentially overcome. This entails rolling back global governance and re-asserting national
sovereignty. IOs should once again become tools of national governments, and international
bureaucrats should be answerable solely to national leaders. Many problems of risk
exacerbated by global governance would be undercut. Global governance would be
democratic to the extent that multilateral collaboration occurs between democratic states.
This model could take diverse institutional forms, but the design of all IOs should place the
rights of democratic states at the core. Statism varies from cosmopolitan democracy which
entails giving rule makers a direct say in global governance and limiting national sovereignty.
The statist model comes in two distinct strands. The most radical strand is composed of ‘new
sovereigntists’ (Goodhart and Taninchev 2011). These proponents – who include John
Bolton, Jack Goldsmith, Eric Posner, Jeremy Rabkin, and many others – argue that global
governance in all forms undermines popular sovereignty and, by extension, national
democracy. Because states are beholden to IOs, citizens cannot determine the course or
policy of the national government. The remedy suggested by most new sovereigntists is to
strip back the interdependence of global governance and strengthen national authority. The
less radical view comes from Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Steven Macedo
9
(2009). These authors suggest that global governance can actually support national
democracies by restricting the power of special interest groups, protecting individual rights,
and carving out space of deliberation. Both strands suggest that rule makers should have
democratic rights within the state, and global governance should be limited to multilateral
institutions which bolster national democracy.
This model has severe limitations. First, it is at odds with the empirical reality of world
politics. IGOs, NGOs, MNCs, and other IOs all wield authority without the sanctioning of
states. Indeed, the credibility of many IOs derives from the fact that they operate without
official state control. NGOs often seek to expose unjust state behavior; MNCs evade national
regulations and taxes by shifting their headquarters; and international financial bodies such
as the IMF require some degree of independence to decide where to allocate funds. These
bodies, which operate beyond the control of states, can play an essential role in undermining
international risk. While new sovereigntists might deride this state of affairs, it is not feasible
to curtail global governance. Second, IGOs typically develop their own cultures and
pathologies which pull against the preferences of national governments (Barnett and
Finnemore 1999). Thus, even if citizens have national democratic rights, over time IOs will
strain the connections between citizens and global rule makers. Finally, trying to constrain
global governance to inter-governmental decision-making may exacerbate global risks. Issues
(such as climate change) are subject to seemingly impervious cooperation and collective
action problems, and inter-national negotiations have proven ineffective in their resolution.
5. Interconnected Solutions
The models discussed would all struggle to mitigate issues of global risk and dampen the
global democratic deficit. Over the past few years, a new method of thinking about global
democracy has come to the fore. Instead of seeking one specific model of global democracy,
proponents can disaggregate the concept of democracy (people’s rule) into a set of values
which can be sought in myriad ways across the international system (de Búrca 2008). These
values – such as equal participation, accountability, popular control, authentic deliberation,
and contestation – are common to a range of different democratic models, but exclusive to
none (Bexell et al. 2010). This approach suggests that advocates can strive for different
democratic values in the international system (Little and Macdonald 2013; Kuyper 2013). IOs
can then be judged by how well they secure participation, accountability, deliberation, and
other values with respect to affected rule takers.
This proposal may also be better equipped to handle interconnected issues of global risk.
Climate change, intellectual property rights, financial crises, security, refugee movement,
terrorism, and a host of other risks stretch across issue areas. For instance, pandemics are a
public health, (bio-)security, and intellectual property issue. Climate change is most
obviously an environmental problem, but it raises economic, health, and development
questions. While models of democracy provide an ex ante institutional scheme – global
parliament, world government, GCS, or IGO multilateralism – to handle problems of risk,
attaining democratic values opens up novel avenues to include stakeholders, secure
compliance, and find democratic solutions to problems.
In this vein, different risks can be democratized in different ways. Ecological risks may well
be more amenable to deliberative democratization as John Dryzek (2012) has suggested,
10
whereas economic governance is more susceptible to standards of (liberal) accountability
(Keohane et al. 2009). Indeed, it may also turn out that interconnected problems of risk are
most likely to give rise to problem solving and democratization. In the area of intellectual
property rights, the WIPO’s ability to bolster development rights and public health against
the economic mandate of the WTO highlights how IOs in different issue areas can enable
deliberation and participation to tackle risk. Looking at the intersections of issue areas, and
the potential of interconnected institutions, presents novel options for democratic problem
solving.
6. Obstacles
But of course many obstacles remain to global democratization and mitigating transnational
risk. Although the international system might be highly dense, it is still anarchic: there is no
single hegemon to impose its will, no universal legal framework, and actors can often violate
international law without sanction. In other words, global politics is still a domain in which
power politics dominates. Nation-states, IGOs, MNCs, and NGOs are heavily resourcedependent, and bargaining pervades international negotiations. While sovereignty provides a
formal degree of equality between states, the practices of economic and political relations
beyond the state are animated by inequality. International negotiators take consideration of
national interest, but rarely discuss the democratic rights owed to affected individuals or
acknowledge how global authority and risks cut across national boundaries.
Just as importantly, much of today’s global governance occurs through subaltern networks.
These bodies directly affect rule takers but remain out of public sight. In the issue area of
global financial governance, for instance, the WTO, Group of 8 (G8), IMF, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), and many other bodies are highly visible. However, credit rating
agencies such as Moody’s Investors Service, and Standard & Poor’s, the Hedge Fund
Standards Board (HFSB) have global regulatory capacity without national oversight.
Similarly, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the Alberta Securities
Commission, and many other groups form complex networks with diffuse authority. The
time, location, and content of meetings within these networks remain secretive and thus
elude democratization efforts. These bodies make globalization manageable, but present their
own risks to global democracy and the world economy. Although global financial regulation
has occurred for decades, the 2008 financial crisis highlighted the fragility of the world
economy and risks of undemocratic global governance.
Finally, global democracy faces persistent feelings of nationalism from individual rule takers.
Shifting authority to the regional and global level can engender cosmopolitan feelings and
sentiments, but it can also lead to dissatisfaction with governance beyond the state. Under
these conditions, individuals tend to reassert their national identity. As a current example,
this reaction can be seen across many European states as citizen dissatisfaction with the EU
produces deep levels of Euro-skepticism. This is problematic because global problem solving
requires both rule makers and rule takers working in tandem. Rule takers should be included
in sites of global authority, not just to enhance inclusion and the legitimacy of decisionmaking, but to help secure support for the outcomes of rule-making. Implementing climate
change solutions will require action that stretches from international coordination all the way
from MNCs, and national policies, to individual compliance. If global governance is
continually seen as illegitimate and undemocratic, solving problems of global risk will remain
elusive.
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