ASSOCIATION FOR CONSUMER RESEARCH
Labovitz School of Business & Economics, University of Minnesota Duluth, 11 E. Superior Street, Suite 210, Duluth, MN 55802
“The Good, the Bad and the Certain”: When Ambivalent Attitudes Affect Intention Differently
Nico Heuvinck, Ghent University & University College Ghent, Belgium
Maggie Geuens, Ghent University & Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School, Belgium
Iris Vermeir, Ghent University, Belgium
Distinguishing between manifest and univalent ambivalence (i.e., knowing vs. expecting conflicting information), we show that
manifest ambivalence yields greater attitude certainty and a higher attitude-intention consistency than univalent ambivalence. The
former seems to be driven by a difference in attitude clarity (rather than attitude correctness), but the latter is not.
[to cite]:
Nico Heuvinck, Maggie Geuens, and Iris Vermeir (2011) ,"“The Good, the Bad and the Certain”: When Ambivalent Attitudes
Affect Intention Differently", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 39, eds. Rohini Ahluwalia, Tanya L. Chartrand,
and Rebecca K. Ratner, Duluth, MN : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 425-426.
[url]:
http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/1009202/volumes/v39/NA-39
[copyright notice]:
This work is copyrighted by The Association for Consumer Research. For permission to copy or use this work in whole or in
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“The Good, the Bad and the Certain”
When Ambivalent Attitudes Affect Intention Differently
Nico Heuvinck, Ghent University & University College Ghent, Belgium
Maggie Geuens, Ghent University & Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School, Belgium
Iris Vermeir, Ghent University, Belgium
Extended Abstract
When consumers simultaneously evaluate an attitude object
as positive and negative, they are said to experience attitudinal
ambivalence (Kaplan 1972; Priester and Petty 1996). Although
attitudinal ambivalence is usually treated as a general construct
(Kaplan 1972), the underlying structure of the feelings of
ambivalence may lead to very different consumer responses. Building
on Priester et al. (2007), we distinguish two different types of
subjective ambivalence: manifest ambivalence (knowing conflicting
information) versus univalent ambivalence (anticipating/expecting
conflicting information). The objective of this paper is to investigate
the impact of these different types of subjective ambivalence on
attitude certainty (conceptualized by attitude clarity and attitude
correctness) and attitude-intention correspondence.
Ambivalence is generally associated with uncertainty as the
conflict between positive and negative reactions attenuates the
certainty of holding an attitude (e.g. Jonas et al. 1997; Petrocelli et
al. 2007; Petty et al. 2006; Tormala and Rucker 2007). However, we
suggest that attitude certainty associated with an ambivalent attitude
will be influenced by the type of conflicting reactions that underlie
subjective ambivalence. When conflicting reactions are anticipated
(i.e., univalent ambivalence), people will be less certain of their
ambivalent attitude compared to when conflicting reactions are
known (i.e., manifest ambivalence) or rather absent (i.e., univalence).
In Study 1, we manipulated attitudinal ambivalence
(univalence, univalent ambivalence, and manifest ambivalence) by
varying the amount of positive and negative features respondents
received about an MP3-player (cf. Priester et al. 2007), and by
varying the opinion of one’s best friend. Respondents indicated their
attitudes, attitude certainty (Clarkson et al. 2008; Petrocelli et al.
2007; Tormala and Petty 2002), type of conflicting reactions, and
subjective ambivalence toward the MP3-player (Priester et al. 2007).
The results show that although manifest and univalent ambivalent
individuals experience the same level of subjective ambivalence,
univalent ambivalent attitudes are held with less certainty compared
to manifest ambivalent and univalent attitudes. Hence, the type of
ambivalence, fed by different conflicting reactions, indeed induces
different levels of attitude certainty.
According to Petrocelli et al. (2007), attitude certainty is
composed of (1) attitude correctness and (2) attitude clarity. Attitude
correctness refers to the extent to which one feels confident that
his/her attitude is correct, valid, or justified. Individuals with high
attitude correctness not only believe that their attitude is correct, but
also think that other people should have the same attitude. Attitude
clarity is the extent to which people know what their true attitude
toward a topic is and to what extent this attitude is clear to them. We
argue that univalent ambivalent people are less likely to know their
true attitude (cf. attitude clarity) toward a focal product because they
anticipate, but are not really aware of any conflicting information.
In contrast, manifest ambivalent individuals are well aware of
conflicting information. Therefore, we believe that they perceive their
attitude to be clearer compared to univalent ambivalent individuals.
In contrast, concerning attitude correctness, we do not expect any
differences between manifest and univalent ambivalent individuals.
Univalent ambivalent individuals can be as convinced as manifest
ambivalent individuals that their attitude is correct/valid given the
available information.
Study 2 was identical to Study 1, except for one modification; at
the end of the questionnaire, we assessed attitude clarity and attitude
correctness (cf. Petrocelli et al. 2007). Besides replicating the findings
of Study 1, Study 2 shows that univalent ambivalent respondents
indeed feel that their attitude toward the MP3-player is less clear as
compared to manifest ambivalent and univalent participants. Also in
line with expectations, univalent ambivalent individuals feel equally
confident as manifest ambivalent and univalent individuals that their
attitude is correct, valid or justified. Hence, it seems that the lower
attitude certainty experienced by univalent ambivalence (versus
manifest ambivalence and univalence), is driven by a difference in
attitude clarity rather than a difference in attitude correctness.
Several studies have shown that attitudinal ambivalence
results in lower attitude-behavior consistency (e.g. Armitage and
Conner 2000; Conner et al. 2002; Costarelli and Colloca 2004;
Thompson et al. 1995). In contrast, Jonas et al. (2007) and Sengupta
and Johar (2002) found that ambivalent attitudes lead to higher
attitude-behavior consistency. We argue that the type of conflicting
reactions underlying attitudinal ambivalence could help explain
these different results. People are spontaneously motivated to make
sense of inconsistencies in order to arrive at an integrated evaluation
(Srull and Wyer 1989). Accordingly, exposure to inconsistencies
stimulates information processing, increasing the strength and the
predictive ability of the attitude (Jonas et al. 1997; Petty et al. 1995).
Since manifest ambivalent people are confronted with positive and
negative information, they will probably consider both in an effort
to create an integrated judgment that is predictive of behavior (i.e.,
a strong attitude). Univalent ambivalent people are aware of only
positive items and merely anticipate on negative information. As
an outcome, judgments can be expected to be less integrated and
hence less predictive of behavior. Moreover, attitudes held with high,
rather than low, certainty yield greater attitude-behavior consistency
(e.g. Rucker and Petty 2004, Tormala et al. 2006; Tormala and Petty,
2004a, 2004b; Tormala and Rucker 2007). The results of Study 1
and 2 show that manifest ambivalent people indicate higher attitude
certainty compared to univalent ambivalent people. Hence, manifest
ambivalent people can be expected to also display higher attitudeintention correspondence.
Study 3 was similar to Study 2, except for one modification.
At the end of the questionnaire we assessed respondents’ intention
to buy the MP3-player (cf. Costarelli and Colloca 2007; Jonas et al.
1996). Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2. Moreover,
we show that attitudes are more predictive of behavioral intentions
in the manifest ambivalent and univalent condition compared to the
univalent ambivalent condition which is not mediated by attitude
certainty.
Taken together, the findings of our three studies shed light on
the difference of the underlying structure of feelings of ambivalence
and how the type of attitudinal ambivalence (manifest versus
univalent) influences attitude certainty (conceptualized as attitude
clarity and attitude correctness) and attitude-intention consistency.
These findings have important implications for both theorists as
practitioners.
425
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 39, ©2011
426 / “The Good, the Bad and the Certain”When Ambivalent Attitudes Affect Intention Differently
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