The Jewish Peace Lobby Annual Report 2013 The Jewish Peace Lobby Program JPL seeks to develop solutions, both to the fundamental issues of the conflict and to the problems of process. We undertake contact with policy makers in Washington, Jerusalem and Ramallah. We also address the various publics: Israelis, Palestinians, Americans. And with assistance from Professor Leonard Grob, we maintain a strong presence at the UN, where we engage with diplomats from the EU countries as well as other delegations. In this years annual report we have included three pieces that we have used in conveying new ideas to policy makers: 1. An article we wrote for Foreign Policy that deals with the inter-­‐related issues of Palestinian refugees and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. This article also discusses the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence and how it accepted Israel as a Jewish State. 2. A JPL memo prepared for American decision makers on how to deal with the Jerusalem question. We recommend the Sovereignty Belongs to God approach. This memo draws upon polling done by JPL a while back, but still of interest. 3. A memo that we have shared with EU diplomats and others at the UN which suggests a UN based approach should the current bilateral negotiations fail. This memo suggests having the UN re-­‐establish UNSCOP, the special committee that recommended partition in 1947. It suggests linking UNSCOP-­‐2 to the Arab Peace Initiative. This is the first time we have provided copies of memos in our annual report. We thought it would provide a good window on what we actually do. A Perspective on the Current Negotiations 2 One element that distinguishes the current negotiations from previous rounds over the last eighteen years, is the Israeli insistence that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state. A good deal has been written about this, but it may be useful to look at it in relation to a very interesting statistic: In 1995, when Yitzhak Rabin was still alive and when people were most hopeful about the Oslo Process, two-­thirds of Israeli-­Jews said that they did not believe that a peace treaty with the Palestinians would lead to real and lasting peace. Today, even though a majority of Israelis support negotiations, only a tiny minority believes that real and lasting peace will emerge even if an agreement is reached. It is within this context, of near total skepticism, that the Jewish state issue has come to the fore. Prime Minister Netanyahu doesn't seek Palestinian recognition of Israel as a
Jewish state as an end in itself. Arguing that the Palestinian refusal to recognize
Israel as a Jewish state is at the heart of the conflict, he demands Palestinian
recognition because, in his eyes, it is part of the Palestinians accepting that "they
have no national rights in Israel." For him, it is part of their giving up the right of
return.
While no one knows the inner recesses of the Prime Minister's mind, it appears
that he sees Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state as an important
litmus test for distinguishing between agreements which are mere paper and
those that could yield real peace.
Netanyahu is far from alone on the Israeli right in saying that for a peace
agreement to be meaningful it must go to the heart of the conflict. Minister of
Defense, Moshe Ya'alon, who has been outspoken in dismissing the peace
negotiations and in rejecting the high-tech security arrangement proposed by
Secretary Kerry, has said, "security begins with education." He put it this way:
When I’m told about the security answer in Judea and Samaria, and when they talk about satellites, drones and technologies, I say, ‘guys, you’re wrong.’ The principal problem is education. If in Nablus and Jenin they continue to educate the young generation as it is being educated today, to idolize terrorism and jihad, and that the Jewish people have no right to this land, if this is how they’re educated, then technology stops nothing. . . . If the education does not change, we’ll have the same pressure from the inside. And then there will be a Hamastan in Judea and Samaria, like in Gaza. It's possible that the stance of both Netanyahu and Ya'alon represents nothing more than cover for their real position: opposition to the two-­‐state solution. But let us not make that assumption. Instead, consider their positions on the merits. 3 Both Netanyahu and Ya'alon emphasize the need for deep resolution of the conflict, dealing with the heart of the conflict and altering fundamental attitudes. While everyone believes that deep resolution is desirable, not everyone believes it is necessary in order to achieve a stable peace. For instance, the treaty between Israel and Egypt did not produce deep resolution, yet it has withstood considerable pressure for thirty-­‐five years, and has protected both peoples from the terrible costs of war. On the other hand, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is not the same as the conflict that existed between Israel and Egypt. And when it comes to the Palestinians, Netanyahu and Ya'alon seem to be saying that without deep resolution it is not in Israel's interest to give up control of the West Bank. Whether we agree with this or not, taken in itself, this is not irrational or anti-­‐peace. Indeed, it could, in principle, be part of a genuine commitment to seek resolution of the most fundamental aspects of the conflict. The problem, however, is that neither Netanyahu nor Ya'alon, seem to be seriously seeking deep resolution. At bottom their policy prescriptions amount to little more than a one-­‐sided insistence on things that the Palestinians should do that would, under some circumstances, promote deep resolution. There seems to be no recognition that this is a two-­‐sided conflict. They have put forward no proposals about what Israel might do to promote deep resolution; rather, they operate on a fantasy level that somehow deep resolution can be achieved by having only one side undergo a process of transformation. Moreover, they fail to recognize the importance of the process that leads to meeting the kind of demands they have made. They do not seem to understand that unless such steps are the result of movement on a fundamental level by both peoples, their attainment will fail to produce the deep resolution that is desired. Consider the demand that the PLO must recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Let us suppose that some modified statement on the Jewish state issue is proposed by Secretary Kerry, such as "Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people and of all of its citizens." And let us suppose that the Palestinians and the Israelis agree to a package in which the Palestinians make that statement and Israel agrees to withdraw to the 1967 lines modified by land swaps on a one-­‐to-­‐one basis. From the point of view of the negotiations, agreement to this package this would be a major breakthrough. But would this really represent deep resolution of the conflict? In particular, would it signify, as Prime Minister Netanyahu maintains, Palestinian relinquishment of the right of return? Surely it all depends on how refugee claims are addressed in the agreement. Under some circumstances the agreement itself will delegitimize those Palestinians that sign it. For instance, suppose the PLO accedes to chief negotiator Tzipi Livni when she says "Israel will not agree to the return of even one refugee" -­‐-­‐ will this not contribute to support for Hamas' position that the PLO cannot bind the Palestinian people? Will it not contribute to Hamas' electoral fortunes in the first or second 4 election within the State of Palestine? What if virtually all the refugees believe that the PLO has betrayed them? Does this not assure that a peace agreement is only a piece of paper? Without real movement by Israel on the refugee issue, focus on the Jewish state question can contribute to undermining the value of a peace agreement. Or consider Ya'alon's focus on Palestinian textbooks and school curriculum. Suppose that under pressure from Ya'alon's critique, the Palestinians issue a revised and satisfactory textbook tomorrow, and further suppose that this was immediately adopted in all Palestinian classrooms. How much of a difference would it make? To what extent would it make it more likely that a peace agreement would yield real peace? To what extent would it promote deep resolution of the conflict? In truth, I doubt it would make much difference at all. The focus on textbooks or school curriculum or public statements of various leaders, vastly overemphasizes the role that such factors play in the formation of Palestinian attitudes towards Israel and Israelis. We are not talking here about peripheral beliefs. We are concerned with the fundamental moral questions of the conflict: Did the Zionist movement have a right to establish a Jewish state in Palestine? Was the creation of Israel at its core a project of the dispossession of the Palestinians from a land that was their own? These are complex questions, potentially the subject of debates that could go on forever. Neither Israeli nor Palestinian children learn their answers to these questions from their textbooks. They breath in the perspective of their elders from the moment they are able to understand language, able to formulate an identity, able to answer the question: "Who am I?" For Palestinians, these answers are set in place from the moment children are able to understand a parent or grandparent or uncle or cousin who speaks about 1948, who makes a reference to the house that they once had, to the village they once lived in, to the olives or lemons or melons they once grew. Of course, Palestinian children do not hear about the needs and rights of Jews, nor do they hear of any responsibility they might have for the creation of the refugee problem. This is no surprise. Each side tells a one-­‐sided story. And while this can change over time, and schooling can play an important role, it is ridiculous to imagine that declarations by the PLO or new textbooks will make much difference, unless it is part of a much more powerful effort on both sides to address the fundamentals of the conflict. If Israelis seek deep resolution of the conflict, then rather than demanding that Palestinians renounce the right of return, or stop telling their children about what 5 happened to their family when Israel was created, Israel needs to take decisive steps on the core Palestinian grievance: the Nakba, the dispossession of 1948. The fundamental question is: What can Israel do, without endangering its security and without endangering its Jewish character, that would actually provide some redress for the refugees? Remarkably, in the eighteen years of negotiation since the Oslo process started, except perhaps at Taba, this question has never been given extended and serious attention. And it does not appear that it is being seriously addressed in the current negotiations. Over the last several years, the Jewish Peace Lobby has been wrestling with this issue. Reprinted below is a recent article "Palestinian Refugees and a Jewish State" in which we give the beginning of an answer. 6 [Reprinted from Foreign Policy -­‐ Dec. 13, 2013] Palestinian Refugees and a Jewish State Jerome M. Segal Analysts of the Israeli-­‐Palestinian conflict sometimes make the distinction between "the 1967 issues" and "the 1948 issues." The 1967 issues are those having to do with Israel’s 1967 occupation of the West Bank and the issues of settlements, borders, and security. The 1948 issues are those having to do with the Arab opposition to the very existence of a Jewish state, and with the Nakba, the expulsion or exodus of Palestinians refugees. Jerusalem is its own special category. Efforts to resolve the conflict will likely fail if negotiators focus primarily on the 1967 issues, hoping to glide over the 1948 fundamentals. For instance, there is the problem of implementing the evacuation of a significant number of settlers from the West Bank. No Israeli government will have the political will and staying power to carry this out if the Israeli public, on both sides of the green line, believes that a peace agreement will not yield real peace because it does not include Palestinian recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people. Or consider the issue of the claim to a right of return for the refugees. The stance of Tzipi Livni, the "moderate" chief Israeli negotiator, has been that no refugees will return to Israel. Suppose that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership actually accepted this. Is it not likely that PLO responsibility for betraying the refugees, when combined with the likely disappointments of independence, would give rise to a Hamas victory in the first or second free elections within the State of Palestine? The goal of the negotiations must extend beyond a peace agreement. A piece of paper that can neither be implemented nor sustained, may be worse than no agreement at all. But can the 1948 issues be resolved? There is a way to win PLO recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, and there are ways to significantly address the material and symbolic needs of the refugees without endangering Israel's Jewish character. The key, however, is that the two 1948 issues have to be taken up together. Consider first the Jewish state issue. Some PLO leaders have said they will never accept this; and certainly it will not be easy to shift the current stance. However, this was not always the PLO position. Reviewing the history of the Palestinian national movement, there is a powerful vantage point from which to successfully engage the Jewish state question: the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, proclaimed at the Palestine National Council in Algiers in 1988. It was the highpoint of Yasser Arafat's legacy as a peacemaker. The Palestinian Declaration of Independence, which was written by Palestinian national poet and PLO Executive Committee member Mahmoud Darwish, was and remains, the most remarkable document of the Palestinian national movement. 7 Unfortunately, it is largely unknown outside Palestine. This stands in sharp contrast to the other foundational document of Palestinian nationalism, the PLO Covenant, written in 1964. Over the years, the covenant was subjected to acute, even manic, analysis and interpretation, not just by the press and the U.S. Congress, but by leading figures within the Israeli intelligence community. The lack of attention to the declaration is very odd, given that it reversed the heart of the covenant, thereby redefining Palestinian nationalism. Both the covenant and the declaration addressed the Partition Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1947 (UNGA Res. 181), a document itself cited in the Israeli Declaration of Independence as a central basis in international law for the creation of Israel. The PLO Covenant stated, "The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time . . . ." The covenant underscored this, stating, "Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit." The declaration reversed the PLO position on partition. In 1988 the PLO revisited the 1947 Partition Resolution and asserted it as the basis in international law for the Palestinians' own proclamation of statehood: Despite the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinian Arab people resulting in their dispersion and depriving them of their right to self-­determination, following upon UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, yet it is this Resolution that still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty. Here the Palestinians made a fundamental distinction between matters of morality and legality. As a matter of morality, they continued to view all of Palestine as rightfully theirs and creation of Israel as unjust. But regarding matters of "international legitimacy" they reversed the claim in the covenant that partition was illegal; instead they affirmed the continuing legal force of the 1947 Partition Resolution. And on this basis, the Palestinian national movement was transformed from one dedicated to reversing partition, to one that embraced the two-­‐state solution. Particularly relevant, is that the declaration characterizes the newly legitimized Partition Resolution as having partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. Remarkably, inside the foundational document of their future state, the Palestinians acknowledged that Israel was created, under international law, as a Jewish state. In doing so, they linked the international legitimacy of their state to that of the Jewish state. The PLO has not abandoned the 1988 declaration. Indeed, in 2008 the PLO Central Council affirmed Mahmoud Abbas as President of the State of Palestine. In 2009, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's plan for building the institutions of statehood, four 8 times cited the declaration as the basis of the state. And in 2011, when the PLO submitted its application for the State of Palestine to be admitted to the United Nations, it affirmed that it was seeking admission for the state that had been proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence in 1988. It is possible to draw on the declaration to achieve a negotiations breakthrough on the Jewish state issue, but whether this will actually happen depends primarily on the Israelis. In ways that were not operative in 1988, the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state is today intermeshed with three other issues: the potential implications for the 1.2 million Palestinian citizens of Israel, the validity of the Palestinian narrative, and the implications for the claims and rights of Palestinian refugees. On the first, the PLO is simply not in a position to negotiate on behalf of Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. Israel will not accept this, and it is inappropriate. The real grievances of Israeli-­‐Palestinians will ultimately have to be addressed within Israeli society. In negotiations, some acceptable formula, such as recognition of Israel as both the state of the Jewish people and of all its citizens will have to be found. With respect to the Palestinian narrative, much depends on what it means to agree that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state. Is this a moral right of the Jewish people to have brought Israel into existence or is it a legal right under international law for Israel to exist as a Jewish state? If the demand is that the Palestinians must agree that they were wrong in resisting the creation of Israel, or must deny that they suffered an injustice when a Jewish state was imposed on them, then this will not happen. But if what is sought is an acknowledgement that Israel was created as a Jewish state pursuant to international law, and that it retains a legal right to remain a Jewish state, then this is largely what the declaration affirmed. The linkage of the Jewish state issue to the refugee issue is more problematic. Progress will not be made by calling on Palestinians to renounce the right of return as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demands, nor by maintaining that zero refugees will return as Livni insists. Instead, in the context of Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, what is needed is an authentic Israeli willingness to address the material and symbolic needs of the refugees, going as far as possible without threatening Israel's Jewishness. The stance should not be that the right of the Jewish people to a state of their own annihilates Palestinian refugee rights, but rather that it limits the modalities of their implementation. Ideally such a change in direction would be motivated by a change of heart with respect to the history of the refugee issue, but it would suffice if it were motivated by the pragmatic realization that the more forthcoming Israel is with respect to refugees, the more likely it will be that a peace agreement will really bring lasting peace. What can be done to seriously address the refugee issue, without threatening Israel's Jewish character? A first step would be for Israel to agree that all of the original 1948 refugees will be allowed to return to Israel. Of the original 1948 refugees, it is estimated that no more than 50,000 are still alive, with their average 9 age close to 80 years. If they were all allowed to return, at most, a few thousand would actually do so. There may be some situations in which there are elderly refugees who would only be able to relocate to Israel if they were accompanied by a younger relative. In those situations Israel should offer non-­‐citizen residency status on a temporary basis to designated relatives. On this approach, the actual return of 1948 refugees to Israel would have almost no impact on Israeli demographics, but by giving a return option to the original refugees, the class of refugees that has the strongest claim, it is possible to make a powerful contribution. Rather than focusing on numbers, Israel should consider extending options to other classes of refugees, and then regulating implementation to ensure that the actual number that returns in any time period is not excessive. For instance, priority might be given to the refugees still living in camps in Lebanon, taking the oldest first. Additionally, there are currently approximately 200,000 Palestinians who are not Israeli citizens, yet live in Israel. These are the Palestinian of East Jerusalem. If a peace agreement transfers Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty, these Palestinians will be outside of Israel, and citizens of Palestine. This in itself, opens a substantial opportunity to admit refugees with no net impact on demographics. It could be linked to an approach suggested by Yossi Beilin, which would offer refugees non-­‐citizen residential status in Israel that would match, in equal number, a similar status chosen by Israeli settlers who would be allowed to remain when Palestinian sovereignty is extended to settlements in the West Bank. A second dimension of the refugee issue goes to the Palestinian need for some acknowledgement of the Nakba. In past negotiations Palestinians have sought from Israel a statement of responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem. Israel has resisted such demands, and it appears that little more than a statement of regret for the suffering of the refugees has been on offer. Needless to say, a limited statement of regret will contribute little to putting the issue to rest. A more powerful way to address the needs of refugees for some form of moral and historical recognition can be obtained through deeds rather than words. In 1948 and 1949, Israel made a concerted effort to erase the remains of 418 villages that were depopulated. Almost all of these villages were bulldozed, and today, while perhaps half of these villages have not been built over, their remains can be difficult to find. To the extent physically possible, Israel should allow the descendents of the villagers to restore the village cemeteries to a semblance of decency. This can be done indirectly by refugees living outside Israel. For instance, they might raise money to hire an Israeli-­‐Arab firm to carry out such services. It is unknown to what extent refugees would actually undertake such efforts, but by allowing restoration of the cemeteries, Israel would make it possible for refugees to maintain a physical link to their history and ancestors. 10 A third dimension has to do with compensation, which has long been seen as an alternative to return. Unfortunately the numbers do not work. With close to seven million refugees, the monetary levels of any realistic scheme will be so low that they will provoke only anger and outrage. For instance, even a fund of $20 billion would provide only $3,000 per refugee. Rather than focusing on cash dispersals, other forms of compensation may be more meaningful. The land that Palestinians lost represented more than housing. This was an agrarian society; for most Palestinians land offered a source of employment and income, essentially a capital inheritance passed down through the generations as the key to assuring the family's continued ability to meet its core economic needs. In today's society, the closest functional equivalent is the transfer of human capital from one generation to the next, often through the intermediation of educational institutions. Seen in this light, a multigenerational guarantee that the descendents of Palestinian refugees will have access to the finest schools, can serve as a meaningful aspect of compensation. Fortunately this can be done non-­‐quantitatively thus avoiding the specification of a price at which "the right of return was sold." One element might be a commitment of top universities around the world, including Israeli institutions, to provide cost-­‐free access to qualified Palestinian students. Alternatively, governments could commit to the provision of a certain number of scholarships, or there could be a fund to which individuals could contribute. The result would be to provide future generations of Palestinian students with a unique guarantee of access to the world's finest institutions. This in turn would be linked to raising Palestinian institutions to world-­‐class standards. This is not a comprehensive plan, but it is a start. The main thing is that a good faith effort has to be made to truly respond to the refugees. If this is done, the way will be open for the Palestinian leadership to reaffirm that part of their Declaration of Independence which acknowledged that the Jewish people had a right under international law to bring Israel into existence as a Jewish state and further, to agree that Israel retains a legal right to remain so. This, in itself will not resolve the 1948 issues within the hearts and minds of the two peoples, but it may be enough to start the process of healing which true peace requires. Given the already dysfunctional exchanges, it is unlikely that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators will accomplish this on their own. The challenge, if met at all, will need to be taken up by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and President Barack Obama. Jerome M. Segal is a philosopher at the University of Maryland. He is currently writing a book about the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. In 1988, his writings served as a catalyst for the Declaration. 11 [JPL Memo] The Sovereignty Belongs to God Option for the Temple Mount/Haram al-­Sharif and/or the Old City: An Analysis 1. The Problem: An analysis of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion makes clear that it is politically impossible for either political leadership to agree to the other side having exclusive sovereignty over either the Temple Mount or the Old City. (See Negotiating Jerusalem (NJ), by Segal, Levy, Sa'id, and Katz). What is needed is a permanent way of dealing with sovereignty which does not require specifying that one party or the other is the exclusive sovereign. 2. The Sovereignty Belongs to God (SBG) option: This option is one of several ways of circumventing the attribution of exclusive sovereignty. Other options (e.g. joint sovereignty, divided sovereignty) are not discussed in this paper. It is not argued that the SBG approach is in theory the best option; rather that it is an attractive “second best” approach that can be accepted by both sides. In the SBG approach the two parties stop arguing about which side has political sovereignty and instead they focus on an administrative framework. They are facilitated in doing this because they both agree that ultimate sovereignty belongs to God. There are two forms of the SBG option: 1. Strong SBG: The two sides affirm that in light of their agreement that sovereignty belongs to God, claims of political sovereignty are overridden. 2. Weak SBG: The two sides affirm that sovereignty belongs to God, and that because of the unique historic and religious significance of these areas, it would be inappropriate and unfruitful to insist that the other side accept one’s own claim to political sovereignty. Thus, they agree to place their disagreement on political sovereignty in abeyance. (They agree to disagree in silence.) 12 Both approaches have the virtue of not requiring recognition of any form of political sovereignty by the other side. Strong SBG has the attraction of removing a disagreement; both sides withdraw their conflicting claims to political sovereignty. Weak SBG, on the other hand, is directed at making it possible to live with a disagreement. Weak SBG has the advantage of being more likely to be acceptable because it does not require withdrawing one's own claim to political sovereignty. The focus below will be on weak SBG; most of the points apply to strong SBG as well. 3. The Contributions of SBG Weak SBG is intended to make "agreeing to disagree" a feasible option. It does this by introducing a new symbolism on which the parties do agree (God's sovereignty) that makes it possible to treat administrative issues as merely administrative, rather than as part of a struggle for de facto political sovereignty. Without some mechanism for deflating the symbolic importance of administrative issues, each matter, each controversy takes on overwhelming importance as both parties struggle to establish de facto sovereignty. Without some symbolic deflation merely "agreeing to disagree" is a recipe for repeated incidents and struggles, possibly for a Jerusalem-­‐centered conflict. Essentially, SBG gives "agreeing to disagree" a fighting chance, by encompassing it within a wider, shared, symbolic framework that allows the issue of political sovereignty to recede into the background. 4. Administration Under SBG With or without SBG, the parties will need to agree on a framework for administration. An administrative agreement is required because of the complex issues such as access, excavation, security powers and responsibilities. This need to address administrative issues is not unique to SBG and is not necessarily more complex under SBG than it would be even if a straight-­‐forward designation of political sovereignty were possible. What follows are suggestions for how several administrative matters might be dealt with under SBG. Other administrative options are possible, and the SBG approach does not rise or fall with the acceptability of these suggested arrangements. 13 a) Access to the Plateau Access to the Plateau (but not the Mosques) would be guaranteed to any individual unless there is a reasonable expectation of either improper behavior or behavior that would generate a threat to public safety. With respect to implementation of this principle, it would be desirable to have Israel charged with the primary responsibility of restricting access to Israelis and for Palestine to have the central responsibility for denying access to Palestinians. This is particularly important because giving the other side the authority to restrict the access of ones own nationals suggests a loss of sovereignty; thus, for instance, the practice of the Israeli government restricting access to the Temple Mount Faithful should continue. The problem arises however with respect to the failure of one side to restrict access to persons the other side judges to fall within the criteria meriting restriction. Here a decision should be made by a third party. Presumably the overall treaty will include provisions for binding arbitration of disputes, but whether there is an overall arbitration structure or not, one will be needed for Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif issues. This might involve an international commission (e.g. three jurists representing the U.S., Egypt and Sweden), or the UN Security Council, or some other arbitration body. b) Impermissible behaviors Day to day administration and non-controversial matters presently
handled by the Wakf such as dress codes, would remain under Wakf
authority. The particularly delicate issue is Jewish prayer. Even
though only the tiniest fringe actually seeks to pray on the Mount, any
formal prohibition on Jewish prayer would make it very difficult for
Israel to accept the proposal. On the other hand, Israel itself presently
prevents Israelis from going onto the Mount if it believes they will
undertake anything but silent prayer. This is done on grounds of
public safety. It would be best to try to finesse this issue, with both
sides agreeing to “uphold the status quo” with respect to behaviors
that constitute a threat to public safety.
14 Here as above, disagreement over whether a particular person represented a threat to public safety would be referred to the Commission. c) Police function This is the central problematic area. And it is here that we need a departure from current practice in which Israel reserves for itself the right to send police and troops onto the Mount, either for preventative or restorative measures. Though it is not the only approach, it might be best to have the Palestinian state given full police responsibilities and authority. Here it would be particularly important to specify the obligations that go along with this responsibility. This would contain some very strict obligations to prevent any threat to the safety of the Jewish worshippers down below. Secondarily the police function would carry an obligation to protect the safety of any individual who was given access. The treaty could provide that in arbitrating failures to fulfill such obligations, the arbitration commission could transfer police functions for a specified period, possibly to a third party, such as the UNSC or perhaps place them under the Arbitration Commission itself. d). Construction and Excavation: Here principles would be
determined, and both sides would be given a veto over proposed
projects, with appeals being possible to the Commission.
5. The Unique Acceptability of SBG Of crucial importance in evaluating the merits of the SBG approach is how it resonates with the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. Survey research on this question was done among Palestinians in 1995 and among Israeli-­‐Jews in 1995 and 2005. a. Palestinians: Among Palestinians (see NJ) when asked their view of this approach to the holy sites in Jerusalem, 64% indicated their support. This rose to 77% among those identifying with Islamic fundamentalist parties, and to 88% among the very religious. This is a 15 level of support far beyond that of other options and suggests that the notion of God's sovereignty resonates deeply within the culture. b. Israeli Jews: Polling data (June 2005) indicates that Israeli Jews are also prepared to accept a SBG approach. First they were asked about a proposal under which Palestinians would have sovereignty over the Temple Mount and Israel would have sovereignty over the Western Wall. This was thoroughly rejected, with 35.7% willing to accept the idea, and 53.8% opposed (43.2% strongly opposed). Then they were asked about an approach in which both sides agree that sovereignty over the Temple Mount belongs to God and determine practical arrangements for administration, with Israel retaining sovereignty over the Wall. This was supported by 54.9% with 33.1% opposed. It is to be expected that these numbers would be still higher within a context in which a) the proposal had government support, b) the proposal was part of a negotiated package which was understood to resolve all the issues to the conflict, c) it was widely recognized that the Palestinians would not accept exclusive Israeli sovereignty. Furthermore the fact of solid Palestinian support can be used to give credibility to the claim that this is an approach to peace that will be more than a piece of paper, that it will last through the generations. This in turn is the most important factor in disposing Israeli Jews to compromise on Jerusalem. 6. Wider Islamic Support Because this approach resonates so powerfully among the most religious Muslims, it is likely to garner wide support throughout the Islamic world. With Jerusalem as the most potent symbol of the conflict, an approach to Jerusalem that is received enthusiastically throughout the region is invaluable. It will set the tone for the general acceptance of a new era of peace. This potential and any early response reflecting it will, in turn, build support for the entire peace agreement within Israel. 7. Future of Fundamentalisms/ Jewish-­‐Islamic perceptions of the Other 16 A solution to Jerusalem that has at its center the symbolism of a common God, for Jews, Christians and Muslims, points religious consciousness in the right direction. Within each of the traditions there is sufficient complexity to allow partisans of discord as well as partisans of concord to draw on religious tradition to advance their orientation. Agreeing that sovereignty belongs to God carries the implicit message that the three faiths share the same God. It helps to underline the Koranic perspective that the God that spoke to Mohammed is the same God that spoke to the Hebrew prophets; indeed, that Islam views the Hebrew prophets as their prophets as well. Similarly, the SBG approach lends itself to remembering that in the Torah Abraham has a strong bond with his first son, Ishmael, and that God covenants with Hager (Ishmael's Egyptian mother) that from Ishmael will also come a great nation. Indeed, the Torah passage within which Isaac and Ishmael come together to jointly bury Abraham can itself be seen as symbolic of the decision to jointly administer the Old City. 8. Other Considerations: a) Within the Arab/Islamic world much of the unique force of the SBG approach comes from the fact that in Arabic it affirms that sovereignty belongs to “Allah.” For this reason, it is important to actually use the phrase “sovereignty belongs to God” rather than to refer more vaguely to “spiritual sovereignty” or “divine sovereignty.” b) It may be argued, that since sovereignty belongs to God with respect to the entire world, how can the negotiators pick out one little spot and say that sovereignty belongs to God in that area. The answer to this is that the negotiators will not be saying that this is the only area in which sovereignty belongs to God; rather they will be saying something of the following sort: “Because the Temple Mount/Haram al-­‐Sharif belongs to the spiritual heritage of both Judaism and Islam, 17 “Because the State of Israel and the State of Palestine are in fundamental disagreement with respect to claims of political sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-­‐Sharif, “Because the Abrahamic faiths all believe in the same God, and “Because it would be inappropriate and unfruitful for either side to continue to demand that the its claim to political sovereignty be accepted by the other side, “The two sides have agreed to affirm that ultimate sovereignty belongs to God, and “Further agree to place in abeyance their claims to political sovereignty and to enter into a treaty governing the Administration of the Temple Mount/Haram al-­‐Sharif.” Summary: The SBG approach not only is a viable solution to one of the most difficult problems of the negotiations, it offers unique strengths that can lend support to the entire peace endeavor. 18 [JPL Memo] Re-­‐establishing UNSCOP as Step-­‐2 at the UN (with an emphasis on the API) Jerome M. Segal Revised: December 18, 2012 Summary: This memo proposes an international initiative that focuses directly on the two peoples, rather than on the two governments. The proposed step, re-­‐establishing UNSCOP, could emerge from the UN Security Council, but as US support is not likely, it can proceed without US support from the UN General Assembly. The core idea is that the General Assembly re-­‐establish the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) and that UNSCOP be directed to come to the region for an extended period (e.g several months) to engage in a dialogue with the Israeli and Palestinian peoples following which it would develop a fully detailed draft treaty that would be a basis for future negotiations to end the Israeli-­‐Palestinian. As such, the work of UNSCOP could be presented as Phase II of the Arab Peace Initiative (API). It would take the API as its terms of reference, and seek to find a draft agreement that would be acceptable to a majority of both the Israeli and Palestinian people. It would do this through a high profile process that would involve listening to the two peoples from across all parts of civil society, including Palestinian refugees in Palestine and in Diaspora camps, and Israeli groups generally not heard by peace processers, (Russian immigrants, settlers, religious right). It would not only hold hearings, but undertake public opinion research, and study of the record of past Israeli-­‐Palestinian negotiations, in particular, the progress made at Taba and in the Olmert-­‐Abu Mazen round. It would also hear from negotiators on both sides, should the Israel government not boycott its work. Then it would return to New York, and develop a fully detailed draft treaty, which it would report to the General Assembly for further action discussed below. Background on UNSCOP: In May of 1947, the UNGA passed a resolution calling for the establishment of the UN Special Committee on Palestine. UNSCOP was quickly established, held hearings in the Middle East, receiving testimony from Ben Gurion and Chaim Weizmann. It was boycotted by the Palestinians. In September, UNSCOP reported back to the UNGA and in November 1947, its majority report was adopted as the Partition 19 Resolution, UNGA Res. 181, which became, in May 1948, the basis on which Israel was established. Advantages of Re-­‐establishing UNSCOP: 1. As a new UN-­‐based process, it will fill void if the current negotiations effort fails. In doing so, it offers an alternative to the resumption of violence. 2. Even if Israel boycotts UNSCOP, because of the centrality of UNSCOP-­‐1947 to the creation of Israel, UNSCOP-­‐2 will be given great attention by the Israeli public, and many distinguished individuals will testify at UNSCOP hearings. Potentially, this process can shake-­‐up the stagnant political reality inside Israel. 3. During the course of its work, UNSCOP will re-­‐center international and Israeli/Palestinian discourse on the final status issues themselves, rather than on issues of process and obstacles to renewed negotiations. 4. In searching for an agreement acceptable to both sides, UNSCOP will take as an essential reference point the most recent productive negotiation and understandings, those between President Abbas and former Prime Minister Olmert. 5. The UNSCOP process will be a vehicle for updating thinking about solutions to the conflict. Quite possible, new and constructive ideas that have not been part of past negotiation efforts will emerge. The likely result of UNSCOP will be an international sanctioned draft treaty that goes beyond what was proposed in the past. 6. As a UN initiative, a new UNSCOP plan may be a vehicle for the PLO to say "Yes" to a specific peace treaty proposal, or to announce its willingness to resume negotiations with Israel with the draft treaty as a starting point. Were this to happen it would transform the situation, with the next Israeli elections being, in effect, a referendum on whether to negotiate on the basis of treaty that is supported by a majority of Israelis and Palestinians. A Possible Scenario: 1. A resolution would be introduced in the UNGA which would establish UNSCOP-­‐2. This would be presented as Phase-­‐II of the Arab Peace Initiative, an effort to develop, in full detail, a plan to end the Israeli-­‐Arab conflict. It would take the API as its terms of reference. 2. UNSCOP would be directed to undertake an inquiry-­‐process to formulate a plan that could win majority support of both the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. UNSCOP would travel to the region, hold hearings, conduct opinion research, and review the eighteen year record of Israeli-­‐Palestinian negotiations. 3. The US would, no doubt, maintain its opposition to using the UN as an alternative to bilateral negotiations. However EU support could be achieved if it were agreed 20 that UNSCOP would be utilized as a path back to bilateral negotiations, rather than as the basis to a new-­‐181 and an imposed solution. 4. Hopefully, the US would abstain (rather than vote "No") in the UNGA vote to establishing UNSCOP. On this scenario, the US would state that it would take a "wait and see" approach in determining whether it would cooperate with UNSCOP. It would be pointed out to the US that a "wait and see" approach would allow it to have an important role in influencing the composition and mandate of UNSCOP. 5. Once UNSCOP was created, depending on its mandate, composition, terms of reference, and mode of operation, the US would decide whether to cooperate with UNSCOP. Ideally, UNSCOP would be headed by a widely respected American public figure, perhaps a retired member of Congress. 6. Six months or a year later, attention would shift from how UNSCOP was created to what UNSCOP proposes. Hopefully, the US response to the UNSCOP recommendations would be based on their merits. Possibly, the US would support proposals to renew negotiations that take the UNSCOP plan as a starting point. 7. One approach to renewed negotiations would be for the General Assembly (or if the US agrees, the UNSC) to call on both sides to negotiate for three months to see if they can agree on any mutually acceptable improvements to the draft treaty. Extensions would be made if requested by the parties. If they fail to reach agreement, the UNGA would call for the draft or amended document would be put to a non-­‐binding referendum in both societies. Likely Israel would refuse to do this. 8. If UNSCOP succeeds in developing a balanced proposal that a majority of Israelis and a majority of Palestinians support, the next Israeli elections will in effect be a referendum about whether Israel should enter negotiations. Questions and Answers: Q1. Why link this to the API. A: Linkage to the API offers Israel full normalization with the Arab world. The API was unsuccessful because it was deliberately vague with respect to refugees; Israelis interpreted mention of UNGA Res. 194 as threatening. The UNSCOP draft treaty will propose a detailed solution to the refugee issue. Q2. Wouldn't this mean that the Arab states would be turning the API over to the UN to fill in the content? A: Not really. The API calls for an agreed solution. The UNGA would note that standard negotiations efforts have failed to yield a negotiated solution, and that this is simply an alternative approach to productive negotiations. Q3. What about EU support? 21 A: Support of the European nations is key to establishing UNSCOP's credibility. Preliminary discussions have been held with many of the European delegations as the UN and there is receptivity to this approach. Q4. Is this the only way to carry out an UNSCOP initiative? A: No. Many variants of this general idea are possible. For instance, one alternative approach would be to have the UN General Assembly create a "Listening Commission." The Commission would travel to Israel/Palestine in order to hear from the two peoples and to determine if there is any comprehensive solution to the conflict which would be acceptable to a majority of both Israelis and Palestinians. So formulated, the commission would be open to a wider set of solutions than the two-­‐ state solution, and as a result, its establishment would not be linked to the API. Q5. On this "Listening Commission" approach, would the Commission produce a draft treaty for resolving the conflict? A: That is one possibility. Alternatively, the decision on whether or not to develop a draft treaty could be determined by the General Assembly once it has received the report and recommendations of the Commission. It need not be part of the original mandate of the Commission. Q6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the "Listening Commission" approach? A: Advantages include the possibility of wider support internationally, and less likely opposition by US Congress and GOI, as it is less likely to be perceived as a step towards an imposed solution. Also, by being open to ideas such a "one-­‐state solution" it may be of more interest to both Israelis and Palestinians, and get more attention. On the other hand, rather than focusing on how to make the two-­‐state solution work, the focus might shift to hypothetical alternatives that would be impossible to negotiate. Q6. Is it possible to start with a Listening Commission that is open to all ideas, but for it to evolve into the UNSCOP approach detailed above? A: This is certainly a possibility if the Commission concludes that only the two-­‐state solution can win the support of a majority of both peoples. Q7. How does the UNSCOP proposal connect to the issue of Palestinian unity? A: The proposal has no direct connection to reconciliation efforts between the PLO and Hamas. It does, however, have several important connections to the deeper issue of Palestinian unity: -­‐ UNSCOP will undertake hearings in both the West Bank and Gaza. In its mandate to find a solution acceptable to a majority of the Palestinian people, it will be treating the two populations as a single people and bringing them into a common discourse. 22 -­‐ A variety of polls show that the views of Palestinians in the West Bank are not greatly different from those of Palestinians living in Gaza. Thus, an UNSCOP peace proposal that has overall support of a majority of Palestinians will also be supported by majorities of both populations. This will contribute to moving both the PLO and Hamas in the direction of a common program. -­‐ Hamas (e.g. the Mecca Accord) has taken the position that it would support any agreement approved in a referendum of the Palestinian people. Once UNSCOP has produced its proposal, it could be the subject of a Palestinian referendum, and this in turn could contribute to a major evolution in the Hamas position. 23