Understanding The Gulf’s New Syria Policy:
Power, Identity, or Economy?
By
Andrew H. Workman
A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts
Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University
Montréal, Canada
March 2016
© Andrew H. Workman, 2016
All Rights Reserved.
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Table of Contents
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………….....................4
RÉSUMÉ……………………………………………………………………...………………...5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………...………………………..6
INTRODUCTION
Syria’s Relationship With the GCC………………………………………..…………...8
CHAPTER ONE
A Theoretical Application to Gulf Policy……….……………..…………………..….14
Neorealism: The Starting Point………………………………………………………….14
Constructivism: Wendt and Barnett…………………………………..…………………18
Political Economy: World Systems Theory………………………………………..……26
Methodology…………………………………………………………………….………33
CHAPTER TWO
In the Interest of Power: The GCC’s Motives and Strategies in Syria…………..…36
Gulf-Syria Relations: In Historical Context………..……………………………………36
Realpolitik in Gulf and Syrian Foreign Policy ……………….…………………………42
Understanding Gulf-Syrian Alliances in the Pre-Conflict Era……………..……………48
Examining the Shift in Gulf-Syria Policy After the Arab Uprisings……...…………….55
Saudi-Qatari Rivalry and Present-day Support…………….……………………………60
Conclusion: An Assessment and Evaluation of Neorealist Motives………….…………64
CHAPTER THREE
Islam and the GCC: Tangible Influence or Legitimizing Tool?.................................70
Constructivism and the Influence of Islam in Foreign Policy ……………..……………71
Islam and Foreign Policy in the Gulf……………………………………………………76
Islam, Gulf Policy, and the Syrian Crisis: An Analysis of Khutbahs and Fatwas…...….80
Conclusion: Assessment of Tangible Influence……………………………...………….93
CHAPTER FOUR
Gulf-Syria Policy and the Politics of Oil.....................................................................100
Gulf Foreign Policy in the Context of the International Economic System…...………101
Rentier Politics and Gulf Foreign Policy in Syria…………………….……………….103
The Transformation of the Oil Economy and Gulf Policy…...………….…………….105
Oil Wealth, Institution Building, and Political Autonomy…………….………………107
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Oil Price Volatility and Policy Change in the Gulf……………………………………114
Pipeline Politics in Gulf-Syria Relations ………………...……………………………117
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..128
CONCLUSION
The Roles of Power, Identity, and Economic Interests in Gulf-Syria Policy …..... 133
Gulf-Syria Relations Timeline…………………………………………………………134
Power, Identity, or the Economy………………………………...…………………….135
A More Comprehensive and Synthetic Approach…………….……………………….139
Future Research Agenda………………………………………….……………………142
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Introduction and Chapter One……………………….…………………………………144
Chapter Two……………………………..…….……………………………………….148
Chapter Three…………………………..………………………………………………153
Chapter Four…………………………………..……………………………………….156
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ABSTRACT
The recent decision on the part of the Gulf states to provide political, logistical, financial,
and military support to the Syrian opposition, represented politically by the Syrian National
Coalition, represents a significant shift from its historical policy towards the regime in
Damascus. Prior to 2009, the Gulf sates, led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, were providing support
to the Assad regime in the form of financial investment in order to promote a policy of Arab
solidarity that was largely designed to prevent Syria from building close relations with Iran.
However, months after the Arab Spring began, Syrian opposition began receiving military
support from Riyadh and Doha. This thesis explores the reasons behind this shift by closely
examining the decision-making and policy processes that led to the new policy vis-à-vis Syria on
the part of the Gulf states. This study explores the factors behind this policy change through the
lens of three prominent theories in international relations: neorealism, constructivism, and the
political economy approach associated with World Systems Theory. To evaluate the utility of
neorealist approaches in understanding the shift in the Gulf states’ policy towards Damascus, this
study examines the content and analyzes the relevance of a series of cables from Wikileaks,
spanning from 2006 to the present. To study the pervasion of constructivist influence, religious
sermons (khutbahs) of Gulf Imams in the period before and after the onset of conflict in Syria are
examined. In order to shed light on the economic factors that may be associated with the new
Gulf-Syria policy, this thesis examines the relationship between the volatility of international
energy markets, rentier politics, and the competitions between regional actors over two pipeline
projects designed to run through Syrian territory: one initiated by Iran and the other by its
regional rivals, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The study finds that the decision-making
process associated with the Gulf’s new Syria policy has been shaped by a combination of factors.
These include the strategic and security concerns of Gulf states related to the rising influence of
Iran in the region, the crucial role played by Sunni-Islam as a legitimating ideology, and the
economic benefits that Saudi Arabia and Qatar would potentially receive with the emergence of a
Gulf-friendly regime in Syria. In conclusion, any evaluation of this new Gulf-Syria policy
through strictly dichotomous applications of neorealism, constructivism, and political economy
provide an incomplete picture. Instead, this study shows that this shift was a result of a mix of
motives and factors, and that key conceptual insights from all three theoretical approaches should
be combined in a synthesis so as to more fully understand the Gulf’s new Syria policy.
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RÉSUMÉ
La décision du Golf d’appuyer militairement l’opposition Syrienne représente un
changement significatif en ce qui concerne sa politique historique envers la Syrie. Il semble que
du jour au lendemain, l’Arabie Saoudite et le Qatar ont renversé des décennies de collaboration
avec Assad, passant de support économique à adversaire militaire. Jusqu’en 2009, l’Arabie
Saoudite et le Qatar courtisaient avec succès Assad loin de l’Iran avec des promesses
d’investissement et de solidarité Arabe. Toutefois, dans les mois suivant les débuts du Printemps
Arabe, l’opposition Syrienne commença à recevoir du support militaire de la part de Riyad et
Doha. L’analyse des raisons qui ont poussées ce changement de politiques servira à approfondir
la compréhension du processus politique de décision des États du Golf post Printemps Arabe.
Cette étude explore le changement de politique à travers certaines théories de relations
internationales, soit le néolibéralisme et le constructivisme, ainsi que l’économie politique. Afin
d’étudier la pénétration l’influence du néolibéralisme, une analyse de câbles gouvernementaux
de Wikileaks est fournie, couvrant une période de 2006 à aujourd’hui. Ceux-ci sont complétés et
rendus plus complexes par une analyse de khutbahs provenant de mosquées du Golf pré conflit
ainsi que la période du conflit, où l’influence de l’Islam est évaluée. Pour finir, le rôle de
l’économie est étudié à travers le prisme de projets de pipeline concurrents qui traverse tous deux
la Syrie, l’un initié par l’Iran et l’autre par le Qatar, l’Arabie Saoudite, et la Turquie. Ce projet
déduit que la nouvelle politique du Golf envers la Syrie n’est pas seulement affectée par des
considérations de realpolitik, tel que la peur de l’Iran et le désir d’étendre son influence, mais
aussi l’Islam en tant que réelle influence et comme outil de légitimation de l’état; ainsi que les
bénéfices économiques potentiels résultant d’un régime en Syrie favorable au Golf. Finalement,
cette étude conclue que l’évaluation de ces réponses collectivement à l’intérieur des stricts
paradigmes individuels de théories de relations internationales produit une synthèse incomplète
qui ignore les conclusions des autres prismes théoriques. Il s’avère préférablement que ces
théories devraient être utilisées comme concepts plutôt que paradigmes, permettant une synthèse
plus complète où des conclusions en provenance de différents angles sont à la fois
supplémentaires et perpendiculaires entre elles, plutôt qu’en rigide opposition paradigmatique.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to express my greatest thanks to my supervisor, Dr.
Khalid Mustafa Medani. He not only believed in me enough to take me on as his student, he
continued to believe in me and gave continuous encouragement throughout this long process. I
have learned a great deal from him about being a scholar and a human being. Not only would he
ask about my work, he was also never afraid to ask how I was doing as a person, which meant
the world to me. I am a better academic, analyst, and person because of my relationship with
him.
Within the Institute of Islamic Studies, there are many that are deserving of my gratitude.
A special thanks to Dr. Laila Parsons, who walked me through the process of using Wikileaks
documents as a source. Her stimulating seminars and conversation gave me great insight into the
way a historian approaches research. Of course, I will forever be in Adina Sigartu’s debt- as all
students of the Institute know, it is through her all processes run, and she has put up with my
constant emails, badgering, and frantic visits. Thank you to Shokry Gohar for helping me
complete (for now) my journey with the Arabic language. To the librarians, thank you for putting
up with my constant presence and insistence on keeping my humanities books in my carrel.
Thank you to my professors at Ohio State, who nurtured my interests when they were just in
their infancy, and who inspired me to go on this journey.
There must be special mention of my friends. First, there are Michael, Temel, and Brian.
From countless cups of tea, to secret Islamic law and Hebrew sessions, and to long siestas at
Sana- there can be found no greater friends than these three. They have allowed me to keep my
sanity these two years and served to lift my spirit in times of adversity. I will forever be grateful
for their intellectual curiosity, endless humor consisting of academic puns, and for their
willingness to befriend a young academic whose experience paled in comparison to theirs.
Second, I am in debt to Wadha al Zuhair, who was my source and guide for all things Saudi. Her
insight and advice proved invaluable to this work. Next, a special thank you to Geneviève
Mercier for translating my abstract into the beautiful French language. Thanks to Chris Anzalone
for giving me constant advice and wonderful conversations. To my friends outside of McGill:
David, Thomas H., Nawal, Emmanuel, and Thomas F., thank you for making the city of
Montréal more than just a place where I studied.
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Lastly, and most importantly, the biggest thank you goes to my family. They are my
whole world. There are not too many kids from Amish Country who have an interest in Islam
and the Middle East, and it could not have been easy to have a son or brother whose interests
were so radically different from our culture and context. Yet, they have given me unconditional
support, encouragement, and inspiration to pursue my dreams, wherever they may be. From
living in Columbus, Dubai, and Montréal, I have missed many milestones in their lives, and I
hope that this work may serve to justify a small part of that. This is for them.
To David, Gail, Sara, Michael, and Emma.
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INTRODUCTION
SYRIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GCC
Research Question
After decades of supporting Assad’s regime in Damascus, how can we explain the
GCC’s, and specifically Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s, support of moderate Sunni insurgents in
Syria? What accounts for this shift in policy? More specifically, what role has power
considerations, Islamic identity, and economic interest played in this new Syria policy?
This notable shift in the GCC’s policy represents an important puzzle that has relevance
and implications for both policy and theory. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, after decades of providing
financial, political, and military support to Syria’s Alawi dominated regime, changed their policy
towards Damascus and are now supporting Sunni insurgents in ways that challenge conventional
understandings of realist international relations theory, which long assumed that strategic threats
and economic interests are the foremost factors driving alliance politics.
Historical Background
In July of 2011, Qatar formally severed all diplomatic relations with Syria and withdrew
their ambassador, a move that was followed six months later by Saudi Arabia and the rest of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Khatri 2012, Pradhan 2012). A decisive diplomatic statement,
this act was followed up by the opening a new Syrian embassy in Doha for the Assad regime’s
main opposition, which consists of a conglomerate of moderate Sunni rebels and Islamists
(Khalaf 2013). Estimates as recent as 2013 place Qatari spending in the Syrian Civil War at
around three billion dollars (US), and have been cited as even offering lucrative packages of up
to fifty thousand dollars a year to defectors and refugees (Khalaf 2013). However, in a 2013
conference made up of Syrian opposition forces and GCC members, Saudi Arabia reportedly
pushed their way into the forefront of opposition aid, taking the lead in both monetary and
military support, capitalizing on highly publicized Qatari mishaps (Karouny 2013).
These developments may have come as a surprise to regional experts and Middle Eastern
historians, as the GCC, led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, had been notoriously silent when Syrian
opposition has looked for support, dating back as far as the Islamist uprisings in the seventies
and eighties. At that time, the main opposition was the Muslim Brotherhood party, an
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organization that is now considered a terrorist group by many states, but is still widely supported
in Qatar. Indeed, at present, the Egyptian MB leadership now uses Doha as their center of
operations. Ruled by a Shi’a Alawite family for forty years, Syria has historically cultivated
close ties with Iran and Lebanon, forming a de facto Shia alliance that surely put the
predominantly Sunni GCC on edge. This is only compounded by the fact that seventy-five
percent of Syria’s own citizens are Sunni, creating a high level of incongruence within the state
(U.S. Department of State 2006). Not only has the Sunni GCC refused to support any type of
Sunni opposition in Syria, states such as Qatar continued to support and invest in the Assad
regime up until 2009, to the tune of over five billion dollars (Khalaf 2013). Saudi Arabia, most
notably under the reign of King Fahd, held a unique and close relationship with Hafez Assad
throughout the late 20th century, despite the Syrian regime being distinctly Shia and continually
oppressing its Sunni majority (Al-Ahram 2005). Contrasted with Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s recent
actions, it is clear that a drastic shift in policy has occurred, and the same can be said for the rest
of the GCC.
In order to fully grasp the magnitude of this policy shift, the relationship between the
GCC and Syria must be fully examined. Though many GCC states gained independence well
after Syria, Saudi Arabia was a well-established state after WWII. Even the founder of the Saudi
Kingdom, King ‘Abd al ‘Aziz, was reported to have told his sons on his deathbed to “Keep an
eye on Syria” (Sunayama 2007, 17). From the genesis of the infant relationship, Saudi Arabia
would seek to gain influence within the Levantine state and to maximize its interests.
Throughout the 1940s through the late 1960s, Saudi would routinely bribe Syrian officials and
entire political factions, manipulate Syrian media through bribes, and encouraged coup attempts
(Sunayama 2007). It did not take Saudi long to flex its financial muscles in an attempt to turn
economic prosperity into political capital and influence in Syria. In the public sphere, this early
period saw Saudi convert its oil money to lucrative financial loans to the Syrian state, with the
desire of accruing favor with the fledgling government in Damascus. The genesis of U.S.-Syrian
relations also depicted a heavy amount of influence by the U.S. After being unhappy about the
government that formed in the late 1940s, the CIA would try to overthrow the Syrian regime
twice in the next ten years, and succeeded in its initial attempt. While the U.S. undoubtedly
wanted to gain political influence, it also had economic motivations as well- a proposed oil
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pipeline was arguably the reason for the first coup, and the new U.S.-backed regime approved of
its construction.
Saudi penetration of Syria in this early period was more than just financial or political in
nature; it was also religious. The Saudi strain of Salafism, also known as Wahhabism, began to
spread through proselytization in Saudi-Syrian trade networks (Pierret 2013). It is important to
note that many of the largest Sunni mosques in Damascus were also directly funded by the Saudi
government during this period (Pierret 2013). For the Saudis, religious penetration and influence
was given the same amount of importance as financial and political dominance, even if the
former came at the expense of the latter two. The rise of Hafez al Assad to power in 1971
brought with it a repression of the Sunni Ulama of Syria, and many fled the country. Rather than
go to prison, influential Sunni Sheiks such as Muhammad ‘Awad and Sheikh Zayd al Rifa’I fled
to Saudi Arabia and took refuge in Jeddah (Pierret 2013). Saudi Arabia offered these Sunni
scholars sanctuary despite being in the midst of a rapprochement with Hafez al Assad. Religious
obligation for the reign of King Fahd was rarely superseded by political or economic priorities.
Lastly, Assad’s economic liberalization of the early 1970s allowed Islamic organizations in Syria
to receive heavy Saudi financial backing (Pierret 2013).
The goals and aims of Saudi economic, political, and religious penetration of Syria were
thrown into doubt with the ascension of Hafez al Assad to the presidency. A member of a Shia
sect, the Alawites, Assad immediately presented not just a physical opponent of Saudi Arabia,
but a religious one as well. Assad stocked his government with other Alawites and similar
religious minorities, beginning a trend of irredentism that would peak under his son’s
dictatorship in the 2000s. Syrian foreign policy also shifted as a result of his rise, with the state
now looking to other regional powers for partnerships- most notably that of the Soviet Union and
Iran after its Islamic Revolution. Syria was also dealing with a crisis on its southern border, as
Israeli forces continued their military success from 1967 into a capturing and informal
annexation of the Golan Heights until 1981. The conflict with Israel continued to complicate
their relations with the United States, and the 1967 war caused a severing of relations between
the two that would not be resumed until the Gulf War. Throughout this period, this was the lens
in which the U.S.-Syria relationship was viewed. The Israeli-Arab conflict as a whole would
prove to be pivotal in Syria’s relationship with other Sunni states.
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In 1968, when Hafez al Assad was the Defense Minister, the recovery of the Golan
Heights was paramount to Syrian interests. In order to do so, Assad argued that a détente with
the Gulf monarchies was necessary in order to finance any sort of attack or annexation of Israeliheld land (Hinnebusch 2002). As Assad continued to gain power, Syria’s policy increasingly
became intertwined with the Gulf, and in particular, Saudi Arabia. In exchange for heavy sums
of financial backing, the oil states asked in return for Assad, and Syria as a whole, to commit to
ending their support of revolutions across the Arab world (Hinnebusch 2002). By doing so, the
monarchies effectively bought stability in their own states, while simultaneously projecting
support for Syria in in the Arab-Israeli conflict. When war finally broke out in October of 1973
between Syria and Israel, oil prices skyrocketed as a result. This allowed the Gulf to funnel even
more resources and economic aid to the Assad government. Indeed, Assad’s regime was able to
consolidate its own domestic power by using some of these financial resources to gain support
through funneling the money to those associated with the regime (Hinnebusch 2002). The peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 only increased Gulf motivation to support other states
surrounding Israel, particularly ones that were willing to continue to fight.
Despite the amount of aid he received from the Gulf states, Assad was still not satisfied.
Before the 1976 Lebanese Civil War, Assad flew to Moscow with the aim of gaining more
support from the Soviet Union. Syria was already receiving significant amounts of Soviet arms,
and this visit understandably caused great concern with the oil states- they did not want Soviet
influence in their regional disputes, and states like Saudi Arabia had already begun to align with
Western powers. Assad’s visit to Moscow successfully blackmailed the Gulf monarchies into
assuring even more significant financial support (Sunayama 2007). Assad would even eschew
domestic ideology for foreign policy gains; limiting the socialist ideology he rose to power with
in favor of economic pragmatism (Hinnebusch 2002). If he had refused to liberalize the
economy, it would be unlikely that Assad would gain the support he needed from the Gulf and
the West. Furthermore, by assuring that more capital would flow through Damascus, Assad
continued to accrue political capital from a wealthy upper-middle and elite class that was quickly
forming as a result of economic liberalization.
Throughout this period, Assad made a calculated risk of supporting Iranian opposition,
which paid off with the Islamic Revolution of 1978. Assad even offered to grant Ayatollah
Khomeini asylum in October of 1978, and his support of the new regime would not waver after
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the latter rose to power (Sunayama 2007). By aligning with the new Iranian government, Assad
avoided being trampled in the increasingly powerful Saudi-Iraq axis, and was thus able to secure
itself a powerful regional partner. Furthermore, Assad placated his own domestic Islamist
opposition, who were hopeful that an Islamic Revolution in Iran would spark similar reform to
Assad’s Ba’athist government. The Assad regime attempted to assuage Saudi angst by claiming
that the real cause for concern should be Israel, and subsequently attempted to turn Gulf attention
back to the Israeli conflict. Syria also portrayed itself as a willing and influential intermediary
between the Iranians and the broader Sunni world (Sunayama 2007). With the outbreak of the
Iran-Iraq war, Syria found itself able to play off Saudi fears. Leadership from both states held
numerous talks throughout the war, and Syria’s support of Iran allowed it to act as an
intermediary (Sunayama 2007).
The drastic decrease of oil prices in 1986 took away much of the Gulf’s economic aid to
Syria. This, coupled with the burdens of a heavy military buildup and the Gulf states’ decrease in
aid because of the Iran/Iraq war, left the Syrian economy in shambles (Hinnebusch 2002). After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria was also unable to play off of any bi-polar elements in the
region, and American hegemony left conflict with Israel a dangerous prospect. As a result,
Syrian foreign policy was effectively limited. A previous agreement with the Soviets allowed
Assad to accuse the Gulf states of insufficient backing for their fight against Israel, and therefore
solicited economic aid to make up for this perceived lack of political and military support.
Sonoko Sunayama sums up the relationship between Syria and Saudi Arabia in the context of a
bi-polar world when she states, “Both Riyadh and Damascus despised each other’s close alliance
with the respective superpowers, but under the circumstances in which these alliances were
unlikely to go through tremendous changes, each sought to capitalize on the other side’s access
to the superpower in the opposing camp” (Sunayama 2007, 77). Without their Soviet patron,
Syria found itself without a major ally, and even out of good graces with many regional powers.
Their woes continued with the Camp David Accords, which was not affected by Iraq’s refusal to
join Syria in opposition. Increasingly, Israeli military superiority and the Camp David Accords
left Assad in desperate need of gaining support.
His opportunity came with the beginning of the Gulf War, where Assad aligned with the
Coalition against Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces. Assad realized that as his relationship with the
Soviet bloc was crumbling, his economic and military need would continue to increase. The Gulf
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War was the ideal event to spark a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies.
Raymond Hinnebusch states, “Assad had never before allowed economic factors to dictate
strategic decisions: in this case, however, Saudi support was so indispensible to the maintenance
of Syria’s strategic position in the battle with Israel that economic and strategic factors became
indistinguishable” (Hinnebusch 2002, 158). This decision was not without its risks- Assad’s panArab credentials took a blow when he sided with a Western-backed coalition against an Arab
nationalist regime. Nonetheless, Assad’s alignment with the Gulf paid off and resulted in the
Declaration of Damascus, enabling it receive abundant economic aid once again (Ziaden 2011).
Syria would also subsequently enjoy its best relations with the United States in the aftermath of
the Gulf War, with the latter beginning to recognize Syrian interests for the first time
(Hinnebusch 2002).
The ascension of Hafez’s son, Bashar al Assad, to power in June of 2000 changed little in
the relationship between Syria and the Gulf states. Diplomacy was frequent and common,
economic aid continued to prop up the Syrian economy, and support for Syria in the Israeli
conflict did not waver. As mentioned previously, states like Qatar, through the Qatar Investment
Authority, poured money and economic resources into Syria throughout the 2000s. Though there
were a few blips in the relationship since the Gulf War, notably Assad’s criticism of Wahhabism
and the Saudi hijacking of Syria’s normalization plan with Israel, the bond between Syria and the
Gulf continued to grow. The GCC states viewed the Assad regime, and Syria at large, as vital
enough to invest billions of dollars into an economy and state that would likely collapse without
such support. These Sunni states saw Assad as not only a Shia balancer to Iran that they could
exploit, but also as a state led by a repressive regime that did not allow for its Islamist opposition
to hold significant power. This oppression can also be seen in many Gulf monarchies, and the
same fear of a popular Islamist uprising could be found in both the GCC and Syria. A revolution
in Syria could mean disastrous consequences for GCC powers. And yet, through all of their aid
and support to Assad, despite potential threats of an uprising in their own state, notwithstanding
its Arab sentiment and support in Syria’s feud with Israel, and despite Syria’s valuable counterweight possibilities in a long-term engagement with Iran, the GCC still decided to back Syrian
opposition for the first time in the wake of the uprisings of 2011. One question remains: Why?
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CHAPTER ONE
A THEORETICAL APPLICATION TO GULF POLICY
Literature Review
As mentioned in the introduction, this study builds on the insights of neorealism,
constructivism, and political economy in order to address the primary research question. The
primary objective is not so much as to determine which theoretical approach best answers the
question having to do with the shift in Gulf-Syria policy, but rather to answer this question
through a historical analysis, and only then evaluate the effectiveness of the respective
approaches noted above. Ultimately, the goal is to understand, in more empirical terms, why
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the GCC have decided to support and arm moderate Sunni rebels in
Syria, and the roles that power considerations, Islamic identity, and economy played in their
decision.
Neorealism: The Starting Point
A powerful and influential argument in explaining the Gulf’s shift in policy is
neorealism, which explains this change as a result of strategic survival and power considerations.
Arguably the starting point for all of IR theory, supplanting classical realism, neorealism was
brought into existence and made popular by Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics.
Like classical realism, neorealism uses states as the one and only unit of analysis, but in contrast
to its forefather, neorealism examines the relationship between states and the international
system. Ultimately, neorealism is based upon assumptions or principles. First, the international
system and world order is inherently anarchic- there is no ruling body or overarching governor
that rules the modern state. Second, the capabilities of states and the distribution of power among
them vary greatly within the international system. This in turn yields structural constraints,
which affects how states can behave.
With these two realist principles in mind, the rest of neorealism falls into place. Waltz’s
theory proposes that states act rationally in a self-help way, seeking to maximize their own
security and the ensuring of their own survival (Waltz 1979). Therefore, the international system
is dictated by security concerns that are constrained by the distribution of power (Mabon 2013).
15
Waltz argues that the security of states is preserved through the balance of power, where states
seek to counter threats and potential dangers that would bring their security into question (Waltz
1979). However, when states seek to balance the power ratio, they are affected by structural
constraints such as relative power and capability (Jakobsen 2013). Due to the fact that some
states will have greater capabilities and power within the international system, some states
benefit more than others, possibly creating conflict between relatively powerful states and their
opponents, who seek to change the status quo and to increase their benefits (Shimko 2010).
Within this ever-shifting landscape of power balancing, some states choose to align
themselves with or against other states. This act, termed bandwagoning when states align
themselves with a greater power, or balancing when states align against a power, occurs
frequently through militaristic, economic, or other diplomatic means. Neorealists have often
attempted to discern what situations or criteria causes states to bandwagon, and what other
circumstances prompt states to balance the threat or power. Some theorize that states usually
respond to threats by balancing against the source of the threat, and not choosing to align with it
(Schweller 1997). However, states bandwagon and balance for reasons other than simple
security, and there is disagreement on the proposition that states generally choose to bandwagon
over the option of balancing (Schweller 1997). Stephen Walt introduced his balance of threat
theory in 1987, which is seen as a reformulation of Waltz’s balance of power theory. Walt
attempted to explain interstate alliances, and proposed that states respond to threats by balancing
against them (Walt 1987). Walt also asserted that an actor’s perception of the intentions and
power capabilities are just as important as the distribution of material capabilities. Ultimately, as
states begin to amass power and expand their capabilities, others will undoubtedly feel the need
to address the situation if they want to ensure survival, safeguard their sovereignty, or at the very
least control their own fate (Jakobsen 2013). While it may be cogent to assume that neorealism
predicts war in these instances, or at least foresees the pervasion of conflict within the
international system, this is not necessarily the case. However, while neorealism does dictate that
wars will happen and in some cases are inevitable, ultimately the permissive causes of war and
peace are the same elements: the principles of anarchy and distribution of power within the
international system (Jakobsen 2013).
Thus far, the description of neorealism has not included things such as religion, transstate ideologies, and identity. However, there has recently been an effort to incorporate religion
16
within IR theory, especially neorealism. This can be problematic, as neorealism is primarily
concerned with the state and the causes of its behavior, which neorealists believe is centered on
power and security. A number of approaches have been suggested as to how religion can be
better incorporated into IR theory- working within the traditional framework, supplanting
existing paradigms, using secularism as a comparable worldview instead of a foil to religion, and
by using religion as a causal variable (Snyder 2011). The first approach, seeking to insert
religion into the traditional framework, is used by Sandal Nukhet and Jonathon Fox in their
volume Religion in International Relations. They theorize that religious worldviews can be part
of a unit-level theory that fits into the international system and that religion can affect the
perception of an actor in Walt’s balance of threat theory (Sandal & Fox 2013).
When applied to the Middle East, neorealism’s clear and simple picture starts to become
opaque. One of Walt’s primary historical examples for balance of threat theory was cited as the
Middle East between 1955 and 1979, claiming that balancing in the region was far more
prevalent than bandwagoning. Walt cites the many perceived sources of threat in the region as to
why either of the bipolar powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, did not cause a bandwagoning
alliance (Walt 1987). Both Waltz and Walt’s theories address much of Middle Eastern politics
and relations without exceptions, but the Middle East does provide some serious questions for
the theory. Neorealism does not accept the impact of trans-state ideology in determining state
behavior, and yet it was during the time period that Walt examined that Pan-Arabism was
rampant in the region and played a large role in state actions (Mabon 2013). Walt attempted to
address this issue, theorizing that Arab states balanced against Egypt during the Pan-Arabism
wave (Walt 1987). However, though they may have balanced against Egypt, Pan-Arabism still
played a role in determining state behavior. Walt, in his balance of threat theory, brings in the
idea of perception into neorealism. However, while he proposes that perception is based off of
the perceived power capabilities of an actor, many argue that such perception is rooted in
identity. This could be especially true in the Middle East, where threats shaped by identities are
characterized as coming from ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’ (Hinnebusch 2014). This is compounded by
the longevity of authoritarian and sectarian regimes in the region, where ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’
labels are often more permanent than temporary. Furthermore, since neorealism is predicated
upon the state seeking to ensure survival and the constant security dilemma that arises out of
such a desire, why has no Middle Eastern state openly allied itself with Israel, who many would
17
classify as the hegemonic military power in the region? The absence of an alliance between
Israel and any Middle Eastern state appears to suggest that trans-state ideology and identity play
a role in state behavior (Mabon 2013).
Does neorealism provide an adequate and logical explanation for the historical
relationship between Syria and the GCC? Indeed, it seems that balancing and self-survival
motivated Syria’s original alliance with Iran. Upon seeing the Riyadh-Baghdad coalition, Assad
worried that joining such an alliance would see his influence dwindle and be overshadowed. As a
result, he balanced that axis by joining forces with Iran, effectively checking the growing power
of Riyadh and Baghdad. However, neorealism does not account for the domestic politics that
played a role in this decision- Assad using an alliance with an Islamist government to appease his
own Islamist opposition within Syria. While this could fall under the category of ensuring one’s
survival, and thus become a realist motive, neorealism does not adequately account for domestic
politics’ role in foreign policy decision-making.
The theory does better explain Assad’s effort to gain economic and financial aid from the
Gulf sates. By balancing with Iran and continually portraying itself as the primary Arab
resistance against Israel, Assad ensured that he would receive the funds he sorely needed to
sustain his economy and his regional aspirations. Assad’s eschewing of his own socialist policies
in favor of economic liberalization to provide foreign policy dividends only strengthens the
neorealist argument. Furthermore, Assad’s joining of the Gulf War Coalition can also be seen
through a neorealist lens. As the bi-polar system collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union,
Syria found itself without a superpower patron and little economic aid. The result was an act of
bandwagoning by Assad with the Gulf states in exchanged for badly needed financial resources
to stimulate a dragging economy. They also joined the coalition due to external threats- a small
possibility existed that a Saddam-led Iraq could pose a military threat to Syria, and a greater
chance that skipping out on the coalition would leave them helpless against Israel (Hinnebusch
2002).
Casting the neorealist lens upon the GCC’s motivations for supporting Syria, how does
the theory hold up when looking at decades of support? Saudi and the other Gulf states did see
Syria as a potential check to Iran’s rising regional power after the Islamist revolution, but
ultimately Assad’s loyalty and cooperation with the Gulf depended on aid. In order to minimize
Syria’s proximity to the Soviet Union and be seen as a leader in the fight against Israel, Gulf
18
states poured economic support into the Assad regime. Once again, neorealism struggles to
explain the Gulf’s domestic motivations in supporting Assad. Doing so ensured that the Syrian
Islamist opposition would not come to power or spark a revolution, something that Saudi Arabia
in particular was concerned about. Furthermore, it cannot account for the ideological aspect of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Appearances matter to the Gulf monarchies, and they could not be seen
as even implicitly supporting Israel through withholding support from Assad. This would lead to
accusations from the Islamic community, from the Ulama and Islamists, that the government put
its own interests ahead of Islamic or Arab ones. Both domestic and ideological constraints hinder
neorealism’s ability to answer the proposed question, but neorealist tenets such as
bandwagoning, balancing, and the role of self-survival are clearly viewable when looking briefly
at the study in question.
Constructivism: Wendt and Barnett
Another significant explanation of the GCC’s shift in policy can be found in
constructivism, which would highlight the role that identity and social norms played in the
Gulf’s backing of Sunni insurgents in Syria. While it utilizes the state as its primary unit of
analysis, akin to neorealism, it nevertheless exalts the role of identity, ideas, and norms. In the
context of Gulf-Syria relations, constructivism would argue that the Sunni Islamic identity of the
GCC played a paramount role in the decision to pull support away from the Shi’a Alewite regime
in Damascus. It also privileges the role of other international institutions in the construction of
these religious norms and identities, such as the Islamic Conference, Arab League, and the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
When it comes to constructivism, it is best to start with its founding father, Alexander
Wendt, who is credited with the genesis of the theory as a response to Waltz’s neorealist work.
Wendt makes clear that constructivism, according to him, shares five realist assumptions and
premises: international politics are inherently anarchic, states have offensive capabilities, a
state’s intention is not always known, states seek survival, and that states are rational actors
(Wendt 1995). It is clear that constructivism, while perhaps not based in realist or neorealist
theory, did come about as a response to works by Waltz and Walt. However, Wendt maintains
that constructivism is,
“A structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1)
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states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key
structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state
identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather
than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.” (Wendt
1994, 385).
Unpacking this, it is important to note Wendt’s first point- that states are the principal units of
analysis, which is consistent with realism, though the latter would claim that states are the only
appropriate units. Next, it must be determined what Wendt means by structures. Wendt proposes
that these structures are defined by shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge (Wendt
1995). However, while Wendt does not rule out the possibility that structures can also be
material, he maintains that most structures are social, and primarily exist in practice and process
(Wendt 1995). Wendt’s constructivism allows for the possibility of social structures affecting
state and actor behavior. Furthermore, these social structures serve to construct through
interactions an identity, which can also impact states.
Since identity is constructed through the perceptions of states instead of existing
inherently, this leads to a main point of Wendt’s theory: anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt
1992). Anarchy may be inherent in the international system, but anarchy is viewed differently by
each state, since it is constructed by the various structures and perceptions of the state. To
reiterate, Wendt’s main point is, “that the culture in which states find themselves at any point in
time depends on the discursive social practices that reproduce or transform each actor’s view of
self and other” (Guzzini 2006). This is Wendt’s heaviest critique of neorealism: that anarchy
does not cause states to constantly worry about self survival, relative power, and security, but
that anarchy does not compel them to do anything conflictual (Guzzini 2006). Furthermore,
constructivism rejects objective facts, suggesting that facts are dependent upon these social
structures and established conventions (Mabon 2013). Another central tenet of constructivist
theory is that although states may be the principle actors and units of power within the
international system, non-state actors may also wield power and influence state decisions. Not
only can entities such as international institutions affect state behavior, they can also be
theoretical petri dishes where new practices, policies, and norms can be developed (Haas 2002).
Perhaps one of the few equals Wendt has in constructivism is Michael Barnett, who has
made large contributions to the theory, though he notably disagrees with Wendt on a few issues.
20
Barnett develops the importance and impact of identity and norms within international relations,
a concept that, while central to Wendt’s contribution, is not heavily focused upon. For Barnett,
identities, “Must begin with the understanding of oneself in relationship to others…are not only
psychological, but are also social, profoundly influenced by the actor’s interaction with and
relationship to others” (Barnett 2002, 8). Since they are influenced and even made out of
interactions with others, identities therefore are socially constructed and are dependent upon
historical social roles that are occupied by actors (Barnett 2002). It is in this way Barnett chooses
to parallel Wendt in terms of constructivism, by showing that the identities are constructions in
themselves. These interactions between actors and social understandings are often influenced by
norms according to Barnett, which regulate relations and express identity (Barnett 2002, Mabon
2013).
This description of identities brings about the possibility of multiple identities within one
state, including a possible state identity. However, Barnett is most focused upon national
identities, as he feels it is the best category of identity to approach the Middle East. National
identities can be influenced by three primary sources of influence: power elite/instrumental
forces, societal forces, and international forces (Barnett 2002). Again, these influences come out
of practice and process in constructivism, and are not inherently present. In continuing with the
Middle East example, though it certainly could be applied elsewhere, Barnett shows that often
times there are multiple identities that compete with one another for influence, resulting in a
menu of identities to choose from- Barnett cites Islam, statism, and Arabism as options in the
Middle East (Barnett 2002). Selecting one of these as the ‘national’ identity can occur through a
number of different processes, and the result can vary state by state. Due to the many options
available and the number of influences impacting identity, it is very fluid and can be constructed
and deconstructed, as well as being something that is highly contested and fought over in
domestic politics (Hinnebusch 2014). When identities are established, norms can be identified.
Norms, or a standard of appropriated behavior for actors with a given identity, can be divided
into two types: regulative norms, which control and influence behavior, and constitutive norms,
which create new actors, categories, or interests (Finnemore 1998). Finnemore argues against the
realist notion that norms oppose rationality in political thinking, instead theorizing that
rationality cannot be separated from any instance of normative influence, and that they are
intimately connected (Finnemore 1998). Norms and ideas are not just embedded in leaders alone,
21
but rather whole societies and institutions. For instance, the GCC, as an institution, can be a
structure where norms evolve over time, thus impacting policy. Thus, the shift in Gulf policy
towards Syria may be the result of an evolving of norms and ideas through the mediums of
society, institutions, or leaders.
Can religion be considered as a norm or identity? In constructivism this is likely, for
religion can both control and influence behavior (norms), as well as be a determining factor in an
actor’s relationship with others (identity). This is compounded by the fact that since religion is
often one of the most deeply held and arguably formative beliefs to humans, it is likely that
individuals will act upon these beliefs, whether they are part of state or non-state actors (Dark
2000). The manifestation of religion in non-state actors has been increasingly on the rise, through
religious relief or aid organizations to religio-social organizations. This brings the possibility of
religion impacting the international system through means outside of bilateral or multilateral
diplomacy. The implications of this could be significant, especially when considering conflict
resolution. T.G. Walsh maintains that religion can often accomplish what the state cannot:
change the hearts and minds of citizens (Walsh 2013). The problem, as diagnosed by Walsh, is
that religion has yet to undergo its own version of Westphalia- that is to give up the hope of
unilateral hegemony and accept that bilateral and multi-lateral collaboration could achieve things
unattainable through state diplomacy (Walsh 2013). Can this apply to other identities and norms?
That is, in order for identities to subvert the current state-centric system, must those that adhere
to one identity be willing to work across identities to achieve a goal? Is that defeating the
purpose of the identity, whatever it may be?
Perhaps another useful lens to analyze the role of religion in international relations is
through the Clash of Civilizations Theory by Samuel Huntington. If, as Huntington theorized,
civilizations that are based upon different religions and cultures bound to come into conflict, how
can we interpret the GCC’s actions in this light? Assuming that Shi’ism and Sunnism here are in
distinct, separate categories, GCC intervention in Syria could be seen as a type of civilizational
bandwagoning, where Sunni states are uniting in an attempt to prevent a Shi’a led Syria, an
attempt to protect the Sunni majority population. Does religion and its respective sects have an
autonomous role in the policy shift- or can it be subsumed and overpowered by other
considerations? As the GCC is under Wahhabi influence, a brand of Sunnism that is particularly
hostile to the Shia, it is possible that the conflict results from a civilization conflict, where the
22
construction of a ‘Shia Arc’ has prompted conservative Sunni states to intervene. As previously
stated, norm evolution can take place through leaders and institutions, and due to the religious
homogeneity of the GCC, it is entirely possible that such religious norms prompted a concerted
policy change in response to the growing Shia threat to Sunni influence in the region. Huntington
argues that neorealists overemphasize the role of the state as the central actor, which obscures the
role of history and religious identity. The latter, according to Huntington, can prove to build
alliances across state lines and can spur what is seen as ‘irrational’ behavior among state elites.
While this is certainly a controversial explanation, it nonetheless resonates in this case study due
to the religious identities of the actors involved. However, Huntington’s theory does not account
for other factors such as self-survival and economy, leaving his explanation to be narrow and
incomplete in many aspects.
Similar to neorealism, Wendt and Barnett’s constructivism is not without its restraints or
critics. Wendt’s state-centric view of the international system is not only challenged by those
outside of constructivism, but those within the theory, notably Haas and Barnett, who place a
higher value on non-state actors. Furthermore, Wendt’s constructivism often excludes the impact
of domestic politics in placing such emphasis on the relationship between states (Zehfuss 2002).
The identity Wendt describes must identifiable and clear-cut, which is problematized by the
appearance or existence of more malleable, shifting, and insecure identities (Zehfuss 2002).
These identities are common in states with high levels of irredentism and incongruence, where
the competition for a singular identity is fierce, and any attempt of consolidation is met with
resistance and skepticism (Mabon 2013). In addition, Wendt’s state-centric approach does not
account for identity incongruence: Syria, ruled by an Alawite family and which projects a more
Alawite-Shi’a identity, has a population that consists of a Sunni majority and who adhere to a
Sunni identity, calling into question the legitimacy of the state identity (Mabon 2013).
Neorealists claim that, contrary to Wendt’s constructivism, anarchy and distributions of power
can have effects that are not dependent upon the assumptions of real and current distribution of
interests- all it takes for anarchy to have an inherent effect is that states must have uncertainty
regarding the present and future interests of others (Guzzini 2006).
As noted, Barnett’s constructivism places a particularly high emphasis on norms and
identities, which in turn can impact leaders and elites, encouraging them to cultivate their own
norms and identities. As a result, Barnett theorizes that realist self-survival via arms races is not
23
the dominant factor in the Middle Eastern security dilemma, instead claiming that it is the selfimage of leaders that determines action (Mabon 2013). Therefore, Barnett believes these leaders
hold symbolic politics in higher esteem over military politics. However, this is potentially
problematic, given the priority that the military is given in Middle Eastern states. For example,
Qatar’s effort to be brought under the United States protection umbrella was the first step in
starting a long series of diplomatic efforts (Kamrava 2014). Though Qatar’s national identity
may be more cohesive than in Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, each of those states have made
military identity a definitive priority.
Syria, and the Assad regime at large, maintained a consistent identity in the view of the
Gulf states. Despite Assad’s uncomfortably close connections with Tehran, the Gulf monarchies
knew that Syria could always be dealt with for the right price. Furthermore, the Arab-Israeli
conflict loomed so large in Syrian foreign policy that the Gulf could usually count on exploiting
or invoking that narrative to elicit or gain Syrian support. However, this steady image changed in
the late 2000s. As Bashar al Assad became ever closer with Iran, political unrest increased, and
Assad’s repression of the opposition reached an all-time high. Within this period, a new Syrian
threat was constructed in the eyes of the Gulf, particularly as a result of Bashar al Assad’s
leadership. The Gulf’s one-time perception of Syria as the bastion against Israel started to shift,
as well as their opinion on the Syrian-Iranian axis as Assad increasingly became dependent upon
Iranian military support. The construction as a pragmatic partner began to evolve into an identity
as a rogue state led by an unpredictable leader. However, it is important to go beyond simple
friend/enemy dichotomies and threat construction and view this relationship in another
constructivist light: religion.
Two of the seminal works that examine Islam’s role in international relations are
Muqtader Khan’s Islam as an Ethical Tradition of International Relations, and Waheed Zaman’s
Doctrinal Position of Islam Concerning Inter-State Relations. Their works are noteworthy
because they choose to conduct their examination through Islam itself. By choosing to start with
Islam, these authors provide a unique view of where and how Islam can fit into IR theory.
Khan’s work attempts to explain and place Islam within contemporary international relations
theory by claiming that Islam is foremost an ethical tradition. By establishing this, Khan sees that
states can thus draw upon ethical traditions to influence their policies. Not only does this
establish that religion can be a determining factor in international relations, it shows that
24
specifically Islam can be utilized as both motivation and possibly a means for foreign policy
goals. Importantly, Khan shows that Islam can also be used selectively by states to advance their
goals that produce negative consequences. By doing this, he distinguishes between taking
advantage of Islam and drawing upon Islam for ethical guidance in policy making. This provides
states with ethical motivation, thereby proving that Islam plays a role in state’s foreign policy.
Furthermore, this work shows that Islam can be a very important factor in international
organizations and their success- it is clear that Khan relies on Wendt’s provision for norms as an
influence. However, instead of starting with IR theory as the building blocks of his argument,
Khan instead starts with the ethics of Islam, which then subsequently lead him to these
constructivist notions.
Similar to Khan, Zaman’s Doctrinal Position of Islam Concerning Inter-State and
International Relations also starts with Islamic ethics as the foundation, and proceeds to move
from that base. Zaman first looks at specific Islamic ethics that are found in the Quran or various
hadith and interprets their meaning in a diplomatic context. As a next step, he examines how
international relations should be conducted from an Islamic perspective, and studies the
trajectory of the foreign policy undertaken by the earliest Muslim civilizations and their
progression over time. Zaman posits that since Islam is ultimately geared towards peace and
submission to Allah, then Muslim states’ diplomacy should reflect that. By showing that the
Prophet was also a diplomat and a skillful negotiator, Zaman traces the intersection of Islam and
international relations to the very genesis of the religion. Like Khan’s work, this is based upon
religion but eventually leads into Wendt’s theory in that it prioritizes norms and ideas. Perhaps
more importantly is how it resides within the space created by Finnemore. Zaman’s work centers
on diplomacy based upon submission to Allah. Initially and even today in other schools of IR
thought, this would be viewed as an irrational action made by a government. However,
Finnemore establishes the legitimacy of such thinking and gives it validity. Kramer’s building of
a Muslim statecraft trajectory contributes to this as well, showing that this is not an outlier or
one-time occurrence (Kramer 1986). Ultimately, this validates Zaman’s methodology by
showing that using Islam as a starting point is not only rational, but it has historical precedence.
When considering the relationship between Syria and the GCC, it is important examine
the differences between the Shi’a and Sunni in regards to both governance and the role of Islam
in leadership. The Shi’a-Sunni divide is historically predicated upon leadership- who would
25
succeed the Prophet Muhammad after he died. Unsurprisingly, the differing opinions produced
different types of leadership. While Shi’a Islam found authority in the Imamate, ruled by a single
Imam, Sunni Islam relied on a process of consultative leadership by a council of Islamic scholars
and leaders, the Shura Council. As a result, Shi’a communities were often dominated by single,
charismatic, religious leaders while Sunni regions lend themselves to a leadership that, while
may be inclusive, can also be more fragmented. The effects of this historical trend can be seen in
the makeup of Syria and the GCC. Assad, while not an overtly religious authority, dominates the
political landscape as a single, authoritative figure whose legitimacy and rule are almost
absolute. The Gulf monarchies rely on Shura Councils to lead their states, but these councils are
stacked with friends of the monarchy and grossly misrepresent both Islamist opposition and the
minority Shi’a populations that exist in their states. From a scriptural and doctrinal basis, the
differences are stark- religious authority, rituals, Quranic exegesis, fiqh (law), theology, and even
eschatology all contain strong contrasts between the Sunni and Shi’a. Both have their own
physical centers of education and scholarship, from Shi’a dominated Qom in Iran to the Sunni
center of al Azhar in Cairo. In the modern period, little common ground has been established,
though this does not always mean conflict between the two sects. Where then can we assess
Islam’s role in the GCC-Syria relationship?
When a state such as Saudi Arabia is founded as an Islamic State and is entirely
predicated upon the implementation of Sunni Islam, it is almost impossible to summarize the
amount of penetration Islam has within the Saudi government. The relationship of Islam and
Saudi Arabia will be examined more closely in chapter three, but it is important to note that the
majority of governing structures within the Saudi state are based upon Islamic justifications and
recommendations. In addition, this does not even take into account the influence of the Ulama in
politics and decision-making, which will also be looked at in chapter three. However, the grand
totality of Islam’s influence within Saudi Arabia, and to a similar extent the rest of the GCC
states, makes it unsurprising to find misgivings about a Shia ruler in Syria. After the fall of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the rise of Nouri al Maliki, a Shiite, the GCC was looking at a
fundamental change in the regional religious balance. Iran, a Shia led Iraq, a Hizbollah and Shi’a
influenced Lebanon, and Assad-led Syria formed a veritable “Shia Crescent” that spanned from
the Mediterranean to the reaches of Iran’s border with Afghanistan, posing a significant threat to
the Sunni world. As the power shifted towards Shia hands in the Levant and in Iraq, Saudi
26
leaders and the GCC were likely worried that regional influence would now be Shia dominated.
Religion constructed as a threat is accounted for in constructivist theory, and very well may have
been a primary source of the Sunni GCC’s apprehension with the Shia arc.
Lastly, while constructivism, and its subsequent approach to the research question, offers
a number of compelling arguments and lens through which to view this study, it nonetheless
offers opportunities for critique. By emphasizing the role of agency and institutions, such
approaches may understate the centrality of the state in the international system and the effect it
has on policymaking. Furthermore, there is also the risk of overstating the role of the religious,
thus neglecting factors such as economy and power politics.
Political Economy: World Systems Theory
Political economy is another lens in which the GCC’s policy shift can be viewed- an
explanation that would emphasize economic gain and interests as the primary motivations for
supporting the Syrian opposition. Simply put, political economy is, “How politics determines
aspects of the economy, and how economic institutions determine the political process”
(Staniland 1985, 6). The state has the ability to profoundly impact the outcome of market
activities by determining laws that govern property rights and general economic behavior
(Weber, Gerth 1946). Conversely, the market itself is a power source that can determine political
outcomes, thus showing the exchange in influences these two arenas have (Gilpin 1987). With
the explosion of the market in a politically and socially fragmented world in the last few
centuries, there are numerous economic consequences that can be directly related to political
responses.
First, the introduction of market forces and system of prices into society often
overwhelms and, in come cases, dissolves traditional social relations and institutions (Gilpin
1987). This outcome is often cited when globalization is talked about in a negative sense- the
argument is often made the integrated world system, complete with its own price and production
rules, has the ability to degrade long standing structures. Second, a true world market economy
significantly affects the distribution of wealth and power in society. This is closely connected to
the criticisms, notably Marxist ones, of capitalism, which will be discussed later in this section.
Third, because of the fact that economic interdependence establishes power relationships among
groups, it creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited and manipulated; especially considering
27
the market is rarely neutral when it comes to politics (Gilpin 1987). When one actor stands to
gain from one aspect of the market, another entity often will suffer as a result. Market economies
can produce both costs and benefits on groups and societies (Gilpin 1987).
These consequences, notably the third, are the result of a capitalist driven market
economy. As mentioned, these effects have opened up the system to a large amount of criticism,
and few were as vocal as Karl Marx. Recognizing the system’s nature of inequality, Marx
theorized that capitalism produced an inequitable distribution of money, and those that control
the means of production could exploit the working class (Handelman 2013). This was made
worse by the unequal process of industrialization and modernization in the world. States, notably
Western European and the U.S., made greater strides in terms of industrial economy and means
of production, buying mass amounts raw materials from underdeveloped regions at lower prices,
then refining them into finished products through their own advanced industrial processes. Thus,
Marx believes imperialism and colonialism was a direct result of capitalism, and that they could
not be separated. Specifically, “Once capital is invested in a foreign country there is pressure to
occupy it or make it a colony or protectorate in order to safeguard the investment and to limit
competition from other industrial countries” (Haddad 2014, 40). This is an excellent example of
economics altering the political landscape. As Gilpin noted, market economies create gaps to
exploit, and once exploited, as seen in the case of industrial states in the 19th century, there is a
need to protect the gains that have been made- usually through some form of imperialism or
colonization.
Before further examining the exchange of effects between politics and economy, an
approach and model is needed to evaluate the current state of the world economy. Perhaps no
theory is as popular or helpful as Wallerstein’s World Systems theory. Proponents of this theory
brush aside religious and state-level security determinants, instead arguing that unequal
economic relations would explain the trajectory and shift in Gulf-Syrian relations. As the name
implies, Wallerstein approaches the market through a world level approach, acknowledging the
widespread economic integration in the current makeup of the modern world. However, like
Marx, Wallerstein identifies groups that clearly gain from the nature of the system and actors that
are often on the losing end of the relationship. He theorizes that the capitalist world system is
based on an intentional division of labor that determined relationships between different regions,
forming four different categories of economic regions- the core, semi-periphery, periphery, and
28
external (Halsall 1997). Often for simplicity and due to difficulty in determining which category
a region or state should belong to, these four categories are usually reduced to two- the core and
periphery. The core consists of regions that benefit from the world economy, and are often
characterized by strong central governments, extensive bureaucracies, high levels of
manufacturing and production, and are often technologically advanced (Halsall 1997).
Conversely, the periphery can be seen as lacking a strong government, having high amounts of
raw resources, using coercive labor practices, low amounts of manufacturing, and engaging in
unequal trade relations with the core (Halsall 1997). As a result, the core often engages in
dominant behavior with the core through political, economic, and even cultural relations.
It is widely accepted that the modern core is made up of the modernized West, led by its
hegemon in the United States, and the periphery consists of mostly southern Hemisphere, Middle
Eastern, and eastern states. In fact, the birth of some states, especially in the decolonization
period, is perceived to be an attempt by the core to still control the periphery, even after it has
ended formal ‘occupation’, and the foremost subject of this accusation is the Middle East, where
state formation came at the hands of colonial powers who were leaving their colonies (Haddad
2014). In light of this theory, it is unsurprising that states in the Middle East and in other areas
have not reached the core level. However, in going beyond the simple, worldwide core-periphery
level, there are levels within regions as well. In sum, there are peripheries within the core, and
cores within the peripheral regions as well.
Johan Galtung, a leading World Systems theorist, states, “the world consists of Center
and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery. Hence our concern
is with the mechanism underlying this discrepancy, particularly between the center in the Center,
and the periphery in the Periphery” (Galtung 1971, 81). The ‘Core’ in the periphery regions is
most often privy to the closest connections, usually economic and political, to the worldwide
core. In the Middle East, states have experienced high levels of penetration from the West
through intervention and control (Brown 1984). After the colonial period, these new states, often
due to their own insecurity and disputes within the region, sought out external patrons and
resources to help consolidate their power, both regionally and domestically (Brown 1984). This
led to the beginning of the client-patron relationship in the Middle East, which can also be
interpreted as a periphery-core relationship. When this relationship was challenged internally by
any type of opposition, it was crushed. Haddad states, “Those leaders who rose to power and
29
tried to break the pattern of subservience to the Center were denounced as new ‘Hitlers’ or
‘rogues’” (Haddad 2014, 69-70). Once this network of patronage was established, the Core
hegemon, in the case of the Middle East the U.S., needed a leader in the periphery that would act
for the benefit of both states in terms of economic and political interests- Galtung coined this
state the ‘bridgehead’ (Galtung 1971). This special relationship created shared economic
interests between the core hegemon and the elites of the bridgehead state, thus stagnating any
sort of growth and development in the societal levels beneath them (Hinnebusch 2014). This
relationship in the Middle East is embodied through the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, and is
“Manifested in the way the overwhelming investment of surplus petrodollars by Arab oil
monarchies in the West gives their ruling families a much greater stake in the economies of the
core than in the MENA region” (Hinnebusch 2014, 5). This results in the lack of motivation to
invest in regional development and economy, as the welfare of the bridgehead elites is
incumbent upon the status of the core’s economy.
Unsurprisingly, even though dissenters have historically been dealt with, there are still
regional state actors that align against the bridgehead, and by extension the core. However, the
relationship is not as black and white as it seems, as some states will occasionally play to both
sides, or try to maximize their gain from their standing in the core-periphery hierarchy. In doing
this, regional states look to evade the core’s constraints or to manipulate the core-periphery
system (Ayoob 2002). In the MENA region, while Saudi Arabia is the bridgehead, with the other
Gulf states following closely behind with their oil and natural gas based economies, Iran serves
as the major opponent, aligning against both the regional core and the world core hegemon
(Mahdavi 2014). MENA states, seeing this, seek to play the system and attempt to parlay and
leverage the sides against one another in an effort to gain economic or political benefits.
When discussing political economy in the Middle East, oil and natural gas cannot be
avoided, and for good reason. The abundance of these natural resources, in such a concentrated
pocket of the region, has been the source of alliances, disputes, and downfalls. One of the main
relationships it has impacted is that of the core-periphery. It would not take much to convince
even the most hardened skeptic that the core hegemon, the U.S., did not set up its client patron
network and effectively appoint Saudi Arabia its bridgehead because of oil and natural gas.
Within the GCC, Saudi holdings from oil and natural gas amount to between $750 and $850
billion dollars, while the rest of the GCC combined account for around $500 billion dollars
30
(Luciani 2009). Oil revenues, or rents, are the difference between the market price and the cost
of production, and in the case of rentier states, those revenues go directly into the coffers of the
government (Richards 1996). In turn, this allows the government to avoid difficult or challenging
development choices about investment or policies- if the rents are high enough and reasonably
stable, then the government has no incentive to give up a portion its stranglehold on the economy
in exchange for economic benefits (Richards 1996). Furthermore, this allows them to adapt more
readily to globalization, and as oil prices in the region increase because of global scarcity
concerns, the impulse towards any type of reform has decreased (Luciani 2009).
Though oil and natural gas have often played the role of instigator between MENA states,
could the economic benefits and resources be put towards regional cooperation? The agro-poor
states and those without vast oil reserves often feel the Gulf states do not do enough with the
resources they have, whether that is lack of investment or through trade with the rest of the
region. One theory as to why this is not more common is due to the disparity between political
and economic institutions throughout the region, especially between Gulf states in the regional
core, and states in the regional periphery. Put simply, “One of the barriers to regional
cooperation in the Middle East has been the wide discrepancy of economic structures and
political regimes. The absence of democratic regimes and open societies has indeed constituted a
major problem” (Çarkoğlu 1998, 52). Ultimately, incongruence is one of the major factors
inhibiting economic cooperation between MENA states. Without domestic support for
governmental decisions, regional economic cooperation is highly unlikely to succeed in the long
term (Çarkoğlu 1998). Another issue that stagnates cooperation in the economic arena is the
suspicion of gain and loss. The question of ‘who maximizes gain?’ has long prevented
cooperation, even when agreements may benefit both parties. This particularly becomes an issue
when a rentier Gulf state is dealing with another MENA state, as a feature of rentier states is to
become embroiled in issues that transcend their national boundaries, and do not especially affect
their national interests (Luciani 2009). This is a sore spot for non-rentier states, as many
understandably resent the interference in their national affairs, and are thus likely to have a
healthy dose of skepticism when attempting to come to an economic agreement with a rentier
state. Added to the prevalence of Pan-Arabism sentiment in non-rentier states, who have
articulated a claim to a share of the oil rent over the years, this issue is one that is not easily
solved (Luciani 2009).
31
This progression inevitably leads to the effect economy has on foreign policy, especially
that of the rentier Gulf states. There are essentially two fronts on which they must conduct their
diplomatic affairs- as the bridgehead of one periphery, and as the core of the region. This twolevel diplomacy is further complicated by the very nature of rentier states, as a large part of their
very existence depends on the market for their abundant resource. Therefore, all economic and
diplomatic measures must be calculated carefully, with one eye towards protecting the market
and the other towards appeasement of both the world core and other regional actors. Qatar has
created the Qatar Investment Authority, a sovereign wealth fund that it uses to pursue
international investment, and seeks to facilitate growth in domestic industries and
macroeconomic stabilization, thereby increasing returns on investments and growing the pool of
wealth for future generations (Portman 2008). Qatar has made numerous investment deals with
European states and others in the MENA region, acquiring a reputation for the most deal-willing
Gulf state. Qatari investments through the QIA, at a time when other MENA states desperately
need development, has coupled with other foreign policy objectives- such as military protection
and branding, thereby giving Qatar a large amount of strategic and economic importance in the
region (Kamrava 2014).
Similar to Qatar, Saudi Arabia’s economic prowess gives its foreign investments and
relationships a unique position within the region. However, due to its much higher population of
nationals than Qatar, Saudi’s domestic investment is just as, if not more, notable than its foreign
policy. Through ARAMCO, the Saudi government has funded massive development projects in
its own state- through building roads, railroads, and educational centers (Gause III 2014, Vitalis
2006). Outside of development institutions, “The basis of state-society relations has been the
provision of goods and services by the state to society, with little but political loyalty expected in
return” (Gause III 2014, 197). This loyalty allows the Saudi government more room to maneuver
in diplomacy, as they have the full backing of their constituents and therefore have leeway to
pursue objectives that benefit the governmental or royal elites. However, this system produces
two consequences: first, oil rents must be high enough in order ensure that the government can
provide these services to the population. Second, it must provide security to its citizens without
the expectation of mandatory service (Gause III 2014). Since political loyalty is the only
requirement, citizens expect full military security without having the requirement to serve. In
this, Saudi Arabia stands alone as the only Middle Eastern state that does not require young men
32
to serve in its military (Gause III 2014).
Historically, the linkages between economy and foreign policy shifts can be seen in the
Middle East. The Trans-Arabian pipeline, stretching from Saudi Arabia through the Golan
Heights and ending in Lebanon is a definitive example. Both the British and the Americans
fought over the placement of the pipeline, an argument that the Americans forcibly won. The
Syrian government in 1949 would not allow a pipeline to run through its territory. Not long after
their refusal, the United States heavily backed a military coup in Damascus, and the pipeline was
running by 1950 (Little 2003). Consistently, Western and imperialist powers adopted policy
contingent upon economic gains and spoils to be had from occupation or invasion. Hafez al
Assad certainly prioritized securing economic and financial aid from regional powers, and this
need for such resources certainly affected his foreign policy, most noticeably in his alignment
with the Gulf Coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War. Can the same be said for the Gulf states?
Qatar proposed the construction of an oil pipeline that would run from Iranian-Qatari South Pars
/ North Dome Gas field towards Turkey, which would cross through Syria. The Assad regime
promptly rejected this proposal, claiming it had to protect Russia’s interest as a top oil producer.
This rejection can also be seen as Assad acting as a regional bridgehead for Russian interests.
Not long after this rejection, Assad signed a new gas pipeline deal with Iran and Iraq. Shortly
thereafter, the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, turned on Assad and declared
foreign intervention to be necessary in Syria. At the very least, this is a striking coincidence. At
most, it is a significant indication that economic reasons played a very influential role in
supporting Syrian opposition.
Streamlining a state’s foreign policy through an economic framework is fairly common in
the international system- after all, a state will have more leverage and power when it is an
economic power. Election rhetoric routinely calcifies around narratives that center upon building
up an economy that is impervious to global crises, as well as an economy that would allow it to
have influence on the world stage. The GCC is an excellent example of this streamline- for
without its economic prowess, states such as Qatar would not nearly have as much influence in
regional and global affairs. Instead, the most leverage it could utilize would be its strategic
location in the Persian Gulf. It is in this way that economy can explain policy change in a
different way than political or religious motivation. Of course, having political and religious
power, especially in the heavily religious Middle East, brings a certain amount of legitimacy.
33
However, that legitimacy can often be hollow without economies that can self-fund regional,
political, and religious aspirations. Economy can also be a motivation in itself, an end in which a
state’s motivations are driven by economic gains. As discussed above, these economic gains may
bring domestic stability, international respect, and military might. These three outcomes,
particularly the first, are at a premium in the Middle East. As a result, economy cannot be ruled
out as a primary motivational factor in the GCC’s decision to support Syrian opposition.
However, World Systems theory and political economy generally fail to include variables that
supersede the economic level of analysis, such as religion or the primacy of state security.
Furthermore, the blurred lines between economic prosperity and state survival mean that any
economic motivations may well be intertwined and impacted upon by the considerations of
power politics.
Methodology
This question will be approached and examined through both the quantitative and the
qualitative. This approach will utilize content analyses of writings, speeches, and web archives to
evaluate and weigh the different propositions that are drawn from the various theories explored
in the literature review. Each section will elevate the use of different sets of primary sources that
are tailored with the respective hypotheses in mind. Examining the role of neorealism of the
GCC’s decision requires unique insight into Gulf governments’ decision-making and political
elites. Previously classified government cables, released by Wikileaks, are particularly suited to
this study. This is because they allow for an inside look into state motivations, thus enabling the
study to examine the pervasion of neorealist influence from the state’s perspective. These
documents span the pre-conflict and conflict periods, allowing the documents to form a
comprehensive trajectory in both the build-up to the Gulf’s decision and the aftermath. However,
using documents and cables from Wikileaks bring with them a unique set of problems- issues of
authenticity, bias, and commentary.
In an effort to best evaluate each document and its veracity, it will be important to note
the different types of documents that exist. I will use two collections: those taken from the U.S.
State Department from 2006-2010, and those from the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Each collection has their own style and their own complexities. For instance, some of the
information in the U.S. cables consists of off the record conversations about meetings that took
34
place. While the diplomat may have trusted his counterpart to be truthful, it still must be noted
that a certain type of secondhand anecdotes invariably make their way into these documents.
While this information will be used, it will also be given its proper context. Next, certain biases
and views undoubtedly influence the content of these cables- in some ways this is helpful, as it
allows unique insight into government mindsets. However, it can also cloud and slant the
information in untruthful or suspect manners. Keeping these limitations in mind, chapter two’s
primary text analysis will be broken into two parts: documents from the pre-conflict period, and
those from the start and duration of the Syrian Civil War. The presentation will be roughly
chronological, though the order will be at the behest of thematic cohesion. Broadly speaking, the
U.S. cables span the pre-conflict period while the Saudi documents begin at the start of the
conflict.
In order to ascertain the influence of Islam, and thereby the salience of constructivism in
this study, khutbahs (mosque sermons) gathered from Saudi Arabia and Qatar during the period
before and after the severing of diplomatic ties will be examined. The relationship between the
powerful Wahhabi Ulama of the Gulf, specifically in Saudi, and the governments must be
examined in order to determine whether Islam is a tangible influencer of policy or is simply a
legitimizing tool used by the state to justify intervention. Particular emphasis will be given to the
state-run mosques in Mecca and Medina due to their powerful influence in the Muslim world and
their close connections to the Saudi state. For political economy, the economic ties between the
GCC and Syria before the conflict must be examined and established. A close study of the effect
the global recession of 2008 had on the GCC states will show the economic state the GCC was in
when it made this decision. Oil and natural gas policy will play a pivotal role in this study, which
will include the effect that price shifts have on foreign and gas policy. Lastly, the question of
economic influence will be examined through the proposition of two natural gas pipelines, one
proposed by GCC states, and one proposed and supported by Iran and Russia. Each pipeline
would cross through Syria, making it an important player and controller in the distribution of
natural gas from the Middle East to the West.
It is also important to note the definition and use of the word ‘moderate’ when describing
the Syrian opposition. This study will not look at the reported backing by wealth, ultraconservative individuals to internationally recognized terrorist organizations like Jabhat al Nusra
or the Islamic State. Rather, the Syrian groups of interest in this piece will be confined to groups
35
officially backed by GCC governments. By using the term ‘moderate’, I seek to simply exclude
terrorist organizations that may receive backing by individuals. The label itself is rife with
misconceptions, and scholars such as Brookings’ Shadi Hamid have even advocated for
abolishing the term altogether when describing Muslims (Hamid 2015). Hamid argues that
‘moderate’ is used by Western and non-Islamic academics to mean Muslims that do not allow
Islamic ideology to pervade their political ideology. However, as Hamid states, this is not
possible due to the permeation and predominance of Islam as a daily discourse and influence
upon life. A possible alternative would be to invoke a spectrum of Islamism instead- but this
excludes the purely secular opposition groups that do exist, such as the Southern Front. As a
result, ‘moderate’ will refer to secular opposition and relatively moderate Islamist groups,
specifically those that receive support from the GCC. Of course, Syrian opposition is but one set
of actors that this study will focus on. In addition to these non-state entities, state and
international actors will also be used, as they are a key level of analysis in IR framework. Below
is a brief list of the most important Syrian opposition actors, both political and military:
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces: This group is the main
Western-backed political alliance, and supports the implementation of the 2012 Geneva
Communiqué, which calls for the establishment of a transitional governing body in Syria.
National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change: This is the Syria-based opposition
political group which calls for a peaceful transition from Assad to his successor.
The Free Syrian Army: The largest moderate and secular military group, consisting of defected
members of the Syrian Army. Estimated to have over seventy thousand soldiers (Lister 2015).
The Southern Front Alliance: A military entity that operates in Southern Syria and consists of
fifty-eight separate factions. The largest group operating under the Free Syrian Army and is
secular and moderate, and also backed by Gulf assistance.
Ahrar al Sham: A large conservative Salafi rebel group that wishes to establish an Islamic state
in Syria, though it does not approve of extremist actions. Despite this, Ahrar al Sham is a part of
Jaish al Fatah, an alliance of groups that includes the al Qaeda-affiliated al Nusra Front and is
actively supported by Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Sengupta 2015).
Jaish al Islam: An Islamist rebel group active primarily near Damascus, and while it previously
called for the implementation of an Islamic state, the group’s leaders now signify that they are
willing to allow Syrians to choose any form of government.
36
CHAPTER TWO
IN THE INTEREST OF POWER:
THE GCC’S MOTIVES AND STRATEGIES IN SYRIA
The primary goal of this chapter is to apply a neorealist framework in order to evaluate
and ascertain the extent to which security and power interests can best explain the seemingly
confusing turnaround of the relationship of the Arab Gulf monarchies vis-à-vis Syria. This about
face is evident in the Gulf states’ change with respect to its Syria policy. This policy evolved
from staunch support to the Assad regime to one where Saudi Arabia and Qatar have come to
support the anti-regime moderate Syrian opposition both financially and militarily.
In order to fully understand the significance of the GCC’s recent shift in policy towards
Syria, it is vital to first revisit the strategic motives highlighted by realist perspectives in their
historical context as their pertain to Gulf-Syria relations. In this regard, particular attention will
be paid to the influence and role of ideology versus security and power concerns. This is
especially crucial since neorealism dictates the latter will always supersede the former.
Subsequently, the foreign policies of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria will be examined through a
neorealist lens.
Empirically speaking, the bulk of this chapter will focus on a content and textual analysis
of government rhetoric and leaked diplomatic cables. Through these, an effective assessment of
the motivations behind Gulf state behavior can be carried out. Since neorealism prioritizes
actions of the state above that of non-state actors, more time will be spent of government rhetoric
rather than on non-state textual evidence. The majority of the cables and textual evidence are
derived from Wikileaks, allowing for an inside look into state motivations. Next, it must be
proved that Qatar and Saudi are indeed funding and arming Syrian opposition. Not only will
evidence be presented to confirm this support, but also insight into the growing Saudi-Qatari
rivalry in this effort will be discussed. To conclude, a final assessment of neorealism influence in
Gulf policy will be made, and an evaluation of its shortcomings will serve to transition in the
next chapter.
Gulf-Syria Relations: In Historical Context
Importantly, while the recent policy shift of the Gulf with respect to Syria is viewed in
rationalist strategic terms in much of the analysis on the subject, historical events that influenced
37
such the decision underpinning this shift are too often ignored. Indeed, a key insight associated
with the neorealist school is not only that state actors are ultimately motivated by strategic and
realpolitik interests, but also that their actions, and political behavior, are formed through their
perceptions of history. In the Middle East these perceptions often endure even after the onset of
significant and rupturing geo-political shifts. This is primarily due to the authoritarian nature of
governance, the exceedingly slow rate of change in leadership, and low regime turnover in the
region. This makes historical context all the more important when considering state behavior.
Though the introduction and literature review examined some key components of the historical
relationship between Syria and the Gulf monarchies, it is vital to expand upon the strategic and
security interests that influenced the formation and evolution of the relationship leading up to the
Syrian Civil War.
A key historical event that greatly influenced the trajectory of Gulf-Syria relations was
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Following the 1967 war, Israel annexed and occupied the Golan
Heights, a swath of land that had previously been a part of Syria. Recovering this lost land
immediately vaulted to the top of Syrian interests, and there were many debates on the various
courses of action the Syrian government could take. Ultimately, the decision was in the hands of
the then Defense Minister Hafez al Assad in 1968. Recognizing the Syrian economy and military
likely could not sustain another protracted conflict; Assad sought a rapprochement with the Gulf
monarchies, which would provide crucial economic assistance to a struggling economy and
finance his military. As a result, Assad drove Syria closer to the Gulf, making the conflict against
Israel as the unifying glue to their relationship. Such an exchange did not come cheap for Syriathe Gulf demanded that Syria end her support for political revolutions and Arab nationalist
leaders across the region. From the perspective of the Gulf leaders, this would ensure political
stability in their own states, and also ensure a measure of domestic popularity, as the Gulf
regimes would be seen as playing an integral role in the fight against Israel.
Although this explanation can stand on its own, even these actions have their roots in
earlier history, showing the connection between alliance making, ideology, and prioritization of
regime survival. In fact, this interplay of motivations dates back to the British Mandate in
Palestine, and the founder of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud. During the early 20th century, Saudi Arabia
gained its independence under the leadership of Ibn Saud, who partnered his military might and
relative power with a puritanical strain of Sunni Islam, Wahhabism. The Muslim Sunni scholars
38
who came under the influence and patronage of Ibn Saud effectively legitimized his right to rule
over the country, and Ibn Saud moved quickly to consolidate his rule in the Arabian Peninsula.
However, there were two primary threats to Saud’s rule: domestic threats stemming from
tribal rivalries, notably the Hashemites, and the British, who controlled most of the region. Ibn
Saud proved to be adept at dealing with both, but inevitably the respective interests of both
groups came into conflict. The British, sponsoring mass Jewish immigration to Palestine,
angered the religious community and general populace, who saw their efforts as an attempt to
establish a Jewish state in Arab land- this accusation did not have to be stretched very far, as the
Balfour Declaration of 1917 outlined similar aims. Initially, Ibn Saud was not particularly
invested in the Palestinian cause, skipping a meeting of Arab leaders on Palestinian issues in
1931 (al Rasheed 2007).
As tensions and Jewish immigration continued to rise, Ibn Saud was left little choice, and
voiced his concerns to the British government through a series of letters to the Foreign Office.
The British responded with thinly veiled threats, saying, “The Arab agitation in Palestine is
directed against the policy of His Majesty’s government, and for Ibn Saud to declare his
sympathy to it would be to declare himself on the side of those hostile to British policy”1. Ibn
Saud immediately backtracked on his statements, recognizing that the British Empire could
easily remove him from power if it so chose, as their military power would overwhelm his small
force. Instead, Ibn Saud attempted to portray himself as an Arab leader that could cooperate with
British interests, telling the British,
“(I) Would be a liar were I to say to you that I did not want to fight the Jews with every
bone in my body, but Britain is the ultimate judge in Palestine and it is in the interests of
the Arabs to remain loyal to Britain. We must confess that we received many requests to
help with the revolution in Palestine but God willing we will never do anything that
undermines our promises to Britain.”2
By portraying himself as a leader and unifier of the Arabs, Ibn Saud could ensure his regional
influence. However, when his interests directly conflicted with the global hegemon of the time,
Ibn Saud backed down, prioritizing regime survival over regional influence and aspirations.
Though fledgling pan-Arabism and Arab identity were strong at this stage due to the perceived
1 Air 2/1858, telegram to Sir Andrew Ryan (Jiddah), Foreign Office to Saudi Arabia, 1 May 1936. Cited in al Rasheed 2007.
2 Letter from Ibn Saud to the British Government, 1 January 1937, in al-Mursi, Min Khutab al-malik Abdulaziz, pp. 268-71.
Cited in al Rasheed 2007.
39
dangers of Jewish immigration, the infant Saudi state had to prioritize self-interest above
ideological causes.
As Jewish immigrants continued to flood Palestine, Ibn Saud repeatedly asked the British
to halt the flow, even suggesting a ten year ban in order to allow for tensions to settle, but to no
avail (al Rasheed 2007). However, once again he deferred to the British in the interests of selfsurvival. After a series of interviews with Ibn Saud, a British Foreign Officer summed up the
King’s position: “As a Moslem and an Arab his sympathy naturally lay with the Arabs of
Palestine. He has suppressed these feelings out of friendship…he had to think of his position in a
world where many of his co-religionists would not even admit that he was a Moslem”3. To even
entertain the possibility of the public questioning his Islamic identity was to bring on incredible
risk to Ibn Saud. He had built a kingdom entirely premised on Islam, and for many religious
scholars and contemporaries to claim he was not a Muslim was to threaten the very existence of
his reign. Yet in light of all of these threats, he deemed Britain to be the greater one, and
routinely sought to placate the foreign power over the religious community. While domestic
threats could certainly undermine his rule, it was the military might of the British that deterred
Ibn Saud from coming into conflict with the British. This in essence typifies a key assumption of
neorealism: the prioritization of regime survival over ideology, and the value of state and
international threats over the influence of domestic politics.
Throughout this period, the Arab-Israeli conflict loomed large in the Middle East, but
when wars broke out in 1967 and 1973, they took place in a fundamentally different point in
history than when Ibn Saud decided to defer to British interests. The discovery of oil and the
subsequent realities of the Gulf’s newfound economic wealth forever changed the dynamics of
the region. In contrast to traditional Arab powers such as Egypt and Syria, the Gulf monarchies
had deficits in population that constrained them to use their wealth as a means of influence and
power. It is here where the simple choice of regime survival over ideology becomes opaque.
Whereas Ibn Saud had little say if he wanted to remain in power, the Gulf countries now found
themselves with significant more power and leverage than ever before.
Understandably, the Saudis were furious at the result of the 1967 war, and immediately
after, King Faisal issued an oil embargo on all oil sales to the U.S. However, this attempt at using
the ‘oil weapon’ failed for a number of reasons. First, this was relatively early in the period of oil
3 Air 2/1858, telegram from Sir Reader Bullard (Jiddah) to FO, 24 March 1937. Cited in al Rasheed 2007.
40
production in the Gulf. The vast reserves of the U.A.E. had not yet been discovered, and Saudi
production did not even equal that of the United States (Rosemarie 2009). Second, much of the
oil production and output was controlled by the ‘Seven Sisters’ oil companies, a monopoly of
mega-corporations unburdened by international regulation that would come with the creation of
OPEC. As a result, the United States was not damaged economically. However, much like his
father, Ibn Saud, King Faisal showed his willingness to employ oil as a means of international
leverage. Furthermore, it showed for the first time that Saudi Arabia was willing to forgo
hegemonic interests of a Western power in favor of its own. Funneling massive amounts to
Assad’s Syria, the Gulf determined that it now had a favorable distribution of power, anchored
by their monopoly of oil.
War broke out once more in 1973 when Egypt and Syria invaded Israel, and both were
economically backed by the Gulf. In response, the United States provided Israel with a large
airlift of weapons, with the daily amount of war material reaching into the thousands (Bahgat
2006). Almost immediately, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
convened, and decided to once again progressively reduce their oil production. This time,
however, it was not just Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and therefore the economic impact was
greatly felt by the international community. As a result, oil prices skyrocketed from $2.83 in
1973 to $10.41 in 1974, cumulating in a massive windfall of wealth for the Gulf states, which in
turn allowed them to establish an annual ‘contribution’ of $2.5 billion dollars to the Israeli
‘frontline’ states (Bahgat 2006). Within a year, Saudi Arabia had become one of the richest
countries in the world. It was eventually admitted in 2003 that the U.S. considered launching a
military conquest of Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Emirati oil fields during the war (Bahgat 2006).
With the discovery of oil and the massive rents that stuffed the Gulf coffers to the point
of overflow, the distribution of power in the region tipped in favor of the Gulf monarchies.
During the wars of 1967 and 1973, the Gulf used oil, or their power capabilities, to stand up to
the global hegemon (U.S.), in an act that prioritized ideology and beliefs over state survival. As
reports show, the U.S. was ready to invade the Gulf states and seize oil fields if need be- yet
Saudi Arabia and its allies looked past the threat to their survival in favor of open denial, even to
the point of denying the hegemon a much needed resource. It should also be noted that it was not
simply one ideology that caused this, but it was the combined weight of Arabism and Islam that
inspired this rebellion. While the domestic pressure at the time certainly supported and helped
41
instigate these actions, it was not threatening the regime in the way the Ulama could threaten Ibn
Saud. Saudi Arabia at the time was well established and could very well quash any domestic
uprising that would have occurred. The regime was also given assurances by Assad that any
political revolutions would not be supported by Syria. This in effect leveled the domestic threat
the Saudis faced, and enjoying a significant amount of leverage in the international system due to
their oil might, King Faisal defied the global hegemon.
Thus, it is apparent that the Gulf had its own reasons to throw their support behind Assad,
for it not only served to undermine the threat inside its borders, but it also allowed them to gain
domestic legitimacy if not popularity, and most importantly to employ their newfound power in
the face of the United States. By weighing the consequences, Saudi Arabia showed that it was
indeed motivated by security and economic interests in ways predicted by neorealist proponents:
it would only balance the hegemon when the distribution of power was in its favor. Israel, the
regional military power, and backed by the global military power, forced a balancing of power
among Arab states. It is unlikely the Gulf would have followed suit if they did not have the oil
and economic leverage they did- as seen in the case of Ibn Saud, regime interests were more
important than region wide pan-Arab or pan-Islamic ones.
For his part, Hafez al Assad also took part in taking actions to ensure regime survival as
well, though this actions served to alienate his Gulf allies. By backing the Iranian Islamic
Revolution in 1979, Assad placated Syria’s own Islamists, assuaging their discontent with the
prospect of close relations with Ayatollah Khomeini. Assad also used his Iranian ally to counter
the increasingly powerful Saudi-Iraq axis, giving Syria a more favorable power distribution and
less probability of its interests being superseded by Iraq. Saudi leaders believed that their
historical ties and economic assistance could be used to effectively ‘check’ Iranian interests, and
believed that Syria could moderate Iran. While this never quite came to pass, Syria did act as a
willing intermediary during the Iran/Iraq war (Sunayama 2007).
Keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict at the forefront of domestic and international headlines
was very important for Assad’s regime. Doing so would ensure that economic aid would
continue to flow to Damascus, and meant that he would remain the face of Arab opposition. In
order to do so, Assad aligned with the Coalition in the first Gulf War. Doing so instigated a
period of rapprochement with the Gulf, and economic aid flowed once again to Syria’s starved
coffers, ensuring that Assad would not have to worry about an economic threat to his rule. The
42
Gulf, once again, were only happy to oblige, as supporting this effort was a boon for its domestic
legitimacy- being seen as supportive of Palestine in the face of the West. It also served its
international interests, as closer ties to Syria meant added leverage against Saddam Hussein and
an opportunity to check Iranian power in the region.
In sum, the influence of power and state-centric security interests predicated by neorealist
perspectives on alliance formation can be seen from the earliest history of the Gulf monarchies.
The consistent theme of regime survival holding a priority over other interests is shown through
both Gulf and Syrian policy in the 20th century. Notably the only instant of an actor defying the
global hegemon came when the distribution of power was in its favor- when the Gulf monarchies
employed the oil weapons against the United States in 1973. There was often an amalgam of
interests that led to the relationship between Syria and the Gulf, but above all was the realization
that such relations would serve to preserve the respective regimes. The Gulf need to balance Iran
played an important role in its relationship with Syria, as the Islamist regime posed unique and
dangerous threats to the monarchies: a rival oil power, demographic challenges, a proven record
of Islamist revolution, and stark ideological differences.
Realpolitik in Gulf and Syrian Foreign Policy
In order to better understand the historical shift in the Gulf’s relations with Syria, it is
vital to examine the evolution and character of the strategic calculations that have dictated the
foreign policies of Saudi Arabia, Qatari, as well as Syria. As detailed above, throughout the last
half-century, these states have demonstrated remarkable continuity and consistency in their
respective policies. By establishing a baseline, or rather a foreign policy ‘norm’ for each of these
states, it will in turn be easier to detect the inconsistency or reasoning behind the important
change in policy, most notably the Gulf’s break from Syria, after decades of support to
Damascus on the part of all the GCC. Is this break completely in line with long standing Gulf
foreign policy norms, or does it represent a fundamental shift in the context of the profound
geopolitical changes in the region? Moreover, what of the change in Syrian foreign policy in
recent years? Is this shift connected to a profound foreign policy shift away from the Syrian
regime’s historical norm in ways that have compelled the Gulf countries to sever their historical
alliance with Damascus?
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In order to answer these questions in ways that can best explain this shift in policy, it is
best to begin with Saudi Arabia. This is because it is not only the first independent Gulf
monarchy, but it also a regional hegemon and the strongest partner of the United States in the
Middle East. F. Gregory Gause III argues that, like all states, Saudi foreign policy is inherently
realist- its aims are to protect the country from foreign influence and invasion, and to preserve
the Al Saud dynasty (Gause III 2014). It is crucial to note that these aims may be prioritized in
themselves- it is evident that Saudi Arabia has accepted a fairly high level of U.S. influence in
order to assure dynastic continuity and regime survival. However, like many of the Gulf
monarchies, Saudi foreign policy is rarely publicized, as Gause notes, “The pursuit of these goals
is rarely direct and clear-cut, because Saudi foreign policy must operate on various levels
simultaneously: international…Middle East regional level…Arabian Peninsula level” (Gause III
2014, 185-186). This layered diplomacy was partially discussed in the literature review. While
Saudi Arabia acts as the bridgehead for U.S. policy on one level, it must also balance regional
and peninsular policy on other levels. Consequently, examining the changing geopolitical
dynamics at the international, regional, and peninsula (i.e. Gulf) level as they have impacted the
decision making of the Gulf states as well as the regime in Syria can shed light on some of the
reasons behind the Gulf’s abandonment of Syria as a core historic ally.
Little doubt remains regarding the fact that Saudi Arabia’s decision making with respect
to both domestic and foreign policy is in great part rooted in the truth that the state is predicated
on a relatively particular form of Islamic legitimacy. Specifically, it is rooted in the Wahhabi
beliefs that helped place Ibn Saud in power. Such beliefs are modeled after the puritanical
preacher Mohammed Ibn Abd al Wahhab, who condemned Shi’a practices and beliefs. Thus,
Saudi’s very founding was intertwined with suspicion and in some cases outright hostility
towards Shi’ite communities (Potter 2013). This foundation proves to be problematic in the
foreign policy realm, as Saudi’s assertion of being the purist Islamic state often comes under
scrutiny due to its anti-Shi’ite foundations and Saudi citizens’ role in the 9/11 attacks. These
force Saudi leadership to utilize cautious measures in an effort to de-escalate pressure from both
international and domestic fronts. As mentioned previously, leaders often run the risk of
appearing as veering away from the true Islam to their populations and religious authorities,
which in turn could lead to a lack of domestic legitimacy that undermines their rule.
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In recent years, the most dangerous threats to Saudi rule appear in the form of Islamist
movements and rival economic-military powers. Iran poses a particular threat to Riyadh as the
major sponsor of Shia Islamist movements as well as enjoying a powerful military. Indeed, since
2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq no longer acts as a buffer to Iran and check on its
growing power. The Saudis view the rise of Iranian power in the region as both a conventional
balance of power threat as well as a profound ideological threat (Gause III 2014). In the context
of Iran’s increasing support of Levantine Shiite communities, notably Hizbollah and Assad’s
Alawite regime, the Saudis, and the Gulf as a whole, fear a growing alliance between Iran and
Gulf Shi’ites.
This is not the first time Saudi Arabia faced a transnational ideological threat. In the
midst of the Cold War, pan-Arabist movements threatened the legitimacy of the Al Saud
dynasty. The Saudis fought Arab socialist ideology with their own brand of Islamist identity
politics, and proceeded to depict these Arab nationalist movements as inherently communisthardly a stretch, as many did have their roots in Marxist ideology. This conflation was taken a
step further, and the Al Sauds claimed that since pan-Arab movements were communist, and as
communism is naturally atheist, then pan-Arabists were in actuality atheists. Understandably,
these claims were incredibly damaging, and the Saudis portrayed themselves as the holders of
Islam that were trying to resist a new atheist surge in the Middle East. While the influence of
ideology is often associated with constructivist assumptions, in this case Saudi Arabia utilized
ideological rhetoric for instrumentalist reasons, and more specifically, to fight transnational
ideological threats to its regime.
At the regional level, balancing and countering the Iranian threat has taken precedence
over Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with other Arab regimes. Iran is the only power that can compete
with Saudi Arabia in terms of economic, military, and demographic might. Within the Gulf, the
Saudis see themselves as the dominant hegemon, viewing the other monarchies as their natural
sphere of influence (Gause III 2014). Indeed, were it not for post-colonial British policy, the rest
of the Gulf very well may have been a part of Saudi Arabia. As the natural rival to Iran, Saudi
Arabia often depicts itself as the defender and unifier of the Gulf and its interests, though in
peaceful and less turbulent times the smaller monarchies typically attempt to distinguish
themselves from Saudi policy. A primary example of Saudi leadership was shown during the
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Arab Spring, when the Saudi military was sent into Bahrain in order to support its monarchical
ally and to quell any hopes of a popular Shi’ite protest (Gause III 2014).
Importantly, however, within the Gulf opposition and resistance to Saudi policy usually
comes from the small principality of Qatar. The state of Qatar is uniquely positioned to both
solidify and challenge Saudi hegemony in the Gulf. In terms of demographics, Qatar is both
blessed and cursed- its small and homogenous population allow for a great deal of regime
legitimacy, but it is restrictive in terms of military and hard power capacity. Militarily, Qatar
accepted U.S. protection and deferred to the global hegemon to provide its defense needs,
knowing it could not hope to win any potential confrontation with Iran or Saudi Arabia. This
minimalist military strategy is the polar opposite of its foreign policy aims, which are wideranging and ambitious. As Mehran Kamrava notes, “The Qatari state’s capacity is rooted in two
distinct yet complementary sources: massive revenues accrued from hydrocarbon exports…and
elite institutional cohesion, thus streamlining policymaking decisions and ensuring political and
diplomatic agility” (Kamrava 2014, 162). Knowing it has U.S. military protection; Qatar can
afford to devote its massive wealth through diplomacy and economic means, which are
unhindered due to the regime’s cohesion and unity.
The result is a hyperactive, maverick diplomacy that differs from its Gulf counterparts.
Qatar is the only monarchy to hold an official Israeli outpost, holds regular meetings with Iran
and Hamas, and openly supports Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatari policy
of ‘hedging’ contrasts with the Gulf monarchies policy of bandwagoning or balancing against the
Iranian threat. Ultimately, “hedging enables a state to simultaneously maintain close and
seemingly friendly relations with multiple actors, many of whom may be at odds with each
other” (Kamrava 2014, 167). Though Qatar is military tied to the U.S. and its interests, it still
chooses to routinely hedge in favor of conducting relations with Iran and Hamas. Such actions
stand in stark contrast to Saudi and other Gulf countries, all of whom preoccupy themselves with
deterring any threats from Iran.
Hedging among powerful and influential actors like the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia
allows the small state of Qatar to maintain good relations with all states, keep open lines of
communication with both sides, and allow for its significant wealth to influence all parties
(Kamrava 2014). Indeed, much of Qatar’s influence lies in two unconventional foreign policy
factors: Al Jazeera news outlet and the Qatar Investment Authority. Both of these project Qatari
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influence across the region, with Al Jazeera controlling what makes news headlines and the
narrative trajectory of events and the QIA dictating where and when states can receive Qatari
investments. Both of these tools are particularly powerful in the modern Middle East, where
economic aid and media hegemony are at their most important point in recent memory. These
tools greatly increase the distribution of power and its projection for Qatar and compensates for
its military weakness. Since Qatar, unlike Saudi Arabia, does not have to worry as much about
domestic threats due to its internal cohesion, it can thus pursue an aggressive foreign policy
without paying mind to popular sentiment or opposition groups.
Though Saudi Arabia and Qatar usually align and cooperate, the onset of the Arab Spring
brought with it a new round of tensions between the two monarchies. Qatar’s unequivocal
support for Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood broke with the rest of the Gulf, and their open support
of Morsi’s democratically elected regime caused Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Bahrain to
withdraw their ambassadors from Doha in March of 2014. It is likely that Qatar sought to
increase their influence in Egypt, and combined with over $400 million spent in support to
Ghaddafi opposition, it is clear that Qatar wanted to craft and shape a new order in North Africa
(Kamrava 2014). Qatar placing its bets and hedging in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood proved
to be a poor decision and continues to cause dissent from the other Gulf states. Furthermore,
Saudi and Qatari support for rebel groups in Syria also caused consternation between the two, as
they often funded rival militias and fought over influence in the Syrian opposition camp. A
realist battle in almost every way, this typifies the struggle for power projection and influence
that Qatar and Saudi Arabia fight for in the Middle East. This particular issue will be explored at
length at the end of this chapter.
After Hafez al Assad came to power in Syria in 1971, the Levantine state quickly gained
a reputation for being able to exert influence that perhaps outgained its actual power capabilities.
Assad was a classical realist, and viewed the world as, “A Machiavellian struggle for power,
where the strong do as they will and the weak accept what they must” (Hinnebusch 2014, 216).
Assad’s foreign policy matched his beliefs, as Syria attempted to expand and increase its power
in order to increase its regional aspirations. In addition to resorting to any means to ensure
regime survival, Hafez al Assad also diversified his allies in order to gain economic and military
support, as discussed at length in the introduction. With Soviet arms, Gulf economic aid, and
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Iranian support, Assad built a Syria that could afford to pursue aims such as recovery of the
Golan Heights.
For much of Syria’s post-independence history, the foreign policy of the successive
regimes in Damascus conform to Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory in that they have
pursued policies intent on balancing their own power against regional threats. This policy is
usually attributed to Syria’s vulnerable geopolitical location and unfavorable regional balance.
Indeed, since Syria shares borders with Turkey, Iraq, and Israel, it finds itself in a very
vulnerable geostrategic position in the complicated politics of the region. Bandwagoning could
lead to a potentially uneven relationship with certain powers, and leave Syria at the mercy of
other regional hegemons. As a result, both Hafez and his son and successor Bashar al Assad
aligned against threats to preserve their own power. Bashar inherited Syria at a time when
economic liberalization was key to preserving domestic legitimacy and regime survival. Doing
so greatly increased its standing with the West, but Bashar was still committed to his father’s
Arab nationalist legacy and realist outlook. Bashar, when faced with external threats such as
Israel or Iraq, quickly fell back on his father’s Machiavellian view of the world. Raymond
Hinnebusch states, “A deep-seated Syrian tradition when faced with external great power
demands is to reject, evade, or try to bargain over them; Bashar continued that tradition”
(Hinnebusch 2014, 219). This rings especially true in the case of the Arab Spring, where
Bashar’s regime refused to give the protesters any legitimacy through acknowledgement, and
demonstrated an iron will to do whatever it took to keep his power.
Thus, it is vital to understand the changing dynamics at both the international and
regional level in order to understand the origins and ramifications of the GCC’s decision to
support Bashar al Assad’s opposition. In the context of increasing threats from Iran as well as
energized Islamist movements in the region, both Qatar and Saudi Arabia recognize the new
threats posed by the policies of the Assad regime, which is engaged in policies primarily based
on regime survival. Therefore, devoting an extraordinary amount of resources to undermining
and removing such a regime means that its removal is not only wanted, but absolutely necessary
to Gulf interests, and that it is worth the losses that come with fighting against such a regime.
Few know Syrian foreign policy history better than the Gulf, who, as shown, has been
intertwined with both Assad regimes from the beginning. Being willing to take on Bashar’s
brand of regime-centered realism denotes realist ambitions from the Gulf, that Bashar’s removal
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would not only enhance the power distribution in favor of the Gulf, but also strengthen their own
self-survival statuses. Though Saudi Arabia is more concerned with the latter than Qatar, both
states see Bashar al Assad’s Alawite, Ba’athist regime as threatening to their own national
narratives and state interests.
Understanding Gulf-Syrian Alliances in the Pre-Conflict Era
Prior to the historic Arab uprisings that greatly influenced the shift in the geo-politics of
the Gulf and Middle East region, the long-standing Gulf-Syrian alliance built over decades was
already showing great strain. As the documents and cables of the time will clearly indicate, this
was evident with respect to the policy interests at the international, regional, and domestic levels.
Specifically, the increasingly precarious alliances between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis
their relations with Syria, and most importantly the threat of Iran, played a determinant role in
altering the foreign policies of the region.
From a neorealist perspective, it is critical to note a few consistent themes evident in the
documents. First, regime survival came foremost in the mind of Bashar al Assad, and he was
willing to reach out to whomever offered the best changes for self-survival. In the mid 2000s this
was Iran, but that quickly changed due to economic sanctions and the potential of war. As a
result, Assad shifted his gaze to the Gulf and defied Tehran, but only when the distribution of
power was in his favor. Similar to King Faisal in defiance of the U.S. during the 1973 war, Assad
turned his back on the Iranians when he had the leverage and capability to do so. Saudi Arabia,
also worried about regime survival, was terrified of expanding Iranian influence in the Levant,
and these fears only expanded when Tehran began cooperation with the Houthis in Yemen. As
seen in these documents, the only reason that Syria was brought back into the Gulf good graces
was to pry it away from the clutches of Iran. As the Bahraini royal put it, the ‘tentacles of the
Iranian octopus’ needed to be dismembered from the view of the Gulf. As of 2010, this
rapprochement was in full swing and the effort to isolate Iran was progressing quickly. The roles
of state security and self-survival feature prominently throughout the decision-making process.
For its part, the U.S. attempted to influence Syrian decision-making and actions, while
also trying to fully determine the direction Assad’s regime was headed towards. In a document
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entitled, “Influencing the SARG4 in the End of 2006”, an end of year assessment of the Syrian
government from a U.S. perspective, the author an influential American diplomat, listed Assad’s
areas of vulnerabilities and ways designed to exploit such weaknesses in favor of American
interests. Ultimately, the U.S. diplomat concluded that, “the bottom line is that Bashar is entering
the new year in a stronger position than he has been in several years, but those strengths also
carry with them, or sometimes mask, vulnerabilities” (06-5399) 5. The prevailing U.S.
assessment was that a small clique made up of Bashar al Assad and his inner circle effectively
ruled Syria, and this circle was prone to rash and emotional decisions. The diplomat also stated,
“We believe Bashar’s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to looming issues, both
perceived and real” (06-5399). Recalling the prevalence of perceptions in international relations
theory, its clear that Assad’s threat perception often drove his policies. One of these perceived
threats was Abdul Halim Khaddam, Hafez al Assad’s former vice president. Khaddam did not
agree with the dynastic transition in Syria, and was often critical of Bashar’s policies. The U.S.
wished to foment this perceived threat to Assad, and decided to encourage the Saudis to give
Khaddam media airtime to “air the SARG’s dirty laundry”, anticipating an overreaction and
emotional response from Assad (06-5399). It becomes clear that throughout this period that the
U.S. and its allies were scrambling to find ways to undermine Bashar’s rule. This is summed up
by a comment at the end of the referenced cable, “If we are ready to capitalize, they will offer us
opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep him off-balance, and make him pay a
premium for his mistakes” (06-5399).
The U.S. also wanted to play on Saudi’s fear of Iranian influence, and drew attention to
Shi’ite proselytization in heavily Sunni areas, and assessed that Saudi missionaries and religious
leaders were giving the matter increasing attention (06-5399). The U.S. sought to discourage
foreign investment from the Gulf into Syria, as Assad was attempting to secure as much
investment as possible to strengthen his weakening economy. The U.S was not the only state that
looked to influence and undermine the Assad regime. A month later in January of 2007, U.A.E.
foreign minister Mohammed bin Zayed commented to a U.S. diplomat that Assad is “very weak”
and that Syria has limited cards left to play (07-97). Even in this early period, the Gulf states saw
4 Syrian Arab Republic Government.
5 There is no uniform way to cite Wikileaks. Each cable has an ID number from the State Department or given to it by
Wikileaks. Cables from the U.S. appear with the first two digits representing its year and then ID number, such as 06-5399. For
Saudi cables, the first six digits of the Wikileaks’ ID documents will be used, such as 162cac.
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the weak state of Assad and collaborated with the U.S. to influence Syria. Those within Syria
also sought to limit the might of the regime. In discussing targeted economic sanctions to the
regime in 2006, the U.S. was approached by Sunni leaders, questioning why American sanctions
did not target powerful regime figures (06-686). Accordingly, the U.S. had to walk a fine line in
applying sanctions so as not to appear to be openly targeting Assad.
The efforts on the part of the U.S. to undermine the regime in Damascus were clearly
rooted in Washington’s concern over Syria’s relationship to Iran and its interventions in
neighboring Iraq. By the early months of 2007, the Assad regime was starting to feel the pinch of
economic and political measures, and began to lose control over its population and affairs. A
Syrian official admitted to the U.S. that, “the government, despite the Ba’ath party and security
services, does not have good control of the political processes at the grass-roots level. It can still
use force and coercion to get its way, but it is not very adept at using political methods” (07-22).
By way of the economic sanctions, rising opposition, and Sunni fears, Assad’s grip over his
populace was slowly weakening. Perhaps in an attempt to make amends with the U.S., Assad
asked his Iraqi counterpart, President Talabani, to relay to the U.S. that, “his policy was the same
policy of his father, Hafez al Assad” (07-229). Hafez, the quintessential realist, worked and
cooperated with the U.S. when necessary, and Bashar desperately wanted to project the same
willingness.
However, Bashar al Assad had already trapped himself in a quandary between his proArab rhetoric and Iranian alliances. After a bilateral Syria-Iran visit, the U.S. noted that, “The
SARG finds itself in an increasingly difficult position with the Arab (and Sunni) world as it tries
to proclaim ‘Arabness’ while appearing to be complicit in the expansion of Shiite and Iranian
power” (07-196). Assad’s attempt of playing off all sides, a common theme and a popular
strategy by realists, was digging him into a rhetorical hole that he was struggling to avoid. This
multi-faceted rhetoric received hostility from the Saudis, and outright dismissiveness from
another important regional power, Egypt (07-196). Combined with U.S. attempts to undermine
his hold on power, Bashar’s double talk did little to endear him to the Gulf states. During a
bilateral meeting with the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Bashar appeared to be “under pressure”, and
asked the Kuwaiti official to use his “good offices” to try and mediate with the Egyptians and
“especially the Saudis” (08-668). When the U.S. diplomat asked his Kuwaiti counterpart about
the priorities of Bashar al Assad, he promptly responded, “Regime survival” (08-668). It is likely
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that Assad realized his rhetoric and close ties with Iran had cost him his relationship and much
needed economic assistance, and was now seeking a rapprochement with the Gulf.
Though in previous decades Syria was able to build a strong alliance with the Gulf states,
by the mid-2000s it was clear that the Gulf countries were becoming increasingly apprehensive
and threatened by to emerging and related developments: the rise of Iran and its growing ties
with Syria. The policy of promoting such a rapprochement was not to come easy, as SyrianIranian ties had only grown under Bashar al Assad, much to the angst of the Gulf. Anti-Iranian
sentiment was increasing throughout the Arab world, and in the views of many, it drove foreign
policy decisions. As the 2006 end of year assessment made clear, “Bashar is walking a fine line
in his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking necessary support while not completely
alienating Syria’s moderate Sunni Arab neighbors” (06-5399). A dissenting Syrian official in
2007 noted that Iranian influence in Syria was greatly expanding in military cooperation,
planting great amounts of unease in some military and business circles (07-22). Iran also strove
to culturally influence Syria. Dr. Samir al Taqi, a Syrian advisor, claimed that Iranian efforts of a
‘Shia-ization’ of Syria were well underway, with Iranian funding being used to build Shi’ite
pilgrimage destinations, distributing tens of thousands of Shi’a cassettes and booklets, and
financing Shia mosque construction (07-128). This understandably caused great alarm “at all
levels of Syrian society”, but they were powerless to stop such an effort, as the Iranians were
even “spreading money around in poorer villages…in attempts to encourage the conversion of
Sunnis to the Shia faith” (07-128).
These efforts of a Shia-ization and expanding Iranian influence greatly worried the Gulf
powers. In a Bahrain-U.S. bilateral meeting, Bahraini crown prince Sheikh Salman claimed that
the Iranians are “outside the box” and have gone too far (07-7). He suggested a joint military
exercise in the Persian Gulf as a deterrent, a first step in an effort of, “Cutting the tentacles of the
Iranian octopus” (07-07). No doubt worried the same influence that was taking hold in poor
Syrian villages could take hold in Bahrain’s large Shia population, the crown prince needed
assurances from the U.S. that precautions would be taken. Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon
Abdulaziz Khoja accused Iran of “destroying” the political situation in Arab countries (09-139).
Worry in the U.S. camp also grew, as Assad was increasingly content to let extremist fighters
cross the Syria border into Iraq unchecked, in addition to the Iranian influence that began to
restrain U.S. efforts in the midst of their military surge. For their part, the Iranians felt compelled
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to address U.S. accusations of Iranian-backed militias attacking U.S. troops in Iraq. In a meeting
with Iraqi president Talabani, General Qassem Soleimani of Iran reportedly said, “I swear on the
grave of Khomeini I haven’t authorized a bullet against the U.S.” (07-229). As anti-Iranian
sentiment grew, questions on how to deal with Syria also arose, and a strategy was quickly put
together by the Gulf monarchies: it would try to bring back Syria into the Arab fold in order to
limit Iranian influence.
Surprisingly, the idea seemed to find its genesis in an unlikely medium: Hizbollah. The
Iranian-backed military organization originally suggested the idea to Saudi Arabia in an effort to
decrease tensions in Lebanon in 2007, but the Saudis did not regard it as a serious proposition
and told the Lebanese to, “work out their problems on their own” (07-1). Though they may have
caught wind of the idea, or perhaps more likely developed the idea on their own, the Qataris
confided that they too thought a rapprochement was necessary. In a meeting between U.S.
Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin al Thani, the latter “stressed
the importance of wresting Syria away from the Iranian camp…and believed that Syria’s
attachment to Iran resulted from a sense of isolation and belief that it was a target of regime
change” (07-1042). As a result of these real or perceived slights, Bashar thus turned to Iran, and
the Qataris felt that the Gulf and the U.S. needed to give Syria a reason to return back to the Arab
fold. Here again, the rhetoric of prying an Arab ally from the influence of Iran dominates the
political thinking and planning. Kuwait quickly adopted this approach as well, eager to see Syria
return as a partner and to limit Iranian power projection. In a meeting between the U.S.
ambassador and a prominent Kuwaiti MP in 2008, the latter believed economic investment to be
the main reason behind Syrian-Iranian relations. As a result, Kuwait felt that “it would not be
impossible to separate him (Assad) from the Iranians…a large package of assistance from the
West could encourage Syria to move away from its alliance with Iran” (08-937). Were the U.S.
and the Gulf to put together a lucrative investment and economic package, it was believed that
Syria could be brought back.
As noted in the introduction, there was certainly historical precedence to this moveHafez al Assad often leveraged Syrian alliances and power in return for badly needed economic
aid. Given the global recession that was beginning to hurt the region, the Syrian economy was in
dire need of any investment possible. The Gulf and the U.S. saw this as an opportunity,
particularly since economic sanctions did not provide Iran with enough capital to sufficiently
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support Syria. The Saudis soon adopted the plan, and in early 2009 Saudi officials informed the
U.S. that, “King Abdullah’s outreach to Syrian President Bashar Assad was necessary to limit
Iran’s influence in the Arab world…Saudi Arabia was anxious to have the Arab countries present
a united front at the next Arab League summit” (09-139). Though Saudi still “does not trust
Assad”, it saw rapprochement as the only way to keep Iranian influence out of the Arab world
(09-139). As Gulf overtures were made to Damascus, King Abdullah met privately with Bashar
al Assad in October of 2009. Few official statements from the meeting were released, but
common ground was found on various issues, particularly Lebanon (09-1507).
Tehran increased its anti-Saudi rhetoric as a result of this process, and general SaudiIranian tensions quickly escalated in late 2009. Iranian meddling in Yemen made the Saudis
furious, who historically regarded Yemen as part of its sphere of influence. Their support of the
Houthis gave credence to Gulf fears that Iran was attempting to expand its influence in the
peninsula, and GCC statements from this period proved that, “The Saudis have been able to
convince other countries in the region to share their greater-than-usual sense of unease” (091507). As the U.S. diplomat noted, Iran has historically been a Saudi scapegoat for regional
problems, but now the latter had actual proof in the cases of Syria and Yemen, and whipped up
anti-Iran rhetoric in international channels like the GCC.
Iranian leaders acted quickly to try to ensure it still could count Assad in its back pocket,
but economic sanctions had left it with little leverage or bargaining power. Only a few weeks
after King Abdullah traveled to Damascus, Iranian officials paid three successive visits to Assad
in order to reaffirm security ties and bilateral cooperation. The meetings did not go well for
Tehran, as “Assad reportedly resisted Iranian arguments for closer bilateral coordination…and
flatly rejected being drawn into a war between Iran and Israel” (09-880). Syrian officials even
complained that the Iranians were “too needy”, and sensed a growing panic on the part of Tehran
concerning the renewed Saudi-Syrian relations, making Iran “jealous” (09-880). Already facing
anti-regime protests in 2009, the Iranians were quickly losing steam in terms of regional
influence, balanced by a Gulf-U.S. détente that was quickly reeling Syria back into the Arab
fold. Initially, Washington was reluctant to be included in the plan, as Syria and Iran were
becoming increasing headaches to U.S. efforts in Iraq. During a meeting between the U.S.
ambassador and a Saudi official from the foreign ministry, the latter tried to shed some light on
Gulf thinking. The plan, according to Prince Torki al Khabeer, was part of a strategy of
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“squeezing Iran”, and claimed that, “isolating Syria will only benefit Iran” (09-684). The Saudis
believed that renewed relations would “contain the Iranian threat”. At a contentious point in the
bilateral meeting, Prince Torki asked, “How else can we reduce Iran’s influence?” (09-684). It is
clear that for the Saudis, addressing the Iranian threat was the top priority, forcing a
rapprochement that would not normally be needed or wanted. After the meeting, a U.S. diplomat
commented, “Torki’s most recent comments show that fear of Iran remains the driving factor
behind most Saudi foreign policy decisions” (09-684).
As far back as 2006, Bashar al Assad called on Saudi businessmen to invest in Syria,
recognizing the country’s desperate need for economic aid (06-1515). Their situation would only
worsen as the years went on, and 2008 showed just how bad things had gotten in Damascus:
Assad even asked Iraq, in the midst of a war and political upheaval, for aid and investment. A
cable from Damascus states, “In need of private investment to fuel economic growth, Syria
wants both increased investments from Iraq” (08-420). Once the Gulf began to woo Syria away
from Iran, the investment and aid was turned back on- the Kuwait Investment Authority
promptly traveled to Syria do discuss a new round of mass investment in June of 2008 (08-656).
During King Abdullah’s visit with Assad in 2009, the two states agreed on a number of new
investment and cooperation ties. Agreements in the areas of tax evasion policy, banking,
insurance, and tariffs were all made during this trip (09-684).
Though a large reason Assad agreed to befriend the Gulf once again was due to economic
reasons, his regime became increasingly uneasy at the prospect of Iranian military action in the
Levant, particularly when it came to war with Israel. In fact, Syria made secret agreements with
Qatar and Turkey in the event of an Iran-Israel war. A Syrian official confided, “We expect to
wake up one morning soon and learn the Israeli strike took place. Then we expect an Iranian
response. At that point, we, Turkey, and Qatar will spring into action to begin moderating a
ceasefire” (09-880). Assad could simply not afford to openly support Iran in such a situation,
knowing that as a hostile neighboring state, Syria would receive its share of wartime damage. It
would also have the potential to irrevocably destroy relations with the U.S., a needed relationship
if economic agreements with other countries were to be secured. Being dragged into a war would
also not be a popular act with most Syrians, and Assad needed to boost his domestic image
quickly to address any potential threats. Though Russia recently agreed to provide some
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defensive weapons to Syria, it refused to transfer offensive weapons to Assad, another move that
made any prospects of war seem dim (07-133).
It is clear that the U.S. and various Gulf allies intended to undermine the Assad regime
from the beginning of 2006, but once the level of Iranian influence in the region was seen, plans
quickly changed. Saudi Arabia in particular saw rapprochement with Syria as the only way to
counter Iranian gains, and the Gulf states quickly capitalized on Assad’s need for economic aid
to woo the Syrians back into the Arab fold. Desperately trying to secure their ties with Syria,
Iranian leaders made attempts to reinforce cooperation, but were left empty-handed when Assad
weighed the consequences. As a result, Iranian relations with Syria were badly damaged and
economic aid from the Gulf flowed once again to Damascus.
Examining the Shift in the Gulf-Syria Policy After the Arab Uprisings
It was clear through the documents and cables that none of the leaders foresaw the Arab
Spring, an event that would fundamentally change regional dynamics, agreements, and alliances.
As mentioned, the Syria-Gulf relationship was only growing until the start of the uprisings.
Interestingly, the U.S. State Department cables end in early 2010, and the earliest Saudi cables
are from late 2011, leaving out a few crucial months. However, it is possible to piece together
theories on what exactly went wrong in the Syria rapprochement plan. As seen in the previous
section, the U.S. and its Gulf allies were searching for ways to undermine the regime in
Damascus, and since popular uprisings put Assad in jeopardy, it is possible that they decided to
finally take their chance. Popular Sunni support for the Arab Spring allowed the Gulf to envision
a Sunni led, anti-Tehran Syria. Perhaps the reprehensible and atrocious acts committed by Assad
against his own citizens convinced the Gulf that he was ruling on borrowed time, or that he
simply needed to be removed. Instead of conjecturing further, I will turn to the conflict-era
documents, as they ideally will elucidate this question and give further insights into the process
of dismantling the historical relationship between Assad and the Gulf. The process of funding
and arming Syrian opposition will also be examined in this section, with particular attention paid
to the growing Saudi-Qatar rift.
First, it is worthy of note that Saudi Arabia devoted enormous resources to control media
outlets and rhetoric during the Arab Spring. The Kingdom was worried about two main actors:
Egypt and Iran. The former caused great concern to the Saudis, as the prospect of a
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democratically elected Islamist party like the Muslim Brotherhood posed a serious threat to its
domestic legitimacy. Iran attempted to play the part of instigator, fanning the flames of Islamist
revolution and urging others to follow its own model. As a result, the Saudis turned to buying off
or shutting down entire media outlets. As expressed in an internal Saudi Ministry of Foreign
Affairs document, the Saudis identified certain channels that portrayed the Kingdom in an
unfavorable light, and quickly moved to silence them. An undated document states that the
Egyptian channel “ONTV LIVE is against the kingdom…the motives and circumstances behind
this matter can be dealt with” (C3faae). The Saudis were also concerned at the development of
an Egyptian media discourse that pitted them as acting against the revolution. A 2012 document
reads, “With regard to the Egyptian media position after the January revolution…it can be read
from the youth of the revolution…and others that have adopted positions against the Kingdom”
(1e9ea8). In addition to being accused of attempts to quash the revolution, the Saudis were also
deemed to be supporting the various Salafist movements that began to emerge in the revolution
(1e9ea8).
The Saudis also moved to silence Iranian outlets, as well unfavorable Saudi media.
Originally, Saudi officials simply wanted to “correct the image” that a particular Iranian-linked
channel was projecting into the kingdom (8a7656). However, as the “disputed frequencies”
caused more problems in 2012, Saud al Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, ordered requested the
Minister of Communication to find the “use of rich ways to reduce Iranian broadcasting power”
(91a11a). Doubtless concerned at the potential such Iranian rhetoric could have on its domestic
population at the height of the Arab Spring, Saudi officials moved to silence them- but it may
have been too late, as Saudi media seemed to be affected as well. In a cable written by Foreign
Minister Faisal, he described, “articles of Saudi books and others published by some Saudi
newspapers dealt with in a negative state”, and as a result he considered “that it may be
appropriate to stop such writings that do not serve the objectives of the Kingdom” (C6792e). It is
clear that by attempting to control their image in both domestic and international media, the
Saudis sought to eliminate any possibility of the Arab Spring being exported to the peninsula.
High priority was placed to ensure domestic stability, as it would not be able to act abroad while
trouble brewed at home. This possibility became quite real when Saudi’s neighbors, Bahrain,
experienced mass upheaval.
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As the security situation in Syria began to crumble in 2011, the GCC took an immediate
notice and was determined to produce a prompt response. The member states met on August 6,
2011 to discuss and summarize general feelings on the conflict. They expressed “grave
concern…at the continuing deterioration of the security situation in Syria”, describing
“increasing acts of violence and excessive use of force” (26e6f2). Continuing, the GCC
expressed “regret and sorrow of the continuation of the bloodshed in Syria…and calls for the
immediate cessation of violence and…to make serious and necessary reforms” (26e6f2). Clearly
even at this early stage, the GCC was turning against the Assad regime, as exhibited by their
robust accusations of excessive violence and calls for comprehensive reforms. Though it did not
specify what such reforms who look like, or more importantly who they would involve, the GCC
exhorted the need of “resorting to wisdom” and derided the “large-scale military operations”
(26e6f2). The GCC even singled out Bashar al Assad and his family’s dynastic rule, calling it
“domination of power in Syria” and implied solidarity with the U.S. and France in considering
“further steps to pressure Assad” (26e6f2). Seeing Western powers quickly align against Assad
likely helped the GCC’s decision to counter the regime. It should also be noted that the U.S.
always seemed to prefer alignment against Assad, rather than rapprochement, as seen in the preconflict era documents.
The Saudis began efforts to mediate an agreement for reforms to take place with the
Assad regime, but their efforts produced little fruit. In 2012 King Abdullah met a Syrian envoy
headed by Lakhdar Brahimi. A document within the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes
the Saudi view of the conflict and the result of the meetings. The Saudis believed Assad used
aggression which exceeded “physical and human principles”, and that the “Syrian people are
suffering from the crisis” (8eb229). However, the meetings did not go as planned, and offers of a
solution were dismissed and put off by the Assad regime, as “Brahimi has not yet received a
response from the Syrian regime” (8eb229). Following this, the Arab League asked the United
Nations Security Council “to provide the Syrian officials to international trial” (8eb229). The
break from Assad looked to be in full momentum by 2012, with Arab states calling for Assad to
step down and for regime members to be brought to trial in international courts. In internal
memos circulated in 2012, the Saudi regime appeared to be considering military intervention in
cohesion with the United States, but were limited by political considerations in Washington.
Saud al Faisal, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, writes, “Concrete overthrow of the current
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regime in Syria may be linked to the United States by two factors: The first is…the negative
impact on the upcoming presidential elections in the United States…the second is to give priority
to dealing with the Iranian issue and the subject of Syria postponed to a later stage” (25e9cd).
Since the Saudis could not count on the Obama administration given its aversion to military
intervention and pre-occupation with nuclear talks with Tehran, the Saudis took matters into their
own hands. Faisal claimed that “coordination with Turkey is very important”, and believed it to
be “important to intensify out contacts with the Syrian opposition and urge them to unite and
coordinate” (25e9cd).
The Saudis began to increase their domestic anti-Assad rhetoric, with one internal memo
written in March 2012 claiming, “Syria is witnessing a historic crisis” (18ddb7). The shift to an
anti-Assad policy was complete, and Saudi Arabia began to expand its influence in any way
possible- even taking in Syrian religious clerics that were facing persecution and giving them
Saudi passports (0a6f8b). However, Saudi ambitions were initially checked by a familiar ally and
an old foe- the UAE and Iran. In 2012 Saud al Faisal fumes in a document that the Emiratis do
not support military intervention, and subsequently blames Iran as a result. He states, “UAE is
negotiating with Iran…not to take sides against the regime in Syria, and does not recognize the
subject of military intervention in exchange for no stress with Iran” (Bdd747). Faisal blames this
on a territorial dispute between the UAE and Iran concerning islands in the Persian Gulf, and in
order to end the dispute and avoid a confrontation with Iran, the UAE agreed to not support any
anti-Assad military action (Bdd747).
Saudi ambitions also met Turkish resistance, a partner that Riyadh had clearly counted on
helping the anti-Assad operation in lieu of U.S. and French non-commitment. However, Saudi
intelligence from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals significant backlash from
Turkey concerning any Turkish involvement in Syria. A leaked cable describes Turkish
discomfort at being drawn into Syria and disagreement with Arab League stances, and one
official said, “We want an Arab solution to the Syrian crisis” (609139). Officials questioned
Turkish gain in military involvement, asking, “Why should I do this work on my own and what
is the price?” (609139). Clearly, Turkey felt that it was planned to be used by the Arab League to
do the heavy lifting in overthrowing Assad. Turkish officials offered that if an agreement could
be found on the right price, plan, and the guarantee of Arab states’ support, it would consider
involvement; but as of then it remained lukewarm on the idea. Another possible partner, Jordan,
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also expressed concern about Gulf plans for Syria. The Jordanians were worried about the
possibility of Saudi and Qatari backed opposition threatening the stability of the Hashemite
Kingdom, and asked for greater communication to ensure such threats did not materialize
(A9f31e). Bahrain also offered resistance, though the Saudis were quick to reprimand the small
island kingdom, chastising Bahrain for “not standing with the Syrian people” (9b7391).
Thus, it seemed that Saudi Arabia and Qatar were left to their own devices in both
identifying Syrian opposition and providing them with weapons and funds. Even in the early
days of the conflict, Saudi contact with Free Syrian Army officials was close. Saud al Faisal
speaks that the Saudi ambassador in Lebanon “Received a call from the Office for the
Coordination of Colonel Riad al Asaad Qand of the FSA” and that Saudi hoped to “send an
envoy to meet him in Turkey” (A6f5b2). Colonel Qand of the Free Syrian Army quickly
developed as a go-between for Syrian opposition and the Saudis, and wrote a letter to Saudi
officials which conveyed “the risks to the cities of Homs and Rasta…they are in dire need of
urgent support” and complained of the “lack of possibilities of gear and armament” (162cac).
The FSA gave the Saudis specific and geographical areas where they could lend support,
exhibiting the high level of cooperation even in the conflict’s earliest days. A formal request
came on February 12, 2012, asking the Saudis and Qataris to “provide material support,
weapons, and training to the Free Syrian Army” (0867d4). Another communiqué from Saudi
Arabia showed that Syrian opposition also requested “from Qatar to provide material support,
weapons, and training of the cadres of the Free Syrian Army” (E8b01c). Curiously, this
document also claims the author already underwent training in Qatar, possibly signaling that
Qatar was supporting Syrian opposition before 2012, likely in the late months of 2011.
Saudi support was also economic in nature- a document from 2013 speaks of a Saudi
deposit totaling “an amount of ten million dollars…to support our brothers in Syria” (070bd5).
The same cable also speaks of setting up a “donors conference” that included Kuwait, calling for
actors to contribute in order to put an end to the bloodshed and violence (070bd5). Interestingly,
many donors gave money along tribal lines, and those in Syria that claimed kinship with Saudis
received the bulk of economic assistance- over $150M was raised in 2012 during Ramadan alone
(Robertson 2012). Due to the arbitrarily drawn borders made back in 1916, thousands of Saudis,
Kuwaitis, and Qataris share tribal ties with Syrians (Robertson 2012). Weaponry also continued
to flow in 2013, with one cable describing a shipment of four hundred Kalashnikov submachine
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guns to the FSA (6a4564). However, as in the lead up to arming Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia
and Qatar encountered angst and opposition from other regional states. Lebanon in particular was
upset that it was being used as a channel to funnel arms to rebels. An undated document
describes a failed shipment: “The Lebanese authorities stopped a ship laden with heavy
weapons…warning that this is the third ship loaded with arms to those armed groups” (029136).
The Lebanese, specifically elements or friends of Hezbollah, likely would have tipped off the
Assad regime that such shipments were headed for Syrian soil.
Unsurprisingly, the Assad regime was upset at the Saudi response to the uprisings and its
support of opposition, and it planned to fight back. A well placed Hezbollah source claimed that,
“Syria was upset by the Kingdom’s position and would respond by targeting internal security
through the recruitment of terrorist elements, some of them Saudis” (0a2332). What form or
level of operational capacity these terrorists would have is unclear, but it demonstrates the
willingness of Assad to try to undermine Saudi efforts. The Gulf also began to experience a
struggle for influence over the very opposition it was supporting. Once again, Iran sought to
interfere and ensure that the opposition did not pose an existential threat to Assad. A Saudi cable
from 2012 shows the worry it had when a delegation from Syrian opposition met with Iranian
officials in Tehran. According to their sources, the two parties agreed to a number of
stipulations- “the establishment of a pluralistic system…stop armed clashes and not to introduce
weapons, and preventing the use of economic pressure on the Syrian government, that the
opposition abroad and cooperation with the outside world is not in favor of Syria” (E27171).
Though the Saudis were understandably concerned, it is likely that they still had the upper hand
in dealing with Syrian opposition, as their goals more closely aligned with them than the
Iranians.
Saudi-Qatari Rivalry and Present-day Support
Though Saudi Arabia understandably considered Iran and the Assad regime as its primary
enemies, it soon had to regard Doha as a rival, even if it too wanted to topple Assad. Rifts began
appearing almost as soon as the two Gulf states stated their intent to back Syrian opposition.
Initially, it seemed that Qatar did not want to participate in the process, much less accept the
primary role of backing Syrian opposition. In 2013, Qatari Prime Minister bin Jassim lamented,
“We didn’t want to take the lead. We begged a lot of countries to start to take the lead and we’ll
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be in the back seat. But we found ourselves in the font seat” (Khalaf 2013). While this suggests
that Saudi backing came late, the Wikileaks documents reveal both states had heavy hands in the
supplying of arms in early 2012. In fact, it was in this early period that Qatar began to not only
ramp up support, but to also break from Saudi policies. First, reports indicate Qatar used their
extensive Muslim Brotherhood contacts, considered a terrorist organization by Riyadh, to
identify and seek out potential rebel groups in Syria (Khalaf 2013). Not only did the Saudis
disapprove of such a selection, it would also mean the implementation of a definitive Islamist
flavor to the opposition, a prospect that likely worried the Saudis.
Due to their outsourcing of military protection to the United States, Qatar did not have
the weaponry surplus or might to provide backing immediately. As early 2012 transitioned from
nonviolent protests to armed opposition, Qatari officials began the search for extra arms- buying
up substantial amounts leftover in Libya and in Eastern Europe, then flying them to Turkey
where intelligence services delivered the weapons across the border (Khalaf 2013). Between
April 2012 and March 2012, over seventy military cargo flights from Qatar landed in Turkey,
signaling a huge increase in involvement and investment into Syrian opposition (Khalaf 2013).
Reports also suggested that with the help of the CIA, Turkey set up a secret base to direct
military and communications aid from Saudi Arabia and Qatar (ISW 2013). By 2013, Qatari
spending on opposition was estimated to reach three billion dollars, going to Doha-linked rebel
groups such as the Ahfad al Rasoul brigade and Liwaa al Tawhid, a coalition based in Aleppo,
notably near the Turkish border (Khalaf 2013).
Though the Saudis ultimately swallowed their discontent at the process by which Qatar
identified potential arms recipients, the relationship began to sour further in late 2012. Simple
logistics and the complex nature of the conflict required a high level of cooperation between
Doha and Riyadh, but such cooperation quickly gave way to rivalry. Saudi and Qatari officials
agreed to unite support behind the Join Command, but the Saudis were quick to accuse the
Qataris of stacking the structure of the command in order to have more influence over decisions
(ISW 2013). This crucial disagreement lend to the unraveling of coordinated support. Elizabeth
O’Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War states, “This perception prevented Saudi and Qatari
sponsors from uniting their support behind the Joint Command, instead leading them to select
individual allies from inside and outside the organization” (ISW 2013). Fragmentation of the
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rebels ensued, coalescing around certain individuals favored by either Doha or Riyadh, causing
an uneven distribution of arms and leading to a distinct lack of organization.
In response to perceived Qatari domination, Saudi officials took over a wing of the Joint
Command that held control over coordination, and quickly appointed Saudi-friendly leaders,
greatly angering rebel leaders who protested that they should be able to choose their own
commanders, regardless of Gulf backing (ISW 2013). As shown, not only were groups becoming
fragmented, more and more of the opposition were given leaders they did not want and refused
to support- all due to the Saudi-Qatari rivalry. To respond to the Saudi initiative to appoint their
own leaders, Qatari officials called a meeting of prominent rebel commanders in Doha to regain
control and influence. Those who attended were promised up front monetary deposits and
increases in weaponry, but Saudi officials got wind of the meeting and attempted to hijack it- not
surprisingly by offering money to commanders to stay in Syria (ISW 2013). Not only was this
system of patron rivalry inefficient for providing the support the opposition needed, it also
supported and instigated the appearance of scattered groups led by individual warlords. Saudi
Arabia and Qatar came to a begrudging embrace in 2013, setting up the Supreme Military
Council, a structure birthed out of the merging of the Qatari-designed Joint Command and
another Saudi organization, the Five Front Command (ISW 2013). However, the SMC did not
solve the woes that dogged Syrian opposition, who complained that support after the merger was
even worse and less consistent.
The lines between various groups deemed moderate and those deemed extremists became
increasingly blurred as the conflict continued, and allegations continued to follow Doha officials
about their reported backing of militant Islamists. Given the disorganization and lack of unity
discussed above, it is logical to assume that many groups did not have the full manpower to have
full operational capabilities on their own- often relying on support from other groups during an
assault. Indeed, even the Free Syrian Army did so: “If the FSA needed hardened men for an
assault, they would turn to the suicide bombers of Nusra” (Ignatius 2015). Not only did extremist
groups like the Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra provide support and collaboration on assaults
against the regime, the fighters in groups like al Nusra had more military experience than those
in moderate groups. When asked if the FSA fought with al Nusra, an FSA commander promptly
responded, “Of course, they’re the best fighters” (Ignatius 2015).
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This posed a significant problem for Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as their funding and arms
inevitably made its way into the hands of extremist groups, and whether it was intentional or not,
the ambiguous nature of the collaborating groups made such a result a foregone conclusion.
Qatari officials, already maligned for their purported support of al Nusra and close ties with the
Muslim Brotherhood, confided that they believed al Nusra could be split into several factions
that can be supported by Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi- as long as they reject terrorist operations
(Ignatius 2015). This report was confirmed by prominent jihadist sources affiliated to al Nusra in
March of 2015, with the proposed plan of breaking al Nusra off from al Qaeda and forming a
new entity with several other groups, with the main goal of fighting ISIS instead of Assad
(Karouny 2015). The new entity would be heavily backed by the Gulf states, especially Qatar,
who were reportedly in contact with al Nusra’s leader, Abu Julani, in an effort to entice them to
the bargaining table with promises of massive funding (Karouny 2015). This would allow Qatar
to openly fund al Nusra, likely putting Western powers on alert due to its designation as a
terrorist organization, a label unlikely to change even if the reported plan went through.
Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar constantly fought to control and shape the opposition,
neither to much success due to the difficulties in collaboration and fragmentation that ensued as a
consequence. To a certain extent, the infighting was understandable: Saudi feared Qatari-backed
opposition, as it undoubtedly had close ties with Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood,
Ahrar al Sham, and of course al Nusra. Were Qatari backed opposition to take down Assad, the
new regime would undoubtedly be stocked with Islamists, a prospect that made Saudi queasy
because it would not only pose a threat to domestic Saudi legitimacy, but it would also owe its
loyalty to Qatar. Saudi success in Syria would doom Qatar to playing the regional second fiddle
once more, containing its diplomatic and wealth outbreak to limited influence.
However, some of the infighting became a moot point when Russia became involved in
the fall of 2015. As a result, “Saudi Arabia has indicated in recent weeks that support to the
Syrian opposition would intensify in the face of increased Iranian and Russian backing for
Assad” (Perry 2015). Saudi officials committed to massive increases in funding for the rebels,
providing them with large amounts of lethal weaponry to the FSA and other groups (Gardner
2015). These included anti-tank TOW missiles, but the Saudis notably declined to send antiaircraft systems to counter Russian bombing of rebel groups (Perry 2015). Regardless, the Saudis
felt the need to respond and balance against the Russians and Iranians, taking the lead in
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supporting the opposition in manners far more intense than what was previously given. One rebel
source stated, “Saudi is in a state of madness, escalating to the greatest degree” (Perry 2015).
This rampant escalation of arms, funding, and overall involvement is a far cry from just years
earlier, when King Abdullah visited Bashar al Assad to bring him back into the Arab fold. A few
years later a new king reigns in Riyadh while a civil war rages on in Syria, and Saudi Arabia and
Qatar find themselves at the forefront of the anti-Assad coalition. Billions of dollars, countless
arms, and untold amounts of political capital have been spent by the Gulf states to oust Assad,
with little progress made as the conflict continues unabated in its fourth and fifth years of
existence.
Conclusion: An Assessment and Evaluation of Neorealist Motives
Applying neorealist theory as a lens to the research question provides a powerful but not
complete explanation of why the GCC decided to arm Syrian opposition. It is clear that many of
the major tenets of realist theory can be seen in the historical relationship between Syria, the
Gulf, and Iran. According to neorealist theory, the international system is dictated by security
concerns that are in turn constrained by the distribution of power (Mabon 2013). Power
distribution varies greatly among states, yielding both security dilemmas and behavioral
constraints. These security concerns are dominated by the need and prioritization of self-survival,
and is a recurring theme in this case study. When asked what he thought Bashar al Assad’s
primary motivations were, a Kuwaiti official quickly responded, “regime survival”. This
response typifies the majority of actions and diplomatic maneuvers covered in the sections
above. Manifested in various forms, regime survival was consistently the primary motivation for
state action. Saudi Arabia attempted to silence and bought off media outlets in exchange for
domestic stability. Syria allowed itself to be wooed by both Iran and the Gulf in exchange for
economic support, paramount in keeping a hold on its power.
Regime survival is also heavily intertwined with threats, whether they are perceived or
real. As both Waltz and Schweller theorize, states tend to balance against threats in order to
preserve their own security and maximize their power gains (Schweller 1997, Waltz 1979).
Within this case study, the origin of the threat to the Gulf is Iran, which posed a serious
challenge to Saudi and Qatari hegemony in the region. To align against the threat, an interstate
alliance was formed with Syria, supporting Walt’s theory that alliances naturally form in
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response to mutual threats (Walt 1989). By bringing Assad back into the Arab fold, the Gulf took
away a valuable ally of Tehran, presenting a united Arab front to counter the Iranian threat to
Sunni Arab rule. Some threats, while they may eventually be real, are primarily based on
perception. This could be seen in the U.S. assessment in 2006 of the Assad regime, where it was
noted that he and his small clique of elites were prone to seeing imaginary threats and responding
with emotional overreactions. Though the actions themselves were real, the fury that the
‘Shia’ization’ of Syria caused in the Gulf was also a perception- though Iran certainly has
influential power, the odds that masses of Sunni Arabs were converting to Shi’ism were slim, but
due to Iran’s identity and threat perception, it was deemed as a crisis in the Sunni Gulf.
Identity would prove to play a major role throughout this study. As Hinnebusch
theorized, perceptions of actors are rooted in state identities. Iran’s consistent portrayal as a
threat and historical precedence of a ‘rogue’ actor constantly pitted it against the actors in the
Gulf. Syria’s identity is more complex and fluid, as both Assad regimes were willing to work
with various actors in order to ensure regime survival- from Russia and Iran to Saudi Arabia and
the U.S. This fluid and opportunist identity played a major role in the belief the Gulf states held
that Syria could be pried away from Iran for the right price. As Assad had built an identity and
perception based off of regime survival, Syria remained an actor whose identity was solely about
power maximization. Were Syria more powerful or the Assad regime’s grip on the populace
more stable, it would not have had to pander for assistance, and could afford to develop a more
consistent identity rooted in more stable alliances. However, this was not the case, and history
shows the willingness Assad had to eschew longtime allies in favor of a better deal. This seeking
to maximize power and ensure security is close to the very definition of realism.
Power maximization can also be seen in the actions of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two states
who hold a favorable distribution of power due to their economic might and military security.
Qatar’s recent trend of hyperactive and maverick diplomacy, along with heavy regional
investment, portray a stable state that is attempting to influence and increase the balance of
power in their favor. Getting its hands dirty by playing a major role in the toppling of Ghaddafi
in Libya, Qatar showed it was willing to use its economic might and diplomacy to shift as much
power and influence to Doha as possible. This only continued with the arming of Syrian
opposition, with Qatar taking the initial lead and enjoying a heavy influence on the rebels. With
other states hurting by the 2008 global recession and reeling from the Arab Spring, Qatar found
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itself with perhaps the greatest amount of relative power-for-size in the region, and they did not
rest on it- rather, they attempted to enhance their gains by accruing influence and power at
vulnerable moments in the region.
Saudi Arabia’s actions were similar to Qatar’s, though they were more rooted in
countering the Iranian threat. As Qatar simply could not hope to outlast Iran in a theoretical war,
which partly explains their low-level relations with Tehran, for Saudi the stakes are higher. Their
regional hegemony, economic prowess, and influence are being challenged by an Islamist regime
that does not hesitate to criticize Riyadh. As U.S. diplomats noted, the primary motivation
behind Saudi state behavior was acting on its fear of Iran. By attempting to pry Syria away from
Iran, Saudi hoped to complete the Arab rejection of Iranian influence and break the quickly
forming Shi’a crescent that stretched from the Levant to Iran. By wooing Assad, Saudi could
take away Iran’s closest Arab ally, leaving it isolated and with few regional friends. The effect of
Iranian support of the Houthis cannot be underestimated as well. With Iran supporting a Shi’a
proxy on its southern border, Saudi became understandably worried that the ‘Shia’ization’ that
Iran tried in Syria was being exported to the Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s own Shi’a minorities also
represented a dangerous opportunity for Iranian expansion into the Kingdom. The Kingdom
raised alarm amongst the GCC accordingly, whipping up anti-Tehran rhetoric in a bid to restrain
Iranian influence and counter the threat that was hydra-like in nature.
Thus, the Arab Spring had a profound impact and far-reaching ramifications on regional
threats, identities, and role of regime survival. To dislodge and change identities and threats built
on decades of historical precedence took a historical event, and the Arab Spring was just that: a
series of uprisings that realized every regime fear- the domestic population overthrowing a
government. Mainstay rulers fell, from Ben Ali in Tunisia to Mubarak in Egypt, and it quickly
spread to Syria, whose population had been oppressed for decades under the Assads. Saudi
Arabia, fearing its borders were not immune to this sentiment, moved quickly to silence any
negative media coverage and to consolidate its hold on the population. Saudi and Qatar were
helped by a distinct lack of irredentism in their societies, leaving less room for revolution to
foment. Iran remained in the best regional position, as relatively little turbulence touched rulers
in Tehran, leaving it with an opportunity to influence and shape the protests in their favor, such
as in Yemen. Threat perception and prioritization, while always focused on regime survival,
quickly moved from the international level to the domestic. Within the blink of an eye, rulers
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were less concerned about the regional power next door than they were about the opposition
group on the other side of the street.
Though some protests certainly occurred in their respective states, Qatar, Saudi, and Iran
were left in the pole position to influence actions in the region. They had the wealth, relative
stability, and power distribution in their favor. Saudi quickly snuffed out Shi’a dominated
protests in neighboring Bahrain, while Qatar set its sights on supporting the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt. Iranian aid quickly inspired Houthi rebels to march south of their stronghold in Saada
towards the Yemeni capital Sana’a. The outcome of alliances in Syria was not pre-determined,
and as examined, the previous trajectory initially pointed to closer ties between the Gulf and
Assad. However, as explained, these increasing ties were primarily economic and an attempt to
counter Iranian influence in the Arab world. Once serious opposition appeared, economic help
would serve little to Assad’s interests as it became clear that the protests were more than just
about economy. Fearing for self-survival and hold on power, Assad turned to his closest military
allies, who could help him in terms of raw power and ability to violently quash the opposition:
Iran and Russia. Future economic promises mattered little if Assad could not keep power.
Thus, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf lost Syria to the militaristic clutches of Iran, and set into
stone the positions of Riyadh and Doha. As they were in good position to influence the civil war,
and considering that countering Iranian influence drove motivations, it is unsurprising to look at
the path they chose. Without Assad in their pockets, the Saudis had little incentive to do anything
other than back opposition, as it present a prime opportunity to counter Iran and establish a Gulffriendly regime in Damascus once and for all. Once again, the primary threat emanated from
Tehran, but this time the battlefield was in Syria. Qatar’s track record of attempting to spread its
influence as much as possible also makes their support logical, especially when one considers the
prominent role Islamists play in Syrian opposition. Regime survival did also factor in Riyadh, as
supporting Sunni opposition proved to be hugely popular in the domestic population and in
religious circles. It would also increase their international standing, as it would portray them as
opposing a violent and oppressive dictator.
However, while neorealism offers a powerful explanation of the GCC’s decision to back
and arm Syrian opposition, it does contain significant shortcomings. First among them is the role
of domestic politics in this case study. Regime survival’s most consistent threat is domestic, and
the role and weight given to domestic considerations are paramount- from Assad eschewing
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alliances for needed economic aid, to Saudi silencing of media outlets, and to the grave
consequences of domestic uprisings in the Arab Spring. While prioritizing domestic threats in
order to ensure regime survival is in the end realist, the means and medium are not. As the
primary actors in realism are states and the international system, domestic opposition and actors
are given a limited theoretical role, despite evidence that they greatly affect and shape state
action. Another limiting factor to neorealism’s explanation is the role identity plays in state
behavior. While Walt rightly notes that threats are often based on perceptions, it is clear that the
majority of threat perception is based on actor relationships, which are driven by historical
actions, thus constructing for a state an identity that is rooted on previous actions and aspects like
religion. This can be seen in the Iran-Gulf relationship, where the threat to the Gulf is rooted
upon relationship history and the Shi’a identity of Iran. Shi’ism proved to be a spark for the
Gulf’s fears of Iranian influence in Syria and Yemen, and played a major role in the domestic
population’s opinions on backing Syrian opposition. The religious Ulama enjoys significant
influence in Saudi Arabia, and for a Shi’ite power like Iran to expand its influence in such a
wide-ranging manner caused great concern.
Lastly, the role of non-state institutions provides a challenge the neorealist tenet of state
primacy in the international system. Because Saudi Arabia and especially Qatar have relatively
limited military capabilities, it relies on its wealth, diplomacy, and non-state channels to exert its
influence. Part of the reason behind the Syrian rapprochement by Saudi was to present a united
front through the Arab League, and demonstrate that Persian interests and influence could not
crack the Arab world. One must also consider the nature of Saudi and Qatari power- it lays in
great economic wealth. The best and primary means to utilize economic power is not on the
battlefield, but in the boardrooms of international institutions, through offering economic
incentives for state actions- as seen in bringing Assad back into the Arab fold. It was clear that
the Gulf states thought that Syria could only be pried away from Iran with economic incentives
and through institutional channels. The Gulf routinely looks to non-state institutions to exert their
prowess, whether it is the UN, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, or the GCC.
Simply put, neorealism does not adequately account for the influence of these non-state
institutions and the role they play in determining state behavior.
Consequently, while neorealism provides powerful explanations in terms of power
distribution, threat prioritization, and regime survival to explain important elements of foreign
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policy decision-making and alliance formation, it does not sufficiently account for the role of
domestic level politics, identity, religion, and non-state institutions in these processes. Thus,
neorealism only completes a portion of the puzzle as to why the GCC decided to back Syrian
opposition to Assad, but it nonetheless provides a firm foundation on which a more complete and
nuanced explanation shall be constructed.
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CHAPTER THREE
ISLAM AND ARAB GULF FOREIGN POLICY:
TANGIBLE INFLUENCE OR LEGITIMIZING TOOL?
This chapter will seek to answer the question of whether Islamic identity acted as an
important and tangible influence upon the GCC’s decision to back Syrian opposition, or whether
it was a rhetorical tool used by states to legitimize their actions to religious authorities and their
domestic populations. As the previous chapter examined the GCC’s actions through a neorealist
lens, this chapter utilizes constructivism as a mode of analysis to determine the role of Islamic
identity in state actions. However, perhaps more than any other chapter in this work, this section
will be challenged and nuanced by several important analytical complications. These issues will
be expanded upon in the first section of the chapter, which examines the ways of thinking about
Islam in foreign policy. Specifically, there are certain challenges and hurdles one must overcome
and reconcile in order to have a sober analysis of Islam in international relations. These include
resisting the temptation to the causal role of Islam as a driving force in state behavior, and
accounting for historical timing in assessing the role of Islamic identity in foreign policy
decision-making. Consequently, constructivist theories that take seriously the role of religion in
international politics will be used to address these challenges, specifically Michael Barnett’s
work on identities and Brenda Shaffer’s theories on religion and legitimacy in statecraft.
Subsequently, I will examine classical Muslim understandings of the proper conduct of foreign
policy between states in order to compare the views of Islam and international relations with
contemporary state behavior patterns in Muslim countries, specifically those adherent to
Wahhabism. This will include a study of diplomacy and international relations through the lens
of the Quran and various hadith, in addition to examining various IR theories that are found in
Islam.
In orderly to contextualize Islam in the Gulf monarchies, I will present a background of
the relationship between Wahhabism and Gulf governments. Its birth and subsequent marriage to
the Saudi state is of the utmost importance, as well as its modern day relationship with the
current government and its role within foreign policy initiatives. Wahhabism’s predisposition
towards fueling inter-sectarian conflict, anti-Shi’ism in particular, is a result of the utilization of
the concept of takfir (excommunication) as part of its creed as well as policy making, will be
examined given the importance of the emergent Sunni-Shia conflict in the Syrian Civil War.
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Next, the bulk of the chapter, and indeed the object of study and scrutiny, will consist of a
comprehensive textual and content analysis of conflict-era khutbahs, or mosque sermons, and
fatwas delivered in Gulf monarchies. Khutbahs from Mecca and Medina will be given particular
significance due to their location, as they are the two holiest places in Islam, and because they
are most often sanctioned by the Saudi government. Rhetoric from these khutbahs and fatwas
will be examined in order to ascertain whether Islam is being used both as a tool of state
legitimation for specific policy objectives, and as a call to action aimed at actors in civil society
as well as those in government. In order to ascertain the extent of Islamist opposition against the
Gulf states in civil society, and, more importantly, the extent to which Islamic norms of
identification played in state actions, I will also analyze sermons given my non-government
sanctioned clerics. Wikileaks documents that shed light upon the relationship and contestation
over Islamic symbols and rhetoric between the religious elite and the government in Saudi
Arabia provide unique insight into this issue. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of
the role that Wahhabi understandings of Islam has played in the GCC’s decision to support
Syrian opposition, which will take into account the theories and challenges introduced in the
beginning of the chapter.
Constructivism and the Influence of Islam in Foreign Policy
Studying and examining the role Islam plays in foreign policy decisions and statecraft is
inherently wrought with difficulties, biases, and theoretical challenges. Indeed, perhaps the very
act of even attempting to examine at Islam in foreign policy is flawed- for it singles out Islam as
defining or singular feature in foreign policy, an act that ignores other security or material
interests underpinning state actions. This temptation to overemphasize Islam as an influential
factor in policy making in the decision-making process of Muslim states obscures the ways in
which Islamic identity evolves over time at both the state and civil society level, often dependent
on particular historical circumstances
Clearly, a more nuanced approach is needed. The starting point for such an approach
necessitates the incorporation of a comprehensive definition of Islamic identity, as well as a clear
discussion of the specific processes associated with foreign policy decision-making into the
analysis in ways that shed light on the conditions under which Islam may or may not play an
influential role in the process. Indeed, many scholars only consider foreign policy in its
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implementation phase- the making of a treaty, the signing of an arms deal, or cutting off
diplomatic ties. While this portion is undoubtedly pivotal, there are two other major factors of
the foreign policy process- the influences on foreign policy and the making of such policy
(Dawisha 1983). In this case study, the decision to support Syrian opposition by the Gulf
monarchies represents the implementation of foreign policy. Arguably, it is the first phase- the
influence, which is perhaps most important. This is the phase when a pattern or evidence of
certain influences can be detected. As a result, it is easier to determine the cause or motivation
behind foreign policy implementation. In the Muslim world, it is reasonable to expect Islam
plays at least some role as an influencer, and that this in turn determines the choices state elites
make throughout the foreign policy-making process. It is in the ways Islam can determine and
underpin the perception of threat and interests on the part of political elites and those that make
policy which provides key inputs on the ‘decision-making’ process (Dawisha 1983).
However, it is also important to note that Islam can be difficult to detect as an influence
in foreign policy. This is because, like other cultural and religious forms of identification, it can
act as both a unifying force, which forges cooperation and alliances among states, or a constraint
when it serves as a source of conflict between states and an impediment against international
peace and cooperation. It is usually most visible when it acts as the former, as it is
understandably thrust into the public sphere and trumpeted as a primary motivation behind state
action, as is clearly the case with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Specifically, in the case of the conflict
between Sunni-Wahhabism and revolutionary Shia Iran, the sectarian divide within Islam has
underpinned this rivalry. Moreover, Sunni and Shia versions of Islam arguably gave the Gulf
monarchies and Iran a sense of purpose, a unifying theme on which to build state legitimacy
upon, and a fervent drive to export its own brand of Islamic unification (Dawisha 1983).
Furthermore, Islam may also represent a constraint and challenge to international
cooperation and alliance formation with non-Muslim states, which are perceived to be ‘enemies’
of the broader Islamic community. Consider the example used in the previous chapter- Saudi
Arabia and Israel. While realist theory and realpolitik advocates would predict a process of
bandwagoning characterized by an alliance between the two foremost military powers in the
region, as well as the two acting bridgeheads for U.S. policy in the Middle East, Islamic
identification restrains any such agreement between the Islamic Wahhabi monarchy and the
Jewish state. Therefore, Islam can effectively move the boundaries between what is and what is
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not possible in policy, as evidenced by the contentious relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel
(Dawisha 1983). Indeed, it is in these ways that Islamic identity demonstrates great influence
upon policy making.
But what determines the level of this influence in foreign policy? Simply put, to identify
Islam as a source of cultural and political identification by no means guarantees its role as a
tangible influencer on state actions. As James Rosenau noted, “To identify factors is not to trace
their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why
they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others” (Rosenau 1966, 31).
Identifying Islam as a force and driving factor in the Gulf monarchies does not mean it is always
relevant (Dawisha 1983). Indeed, what these scholars, working from the constructivist
perspective, highlight is the key role of history and timing in determining the role of identity in
the processes of foreign policy decision-making. Rosenau in particular brings up an important
issue in that the point in history during which foreign policy is made can have a great affect on
the level of influence Islam can have. That is, some points in time may denote a higher amount
of influence, such as the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In other words, when
assessing influences, timing must be taken into account, for periods in history may be more
susceptible to religious influence than others.
Another important factor is Islam’s role at the level of supra-national institutions.
Individual states and leaders are not the only ones that can be affected by Islam. Rather, Islamic
organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Muslim World League,
and World Assembly of Muslim Youth can impact state decisions by implementing or espousing
Muslim solidarity on an issue, or as the tools of implementation of an Islamic foreign policy
(Mandaville 2009). Adeed Dawisha sums up the root of the ambiguity surrounding the
assessment of Islam’s role in foreign policy,
“The question with which the analyst is repeatedly faced is the following: was a
particular policy pronouncement or decision motivated by Islam, or was it motivated by
some other value or consideration (for example, personal interest), whereby Islam would
be used simply to bestow credibility and legitimacy on the policy? In other words, the
methodological problem is twofold; namely how to separate the perceived influence of
Islam from other motivating values; and how to distinguish between, on the one hand
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Islam as a motivator of policy, and on the other hand its other functional roles” (Dawisha
1983, 5).
This is a defining feature and problem surrounding this thesis’ case study: was Islam, an
identifiable factor or identity in the Gulf, a tangible influence that changed and affected
perceptions and motivations so that it drove state policy, or was it simply a widely-held value
system used to legitimize a potentially unpopular policy decision?
In order to best answer these questions, it is vital to not only identify at what historical
juncture Islam has acted as a potential constraint or unifier in the process of alliance formation,
but also to highlight the precise ways in which Islam may play a key role in policy making. It is
also pivotal to contextualize the environment that is being studied; in this case the relationship
between Wahhabism, Islam, and the Gulf states will be examined. In this regard, there remain
two primary issues to consider that have to do with understanding the role of Islam at the
institutional level: state legitimacy and religious identity.
First and foremost is the fact that states need legitimacy to survive and exist, and therefore
it is a priority among policymakers. These policymakers, as Brenda Shaffer argues, are
inherently impacted by culture by the mere fact that they are humans (Shaffer 2006). Therefore,
it is cogent to believe that culture or religion can play a role in decisions. However, cultural or
religious interests may often be at odds with a state’s material interests, leading to a clash of
policies. Shaffer states, “If a culture is a predominant factor in a state’s foreign policy, the
decision-making elite would frequently accord it precedence even when this action would be
significantly costly to the state in a material way” (Shaffer 2006, 2).
What is then more effective in bringing a state legitimacy- the pursuit of material or
cultural interests? There are a number of variables in the answer: the values of the population,
the state of the world system, and the cultural or religious orientation of the ruling class to name
a few. However, Shaffer presents a few important caveats and much-need nuance in this
discussion. Her findings show that states are not always held accountable by the domestic
population for rhetoric or actions that go against the dominant culture or religion (Shaffer 2006).
This is especially cogent when considering the strength of a particular regime, or the level of
legitimacy it has already inculcated in its population. Furthermore, Shaffer states that leaders can
stretch and create cultural or religious identities to coincide and agree with their preferred policy
(Shaffer 2006). Leaders, while using familiar religious rhetoric, may use religion in a way that is
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not familiar to the mantra of said religion in order to justify their decisions. This may be difficult
to detect because a policy that is dressed in overtly religious rhetoric and motivation may in fact
be nothing of the sort, thus creating confusion over what the actual policy motivation is or its
intentions.
Lastly, Shaffer points out that, “Policy dilemmas between material interests and cultural
interests are especially acute in states that identify with trans-state ideologies such as Islam”
(Shaffer 2006, 7). This is particularly true with Saudi Arabia, the very birthplace of Islam and the
administrator of its holiest places. As a result, the Islamic community, including Saudi’s
domestic population, may look to Saudi Arabia as the keeper or upholder of certain interests,
which may clash with the Saudi government’s material interests. Not only does this show the
potential influence of Islam on state policy, it also is a perfect example of how it can act as a
unifier or constraint upon Saudi policy. Not only does Saudi need domestic legitimacy, it is
unique in that it also needs and craves Islamic legitimacy from the international Muslim
community.
Shaffer’s work helps us understand that the role of religion in foreign policy is often
determined by the degree of strength and authority wielded by the political elite, as well as the
extent to which the legitimating ideology of the state operates under the constraints of a broader
transnational community. However, in this case study, it is important to examine the role of
Islam as a motivating factor in foreign policy. Michael Barnett and Shibley Telhami’s work on
religious identity, particularly Islamic, will be seminal in complementing Shaffer’s work in ways
that address the role of Islam in the decision-making process and helps to explain why Islam,
rather than other secular modes of identification, have played such a pivotal role in foreign
policy.
As mentioned in the introduction, there are always a plethora of identities competing for
supremacy in society, such as Islam, Arabism, and Communism. Barnett and Telhami theorize a
similar point about history as made above- timing greatly affects which identities rise to the top
and take precedence (Barnett 2002). For example, it is unsurprising that Pan-Arab nationalism
became popular following the defeat of the Arab states by Israel in the War of 1948 and Israel’s
subsequent victories over Arab powers. However, historicism’s influence is particularly
significant when it comes to the Islamic identity. As Barnett and Telhami point out, Islam is
prone to the shifting of meanings and practices over time (Barnett 2002). Therefore, what may be
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Islamic, or construed as representing Islam, at one time in history may not be in the present day.
This is especially significant at times when sectarianism is pervasive in the Muslim community.
Identities often play a larger role than most realize in politics and foreign policy. Certain
identities, particularly religious and ethnic, can influence preferences towards domestic policies
and can foster feelings of loyalty, interest, and fear of extinction at the hands of another identity
(Saideman 2002). In terms of foreign policy, constituents of a certain identity may hold singular
and unique views on immigration, relations with other states, and tariffs on particular goods
(Saideman 2002). Though this may seem particular to immigrant communities and the business
sector, religious constituents voice their foreign policy concerns as well, such as evangelicals in
the United States, who wish to see the utmost cooperation with Israel. Politicians who need
support of a religious community will of course emphasize the role of religion in government.
In terms of state identity, constructivists believe that it shapes perceptions of oneself and
of others, which in turn affects a state’s foreign policy and places upon it a certain reality- what
is and is not possible (Saideman 2002). Barnett theorizes that collective identity helps this
process by legitimizing some action while making others unthinkable (Barnett 2002). However,
when it comes to Islamic identity, there is no consensus, with Saudi Islamic identity being
different than Iranian Islamic identity. Even Islam as a dominating factor in a state’s identity is
always contested, with racial divides (Arab vs. non-Arab), tribal lines, and language ties each
serving as a powerful identity in each Middle Eastern state. Indeed, some suggest that Muslim
identities are in fact more shaped by local factors- ethnicity, race, and local politics (Pasha 2003).
Though this may be true, it is undeniable that the states in question, the Gulf monarchies, chose
to use Islam as its chief collective identity, even if that identity is either contested or not as
cohesive as advertised. These considerations must be kept in mind when examining the role of
Islam in the GCC’s decision to back Syrian opposition.
Islam and Foreign Policy in the Gulf
Any and all analysis of the role of Islamic identity in the foreign policy of the Gulf states
necessitates a brief discussion and understanding of the key elements of classical Islamic
understanding of Islam and international relations. There are a myriad of verses in the Quran and
accepted hadith concerning war, peace, and diplomacy, but in order to keep this background
succinct, this section focuses on exploring the theory of foreign policy in Islam. In this regard, it
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is necessary to overview and highlight the broadly accepted tenets of the international system
within Islam. First, based on classical Islamic texts, the state in Islam is not generally perceived
as system of sovereign entities but rather made up of a collectivity or Umma, a Muslim
community that is bound together by their Islamic faith and assabiya, or group feeling (Turner
2009). Second, there is the acceptance of a permanent divide in the world, between the lands of
Islam, Dar al-Islam, and the land of war or unbelievers, Dar al-Harb. This divide relates directly
to the treaties referred to in the Quran and many of the verses of war and immigration, as Dar alHarb is traditionally seen as the opposite and object of war by Dar al-Islam. Lastly, each of
these theories are grounded in the same ontology, as each school of thought is rooted in the
Quran and hadith as its sources- the difference is in each respective group’s tafsir, or exegesis.
There are three schools of thought concerning diplomacy and international relations within
Islam. John Turner, a scholar on the Islamic theories of international relations, states,
“A traditionalist school, which is in many ways mirrors classical realist concepts
regarding power, anarchy, war and the state of nature. A reformist, or non-traditional
school, that regards far less rigid concepts of cooperation and security, engages with
modernity, accepts the temporal existence of nation states in Islamic lands and provides a
discourse for a durable peace with non-Muslims. Finally a revolutionary school termed
Salafi/ Jiahadi which serves as the ideological backbone for international terror
organizations” (Turner 2009).
Each of these schools enjoys success and an audience with varying amounts of Muslims. Though
there is not space enough to appropriately give each theory a full examination, it is sufficient to
say that the scriptures are numerous and wide ranging enough to create space for radically
different interpretations of the texts, and these interpretations have significant ramifications on
states. Recalling earlier discussions on the role of Islam as a possible influence or legitimizing
tool, it is interesting to note the salience and pervasion of foreign policy directives already inside
the religion- such an influence is not only accounted for, but also built in the very foundations of
Islam. Rather than Islam influencing foreign policy, Islam is foreign policy in that the religion
includes international relations. Therefore, the question turns to the amount of Islamic influence
a modern nation-state, post-Westphalia, can have; as state-like entities during the time at which
the Quran was written are certainly not comparable to what is present in the modern day. The
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foreign policies of Qatar and Saudi generally fit within the traditionalist school Turner describes,
though some reformists and rogue actors in these states adhere to the other respective theories.
Building on Barnett’s theories of identity and Shaffer’s work on legitimacy, Islam, as
seen in the tenets of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, distinguishes itself from other religions, and
therefore Muslims from non-believers. This is effectively identity motivated, as people are seen
through the lens of their collective identity as Muslims and non-Muslims, and in most Muslim
countries Islam continues to be the hegemonic criteria of group identity and loyalty (Lewis
1988). Islamic identity supersedes other identities due to its primacy in the religion, and the
importance of distinguishing oneself as a Muslim. Furthermore, for most Muslims, in times of
crisis and upheaval Islam is still the most acceptable and agreeable basis of authority, meaning
that Muslims are more likely to accept authority when its legitimacy is derived from Islam
(Lewis 1988). However, because of a lack of religious authority within Islam, especially
Sunnism, usurpation and tyranny of power can sometimes come into the political sphere. This
leads elites to seek religious legitimacy as a basis of authority, something that the founders of
Saudi Arabia did in the creation of the Saudi state. Furthermore, perhaps due to the distinction of
Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, there is a perceived primacy of the domestic sphere when it
comes to Islam (Berger 2010. This may also be due to a lack of faith in international justice,
where the only remedy to injustices such as Palestine or other Muslim suffering is Islamic justice
(Berger 2010). The examination of Islam and foreign policy, accompanied by Barnett’s theory
on identity as well as Shaffer’s legitimacy theories will be important when examining the
relationship between Wahhabism and the Saudi state in general and the Saudi monarchy’s policy
vis-à-vis Syria. This, as will be shown in the rest of the section, is because of the intertwined
nature of Islam and Saudi Arabia.
If there was on region where the role of Islamic identity is a crucial element underpinning
foreign policy, it is the Arab Gulf region. The Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, have
almost become synonymous with Islam over the last century. Not only is this due to the location
of Mecca and Medina, but it also signifies the deep salience of the religion in the respective
societies. However, the type of Islam practiced is also distinct from the rest of the Muslim world,
a type known by outsiders as Wahhabism, though to its Gulf adherents it is simply the true form
of Islam. The marriage of Wahhabism and the Saudi state would fundamentally change the
political and religious dynamic of the Arabian Peninsular and the entire Middle East.
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Perhaps more than any other sect or belief system within Islam, Wahhabism has a unique
relationship with foreign policy. Conducted originally through the sword, as seen through its
original advancements and conversions, Wahhabism now counts oil money as its medium to gain
adherents across the Muslim world. This brand of ‘petro-Islam’ allows Saudi clerics to directly
fund the building of mosques around the world, which are subsequently staffed with Wahhabileaning imams. It also allows the creation of Islamic organizations that pay for Muslims wishing
to undertake religious studies to travel to Saudi and learn from Wahhabi clerics. These students
are then sent back to their original states to spread the message. It is estimated that since the
1980s, Saudi has spent at least eighty-seven billion dollars to propagate Wahhabism (Valentine
2015). However, the Saudi state cannot always control where the Ulama and other religious
clerics send money. Simon Valentine states, “It is well documented how ubiquitous zakat
(charity) boxes in mosques all over KSA have collected money to support jihad in various
localities including Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq” (Valentine 2015, 243). This proves that there
exists a level of independence and resistance among the Ulama from the royal family, though the
relationship that exists today is consistently complicated by its reciprocal nature.
Wahhabism’s disdain for the Shia can be seen through foreign policy and various other
arenas. Wahhabi clerics believe that the Shia are guilty of shirk, or idolatry, due to their
reverence for Husayn Ali and the thirteen imams as well as other religious practices, including
tomb visitation. As a result, a war of words and propaganda always exists between Wahhabism
and Shi’ism, one that grew in intensity after the Iranian Revolution. After hearing criticism by
the Saudi Ulama, Ayatollah Khomeini dismissed the Wahhabis as, “Followers of the camel
grazers of Riyadh and the barbarians of the Najd, the most infamous and the wildest members of
the human family” (Valentine 2015). Both Iran and Saudi consider themselves to be the home
and veritable protectors of the true forms of Islam, creating a constant back and forth game of
‘holier-than-thou’. While Saudi calls on other Muslim governments to recognize its primacy,
Iran accuses it of selling out Islamic interests (Kramer 1986).
The situation escalated with the spreading of the Arab Spring, where Saudi Arabia
stressed the Iranian Shia influence of the revolutions, clearly hoping that it would not take root
on the Arabian Peninsula (Mabon 2013). Shortly after, the Saudi Grand Mufti Shieikh al Sheikh
declared that such protests are against Islam and are haram (Matthieson 2015). The fact that there
exists a sizeable Shia minority within Saudi Arabia only served to heighten insecurities and
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tensions. This identity incongruence can occasionally challenge Wahhabism’s ideological
dominance in Saudi. The Saudi Ulama and government framed these uprisings as sectarian in
nature, leading to broad domestic support for the Syrian revolution (Matthieson 2015). However,
some suggest that this is only due to the threat posed to the Saudi regime; that Islam is only used
as a framework when Saudi is vulnerable (Dawisha 1983). Regardless, anti-Shia rhetoric is a
mainstay in Wahhabism, as such rhetoric was existent in the earliest days of Ibn Abd al Wahhab,
the ideology’s founding father. The next section, a primary source collection of khutbahs and
fatwa given by Wahhabi Ulama in Saudi, Qatar, and the UAE will show the on-the-ground
reality of how Wahhabism can serve as a motivator, influencer, or legitimizing tool for foreign
policy.
Islam, Gulf Policy, and the Syrian Crisis: An Analysis of Khutbahs and Fatwas
Examining the role of Wahhabi Islam and the shift in Gulf-Syria policy is perhaps best
conducted through a content and textual analysis of the khutbahs and fatwas given by clerics in
the Gulf from the beginning of the conflict period to the present. In order to truly ascertain and
assess the level of influence or pressure waged by the Gulf Ulama for intervention or
disengagement with Assad, I analyze the nature, language, and core Islamic concepts utilized by
religious authorities. This analysis will be conducted in two important dimensions: the state runmosques as well as the private, or non-state sanctioned religious authorities. It is also important
to note that although some mosques are not run in conjunction with the state, all mosques are
staffed by imams that received standardized religious education. This section will therefore
provide a content and textual analysis of khutbahs and fatwas given by clerics in the Gulf from
the beginning of the conflict period to the present. Furthermore, it is also noteworthy to keep the
audience of these messages in mind: primarily the Saudi domestic population as well as the
Saudi government. The Ulama enjoy great popularity and rank amongst ordinary Saudi citizens,
and their messages resonate deeply with the general public, which in turn can put pressure on
government officials. Lastly, many of the Ulama are either royal family members or have
relatives in government, increasing the connection between the two entities.
There are a few consistent themes evident in the primary texts that will shape and frame
the analysis of Islamic influence in the Gulf’s decision to intervene in Syria. First, there is the
continuous dichotomy and relationship between the state-sanctioned and ‘rogue’ clerics in Saudi
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Arabia, who each use Islamic rhetoric and justifications to make their claims. Next, the
increasing introduction and role of anti-Shia rhetoric utilized by the state clerics in order to
mobilize local populations to support intervention on behalf of Sunni insurgents are clear
throughout the texts. Another theme is the use of core Islamic concepts, such as Dar al Harb and
takfir, which are consistently invoked in order to delegitimize the Syrian regime and cast them as
part of Dar al Harb, or as non-Muslims entirely. Lastly, the relationship, usually implicit in the
khutbahs, between the Ulama and the state serves to complicate the khutbahs in ways that force
an examination of the individual relationships between clerics and the state.
The primary focus in this section will be on khutbahs from Mecca and Medina, as they
are the holiest cities in Islam, have the largest audiences, most respected clerics, and closest
connection to the Saudi government. These locations and clerics are perhaps in the best position
to influence a decision made by the royal family, as their words carry significant weight among
the Saudi population and religious circles. The period where Saudi Arabia and Qatar were
contemplating and beginning to mobilize to militarily support Syrian opposition, late 2011
through spring of 2012, coincides with a substantial increase and appearance of religious
messages about the Syrian revolution. In a fiery khutbah given on February 24th of 2012, the
imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Sheikh Saleh aal Talib, repeatedly called on Muslims to
get involved in Syria6. Using vivid imagery and appealing to Islamic notions of Umma, Sheikh
Talib openly addressed the situation. He states, “The Islamic nation is crushed for the sake of the
interests of individuals…women and children are not armed even with a stone, the missiles of
treachery are scattered on the stones of their homes; and their bodies are shattered” (Talib 2012).
Sheikh Talib connects and parallels the plight of the Syrians to the greater Umma, thereby
calling the actions of Assad as an affront to the entire Islamic world. As a result, “it is necessary
on the Muslims, all the Muslims, to drive off as much as they can so that the hand of corruption
does not change the beautiful face of Shaam7” (Talib 2012). By declaring that help for the
Syrians is wajib, or compulsory, Sheikh Talib declares that for Saudi to stand aside and do
nothing would be to go against Islam. In a show of public connection, Sheikh Talib ends his
khutbah with praise for the royal family’s initial efforts to aid Syrians, saying, “The custodian
6 Khutbahs given in Mecca and Medina can readily be found on Youtube, as well as in English translation on various websites.
However, any mistranslation is the fault of the author.
7 Shaam, a synonym of Levant, is the Arabic term for the expanse of land that generally includes Syria, Lebanon, and
Israel/Palestine. In this context, Shaam exclusively refers to Syria.
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(King Abdullah) of the two Holy Mosques has raised his voice from the first hour…coming out
openly with words of truth and justice” (Talib 2012). Though commendation is given for the
Saudi government’s public statements, it is interesting to note that no mention of any concrete
action is given, for the only mention of state action is simply that of rhetoric.
As winter gave way to spring in 2012, Sheikh Talib’s rhetoric increased in intensity and
specificity. During a khutbah in April, Sheikh Talib exclaimed in Mecca, “The satellite channels
are raining over us pictures of killing and intimidation which are happening in our beloved
Shaam, and its killer has assured the tackling of the nations” (Talib 2012). Sheikh Talib’s
repeated use of vivid and gory imagery depicts his intentions of galvanizing the population, and
even compared it to the struggle of the Palestinians. The first hints of sectarianism can be found
in this message, as Sheikh Talib states, “The Muslims, and the Sunni of them especially, will not
only succeed him (Assad), but they were the predecessors of his party for generations” (Talib
2012). Sheikh Talib portrays Assad as aberration, an outlier amongst a sea of Sunni rulers in
Syria, and proclaims that Sunnis will once again rule after he is ousted. However, the most
significant moment in the khutbah comes in the following lines, where Sheikh Talib declares that
Assad’s regime is not Muslim. He states, “And Shaam was more honorable, more pleasant,
secure, and finer when it was under Muslim rule, and it did not know of misfortunes until the
tyranny appeared” (Talib 2012). This act of takfir is incredibly important, and represents a
seismic shift in religious rhetoric. By decreeing that Assad and his regime are un-Islamic, Sheikh
Talib opens an entirely new set of considerations under Wahhabi doctrine. As Muslims now
dealing with non-Muslims, it is now therefore permissible for Saudi to use force in removing
Assad, and for Sunni Muslims to take up arms against him. Similar to the khutbah given in
February, Sheikh Talib concludes his message by noting the Saudi government’s calls for
intervention through international channels, though once again any mention of military action is
not mentioned.
Though in his earlier khutbahs Sheikh Talib refrained from calling on Syrians to take up
arms themselves, this changed in June 2012. He begins his message by proclaiming, “The blood
is still flowing oppressively on the soil of Syria…and surely Allah has permitted for those who
are fought against and oppressed that they have the right of defense of themselves” (Talib 2012).
Though his February khutbah warned against Syrian opposition imitating Assad’s killing, Sheikh
Talib endorsed such a defense through violent means. This is likely invoking the concept of
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defensive jihad, where violence is permissible when Muslims are attacked. Supporting this
theory, he references a passage of the Quran, saying, “O Syrians: ‘Permission to fight is given to
those who are fought against, because they have been wronged (Hajj; Verse 39)’. Surely the thief
government has overstepped in oppression” (Talib 2012). He goes on in the khutbah to describe
Assad as a “butcher”, claiming that the regime intends to destroy the land of Shaam. This paves
the way for Saudi to give and funnel Syrian opposition weapons, as it is acceptable according the
Ulama to do so under the tent of self-defense against the Assad regime. Talib continues,
“Responsibility is great on the Arabs and Muslims especially, so they should call for the helping
of the oppressed and warding off of the oppressor…this is an announcement of a close relief”
(Talib 2012). Although ‘helping’ is an ambiguous term, given his rhetoric on self-defense, it
would not be unreasonable to infer that Talib is referring to military help, especially when one
considers his proclamation of relief being ‘close’ at hand. Coming in June 2012, this message
parallels reports of the setting up of a Saudi base in Turkey, with the intention of funneling arms
to Syrian opposition. However, his colleague and member of the Saudi Council of Senior
Scholars, Sheikh Ali Abbas al Hikmi, declared that Muslims were not allowed to practice
physical jihad in Syria. Sheikh Hikmi interestingly proclaims that such a jihad must be in
accordance with the nation’s foreign policy, saying, “Everything is linked to a system and to the
country’s policies and no person should be allowed to disobey the guardian and call for jihad”
(Jamestown 2012). This brings up the question: would the cleric’s stance on jihad change if the
nation’s policy changed? As will become apparent throughout later khutbahs, the religious
message would closely mirror the situation on the ground and the reality that the government
faced.
Sheikh Talib made a special exhortation for support during Ramadan, which fell in July
of 2012, hoping to use the festive period to foster support. He states, “Ramadan dawns while our
brothers in Syria are being slaughtered and destroyed…victory that builds towards the tributaries
of the patient ones, provided by the supplication of the humbler fasters” (Talib 2012). Sheikh
Talib even mentions the possibility of the conflict ending by the end of Ramadan, a wishful
thought but insightful given his confidence of Saudi support. A month later Sheikh Talib was
joined in his call by Sheikh Saleh al Budair, the imam of Medina. On August 31st, Sheikh Budair
stated, “O’ Muslims, the deluded tyrant, oppressive leader, along with his alliances is committing
grave sins and perpetrating shameful acts and offenses in our beloved Syria” (Budair 2012). This
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is possibly the first time the Ulama references Iran, here under the vague title of “alliances”,
though the audience would clearly understand the implications of such a reference. The rhetoric
becomes more personal, calling Assad a ‘deluded tyrant’, attempting to strip him or his allies of
any and all legitimacy, building off of Sheik Talib’s assertion of them as non-Muslims. Sheikh
Budair proceeds, “O’ Muslims, do not desert your Muslim brothers and sisters in
Syria…Support, assist, and provide them with what will enable them to break the backs of their
enemy and put an end to their battle with them. Be aware, that the most shameful act is to desert
them” (Budair 2012). Sheikh Budair openly calls for any type of assistance that would help
Syrian opposition, and states that anyone that does not contribute to the cause should be shamed.
Here the message seems aimed at not only the Saudi government, but to also wealthy, individual
patrons who can funnel substantial amounts of personal funds to Syrian opposition. Sheikh
Budair begins what would become a pattern for many other clerics in Saudi- an exhortation that
relates to Syria in the dua, or prayer portion, which concludes each khutbah. Below is the full
text of the dua given by Sheikh Budair:
“O Allah grant our people in Syria victory! O Allah make them achieve victory! O Allah,
the Lord of all creation, render them triumphant over the perpetrators of these acts of
inhumanity. O Allah it is upon you to take revenge for us from the one who is killing our
brothers and sisters in Syria! O Allah crush him! O Allah destroy him! O Allah
Almighty, the most Powerful, the Lord of all creation bring him to an end! O Allah, the
Almighty, the most Powerful destroy him and all those who aid or support him!” (Budair
2012).
Though many khutbahs given by the Ulama may not mention Syria in the message portion, it
soon became common for imams to include a few sentences about Syria in the dua, serving as a
constant reminder to the people about the crisis.
As 2012 gave way to 2013, the type of rhetoric and language used by the Ulama shifted.
Instead of general calls for assistance for Syrians, they began to criticize international efforts
more frequently, in addition to upping the fiery language in calling for help. Almost a year after
his initial address referencing the Syrian crisis, Sheikh Talib lambasts the attempts of the
international community, “Verily the inaction to aid the weak in Syria, despite the rapid
intervention in other places is surely blatant racism, international injustice and an uncovered
conspiracy” (Talib 2013). Sheikh Talib attempts to frame the international community’s inaction
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as an affront to the Umma, thereby galvanizing his population to increase their action in the
conflict. Sheikh Talib also indirectly criticized the efforts of Qatar, who by this time was
embroiled in a power struggle with Saudi over the leading role in supporting Syrian opposition.
He states, “Verily it is upon the truthful ones to extinguish the fire of sedition, and to move
quickly towards serious actions” (Talib 2013). In actuality, Sheikh Talib could be criticizing both
parties, as the disorganization and feuding on both sides greatly hindered the effect of any
assistance. The disunity between the Gulf monarchies, which in turn led to fracturing of the
Syrian opposition, was noticed and called out by other members of the Ulama. Sheikh Saleh al
Humaid, president of the Saudi Shura Council, exhorted in a May 2013 dua, “O Allah! Unite
them and set right their affairs! O Allah! Turn their concerns and distress into relief, and their
inflictions into well-being!” (Humaid 2013). Clearly, the rifts appearing between the Gulf
powers and Syrian opposition groups caught the eye of the Ulama, who imbued religious
reasoning and calls for unity into their rhetoric.
Two duas given in May and June depict an increase in sectarian-related rhetoric, possibly
indicating a resort to such speech after unsatisfactory results or in an attempt to further fan the
flames of discord between Sunni and Shia. In a May 31st khutbah, Sheikh Budair states in his
closing dua, “Grant victory to our people in Syria against the tyrannical aggressors, criminals,
and murderers. O Allah! Relieve the distress of the followers of the Sunnah…Accept their dead
as martyrs” (Budair 2013). In addition to the usual anti-Assad rhetoric, Sheikh Budair for the
first time mentions that opposition members are followers of the Sunnah, or practices of the
Prophet Muhammad and his companions. In Wahhabism, the Shia are considered to have strayed
from following the Sunnah, bringing bid’a, or innovation, and implementing other practices and
concepts. Thus, Sheikh Budair frames the conflict as inherently sectarian- Sunni vs. Shia.
Furthermore, he indicates that followers of the Sunnah, Sunnis, who die at the hands of
Assad should be considered martyrs. This too is a significant evolution in the rhetoric espoused
from the Ulama, that now a Sunni who dies in the fight against Assad is a martyr, and will thus
go to heaven. Not only does this glorify the opposition, but it also serves to encourage those
thinking about joining the fight to do so, for if they die they will be martyrs. A week later on
June 7th, Sheikh Ali al Hudhaify, an imam at the Grand Mosque of Medina, stated in his dua,
“Grant victory to the Muslims in Syria…grant victory to them over those who have oppressed
them” (Hudhaify 2013). Once again, the language insinuates that those fighting for Assad are not
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Muslims, and that those in the opposition are true Muslims fighting to rid themselves of unIslamic oppression. Saudi cleric Sheikh Ayed al Qarni called for scholars to issue a joint fatwa
against Assad, saying he was not a Muslim, proclaiming, “That is why all Syrians have to fight
this regime. The Syrian youth should take up arms against the regime” (Solomon 2013). This
rhetoric is not new in the Salafi and Wahhabi movements. Ibn Taymiyya, a scholar from the 13th
century and intellectual giant among ultra-conservative Muslims, issued fatwas against the Shia.
His rulings specifically included the Alewites, the sect of Bashar al Assad, calling them
“deceptive unbelievers…their religion externally is Shi’ism but internally it is pure unbelief”
(Jamestown 2012).
The clerical establishment continued to ratchet up their language in June of 2013, perhaps
the most significant period when it comes to this section of the case study. Using both emotional
and religious arguments, the Ulama plead and exhort the population, and all Muslims, to become
involved in the Syrian conflict. Sheikh Saud ash Shuraim, an imam in Mecca, describes the
carnage in Syria: “The roofs above them are dripping, their walls leaking, their houses
crumbling. Bombs and shrapnel are falling upon them; their valleys are full of human corpses
and heads” (Shuraim 2013). This continues the pattern of beginning the khutbah with a
description, usually vivid and gory, of the situation in Syria, designed to create empathy and to
grab the listeners’ attention. Then, it is followed by a call to action and exhortation of Islamic
values. Sheikh Shuraim continues, “All of this places a share of responsibility…this includes
leaders, rulers, Ulama, reformers, intellectuals, and ordinary people. Muslims should stand
united in front of the flood of this mad rush and conspiracy against our brothers in Syria”
(Shuraim 2013). Here Sheikh Shuraim directly calls for government action, as well as practically
any able-bodied person to intervene in their own way. As usual, the language indicates that the
situation is an attack on all Muslims, meaning that defense is incumbent upon believers. In a
transparent moment, Sheikh Shuraim acknowledges the difficulties and setbacks in the
opposition’s fight, pleading, “Our brothers need more efforts and perseverance in order to put an
end to this merciless oppression and aggression by whatever means” (Shuraim 2013). Clearly,
the Ulama felt that more support was needed, and the terminology of ‘whatever means’ opens a
Pandora’s box of possibilities, from individual donations to Saudi nationals joining the fight.
On June 14 of 2013, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Hussain al Sheikh, gave a
khutbah titled Syria: A Part of the Muslim Body, in which a telling crisis within the religious elite
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was revealed. Sheikh al Sheikh began his khutbah by describing the connection between Saudi
and Islam, saying, “The pillars and foundations for the safety and protection for this nation are
not only achieved by mustering military power, but also by applying the rule of Islam in all
affairs” (al Sheikh 2013). This statement insinuates that al Sheikh is defending recent actions of
the state by declaring that Islam’s pervasion in all affairs justifies any decision of the state.
Though he touts Islam’s influence, he goes on to bemoan the lack of unity Muslim scholars have
on the Syrian crisis, indicating that a rash of clerics are issuing fatwas that are not true to the
sharia, creating a problem for practicing Muslims. He states, “Individuals seeking knowledge
should beware of issuing fatwas concerning crucial matters that can affect the whole of the
Muslim Nation without consulting all reliable scholars” (al Sheikh 2013). One interpretation of
this statement is that al Sheikh is criticizing jihadist groups such as Jabhat al Nusra or ISIS,
whose religious rulings inspired some Muslim youth to join them. This criticism shows that al
Sheikh and the Ulama as a whole are fighting to regain their supremacy and authority in religious
rulings, exhorting Muslims to only accept fatwas given by the appropriately trained and accepted
scholars. He concludes, “The state of turmoil and confusion of fatwas are issued individually to
the youth in the Umma without the necessary understanding of the rules of ijtihad (reasoning)
threatens to have grave consequences” (al Sheikh 2013). The Grand Mufti saw fit to address the
rifts appearing in the Ulama, pleading for Muslim youth and the Umma as a whole to refrain
from following radical or poorly trained clerics. Losing control over the Muslim population and
their actions, as al Sheikh asserts, could indeed have grave ramifications. Saudi cleric Sheikh
Hassan Safar went one step further, saying, “These sheikhs should not be issuing fatwas if they
seek publicity or money” (Solomon 2013). However, the problem persisted as the Grand Mufti
once again addressed this issue in early 2015, saying, “That who called for joining deviant
groups is mistaken and offending, because these deviant groups kill each other without mercy
and took advantage of our young people” (Asharq 2015).
Other members of the Ulama responded to the Grand Mufti’s call for qualified scholars to
exert their influence on the conflict. On June 21st, 2013, Sheikh Humaid built off of Sheikh
Shuraim’s calls for participation by making such involvement an act of jihad. He states, “It
behooves every Muslim to set out with serious intent and wholeheartedness for the rescue, relief,
and support of his brothers and sisters in the Shaam as an act of jihad in the way of Allah”
(Humaid 2013). While he may well be referring to humanitarian or financial efforts, it is
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undeniable that this message has undertones of physically fighting in Syria. Sheikh Humaid
provides those who want to fight in Syrian opposition a way to do so, by declaring that such
support is a justifiable act of jihad and therefore permissible within Islam, as it is defensive jihad
to protect Muslims from non-Muslims (the Shia). Sheikh Humaid understandably scales back his
rhetoric later in the khutbah by exhorting that scholars and politicians should rally the Umma in
public support, he ends his message with another call to jihad. He proclaims that this public
exposure amounts to “Helping expose the reality on the ground in all clarity, protecting our
brothers and sisters in Syria and saving them from destruction, tyranny, and displacement as an
act of jihad” (Humaid 2013). Though Sheikh Humaid moderates his message, it nonetheless
could be interpreted by some that physically fighting in Syria is justified. The Ulama likely
realized that their calls to support have been too vague and as a result suffered the consequences
as Saudi citizens joined the jihad in Syria, and as a result called for support to be limited in
public expression or other channels.
This cautionary tone continued in a khutbah given in July 2013 by Sheikh Talib, who
encouraged the population to trust the Saudi government to provide the necessary support to
Syrian opposition. Referring to the situation in Syria, Sheikh Talib states, “We are hopeful
that…our fellow Muslims throughout the world shall realize the complexity of their cause in
such a way that urges them to hasten to their support” (Talib 2013). By acknowledging the
complexity of the situation, Sheikh Talib is both cautioning those eager to take rash action and
explaining the lack of any real progress on the ground. Thus, he asks for more support while also
attempting to nuance the reality on the ground. His solution, therefore, is to channel support
through the Saudi government. He exhorts, “We place our hope first in Allah and then in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia…the Custodian (King Abdullah) of the Two Holy Mosques himself
has so repeatedly and generously insisted on halting this bloody violence in Syria” (Talib 2013).
The insistence on working through government channels may insinuate unhappiness with
individuals using their own personal networks to influence the opposition. Sheikh Talib asks for
the domestic population to place their trust in King Abdullah, a slight change in rhetoric from a
year ago when calls were for individuals to assist in any way possible. Perhaps there was
pressure from government officials to make this statement, though there is no way of confirming
this suspicion. Despite this caution, another group of leading Sunni clerics issued a call to jihad
during a meeting in Egypt, led by Mohamed Hassan, a popular Egyptian cleric, who stated,
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“Jihad is necessary for the victory of our brothers in Syria- jihad with mind, money, weapons; all
forms of jihad” (MEO 2013). This depicts a rift within the broader Sunni religious community,
and Saudi clerics would soon appear to choose sides, one of which was Sheikh Abdul Rahman as
Sudais, an imam at the Grand Mosque of Mecca.
Sheikh Sudais combined the calls to jihad and the asking for the population to trust the
government in a khutbah given in August of 2013. Following the template for a khutbah on
Syria, he begins with a vivid image of the catastrophe that is Syria: “The most horrible and
preoccupying form of such terrorism has been recently recorded in the savage massacre
perpetrated by the oppressors in Syria…chemical weapons were used, along with international
banned poison gas, equally banned in religion (Sudais 2013). This is the first mention of
chemical weapons, which as Sheikh Sudais notes is banned in Islam, which further reinforces the
image and perception that the Assad regime is not Islamic. Then, Sheikh Sudais praises the Saudi
state, “The government and people of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have taken the initiative to
denounce such a massacre…in doing so the Kingdom is motivated by its firm belief, fixed
principles, and historic stands” (Sudais 2013). Once again, Sheikh Sudais touts the influence of
Islam on Saudi actions, claiming that since Saudi is rooted in Islamic virtue and justice, it has
taken a stand against Assad. However, while he thanks the Saudi government for its role, Sheikh
Sudais slightly contradicts Sheikh Talib in his calls for action. He proclaims, “This imposes on
us the obligation to join efforts and keep all sorts of promises and covenants to eradicate the
legion of turmoil, tyranny, and chaos” (Sudais 2013). For Sheikh Sudais, while trusting and
supporting the government is important, it does not abrogate the Islamic call to action for
individuals.
While Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment is certainly deserving of this section’s focus,
it is useful to look briefly at what was happening in other Gulf circles, and whether the same
dilemma and discord was apparent outside of the Kingdom. A lengthy khutbah given in a statesanctioned mosque in the UAE during December of 2013 serves as a bold contrast to the Saudi
Ulama. Rather than apparent disunity and disagreement over the balance of individual action and
state support, the khutbah given in the UAE is continuous and unwavering in its message: state
and humanitarian support is the action an individual should partake in to support Syrian
opposition. The imam states, “This is an opportunity for you; please seize it and be generous to
the people of Syria by meeting their needs and know that anyone who helps the poor and feeds
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the hungry will enjoy high status in the sight of Allah” (Awkaf 2013). While Saudi’s calls for
participation were vague overtures that left much open to interpretation, the UAE was specific in
singling out humanitarian aid as the path that their population should take. The imam continues,
“Today calamity befalls Syrians and you have the means to help them with food, clothes, and
medicines” (Awkaf 2013). While the Saudi Ulama urged the population to use its wealth in a
variety of means, the state-sanctioned message in the UAE implored the wealthy to refrain from
giving to anything other than humanitarian channels. However, like the Saudis, the UAE was
quick to trumpet the government’s role in helping Syrians. The imam states, “This blessed
country and people are always quick to respond…today its president and leader, HH Sheikh
Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, may Allah protect him, is ordering a humanitarian relief initiative
to support Syrians” (Awkaf 2013). However, the previous chapter revealed that the UAE may
have chosen restraint in arming Syrian opposition due to their unwillingness to anger Iran,
causing frustration in the Saudi camp. Therefore, their unwillingness to arm opposition due to
political reasons may explain the unity present in their religious rhetoric. While arming rebels in
Syria would do much to gain the angst of the Iranians, confining aid to humanitarian channels
would not, allowing for the Emirati government to look supportive of the cause without
jeopardizing their political intentions.
As the Grand Mufti insinuated in his khutbahs, the problem of rogue clerics espousing
extremist or differing ideology was a problem from the very beginning of the civil war. Though
all religious figures go through the same standardized education for imams, it has produced a fair
share of radical clerics over the years due to extreme interpretations of Wahhabi doctrine, an
already ultra-conservative belief system. Interestingly, Wikileaks documents reveal that the U.S.
pressured Saudi to overhaul and moderate its religious training in 2006, causing the religious
establishment to implement a four-year ‘re-training’ of imams, including new textbooks and
curriculum (06-9079). U.S. diplomats scrupulously monitored khutbahs, sending out weekly
reports to notify officials of particularly radical messages, even suggesting new content. In a
meeting with a U.S. Homeland Security official, the Saudi Islamic Affairs Minister Mohammed
al Sheikh said that, “Friday sermons are now more rational and less extremist, including on
foreign policy issues” (06-9079).
However, these rogue figures persisted and continued to thrive. The religious
establishment had a difficult time controlling these clerics, some of whom were perfectly
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licensed under the state, and sought to bring them back under establishment control. As al Sheikh
mentioned in his khutbah, the fight over who influenced Saudi youth was particularly fierce. One
particular instance of radicalism stands out that occurred in September of 2013. A statesanctioned and trained imam gave an Eid al Fitr khutbah to a large crowd at the Sheikh
Mohammed Bin Abdul Wahhab Mosque in the Saudi capital of Riyadh. Because it was the end
of Eid, the mosque likely had its largest crowd of the year on hand to hear the extremist message.
The imam, whose name Saudi security did not release, glorified al Qaeda and accused Muslim
scholars and the establishment of letting down prisoners accused of terrorism, saying they should
issue fatwas to release them (Saudi Gazette 2014). He then went on to urge all parents to raise
children to be advocates of jihad, and praised the mujahideen in Syria, saying, “Many Muslim
lions have gone to Syria to fight the tyrant (Assad) and defend Islam” (Saudi Gazette 2014). He
also praised ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and encouraged youth to travel abroad and fight.
His fifty-minute sermon was quickly released online and went viral in Saudi social network
circles, prompting the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to give him a five-year prison sentence and a
ruling that he could not deliver khutbahs in the future.
Not only did this extremist message take place in the heart of Saudi and Wahhabism,
Riyadh, but it also occurred at a state-operated mosque, given by a state-sanctioned imam. This
indicates that the ‘fringe’ group of radical clerics may not be as ‘fringe’ as the imams in Mecca
and Medina would have the population believe. If a well-known, state-educated imam gives such
a khutbah at a popular mosque in the Saudi capital, it would be folly to assume that extremist
messages were only taking place on Salafi satellite TV channels or at mosques in small desert
towns. These messages clearly resonated, as the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Political Violence estimated that by 2013 up to a thousand Saudi nationals were participating in
the Syrian jihad (Zelin 2013). Several other Saudi clerics were implicated as supporters of ISIS,
such as Sheikh Muhammed al Arefe, a prominent professor at King Saud University. Al Arefe
praised ISIS through his various social media accounts and inspired youth to join ISIS (Valentine
2015). Therefore, the problem that faced the establishment was not just faux clerics who
espoused radical ideology, but also ones from within the Ulama. Sheikh Sudais, whose khutbahs
were previously quoted in this section, was one of these establishment clerics. In March of 2015
Sheikh Sudais came under scrutiny for a khutbah that openly advocated for sectarian violence.
He states, “Our war with Iran, say that out loud, is a war between Sunnis and Shiites…it is truly
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sectarian. If it was not sectarian, we will make it sectarian…our disagreement with the Rafidha
(Shiites) will not be removed nor our suicide to fight them” (Mohammed 2015). Sheikh Sudais is
an imam at the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the most followed and publicized mosque in the world.
Such a message is a substantial break from others within the Ulama that advocated for simple
humanitarian efforts. Given his previous praise for the government’s efforts, calling for an allout sectarian war with the Shia is a substantial progression from his earlier rhetoric.
Saudi clerics were not the only Gulf figures to call for physical intervention in Syria. A
prominent Egyptian cleric based in Qatar, Dr. Yusuf al Qaradawi, played an integral role in
pressuring Gulf governments and youth into intervening and fighting in Syria. His views
progressed over the course of the conflict. In 2012, he was a signatory on to a fatwa given by
over one hundred Muslim scholars that declared it to be impermissible for Muslims to be a part
of Assad’s regime, and made it compulsory for Muslims to support the opposition (Islam21
2012). Then, in 2013, Qaradawi led a group of scholars that issued a call to jihad in Syria,
specifically singling out the need for armed resistance (MEO 2013). These calls and rulings
culminated in a May 2013 rally in the Qatari capital of Doha. Qaradawi did not hold back on his
views, proclaiming,
“Every Muslim trained to fight and capable of doing that must make himself
available…Iran is pushing forward arms and men so why do we stand idle? The leader of
the party of Satan (Hezbollah) comes to fight the Sunnis…Now we know what the
Iranians want…They want continued massacres to kill Sunnis…How could 100 million
Shia defeat 1.7 billion Sunni? Only because Sunni Muslims are weak!” (Lister 2015).
It is difficult to understate the importance of this speech. Qaradawi is a greatly respected scholar
in the Islamic world, having studied at the famous Al Azhar Universtiy, author of over one
hundred books on Islam, and frequent guest on Al Jazeera (Lister 2015). For a relatively
mainstream and respected cleric to openly rule that able-bodied Muslims must fight in Syria
against Assad is nothing short of seismic in its importance. By dragging mainstream opinion to a
more conservative and violent direction, Qaradawi makes jihad no more a virtue extolled by
radical clerics, but one demanded by a popular imam. Furthermore, he does so in the Gulf, where
wealthy patrons and willing youth eagerly listened to his message. While the religious
establishment and other clerics in the Gulf disagreed to varying degrees on the type of
intervention necessary in Syria, there was certainly ijma’, or consensus, on one issue: Islam
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dictated that supporting Syrian opposition and intervention in the Syrian civil war was not just
necessary, but compulsory.
Conclusion: Assessment of Tangible Influence
Recalling the original conundrum proposed by Dawisha, was Islam a motivator of state
policy, that is intervening in Syria, or did Islam operate in another functional role that
supplemented such a decision, such as being used as a legitimizing tool by the state? Indeed, this
already complex question is complicated further when one adds the analytical elements of
international relations theory. However, it is important to begin with such theory, as it will serve
to frame the rest of the analysis. Considering Barnett and Telhami’s work on Islamic identity,
their thesis of the primacy of Islamic identity is proven to be true in light of the Saudi khutbahs.
In each, the Islam is explicitly placed above the state, setting a standard for collective identity
and constituency in Saudi Arabia- one where being Muslim is more important than being Saudi.
Furthermore, their emphasis on Umma solidifies this point, as more language is used to cast
Saudi and Gulf Muslims as part of a greater Umma, one that is in need of a defense, than lenses
that may view the same persons as Saudi, Syrian, or Qatari. Does, as Barnett theorize, this
Islamic collective identity legitimize action while making others unthinkable? It is clear in this
case study that it does indeed, as numerous clerics, specifically Sheikh Sudais and Dr. Qaradawi,
use Islamic identity and justification as the reason behind action. Contrarily, Islam also made
some actions unthinkable in the view of the Ulama, specifically the option of not intervening.
Casual admonishment for those that stood on the sidelines evolved into harsh and compulsory
calls for participation, with Islam as both the justifier and motivator.
Shaffer’s theory on legitimacy may be proven both true and false in this case study. She
theorizes that states where cultural interests are predominant frequently make decisions that may
be costly in a material way- but possibly beneficial in a cultural one (Shaffer 2006). In this
theory, religion is not a legitimizing tool, but it is the legitimacy itself. It is clear that the Ulama
were ready to make sacrifices in order to intervene, from financial to personnel losses, but the
option of not intervening likely would bring far worse consequences. For the state, were the
cultural payoffs of intervening, namely the ‘defending’ of Islam and true Muslims, enough to
outweigh what would undoubtedly be a long, costly, and embroiling conflict? As seen in the
previous chapter, Saudi and Qatar certainly worried about the ‘Shia-ization’ of Syria, but it was
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also shown that many realist reasons existed. Therefore, the payoff is not one of material vs.
cultural payoffs, as both pointed positively to intervention. This makes it both easier and more
difficult to assess Islam’s influence, for if both the state and the Ulama embraced the payoffs of
such a move, how can either’s influence be adequately assessed? Perhaps it is enough to say that
both played a role, but that shall be explored later.
Two other assertions by Shaffer are challenged or complicated by this case study. The first
is the idea that leaders can shape or mold religious identities in order to generate support for their
preferred policies. However, this is complicated by the fact that in this case the leaders are in
effect religious figures. It also depends on the relationship between the Ulama and the royal
family, but the latter are careful of the former’s domestic popularity, which brings up Shaffer’s
second assertion. She theorizes that regimes can often make decisions that go against the
dominant culture without much domestic retribution. Is this the case in Saudi? Could the royal
family openly defy the Ulama on a policy decision? Likely not, considering the salience and
importance of Islam at every level of Saudi society, not to mention all state decisions are given
Islamic justifications. Furthermore, it would upset the balance and implicit agreement between
the royal family and the Saudi population. In exchange for government oil subsidies, the royal
family is given support. In short, Saudi rulers could not afford to ignore domestic feeling, and
this is proven by the Wikileaks documents in the previous chapter. However, a way around this
would be for the state to co-opt a cleric, in essence buying him off, in order to gain the type of
ruling that would justify their actions.
When it comes to discussions about foreign policy in Islam in lieu of this case study,
there are a few points to consider. First and foremost, certain decisions and opinions of the
Ulama are unique to Wahhabism. The clerics issued a takfiri ruling when it declared the Assad
regime as non-Muslim, as that judgment is simply not possible or permissible in other sects.
Second, the messages in the khutbahs clearly built off of the takfir ruling, evolving into the belief
that Assad’s property and land was now Dar al Harb, thus distinguishing it from Dar al Islam.
This is important because Syria was not always Dar al Harb as a few sheikhs pointed out, as the
Umayyad caliphate and other Sunni rulers have long laid claim to Syria. Under Wahhabism, it is
permissible to not only attack apostates, but to also recapture land that was previously in Dar al
Islam, thus allowing Saudi intervention and framing it in the lens of religion. Furthermore, as
seen in the Quran, the theme of oppression features prominently, a troupe that was continually
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emphasized by the Saudi Ulama in relation to Assad. Each mention of the oppressors strikes a
deep religious chord with Islamic audiences, and conflating the Assad regime with the
oppressors described in the Quran does much to galvanize a population. Lastly, the pervading
lack of faith by Muslims in the just of the international system appeared continuously in the
primary sources, supporting Berger’s thesis that as a result, Islam would be used to frame justice
(Berger 2010). As seen in the khutbahs, there was much criticism about the hesitation to act by
the international community. This led the sheikhs to re-emphasize that Islam was the only way to
gain justice for the Syrian people, and that only true Muslims could be counted on for the
defense of the Umma. As a result, the domestic population was convinced that, or at the least
exposed to, the belief that Islamic actions and motivations would be the way to end the suffering
of the Syrian people, as opposed to relying on international norms and actors.
In reality, this analysis and its outcome truly rests on the relationship between the Saudi
Ulama and the state, or royal family. The connection and interplay between the two suggest a
complexity, a lack of a single fissure on which to draw a line between the camps of ‘influencer’
and ‘tool’. Indeed, both are true for both groups, and cases of working together are just as
numerous as the number of feuds that arose over the decades. Furthermore, there is a common
mischaracterization of the Ulama, which is the tendency to view it as a singular entity or bloc
where each sheikh conforms to the same views and shares the same relationship with the state as
his establishment peer. Nothing could be further from the truth, as each sheikh has his supporters
and his enemies within the Ulama and the state. For instance, Saudi sources close to the royal
family indicated that Sheikh Sudais is well liked within the state apparatus- he married into the
royal family and is widely viewed as being bought off by the state. The state even granted Sheikh
Sudais wide tracts of land in Mecca, which are incredibly valuable. In contrast, it is known that
Sheikh Shuraim is viewed as problematic to the royal family, but is tolerated because of his
domestic popularity as an imam and reciter. With this in consideration, could the state control the
Ulama if it wanted to, seeing as each sheikh has a different relationship with the state? This is
not likely, though it could choose to promote or support certain messages over others. In
contrast, the Ulama could influence the state, for any message given by a domestically popular
sheikh would have wide ranging impact if the population put pressure on the state. In addition, a
controversial message given by a sheikh that is known to be in the pockets of the royal family
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will not likely have much effect, though it may among portions of the population where the royal
family is popular.
What then, of this case? Were the Ulama and state working in harmony, as both Islam
and state policy dictated an intervention? Perhaps, though the evidence suggests a more muddied
picture, one that evolved as time progressed. Timing is a crucial variable in this study. Religious
rhetoric only gained steam in late 2011, after Saudi cut off diplomatic ties with Syria. However,
the decision by Saudi and Qatar to arm rebel factions in the same period coincided with calls by
the religious establishment for action. Furthermore, as 2012 and 2013 saw escalations in armed
involvement by the Gulf, so too did those years see the introduction of takfir, jihad, and other
doctrine that called for involvement. This suggests some level of either cooperation or influence.
Considering the closeness of the Ulama and the state, to conclude that coincidence is the answer
would be incongruent with history and logic. While the Ulama may not initially agreed with the
state decision to cut off diplomatic ties, it may have been swayed by the atrocities of the Assad
regime, or the reports of sectarian flare ups- the perfect instigator for Wahhabism’s sectarian
nature.
Another important factor is the weight and power of the domestic population. It was
proved that the royal family and the state take great pains to take domestic feeling into account,
which coincides with the fact that the Ulama enjoy great popularity and esteem amongst the
population. Given Saudi society’s emphasis on religion, this is unsurprising. Therefore, Islam,
through the messages and teaching of the Ulama, has a great effect on the population, which in
turn can put pressure on state decisions. However, while Islam may have driven the domestic
sphere to place pressure on the Saudi state, is religious influence transferrable to another
medium? In other words, is religious influence still considered influence when it transforms and
acts in the mode of domestic influence? The answer is yes, as religion remains the primary
motivator, and therefore is an influence, though the medium is different. Religious influence
does not have to have a religious mouthpiece, in fact it could be argued that the pressure of the
masses makes for a more effective one. Thus, the state can be motivated by religion through
giving into domestic pressure. In this case study, this phenomena likely occurred- the Ulama,
with their gory details and emotional calls to jihad on behalf of the Umma, singling out Saudi
citizens as Islam’s lone protector, galvanized the population into supporting intervention. Some,
as evidenced by the high number of foreign fighter figures, took this message into their own
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hands, while others took more conventional paths of donating money or other means. The state
could not afford to ignore these calls; to do so would lose significant support and face by the
domestic population and stir contention with the Ulama.
An excellent embodiment of the royal family’s trepidation and complex relationship with
domestic criticism and the Ulama comes in the form of Sheikh Arefe, a cleric understood by
many to be cooperative and in the good graces of the royal family. In 2013 Sheikh Arefe caused
a firestorm around the Middle East while giving a khutbah in Cairo, where he called for men to
join the jihad in Syria, saying, “I swear to Allah the caliphate is coming. It’s as if I am seeing it
with my own eyes” (Al Arabiya 2014). This statement and message is further compounded by
comments Sheikh Arefe made just months before, where he defended al Qaeda’s actions and
doctrines. This call and explicit support of jihad in Syria was a break with the rest of the Ulama,
and caused the Saudi state to receive harsh criticism. Still, the state issued no rebuke or arrest of
Sheikh Arefe, even though he brought considerable international criticism onto the government.
However, the Saudi state did arrest Sheikh Arefe a year later in 2014, but not for calling young
men to fight in Syria. In fact, it was domestic criticism that caused the state to arrest Sheikh
Arefe, whose offense was tweeting criticism of the way the state handled the logistics, in
particular the train system, of the Hajj pilgrimage (MEM 2014).
However, many doubted that the state would arrest Sheikh Arefe over a few tweets, and
reports soon confirmed that the Hajj criticism was a convenient excuse to jail the cleric. In fact, it
was leaked that it was due to his refusal to cooperate with Saudi intelligence. The state initially
asked Sheikh Arefe to do speeches and give advice to Muslim youth in order to provide spiritual
council to those fighting in Syria, as well as persuading Saudi youth to refrain from joining ISIS
(New Khalij 2014). Sheikh Arefe consented, and even travelled to Turkey to lecture and provide
religious training to opposition (Noon Post 2014). However, Sheikh Arefe backed out because he
found the whole initiative to be a ploy by Saudi intelligence to increase communication between
Saudi forces and the religious leaders of the armed groups in Syria (Noon Post 2014). Jailing a
prominent cleric, one even known to be in the royal family’s good graces, the government would
need to present enormous justification to the public. The state could not get away with arresting
Sheikh Arefe because he refused to be a pawn for Saudi intelligence, as the domestic population
would protest such actions. Instead, the state appealed to Saudi’s responsibility and role in the
Hajj, something that resonates with all Saudis. By insinuating that Saudi was not doing enough
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to protect Muslims and facilitate the Hajj, Sheikh Arefe opened the door for the state to exploit
his words by framing them to the domestic population as a type of blasphemy. In reality, such
criticisms were valid and likely would have resulted in a simply reprimand; but the state, already
furious with Sheikh Arefe, had its perfect excuse and played domestic opinion to their advantage.
Contributing another layer of complexity to this question is the sectarian rhetoric evident
in both the state apparatus and religious establishment. Where is the line between religious
conflicts and Saudi fears of Iran due to political and economic reasons? Does one drive the
other? Indeed, as evidence by Ibn Taymiyya, anti-Shia rhetoric long predated any Saudi fear of
Iran’s economic prowess. Furthermore, given Wahhabism’s 18th century birth as an inherently
sectarian belief, it is clear that any anti-Shia rhetoric coming from the Ulama is no doubt pure in
its sincerity and hatred. However, state paranoia of Iran’s regional hegemony and potential
economic might is equally just. In this case, religion and state agree, and the lines between the
two blur when anti-Iran and anti-Shia rhetoric is espoused in public circles. One may feed the
other, but it is undeniable that both exist on their own terms. However, as each member of the
state is a Muslim, brought up in Wahhabi doctrine, religious animosity for the Shia is likely
present in each policymaker, ratcheting up the stakes in their geopolitical chess game with Iran.
Thus, religion is present and prominent in anti-Assad rhetoric, but so are political considerations.
Both are cogent, coexistent, and valid.
The Ulama proved they know the key to gaining influence in policy decisions- openly
express religious opinions about current events and impact the domestic population’s opinion. In
sum, while the Saudi state undeniably had political and realist motivations behind the decision to
arm and support Syrian rebels, it is clear that Islam was another motivation. While it was not the
only influence or motivation, policy decisions rarely, if ever, only have a singular motivator. The
level and salience of Islam in Saudi society, coupled with the might of the Ulama and their calls
to arm rebels and ease Syrian suffering, not only galvanized the domestic population but it also
pushed the state into making what is seen as the just and Islamic decision. While the state may
very well have reached that decision on its own due to political and regional considerations,
Islam as an influence exists in this landmark policy. It exists in domestic considerations, where it
is the motivation for action, as well as in each policy maker who was brought up in Wahhabi
madrassas. As was stated in a previous section, in Wahhabism, Islam is foreign policy. There is
no distinction.
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However, while it played a role and motivating factor, it was not the only one, as the
previous chapter showed. Thus, while it has been proved that realist and Islamic factors inspired
the Gulf decision to arm rebel factions and Syria, the picture is still not complete. Returning to
Shaffer’s theory on material vs. cultural payoff, the former must be further explored, since the
fact the Islam as a cultural payoff is now firmly established. Material interests were examined
through a geopolitical and realist lens in the first chapter, but were these the only material
interests of the state? Indeed, material interests do not only include political considerations, and
for a better and more nuanced picture, economic considerations and motivations must now be
taken into account. Motivation, as shown, can have many influences, and in this case study two
of them are realpolitik and religious considerations. In order to fulfill the complete picture
behind the motivation to arm Syrian opposition, this work now turns to political economy, and
its role as an influence in motivation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GULF-SYRIA POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF OIL
Given the economic weight of the Gulf monarchies, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar in
particular, it is crucial that any analysis of their intervention in the recent conflict in Syria take
into account economic motivations. Indeed, their nature as rentier states combined with the fact
that they have long relied on legitimating their domestic rule over civil society and foreign policy
through their wealth would suggest that their foreign policy continues to be at the least partially
determined by their own economic interests. Before looking at specific policies or economic
agendas that may have contributed to their Syria policy, it is important to situate the Gulf
monarchies in the context of the international economic system. As detailed to in the
introduction, it is analytically useful to understand Saudi Arabia and Qatar within World Systems
Theory (WST). Consequently, this chapter will begin with applying WST to each state.
Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the nature of the rentier state, as these states tend to
behave and craft policy differently than the rest of the world. This chapter will thus seek to
further contextualize Saudi Arabian and Qatari economic policy within the influential rentier
state literature. Subsequently, the political processes through which oil and natural gas have
shaped domestic political institutions in the Gulf will be examined in order to illuminate the
correlation between economy and political policy.
Large amounts of concentrated wealth has allowed ruling elites in the Gulf to establish
networks of patronage throughout the political system and to effectively create institutional
fiefdoms over which they have total control. There is little question that these networks have
underpinned the Gulf states’ relationship at both the domestic and regional policy levels prior to
the conflict in Syria. However, it is no less true that rentier economies are particularly
susceptible to the exogenous economic shocks associated with oil price fluctuation, and, in this
regard, it is possible that Saudi Arabia and Qatar have intervened in Syria in order to maintain
their own economic and domestic political stability. Indeed, the very timing of these
interventions can be partially explained by the changes in the international economy.
More specifically, the emergence of the United States as a swing oil producer after the
global recession in 2008 resulted in an important shift in the world’s natural resource market
which greatly impacted Saudi Arabian and Qatari decision making in the region both on a
holistic level and in particular in reference to their Syria policy. Indeed, an important argument
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that is oft repeated in many scholarly as well as journalistic circles in reference to Gulf
intervention in Syria is that the intervention on the part of Saudi Arabia and Qatar is primarily
motivated by the Assad regime’s rejection of a gas pipeline to be built from Qatar to Turkey,
which would run through Saudi and Syria. Instead, in 2011 Assad signed an agreement to build a
pipeline from Iran, running through Iraq, to Syria.
Thus, this chapter will present a few main lines of argument, each connected to a
different facet of political economy. First, this shift in Gulf policy came partly as a result of the
opportunities and constraints of the Gulf states operating under the current international
economic system. Second, the high level of political autonomy of the Gulf royal elite afforded by
the states’ status as rentier economies allowed for Saudi Arabia and Qatar to act within singular
economic interests that are not beholden to civil society. Another influence on this shift in policy
was due to the volatility of these economies as a result of specific crises, as well as the fact that
constant price volatility necessitates the need for a stable source of oil, gas, and production.
Finally, Gulf support for Syrian opposition can be accounted for through the international
competition over the construction of an oil pipeline going through Syria, which is reflected in the
subsequent interventions in Syria by international actors such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and
Russia.
Gulf Foreign Policy in the Context of the International Economic System
Although a review of WST was presented in chapter one, at this juncture it is necessary
to address this theoretical framework as it pertains to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in more specific
terms. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, an important proponent of World Systems Theory,
the world is divided into two main groups: the core, which dominates the economy, and the
periphery, which is exploited by the core for its natural resources and is generally poorer and less
developed. In addition to the world having a core and periphery, each region can have its own
subgroups as well. Hence, a nation can be in the periphery in terms of its global standing but also
a core country in its regional status. During the colonial period, the Middle East, a world
periphery region, experienced a significant amount of economic and military penetration from
the West, which effectively continued into the post-colonization era in which states in the region
continued to depend on client-patron relationships with the West, inherited from the colonial
period (Brown 1984).
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However, in the Gulf these client-patron relationships became complicated by two
important geo-strategic and economic developments: the establishment of the Gulf region as a
‘bridgehead’ supporting the security interests of the United States, and the genesis of the rentier
state. More specifically, the hegemonic British and American powers created a special
relationship with Saudi Arabia that would prove to forge an alliance based on mutual geopolitical
and economic interests (Galtung 1971). Essentially, this relationship meant that the interests of
the hegemonic core and the periphery elites were similar and shared. According to scholars of
WST, this effectively meant that the policy of rulers in the periphery did not always take the
form of what was in the best interest of the domestic population. Furthermore, as will be
explored in greater detail in the next section, the political elites of Gulf rentier states are in a
natural position to become the bridgehead of the core, as they control vast amounts of natural
resources but are still relatively weak in terms of military and political capability.
There is little doubt that Saudi Arabia is part of the core in the Middle East region, as
well as acting as the bridgehead in the Middle East for the global hegemon, the United States.
There are also few arguments that would hypothesize that this relationship is not founded upon
oil and natural resources. This special economic relationship is buttressed by a deep and historic
military partnership. It is also built upon the reliance of the Gulf elites on the continued success
of the core’s economy. Thus, Saudi Arabia must craft policies with both its own and the core’s
interests in mind. However, a core argument I present in this chapter is that this relationship is
changing due to two important developments: the growing power associated with the great
influence of the Saudi economy, and the United States’ decreasing need for Middle Eastern oil or
gas. In recent years, this has meant that Gulf economic policies are relatively more autonomous
and less dependent upon the interests and patronage of the United States as WST scholars would
predict. Furthermore, in geopolitical terms, the status of the Gulf as a bridgehead for U.S.
interests has also undergone a significant change in recent years. While smaller Gulf states
continue to tie themselves closely to their alliance with the U.S. and the West, more powerful
and economically independent states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have chosen to hedge their
policies by aligning with a wider range of allies. Still others in the Middle East, most notably
Syria, have at times chosen to align with Iran, and by extension, Russia as well.
As noted in chapter two, Qatar’s foreign policy is increasingly characterized by what
international relations scholars term ‘hedging.’ Importantly, this policy of aligning with multiple
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international actors and powers simultaneously can also be seen through WST and Qatar’s status
in the regional and global order. As a consequence of its small size, low population, and minimal
military capability, Qatar is often forced to hedge and leverage both regional and global powers
against one another in order to gain economic, military, and political benefits. As an important
example, Qatar often represents its proximity to Iran as a source of both domestic vulnerability
as well as a threat to international security in order to receive and sustain military protection
from the United States. However, it is also important to note that Qatar seeks to maximize its
economic gain by doing business with Iran, working closely with Tehran in the Persian Gulf on
natural resource matters. Moreover, Doha also goes against Saudi policies, even though these
polices are often in line with U.S. interests. This seeming act of rebellion on the part of Qatar is
further complicated by the fact that Qatar owes its protection to the U.S., and as a result Qatari
policy is carefully crafted to create spaces to push back but to never completely contravene or
undermine the interests of Western powers in the region.
Rentier Politics and Gulf Foreign Policy in Syria
If the location of the Gulf within the international economic system provides both
constraints and opportunities in Gulf foreign policy decision making, it is also important to
emphasize the role of their rentier status as a crucial element in this process. As is widely known,
oil-exporting rentier states are dependent upon rents, or state generated revenues accrued from
the difference in the market price and the cost of production of petroleum. A state is considered
to have a rentier economy when it has two characteristics: “rent needs to play a predominant role
within the economy concerned, and the origin of that rent must be external to the state” (Niblock
2007, 15). Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar fit this profile, as each state’s economy is built up from
government expenditure, which acquired the funds through oil rents. Though there is no
scholarly consensus on how much of a government’s income should come from rents to be
considered a rentier state, some suggest that it must be at least forty percent (Luciani 1987). In
2009, the percentage of oil revenues as a percentage of the state’s income was eighty-two percent
for Saudi and forty-five percent for Qatar (Ehteshami 2013). Both of these figures are above
Luciani’s proposed cut-off for a rentier economy, and Qatar’s figure would be significantly
higher if natural gas were included in the figure. Each state’s trade is also dominated by natural
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resources, with eighty-five percent of all exports from Saudi constitute as fuels, with Qatar
checking in at eighty-four percent (Ehteshami 2013).
In rentier states, the state is freed from its domestic economy through external income,
meaning, “Individual strategies of sharing the rent dominate political strategies of organization,
and distribution is a more important state function than regulation or economic policy in the
strictest sense” (Hertog 2005, 113). As Hertog explains, a rentier state is less concerned about
forging and evolving its domestic economy, but chiefly deals with distribution and recipients of
its massive wealth accrued from abroad. They can choose when and where rents are distributed,
and as will become apparent, they can create a system of governance that solidifies their rule. As
Hertog notes, “Distribution is not neutral but discriminatory by its very nature and hence tends to
induce politics, just like redistribution in other states” (Hertog 2005, 113). However, the
domestic population does play a role in rentier states, as rents empower the state vis-à-vis
society. The state, upon distribution of rent wealth, is empowered by the population, whose
loyalty is given to the state because of subsidies and other economic benefits.
It is important to note here that due to the intertwined nature between the state and the
economy in rentier states, rentier arrangements can shape and restrict state policies, including
foreign policy (Kamrava 2012). This is because rentier relationships are usually mutually
reinforcing, deepening existing power structures so that both parties, the state and foreign
corporations, may benefit. Moreover, not only is there mutual dependence between the state and
the corporate, but rentierism also establishes reinforcing relationships between the state and the
population. Thus, the state relies on the domestic population for loyalty and legitimacy of rule,
which the population accepts on the conditions of economic benefits and state subsidies. As a
result, the rentier state is now beholden to and intertwined with two forces that can be at odds
with each other: foreign, corporate entities and the domestic population. In this way, state
policies are constrained by these sometimes-competing forces. The more a state relies on rents,
the more it is at the mercy of corporate interests (Kamrava 2012).
In addition, the nature of a rentier state’s foreign policy is also different than most states
primarily because the constraints and opportunities noted above shape the foreign policy process
in unique ways. Due to their relative domestic stability, which stems from state subsidies, as well
as large funds to draw upon, rentier states are often tempted to get involved in transnational
issues that are not beneficial (Luciani 2009). Though it is seen as attempts at accruing or
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establishing influence, these involvements rarely achieve such goals. This is clearly evident in
the case of recent Gulf-Syria policy. While both Qatar and Saudi Arabia are engaged in
supporting Syrian opposition, the regional instability associated with these interventions have
had the unintended consequences of undermining the political legitimacy and long-term
economic security of both Gulf states. Moreover, rentier foreign policy and domestic politics can
often be more agile and accommodating, as seen in Qatar’s maverick diplomacy (Kamrava
2013). Qatar’s alliance with Islamist actors during the Arab Spring and in its Syrian intervention
is a break with Saudi and Western policy, but due to its flexibility in foreign policy such actions
are not constrained by typical norms. With economic leverage and domestic stability, rentier
states can often pursue policies with a level of autonomy that most other periphery nations could
not.
The Transformation of the Oil Economy and Gulf Policy
Importantly, this relatively higher level of autonomy enjoyed by the Gulf states with
respect to both domestic and foreign policies is in part a result of the very nature of oil
production and the exportation process. Indeed, due to the nature of the oil refinery process, the
Gulf states have by and large avoided the high level of economic and political dependence on the
great powers that define the relationship of the West and the non-oil exporting states in the
Middle East. Oil must be treated and refined, and due to its liquid nature, it either must be
refined close to the point of extraction or travel through pipelines or cargo ships to their refinery
destination. As a result, the refining process takes place in the state of its extraction, or at the
very least, the state is paid large sums for it to be refined elsewhere. Thus, the Gulf states, and
most oil states, are in a natural position to avoid great dependence on the advanced industrialized
states.
While the exportation of oil began in the 1940s, it was still not a crucial part of the Gulf
economy, but this changed in the 1950s when the 50-50 oil profit arrangement was agreed upon,
leading to the combining of the Saudi state and royal family finances (Ehteshami 2013). Over the
next few decades, oil productions and profits reached unforeseen levels. In 1957, Saudi made
$323 million from oil, with Qatar reaching profits of less than $50 million- just ten years later,
on the eve of the Arab-Israeli war, Saudi was raking in $903 million while Qatar made $105
million (Ehteshami 2013). It is difficult to understate the importance and sheer size of these
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increases, though these markups pale in comparison to the next ten years. In 1980, oil profits in
Saudi reached $41 billion and Qatar checking in at $2 billion (Ehteshami 2013). This windfall,
partly due to the heavy increase in oil prices during the 1974 war with Israel and changes in the
global market, cemented the Gulf states status as a major financial player in the global economy.
These windfalls were mirrored in the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq, and by the 1980s the
GCC was responsible for a quarter of the world’s production of crude oil (Lawson 2012).
Unsurprisingly, it was in the early part of this decade when the Gulf states formed the GCC,
seeking to unify and protect their respective economic interests and oil production policies. By
the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production accounted for an astonishing 12.4% of the
world’s output, as well as a third of OPEC’s production (Ramady 2005). This was due to not
only increased oil prices, but increased production as well: Saudi went from four million barrels
a day in 1987 to producing eight million per day in 1990 (Ramady 2005).
The turn of the millennium once again changed the nature of the GCC oil economies due
to wild swings in oil prices and the world market. Since high rates of volatility are likely with
natural resource based economies, the Gulf states are usually well prepared to meet any drastic
changes in the market. In the early to mid 2000s, oil prices skyrocketed, going from $28 per
barrel in 2003 to a hefty $150 in 2008, resulting in yet another cash windfall for Saudi and Qatar
(Ehtashami 2013). During these boom years, it is estimated that GCC states accumulated close to
$2 trillion (Ehtashami 2013). By 2008, oil and gas accounted for ninety percent of all Saudi
revenue, while it was responsible for sixty percent of Qatar’s (Kamrava 2012). However, these
profits quickly came to a halt with the advent of the 2008 global recession, where the price of oil
crashed and the Gulf states had to quickly assess the level of damage that had been done to their
economies. It is estimated that the global recession caused Saudi and Qatari assets to decrease by
approximately $46 and $27 billion respectively, while GCC oil revenues plummeted from $577
billion in 2008 to just $342 billion in 2009 (Ehtashami 2013). Just as it looked the Gulf states
would suffer with the rest of the world, the volatile nature of oil appeared once more, and oil
prices quickly recovered- leading to a fast recovery by both Saudi and Qatar.
Just two years after reporting record low numbers in 2009, the GCC reported record
highs of $608 billion in 2011 in income (Ehtashami 2013). In particular, Saudi’s real GDP
growth went from just 0.1% in 2009 to 4.6% in 2010 and 6.8% in 2011 (Ramady 2014). Per
capita income increased in the Kingdom from $14, 129 in 2009 to $21, 046 in 2011 (Ramady
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2014). Thanks to recovering and increasing oil prices, the GCC states now were in a position to
capitalize on the rest of the world’s downturn. While the global economic situation deteriorated,
GCC states, especially Saudi and Qatar, quickly used the windfall to their advantage and
invested in the West and used the crises to broaden their asset portfolios (Ehtashami 2013). It is
estimated that Saudi foreign assets accounted for $862 billion in 2013, a massive increase of
almost twenty percent from just a year prior (Ramady 2014). This type of investment is used as a
protection against low oil prices, which can decrease at a moment’s notice. Saudi’s stability led
to an AA- investment grade from Fitch and Standard & Poor, exemplifying the type and scope of
recovery Saudi went through as a result of the oil market (Ramady 2014).
Given its strong numbers in the early-to-mid 2000s, and its incredible recovery, it is
unsurprising that the GCC intended to use economic leverage to bring Assad back into the Arab
fold. This period of recovery allowed the Gulf states to pursue alliance formation with Syria and
alignment against Iran because of its strong economic position in the region. They were in an
excellent position to entice Assad, whose state had been devastated by the recession. However,
as will be shown later, this appearance of economic stability may have been a mirage. Only a
few years after oil prices recovered from the global recession of 2008, oil prices once again
decreased. Furthermore, Saudi Arabian investments abroad were hit especially hard during the
recession, causing the Kingdom’s coffers to shrink as a result. Lastly, it should be noted that
Iran, due to tight and increasing economic sanctions, did not experience the same recover the rest
of the oil-producing GCC countries did.
Oil Wealth, Institution Building, and Political Autonomy
Clearly, the enormous wealth of the Gulf states played a key role in influencing foreign
policy decisions, and in particular affording the GCC countries a level of autonomy in meeting
their foreign policy objectives. This was evidenced in the context of the recovery period, where
as noted above Saudi Arabia managed to support the Assad regime in a policy that stood in
contradiction to the expressed policy of the U.S., which was to isolate and undermine the regime
in Damascus. It is important to note that the very manner in which the great wealth accumulated
under the rentier system in Saudi Arabia also greatly increased the autonomy in decision making.
This was done in two key ways: first, it ensured the formation of a vertical clientelist political
system in which royal family elites retain economic and political power over state institutions.
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Consequently, the royal family is able to coordinate foreign policy with respect to their own
individual and familial interests with little opposition in civil society. Second, the actual nature
of investments in Saudi Arabia in terms of volume and destination has effectively insulated the
monarchy from many consequences of the global recession that impacted most other states. This
in turn has afforded them autonomy from dramatic shifts in the international economy, and, to a
certain extent, global hegemonic powers. Taken together, this has meant that Saudi Arabia, and
to a lesser extent Qatar, have been able to formulate and implement their Syria policies with
respect to the economic interests of the royal family rather than the domestic population or their
traditional Western allies.
Naturally, tracing the great amounts of money these states spent in the last few decades is
a Herculean task, but three areas quickly become apparent as recipients or mediums of large
sums of wealth: state institutions, foreign assets and investment, and foreign aid. Considering the
expansion and explosion of oil rents coincided with the early beginnings and creation of the
Saudi state, it is logical to assume that wealth accrued from rents played a major role in state
institution building. This, taken together with Saudi Arabia’s patron-client political system,
crucially impacted the nature of state policies. Specifically, the high level at which oil wealth
linked state and family coffers essentially created little separation between the state bureaucracy
and family profits. Furthermore, as is typical with rentier states, this also ensured that state
distribution was effectively controlled by a select group of people that belonged to the royal
family.
As a natural result, this usually creates client-patron relationships with either institutions
or individuals that are recipients of this selective distribution, and Saudi is no exception to this
rule. In more typical modern bureaucratic states and advanced industrialized economies, there is
usually a high level of horizontal communication between institutions. For instance, the Ministry
of Defense will be in close contact with Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of Interior will closely
coordinate with the military. However, in rentier states that have top-heavy distribution channels,
this is not the case. Because the Saudi royal family controls state distribution, there is “little need
for communication between different sets of institutions and actors, and hence the horizontal
integration of the system was very low, as ‘clientelism’ denotes vertical structures of
communication and exchange” (Hertog 2005, 116). Since these state institutions are funded by
the royal family, there is only top-down communication, and as a result only top-down policy-
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making. Furthermore, as Hertog notes this creates a client-patron relationship between
individuals of the royal family and entire state institutions. Mehan Kamrava states, “the Al Saud
family has been able to leverage bureaucratic and royal largesse to create a system of ‘segmented
clientelism’- a ‘heterogeneous system of formal and informal, rent-based clientelism in which
vertical links dominate’” (Kamrava 2012, 55). Not only does this damage and hinder the
effectiveness of the state to carry out traditional functions and decision making, it can also create
overlapping institutions due to lack of communication. This vertically dominated system creates
a type of ‘fiefdom’ in which institutions are essentially dominated by a handful of people.
Depending on the resources and how closely connected they are to their patron, these institutions
can turn into ‘islands of efficiency’, where some institutions are modern, well run, and efficient
(Hertog 2005). Furthermore, in contrast to efficiency, some state offices will become more
corrupt than others as a result of lacking a consistent ‘patron’ in the royal family.
Due to the growing size and influence of the royal family, there is more and more
influence by various princes in business, government, and on foreign policy. This bourgeois class
is not simply the top of the royal family, who are worth billions of dollars, but also the thousands
of families whose worth tops $100 million, bringing the total number of the Saudi elite to well
over five hundred thousand, or about three percent of the total population (Luciani 2005). Since
familial ties are often involved, the vertical nature of these institutional links is unsurprising.
Steffen Hertog describes the nature of such patronage within state structures:
“There is patronage between elite members (e.g. senior princes protecting and positioning
their offspring and younger full brothers), between elite members and institutions (for
instance, senior princes are known to be close to certain ministers or ministries), and also
within institutions (various forms of bureaucratic patronage and internal segmentation of
departments and sections; patterns of kinship or regional background sometimes play a
role here)” (Hertog 2005, 123).
The extent and scope to which these systems of patronage are salient in the Saudi state therefore
can create incoherence in the implementation of policies and cause certain agencies to be
completely isolated from one another (Hertog 2005). This segmented clientelism impairs the
horizontal coordination of policies and creates a number of potential of ‘veto’ personas who can
stop policy negotiation or implementation at any point. However, the large scope and fragmented
nature of this system means that it integrates a large number of actors into this system, though
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many are elites, which reduces the overall pressure on the royal family, as many think they have
influence or control over the policy process (Hertog 2005). The money flowing through these
networks can create islands of efficiency or completely isolate an agency through ignoring it, or
by cutting off its patronage network.
Royal elites face three options of where they can direct their money: traditional
patronage, islands of efficiency, or creating a royal fiefdom. The first is somewhat selfexplanatory, as elites will funnel money en masse through various channels to recipients who
then use it to improve a pet project or their institution. An elite could create an island of
efficiency, which is an institution that, while still integrated in the state with oversight, is
supplied and maintained so well that it outperforms other agencies in terms of efficiency,
technology, and policy implementation. The last option, creating a royal fiefdom, is most
important to this case study. These agencies are completely autonomous from other state
institutions, have consistent and inviolable budget allocation, and are effectively run as “states
within a state, with their own housing, education, and medical systems- again a sort of
duplication hard to imagine without the temporary availability of huge fiscal surpluses” (Hertog
2012, 236). These fiefdoms can also be islands of efficiency, and often are due to their closed
nature and heavy supervision of their royal patron. Their stand-alone nature reinforces the notion
of vertical-linkages, as they are not beholden or accountable to other state structures. In the Saudi
context, these fiefdoms are integral to this study because the two widely recognized institutions
run as fiefdoms are the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior (Hertog 2010). Various
elites, the patrons, sometimes use these ministries as ‘self-enrichment’ projects, individual
pursuits that combine mass patronage (the Ministry of Interior has over five hundred thousand
employees) and efficiency (Hertog 2012). The fact that two military related entities in Saudi are
effectively royal fiefdoms, controlled by a handful of elites, brings to the forefront the possibility
of personal interest affecting policy decisions. This is only compounded by the fact that rentier
state institutions are inevitably linked with corporations, blurring the lines between personal,
state, and public business policy.
While pouring money into state institutions and creating personal agencies makes up of a
considerable portion of where Saudi elites funnel their wealth, they also have invested heavily in
personal wealth funds and foreign assets. The main form Gulf funds and foreign assets take is in
the model of sovereign wealth funds (SWF), which are government-owned funds that are set up
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for a variety of economic purposes. SWFs are typically funded by the transfer of foreign assets
that are invested long-term in overseas accounts, and “allow for a greater portfolio diversification
and focus more on return than traditionally is the case for central bank-managed reserve assets”
(Bahgat 2012, 219). Rises in natural resource prices result in massive investment abroad through
SWFs, from the boom in the 1970s to the rise, collapse, and re-rise of prices in the mid-to-late
2000s. Current Deutsche Bank estimates indicate that total SWF holdings in the global market
add up to around $10 trillion, meaning they are a substantial player in the world economy
(Bahgat 2012). Gulf SWFs traditionally favor Western investments, and in particular investing in
U.S. and European financial companies rather than global healthcare or transportation (Baghgat
2012). Investing and creating SWFs is a natural choice for Gulf states for a number of reasons.
First, having significant and diversified financial holdings abroad can insulate them from the
volatility of oil prices, allowing them to weather any potential collapse of the oil market. Second,
as the Gulf states are rentier states, their wealth comes from unsustainable natural resourcestherefore every time oil is extracted, it represents a depletion of wealth, causing the Gulf states to
further invest in sustainable sectors, such as financial companies or real estate (Bahgat 2012).
Lastly, by investing in foreign assets, Gulf states encourage reinvestment from foreign actors
into their own economies (Niblock 2005).
Saudi and Qatar differ slightly in the way they chose to set up their respective SWFs and
the channels they use to move and invest money. All investments managed by Saudi are done
through the central bank, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). SAMA is technically
not a SWF by definition, but is always included by independent observers or financial
corporations as a SWF. SAMA investments fluctuate between $300 and $500 billion depending
on the state of the Saudi coffers, and acts as a centralizing agent to oil rents from different
companies like ARAMCO and subsequently invests them abroad (Seznec 2012). SAMA, as the
Central Bank, invests accrued wealth on behalf of the royal family, and has gained a reputation
as well as criticism from some Kingdom circles as being too conservative on investments
(Seznec 2012). Having little tolerance for risk, SAMA chose not to invest heavily in western
markets during the boom of the 2000s, creating angst among Saudi elites. However, in the end it
was a brilliant move that prevented Saudi Arabia from being especially hard hit by the global
recession in 2008, whereas other investment funds lost up to sixty percent of their value (Seznec
2012). Interestingly, the Saudi royal family does not invest in shares or stocks, but puts all of its
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holdings in state funds. Conversely, Qatar uses a true SWF that operates completely independent
of the central bank called the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). The QIA has gained a
reputation for its intense secrecy, though somewhat paradoxically it also is known for its streaks
of acquiring substantial amounts of holdings in small time frames. The QIA mostly invests in
financial holdings and real estate, enjoying majority shares in Barclays Bank and Credit Suisse,
as well has owning massive tracts of London’s high-priced real estate (Seznec 2012). Though
QIA holdings are just a fraction of SAMA’s, sitting around $60 billion, this number will only
jump with the increase of natural gas production.
In addition to creating state institutions and SWFs, Saudi and Qatar also contribute large
amounts of their wealth to foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid. It should be noted
that there are significant differences between these two categories, but will be paired together as
both avenues mean that Gulf money from oil rents is being invested abroad. FDI is an investment
where returns are expected, whereas foreign aid is just that, with no financial return expected,
though political returns may be on the table. Saudi created its own FDI organization in the midseventies called the Saudi Development Fund (SDF), with the intention of financing
development projects abroad through loans. Saudi policymakers take into account
creditworthiness of the project, the state’s ability to repay back the Saudi state, and importance
of the project when considering investment (Mallakh 1982). However, over time FDI resulted
less in investment of development projects than it did more traditional investment avenues, such
as bonds and bank deposits. Return on Saudi FDI climbed in a short amount of time, going from
$7.4 billion in 1980 to $12.5 billion in 1985 (Ehteshami 2013). As these numbers continued to
increase and collide with high oil prices, the GCC began to look to the West for investment. By
2005, it is estimated that the GCC sank $24 billion into shares of stock in private U.S. and
European companies, but also made another pivot back to the Middle East as well (Lawson
2012). By 2006, FDI from the Gulf into the MENA region equaled the sum of FDI in the U.S.
and Europe, with Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Tunisia as the primary beneficiaries of this
investment (Lawson 2012).
By 2010, FDI from Saudi and Qatar had grown to almost unrecognizable levels of
investment. Just years removed from a global recession, Saudi FDI topped $35 billion, with
Qatar checking in at $8.7 billion, the second highest only to Saudi in the GCC (Ehteshami 2013).
These numbers are only for fiscal year 2010, and do not reflect the amounts these states
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previously poured into FDI in the last decade. By 2005, Saudi investments abroad were
estimated to be between $800 billion and $1 trillion, though these numbers would likely be even
greater if such estimates did not traditionally undervalue real estate holdings (Luciani 2005).
Recalling the income made from FDI in the 1980s, approximately $12.5 billion, it is estimated
that by 2005 Saudi was making around $35 billion a year from its investments, a figure which is
likely on the conservative end (Luciani 2005). Not only does FDI make Saudi and Qatar less
vulnerable to contingent factors, but as previously mentioned it also stimulates FDI into the
states themselves from abroad. Saudi itself was the recipient of $38 billion in FDI to fund
technological and development projects, and this trend was mirrored in the GCC as a whole, as
FDI inflows reached $60 billion by 2008 (Lawson 2012). Clearly, the Gulf states, with Saudi and
Qatar in particular, have placed high value in diversifying and investing abroad to shield
themselves from their own wealth’s volatility.
In addition to traditional FDI, the GCC has also given substantial amounts in terms of
foreign aid to humanitarian organizations, and most importantly, foreign governments. The SFD,
while also used for FDI, plays a major role in Saudi foreign aid, while the Qatar Foundation is
the primary channel through which Qatari funds are distributed. Saudi especially has a long
history of economic aid to developing states, and as seen in chapter two, economic aid is
consistently used as a bargaining chip for other means. GCC aid efforts find their genesis in
economic and military aid to Arab states during the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was during these
years where the ‘frontline’ states received most of the Gulf’s foreign aid. In 1976, Syria received
a $75 million loan from Saudi to rebuild and expand its internal infrastructure (Mallakh 1982).
By 1980, Saudi aid to Syria topped $155 million, with the majority of aid going towards
development projects such as the Damascus-al Masnah highway on the Lebanese border
(Mallakh 1982). However, not all Gulf aid was economic, and as seen during the Arab-Israeli
conflict, it could be military as well. In 1975 Saudi pledged $200 million to Syria for weapons
purchases, a result of Syria’s proximity to Israel. Though pan-Arabism and altruism were
certainly motivations, Gulf states also financed balance of payments deficits for poor states in
order to mitigate high oil prices (Barakat 2012).
A study from 1970-2006 showed a positive correlation between the amount of Gulf
states’ donations and their oil derived income (Barakat 2012). Once again, high oil prices lead to
increased investment abroad, though like oil, this means that Gulf aid also has a distinctly
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inconsistent and volatile nature. In addition, GCC states, particularly Saudi, gave over $1.3
billion in aid to conflict-affected states from 1999 to 2000, with Saudi alone giving almost one
billion itself (Barakat 2012). Such high numbers no doubt indicate Saudi hopes for influence and
control in such conflict areas, which include Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Furthermore,
almost half of Gulf aid goes directly to governments, with only a third going towards the Red
Cross, the Red Crescent, and the UN (Barakat 2012). These further indicate attempts at
influence, as governments are not traditionally the most effective distributors of aid, especially in
conflict areas. Lastly, Saudi set up in 1999 the Saudi Export Program, which extends loans and
guarantee services to foreign entities, creating a new and independent arm that oversees loan
extension to foreign governments (Ramady 2005). Recent aid from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to
Syria came through such channels, with assistance targeting areas in Syria hard hit by drought
and agricultural deterioration.
Oil Price Volatility and Policy Change in the Gulf
Despite the great wealth amassed through oil and natural gas exports, Saudi and Qatar
have significant challenges already facing them related to their increasingly high debt burden, the
emergence of the U.S. as a potential ‘oil swing’ country, and perhaps most importantly,
competition from other oil exporters and decreasing influence in setting international energy
prices. There is little question that these constraints, even more than the opportunities
engendered by their wealth, have played an important role in determining their economic and
foreign policies, including policies with respect to Syria.
For its part, over the last decade Doha has amassed substantial amounts of local and
foreign debt, leading many financial analysts to increase the percentage of risk associated with
Qatar (Ramady 2014). These worries are furthered by the emergence of more natural gas
producers, specifically the United States. MA Ramady states, “There is ground for concern that
maintaining such high public and commercial banking debt could pose a long-term risk for the
country, especially if the geopolitical gas landscape changes in favor of other non-Gulf producers
like the USA and Australia” (Ramady 2014, 136). Due to increased Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) outputs from other producers and stalling prices, Qatar finds itself in a difficult positionit has a number of large pipeline and construction projects, notably the 2022 World Cup stadia,
and in order to complete them it will need a consistent stream of high profits. In the late 2000s
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when LNG prices began to fall Qatar relied on rising oil prices to recover from the recession and
continue with its projects, but as prices began to collapse in 2014, it will need to find a way to
retain high profits.
Saudi finds itself in a similar position to Qatar in that its rentier nature has rendered it
vulnerable to contingent factors outside of its control. Risk assessments favor Saudi’s relative
domestic stability, but like Qatar financial sectors are leery of the Saudi economy’s volatile
tendencies. Ramady states, “both economic and financial risks are the major dominants of Saudi
Arabia’s country risk profile, while political risk has a smaller effect in comparison with the
other risk components” (Ramady 2014, 84). Recalling the nature of the Saudi state and its close
relationship with economy due to its rentier status, financial and economic risk essentially
amounts to political risk as well. Furthermore, like Qatar, Saudi has a massive glut of projects
planned in the upcoming years, from the Riyadh Metro to drilling projects, all together totaling
close to $800 billion (Ramady 2014). While this would typically not trouble the deep coffers of
Saudi, the volatility of oil no longer makes these projects a sure bet, especially when considering
global developments in the last few years. The United States, in a vein similar to what it did with
shale gas, has increased its crude oil production in recent years to such an extent that many
consider it to be the new ‘swing’ producer in the oil economy, a role traditionally occupied by
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Saudi (Aggarwal 2015). The swing producer can often decide whether to pull back production,
increasing prices, or filling the market with an oil glut, decreasing prices. With Saudi no longer
able to completely control the world’s oil market, there is creeping doubt and concern over the
economic risk the Kingdom faces. As a result, Saudi has recently attempted to make inroads in
the LNG market, with five hydrocarbon projects planned to take place in an attempt to further
their dependence from an unstable oil market (Ramady 2014). Both Saudi and Qatar, while they
are financially stable in the short term due to FDI and their foreign assets, find themselves in an
untenable and increasingly unstable position when it comes to their resource economies.
Though it does not happen until after Saudi and Qatari military intervention in Syria, it is
nonetheless necessary to examine the current state of the oil economy, specifically focusing on
the 2014 collapse and subsequent consequences. This will help to emphasize the volatility of the
market, as well as possibly explain certain actions by global powers in Syria, as discussed in the
next section. As late as June 2014, analysts from the International Energy Agency, Merill Lynch,
and Morgan Stanly predicted that oil prices would rise to over $140 per barrel, furthering the
post-recession boom and creating another windfall for the GCC (Aggarwal 2015). However,
soon after this prediction oil prices began to collapse and decrease in a drastic manner, with
prices bottoming out at just under $50 per barrel that same month. The reason was relatively
simple: increased supply lead to a glut in the market thanks to increased production from U.S. oil
and Canadian tar sands (Aggarwal 2015). The U.S. currently has the three largest oil fields in the
world with the Eagle Ford, Bakken, and Permian fields, and has not been shy at increasing its
production. In reaction to this glut, Saudi decided to increase oil production. As John Hannah
states,
“Saudi strategy has been to maintain high production, fight for market share, allow prices
to collapse, and wait for higher cost producers, particularly in America, to be driven out
of business. With cheaper oil spurring increased demand and squeezing out excess
supply, the theory was that higher prices would return before the Kingdom ever felt any
real economic pinch” (Hannah 2015).
This is typical Saudi policy in reaction to an oil glut in the market- to increase production
and wait until other producers feel the crunch of lower prices. However, Saudi miscalculated
about the timetable for its strategy, as well as the long-term prospects of the North American oil
market, and the prices remained historically low throughout 2014 and 2015. Saudi’s budget for
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fiscal year 2015 was based on the assumption that oil would be at around $90 per barrel, whereas
real market price is about half that, which resulted in Saudi undergoing a budget deficit of well
over $100 billion, or about twenty percent in 2015 (Hannah 2015). Furthermore, this led them to
liquidate up to $70 billion of their foreign assets in the past six months, depleting their foreign
reserves at close to $12 billion a month in order to sustain the state budget (Hannah 2015). While
it is clear that Saudi will not run out of money, such a collapse has led to international anxiety
from creditors and analysts, which could result in a credit downgrading and flight of capital, with
similar concerns also being levied at Qatar (Hannah 2015). This has come in the midst of several
costly military entanglements, which only deepens Riyadh and Doha’s concerns, but also their
resolve to find a solution. Such a solution, as will be explored next, could come in the result of
the Syrian Civil War.
Pipeline Politics in Gulf-Syria Relations
Despite the continued economic dominance of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries in the
region and in international energy markets, these recent economic crises over pricing and future
production levels, in combination with emergent competition between Saudi Arabia and Qatar,
have played a key role in the shift of their respective relationships with Syria. It is also the reason
a number of analysts of Gulf politics have described the interventions of both states in Syria as
grounded in ‘pipeline politics.’
It is important to recall the state at which the Saudi and Qatar economies found
themselves in the late 2000s and early Arab Spring days, as well as their relations with
Damascus prior to the shift in their foreign policy. From 2008-2010 it was clear that the Gulf
states intended to woo the Assad regime away from Iran and Russia through economic promises
of foreign aid and direct investment. Their ability to do this was a result of the quick rebound of
oil prices after the global recession, enabling them to barely feel the pinch of the market crisis.
However, despite the rash of money that befell the Saudis, as well as the Qataris, it still did not
disguise the other economic problems that plagued the two Gulf states at the time. The Saudis,
though they experienced an enormous influx of cash due to the rebound of oil prices, still
maintained noteworthy losses in their foreign assets due to the crumbling of the financial and
banking sectors. Furthermore, they had approved billions upon billions worth of project
spending, a precarious proposition even though the price of oil rents at the time made it sensible
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to do so. Lastly, the Saudis were searching for a way to reduce their dependency on oil, and as a
result planned several exploration projects to find gas off the Saudi coast. As for Qatar, LNG
prices did not recover like oil did, and thus had to rely on its comparatively low oil production to
recover from the recession. Furthermore, the Qataris were also constrained by the routes
available to them to transport LNG. While pipelines extended from Qatar to the UAE, Oman,
and Kuwait, the Qataris still did not have a way to tap into the European market. While they
enjoyed substantial success in trading with South Korea and Japan, the transport costs alone to
the East Asian states made the transaction less cost-effective. In addition, the entrance of the
U.S. and Australia into the gas market was further cause for concern. In short, Qatar needed an
outlet to transport its LNG to Europe, or else it risked letting go of its stranglehold on its share of
the market. The figure below shows the constraints on Qatar’s LNG transport abilities,
exemplifying its need to construct a pipeline to outside markets.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2015.
In 2009, around the time the GCC was attempting to bring back Assad into the Arab fold,
Qatar proposed the construction of what would forever change the world gas market. The
proposed pipeline, as shown in the figure below, would stretch from the Qatar North Fields and
travel through Saudi, Jordan, Syria, and then end in Turkey, where it would be shipped to
destinations in Europe (Carlisle 2009). Qatar was in the midst of finishing an overhaul and
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upgrade of its gas fields, attempting to more than double its capacity of LNG at the time. Qatari
ruler Sheikh al Thani met with Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan and agreed in principle on the
deal. Turkey was looking for a way to escape from the umbrella of the Russian gas market, as
they were Gazprom’s second largest customer, which meant it many ways it could be beholden
to Russian interests at any point (Escobar 2012). As a result, Turkey could solve two problems at
once: it could leave the sphere of Russian gas influence and simultaneously become the new
crossroads for gas transport from the Middle East to Europe, resulting in steady supplies of LNG
for itself and accruing large transit fees. After the bilateral meeting with Qatar, President
Erdogan stated that he desired a “long-term and stable relationship” with Qatar, and concluded,
“I think a gas pipeline between Turkey and Qatar would solve the issue once and for all”
(Carlisle 2009). However, one familiar sticking point to this deal was the Saudis, who could
obstruct the building of a pipeline in its territory in order to constrain Qatar’s profits and
dominance on the LNG market. Though this was a serious concern, Qatar felt that Saudi’s need
for LNG and the transit fees that it would gain would be enough to convince Kingdom policymakers.
Source: AU News. 2 December 2015.
There was another crucial caveat to the proposed Qatar-Turkey plan. Multiple reports
indicated that officials were seriously exploring the possibility of linking their pipeline to the
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strategic Nabucco pipeline project (Carlisle 2009). The Nabucco pipeline would run from the
Caspian Sea off the coast of Azerbaijan, through Armenia, and finally ending in Turkey, where
Caspian LNG would be transported to Europe. This project was already signed into transit
agreement by Erdogan and several EU prime ministers, and state leaders would make a final
decision on the Nabucco pipeline in the next year. Similar to the Qatar-Turkey pipeline, Nabucco
would also ease European and Turkish dependence on Russia for gas, and linking up with a
proposed pipeline from Qatar would assuredly diminish Russia’s hold on Europe and Turkey.
The two pipelines would join together in the Turkish northwest, relatively close to Istanbul.
However, like the Qatar-Turkey pipeline, the Nabucco project was not a sure deal, as Russia and
other conglomerates would lobby heavily to derail such a project, and the final agreements were
not year reached. In addition to Russian and possibly Saudi opposition, the project also hinged
on another pivotal state actor: the Assad regime.
Syria only became a net exporter of oil in the 1980s, exporting its resource to Europe via
the Mediterranean. Due to their relatively small and quickly depleting reserves, oil exports
continued to decrease under Bashar al Assad, and by 2009 the Syrian government was only
netting $4 billion in profits (Escobar 2012). Though Syria did not have vast reserves of crude oil
or gas, it did have something else that was pivotal in the market: location. In order for any Gulf
resource to go to Europe, it either had to go through the Suez Canal or through Syria. As a result,
the Assad regime began to realize that its profits should be made not from oil or gas itself, but
from transit fees as the locus of resource transport in the Middle East. As a result, Assad in 2009
announced a ‘four seas’ strategy, in which he “aimed at transforming the country into a regional
hub for oil transportation between the Persian Gulf and the Black, Caspian, and Mediterranean
seas” (Naresh 2012). This would allow Assad to be less reliant on economic aid from the Gulf
and other states, as well as have the power to control the transit of oil and gas from the Middle
East to Europe. Assad initially cooperated closely with Turkey by integrating their gas grids and
planned the pipeline extension from Aleppo to the Turkish city of Kilis, but that infrastructure
would eventually be for naught (Escobar 2012). Though the Qatar-Turkey pipeline would
certainly benefit Assad in his ‘four seas’ strategy, shortly after the pipeline was proposed in
2009, Assad categorically rejected the plan, with many claiming his rationale was “to protect the
interests of his Russian ally, which is Europe’s top supplier of natural gas” (Ahmed 2013).
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Rather than anger his patron and protector in Russia, Assad ultimately decided to protect Russian
interests, as the Qatar-Turkey pipeline would bring the Russian gas market to its knees.
Instead, Assad found a way to both secure a pipeline that would benefit Syria and be able
to satisfy Russian interests. In 2010, Assad pursued a deal and pipeline worth $10 billion that
would run from Iran’s South Pars oil field in the Gulf, through Iraq, Lebanon, and end in Syria,
with the construction of a refinery near Damascus (Ahmed 2013, UPI 2011). It was quickly
dubbed the ‘Islamic’ or ‘Iran’ Pipeline, and would directly compete with the proposed Nabucco
project. The 3,480 mile pipeline would be able to pump 3.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas per
day, and Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon would also have the ability to tap the pipeline in order to
satisfy their own natural gas needs (UPI 2011). The pipeline’s first two phases, going from the
Iranian port city of Asalouyeh to Ahvaz in eastern Iran were quickly completed and contracts for
the latter two sections were signed in 2011 (UP 2011). Russia did not seem bothered by the deal
and the speed with which it was enacted, for the latter indicates that the project likely had
Moscow’s blessing. Russia knew that if a pipeline would be constructed not matter what, it
would have an easier time controlling Syrian and Iranian output and direction of transit than it
would Qatar and Turkey. The Islamic Pipeline participants would go on to sign a final
“Memorandum of Understanding” in 2012, just as the Syrian Civil War began. This new plan
was “a direct slap in the face” to Qatar, who was back to where it started: without a path to the
European gas market (Ahmed 2013). Shortly after Assad rejected the proposed Qatar-Turkey
pipeline and signed the final deal for the Islamic pipeline, which coincided with the beginning of
the revolution, Qatar and Saudi cut off diplomatic relations and began to arm Syrian opposition.
Turkey, also concerned that the Islamic pipeline would bypass it as well, followed suit.
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Source: AUNews. “Is the Fight Over a Gas Pipeline Fuelling the World’s Bloodiest Conflict.” 2
December 2015.
Source: Mnar Muhawesh. Mint Press News. 9 September 2015.
Interestingly, in a bid to keep Russia out of the war, the Saudis offered to make an
agreement with Moscow, guaranteeing that no pipeline from the Gulf to Turkey would be built if
Russia stayed out of the war (Ahmed 2013). Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan reportedly told
Russia that the post-Assad regime would be “completely in Saudi hands” (Ahmed 2013).
However, Vladimir Putin did not buy the Saudi offer, and rejected any such promise. The Islamic
pipeline would carry thirty-percent more gas than the Nabucco pipeline, which still could have
been completed as it was not part of the Saudi offer, leaving Putin with only one real choice, as
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he would rather oversee the construction of a pipeline he could conceivably control or at the least
heavily influence. As for Turkey, prior to the civil war it took the path of advising at least some
measures of reform in Damascus, but it by no means wanted to see complete chaos along its
southern borders. However, with the scrapping of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline, as well as the
implementation of the Islamic pipeline, Turkey appeared to be in the same state as Qatarwithout any pipeline to Europe and still under the influence of Russia. Without the Qatar-Turkey
pipeline, the Nabucco project was also likely doomed. Soon after Saudi and Qatar joined the war
against Assad, Turkey joined in complete defiance to Russia and its interests. As Pablo Escobar
states, “In a post-Assad scenario all options are open…Ankara is definitely betting on a Sunniled post-Assad government not dissimilar to the AKP” (Escobar 2012).
The civil war only complicated matters as it grew in scope and complexity. Turkey
understandably cut off all joint resource exploration with Syria, and as rebels gained significant
territory in parts of Syria, the possibility of siphoning off resources, damaging pipelines, or
establishing resource ‘statelets’ became a real possibility. In addition to the vast amounts of
pipeline already laid in the Syrian west and east, there still exist gas reserves in the eastern
mountains, as well as several important refineries (Escobar 2012). Large gas fields offshore
between Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Syria were also discovered in 2009 (Imonti 2013).
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2015.
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As the war raged on, Iraq announced in 2013 it had given the other participating states the goahead for the construction of the Islamic pipeline in Iraqi territory (Hurriyet 2013). Given the
level of Iranian influence has on the Maliki and Shia-dominated Iraqi Parliament, this is hardly
surprising, especially considering the large profits that Iraq stood to make from such a deal.
However, this only served to strengthen Qatari resolve. Felix Imonti, an oil and gas strategist,
concluded that, “Qatar is in it for the long term. At the end there will be contracts for the massive
reconstruction and…development of the gas fields…it is strictly business to preserve the future
tranquility and well being of Qatar” (Imonti 2013).
As the war continued, Turkish President Erdogan demanded the creation of a US-Turkey
buffer zone in Syria that would reach Aleppo. To do so, Erdogan allowed the US Air Force to
use Incerlik air base to the US in order to fight ISIS. With American air cover, Turkish, Saudi,
and Qatari backed opposition made great gains in Northern Syria, and some analysts believed
this to be a cover to establish a Qatar-Turkey pipeline (Lin 2015). The lynchpin to this plan is the
city of Aleppo, the largest city in Syria and the setting of intense fighting between the regime and
foreign-backed opposition. Aleppo is where the Qatar-Turkey pipeline would run through on its
way to Kilis, Turkey. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that before Assad rejected the plan, he
integrated and coordinated the gas grids and pipeline infrastructure of Aleppo and Kilis. As a
result, there was already a significant foundation in place in Aleppo for a potential pipeline to
pass through to Turkey. Now, Erdogan proposed that Aleppo and the area along the pipeline
route to Kobani would be part of an opposition statelet as well as a buffer zone, which few saw
as a coincidence (Lin 2015). Though the US readily agreed to such a plan, it caused disillusion
with many observers, notably Major Rob Taylor, deputy commander of US Centcom in Florida.
Major Taylor asserted that Qatar, Saudi, and Turkey only wanted to topple Assad “so they can
control Syria and run their own pipeline through Turkey…Saudi Arabia and Qatar…hope to gain
a share of control over the new Syrian government and a share in the pipeline wealth” (Lin
2015). The goal of Saudi, Qatar, and Turkey seemed to be to carve out enough land through
opposition military conquest to at least establish pipeline production, a plan confirmed by the
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (Lin 2015). However, doing so did not come without great
risk: Russia was sure to take such an offense seriously, and as shown in the previous sections, it
had significant reason to oppose such a plan.
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At first to many observers, the idea of Russia opening a second theater of combat
operations made little sense. Already embroiled in a contentious conflict in Ukraine, Russia was
also suffering from a significant economic collapse, still crippled after the global recession.
However, as seen here, Russia had far more at stake in Syria than just protecting an ally- it had to
protect its monopoly on the European gas market. Reports even indicated that Assad not only
rejected the Qatar-Turkey plan out of deference to Moscow, but that he was put under heavy
pressure to do so (Orenstein 2015). Russia, as Mitchell Orenstein writes, “would rather see the
Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline built or no pipeline at all, so that it can best control gas supplies to
Europe, its main market” (Orenstein 2015). The EU had already taken steps to diversify their
imports of LNG, which President Obama reiterated in a speech in 2014, advising Europe to
reduce its reliance on Russia for gas as the U.S. has done through fracking (AUN 2015). Thus, at
this point, Russia was desperate to hold on to its majority share of the market. As the above
paragraph notes, the northeastern part of Syria was crucial to the Qatar-Tureky pipeline, with
Aleppo being necessary for the opposition to capture. As a result, massive military operations
were undertaken to wrestle it away from the regime, mostly resulting in success for the
opposition. By mid 2015, Qatari, Saudi, and Turkish backed rebels had captured vast amounts of
Idlib and Aleppo provinces, as well as connecting the captured territory to the Turkish border, an
obvious requisite for any potential pipeline. The map below shows the captured areas by the
opposition shortly before Russian intervention- note the northeastern pocket and vast areas of
uncontrolled territory in the west.
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Source: Institute for the Study of War. 14 September 2015.
Once the capture of Idlib and Aleppo occurred, along with the set up of an opposition-controlled
buffer zone in the northeast, the anti-Assad coalition had the tenuous foundation to proceed with
their pipeline aspirations, and were also well on their way to defeating Assad. However, Russia
realized it could no longer stand on the sidelines and allow its interests to be so easily
compromised. As a result, Russia intervened militarily on September 30th of 2015, transporting
vast amounts of fighter jets and soldiers to the regime-held port of Latakia. Though Russia
attempted to portray this to the international community as stepping in to fight ISIS, their actions
tell a different story, one that corroborates the importance of the pipeline. The significant
majority of Russian airstrikes targeted anti-regime rebels backed by Turkey, Saudi, and Qatar,
and most of them occurred around Aleppo and Idlib.
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Source: Institute for the Study of War. Genevieve Casagrande. 25 October 2015.
Russian planes continued to assault Gulf-backed opposition throughout the rest of 2015,
allowing the regime to regain significant territory under the cover of Russian strikes. The West,
fearful of any backlash from the Russians, continued to conduct air raids on ISIS but refrained
from engaging regime or Russian targets. This meant that Gulf-backed opposition only received
air cover if it was fighting ISIS, which limited its success against regime forces. Consequently
buoyed by its Russian allies, Assad’s forces began to retake swaths of land, with seemingly one
target in mind: Aleppo. Both Russia and Syria know of the importance Aleppo has, both as
Syria’s largest city and as the lynchpin to the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project. As 2015 gave way
to 2016, regime and Russian forces encircled Aleppo, and without sufficient coordination or
western backing, opposition forces began to retreat.
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Source: Institute for the Study of War. Chris Kozak. 5 February 2016.
By cutting off the road to Mayrer, Nubel, and Zahraa, regime and Russian forces have effectively
outflanked opposition, and it will take a significant effort by Western and Gulf powers to be able
to support any type of counterattack by the rebels. All operations in Aleppo province are
protected by Russian airstrikes and also supplemented with Iranian proxy militias, signifying
Iran’s interest in Aleppo as well (ISW 2015). At this stage in the conflict, two points are clear:
that Russia and the Gulf-Turkey coalition will go to great lengths in protecting their investment,
and that the pipeline path in Syria, with its locus of Aleppo, will continue to see the greatest
shares of heavy fighting between regime and rebel forces. Lastly, it can also be induced from the
evidence that the timing and escalation in support of various actors in the Syrian theater is a
result of Saudi, Qatari, Russian, and Iranian interests over the potential pipelines.
Conclusion
This chapter traced the role and potential influence of political economy in the decision
by Saudi and Qatar to fund and back Syrian opposition through the paradigms of world systems
theory and the concept of the rentier state. There are several connections to be made between the
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theories and subsequent state actions. First, regarding WST, it is clear that the roles of the core,
periphery, and bridgehead were all at play in the formation of geo-strategic alliances, which are
the subject of this study. Syria’s status as Russia’s bridgehead in the region was evident in its
refusal to agree to the Qatar-Turkey pipeline. This is clearly an indication of Assad’s continued
dependence on Russia as an important ally and his apprehension over the motives of Saudi
Arabia and Qatar as regional threats to his survival. It also demonstrates that Assad has been
willing to put his own regime’s survival above Syrian economic interests. Furthermore, Qatar’s
desire to expand its gas market and its increasing investment in foreign assets display its desire to
go from a hedging member of a periphery region to a major player in the core. However, Qatar
shows its periphery status in the region when its actions directly conflict the region core and
hegemon, Saudi Arabia, who holds the power to stall and block any potential project Qatar
wishes to build. Saudi Arabia can also be seen as a bridgehead for US interests, as the US is
eager to see Russia’s stranglehold on Europe end. Although it may not have wanted to participate
initially due to potential Qatari gains, Saudi Arabia nevertheless took part, a move that surely
appeased the US and its interests.
The nature of the rentier state and their investments also influenced Saudi and Qatari
actions. Such intervention could be seen through a lens of protecting one’s investment, as the
Gulf had already poured in significant amounts of money to Syria, and it desired to have returns
on such investment. Furthermore, it could also be seen as a new investment, one that would
surely have substantial payoffs because of the potential pipeline. As examined in the ‘Oil
Wealth, Institution Building, and Political Autonomy’ section, both of these states, as a result of
their rentier nature, have extremely top-heavy, vertical linkages in decision-making. The elites,
with their islands of efficiency and fiefdoms, effectively control all foreign policy decisions. As
further noted, in rentier states these elites are dependent upon corporate interests, as these entities
will refine and transport the state’s natural resources and repay the elites with large amounts of
resource rents, which will thus consolidate the elites’ hold on power. As a result, elite interests
are often similar to corporate interests, meaning that economy has a unique and powerful
influence in rentier states. Consequently, economic interests rise to the forefront and have little
opposition due to the state structure, made and designed by elites to have minimum amounts of
opposition. For instance, foreign entities have significant sway with Qatari decision-makers in
LNG trade policy, as both groups stand to gain from cooperation and coordination with policy.
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Thus, it is cogent to believe that similar corporation and elite interests were at work in the
decision to propose the Qatar-Turkey pipeline, as well as the subsequent decision to fund Syrian
opposition.
As was detailed above, both Saudi and Qatar share high rates of volatility due their
respective economies’ reliance on natural resources, greatly increasing their sectoral risk. This
can be seen in the constant fluctuation of oil prices, which Gulf states attempt to insulate
themselves from through foreign investment. However, the 2008 recession threatened this
strategy, as many of their foreign assets greatly decreased in value. Two important actions
occurred as a result: first, in an effort to find another regular source of income that is not related
to oil, Saudi has made concerted efforts to find gas in its territory, committing large amounts of
capital to the projects. Second, due to the decrease in LNG prices thanks to the US and Australia,
Qatar has looked to increase the scope of its LNG market by finding a way to transport it to
Europe. In short, both Saudi and Qatar need a pipeline to Europe. Qatar needs one in the near
future, as LNG prices look to continue to fall further as the US increases production and
Australia develops their substantial gas fields. Combined with Qatar’s fast depleting reserves of
oil, the economic situation in Doha is somewhat bleak. In fact, Qatar has recently cancelled two
massive petrochemical projects, laid off thousands of oil workers, and slashed the budget of its
main charity, the Qatar Foundation (Ulrichson 2016). While Saudi does not necessarily need an
immediate pipeline to Europe, it may find itself at some point in desperate want of oneespecially if gas is found during its exploration projects. Furthermore, the volatility of oil prices
could be offset for Saudi with a consistent and steady stream of transit income and gas exports to
Europe, who are eager to leave Russian influence. Turkey, though not studied extensively in this
piece, would also seem to need a pipeline to Europe as well. Were the Nabucco and QatarTurkey projects to go through, Turkey would not only be able to satisfy its own gas needs, it
would also become the regional locus for resource transportation and accrue massive transit rents
from these pipelines. It would also take them out of Russia’s shadow, as Ankara is Gazprom’s
second largest customer (Escobar 2012). Were Russia to get their way and establish the Islamic
pipeline, oil and gas transit would not include Turkey, dealing Erdogan a devastating blow in his
bid for energy independence and regional influence.
Indeed, when evaluating the Pipeline Politics argument through these paradigms and with
the evidence presented, there is a very strong case to be made for seeing the Syrian Civil War as
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a conflict over natural resources and its transportation. Major Taylor writes, “Viewed through a
geopolitical and economic lens, the conflict in Syria is not a civil war, but the result of larger
international players positioning themselves on the geopolitical chessboard in preparation for the
opening of the pipeline” (AUN 2015). This is especially cogent considering the motivations of
the states involved, as well as each one’s precarious position regarding the economy. Saudi,
Qatari, and Turkish intervention in this theory resulted from the desire to boost their coffers,
lower dependence on outside actors, and diversify their economies to decrease volatility and
economic risk. Russia intervened due to the possibility of losing the European oil market, and as
a result has taken to primarily targeting Gulf-backed opposition to halt any potential pipeline
around Aleppo. Russia has also in recent months reminded Turkey of its reliance on Russian gas,
but their intervention, as the conflict shows, has only steepened Gulf and Turkish resolve.
Therefore, as Mitchell Orenstein writes, “Any political settlement of the Syria crisis must also
reconcile competing gas interests” (Orenstein 2015). Such an agreement would be incredibly
difficult to come by as evidenced in the lead-up to the intervention, which signifies the inevitable
probability that the conflict will drag on until one side is militarily victorious or a great
compromise is made. The stakes have only been upped further considering the massive collapse
of oil prices in 2014, leaving Russia, Saudi, and Qatar with a fraction of their normal income and
budget restraints that they did not foresee. As a result, they will focus even more on gaining the
upper hand in Syria, as they can no longer rely on oil to sustain their economies.
Thus, it is by now clear that political economy and economic interests played a
significant role in the decision to back Syrian opposition by Saudi and Qatar. However, as
depicted in the previous chapters, this was not the only influence, indicating a joint-role for
political economy as a motivating factor. The issue now becomes where to place political
economy in reference to neorealism: does the former fall under the latter or is it its own category
of influence? Part of neorealism’s creed is the primacy of self-interest and state survival, which
can be closely associated with economy, particularly in rentier states. The elites in such states
seek regime survival, and in order to maintain the status quo, it behooves them to sustain
economic progress and wealth accrued from rents. Therefore, acting in economic interests could
also be seen as acting in one’s own interests, thus showing the supplemental role political
economy can play in neorealism. However, while political economy and its motivations can fall
under the umbrella and support the notion of realism, it can also stand alone. As seen in this
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chapter, corporate and state interests mirror each other in rentier states, therefore bringing the
possibility of state actions that are motivated and influenced by corporations. Now, while this
may seem like a typical part of a rentier state’s actions for self-survival, it only becomes so when
that wealth is distributed to the population, who in turn give the regime the loyalty and
legitimacy it needs to rule. Therefore, if that wealth is not on some level distributed through
investment or subsidies to the local population, the state and its elites are acting in economic
interests, but not in the interests of self-survival. Here, however, it is clear that both Saudi and
Qatar had economic motivations that would eventually make its way to domestic society,
because not doing so would risk stopping the flow of wealth to the population, especially given
the current economic situation of both states. In sum, it is clear that in this case study, political
economy is a prominent influence on the decision to fund the Syrian opposition; and that such
influence, while significant enough to categorize on its own, ultimately falls under the realm of
neorealism, as this study shows that economic interests are closely correlated with the state’s
need for self-survival.
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CONCLUSION
THE ROLES OF POWER, IDENTITY, AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS
IN GULF-SYRIA POLICY
This study set out to explain the GCC’s, and specifically Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s,
support of Syrian opposition, an act that goes against decades of relatively close political and
strategic ties between the Assad regime and the Gulf monarchies. By examining the motivations
behind this shift in policy, this study has sought to evaluate the role that power considerations,
Islamic identity, and economic interests played in the formation of the Gulf’s new Syria policy.
Furthermore, this study set out to find if the motivations behind the new Syria policy on the part
of the Gulf states challenged conventional understandings of realist international relations theory,
and if so, to examine the ways in which it should be altered and amended in light of new
findings. Using a three-pronged approach consisting of neorealism, constructivism, and political
economy, this study strove to use different paradigms and concepts to solve this question. In
methodological terms, this study utilized primary sources, government cables, mosque sermons,
and economic data. My findings suggest that a combination of power, identity, and economic
interests best explain the seemingly puzzling shift in policy on the part of the Gulf states vis-àvis Syria in recent years.
The primary research question that is the focus of this thesis arose from the empirical
observation that the decision by Saudi and Qatar to back Syrian opposition broke a longstanding
historical trajectory of cooperation and a delicate, albeit relatively strong, alliance. Indeed, the
Gulf monarchies consistently refused to come to the aid of anti-Assad entities, as evident in the
case of the former’s lack of support to the Muslim Brotherhood in their uprisings in Syria during
the seventies and eighties. To be sure, political, religious, and economic interventions in Syria by
the Gulf monarchies spans half a century. However, it is important to note that this relationship
was based on mutual reciprocal terms. In exchange for their cooperation on strategic matters,
both Hafez and Bashar al Assad demanded, and often received, significant amounts of economic
and military assistance, which played an important role in boosting Syria’s failing economy and
sustain it during its contentious periods with Israel. Moreover, this alliance between the Gulf and
Syria had far-reaching consequences that included Syria’s decision to side with the Gulf in the
first Gulf War in 1991 to the Gulf monarchies’ attempt to pry Assad away from Iran with more
economic promises in 2009. It is also important to note that the anti-Assad actors supported by
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the Gulf encompasses a broad range of ideological differences, from Salafi Islamists to secular
entities, as outlined in the introduction. The long, complicated, but nevertheless strong
relationship between the Assad regimes and the Gulf make the stark and comprehensive decision
by the latter to cut off relations with Syria all the more interesting and relevant. The timeline
below depicts alliance evolution and change between the Gulf, Syria, and the U.S.:
Gulf-Syria Relations Timeline
1940-1960: Saudi officials seek influence over Syrian officials through bribes, encouraged coup
attempts. The U.S. orchestrates a military coup in 1949.
1968- Gulf enters détente with Syria, promises financial backing in lieu of Syria-Israel conflict.
1971-1990- Hafez al Assad becomes president in 1971, increases financial and military ties with
the Gulf by using its relationship with Russia as leverage for more assistance.
1990-2000- Syria sides with Gulf Coalition in the First Gulf War, ensuring continued economic
assistance.
2000-2006- Bashar al Assad assumes the presidency, economic and strategic ties between the
Gulf continue.
2006-2009- U.S. officials lobby Gulf states to cut ties with Syria due to their relations with Iran,
Gulf officials instead decide to woo Assad back to the Arab fold with more promises of
economic security. U.S. officials reluctantly consent to this plan.
2009-2011- The Gulf turns aid to Damascus back on, and as a result Syrian-Iranian tensions
deteriorate and fray due to the lack of necessity of the relationship, with the former believing the
latter to be a hindrance.
July 2011- Following the wave of the Arab Spring, protestors in Syria form official military
fronts with the aim of toppling Assad through military force. Qatar shortly thereafter cuts all
diplomatic ties with Assad.
December 2011- The rest of the GCC severs official ties with the Syrian regime. Initial contact
between Gulf officials and Syrian opposition military leaders is made where training and funds
are discussed, particularly with the Free Syrian Army.
Early 2012- King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia meets with a Syrian envoy to attempt to find a
solution to the crisis, but none is found. Arab leaders call for Assad to step down peacefully.
Internal Saudi memos indicate a contemplation of military intervention.
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February 2012- The Free Syrian Army, a moderate and secular military faction, officially asks
for Saudi and Qatari military assistance. Qatar uses its Muslim Brotherhood contacts to seek and
identify other potential rebel partners and buys weapons found in Libya and Eastern Europe.
April-March 2012- Over 70 military cargo flights from Qatar carrying arms and other
equipment land in Turkey to funnel to opposition.
2012-2013- Spending on Syrian opposition by the Gulf reaches into the billions of dollars.
2013- Saudi Arabia and Qatar resolve their differences over rebel funding and leadership and
unite support under the Supreme Military Council- a command structure that includes
representatives from most major rebel groups but excludes Islamic extremist elements.
May 2013- Saudi Arabia becomes arguably the largest provider of arms to the rebels, financing
large purchases of infantry weapons.
June 2013- U.S. government officials approve the providing of lethal arms to the Supreme
Military Council.
September 2014- The U.S. and a coalition that includes Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE target ISIS in airstrikes.
September 2015- Russian forces intervene militarily in Syria, mainly targeting moderate
opposition groups. Saudi Arabia responds by increasing military aid to such groups, including
the shipment of anti-tank TOW missiles.
October 2015- The U.S. officially announces the end of the Pentagon’s $500 million train and
equip program for Syrian opposition and acknowledges that the program failed to achieve its
ostensible goals.
December 2015- A conference of Syria’s political and armed opposition factions is held in
Riyadh with the goal of forming an agreement on a common position from which to negotiate
with the Assad regime.
Power, Identity, or the Economy
The introductory chapter of this study set out to establish the primary theoretical lenses
through which the motivations and interests underpinning the shift in Gulf-Syria policy can be
explained: neorealism, constructivism, and political economy. Neorealism’s emphasis on the
anarchic state system, realpolitik, and regime survival would explain the GCC’s decision to back
Syrian opposition as a choice based on the interests that prioritize the strategic threat of Iran, and
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the related desire for regional influence over the role of Sunni-Islamic identity. For their part,
proponents of the constructivist school would stress on identity-based motivations grounded in
more subjective criteria to explain this shift in policy and alliances. They would contend that
Gulf support of insurgent Sunni rebels in Syria is based on shared sectarian Muslim
identification and that this commonality is the basis of the new alliance between the two actors.
In this formulation, it is Islamic identity that would be viewed as having the greatest impact and
influence on policy decisions. Finally, a political economy approach would characteristically
privilege economic interests in the foreign policy decision-making process, and would argue that
strategic interests, supported by material concerns, best explains Saudi and Qatar support of the
Syrian opposition. These theories are typically seen in opposition to each other, particularly
neorealism and constructivism. However, when applied to this case study, it is evident that the
most plausible explanation for this shift in Gulf-Syria policy is rooted in a synthesis of these
approaches rather than in one particular school of thought.
As this study has shown in chapter two, power and strategic interests have indeed played
an important role in the decision to provide military and financial support to Syrian insurgents on
the part of the Gulf states. Government cables from both the United States and Saudi Arabia’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released by Wikileaks, reveal a systematic engagement with the
Assad regime during the late 2000s, and then subsequent disengagement after the Arab Spring in
2011. The documents revealed U.S. intentions to overthrow Assad as early as 2006, and showed
that most governments believed Assad’s primary goal was self-survival. Furthermore, the
documents depict that the majority of officials believed Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy to be
primarily based on its perception of a grave Iranian threat to their power and influence in the
region. Saudi Arabia’s desire for a united Arab front to confront and react to increasing Iranian
influence in the region meant it had to pry away Iran’s Arab ally, Syria.
Thus, one can point out several conclusions with respect to the new Gulf-Syria policy
that are compatible with neorealist assumptions and explanations. First, regime survival played a
pivotal role in determining the actions of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Second, the fluid
identities and perceived threats of each state structured the decision-making process and shaped
the actions of each state involved in the conflict. Next, power maximization, a key neorealist
assumption of state behavior, also played a key role in Gulf-Syria policy. This is evident by the
actions of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as both were intent on cashing in on years of accrued wealth
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and regional influence, especially in the aftermath of Arab Spring. Finally, Saudi fears and
trepidation over Iranian influence, particularly after the Rafik Hariri assassination in Lebanon,
played a significant role in their decision to support Syrian opposition. However, as is evident by
the findings of this study noted in chapter two, neorealism does not adequately explain two
important developments associated with this shift in Gulf-Syria policy: the timing of this change
in policy, and perhaps more importantly, the ways in which the role of Islamic identity and
discourse was constructed in such a way as to rationalize a seismic shift in alliance formation
after decades of cooperation between the Gulf and Damascus. Thus, while neorealists can
explain the geo-strategic and security interests underpinning this change in policy, they are less
able to detail the evolutionary nature of Sunni-Islamic identity as a legitimating ideology of state
action. They are similarly less equipped to explain the important role that non-state institutions in
the Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have played to make this shift legitimate and
possible in ideological and religious terms.
Indeed, the ideational or identity-based approach associated with the constructivist school
can better approach the issue of Islamic influence evident in the support of Sunni insurgents in
Syria by the Gulf states. The question here, and one examined in chapter three, is whether Islam
was simply a legitimizing tool used by the state to justify its actions, or if it was a true motivator
of state behavior. By looking primarily at khutbahs from state-run mosques in Saudi Arabia, as
well as messages from rogue and outside clerics, chapter three examined the role of Islam in the
decision to support Sunni Syrian insurgents. The khutbahs demonstrated the primacy of Islamic
identity in the Gulf, superseding other identities such as Arabism and nationalism, and showed
that inhabitants consider themselves Muslim first before their nationality. Furthermore, the
content of the khutbahs showed clearly that Wahhabi ideology, specifically the rejection of bid’a
and introduction of takfir, caused the Saudi Ulama to label the Assad regime as ‘un-Islamic’,
opening the door to religious justification for militarily supporting Syrian opposition. The lack of
action by the international community allowed for the Saudi Ulama to place Islam at the
forefront of justification and reasoning, invoking notions of Umma and Sunni solidarity to call
for military action against Assad. The complicated relationship between the members of the
Ulama and the ruling family mean that direct religious influence is difficult to identify, but there
is evidence of tangible influence. Furthermore, in the context of Syria policy, Islam acted as a
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motivation to the state through the domestic population, whose religious convictions put pressure
on the state to act. Thus, it has causal impact as a motivator of state policy.
As with neorealism, religious differences and the pervasion of Islamic identity did not
present a full picture, notably showing its shortcomings in the field of economic and realpolitik
considerations. The focus on the role of identity in Gulf-Syria policy helps us to understand the
process by which the construction of a new religious discourse provided legitimacy for state
action in ways that neorealist proponents do not adequately address. However, this approach falls
short of explicating the reasons why Gulf elites in Saudi Arabia and sought to change their
policies in Syria in the first place. Nor can such a focus on the role of Islamic identity in this
policy shift explain the character and nature of the alliance between Riyadh (and Doha) and the
Syrian opposition, or illuminate the intervention in Syrian politics on the part of other
geopolitical actors such as Russia and Iran.
These questions, central to understanding the economic motivations underpinning the
rapid formation of new alliances in the Middle East, are best explained by the political economy
perspective associated with a refined understanding of World Systems Theory and rentier state
literature. Consequently, chapter four examined the economic state that Saudi and Qatar were in
leading up to the decision, and fleshed out the consequences and benefits of the two proposed
pipeline projects that would each travel through Syria. Indeed, an examination of the role of the
Gulf states in the international economic system and the politics of rentierism revealed two
important conclusions. First, Syria clearly and decisively acted as a bridgehead for Russian
interests when it refused to let Qatar and Turkey build their pipeline. This would have
substantially damaged Russia’s stake in the natural gas market as it would make available gas
from the Middle East to the European market, which is beholden to Russia for its gas needs. The
second finding, as detailed in chapter three, is that it is evident that economic interests of elites,
particularly in Saudi Arabia, played an important role in the policy decision to support the Syrian
opposition against the Assad regime. It is these material interests that were a decisive factor in
the intervention of Syria. Specifically, due to their high rates of volatility in the international
energy markets, and the nature of rentier economies, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar needed a
pipeline to Europe, which would be built if a Gulf-friendly regime replaced Assad in Syria.
Russian intervention into Syria can also be seen as a protection of its economic interests
and investments, leading to the conclusion that any solution will have to deal and solve these
139
competing pipeline projects. This depicts the significant role political economy played in the
GCC’s decision, but as the chapter noted, it is in this case that political economy can be included
as neorealist influence due to its ties and synonymous nature with self-survival.
A More Comprehensive and Synthetic Approach
Though the relationship between neorealism and political economy was explored in the
conclusion of the previous chapter, it is vital to recall that political economy can be accounted
for in neorealist theory through the assumption that state action with respect to material interests
can be part of regime survival. However, there still remain other important connections to be
fleshed out, chief among them the dependent relationship between power politics and economics.
It is clear that both Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek to increase their influence across the region in
conjunction with their desire to limit Iranian power projection. This can only be enabled through
the sectors of economy and finance, as Saudi and Qatar power projection are solely dependent on
having the funds to do so- without them, they are left with the traditional mediums of power such
as the military, and as shown neither Saudi nor Qatar have deep amounts of military capability.
This brings about the clear but important point: if the Islamic pipeline is built, it will mean a
massive windfall of funds will go to Iran, as well as a significant share of the natural gas market.
Iran would also acquire the keys to the European market, and though Moscow would have the
final say in its actions, Iran would be in a much better position for neorealist actions than Saudi
or Qatar.
Not only would Iran receive a large boost in both economy and power, the GCC’s
respective amounts would plummet, especially considering the current economic state Saudi and
Qatar find themselves in. Constructing such a pipeline would limit Saudi to rely solely on oil and
would leave Qatar at the mercy of Asian gas markets, resulting in economies that are likely to
bring in less funds and be at risk to volatile prices. Furthermore, power projection is not the only
neorealist notion that is reliant upon the economy. The very foundation of realist politics, selfsurvival, would be at great risk in Saudi and Qatar if the Islamic pipeline were to be built. Once
again, this is connected to the economic consequences. As already evidenced, were Saudi and
Qatar to miss out on their opportunity, it would have dire consequences for their economies. As
rentier states are entirely reliant on wealth distribution to placate their domestic population, what
happens when there are no funds to distribute? Indeed, as Qatar is considering implementing an
140
income tax, it is clear that each state must come to terms with this question. However, the
possibilities are striking: without a strong economy and stream of gas and oil rents coming in,
Saudi and Qatar will have to find other ways to keep their domestic populations’ loyalty, or else
their very self-survival is at risk. Qatar is in a better situation than Saudi given its smaller
population and higher amount of domestic stability. Saudi could see significant backlash were
such a scenario to occur, prompting a possible military response in a similar vein to the Arab
Spring. This shows the intertwined nature of political economy and neorealism within this case
study, and depicts the lack of clear-cut conclusions that remain in only one category.
The connections between political economy and constructivism in this chapter are less
evident than political economy and neorealism, but no less important. First, consistent and large
amounts of rents have enabled Saudi and Qatar to fund massive projects designed to spread their
brand of Islam, Wahhabism, throughout the developing world. The role of Islam is so crucial to
the state that billions of dollars are consistently spent on bringing religious goals to fruition, from
improving the Hajj to building mosques abroad, even though the money could be easily spent on
domestic and secular purposes. Furthermore, money plays a large role in the relationship
between the Ulama and the state, as chapter three showed. Many prominent clerics are given
significant funds or property from the state, and many clerics use such funds to develop their
own Wahhabi projects in the Kingdom or throughout the world. Lastly, the integral role of Islam
and its pervasion in all facets of life is evident in the steep rise of Islamic banking and finance.
Much of the funds gained from oil rents and other economic adventures are now being put into
Islamic modes of finance, which operate differently than secular sectors. In addition to the lack
of interest in Islamic finance, the notion of zakat, or charity, is prevalent in Islamic banking. As a
result, a certain percentage of the vast amounts of wealth in Islamic banks is automatically
deducted from the account and contributed to the religious establishment or charity. In sum, the
relationship between political economy and Islam is wide-ranging and has a number of
consequences, but once again it is clear that there is no clear separation between the two.
Given the relation and inclusion of political economy within neorealism, perhaps the
most important relationship to examine here is the interplay between neorealism and
constructivism. They are prominently connected through the domestic population and its politics.
Islam and religious authorities, as seen, have great sway and control over the domestic
population, who identify as Muslims before they see themselves as Saudi or Qatari. The state is
141
beholden to the domestic population as a rentier state relies on it for loyalty and legitimacy.
Thus, constructivist notions of religious influence and neorealist structures of self-survival are
intimately connected and reliant upon one another in this case study. As the Saudi state’s selfsurvival relies on its domestic population for loyalty and support, that domestic population is
tangibly influenced and motivated by Islam. Conversely, the religious Ulama is reliant upon the
state for its funding and independence within Saudi society. Thus, neorealist policies are both
enabled and constrained by constructivist checks, and vice versa.
To examine a more concrete example of this relationship, it is necessary to look at the
pervasion of anti-Shia rhetoric and actions of the state. It is clear that Saudi was angered and
fearful of the ‘Shia-ization’ of Syria by Iran. Such fears were no doubt grounded in two bases,
one neorealist and one constructivist in nature. First, such concerns came as a result of Sunni
Muslims being converted to Shi’ism. As has been noted, Wahhabi ideology specifically targets
the Shia as a group that has left Islam, and the conversion of Sunnis to Shias would amount to
apostasy. Second, such fears were rooted in the threat, whether it was real or perceived, of
growing Iranian influence and power in Syria. Indeed, it seems that Sunni-to-Shia conversion
would allow for more Iranian influence, thus blurring the lines between pure power
considerations and religious concerns. Here, it seems that the two work in tandem. Perhaps even
Wahhabi ideology led to initial mistrust of Iran by the GCC, who then found itself with a selffulfilling prophecy when Iran eventually began to grow in both economic and military might. As
Saudi rulers and religious establishment place Sunnis above Shia, such action against Shia could
also be seen as both an act of self-survival and one of religious influence. By the state taking
anti-Shia reactions, it not only adheres to Wahhabi religious principles, it is also likely to receive
broader support form the domestic population and religious Ulama, thus enhancing its selfsurvival prospects.
This section has proved that there are significant constraints from finding a conclusion
that fits singularly within the various concepts and paradigms of neorealism and constructivism.
As evidenced, each, along with political economy, is deeply intertwined with one another in this
case study and often reliant upon the other as an enabling force for action. Thus, a more nuanced
approach and lens is required, one that does not discount clear evidence and influence from
seemingly contradictory theoretical approaches. The shortcomings of neorealism and
constructivism are clear, and each cannot explain the findings and conclusion of this study on its
142
own. Such rigidity would only serve to create an imperfect and unbalanced picture that discounts
clear factors such as Islam and economy. In order to construct an appropriate and balanced
synthesis that arises out of neorealism and constructivism, it is necessary to turn to an alternative
structure, one with the ability to account for the findings in this work.
Applying these theoretical schools of thought in international relations in ways that
conceive of these theories as strictly oppositional in theoretical and conceptual terms obfuscates
the combination of motivations underpinning foreign policy decision-making, and how they
evolve and change over time. What this study has proven is that there is significant areas of
overlap between these various approaches, and more specifically, a close analytical link between
their respective core concepts as associated with the three schools of thought: neorealism,
constructivism, and political economy. With respect to the case study at hand, explaining the
shift in Gulf-Syria policy requires a more comprehensive and synthetic approach. This new
synthesis would entail examining the role of power and strategic interests to understand the
processes of new alliance formation and the construction of religious discourse to explain the
legitimating ideologies that make these new alliances possible. It would also help implement
legitimacy to state level and civil society actors as borrowed from constructivist insights, and
take seriously the role of material incentives to explain the timing of shifts in policy and the
nature and character of the actors engaged in the formation of new alliances based on common
economic interests. Using the core concepts from these theories allows this synthesis to be
formed, and rather than discard some conclusions on the basis of rigid paradigmatic opposition,
this synthesis accounts for all the findings in this case study and allows them to work and exist as
equal influencers.
Future Research Agenda
This study set out to examine the reasons behind the GCC’s support of Syrian opposition
against Assad, which ran contrary to deep historical ties between the two. This question was
answered using the core concepts of neorealism, constructivism, and political economy, leading
to a more complex, inclusive, and layered synthesis. Most works on foreign policy and the Gulf
focus singularly on the role of rentier politics or Islamism, and do not take into account the
mixed motives of power, identity, and economic interests in foreign policy decision-making. As
a result, future case studies must include an analysis that combines all these approaches in order
143
to better explain evolving strategic interests, the construction of Islamic identity, and shifts in the
international economic system. By showing that Saudi and Qatari motivation was layered,
complicated, and wide-ranging, this study serves to show scholars that simplistic, reductionist,
and paradigmatic conclusions that heavily rely on one theory or variable are at risk of coming to
a flawed synthesis. Clearly, this impacts the making of policy as well, as the crafting of such
positions, particularly reactionist policy, is dependent upon understanding the motivations of the
other. Gulf policy, as shown in this study, encompasses a broad and increasingly diverse range of
agents and influences, but several core ones must always be taken into account: regime survival,
Islamic identity, and economic interests.
This study also serves to fill in certain gaps in international relations literature. While
much of such scholarship is divided between theoretical works and case studies, many of the
latter are restricted to addressing an event through a singular paradigm. Conversely, this work
serves to see a case study through multiple lenses, which are conceptual rather than
paradigmatic. This moves the literature towards a more complete and less rigid structure, away
from readings that view state actions in a singular light. Future scholarship should continue this
trend of embracing international relations as a holistic field of concepts rather than strict
paradigms, which in turn can shed light on the plausibility of such theories. Specifically within
this case study’s contexts, a similar study carried out from the perspective of Iran and Russia
would be of great interest, as their perspectives and motivations, while briefly touched
speculated upon, were not completely fleshed out. Furthermore, a similar case study focusing
singularly on the United States’ inaction in Syria and crafting of a non-interventionist policy
requires similar scrutiny. Lastly, a conceptual lens of neorealism and constructivism should also
be applied to non-state actors in this conflict, such as Hezbollah, Jabhat al Nusra, and ISIS.
Though these entities are not states and therefore their ability to be analyzed may be incomplete
at best, it nevertheless would be a useful exercise in comparing such motivations with that of
state actors. ISIS in particular would be of consequence here, as it is a self-declared state and
attempts to govern as well as conquer. Such a study could contribute to the increasing literature
on the role of motivation and governance in jihadist movements, as well as contemporary
international relations scholarship.
144
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