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18th Amendment: A Journey from Strong Federalism to Loose Federalism in Pakistan
*DR. SYED MUSSAWAR HUSSEIN BUKHARI
**MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMRAN
Abstract
Loose federalism contributes to vitality of uniformity to the governance in a state. This arrangement enhances the
autonomy and self ruling for the federating units to oblige the systemic local self government structure. In case of
Pakistan, the system of third tier government either was held suspended under civil political regimes or arranged
under the direct subordination to the federal government during military interlude. Since the adaptation of
consensual 18th amendment, concurrent list has been abolished. Politically it is a skillful move of establishing
decentralized federalism. This article finds the institutional arrangement to establish the new phase of federalism in
Pakistan.
Keywords: Lose Federalism, NFC award, 18th Amendment, New arena for Pakistan,
Introduction
The idea of federalism is based on the contractual union of federating units on decentralized system of
governance.37 The concept espouses two main principles. The first is the unity among federating units at political
levels while second is the regional autonomy to the federating units in their administrative setup that are created
through third tier of government. The third layer is directly derived under the regional territories. This practice has
been successfully persuaded in several states having institutionalized federal system with diverse plural identities
that are separated from one another on ethnic lines (Guelke, 2012, pp. 1-3; Lijphart, 1968, p. 14). It is the structured
and institutional organization in a federal state that incorporate, safeguard, and provide accommodation to the all
the segments of the society on the basis of constitutional autonomy and the principle of federal pluralism (Burgess,
1993, pp. 5-7).
Apart from the principle of autonomy and pluralism, the existence of consociational society at divided lines is an
appropriate condition of maintaining a federation at unified model on decentralized patterns (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 12). The composition of ethnic communities usually finds their political interests by establishing lower tier of policy
reforms. This system takes root from the locality of political activities under democratic regimes. Some booming
states with such arrangements are; Belgium, Canada, India, Russia, Switzerland and United States of America
(Anderson, 2008, p. 2). Federalism does not only make the institutions transparent and accountable but it also
*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, The Islamia University of Bahawalpur. ** Research Student
37
The term federalism is derived from the Latin word „foedus‟, in 1645 that means “a mutual covenant agreed by a
number of individuals”. The concept was used in the meanings of social integration and cultural harmony of
various groups in 16th century. It was reshuffled into the meanings of “political organization of divided groups on
democratic institutionalism” from late 19th century. For the time being, the concept was debated by the German
and French theorists.
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decentralizes the politico-economic and administrative structure by involving the citizens in local decision making
progression.
Unlike the developed federations, the systemic federalism in Pakistan did not inhale biased momentum for an
active popular participation on decentralized blueprint in its long run political struggle. The main factors in its
breakdown are; centralized regimes especially under the coinage of military (Muhammad and Kaleem, 2012, p.
331), the dominancy of the core group [punjabis] against the smaller ethnic groups [sindhis, balochis and pashtuns]
(Ali, 1996, p. 135), partially motivated political culture, centralized constitutional trends, the long run authoritarian
military regime, desertion of political parties at grass root level, the deeply divided tendencies of the ethnic groups
in the regional territories, non consensual attitude of government and opposition elites on the principles of
provincial autonomy (Faisal, 2010, p. 2), traditional subordination of bureaucracy to the centre (Yusuf, 1999, p. 6)
and last but not was the lack of mutual consensus among the provincial elites on the criteria of reciprocated system
of local government during the preceding civil political regimes.
This article has focused on three multifaceted debates of the structure of federalism in Pakistan. First is the study of
highly centralized trends in Pakistan; second is the ethnic consciousness at lingual roots since the passage of 18 th
amendment and third is to analyse the trends of decentralization in federalism in Pakistan in post 2010 regime and
its implications on the future political trends.
Hypothesis
The structure of federalism in Pakistan is oscillated between central and semi-central tendencies since its
establishment. The real change did not evolve at the institutional level to renovate it in the loose leaning. This
article is based on the institutional design of structural federalism that has been evolved after the 18 th amendment in
Pakistan. Two other political ingredients of elite role and evolution of moderate public opinion at variant ethnic
lines are recommended as the support engines to gear up the political process. In this approach, the evolutionary
institutional system and step by development in consensus building of the elites are very important tools in
establishing the loose federalism and the adaptation of systemic progressive level in Pakistan.
Research Methodology
Federalism is a systemic political engine to revive the relation between the centre [core] and the federating units
[periphery] at institutional steps. To find these tendencies we have developed an analytical approach to study the
development of federalism in Pakistan since its formation and its renovation in post 18 th amendment period. The
article approaches the institutional design of federalism from strong to loose scope by sorting out the system of
local self governance at the grass root level.
Literature Review
The study of federalism is not a new phenomenon. It incorporates the volumes of sources in different aspects such
as cultural, historical, traditional, lingual, ethnic, institutional trends. Our research is restricted to the institutional
plan of federalism by focusing on the ethnic trends in Pakistan. It is in this perspective that the research sources that
are taken up in the current article have ethnic and institutional precincts. A prominent researcher on studies of
federalism in South Asia with special reference of India and Pakistan, Katharine Adeney (2007, 2004) emphasis on
the ethnic and institutional development of federalism. She investigates the deep rooted ethnic trends of federalism
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and proposes the institutional paradigm to minimize the disputes among the regional identities in Pakistan. The
writers such as Anderson (2008), Guelke (2012), Hetcher (1975), Lijphart (1968, 1973) and Park (1967) have
developed institutional models such as geographical tendency of the federating units [loose federalism], deep
divided tendencies of the ethnic groups and their coalitional participation, centre-periphery centripetal and
centrifugal frictions [centre-units relations], consociationalism, coalitional unity and regional political maturity
respectively; to evolve the participatory federalism and to increase the participatory public opinion at he grass root
level in a state having multiple ethnic, racial and lingual groups. At the historical and present patterns, the studies
of Ayaz and Kaleem (2012), Zulfqar (2012), Langah (2011), Mustafa (2011), Waseem (2011a, 2011b, 2010),
Faisal (2010), Talbot (2009), Ziring (1997, 1980),
Jalalzai (1996), Maluka (1995), Aziz (2007) and Sayeed
(1968) find the evolution of federalism in Pakistan on ethnic and institutional lines. These studies also describe
about the multiple perspective of federalism such as Mustafa (2011), Waseem (2011a, 2011b, 2010) are more
inclined towards fiscal and political arrangements, Maluka (1995), Talbot (2009) and Ziring (1997, 1980) have
concentrated on the administrative, constitutional, ethnic and political trends of federalism while Langah (2011),
Faisal (2010) and Jalalzai (1996) have dealt with the ethno-political and centralized political trends of federalism in
Pakistan. All these studies have the characteristics of ethnic and institutional provisions and implicate the sign of
institutional bend while studying the history of federalism in Pakistan.
Understanding the Federalism: An Analytical Paradigm
Federalism is a mutually derived covenant by federating territories having multiethnic trends that wish to organize
the system of governance under the aegis of a central government. The union is administered in an overarching
political system by transferring import subjects such as; communication, currency, defence, foreign affairs and
external trade etc., to the central government by equipping remaining job to constituent units under the aegis of a
written constitution (Kuper and Kuper, 1980, p. 292; Daun and Watson, 1978, p. 204). This relationship braces
more succinctly in democracy and finds its pace towards decentralization while it treks to highly innermost
political tendency in totalitarian federal countries. It cherishes federating units to share political sovereignty in their
local affairs based on collective participation having decentralist themes (O’Neil, 2007, pp. 21-42; Burgess, 1993,
p. 11). In other terms, it is a mutually exclusive jurisdiction of the federating units with that of the central
government with the ability of sharing characteristic of political sovereignty (Adeney, 2007, p. 6; Park, 1967, p. 44;
Ahmad, 1993, p. 25; O’Neil, 2007, p. 21).
The structure of federalism is more significant to multiethnic states having moderate sovereignty (Adeney, 2007, p.
6), territorial and political autonomy (Daun and Watson, 1978, p. 204) that encompass the politico-economic and
ethnic trends in groups living in a state at geographically divided lines. The system reflects the political intrigues
and their politicization in finding out their solution on the principle of elite participation (Gagnon, 1993, p. 18;
O’neil, 2007, p. 41). Two formative objectives are integrated in this way; the reduction of the level of vigor and the
incitation of compromise at political levels (Guelke, 2012, pp. 3-5). In civic terms, federalism is a mechanics to
accelerate unity in citizens of a state living at divided ends from their co-state individuals (Burgess, 2006, p. 20).
Among the divided ethnic groups, the uniformity is created under the core structure of institutionalism. In other
meanings, federalism is a political unification of conflicting forces under one central government (Ali, 1996, p. 7).
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In this explanation, the concept is considered more apprehension with the mutually recognized powers of federal
government and those that of the federating units. In other words, federalism is a mode of political organization to
choose for the integration of separate identities in an overarching political structure.
We can say that, federalism is a political process for creating parity of relations between the centre [core] and the
regional governments [periphery] on the principle of institutional mechanics to incorporate the endless conflicting
goals (Burgess, 1993, p. 3) at one step and among the federating units [periphery-to-periphery] at the other step
under the coercion of a written edict at decentralized rule (Faisal, 2010, p. 26). It accentuates the procedural
political working of multiethnic groups under the aegis of democratic institutions by proposing substantial powers
to the ingredient units (Nugent, 1994, pp. 16-17).
By glancing at theoretical perspectives we conclude that federalism is successfully working in states having
historical homogeneity [America since 1776]38, shared customary laws and diversification of powers and flexibility
in centre towards the regional governments [Belgium, Russia and United States of America]. By analyzing the
history of federalism, it is calculated that since late 18th century to the present day; federalism has fetched progress
under the wings of democracy (Faisal, 2010, p. 24). That is why we scrupulous that, federalism is more
appropriated to democracies with decentralized political system rather than in aristocratic regimes. It steps forward
in institutionally developed political regimes such as; in Switzerland, Belgium, United States of America and
Canada etc., less driven in centralized states of Indonesia, India, United Arab Emirates, Philippine and in Pakistan
etc. The significant political measures of decentralization of powers and balance in institutions have played their
role in the storming of federalism in a state.
Historical Diversity of Federalism in Pakistan
The inclination for adaptation of federalism expanded in post colonial regimes due to the privilege of having classy
population in Africa, Asia and Latin America.39 They joined the pillars of federalism at the principle of centrality
that created problems in their internal management from the very beginning. The framework of federalism in post
colonial societies; with weak and inefficient democratic regimes in most cases, experienced the centripetal
tendency in power sharing organization. The impulse of institutionalism did not evolve as the federal states perish
into the disillusioned political regimes with normative political tendencies having lack of ethnic cohesion and elite
institutionalism (Covell, 1987, p. 75).
With dominion status after independence, Pakistan having segregated lingual groups also adopted the system of
federalism at the same footing under the refined India Act of 1935.40 From the very beginning, the administration
of the state was stood on political diarchy from the very beginning (Ali, 1967, pp. 237-239) by expanding their
interests in the provincial jurisdiction. The tendency of centralization (Ali, 1996, p. 41) had kept at the outlay of
38
For example, the origin of federalism in USA was based on “Declaration of Independence Act of 1776” that was
singed by the representatives of thirteen colonies/states.
39
The states are Nigeria, Malaysia, Belau, Comros, Micronesia, Nevis, India and Pakistan.
40
After partition, the population of East Bengal was lingually homogenous while in West Pakistan it was divided
into Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi and Pashtu lingual identities.
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weak rooted Muslim League41 that had eventually declined after the 1954. The roots of provincialism was going to
evolved since 1950, which were managed at short sighted military-bureaucratic oligarchy with the back support of
apolitical
elites
decisions
after
the
promulgation
of
One
Unit
scheme
(Yusuf, 1999, p. 64).
Instead of finding the politico-institutional solution, the federal government reserved the power of centralization
beneath their supervision. The modus operandi traditions such as civil bureaucracy, the maneuver of emergency,
martial laws, dismissal of provincial governments, the federal administrative Acts and imposition of governor rules
and the imposition of emergency in the federation were revitalized to confirm the centrality in the following period
of political instability during the following five decades. That is why decentralization was remained at half hearted
paths.
The bases of federalism in Pakistan discovered from the India Act of 1935. The successive constitutions of 1956,
1962 and even fewer than 1973 ruled out in such a way to extenuate supremacy to the centre. The constitutionalists
notice to colonial covenants as the conducting path for new contracts. The centripetal tendencies dominated to that
of centrifugal forces. An effective political tendency did not institute on decentralized principles of federalism
(Faisal, 2010, p. 2, Jalazai, 1996, p. 489). During civilian governance [1947-58, 1971-77, 1988-1999, 2008-2010]
while in military regimes [1958-71, 1977-88, 1999-2008]; the centre had the provisional apparatus of several
powers of decision making over the provinces. The authoritarian regimes consumed local government structure
(1960-69, 1980-88, 2001-2007) while political ambiance created either troika [1953-58, 1985-1997, 2008present42] of civil machinery to prolong their rule. The provinces and the ethnic authorities were sidelined from the
decision making environment [1947-71, 1977-85] due to the existence of this oligarchic nexus.
The contrivance of centre was remained strong in the provinces. During the prior political circumstances of
Pakistan, the several lingual movements at the geographical levels (Talbot, 2009, p. 14) [1948-71 in East Bengal,
1964-present in Sindh, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 1947-2010, in South Punjab and Bahawalpur since 1970-present,
in Hazara since 198143 and in Balochistan from 1970-present] were emerged for multiple tendencies such as
autonomy, separate territorial identity, cultural uniqueness and the division of federating units into geographically
located ethno-lingual groups (Ali, 1996, p. 11). The whereabouts revised from time to time with small and large
intensity. Inspite of all manifestations the centralization was remained at the upper edge.
In political echelons, the existences of structural weakness derive the elites towards group rivalry. This system
dismantled the organizational roots of political parties on the principles of universality, grass root enrichment and
41
Hardly found on provincial roots, the political party had no experience to exercise political powers except by the
leadership from East Bengal during 1937 and 1946 and in the Interim Government in 1946-1947.
42
The statement is based on the analysis of Daily Newspapers publishing from Pakistan during the last five years,
as the military chief met several times with the civilian political leadership to discuss the political and security
conditions of the state.
43
For the firs time, in 1981 census Seraiki-speaking and Hindko-speaking population was considered on the lingual
basis. The reaction was emerged in more intense way. Zia-ul-Haq proposed Ansari Commission to sort out the
problems of the federation, which in their final report, submitted to the federal government, recommended the
creation of multiple federating units on administrative lines rather than on lingual basis. Earlier, such proposals
were also provoked from Asghar Khan from Tehrik-i-Istaqlal party during 1960s.
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secular algorithms. That is why the political parties appeared into small factions (Ziring, 1980, p. 112) representing
the interests and policies for the sake of a particular community rather than to tune-up services to the citizens of the
state.
The extra-constitutional drifts haul out the appendage of the electoral democracy from the lower basis on the
principles of accountability and expanded the parochial political frustration in the provinces and lingual groups
against one another [peripheral groups against the core groups] and against the federation (Maluka, 1995, p. 299).
This culture fragiled the rational decisions and created a paradoxical boundary [troika] by granting the powers to
the military-bureaucratic aristocracy (Ali, 1967, pp. 241-243). The tendencies may be studied in the following
successive regimes [1953-1958, 1985-1997 and 2008-present]. Sometimes, the troika system leads to the direct
coup de‟ tat [1958-1971, 1999-2008] in Pakistan.
From the above discussion, we may cease that the highly centralized design of federalism has created hurdles
throughout the history of Pakistan. It did not perk up the level of public participation from the starting place of
democratic mobility. The main causes of centralization in Pakistan were; the rivalries among political elites, over
ruling of the institutions, aristocratic leanings, politicized power structure and the imbalanced configuration of the
federating units. These grounds halted a line of political consensus in acute marginalized cleavages and the state
was remained at abeyance in political development and lingual harmony.
Regime Centralization in Pakistan
From the very investiture period, the geographical structure of the provinces in Pakistan have had remained
imbalanced. This discrepancy offers a unique political trend to the centre [core] to exploit their powers by
extending its political influence in the provinces [periphery]. This incongruity had inflexed the tendency of
regionalism in Pakistan in early 1950s. Unlike India which reorganized its several states on lingual criteria and
introduce the Panchayati Raj system of local government under the constitution originated from the British
Imperialism (Cheema et. al, 2003, p. 2); the federation in Pakistan did not adopt such compulsions (Adeney, 2012,
p. 3; Faisal, 2010, pp. 49-51). This decay developed a severe challenge to the veracity of state. The regionalism
also tended to grow in early 1960s and got intensified in East Bengal [1952-1971]44 in Sindh [1964-96], in
Balochistan [1970s-present] and in NWFP [1985-present].
The military authoritarianism was the main prospectus of centralization in Pakistan. Under the coup setup, the
administration had relayed on the working of the bureaucracy as the right hand force of the martial rulers. They
also adopted other judicial, constitutional and discretionary ordinances to prolong their governance without
considering the actual political demands of the country. 45 They expanded the political participation at the lower tier
44
The tendency was grown on lingual lines in 1952, strengthened into the regional nationalism in mid 1960 to the
secession in 1970 and finally into separate state in 1971. This result measures that the central in Pakistan between
1947-71 did not announce any uniform political decentralization tendency.
45
Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf adopted the constitutions while it is surprising that Yahya Khan
spent its two and half years’ tenure under provisionally adopted Legal Framework Order.
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but restricted their improvement under the pouch of the central executive instead of finding the structure of political
liberalism (Cheema et. al, 2003, p. 26).
The centrality had also swelled due to the competitor political forces working in the centre (Aziz, 2007, p. 42) and
in the provinces as the federal government wanted either to exert the political wings or to reduce their provincial
functioning under the constitutional and the executive clout. Both these two characteristics supported the provision
for the federal ascendency in the previous constitution of 1956, 1962 and in 1973 in the perspective of emergency
provisions. The dominancy may be seen during 1947-58, 1973-77, 1988-97.46 The friction of the adversary section
also played their role in dismantling the political characteristics of good governance. The political instability that
was emerged in the early phase after independence was continued in the following period (Ziring , 1997, p. 101).
The provision of the constitutional dictatorship also had played their role in the increasing role of centralization of
the federalism in Pakistan (Sayeed, 1968, p. 259). The whole structure of provisionally adopted India Act of 1935,
the constitution of 1962, 8th and 17th amendment in 1973 constitutions were such provision of constitutional
dictatorship of the central executive (Ali, 1996, p. 131) to produce their extreme political and administrative
pressure on the provinces to control and negate their performance in decision making process. Under the 1973
constitution, the institution of Council of Common Interest47 was established, but its functioning was remained
abeyance during last thirty years except a few meetings in 1990s.
Due to the arrival of military ruling spark in the democratic transition, the systemic interest articulation of the
policies collapsed down. The democratic transition stopped. The self-crafted and so-called decentralized power
structure of local governance was hassled (Chadda, 2000, p. 3). The hierarchy of the federal government was
triumphed and it ensured their superiority through the privileged position of bureaucracy over the partyless elected
representatives at the lower tier. As they conceived that non party participation was best suited to the Pakistani
nation. (Talbot, 2009, p. 158).
Despite all these provisions, the role of the public opinion had played their significant role in ousting the military
rulers from their autocratic positions. It was the movement of opposition parties under the umbrella of Democratic
Action Committee against Ayub Khan in 1969 (Yusuf, 1999, pp. 106-107), Movement for Restoration of
Democracy against Zia (1988)48 and Pakistan People’s Party led parliamentary force against Pervez Musharraf in
2008 which terminated their autocratic political powers under the privileges of public opinion .
The preceding discussion reveals that Pakistan always tends back towards democratic federalism (Waseem, 2011a,
p. 6) despite long term authoritarian decrees, as the public opinion supports this process. The same is true with
Pakistan; which experienced four democratic transitions since its establishment. The first transition is termed as the
46
Various provincial ministries were dismissed and governor rules were imposed for several times.
The council of common interests is an executive body under Article 153 of the 1973 constitution which follows
the equal participation from all the provinces to decide upon the matters that are indulged in the concurrent list, but,
after April 2010, the concurrent list has been demolished. Under 18 th amendment, the role of CCI has become more
prerogative unlike its earlier its earlier performance.
48
The Movement for Restoration of Democracy was launched in 1983 and until Zia’s demise in plan crash in
August 1988, the movement was converted into the mass led political agitation against the military ruler. (see
Ziring, 1997, pp. 460-62)
47
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constitutional democratic transition (1947-56), the second encircles the popular democratic transition (1971-77),
the third is considered an institutional democratic transition (1988-99) and the fourth is the decentralized federal
democratic transition (2008-present). It is of utmost significant political privileges that the political elites and the
public opinion had played their role at all these four levels. They emancipate the authoritarianism regime back to
the federalism on democratic paths which was derailed due to the non democratic hurdles.
18th Amendment: A Consensus for loose federalism
History of federalism in Pakistan reveals the important role of political elites in resolving the several issues. After
1999, the new regime of centralization was exercising their power under the patronage of Pervez Musharraf that
had amended the constitution of 1973 under their own political prerogatives until 2008. 49 He established a suprahierarchical rule like his predecessors; Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. The political activities were
restricted and the parties were divided into the factions supporting for dictatorial illegitimacy.
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the two exiled leaders of main political parties; Pakistan People’s Party and
Pakistan Muslim League decided to convene a meeting in London which proposed a contractual political charter to
grease up the democracy and revocation of greater provincial autonomy to the provinces by erasing the concurrent
list from the covenant by restoring the original document of 1973 constitution. 50 In the following years, the
consciousness of the elites and the public opinion positively tilted in the favor of this document. The elections that
were organized in 2008 under the military regime were won by the PPP and PNL (N) at the basis of charter of
democracy (Pakistan Times, 2006). The election results had downtrodden the Pervez Musharraf’s vision of troikacrafting consciousness.
After the polls, a coalition government based on the political reconciliation was established which considered to
draft the 18th amendment in 2010 under the aegis of 27 members Special Parliamentary Committee on
Constitutional Reforms.51 The amendment deleted the most glaring obstacle of concurrent list in the path of
provincial autonomy (Adeney, 2012, pp. 8-9). In post 18th amendment scenario, the provinces are more flexible
towards centre as compared to previous political regimes. Eighteenth amendment empowered the provinces at three
levels; such as at constitutional, political and administrative rank.
The 18th amendment has reformed the whole structure of the centralized edict. The old hierarchy of the federal
government was broken down and the new period of institutionalism replaced (Faisal, 2010, p. 128). This
amendment has also modules the provincial political participation in Pakistan at the broader occurrence unlike the
previous political regimes. The close cooperation of the political elites was obliged in making the institutional
structure of the state through the political dialogue. The systemic parliamentary system was refurbished. The
49
Pervez Musharraf ruled out the state until 2008 and resigned at the political threat of an impeachment decision
from parliamentary elites against him.
50
The charter was consisted on 35 point agenda. The file was a road map between the two major political parties
for political cooperation. The document stated the restoration of the constitution at the pre-1999 period under
civilian government. (see the text of “Charter of Democracy”, quoted in Pakistan Times, Islamabad, May 16,
2006).
51
Out of 27 members, 18 members either were belonged from smaller provinces or from regional political parties.
The committee spent almost seven month and received 982 proposals from the public groups. The draft was passed
from the parliament in April 2010 and promulgated at the same day.
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institutional structure of the political institutions such the judiciary, executive and the legislature was also executed
that was the imperative demand of the PML (N) since 2008 electoral campaign (Adeney, 20008, p. 2). The
constitutional role of the several state institution such as legislature and judiciary was emerged (Awan, 2012) and
the provincial executives were empowered in making their political and administrative decisions.
At the political level, the amendment has highlighted the sense of cooperation among the political elites from
national and regional political parties on the critical issues. Among the major was the two at major levels such as
the renaming of the NWFP into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the elimination of concurrent list. Under the original 1973
constitution, there were two legislative lists each contained with separate subjects. But the federal government was
enjoying dual legislation; on the federal list and on the concurrent list to overrule of provincial descisions. The
concurrent list was the main hurdle behind the provincial autonomy as the central government had articulated this
as a political weapon against the provincial decisions during the previous regimes and articulated their supremacy.
However there have also been emerged the voices for the creation of new provinces in Pakistan. But the parties
having no consensus on its criteria. The PML (N) call for the acceptance of the administrative division of the
provinces (Waseem, 2010, p. 20) while the other parties such as MQM and the ANP retrieved ‘no province. It is
PPP which call for language base provinces, however, this provision did not accept in Pakistan since partition.
What would be the consequences in the future for the new territorial reorganization is more dependent on the
political elites and their consensus under the parliamentary traditions?
At the administrative basis, the provinces have acquired their unique position unlike the earlier political
reformations. It designated the enhancing role of the Council of Common Interests, the incorporated decision for
the establishment of the local governance system under the provincial tier and the adaptation of the new provision
for the establishment of loose federalism with institutionalized structure in Pakistan. The 18 th amendment have
sought the concerns of the smaller provinces and resolve their terms for the period long provincial demand of the
greater political decision making at transparent level under the provincial elites to meet their local interests
(Adeney, 2012, p. 10). However, the process of provincial autonomy is at the beginning stage as the bureaucracy
tendencies in the provinces will remain under the aegis of the federal government. it would be create a long run
challenges to the provinces especially for the smaller provinces as hey lacked in their local bureaucratic and
administrative system.
Overall, the 18th amendment is considered a new wave of consensus building among the opposition elites at one
front and cooperating behavior of the provincial leadership. The constitutional overrule is considered to be the
major drawback in the development of federalism in Pakistan. The promulgation of 17 th amendment influenced the
working of government in the previous years. The current government has portrayed the good polity and changed
the old shadows of political intrigues. The responsibility is more rigid than less transitory in its functioning.
Economic Decentralization under 7th NFC Award
The fiscal policies adopted by the federal government were based on the centralized structure during the previous
political regimes. The prior fiscal formulas put forwarded by National Finance Commission and mainly were based
on population census. The criteria lack of harmony amongst the provinces also conceded the primary cause behind
the dissatisfaction over the resource distribution. The consensus based formula was needed to adopt. The 7 th NFC
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Award is a unique tendency for fiscal provincial consolidation in Pakistan which had not been implemented in the
preceding regimes (Adeney and Wyatt, 2004, p. 2).
The earlier NFC Awards in Pakistan did not meet the consensus of the provincial government at any levels. Their
adaptation was kept on the centralized patterns having no dictation from the provinces. The fiscal policy was dragged
on the centralized administrative tendencies. For example the 6th Awards ended with the zero-consensus among the
provinces, which finally was adopted at the only discretion of President Pervez Musharraf. The formula affirmed the
45 per cent share of the provinces from the divisible pool with the 1 per cent annual increment in the next five years
(Waseem, 2010, p. 13). The formula was based on the population census and did not meet with additional factors
such as poverty level of each province and their share in the national GDP growth. The centralization was confiscated
by the federal government to preserve their political and economic umbrella on the smaller provinces.
But the 7th NFC Award address the latent issues by evolving discussion about the multiple issues such as poverty,
economic inequality and the level of development of each province. At their juncture of economic consolidation for
federating units, the coalitional government decided to demonstrate a multiple criteria for the distribution of resources
unlike the previous Awards. The criteria included the multiple variations such as; population 82 per cent, poverty and
backwardness 10.3 per cent, revenue collection/generation 5 per cent, Inverse population density including urban
rural development 2.7 per cent (Mustafa, 2011, pp. 7-8).
Many elites from various national and regional political parties in Pakistan; including President Asif Ali Zardari,
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani and Nawaz Sharif; widely hailed consensus over 7 th NFC Award as a remarkable
achievement of the federal government. Under the new award the provincial share from the divisible pool was
boomed from 47.5 per cent to 56 per cent in fiscal year 2010-11 and further expanded to 57.5 per cent in the
afterward years under the vertical distribution of the federal resources (Waseem, 2010, p. 13). Despite all these
immunities from the federal government Adeney confirmed that the centralization in economic policies will continue
in Pakistan (Adeney, 2012, pp. 11-12), as the federating units continuously are dependent on the federal government
in acquiring their financial resources until the broader consensus would evolve between the centre and the provincial
governments and among the federating territories at eh platform of CCI. In coming years, the provincial governments
will need to make consensus on mutually decided financial arrangements under their own jurisdictions or via federal
government.
. 18th amendment: New arena of loose federalism
The development of federalism is measured into three phase’s centralized federalism [core], semi-centralized
[periphery] and decentralized federalism [loose federalism] 52. In case of Pakistan, during previous civil and military
regimes, structure of federalism was remained either at centralized [core] tendencies (1947-71, 1977-88, 1999-2010)
or deviated to the semi-centralized position (1988-1999, 2010-present) but it made their position back to their
52
Hatcher has provided a detailed thesis about the core-periphery model by applying it on colonial regimes. (for
further study see; Hechter, Michael. (1975). Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National
Development 1936-1966, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
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political nucleus due to the existence of authoritarian regimes [centripetal forces]. Thus the peripheral tendencies
become weak in the non-existence of political forces [Political Parties] during that regimes and did not breed at grass
root level [loose forces]. The overall system was remained at centralized structuralist compulsion (Waseem, 2010, p.
23).
Since the adaptation of 18th amendment, Pakistan has gradually moved towards relative liberalized principles of
coordination and cooperation among the provinces and between provinces and the centre itself. It is a transitional
journey of federal from centralization [core] to loose federalism [periphery]. That is why, current political interval is
considered very important in constitutional, political, ethnic and administrative perspectives; as the federal
government has started to liberate the concept of provincial autonomy, which was remained the most prominent voice
in post partitioned political history of Pakistan (Alqama, 1997, p. 294).
The post 18th amendment period is the completion of first phase of federalism [since June 2011]. Now the regime has
pierced into second phase that will complete after the promulgation of third tier of federalism [local government plan]
under the provincial administration based on the systemic involvement of political forces. The tendency must be a
transition towards decentralized political and administrative system (Adeney, 2012, p. 18). After the successful
completion of second phase; the anticipation for the factual working of federalism in Pakistan in its full competence
under the institutional governance with loose propensity (not interfering in the provinces); will come into
comprehensible design. That would be the final phase of federalism that is adopted in most of the states having
federal configuration.
When the system of federalism is transformed from one phase to next; some convinced political frictions are come
ashore that may create serious dilemma for political elites in making verdict in broader sensitivity. These impasses
might be examined in the previous regimes in the form of political instability (1947-58, 1988-97). In the post 18th
amendment scenario; the major friction that is swelled up is the creation of new ethnic tendencies for separate
provincial identity inside the federation on lingual, economic, political and administrative disarrays of one
[marginalized] group against the [core] group (Waseem, 2010, p. 20).
The constitutional incorporation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa instead of the earlier name of frontier province, have
stressed the ethnic and lingual consciousness inside that province in Hazara region and in the South Punjab. 53 It was
the first instance in the constitutional history of Pakistan; that the creation of new provinces has been debated at every
political forum. It also has become a widely accepted constitutional issue for all national and regional political elites
(Langah, 2011, p. 15). Likewise Hazara and Seraiki identity issues, the Urbanized Pashtuns from Balochistan also
want either an independent territorially based provincial identity or their geographical coincident with the province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The case of Karachi from Mutahida Quomi Movement is also laid down on the same footing but unlike other ethnic
tendencies they had demanded the division of Sindh province on administrative lines by dividing it into rural and
urban areas (Waseem, 2011b). Although, since the establishment of current regime there have no clear indication in
this perspective, but there historical records regarding this issue come across since early 1990s. A new debate about
53
In South Punjab, two separate movements of Bahawalpur Province and Seraiki Province have been working
since the abolition of One Unit in July 1970.
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the provincial status of Federally Administered Tribal Areas has also been approached from the corridors of Awami
National Party to merge the region with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with the consent of the tribal people (Zulfqar, 2012,
pp. 148-149).
The creation of provinces in Pakistan relatively will remain an important constitutional issue.54 It is important that the
constitutional provision should describe in two ways. Firstly, it necessitates a broader political consensus of all the
regional and national elites. At second extent; it important to measure the rating of public opinion by means of an
institutinalised modus operandi; such as referendum, grand parliamentary commission or political liberalization by
implementing third tier federal system.
Future perspectives of federalism in Pakistan
While adopting the constitution of 1973, the tripartite constitutional coalition of Pakistan People’s Party, Awami
National Party and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam emphasized on the practice of provincial autonomy under the systemic and
institutional federalism in Pakistan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan announced in a sitting
that the government shall arrange such institutional arrangements to stir up the regional political consensus on the
issue of provincial autonomy. It was also variedly voiced by the political elites that after a gap of ten years the
subjects of the concurrent list will transfer to the federating units under an institutional understanding. It was also
decided that the institutional structure shall also be strengthened in this concern. The promise was remained
unfulfilled for another thirty years, as the state fluctuated between authoritarianism (1977-88, 1999-2008) and
instable civil political regimes (1988-97).
In post 1973 tenure of Pakistan’s history of federalism, the announcements and decision of the political elites
regarding the regional political autonomy were disrupted two times; once in 1977 military coup and in 1999
undeclared military supremacy in the political system of the state. The state derived into the centralized patterns by
inducing the local bodies system of West Punjab in 1979 and Local self Government Plan in 2001 under the aegis of
federal government. In the following eighteen years until 1997, the centralized regime was remained at their
prevalence in Pakistan. The 1997-99 democratic periods rejuvenated the parliamentary democracy to evolve the
regional consensus on provincial autonomy but unfortunately another coup friction of 1999 transit the state into
politically centripetal patterns until 2010.
In Pakistan, the real dilemma was the transition of political powers from the centre to the provinces. After the
abolition of concurrent list and the political restoration of 1973 Constitution since April 2010, the elites have opened
their tendency towards the loose federalism. The political journey of federalism towards the transparent working in
the state will start only after the adaptation of the system of local government on the institutional lines by involving
the grass root level political participation.
The system of local governance will not only ensure the territorial autonomy for the provinces but it also develops
their role in wide-ranging political atmosphere. The system shall make the citizens and the several ethnic groups to
make their political choices at the lower level and their involvement in decision making evolution on more crucial
54
Article 239 of 1973 constitution has clearly defined about the procedure of the creation of new provinces. Under
this Article; the constitutional amendment related to the creation of the province shall require two-third majority of
the parliament along with conditional consensus of the Provincial Assembly.
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issues such as the creation of new provinces, greater administrative and socio-political and economic system. The
arena of loose federalism in Pakistan will also introduce the systemic political and economic changes in the divided
cleavages separated on territorially marginalized contour from one another and which are plunk on stagnant positions
since the last six decades.
The 18th amendment is a remarkable political achievement of political elites in the constitutional history of Pakistan.
It is a period of decentralized evolution of federalism. It is a drift to the trail of constitutional stipulation for
provincial rights and demands under the approved scheme of federalism. It is a herald of political sovereignty and
general will for the people of Pakistan on economically, politically, administratively and constitutionally opaque
issues in their future.
The myth of loose federalism in Pakistan also transmits a political liability for elites from all provinces to find their
institutional role in stemming their job to complete this arena on mutually consensual privileges that are validated
from their people. This process will not only enhance the institutional correlation but also minimize the political
frictions with the passage of time. It also will find the role of federal government at more transparent, liberal and
accommodative environment by evolving the consensus with the provinces.
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