SELLING OUR
S OV E R E I G N T Y
A L A B A M A’ S
FEDERAL DEPENDENCY
ALABAMA POLICY INSTITUTE
Copyright © 2016 by the Alabama Policy Institute
All rights reserved.
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Printed in the United States of America
Selling Our Sovereignty:
Alabama’s Federal
Dependency
Katherine Green Robertson
Vice President
Alabama Policy Institute
foreword by
James L. Buckley
Foreword
The framers of the Constitution understood that the accumulation of power in the hands of any body
was the historic enemy of individual freedom. They therefore incorporated two precautions into the
Constitution: its system of separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government
and the principle of federalism which, as described by James Madison in The Federalist No. 45, dele-
gated “few and defined” powers to the federal government while reserving to the states those over “all
the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”
Thanks to the Supreme Court’s 1937 decision in the case of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, however,
Congress was empowered to ignore federalism’s limits on its own authority. In that case, the Court
declared that Congress has the authority to offer federal funds to the states for purposes that are the
latter’s exclusive constitutional responsibility so long as the states are free to refuse to accept them.
Experience has proven, however, that offers of “free” money from Washington are virtually impossible to refuse. Furthermore, because that money usually comes with the most detailed instructions on
how it is to be used, and because federal grants-in-aid programs now affect virtually every aspect of
state responsibilities, they have in significant ways transformed the states and their subdivisions into
mere administrators of programs designed by politically unaccountable agencies in Washington. And
in so doing, they have stripped the states’ own citizens of the ability to decide how the services and
projects that have the most direct impact on their lives are to be designed and administered.
Katherine Green Robertson’s study has detailed the costs of those programs to Alabama in terms of
both dollars and of their distortion of the state’s own priorities. Let us hope that it will encourage the
state to join with others in resisting the congressional bribery that is undermining their responsibility
to their own citizens and, in that way, restore the effective federalism that framers of the Constitution
were counting on as an essential protection of our freedoms.
—James L. Buckley
Introduction
The problem today is that those governing our towns and states are no longer in control of a large propor-
tion of the government activities that affect our lives. In too many respects, our state officials now serve
as administrators of programs designed in Washington by civil servants who are beyond our reach, im-
mune to the discipline of the ballot box, and the least informed about our particular conditions and needs.
—James L. Buckley, senior federal judge and former U.S. Senator1
The United States’ national debt is currently $19.5 trillion and counting—that’s $60,190 for every
individual living in America today, or $163,192 per taxpayer.2 The total national debt is outpacing
America’s economy, while the publicly held debt as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP)
is nearly 75%.3 Congress, as the keeper of the purse, is responsible for these staggering statistics. But
states, now heavily dependent upon this spending, have become increasingly complicit in Congress’s
fiscal recklessness.
Over the last fifty years, federal spending directed to states through grants has increased by an as-
tounding 4986%—from $12.8 billion in 1966 to an estimated $666 billion in 2016.4 The largest
portions of federal funding to states are designated for health-related programs, income-security
programs (such as housing and food stamps), transportation, and education.5 While treatises could be
written on the dangers of Congress’s spending practices, the unfortunate reality is that the solvency
of many states—including Alabama—depends upon Congress’s generosity. Even aside from the disconcerting vulnerability that comes with reliance upon an insolvent funding source, a state’s federal
dependency diminishes its sovereignty and skews its budget priorities.
This report ought not be read as suggesting that the state of Alabama should wholly reject federal
funding—in fact, the report will demonstrate that it would be nearly impossible to do so under
current circumstances. Nor should it be read to imply that the states’ loss of sovereignty can be
easily recovered—it cannot and would almost certainly require buy-in from Congress. However,
individual states working to this end will be the necessary impetus for a return to federalism. The
report highlights several states that have taken meaningful steps to address their federal depen-
dency. Alabama’s leaders should begin to think along these same lines—to approach federal aid
with a heightened sense of skepticism and to identify opportunities (big or small) for our state to
maintain or regain its authority over various programs. At the very least, a deeper understanding of
the degree to which we sell our sovereignty and the ramifications of our state’s federal dependency
is necessary to advance sound policymaking at the state level.
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Alabama Policy Institute
Background
The near-helplessness of the states was most recently cast into the forefront during the Great Re-
cession with the passage of the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (known as TARP) and the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (known as “the stimulus”)—both of which sent
considerable additional infusions of federal dollars to the states to aid in post-recession recovery. At
the time, economists cautioned against the federal government’s unbridled spending and the precariousness of states’ reliance upon it.6 Unfortunately, Congress has made little progress in reducing
deficit spending. But many members of Congress are hardly in a position to demand federal fiscal
responsibility when the states that they represent are paralyzed by an addiction to federal dollars
with no real contingency plan for any reduction in federal funds. Alabama is no exception.
Largely attributed to Alabama’s high poverty levels, the state has become dangerously dependent
upon the federal government. In fact, the Tax Foundation recently ranked Alabama ninth in an
evaluation of states’ dependency on federal aid.7 Estimates derived from Alabama’s most recent Com-
prehensive Annual Financial Report show that the state received $8.5 billion in federal funding for
fiscal year 2014, while state revenue totaled $11 billion.8 Only ten years prior, Alabama received $5.7
billion in federal grants, with state revenue totaling $8.4 billion.9 This means that Alabama’s intake
of federal dollars has grown by nearly 50%, surpassing the growth of state revenues. During the same
TA B L E O N E 10
State vs. Federal Revenues, 2004–2014
$12
IN BILLIONS
10
8
6
4
2
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total Federal Revenue
2009
2010
2011
Total State Revenue
2012
2013
2014
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
3
period, Alabama’s compound annual growth rate for personal income was 2.6% and only 0.7% for
gross domestic product—both below the national average.11
The federal dollars coming to Alabama are dedicated to an array of services, the largest of which are
Medicaid, education, and human services.12 Funding for these grants comes predominantly from
the federal government’s general fund—its primary fund used for general purposes of government.13
The largest source of general fund dollars is personal income tax.14 Interestingly, a 2012 report by
the Tax Foundation ranked Alabama third in the country as to its population of federal income tax
“non-payers.”15 According to the report, 40% of Alabamians had no federal income tax liability (that
number has now decreased slightly, to 36%).16 This leads to a very high state return on taxpayer in-
vestment—roughly 3 federal dollars for every 1 dollar Alabama sends to Washington17—by the state
as a whole. But the value assessment should not stop there as this money is hardly free. These dollars
return to Alabama tied to innumerable stipulations and restrictions and usually lead to increases in
state spending (which, of course, often necessitates tax hikes).
It is important to note how and why Congress sends money back to the states to begin with. Federal
funding is directed to states in one of three primary forms: (1) block grants; (2) categorical formu-
la grants; and (3) project grants.18 Block grants (like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or
“TANF”) and categorical formula grants (like Medicaid) are established by law and apply to all
states the same.19 Project grants, such as those for economic development, are given out competitively
amongst the states.20 The type of grant determines the degree of the state’s authority and flexibility
over how the funds will be spent.21
Why does Congress send so much money to the states? The Congressional Budget Office offers this
explanation: if state taxpayers felt that they were not directly benefiting from the services that their tax
dollars paid for, then, Congress presumes, they would likely relocate to a state with either lower taxes or
fewer programs funded by redistribution.22 But because you can’t move to avoid federal taxes, “the federal
government is better able to redistribute resources . . . . ”23 This redistribution of resources leads to a significant redistribution of state power. With every congressional check cashed, the state becomes a little more
subservient to the federal leviathan.
In Montgomery, the mindset is that we ought to take as much as we can get of this money that is
rightfully ours—after all, Alabama taxpayers are federal taxpayers. But to get those dollars back,
should the state routinely cede so much of its authority, as William F. Buckley put it, “approaching
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Alabama Policy Institute
the government at Washington as supplicants, begging it to return to the [state] some of the in-
come it has taken from it”?24 And when we do, are we sure that we are getting a good deal? As one
writer analogized, “In the end, the relationship between states and the federal government is that
of a wealthy parent who gives $20 to his kid and then forces him to buy $50 worth of clothes.”25 To
make matters worse, the parent in this example is currently in massive debt and the kid has spent
his parents’ money and his own on clothes that do not fit!
Ceding State Sovereignty for Federal Dollars
Since the first grant-in-aid program, the Morrill Act, was enacted in 1862,26 thousands of laws
have been passed by Congress to lure states into ceding their constitutional authority over a variety
of matters in exchange for federal funding. In addition to the threat that federal funds will deplete
over time, legislators should be troubled by the fact that the state has given up meaningful control
over many of its agencies and programs via the severe mandates and regulations that come with
accepting federal dollars. Not only are legislators often obligated to put up a certain amount of
state dollars to qualify for federal dollars, but, in many cases, state laws or agency rules must also
be changed in order to comply with given mandates. These conditions are, in fact, mandates since a
grant agreement functions as a contract between the state and the federal government.27 A survey
of some of Alabama’s largest federally funded programs is instructive.
Medicaid—a federal-state “partnership” program—is the largest recipient of federal dollars in Ala-
bama. Alabama spent $6.3 billion on Medicaid services in fiscal year 2016—$1.9 billion state dollars
and $4.4 billion federal dollars28—the highest amount ever. What does Alabama commit its taxpayers
to by running a program that is 70% federally funded? In order to receive federal dollars for Medicaid,
Alabama must relinquish control over aspects of the program that directly affect its overall costs. The
federal government requires that Medicaid funds be used to provide specific health care benefits to
specific categories of low-income individuals. Benefits include family planning services, laboratory
and x-ray services, and in- and out-patient hospital services.29 The federal government limits a state’s
ability to impose premiums or other cost-sharing means on recipients.30 For emergency health care
services and family planning services, states cannot impose any cost-sharing provisions on recipients.31
The 2009 stimulus and the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA)—both of which offered additional
federal funding for Medicaid—imposed a “maintenance of effort” requirement on the states to prohibit them from cutting eligibility levels, increasing premium or enrollment fees, or otherwise im-
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
5
plementing more restrictive enrollment policies. 32 Congress tried unsuccessfully to force states into
Medicaid expansion by threatening to take away all of the states’ Medicaid funding if they chose
not to expand. The U.S. Supreme Court struck this down and deemed it to be “unduly coercive.”* 33
While states are permitted to seek “flexibility waivers” for Medicaid from the federal government under
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, many of the more original and inventive state-proposed reforms
to Medicaid have been rejected.34 For states that expanded Medicaid under the ACA, flexibility is even
further diminished.35 This is despite the fact that health care outcomes across the country for those
relying on this expansive federal program (administered by states) have been far from convincing.36
Washington’s one-size-fits-all, centralized approach to health care is unadaptable to the unique needs of
each state—it was not designed with best practices
for serving patients in rural Alabama in mind, for
With every congressional check
include “empowering states and increasing flexibil-
cashed, the state becomes
House of Representatives Republican Caucus.37
a little more subservient to
instance. This reality has led Speaker Paul Ryan to
ity” in Medicaid as a platform issue for the U.S.
Alabama’s second-largest piece of the federal pie
the federal leviathan.
($2.7 billion)** goes to education38—one of the
most prominent areas of state and local jurisdiction that has been federalized. The federalization of
education began under President Lyndon Johnson with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, which provided substantial financial aid to public schools in exchange for compliance with
federal guidelines on spending.39 In 1979, the permanent mega-bureaucracy of the U.S. Department
of Education was founded. Federal spending on K-12 public education has increased nearly every year
since (a 435% increase over 35 years), bundled to the states with federal guidelines.40 In order to qualify
for federal education funding, the Improving America’s Schools Act, enacted in 1994, required states
to establish state standards, standards-based testing, and accountability processes based on test results.41
In 2002, the federal government trod even deeper into state and local territory with President
George W. Bush’s signature education law, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),42 described
as the “greatest extension to date of federal authority over public school governance.”43 In NCLB,
* For further discussion of the Court’s decision, see infra pp. 16-17.
** This amount does not include federal funding for higher education.
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Alabama Policy Institute
Congress held out the carrot of continued federal education subsidies to force states into compliance
with the 670-page law. The law instituted unprecedented federal directives on teacher qualifications,
curriculum selection, tracking annual progress, and intervention procedures when annual progress
was not demonstrated.44 Though states were permitted to seek waivers from portions of the law,
applications were hundreds of pages long, exhausting considerable amounts of time and expense.45
In exchange for “flexibility” via waivers under NCLB, states were required to prove the implementation of four principles: (1) college and career ready standards (subject to specified criteria); (2) dif-
ferentiated recognition, accountability, and support (subject to specified criteria); (3) evaluation of
teachers and principals (subject to specified criteria); and (4) efficient reporting systems.46 In light of
the many preconditions tied to “greater flexibility,” a policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation declared that the waivers “fail to provide genuine relief to the states” and that the conditions attached
to the waivers even “circumvent Congress and represent a significant new executive overreach.”47
In December 2015, a replacement of NCLB was enacted—the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).
It is generally accepted that the new law restores some authority to states and localities, namely in de-
terminations of “failing” schools and attendant school improvement strategies.48 As the law begins to
be implemented, only time will tell whether or not it results in a meaningful retrenchment of federal
intervention in education and a return to state sovereignty.
The third-largest category of Alabama’s federal receipts is human services. One of the programs in
this category is the federally controlled food stamp program, known as SNAP (Supplemental Nu-
trition Assistance Program). According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Alabama
spent $1.34 billion on the issuance of SNAP benefits in fiscal year 2015.49 Though federal taxpayers
pay for the benefits issued, state taxpayers pay at least half the cost of administering this federal program. Alabama spent $43 million in fiscal year 2015 for administrative costs, in addition to the federal government’s $44 million.50 But the cost to the state does not result in meaningful control over
the program, even in the administration of benefits. For example, states are limited in their ability to
tighten the application process to guard against fraud on the front end.51 States do not have authority
to pursue retailers that are trafficking SNAP benefits, only the individual beneficiaries.52 States can-
not mandate that beneficiaries cooperate in fraud investigations.53
The federal government also determines which food items are eligible for purchase with SNAP
benefits.54 If a state desires to restrict purchases, it must seek permission from the USDA via a
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
7
waiver. Recently, Maine’s request for a waiver to prohibit the purchase of candy and sugary drinks
was denied, prompting this response to the federal government from Governor Paul LePage:
Beyond the health effects of the federal government’s corrupt food stamp policy is the tragedy of
billions wasted in taxpayer dollars that buy candy and soda through a program that was originally
designed to reduce hunger. Maine taxpayers see it every day at the grocery store and they are sick
and tired of watching their hard-earned money going down the drain. . . . I will be pursuing options
to implement reform unilaterally or cease Maine’s administration of the food stamp program altogether. You maintain such a broken program that I do not want my name attached to it.55
The USDA also prohibits states from imposing more stringent conditions on eligibility.56 States
including Georgia, Florida, Missouri, and Wisconsin passed legislation to require drug screening
for SNAP recipients,57 similar to the screening imposed upon TANF (welfare) recipients. Georgia
received a letter from the USDA insisting that drug-testing would be a violation of federal policy,
while Florida’s law was struck down by a federal court.58 Knowing this, Wisconsin Governor Scott
Walker preemptively filed a lawsuit against the federal government in an effort to keep his state’s
law intact.59 While the lawsuit is ongoing, eleven governors have petitioned Congress for the abil-
ity to drug-test recipients.60
The federalization of transportation is another phenomenon that began in the 1950’s with good
intentions and a limited scope—supporting the interstate highway system—but has now expanded to unforeseen levels. The federal government funnels billions of transportation dollars back to
the states via the Highway Trust Fund, a fund that in recent years has found itself in a perpetual
state of crisis due to out-of-control spending by Congress.61 This revenue, predominantly collected
through the federal gas tax, is designed to assist states in “construction, reconstruction, and improvements of highways and bridges on eligible federal-aid highway routes and for other special
purpose programs and projects.”62 Not surprisingly, this funding comes back to the states after
a lengthy, bureaucratic process and with onerous constraints. Transportation projects subsidized
with federal funds inhibit states from implementing measures of cost efficiency and can also stifle
innovation, such as the use of public-private partnerships.63 By accepting federal funding, states
are subject to costly regulations, such as the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires federal contractors
to adhere to “prevailing wage requirements,” or environmental regulations under the National
Environmental Policy Act that regularly increase both the completion time and overall costs of
transportation projects for states.64
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Alabama Policy Institute
In Alabama, federal funds account for over half of all transportation appropriations ($720 million in
FY2016).65 Federal dollars are typically doled out through a funding match of 80 federal dollars to
20 state dollars,66 but remember, the federal dollars originated with Alabama’s federal income tax-
payers. To be clear, Alabama gets back almost exactly the same amount that it sends to Washington in
the form of federal gas tax, so federal transportation money (with fine print ad infinitum) is far from
a boon for the state (see Table 2 below). A few Congressional voices in the wilderness, led by U.S.
Senator Mike Lee, have pushed for a devolution of transportation funding to the states. Under his
plan, the Transportation Empowerment Act, the federal gas tax would gradually decrease, allowing
states to keep this revenue; set appropriate funding policy; and, ultimately, make their own decisions
about highway projects.67
Notice that in many of the above examples, states have willingly given up their sovereignty over a
matter only to then be forced to give up a little more to maintain the same (rather than an additional)
stream of funding. More and more frequently, the federal government will merely change the rules
after states have become inordinately reliant on the money. As McDermott and Jensen observe,
“states and localities may be too deeply invested in particular activities to be able simply to forego
federal dollars when new conditions are placed on existing programs and their associated funding
streams . . . . Unless it is truly feasible for jurisdictions to refuse funds with strings attached, conditional spending is effectively a form of direct federal regulation under a veneer of false deference.”68
Consider two recent attempts by the federal government to change the rules on states.
TA B L E T W O 69
Alabama’s Share of Federal Highway Funds in 2014
1.944%
Percent of Alabama’s
payments into the Federal
Highway Trust Fund
1.896%
Percent of allocations
Alabama receives from the
Federal Highway Trust Fund
97.5%
Alabama’s return ratio for
federal highway money
sent to Washington
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
9
In March 2016, a new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) policy took effect, requir-
ing states to submit a “climate change mitigation plan” before being considered for grant funding.70
Under the rule, some red states would be forced to effectively adapt their ideology on climate change
or lose federal dollars. From 2010 to 2014, Alabama received over $112 million from FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.71 In a letter to FEMA Director Chris Fugate, eight Republican
U.S. senators wrote, “We are concerned FEMA’s recent decision to require States to address climate
change in their mitigation strategies injects unnecessary, ideological-based red tape into the disaster
preparedness process. Planning and preparing for disasters should be focused on strengthening and
protecting local communities from inevitable weather events and not about falling in line with the
President’s political agenda.”72 If this new policy is enforced, would Alabama be prepared to pass up
federal funding or would we be forced to comply?
In May 2016, the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice imposed a controversial mandate on
school districts throughout the country that accept federal funds.73 The directive demands that school
districts allow students to use the bathroom or locker room assigned to the gender with which they
“identify,” rather than their sex.74 Based on a distorted reading of Title IX, the departments warned
school districts that compliance with this far-left directive would now be a “condition of receiving
federal funds.”75 If challenged by the federal government, would our values be readily cast aside in
favor of retaining this funding?
Federal Funding Skews State Budget Priorities
The most practical effect of a state’s federal dependency and concurrent loss of sovereignty is that
of skewed budgeting and prioritization. It is fair to assume that, to some degree, many states have
become numb to this reality or, at least, are not fully aware of it. In Montgomery, debate about
Alabama’s federal funding is typically limited to how to get more of it. There is little discussion or
examination of the state’s financial obligations upon accepting it and whether or not the required
spending of state dollars (combined with federal dollars) on a program designed by Washington
yields the best results for Alabamians.
According to the Code of Alabama, the governor is authorized to accept federal funding grants for
any purpose not in conflict with the Alabama Constitution.76 The governor is likewise empowered
to require any agency to meet the terms and conditions imposed on such grants by Congress or the
president, including rules and regulations.77 To aid the governor in preparing the budget, Alabama
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Alabama Policy Institute
law requires each agency or department to submit to him all estimated receipts and expenditures,
including grants received from the federal government.78 The Alabama Legislature maintains the sole
power to appropriate and authorize disbursement of any and all funding, including federal receipts.79
The disbursement of federal funding occurs nearly automatically. While the budget documents pro-
vided to legislators do contain estimated federal receipts by agency, careful examination and debate
over spending is usually limited to state dollars allocated to various agencies. However, an agency or
program’s share of state dollars does not present a clear picture of the entity’s full funding.
Take, for example, the Medicaid agency’s line item in the General Fund budget. While Medicaid re-
ceived $685 million from the General Fund in fiscal year 2016, the Legislative Fiscal Office’s Budget
Fact Book shows that that number accounts for only 11% of Alabama’s total Medicaid spending.80 In
fact, nearly 70% ($4.4 billion) of the total amount came from the federal government.81 Similarly, the
Department of Economic and Community Affairs (ADECA) received $7.4 million from the General Fund in fiscal year 2016, but received $192 million in federal funds (or 88% of its total budget).82
Understanding an agency or program’s total funding is particularly vital to the prioritization of limited state dollars and the overall evaluation of an agency or program’s performance. It is also critical to
acknowledge that the receipt of federal funds can actually impair, not improve, a budget process that
is responsive to the needs and desires of the people.
Formula grant funding for states is usually open-ended, meaning that the federal government agrees
to a certain match (sometimes called “matching dollars”) for every dollar that the state decides to
spend, subject to federally established criteria.83 In other words, the bigger the program, the more
funding the state can bring in from the federal government. Medicaid provides an example of funding administered through formula grants. In Alabama, the match is $2.32 from Washington per every one Alabama dollar spent.84 As noted supra, Alabama spent over $6.3 billion on Medicaid services
in the last year.85 The state’s share of Medicaid spending was nearly $2 billion.86 Since 2010, the state’s
portion has increased by an average of 9.5% annually with no sign of leveling off in coming years.87
The Congressional Budget Office notes that this matching structure can cause states to “spend less
than they would have on other benefits or services that do not receive federal matching, and to shift
activities that had been funded entirely by the state into Medicaid.”88
When there is federal funding available for a second-tier priority of state government, but no federal
funding available for a first-tier priority, then the state may end up spending state taxpayer dollars
to gain federal funding, believing additional revenue to be the primary objective. This can lead to
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
11
persistent neglect or underfunding of state agencies that do not bring in substantial federal funds.
For example, some of Alabama’s most essential government functions, such as the court system89 or
the district attorneys’ offices,90 receive very little federal funding. At times, these agencies have been
overlooked for funding increases or subjected to across-the-board cuts while funding was instead
prioritized for agencies that receive large sums of federal matching funds.
Preserving Alabama’s federal revenue stream was of paramount concern during the 2015 legislative
sessions. Governor Robert Bentley proposed a large tax increase package in an effort to shore up the
state’s distressed General Fund. He highlighted the federal funding that would be lost if the legislature tried to cut its way to a balanced budget. There were a number of agencies or programs that
were deemed entirely “off the table” for cuts, due to the state’s reliance on federal matching dollars.
Federally supported state agencies sounded the alarm, reminding lawmakers that state cuts would be
doubled due to a loss of federal dollars. For instance, the director of ADECA advised that “if this
54% cut [in state funding] holds, more than half of our federal dollars [will] go away.”91
To help curb the temptation of states to replace state dollars with federal dollars, rather than use federal
dollars to supplement state spending, the federal government requires states to show “maintenance of
effort”—that is, that the state is maintaining existing state funding levels upon the receipt of additional
funding from the federal government. Maintenance-of-effort requirements can seriously hinder states
from moving money around during down years. These restrictions can also prevent states from being
innovative, tailoring the administration of a service in a way that’s responsive to taxpayers, or delivering
a service in a more efficient or cost-effective way. The Congressional Budget Office acknowledges that
“restricting the control that state and local governments have over spending decisions may better pro-
mote some federal goals, but such an approach may also limit the ability of state and local governments
to respond to specific conditions in their jurisdictions or to experiment with different program designs.”92
While federal funding is perceived as indispensable, it is also perceived as disposable. This leads to a
less attentive review of how it is spent and what the spending has accomplished. As economist Dr.
Eric Fruits maintains, this can allow bad public policy to “masquerade as good policy because it appears to be cheaper than superior alternatives.”93 States may be getting a good federal match for their
dollars, but are then apathetic to the return on their investment—both in outcomes and efficiencies.
Even the Congressional Budget Office recognizes that “less federal control over the administration
of grant programs could permit states and local governments to find ways to operate those programs
in a more economically-efficient manner.”94
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The level of scrutiny over federal funds should not be incongruous to that of state revenues as
there are few instances in which the former does not directly impact the latter. An analogy:
say somebody gives you two free tickets to a concert. You go to the concert and the music
is just okay, but the tickets were free so you go home content. Imagine instead that you use
the free tickets, but end up spending $25 on parking and $75 on food and drinks. Now that
Federal grants rarely,
if ever, have a positive net
impact on state coffers;
thus, this funding should
you’ve made a $100 investment in the concert, you
are highly annoyed to find that you don’t like the
music. You wish you’d spent your $100 buying
tickets to a better concert. This is how states ought
to perceive taking “free” money to administer un-
manageable or failed programs.
This perception of disposability may also lead
be accepted only after
states to accept federal funds for projects that are
careful consideration of
payers either cannot or will not pay for them. In
whether or not it
will facilitate or impede
sound policymaking.
not in high demand from taxpayers—that is, taxthe short term, “free” money for projects means
free political points; in other words, politicians
can reap the rewards of the spending (and attend
lots of ribbon-cuttings in their districts) without
making tough decisions or facing any real opposi-
tion. Congress counts on exactly this mentality to
push its own agenda down to the states. As former
U.S. Senator James Buckley put it, state priorities are often distorted by the federal govern-
ment’s offering “lucrative grants for purposes of often trivial importance.”95
Consider federal stimulus funds that came to Alabama during the Great Recession, designed
to kick-start projects that would stimulate the Alabama economy and compensate for lost
revenue in state budgets. As would be expected, the money came with very specific instruc-
tions on how it was to be spent. In accordance with federal guidelines, funds were used to
grow government across the country—in particular, entitlement programs and green energy initiatives. Alabama received $3.8 billion in stimulus funds.96 The largest portion, $962
million, went to an increase in the federal Medicaid match; $216 million went to increase
benefits and administration of SNAP; and $149 million went to weatherization grants and
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
13
TA B L E T H R E E 97
1,000
$50
900
45
800
40
700
35
600
30
500
25
400
20
300
15
200
10
100
5
0
2004
2006
2008
2010
Administrative cost to state
2012
2014
2016
0
Recipients
green energy projects (for example, energy efficiency in prisons and schools, reducing the energy costs of automobile suppliers, “green” jobs training, and higher education research on climate
change—perhaps deserving of Buckley’s label, “of trivial importance”).98
Even in cases where the state is not required to match or subsidize a federal project grant, such as
with stimulus funds, when these funds run out, politicians are often pressured to find state funding
to continue the project or program—one that could likely have never been initiated or expanded if
it were to be paid out of state or local funds alone.* Notice how the number of SNAP recipients in-
creased dramatically immediately following the recession (Table 3). Eligibility for the program was
expanded and stimulus funds were given to the states to help cover the additional costs of benefits
and administration. The substantial increase in the number of recipients is still holding steady five
years after its peak in 2011. However, the state’s associated increase in administrative costs lagged
behind, due to stimulus funding, and only began to be identifiable in 2014.
* It is worth noting here that additional state employees are necessary to administer growing federally funded state programs.
While the federal government may cover the cost of these hires on the front end (as with the stimulus), the state is inevitably
making a longer-term commitment to these individuals, not just in payroll costs, but also in health and retirement benefits.
IN $ MILLIONS
IN THOUSANDS
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Trends for Alabama, 2005–2016
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In order to receive stimulus funds, states were also prohibited from cutting the funding (proving
maintenance of effort) of 15 specified programs from levels in effect before the recession began99—
for most states, including Alabama, this meant maintaining spending levels in place at the tail end
of a period of dramatic spending growth [see Table 4].
TA B L E F O U R 100
Alabama’s Total Appropriations, 1990–Present
$35
30
IN BILLIONS
25
20
15
10
5
Total
16
20
15
20
14
20
13
12
20
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
05
20
03
01
20
20
99
19
97
19
95
19
93
19
19
91
0
Inflation-adjusted
The aforementioned examples underscore the fact that, regardless of the type or terms, federal
grants rarely, if ever, have a positive net impact on state coffers; thus, this funding should be
accepted only after careful consideration of whether or not it will facilitate or impede sound
policymaking. The Economics International study found that for every federal dollar sent to the
states, an average increase of $0.82 in new state and local taxes followed,101 leading Dr. Fruits to
conclude that “there are few things as expensive as free federal money.”102 Fruits’s determination
should not be understood as an $0.18 windfall for states—rather his study indicates that $.82
in additional state spending results from every dollar taken in from Washington. Under Fruits’s
hypothesis, if Alabama were already spending one state dollar on a project, then received one
federal dollar, that federal infusion would lead to additional state spending of 82 cents—a ratio
of $1.82-to-1, not 1-to-$0.82.
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
15
A Matter of Federalism
What is needed more than anything else is a process of reeducation in the values of federalism that the
Framers themselves had, and that we must have if the system is going to work properly. No matter
how you write it, it won’t work if we don’t believe in federalism.
—Justice Antonin Scalia103
The illustrations throughout this report have a common theme. In each, federalism—the deli-
cate balance of power between the federal government and the states—has been disrupted. As
James Madison affirmed in The Federalist No. 45, “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitu-
tion . . . are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and
indefinite. The Powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects which . . . concern
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people . . . . ”104 Put simply, those issues that most affected
everyday life were left in the hands of the states, the government closest to the people. Sadly, this
foundational concept has fallen far from the days of the Founders.
How did we get here? Regrettably, the weakened federalism we see today is the result of a triad
of overreach—by the President and his agencies, by Congress, and with the endorsement of the
U.S. Supreme Court. This is accomplished through Congress’s spending power and the way
it uses this power to legislate and regulate matters that the Constitution leaves to the states.
Though the federal government’s enumerated powers are quite limited, the Court has allowed
Congress to skirt these limits through an expansive interpretation of the “General Welfare”
(or spending) clause. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to
spend federal monies in a manner that will “promote the general welfare.”105 But as applied by
the Court, Congress itself determines when federal spending will accomplish this purpose and
is not limited to spending in furtherance of its enumerated powers alone106 —thus, the power is
virtually limitless.
Armed with this limitless power, James Buckley professes, “Congress is licensed to dabble in areas
in which it is forbidden to act, which it does by bribing the states [with the lure of federal dollars] to
adopt Congress’s approaches to problems that are the states’ exclusive responsibility.”107 By taking
the bait, states have become complicit in Congress’s fiscal recklessness and the decline of federal-
ism through the voluntary surrender of states’ authority over matters in exchange for money—we
are actually selling our sovereignty.108
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Why should this be of concern? Because federalism is a critical component in the preservation of
liberty. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained (though not consistently applied in practice), “By
denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism
protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.”109 The Founders knew this and thus,
Regrettably, the weakened
federalism we see today is the
result of a triad of overreach—
encapsulated this ideal in the Tenth Amendment:
“The Powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States . . . or to the people.”110
Fading federalism leads to diminished liberty in that
by the President and his
self-governance is replaced with centralized gover-
agencies, by Congress,
cal governments from being innovative in policymaking
and with the endorsement
of the U.S. Supreme Court.
nance. Centralized governance crowds out state and loand attentive to the citizenry, something Washington
is not capable of doing. The needs that federal funding
purports to address simply cannot be best served the
same way in every state. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Louis D. Brandeis recognized in 1932, “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”111
But these laboratories of democracy are losing the will and/or the ability to solve their own problems as
they have become conditioned to the federal government’s centralized approach to policymaking and
are hamstrung by their reliance on federal funding. There is less ownership of the outcomes associated
with federally run or federally subsidized programs, which perpetuates bad policy.*
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court tried to establish some limits to Congress’s spending power in instances where “the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point
at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion’.”112 However, this test has rarely been applied in a manner that
limits Congress’s use of conditions. One notable exception arose in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (2012).113 In this case, states claimed that the federal requirement to expand Medicaid
under the ACA or risk all federal funding for the program was surely coercion.114 The plurality agreed,
but offered no real guidance as to how the Court would make such a determination in a future case.115
* See supra text accompanying note 93 on p. 11.
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
17
The Court reasoned that it had never been compelled to establish the line at which “persuasion gives
way to coercion.”116 The opinion continues, “wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”117
Nevertheless, the Court did make sure to reaffirm its usual line of thinking that in “the typical
case,” states can just say no. 118
Congress may attach appropriate conditions to federal taxing and spending programs to preserve
its control over the use of federal funds. In the typical case, we look to States to defend their pre-
rogatives by adopting “the simple expedient of not yielding” to federal blandishments when they
do not want to embrace the federal policies as their own. The States are separate and independent
sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act like it. 119
There is little reason to believe that the federal government, through the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch, will voluntarily relinquish power to the states. It is therefore incumbent upon the
states to fight for a return to federalism, which cannot truly commence until the states cease the
continuous and voluntary selling of their sovereignty.
How Are Other States
Dealing with Federal Dependency?
The people of Alabama and our leaders should be troubled by the state’s shrinking sovereignty. Re-
versing this trajectory cannot happen overnight, but to begin emancipating Alabama from federal
dependency, the state must get a better handle on the federal dollars it takes in and the state’s con-
current commitments. A number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions have required Congress to “speak
with a clear voice,” so that states are able to “knowingly” accept federal dollars and be “cognizant of
the consequences of their participation.”120 However, the Court has recognized almost no instances in
which Congress did not fulfill this duty. That means that the onus is on the state to fully understand
the terms of its contract with the federal government and what it could mean for the citizenry.
It is also imperative that we understand the bigger picture surrounding states’ intake of federal dollars. Dependency upon a funding source that is $19.5 trillion in debt places states in a very vulnerable
position. “A continued absence of dependency information,” writes Edward Mazur for the Journal
of Accountancy, “will limit the ability of state and local government leaders to take into account the
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ramifications of such dependency when they seek to institute proactive measures prior to reductions
in intergovernmental flows and a possible worsening of the federal debt crisis.”121 Several states have
heeded the warning signs and have begun to take steps to limit their federal dependency.
In the 2011-2013 sessions, the Utah Legislature enacted a package of bills known as “Financial Ready
Utah,” in pursuit of “fiscal self-reliance” from the federal government.122 The first measure required
agencies to release all of their federal receipts, the percentage of their budget that came from those
receipts, and a contingency plan for a decrease in federal funding.* 123 Another bill set up a commission
to study the “immediacy, severity, and probability”124 of a reduction in federal funds and how that
would affect the state’s overall finances.125 An outside auditing firm was also employed to aid in this
effort.126 State Representative Ken Ivory, one of the bill sponsors, described the motivation behind the
effort: “To think that as a nation we’re perpetually pretending that we can print prosperity—it simply
defies reality. We’ve got to prepare, because no matter what happens at the federal level, we still have
to educate children . . . take care of sick and poor people . . . [and] take care of roads and public safety.”127
Idaho Governor Butch Otter sounded the alarm over the state’s federal dependency in 2014 via executive order.128 The order called for transparency from agencies on the federal funding they received in the
previous fiscal year, the obligations that came with the acceptance of such funding, and how the funding
was spent.129 Like the efforts in Utah, the governor required that a contingency plan for a 10% reduction
in federal dollars be prepared by each agency.130 Speaking in support of the governor’s quest to address
the state’s reliance on federal funding, one lawmaker noted, “Idaho should . . . look for opportunities to
turn down federal dollars for programs that don’t fit the ‘essential functions of government.’ ”131 Another
lawmaker praised the governor’s efforts and expressed the conviction that “Idaho has the duty and responsibility not to be a ‘needy state’ that has its hands out for federal dollars year after year.”132
The Oklahoma Legislature passed a bill in 2015 to require more transparency in the receipt of federal
funds. House Bill 1748 required state agencies to report (1) any action required to be taken as a condition for the receipt of federal funds; (2) any action prohibited to be taken as a condition for the receipt
of federal funds; and (3) any condition of federal funding for which the agency must incur costs to
implement.133 Governor Mary Fallin ultimately vetoed the measure due to concerns over the “administrative burden” that she feared the act would impose on state agencies.134 Bill sponsors presumed
* The Alabama Legislature enacted similar legislation in 2015. See Ala. Code § 41-4-97 (2016). The agencies’ first annual reports
are due by October 31 of this year. See id. Because the publication date of this report preceded the due date of those reports, they
could not be consulted. For a listing of revenues by agency, see sources cited infra notes 8–10.
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
19
one of two possibilities for her opposition: “Either the agencies don’t want the people to know what
the strings are or, even more concerning, the agency directors aren’t making informed decisions.”135
In the Hoosier State, Governor Mike Pence created the “Office of State-Based Initiatives” in an effort
to impose additional oversight and accountability on agencies receiving federal funds. The goal of the
office, established under Executive Order 13-20,136 is to “contribute to Indiana’s continued fiscal health”
by “working with agencies to push back against onerous regulations that often accompany the return of
federal dollars to Indiana.”137 The office is charged with reviewing the state’s federal grant opportunities
and giving approval for any agency to seek a federal grant. The office also “subject[s] each grant to a
cost-benefit analysis” that “measure[s] the grant’s fiscal and regulatory impact.”138 During the 2015 fiscal
year, the office focused its analysis of grants to determine if the state should consolidate programs, seek
more federal waivers, or discontinue certain programs altogether.139 The Pence Administration encour-
ages other states to set up a similar office to help establish “the necessary coalition of states to assert state
authority and make it easier for governors and state legislatures to run their states.”140
The South Carolina Policy Council, aiding state leaders in dealing with federal reliance, recommends
a similar contract review-like approach, whereby state officials seeking federal money are required to
publicly disclose the terms of the agreement, specifically citing any authority that the state would trans-
fer to the federal government in exchange for funding as well as any impact that the agreement would
have on state citizens.141 A policy brief on the matter expounds, “In the case of a contract between the
state and federal government, our elected officials should be able to explain the transaction in these
areas: (1) cost to the people’s freedom; (2) new restrictions on the people’s or the state’s authority; (3)
new state, federal, and local taxpayer-funded positions created; (4) new regulations and policy changes
mandated; (5) the process by which businesses should be notified of new regulations; and (6) identifying
any duplication of private-sector services.”142 “Imposing a contract-like relationship on the sovereign-
ty-in-exchange-for-money transaction would bring that process into the clear light of day,” the brief
advises, “and only when that happens can South Carolina begin to turn down federal money and reject
the federal government’s misguided attempts to solve our problems through centralized power.”143
Rediscovering the Freedom of Federalism
As was true for all of the aforementioned states, the first step for Alabama will be simply understanding and acknowledging the extent of our state’s existing federal dependency. While some information
about Alabama’s federal grants and receipts is currently available, it takes hours of research to find
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the amount or the terms of any one grant. Meaningful assessment of our federal dependency can-
not occur without proper tracking and comprehensive reporting on the receipt of, spending of, and
conditions surrounding the billions of federal dollars flowing into Alabama. A substantive evaluation
of federally funded programs and projects will help state leaders determine when the burden of fed-
eral conditions outweighs the benefit, when more flexibility is needed to accomplish stated objectives,
or when federal money is better left on the table.
State leaders should also work with Alabama’s federal representatives to further a return to state
sovereignty. As Alabama endeavors to better understand the ramifications of its federal dependency, state leaders must communicate to Alabama’s congressional delegation the multitude of diffi-
culties imposed on states through federal conditions. The delegation should be compelled to fight
for a streamlined waiver process for federal grant programs or, even better, block grants that would
send certain categories of federal funding back to the states free of stipulations. As the state faces
elections in 2018, Alabamians should listen carefully to state and federal candidates to determine
whether the individuals are serious about addressing Alabama’s federal dependency.
Lastly, states can and should work together to push back against the federal government and stop
allowing state policymaking to come from Washington. A limited example of this was seen when
29 states turned down Medicaid expansion. States’ attorneys general, including Alabama Attorney
General Luther Strange, have also banded together on several occasions to fight federal overreach
in the courts. A broader, more coordinated effort amongst the states to reclaim constitutional sovereignty would be hard for the federal government to ignore.
What Would an Autonomous Alabama Look Like?
• Alabama taxpayer dollars stay in the state and are spent in a responsible manner that
is directly responsive to the needs and desires of the Alabama public, not federal
matching opportunities.
• Alabama voters are better able to evaluate the performance of their state representatives, as Washington bureaucrats are no longer driving state policy.
• Alabama parents have more control over the educational decisions of their local
schools, while the state can offer more flexibility to schools to ensure that instruction
and resources are tailored to the needs of that student body.
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
21
• Alabama institutes a more innovative, market-based approach to meeting the health
care needs of the poor and vulnerable.
• Alabama appropriators are free to consider lowering taxes, rather than maintaining or
increasing them to secure federal funding.
• Alabama reforms welfare programs in ways that better serve the truly needy and do so
in a manner that promotes Alabama values: strong families, educational opportunity,
and integrity.
• Alabama prioritizes investment in infrastructure where improvements are most needed, not based on where federal money is offered. The process for initiating transportation projects is streamlined as only state-imposed restrictions are present.
Conclusion
“The states that gave the central government life now live at its behest,”144 and Alabama is no ex-
ception. We have become conditioned to the “soft tyranny” of an increasingly centralized federal
government and eroding state sovereignty.145 As a result, we’ve reaped a drastic loss of authority
over matters reserved to the states by the Constitution and skewed funding priorities that are not
responsive to the needs and desires of the people. This sovereignty has not just been taken from us,
it has been sold by our elected officials, or worse,
unelected bureaucrats. Yet, if asked, most Ala-
Federalism is the check on
ton to stay out of their business. Why? Because
government growth and
bamians will tell you that they want Washingthey understand the truism that where government grows, freedom shrinks. Federalism is the
the diminution of freedom.
check on government growth and the diminution
of freedom. “State sovereignty is not just an end in itself,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “ ‘Rather, fed-
eralism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power’.”146
With each passing year, our state finds itself “approaching the government at Washington as
supplicants, begging it to return to the state some of the income it has taken from it.”147 When
the federal government lures us with funding, we, as a state, exercise very little self-control, nev-
er mind the terms. This “trend toward subjugation”148 is leaving our state—its people—with no
meaningful control over some of the most expensive programs it administers. State leaders across
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the country have bought into the false promises of a one-size-fits-all approach to governing,
constantly looking to grow programs dictated by Washington despite evidence that the stated
objectives aren’t being met. Others refuse to look past the short term. They are more concerned
about attending ribbon cuttings for projects in their districts than looking at the bigger, alarming
picture that is fading federalism.
The national debt has now topped $19 trillion. States, including Alabama, have become increasingly
complicit in Congress’s fiscal recklessness. Until recently, that terrifying reality has been of little con-
cern to the states. The indifference, particularly by state leaders, defies logic. As former U.S. Senator
Tom Coburn warns, “If we ignore this problem, we will condemn future generations to a lower standard of living with less freedom and less opportunity. Sooner or later, our ‘debt bomb’ will go off.”149
Our children and grandchildren will pay the price of our nation’s financial mismanagement and our
state’s insolvency. Warren Buffet once made the point more bluntly: “When very human politicians
choose between the next election and the next generation, it’s clear what usually happens.”150
There will never be a perfect time to start addressing Alabama’s federal dependency. The day will
never come when state revenues are abundant and politicians face no opposition. We need leaders
who are equipped to initiate a changing of course, who understand this challenge, and are willing
to bring governance for the long term into the short term. Alabama’s citizens deserve a state government that is free to make decisions that will best serve them, not one that is beholden to Washington. Will we continue to carelessly sell our sovereignty—and, with it, our values—to the federal
government? Or will we begin to take seriously Chief Justice John Roberts’s admonishment? “The
States are separate and independent sovereigns,” he wrote. “Sometimes they have to act like it.”151
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
23
Notes
1
James L. Buckley, Saving Congress from Itself: Emancipating the States and Empowering Their People 79–80 (2014).
2
U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.usdebtclock.org [http://perma.cc/D6RB-5DTX] (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
3
Id.; Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 to 2025, at 1, 3 (2015), http://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/49892-Outlook2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/
EE89-ZQHL].
4
Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, Historical Tables: Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2017 tbl. 12.1 (2016), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
budget/fy2017/assets/hist.pdf [http://perma.cc/4RSA-BWQQ] (providing a summary comparison of total
outlays for grants to state and local governments from 1940 to 2021).
5
Congressional Budget Office, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments 27 (2013), http://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/03-05-13FederalGrants_onecol.pdf [http://perma.
cc/A2DK-PX7C].
6
See generally Edward L. Glaeser, “When States Become Dependent on Federal Aid,” New York Times:
Economix (Feb. 23, 2010, 6:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/when-states-becomedependent-on-federal-aid/ [http://perma.cc/MX37-SW89].
7
Jared Walczak, “Which States Rely the Most on Federal Aid?,” Tax Foundation ( Jan. 6, 2016), http://
taxfoundation.org/blog/which-states-rely-most-federal-aid-0 [http://perma.cc/5MN6-HP8H].
8
See Office of the State Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
(2015) [hereinafter CAFR for FY 2014], http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.2014.Alabama.pdf
[http://perma.cc/T9X9-J2ZU] (reporting financial information for fiscal year 2014).
9
See Office of the State Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual Financial
Report (2005) [hereinafter CAFR for FY 2004], http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/2004CAFR.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4D4H-6DN5] (reporting financial information for fiscal year 2004).
10
These data derive from reports, prepared by the state comptroller after the close of each fiscal year, given annually
to the governor by the state treasurer and state auditor. See CAFR for FY 2014, supra note 8; Office of the State
Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2014), http://comptroller.
alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.2013.ala.pdf [http://perma.cc/9A2Q-XY7B] (reporting financial information
for fiscal year 2013); Office of the State Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual
Financial Report (2013), http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.ala.2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/9QN2NUMD] (reporting financial information for fiscal year 2012); Office of the State Comptroller, Alabama
Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2012), http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/
CAFR/CAFR.Ala.2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/6V85-D4SL] (reporting financial information for fiscal year
2011); Office of the State Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
(2011), http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY9E-889E] (reporting
financial information for fiscal year 2010); Office of the State Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance,
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2010), http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.2009.pdf [http://
perma.cc/MCH6-L8WA] (reporting financial information for fiscal year 2009); Office of the State Comptroller,
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Alabama Policy Institute
Alabama Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2009), http://comptroller.alabama.
gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/78UT-CZB4] (reporting financial information for fiscal year
2008); Office of the State Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
(2008), http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/E8HC-3YFB] (reporting
financial information for fiscal year 2007); Office of the State Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance,
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2007), http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/2006CAFR.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3GCX-NRDV] (reporting financial information for fiscal year 2006); Office of the State
Comptroller, Alabama Department of Finance, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2006), http://comptroller.
alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/2005CAFR.pdf [http://perma.cc/S7SH-BZUY] (reporting financial information for
fiscal year 2005); CAFR for FY 2004, supra note 9.
11
Fact Sheet on Personal Income and Gross Domestic Product in Alabama, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
http://www.bea.gov/regional/bearfacts/pdf.cfm?fips=01000&areatype=STATE&geotype=3 [http://perma.
cc/R8TL-6BPG] (last published Sept. 28, 2016).
12
See Executive Budget Office, Alabama Department of Finance, Executive Budget, Fiscal Year 2016 (2015),
http://budget.alabama.gov/pdf/buddoc/BudDoc2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ABK-VJGX]; CAFR for FY
2014, supra note 9.
13
Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2016, at 373 (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf [http://perma.cc/MY48-S5NZ].
14
“FAQs: Accounting & Budget,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
faqs/Budget/Pages/us-budget.aspx [http://perma.cc/6Z2S-CJA8] (last updated Aug. 16, 2012, 4:39 PM).
15
“Nonpayers by State, 2010,” Tax Foundation (Sept. 18, 2012), http://taxfoundation.org/article/nonpayersstate-2010 [http://perma.cc/U5X4-D7WR].
16
Id. For the most recent individual income-tax statistics from the IRS, see “2014 ZIP Code Data (SOI),”
Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-statistics-2014-zipcode-data-soi [http://perma.cc/WV8S-S64R] (last updated Aug. 31, 2016) (click on “Alabama” hyperlink
to download XLS data file).
17
Ryan McMaken, “Which States Rely Most on Federal Spending?,” Mises Institute (Mar. 4, 2016), http://
mises.org/blog/which-states-rely-most-federal-spending [http://perma.cc/NW6D-U7B7].
18
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 5, at 1.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 9.
23
Id.
24
William F. Buckley, Jr., The Unmaking of a Mayor 107 (1966).
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
25
25
Veronique de Rugy, “Federalism Death Watch: State Dependency on Federal Dollars,” National Review
( Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/289113/federalism-death-watch-state-dependencyfederal-dollars-veronique-de-rugy [http://perma.cc/VL39-CYXU].
26
James A. Maxwell, Federal Grants and the Business Cycle 1 (1952).
27
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[L]egislation enacted pursuant to
the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions.”).
28
Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 61 (2016) [hereinafter Budget Fact Book for FY 2016], http://
www.lfo.state.al.us/PDFs/BudgetFactBook/2016_Budget_Fact_Book.pdf [http://perma.cc/XE3K-2MX7]
(providing budgetary information for fiscal year 2016).
29
See Brigette Courtot, Emily Lawton & Samantha Artiga, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation,
Medicaid Enrollment and Expenditures by Federal Core Requirements and State Options (2012), http://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8239.pdf [http://perma.cc/92X3-JUPS].
30
See Robin Rudowitz & Laura Snyder, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Premiums and Cost-Sharing in Medicaid
(2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/8416.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5MK-S9AW].
31
Id.
32
Families USA, Maintenance of Effort Requirements Under Health Reform 2 (2010), http://familiesusa.org/
sites/default/files/product_documents/maintenance-of-effort.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y9KL-9N6H].
33
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“The Chief Justice . . . concludes that the
2010 expansion is unduly coercive.”). For the Chief Justice’s conclusion with regard to coerciveness, see id.
at 2604–05 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
34
Devon Herrick, Alabama Policy Institute, An Economic and Policy Analysis of Alabama Medicaid Expansion 5
(2015) (on file with the Alabama Policy Institute).
35
Robert Alt & Nathaniel Stewart, Mackinac Center for Public Policy & Buckeye Institute for Public Policy
Solutions, Medicaid: Waivers Are Temporary, Expansion Is Forever 2 (2013), http://www.mackinac.org/
archives/2013/s2013-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/LS5A-THZF].
36
See generally Kevin D. Dayaratna, Heritage Foundation, Studies Show: Medicaid Patients Have Worse Access
and Outcomes than the Privately Insured (2012), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2740.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RFP3-YFGL]; Katherine Baicker et al., “The Oregon Experiment—Effects of Medicaid
on Clinical Outcomes,” 368 New England Journal of Medicine 1713, (2013), http://www.nejm.org/doi/
pdf/10.1056/NEJMsa1212321 [http://perma.cc/U733-473N].
37
U.S. House Republicans, A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America: Health Care 23–28 (2016), http://
abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-HealthCare-PolicyPaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/5X9S-Z5XE].
38
“Funds for State Formula-Allocated and Selected Student Aid Programs,” U.S. Department of Education
( July 6, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/17stbystate.pdf [http://perma.
cc/8HD7-WWLQ] (showing federal funding of education per state).
26
Alabama Policy Institute
39
Charles Murray, By the People: Rebuilding Liberty Without Permission 5 (2015).
40
See “Education Department Budget History Table: FY 1980—FY 2016 President’s Budget,” U.S. Department
of Education (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html [http://
perma.cc/56QW-CZJZ].
41
Kathryn A. McDermott & Laura S. Jensen, “Dubious Sovereignty: The Federal Conditions of Aid and the
No Child Left Behind Act,” 80 Peabody Journal of Education 39, 44 (2005).
42
Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
43
McDermott & Jensen, supra note 41, at 44.
44
Id. at 45.
45
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 5, at 14.
46
U.S. Department of Education, ESEA Flexibility 5–7 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/eseaflex/approvedrequests/flexrequest.doc [http://perma.cc/95SQ-4BZ6].
47
Lindsey Burke, “No Child Left Behind Waivers Surrender Education Control to Washington,” Daily Signal
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://dailysignal.com//2012/02/09/no-child-left-behind-waivers-surrender-educationcontrol-to-washington/ [http://perma.cc/E7WK-NDAT].
48
Frederick M. Hess, “The Every Student Succeeds Act and What Lies Ahead,” Ripon Forum, Feb. 2016, at 11-12.
49
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program State Activity Report, Fiscal Year
2015, at 5 (2016), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/snap/2015-State-Activity-Report.pdf [http://
perma.cc/3TZT-3RXN].
50
Id. at 16.
51
Past, Present, and Future of SNAP: Examining State Options: Hearing Before the House Committee on Agriculture,
114th Congress 4 (2016) (statement of Stephanie Muth, Deputy Executive Commissioner, Office of Social
Services, Texas Health and Human Services Commission) (testimony as prepared), http://agriculture.house.
gov/uploadedfiles/muth_testimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XJ8-JWUK].
52
SNAP: Examining Efforts to Combat Fraud and Improve Program Integrity: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on the Interior of the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, 114th Congress 6 (2016) (statement of Mary Mayhew, Commissioner, Maine Department of Health
and Human Services) (testimony as prepared), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/201606-09-Mary-Mayhew-Testimony-MDHHS.pdf [http://perma.cc/DFF7-SK6F].
53
Id.
54
“Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Eligible Food Items,” U.S. Department of Agriculture,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligible-food-items [http://perma.cc/PK7Q-86NF] (last updated Mar. 21, 2016).
55
Letter from Paul LePage, Governor of Maine, to Tom Vilsack, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture ( June 17,
2016), available at http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2891193/LePage-Letter-to-AgricultureSecretary.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ART-WHEM].
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
27
56
Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 § 5(b), 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (2016).
57
“Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance,” National Conference of State Legislatures
(Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance.aspx
[http://perma.cc/B26G-9LJN].
58
Letter from Robin D. Bailey, Jr., Regional Administrator of the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S Department of
Agriculture, to Keith Horton, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Services ( June 3, 2014), available
at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/Attachment%203%20-%20June%203%2C%202014%2C%20
USDA%20letter%20to%20Georgia-91498.pdf [http://perma.cc/T3WS-SDFR]; Lizette Alvarez, “Court
Strikes Down Drug Tests for Florida Welfare Applicants,” New York Times, Dec. 4. 2014, at A19.
59
Press Release, Wisconsin Department of Justice, DOJ Files Lawsuit Against Federal Government Over Drug
Testing Requirements for Welfare Recipients ( July 14, 2015), http://www.doj.state.wi.us/news-releases/doj-fileslawsuit-against-federal-government-over-drug-testing-requirements-welfare [http://perma.cc/AFV4-RFQV].
60
Jessie Opoien, “Scott Walker, Republican Governors Ask Congress to Let States Drug Test Food Stamp
Recipients,” Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 20, 2016, at 10.
61
See, e.g., Randal O’Toole, Opinion, “Time for Congress to Get Out of Transportation,” Orange County
Register (Cal.), July 7, 2014, at Local 13; Gabriel Roth, “Federal Highway Funding,” Downsizing the Federal
Government ( June 1, 2010), http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/federal-highwayfunding [http://perma.cc/FA52-QPDZ].
62
Federal Highway Administration, A Guide to Federal-Aid Programs and Projects (updated ed. 2016), http://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/federalaid/projects.pdf [http://perma.cc/4TXT-6686].
63Roth, supra
note 61.
64
Matthew Grinney & Emily J. Goff, Heritage Foundation, Bringing Transportation Decisions Closer to the
People: Why States and Localities Should Have More Control 2 (2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.
com/2014/pdf/BG2902.pdf [http://perma.cc/SL5Z-EDP2].
65
Budget Fact Book for FY 2016, supra note 28, at 75.
66
U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-15-33, Highway Trust Fund: DOT Has Opportunities to
Improve Tracking and Reporting of Highway Spending 6 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666442.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GZ3E-99M7].
67
Transportation Empowerment Act, S. 1702, 113th Congress (2013).
68
McDermott & Jensen, supra note 41, at 42, 49.
69
Estimates derived from “Comparison of Federal Highway Trust Fund Highway Account Receipts Attributable
to the States and Federal-Aid Apportionments and Allocations from the Highway Account,” Federal
Highway Administration (Sept. 2014), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2014/fe221.
cfm [http://perma.cc/CCR8-SUQW], using the methodology of Ronald D. Utt, Heritage Foundation,
Federal Highway Program Shortchanges More Than Half the States 2 (2011), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.
com/2011/pdf/wm3228.pdf [http://perma.cc/F6J3-5YW4].
28
Alabama Policy Institute
70
Lydia Wheeler, “Feds to Require Climate Change Plans for States Seeking Disaster Relief,” Hill (May
5, 2015), http://thehill.com/regulation/241050-gop-lawmakers-ask-fema-to-explain-new-disaster-grantrequirement [http://perma.cc/2KFS-HDGR].
71
Letter from U.S. Senator James M. Inhofe et al. to W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency (May 4, 2015), available at http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/c236ab752eca-43be-bcb9-991daa6fd475/femaclimatepolicyletter20150504.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5QW-ZTP9].
72
Id.
73
Catherine E. Lhamon & Vanita Gupta, U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Department of Education, Dear
Colleague Letter on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [http://perma.cc/EL5V-U4U3].
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Ala. Code § 36-13-8 (2016).
77
Id.
78
Id. § 41-19-4.
79
Ala. Const. art. IV, §§ 43, 44, 72, construed in Opinion of the Justices No. 64, 13 So. 2d 674, 677 (Ala. 1943).
80
Budget Fact Book for FY 2016, supra note 28, at 61.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 36.
83
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 5, at 2.
84
Budget Fact Book for FY 2016, supra note 28, at 61.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Estimates derived from Budget Fact Book volumes for the corresponding years. See sources cited infra note
100.
88
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 5, at 17.
89
Budget Fact Book for FY 2016, supra note 28, at 77.
90
Id. at 34.
91
Mary Sell, “ADECA: State Cuts Would Mean Loss of Larger Federal Funds,” Decatur Daily (Aug. 26, 2015),
http://www.decaturdaily.com/news/capital_notes_and_quotes/adeca-state-cuts-would-mean-loss-of-larger-
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
29
federal-funds/article_35ab2cbb-c1e1-5739-9aa0-5787a0eece11.html [http://perma.cc/SA4N-Y96S].
92
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 5, at 13.
93
Eric Fruits, “New Study Concludes: There Are Few Things as Expensive as Free Federal Money,” Economics
International (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.econinternational.com/2015/11/new-study-concludes-there-arefew-things-as-expensive-as-free-federal-money/ [http://perma.cc/C88T-YVNF].
94
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 5, at 2.
95
James L. Buckley, Opinion, “How Congress Bribes States to Give Up Power,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26,
2014, at A13.
96
Alabama Recovery Office, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009: State of Alabama Executive Summary
Report for Reporting Period Ending October 31, 2012, at 2, 5, 10, 23, 44 (2012), http://stimulus.alabama.
gov/PDFs/Executive_Summary_Reports/Alabama_Stimulus_Executive_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/
SVK8-7KXY].
97
These data derive from reports published annually by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). See U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program State Activity Report, Fiscal Year 2015,
supra note 49, at 7, 18; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program State Activity
Report, Fiscal Year 2014, at 5, 16 (2015), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/FY14%20State%20
Activity%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6KB-JNE6]; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program State Activity Report, Fiscal Year 2013, at 3, 12 (2014), http://www.fns.usda.
gov/sites/default/files/snap/2013-state-activity.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZBY9-SWBU]; U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program State Activity Report, Fiscal Year 2012, at 5, 16 (2013),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/snap/2012-state-activity.pdf [http://perma.cc/AJ6Y-5XWA]; U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program State Activity Report, Fiscal Year 2011,
at 5, 16 (2012), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2011_state_activity.pdf [http://perma.cc/4LBS2UNW]; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) State Activity
Report, Federal Fiscal Year 2010, at 5, 17 (2011), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2010_state_activity.
pdf [http://perma.cc/2BHH-LRLJ]; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) State Activity Report, Federal Fiscal Year 2009, at 5, 17 (2011), http://www.fns.usda.gov/
sites/default/files/2009_state_activity.pdf [http://perma.cc/YX44-2PLU]; U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) State Activity Report, Federal Fiscal Year 2008, at 5, 17 (2010),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2008_state_activity.pdf [http://perma.cc/YV5K-KA92]; U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) State Activity Report, Federal
Fiscal Year 2007, at 5, 17 (2009), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2007_state_activity.pdf [http://
perma.cc/GRV4-3KU7]; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Stamp Program State Activity Report, Federal
Fiscal Year 2006, at 5, 17 (2008), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2006_state_activity.pdf [http://
perma.cc/EQF9-YYKF]; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Stamp Program State Activity Report, Federal
Fiscal Year 2005, at 5, 17 (2007), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2005_state_activity.pdf [http://
perma.cc/42R4-KPJJ].
98
Alabama Recovery Office, supra note 96, at 2, 5, 10, 23, 44.
99
Editorial, “The States and the Stimulus,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 2, 2010, at A10.
100
These data derive from volumes, each entitled Budget Fact Book, published periodically by the Legislative
30
Alabama Policy Institute
Fiscal Office (LFO), an agency serving the Alabama Legislature; and, for a year where a Budget Fact Book
was unavailable, appropriations reports published by the Executive Budget Office (EBO), a division of the
Alabama Department of Finance. See Budget Fact Book for FY 2016, supra note 28, at 1; Legislative Fiscal Office,
Budget Fact Book 1 (2014), http://www.lfo.state.al.us/PDFs/BudgetFactBook/2015_Budget_Fact_Book.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CTB6-LCET] (providing budgetary information for fiscal year 2015); Legislative Fiscal
Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (2014), http://www.lfo.state.al.us/PDFs/BudgetFactBook/2014_Budget_Fact_
Book.pdf [http://perma.cc/7N4U-ENBF] (providing budgetary information for fiscal year 2014); Legislative
Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (2013), http://www.lfo.state.al.us/PDFs/BudgetFactBook/2013_Budget_
Fact_Book_Final_Website.pdf [http://perma.cc/W54K-CTYN] (providing budgetary information for
fiscal year 2013); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (2012), http://www.lfo.state.al.us/PDFs/
BudgetFactBook/Budget_Fact_Book_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/UT6V-W8XU] (providing budgetary
information for fiscal year 2012); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (2010), http://www.lfo.
state.al.us/PDFs/BudgetFactBook/FY_2011_Budget_Fact_Book.pdf [http://perma.cc/DLH3-MQDT]
(providing budgetary information for fiscal year 2011); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (2009),
http://www.lfo.state.al.us/PDFs/BudgetFactBook/FY10_Budget_Factbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VT99TQ9] (providing budgetary information for fiscal year 2010); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book
1 (2008) (on file with the LFO) (providing budgetary information for fiscal year 2009); Legislative Fiscal
Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (2007) (on file with the LFO) (providing budgetary information for fiscal year
2008); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (2006) (on file with the Alabama Department of Archives
and History) (providing budgetary information for fiscal year 2007); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact
Book 1 (2004) (on file with the Alabama Policy Institute) (providing budgetary information for fiscal year
2005); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (c. 2002) (on file with the LFO) (providing budgetary
information for fiscal year 2003); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (c. 1998) (on file with the
LFO) (providing budgetary information for fiscal year 1999); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1
(c. 1996) (on file with the LFO) (providing budgetary information for fiscal year 1997); Legislative Fiscal
Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (c. 1994) (on file with the LFO) (providing budgetary information for fiscal year
1995); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (1992) (on file with the LFO) (providing budgetary
information for fiscal year 1993); Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Fact Book 1 (1990) (on file with the
LFO) (providing budgetary information for fiscal year 1991); Alabama Appropriations to Education Trust
Fund for Fiscal Year 2001, Executive Budget Office, http://budget.alabama.gov/pdf/etf/etf2001.pdf [http://
perma.cc/4HWS-4RVG]; Alabama Appropriations to State General Fund for Fiscal Year 2001, Executive
Budget Office, http://budget.alabama.gov/pdf/gf/gf2001.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CEB-JB2M]. Note that
publication of the Budget Fact Book was biennial until the volume for fiscal year 2007, whereupon it became
annual.
101
Eric Fruits, Civitas Institute, Impact of Federal Transfers on State and Local Own-Source Spending 17-18
(2015), http://www.nccivitas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ImpactFederalTransfers_civitas_FINAL.
pdf [http://perma.cc/2AN2-XVC6].
102
Fruits, supra note 93.
103
104
105
106
“Whose Law, Whose Order?,” Liberty and Limits: The Federalist Idea 200 Years Later (PBS television broadcast Apr. 18, 1997).
The Federalist No. 45, at 289 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I’s
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
31
‘enumerated legislative fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the
conditional grant of federal funds. . . . In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve
general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.” (citation omitted)).
107
Buckley, supra note 95.
108
Portions of this report first appeared in Katherine Green Robertson, “Alabama’s Shrinking Sovereignty,”
Alabama Policy Institute (May 16, 2016), http://www.alabamapolicy.org/alabamas-shrinking-sovereignty/
[http://perma.cc/HDD8-CHV3].
109
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
110
U.S. Const. amend. X.
111
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
112
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
113
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 2606.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 2603.
119
Id.
120
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
121
Edward Mazur & John Montoro, “Intergovernmental Financial Dependency: Why It Matters,” Journal of
Accountancy (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2011/oct/20114206.html [http://
perma.cc/ZD3T-VMQ7].
122
Leonard Gilroy, “Pursuing Fiscal Self-Reliance in Utah,” Reason Foundation (Nov. 27, 2013), http://reason.
org/news/show/utah-fiscal-self-reliance [http://perma.cc/YMM5-9M8K].
123
Id.; see Act of Mar. 29, 2011, ch. 365, 2011 Utah Laws 365 (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 63J1-219 (LexisNexis 2016)).
124
S. Con. Res. 7, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013) (enacted) (expressing the support of the legislature and the
governor of the state of Utah for the “Financial Ready Utah” initiative).
125Gilroy, supra
note 122; see Act of Mar. 22, 2013, ch. 62, 2013 Utah Laws 62 (codified as amended at Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63C-14-101 to -302 (LexisNexis 2016)) (creating a commission to address federal-funds issues).
126Gilroy, supra
note 122.
32
Alabama Policy Institute
127
Id.
128
Idaho Executive Order No. 2014-03, 14-5 Idaho Admin. Bull. 19 (May 7, 2014), http://adminrules.idaho.
gov/bulletin/2014/05.pdf [http://perma.cc/U4C2-JVWZ]. A facsimile of the signed order, issued by
Governor Otter on March 20, 2014, is available on the official website of the state of Idaho at http://gov.
idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo14/EO%202014-03%20Establishin%20Annual%20Reporting.pdf
[http://perma.cc/AH7R-4DVE].
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Dustin Hurst, “Otter Orders More Transparency on Federal Funding, Preparation for Cuts,” Idaho Reporter
(Mar. 21, 2014) http://idahoreporter.com/33718/otter-orders-transparency-federal-spending-preparationcuts/ [http://perma.cc/R9TG-6YGK].
132
Id.
133
H.R. 1748, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015).
134
“Newell, Treat ‘Frustrated, Baffled’ By Gov’s Veto on Fed Funds Transparency Bill,” Okie (May 13, 2015),
http://www.theokie.com/newell-treat-frustrated-baffled-by-govs-veto-on-fed-funds-transparency-bill
[http://perma.cc/AL3D-HAKN].
135
Id.
136Indiana
Executive Order No. 13-20, 20130814 Ind. Reg. GOV130357EOA (Oct. 14, 2013), http://
www.in.gov/legislative/iac/20130814-IR-GOV130357EOA.xml.pdf [http://perma.cc/8QER-ELYU]. A
facsimile of the signed order, issued by Governor Pence on July 30, 2013, is available on the official website
of the state of Indiana at http://www.in.gov/gov/files/EO_13-20.pdf [http://perma.cc/X9L9-Z69R].
137 Indiana
Office of State-Based Initiatives, http://www.in.gov/hoosiersolutions/ [http://perma.cc/AAN5XPHY] (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
138
Indiana Executive Order No. 13-20, supra note 136.
139 Indiana
Office of State-Based Initiatives, Annual Report 13 (2015), http://www.in.gov/hoosiersolutions/
files/2015_OSBI_Annual_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/G93D-RBJS].
140
Id. at 13-14.
141 South
Carolina Policy Council, Contract, Clarity, and a Return to Sovereignty 4–5 (2013), http://www.
scpolicycouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Contract-Clarity-pdf.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z5TYD4NL].
142
Id. at 3.
143
Id.
144
Mark R. Levin, Plunder and Deceit: Big Government’s Exploitation of Young People and the Future 168 (2015).
Selling Our Sovereignty: Alabama’s Federal Dependency
33
145
Id. at 190.
146
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’” (quoting
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
147Buckley, supra
note 24.
148
Id.
149
Tom A. Coburn, The Debt Bomb: A Bold Plan to Stop Washington from Bankrupting America, at xi (2012).
150
Warren Buffett, “How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor,” Fortune, May 5, 1977, at 250, reprinted in Tap
Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything, 1966–2012, at 9, 18 (Carol J. Loomis ed., 2012).
151
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012).
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