The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way out?
Author(s): Richard Ned Lebow
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 333-354
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983
The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?
Richard Ned Lebow'
Accepted January 10, 1983
Recent research into the origins of brinkmanship crisis raises serious
questions about the utility of deterrence; it indicates that deterrencefails to
address what may be the most common cause of aggression, the perceived
need to pursue a confrontatory foreign policy because of weakness at home
or abroad. A policy of "reassurance"is proposed to address this problem
and is offered as an alternative or parallel strategy of conflict management.
Some of the implications of reassurance for Soviet-American relations are
explored.
KEY WORDS: deterrence; reassurance; brinkmanship; nature of aggression; Soviet-American
relations.
INTRODUCTION
Deterrence as an approach to regulating conflict has been widely
criticized from a number of different perspectives. My own research into
the origins of brinkmanship also calls the utility of deterrence into question;
it indicates that deterrence fails to address what may be the common cause
of aggression, the perceived need to pursue a confrontatory foreign policy
because of weakness at home or abroad (Lebow, 1981). This paper will very
briefly review these findings and build upon them to develop an alternative
approach to conflict, a strategy of "reassurance." It will also explore some
of the implications of this strategy for Soviet-American relations.
'Peace Studies Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853.
333
0162-895X/83/0600-0333$03.00/1
O 1983 International Society of Political Psychology
334
Lebow
THE ORIGINS OF BRINKMANSHIP
Between Peace and War studied the origins of 13 "brinkmanship"
crises-confrontations in which states challenge important commitments of
adversaries in the expectation that the adversaries will back down - to determine why policymakers pursued policies that risked war.2 It found that
almost without exception these crises could most readily be traced to grave
foreign and domestic threats which leaders believed could only be overcome
through an aggressive foreign policy.
The most important external threat was the expectation of a dramatic
shift in the balance of power. In 7 of the 13 cases, brinkmanship was
preceded by the widely shared perception among policymakers that a
dramatic negative shift in the balance of power was imminent. Brinkmanship in these cases was conceived of as a forceful response to this acute and
impending danger, a means of preventing or even redressing the shift in the
balance of power before time ran out and such a response became unrealistic. The First Moroccan crisis (1904-1905), provoked by German fears
that the Anglo-French Entente would ultimately lead to Germany's military
encirclement, is a case in point. So too is the Cuban missile crisis; the most
widely held explanation of Khrushchev's decision to put missiles into Cuba
attributes it to Soviet realization that the United States was capable of
launching a first strike.
A second motivation for an aggressive foreign policy derived from
weakness of a state's political system. In four of the cases-Korea
(1903-1904), Bosnia, July and Arab-Israel (1967)-domestic political
instability or the frangibility of the state itself appeared instrumental
in convincing leaders to provoke a confrontation. They resorted to the timehonored technique of attempting to offset discontent at home by diplomatic
success abroad.
The political weakness of leaders as distinct from instability of the
political system as a whole provided another incentive for brinkmanship. It
can encourage leaders to seek a foreign policy victory in order to buttress
their domestic position. Political weakness can also lead to confrontations
because leaders feel too insecure to oppose policies they know to be very
risky or otherwise ill-conceived. One or the other of these manifestations of
political weakness appears to have played a role in the origins of 10 of the
brinkmanship challenges.
A fourth incentive for brinkmanship is associated with intraelite
competition for power. This was a primary cause of three brinkmanship
2Readers familiar with the study are encouraged to proceed to the next section of the paper.
The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?
335
crises and probably a secondarycause of several others. A bureaucratic
subunit or political coalition can engineera confrontationwith a foreign
power in the expectation that it will enhance its domestic influence or
underminethat of its adversaries.Intraelitecompetition can also induce
actorsto pursuepoliciescalculatedto advancetheirdomesticinterestseven
though these policieshave the side effect of provokinga crisiswith another
state. The Fashoda crisis (1898) is an example of the former and the
Russo-Japanesecrisisin Korea(1903- 1904)of the latter.
In practice,the expectationthat an adversarywould back down when
challenged often proved unwarranted. The cases revealed that most
brinkmanshipchallengeswere initiatedwithout any good evidencethat the
adversaryin questionlackedthe resolveto defend his commitment.Available indications most often pointed to the opposite conclusion as the
commitmentsat stake appearedto have met the four conditionsnormally
associated with successful deterence: they were clearly defined; their
existencewas communicatedto possibleadversaries;the statesmakingthem
possessedthe means to defend them; and they made reasonableefforts to
demonstratetheir resolve to do so. In only five cases-First Morocco,
Bosnia, Rhineland, Munich, and Berlin-did initiators have compelling
reasonsto suspectthat theiradversarieswould backdown whenchallenged.
Even so, in two of these cases the initiatorshad to back down. In every
other, the initiatorshad to backdown or face war.
These findingsindicatethat the presenceof a vulnerablecommitment
is not a preconditionof brinkmanship.Whatcountsis the perceptionby the
initiatorthat a vulnerablecommitmentexists- a judgment,we discovered,
that was erroneousmore often than not. These cases also suggestedthe
hypothesisthat faulty judgmentwas relatedto policymakers'needs to act.
When policymakersbecameconvincedof the necessityto achieve specific
foreignpolicy objectives,they becamepredisposedto see these objectivesas
attainable.
The study documentedthis assertionin the July, Korea (1950), and
Sino-Indiancrises. In all threecases, politicalleadersin the initiatorstates
felt compelledto pursueaggressiveforeignpolicies in responseto strategic
and domestic political imperatives.They convinced themselvesthat they
could achievetheirrespectivepolicy objectiveswithoutprovokingwar with
their adversaries. Because they knew the extent to which they were
powerlessto back down, they expectedthat theiradversarieswould haveto.
Some of these leadersalso took comfort in the false hope that they would
emergevictoriousat relativelylittle cost to themselvesif the crisisgot out of
handand led to war.
German, American, and Indian policymakers maintained their
illusoryexpectationsdespitethe accumulationof considerableevidenceto
336
Lebow
the contraryboth before and duringthe crisis. They resortedto elaborate
personaland institutionaldefensesto avoid havingto come to terms with
this information.The most prevalentdefense mechanismwas denial. The
Kaiserand those aroundhim used it to discreditreportsthat Britainwould
intervene in a continental war. Acheson and Nehru and their advisors
resortedto it to discount the possibilitythat Americanor Indian policies
wouldprovokea Chinesemilitaryresponse.On an institutionallevel, denial
took the form of structuringfeedback channels to filter out dissonant
informationand to reinforcethe preconceivednotions of politicalleaders.
In such a closed decision-makingenvironment,eventsduringthe crisis did
little to disabusepolicymakersof their unrealisticexpectations.These case
historiessuggestthe pessimistichypothesisthat those policymakerswith the
greatestneed to learn from externalrealityappearthe least likely to do so.
These empiricalfindings raise serious questions about the utility of
deterrence.If policymakersrationalizethe conditionsfor the successof a
foreign policy to the extent they feel compelled to pursue it, efforts to
impartcredibilityto commitmentsmay have only a marginalimpacton an
adversary'sbehavior. Even the most elaborate efforts to demonstrate
prowessand resolvemay prove insufficientto discouragea challengewhen
policymakersare attracted to a policy of brinkmanshipas a necessary
means of preserving vital strategic and domestic political interests.
Fashoda,July, and Korea(1950),the Sino-Indiancrisis,and Cubaall attest
to the seriousnessof this problem.
These cases and others point to the importanceof motivationas the
key to brinkmanshipchallenges.To the extentthat leadersperceivethe need
to act they become insensitiveto the interestsand commitmentsof others
that stand in the way of the successof their policy. The conversemay also
hold true. In the absenceof compellingdomesticand strategicneeds, most
leaders may be reluctant or unwilling to pursue confrontatory foreign
policies even when they hold out a reasonableprospectof success. Hitler
was the only policymakerin our sample whose foreign policy challenges
could not be tracedto suchneeds.
If our analysisof the origins of brinkmanshipis correct, it not only
indicates that deterrenceis a less than satisfactory strategy of conflict
avoidancebut pointsto two reasonswhy this is so. The first reasonwe have
alreadynoted; when policymakersfeel compelledto act they may employ
denial,selectiveattention,or otherpsychologicalsleightsof handto dismiss
indicationsof an adversary'sresolve. In such circumstances,the complex
and ambiguousnatureof the internationalenvironmentdoes not encourage
restraintbut ratherirrationalconfidence.The second and more important
reasonis that aggressionmay be less a functionof opportunityand moreof
perceivedneed. We found reasonableopportunityfor aggression(i.e., a
The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?
337
vulnerablecommitment) in only one-third of our cases but discovered
strongneedsto pursue an aggressiveforeignpolicyin almosteveryinstance.
This indicatesthat policymakers,at least in brinkmanshipcrises, are more
responsiveto internalimperativesthan they areto externalopportunities.
If need is an equal or even more importantsourceof aggressionthan
opportunity, it calls for a correspondingshift in the focus of efforts to
preventaggression.Too much attentionin theory and practiceis probably
devotedto the credibilityof commitmentsand not nearlyenough to trying
to understandwhat mightpromptan adversaryto challengea commitment.
The more realistic goal of conflict avoidance may not be denying an
adversarythe opportunityto act but ratherin minimizinghis perceivedneed
to do so. To what extentis this a feasiblepolicy objective?What strategies
are most appropriateto this end? What light do our cases shed on these
questions?
MANIPULATING INCENTIVES FOR AGGRESSION
Four of the five incentivesfor brinkmanshipnoted in the preceding
descriptionare domestic;they pertainto internalweaknessesof a would-be
aggressor. Unfortunately, while these incentives seem to be important
sourcesof aggressiveforeignpolicies,they do not on the whole seemsubject
to externalamelioration.
Intraelitecompetitionis difficult to influenceprincipallybecauseit is
so often hidden from view. To try to understandlet alone influencepolicy
outcomes in terms of their internal dynamics, it is necessaryto identify
individualsand groupswho actuallyplay a key role in shapingforeignpolicy,
deciphertheir interests, and chart the means by which they acquire and
exert influence. Outsidersare rarelyprivy to this sort of informationeven
when dealing with relativelyopen societies. In the case of authoritarian
regimes, informal policymakingprocesses are more important and less
visibleas such governmentsoften go to considerableextremesto keep their
deliberationssecret. In the absence of any real knowledge about the
internaldynamicsof an adversary,it is impossibleto know whereand when
to applyleverageevenwhenthe meansof suchinfluenceare at hand.
The Korea crisis (1903-1904) and the Fashoda crisis (1898) illustrate
the difficultiesinvolvedin dealingwith a foreignpolicy challengeprompted
primarilyby an intraelite struggle for power. In the Korean case, the
Japanese were unawareof the efforts of AlexanderBezobrazovand his
supporterswithin the Russiangovernmentto expandRussianinfluencein
Koreaprincipallyas a means of underminingthe position of SergeiWitte,
the foreign minister.Tokyo negotiatedwith the Witte faction and reached
338
Lebow
an understanding,the Rosen-Nissi Convention,that it expectedto reduce
the friction between the two countries. When that agreement was
repudiatedby Moscow, a reflectionof Bezobrazov'spolitical ascendancy,
Japaneseleadersnot unreasonablyconcludedthat the Russianshad been
insincere and double-dealing all along. Understandableignorance of
Russiancourt intrigueencouragedthe Japaneseto draw a more extreme
pictureof the Russianthreatthan mighthave otherwisebeen the case. This
sense of threat underlayTokyo's decision to go to war in February1904
(Lebow, 1981,pp. 74-80).
Fashoda highlights the second difficulty in coping with intraelite
competition:the problemof findingany meansof influencingthe outcome
of such a struggle.Unlike the Japanese,the Britishwere aware from the
beginningof the extent to which the Frenchchallengeof Britain'sposition
on the Nile was tied up in and even largelymotivatedby domesticpolitical
concerns.Theywerealso quitewell-informedas to the detailsof the conflict
and in particularabout whichindividualsand groupssoughtto profit from
a confrontationover the Sudan. This insightdid not help London, because
it lacked the means to influence the outcome of the struggle before it
propelledFrance into a crisis with Britain. British policymakerswere in
effect frustratedspectators(Lebow, 1981,pp. 71-74).
The two criseshave disheartening
implications.Whenintraeliteconflict
concernsthe parochialinterestsof the actors, it is likely to remainpoorly
understoodor even invisible to outsiders. But when it is more open and
comprehensible,it is likely to reflecta widerand deeperstrugglewithinthe
society beyond the power of outsiders to affect in a significant or
predictableway. This was certainlytrue in France where the strugglefor
control over foreign policy betweenthe colonial and the foreign ministries
was not only symptomaticof their differing views as to the nature of
France's foreign interests but also toward Dreyfus, the Church, the
Republic,and the verydestinyof France.
The political weakness of leaders is a second domestic source of
foreign policy aggression. It probably played a role in 10 of the
brinkmanshipcrises studied. Its importanceas a catalystof confrontation
variedconsiderablyfrom case to case and only in the Arab-Israelicrisisof
1967 could it be considered the principal cause of conflict. Efforts to
alleviatethe pressuresupon vulnerableleadersto pursueaggressiveforeign
policies are accordinglyonly likely to succeedif they are coupled with an
attemptto addressother importantsourcesof conflict. This caveat aside,
such efforts can easilyencounterdifficultiesof theirown. Concessionsthat
enhancean adversaryleader'sdomesticstandingmay not be in one's own
nationalinterestto grant. Even when this is not a problem,they may make
The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?
339
the leaders responsiblefor them vulnerableto criticism from their own
political opponents and public opinion. Efforts to strengthenthe political
base of an adversaryleaderalso riskbeingmisunderstoodby the leaderthey
are designedto assist, with consequencesthat could be moredamagingthan
the effects of havingdone nothingat all.
Sub rosa South African support of President Kenneth Kaunda of
Zambiaprobablyconstitutesthe best contemporaryexampleof a sustained
and on the whole successfulattemptto enhancethe domesticstandingof an
adversaryleader. Despite Kaunda'sactive supportof efforts to end white
dominationin SouthernAfrica, Pretoriahas for years quietly suppliedhis
governmentwith cooking oil and other essentialitems in very short supply
in Zambiain orderto help him to retainpowerby keepinga lid on domestic
unrest.The South Africansapparentlyreasonthat their assistanceto some
extent moderatesKaunda'spolicies and, even more importantly,keeps at
bay the more extreme Zambian politicians who would almost certainly
replacehim. Fromtime to time, the SovietUnion attemptedto rewardsome
WesternEuropeanleaders for essentiallysimilar reasons. Most recently,
Helmut Schmidt was so blessed, in the opinion of some foreign policy
analysts, as part of an unsuccessfulcampaignto help him retainpower in
the FederalRepublicof Germany.
The weaknessof a state'spolitical system has also been identifiedas a
particularlyimportant incentive to pursue an aggressiveforeign policy.
Once again, there are definite limits on the ability of other powersto ease
the pressureon leadersto pursueconfrontatorypoliciesthat such weakness
often generates.All of the difficultiesattendantupon efforts to enhancethe
domesticstandingof adversaryleadersapply to adversaryregimesas well.
If anything,the kinds of problemsthat sap a regime'slegitimacyare even
more intractableand less amenableto outside influence. Among the most
importantof these, our cases suggest, are nationalityconflicts, acute class
tensions,and economicmalaise.
The Arab-Israel conflict gives testimony to the foreign policy
problems internal instability can create. Throughoutmuch of the Arab
Middle East traditionalauthoritywas swept away in coups organizedby
officers committedto nationalismand economicmodernization.Thesenew
leadersand theirsuccessorsarousedexpectationsthat for the most partthey
wereunableto fulfill. The Arabsremainas dividedas ever;Israelcontinues
to exist; and prosperityfor most Arab states appearsas distanta goal as it
did 20 years ago. For Nasser'sEgypt, Syria, and Iraq, hostility to Israel
becamean importantsourceof internallegitimacy.The very existenceof a
Jewish state in their midst was offered as an explanationfor whateverills
these countriessuffered from. Even conservativeArab states like Jordan
340
Lebow
and SaudiArabiaweredrawninto the conflictbecausetheirleaders,fearful
for their own survival,dared not antagonizenationalistopinion at home,
arousedand supportedby theirmoreradicalArabneighbors.
Israel, for its part, could do nothing to defuse the hostility of its
enemieswithout sacrificingits own security.In the case of Nasser'sEgypt
and Syriaeven this would probablynot have succeededin easingtensions.
For to paraphraseMetternich,if Israeldid not exist, the radicalArab states
would have had to inventit - or find a substituteas Iraqrecentlyhas- as a
convenient foil and scapegoat for their internal disarray. Egypt under
Sadat,the only one of Israel'sneighborsthat has beenableto extricateitself
from this destructiveconflict, succeededin doing so becauseof the initial
successof Egyptianarmsin the OctoberWar.ThisregainedEgyptianhonor
and, with it, her leader's freedom of action. But as the isolation and
subsequentassassinationof Satat reveal, the freedom of any Egyptian
leaderto ignorewiderArabopinionremainscircumscribed.
Domestic problems can be so severe as to arouse concern for the
frangibilityof the state itself. This most frequentlyhappenswhen serious
economic or political problems are superimposed upon preexisting
nationalityor communalconflicts. Structuralproblemssuch as these rarely
lend themselvesto peacefulinternalresolution;they are even less amenable
to outsidestabilization.
Returning once again to our cases, it is unclear with regard to
Austria-Hungarywhat the other powers could have done to alleviateher
nationalityproblem and increaseher sense of security. If asked, Vienna
would almost certainly have indicated support in opposing South Slav
aspirationsto statehood.Even if such a policy had been politicallyfeasible
for the otherpowers,and for Russiacertainlyit was not, it wouldonly have
succeededin postponingthe ultimateday of reckoning.If a solutionto the
Empire'snationalityproblemwas to be found, it had to be an internalone.
However,this was precludedby Germanand Hungarianoppositionto any
reforms that threatenedtheir political and economic privileges.Imperial
Russia, that other empirein difficulty, faced a similardilemma. Plehve's
apparentbelief in the domesticpoliticalutility of "a short victoriouswar"
was a dangerous fantasy. Like its Habsburg rival, Russia's internal
problemscould only have been dealt with in the long run by meaningful
structuralreforms,a courseof actionthat was anathemato those in power.
If there was little the other powers could do to dampen
Austria-Hungary'sperceivedneed to act aggressivelythere was much they
could do to make it more pronounced.This was becauseVienna'seffort to
alleviateher nationalityproblem through territorialexpansionultimately
assumeda significanceout of proportionto its originalintent.The Empire's
successor lack of it in imposingher politicalwill on the southernBalkans
TheDeterrenceDeadlock:Is Therea WayOut?
341
becamethe templateothersused to judge her capabilityand even more her
will. Once Vienna had defined the destructionof Serbia as an essential
condition of her security,her apparenthesitationto act decisivelytoward
this end led the Germansat least to question her political spine. Growing
Austrian fears that Germany would dismiss her as bundnisunfahig
(unworthyof alliance) and that Russia would pursue a more aggressive
policy in the Balkans because she too doubted Austrian resolve, led the
Empire'sfrightenedleaders to seize upon the assassinationof archduke
FranzFerdinandas a pretextfor warwith Serbia.
Viewed from St. Petersburg, passive acceptance of Austria's
destructionof Serbiawas out of the questionbecauseof the czaristregime's
own dependenceon nationalist and pan-Slavic opinion, almost its sole
remainingbase of political support. Opposition to Austria was doubly
important to Russian leaders because of their earlier, still smarting
humiliationat Austria'shandin the BosnianAnnexationcrisisof 1909.This
event, coming4 yearsafter Russia'smilitarydefeat by Japan, had led many
to questionor even discounther abilityto play a significantrole in shaping
the courseof eventsin Europe.For these reasons,St. Peterburgperceivedit
just as essentialas did Viennato pursuean uncompromisingpolicy in the
Balkans. It was this clash of irreconcilabledomesticimperativesand their
impactupon the perceivedexternalstatusof the two powersthat morethan
anythingelse broughtaboutWorldWarI.
The observationto be drawnfromthe precedingcase discussionis that
serious domestic problems can create two kinds of incentivesto pursue
aggressive foreign policies. The first are a function of the problems
themselves. If these initiatives are frustrated, they can generate, or be
perceivedto generate,doubts about that state'scapabilityor resolvein the
minds of thirdparties.Concernfor a state'sinternationalreputationin the
context of unresolveddomestic problems furtherintensifies its perceived
needto act "tough."The most dangeroussituationof all is whentwo powers
or blocs feel the need for these reasonsto displayresolvein the same arena.
This was trueof Austria-Hungaryand Russiapriorto WorldWarI.
The principal external incentive for brinkmanshipis the perceived
need to forestall or compensate for a dramatic adverse shift in the
political-strategicbalance of power. Perhapsthe most importantfinding
hereis the extentto whichperceptionsof threatare frequentlyexaggerated.
The two crises we have previouslycited as motivatedby such perceptions
are both casesin point.
The Moroccocrisisof 1904-1905was broughton by Germanfearsof
encirclement.Germanleaderserroneouslyperceivedthe Entente as being
specificallydirectedagainstthem and greatlyexaggeratedthe extent of the
Anglo-Frenchmilitaryconceptionmandatedby the agreement.In point of
342
Lebow
fact, the Ententewas at first the most tenuousof agreements;it was viewed
suspiciouslyor even disapprovinglyby many influentialEnglishmenand
Frenchmenalikewho had not forgottenthe traditionalenmitybetweentheir
two countries.Only Germanbullyingof Francein the hope of destroying
the fragile Entente brought about the very collaborationGermanleaders
had feared. Franceand Britaindrewclosertogetherand initiatedplans for
joint military action. "It is essential to bear in mind," Sir Eyre Crowe
observed,"thatthis new feature of the Ententewas the direct effect produced by Germany'seffort to break it up" (Eyre Crowe Memorandum,
1907).
Cuba too could be called an overreaction, albeit a more
understandableone. The Kennedyadministrationhad decided to put the
Russianson notice that it was aware of the full extent of their strategic
vulnerability. The reason for doing this was avowedly defensive: to
encourageKhrushchevto moderatehis challengeof the Westernpositionin
Berlin. Moscow may well have perceivedthe message differently. When
placed within the broader context of Soviet-Americanhostility and the
Kennedyadministration'spronouncedand costly effort to achievestrategic
superiority,it could have appearedto Sovietleadersas the openingsalvo of
an Americanstrategic-politicaloffensive. If so, puttingmissilesinto Cuba
in an attemptto reducethe Americanstrategicadvantage,even if it entailed
considerablerisk, could have been seen as preferableto passivity in the
face of a gravethreat.JeromeKahanand Anne Long go so far as to suggest
that the crisiswas actuallycausedby Americaninsensitivityto the Soviet's
strategicdilemma:
can be saidto havehelped
TheKennedyAdministration's
earlyemphasison superiority
causethe Cubancrisisby tiltingthe nuclearbalanceso far againstthe Sovietsthat
theywereforcedto emplacemissilesin Cubain orderto rectifythe strategicrelationship. Had the U.S. becomemore sensitiveto the Soviet need-both politicaland
military-for equality,it mightnot havepressedits advantageas far as it did, and
avoidedthe risksof the Cubanconfrontation.(KahanandLong, 1972)
Agadir(1911)is a thirdexampleof a crisisthat was triggeredby an exaggeratednotion of threat. By 1911, Britainand Germanyhad become so
deeply suspiciousof each other that their leadersread hostile intent into
almosteveryforeigninitiativeof the other. In the case of Agadir,the British
reaction to a Germandemarcheto France, all out of proportionto the
degree of threat intended, transformeda colonial dispute into a grave
internationalconfrontation. From the German perspective, the British
reaction to their demarcheseemed not a reaction at all but a deliberate
attemptto exploit the incident as a pretext for a full-fledgeddiplomatic
assaulton Germany.Both powersemergedfrom the confrontationall the
more convinced of the other's hostile intentions (Lebow, 1981, pp.
312-315).
TheDeterrenceDeadlock:Is Therea WayOut?
343
These several examples suggest two disturbing conclusions about
adversarialrelations.The first is the apparentdifficultyadversarieshave in
predictingthe effect of their actions upon each other. Robert Jervis has
pointed to one reason for this: a generaltendencyamong policymakersto
exaggeratethe likelihood that others will interpretone's behavioras it is
intended(Jervis, 1976). Whenpolicymakersbelievetheir country'smotives
to be benignthey expectothersto interpretthemaccordingly.If otherstates
protest, policymakersare more likely to impugntheirmotives for doing so
than seek reasons for why others might interprettheir actions differently.
John Kennedyand his advisors,securein their knowledgethat they sought
to amelioratenot aggravateSoviet-Americanrelations,appearto have had
no inkling that Moscow would interprettheir signal as a grave threat to
Soviet security.Germanpolicymakersin 1911 were similarlysurprisedby
London'sreactionto their bid for colonial compensationfrom France. A
third example is Americaninsensitivityin 1950 to the consequencesfor
Peking of KoreanunificationunderAmericanauspices [see Lebow (1981)
for a discussionof the Koreancase].
Even when policymakersare sensitive to the ways in which their
actionsare perceivedby others,they may be unableto alteror correctthose
impressionsif they are misleading.The Britisheffort to reassureGermany
about the Entente is case in point. After the agreementwas concluded,
London undertookto explainits content and purposeto Germanleaders.
With this end in mind, EdwardVII was sent to Kiel Weekin June 1904and
personallybriefed both Billow and the Kaiserabout it. The King'sassurances did not succeed in dispellingGermansuspicionsand may actually
have intensified them. Edward reported:"The agreementsthat we have
negotiated apart from him without his permissionand without his help,
have stupefiedhim; they have producedin him a sense of isolation, hence
his agitationand ill-humor"(Albertini,1952).
Edward'sfailureseemsdue to the fact that his assurancesran counter
to the cognitivepredispositionsof Germanleaders.Bulow, the Kaiser,and
their advisors were terrified by the prospect of Germany'sencirclement.
They took for grantedFrance'senmityand viewedBritainas a jealous rival
out to thwart Germany'snatural ascendancy as a world power. The
Entente, if interpreted as the harbinger of an anti-German alliance,
confirmedGermanexpectationsof Frenchand Britishbehavior.Edward's
assurances, on the other hand, flew in the face of them. The only
interpretationof Edward'sbehaviorconsistentwith Germanexpectations
was that it was part of a clever ruse designed to blind Germanyto the
dangersin storefor her. Suchan interpretationhad the effect of magnifying
Germanperceptionsof the threatconveyedby the Entente.
More recent examples of this phenomenon could be drawn from
Soviet-Americanor Arab-Israeli relations. The general conclusion they
344
Lebow
point toward is that efforts by one adversary to reasure another about its
intentions are least likely to succeed in the situations where they are needed
most. Success may well depend upon a prior improvement in relations,
some kind of detente, or lessening in tensions, which establishes the
cognitive preconditions for leaders to perceive such initiatives as possibly
being well-intentioned. Of course, acute crises are far less likely to develop
in such a climate. In the absence of at least some receptivity to signals of
reassurance or cooperation it may require truly dramatic gestures to break
through the other side's cognitive wall of distrust. Here, an analogy to the
Middle East conflict might be helpful.
For four decades, relations between Egypt and Israel were
characterized by acute hostility that erupted into four major wars. The
antagonism between these two countries was in every way as extreme and
deeply rooted-probably more so-than that which exists between the
Soviet Union and the United States. Yet, a peace treaty, something most
contemporary observers dismissed as inconceivable at the time, was made
possible by Anwar Sadat's unexpected and stunning offer to go to Israel and
address the parliament. The same man who several years earlier had
unleashed an initially devastating assault upon Israel now held out the olive
branch and asked Israelis to trust him. His gesture achieved credibility
principally because the very act of making it made the Egyptian president
vulnerable. He opened himself up to strident criticism and possibly isolation
at home and in the Arab world and even more so if he returned home from
Jerusalem empty-handed. Building upon this breakthrough, Sadat and
Begin, knowing that both their peoples favored peace, were able to reach an
agreement to normalize relations and return the Sinai to Egypt. What Sadat
could not achieve by a surprise attack he gained through a surprise peace
offensive.
In the absence of some mutual receptivity to signals of reassurance or
cooperation, a truly dramatic gesture like Sadat's may be necessary to break
down adversarial distrust. When viewed in the context of Soviet-American
relations, there are probably many possible strategic equivalents to Sadat's
offer to come to Israel to address the Knesset. Perhaps a significant step
toward unilateral nuclear disarmament by one of the superpowers would
have the same effect, provided it was not accompanied by an obvious and
strident propaganda campaign designed to embarrass the other superpower.
The cases discussed in this paper suggest some disheartening
conclusions about the ability of outside actors to alleviate in any significant
way the kinds of internal and external pressures upon states to pursue
confrontatory foreign policies. This finding points to a disturbing paradox.
Deterrence which, relatively speaking, is easy to implement may
nevertheless not be a very effective strategy of conflict management,
The DeterrenceDeadlock:Is Therea WayOut?
345
becauseit does not addressthe most importantsourcesof aggression.On
the other hand, efforts to alleviate the kinds of insecuritiesthat actually
encourageor even compel leadersto pursueaggressiveforeign policies do
not seemverylikelyto succeed.
No striking example of successful reassurancecomes readily to
mind. One of the reasonsthis is so may be simplythat such an approachto
conflict managementhas rarely been employed. Another reason may be
methodological;it is extremelydifficultto recognizethe successas opposed
to the failure of such a policy. Failureis manifest in crisis or war, events
that readilyimpingeupon historicalconsciousness.Success,whichresultsin
greatertranquilitythanwouldotherwisebe the case, can easilygo unnoticed
as it may produce no observablechange in the level of tension. Even if
relationsimprove,it is impossibleto determinejust how muchthis could be
attributedto reassuranceas distinctfrom othercauses.
These observations aside, the difficulty of pursuing a policy of
reassurancemust be recognized.The implementationof reassurancein a
consistentand meaningfulway requiresa degreeof freedomfrom domestic,
political, and bureacraticconstraintsthat is extremelydifficult to achieve
and maintain.Even if these conditions are met, it is by no means certain
that a policyof reassurancewill succeedfor all of the reasonsthat havebeen
elaborated.This does not mean that such a policy ought not be tried. As
there is no easy road to conflict resolutionany strategythat offers some
hope of amelioratingconflictis worthyof seriousconsideration.
There is another more telling point in favor of reassurance.A
sophisticatedapproachto conflict managementwould make use of both
strategies. It would seek to discourage confrontation by attemptingto
reduceboth the needand the opportunityto carryit out. It would aim never
to allow one's own state to be perceivedas so weak or irresoluteas to invite
a challengebut at the same time to avoid encouragingan adversaryto feel
so weakor threatenedthat he has the needto do so.
Thereare some obvious but by no meansinsuperableobstaclesin the
of
way pursuingsuch an approachto conflict. To begin with it is necessary
to confrontthe trade-offsbetweenthe deterrenceand reassurance.The two
strategiesare not mutuallyexclusivebut many of the actions designedto
enhancedeterrencemay also have the effect of intensifyingan adversary's
perceptionsof threat and with it his need to display greater resolve. A
preconditionto applyinga combinedstrategyof deterrenceand reassurance
is thereforethe identificationof the rangeof trade-offsthat must be made
betweenthem and the elaborationof some criteriafor doing this. This is an
intellectuallydemandingtask and one that runscounterto the tendencyand
perhapsalso to the need of political leaders to simplify, not complicate,
theirconceptualizationof problems.
346
Lebow
The difficulty of first recognizingand then makingtrade-offspoints
to the importanceof political leadership.Any sophisticatedstrategy of
conflict managementdemandsequallysophisticatedleadersto carryit out.
It also requiresleaders who possess adequatepolitical backing for their
policy and the skill and fortitudeto imposetheir will on the foreignpolicy
and defensebureaucracieswhoseparochialinterestsalmostinevitablystand
in the way of the executionof any rationaland coordinatedpolicy. Such a
policy makingenvironmentis only infrequentlyachievedand is more often
the resultof fortuitouscircumstancesthanit is of consciousplanning.
MANAGING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
American policy toward the Soviet Union ultimately depends on
assumptionsmade about Soviet motives. If Moscow really seeks world
dominationand is willingto use force to achieveit, as the traditionalCold
War view contends, then deterrenceis an appropriate,indeed essential,
strategy for the West. If, on the other hand, Moscow is motivated
principallyby a concernfor its own securityand has soughtto strengthenits
position, militarilyand politically, to protect itself against the West, as
manyrevisionistsargue,then a policy of reassuranceis a more appropriate
affairsfindeitherdescriptionof Soviet
response.Fewstudentsof international
as
motives satisfactory each representsa one-sided characterizationof
Soviet policy. Most describeSoviet foreign policy as both offensive and
defensive,althoughthereis no consensusamong Kremlinologistsas to the
natureof this mix. To the extentthat Sovietpolicy is in fact motivatedby a
mix of offensive and defensivegoals, then some combinationof deterrence
and reassuranceis requiredto cope with it.
A detailedelaborationof a strategythat successfullymeldsdeterrence
and reassurancemust remainthe subjectof another study.3Here, we will
merely identify some of the more importanttrade-offs between the two
approachesto conflictthat mustbe confrontedby policymakers.
The firsttrade-offto be consideredconcernsthe appropriateresponse
to an adversary'sdomestic problems. For the West, this dilemma has
alreadyarisenin connectionwith the Soviet economy. Nixon and Kissinger
soughtto moderateSoviet policy by increasingMoscow'sdependenceupon
the West, a goal they hoped to achieve at least in part throughexpanded
tradeand technologytransfer.The Reaganadministration,by contrast,has
3The author is currently at work on such a study, entitled The Blind Misleading the Blind:
Soviet and American Misconceptions of Their Security. It is scheduled to appear in 1984.
The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?
347
sought to exacerbateSoviet economic vulnerabilityby denying Moscow
access to Western technology and by forcing it to spend even more for
armamentsin orderto keep pace with the United States. On the face of it,
neitherpolicy seems to have been very effective. The Reaganapproachhas
also had the drawbackof antagonizingnot only the Soviets but also the
WesternEuropeans,committedas they are to maintainingbroadeconomic
and politicalcontactswith the East.
The most seriousdomesticproblemthe Soviet Union is likely to face
in the long term is the growing disaffection of non-Russiannationalities.
The Soviet Union is the last of the great empires. The Russians, who
constitute a bare majority of the population, monopolize political and
economicpowerand have assiduouslypursued,withoutnoticeablesuccess,
a policyof Russificationtowardthe othernationalities.
Moscow already confronts national problems in Eastern Europe
wherethe combinationof economicstagnationand nationalismhas led to a
revolutionin Poland. For the time being this threathas been containedby
the impositionof a militarydictatorshipbut Poland'snew leadersappearas
incapableas theirpredecessorsin copingwith the root causesof unrest.The
conditionsthat led to the emergenceof Solidarityin Poland can be found in
varyingdegreeselsewherein Europeand must constitutea seriouscause of
concernfor Moscow. [Thisargumentis developedin Lebow(1982).]
Soviet military intervention in East Germany, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and now by proxy in Poland, makes it apparent that
Moscowviewsits primacyin EasternEuropeas an essentialpreconditionof
its security.One reason for this is the permeabilityof the Soviet Union to
events in Eastern Europe, an ironic outcome of almost four decades of
Soviet efforts to orient the political, economic, and culturallives of these
countriestoward the East. At the time of the Czechoslovakianinvasion,
Brezhnevhimself is reported to have told WladyslawGomulka that all
WarsawPact nations must contributeforces for the operationbecausein
the absence of East bloc solidarity the unrest might spill over into the
Ukraine(New YorkTimes,1980).
Moscow appearsto subscribeto a domino theoryof its own. The fall
of a Communistgovernmentanywherein EasternEurope would threaten
Soviet domination everywherein Eastern Europe. Loss of influence in
Eastern Europe would encourage separatistsentiment within the Soviet
Union and possiblyend up threatenigthe viabilityof that multiethnicstate.
This challenge,still remote,mightbecomemore a realityin the yearsahead
if the economy continuesto stagnateand if the post-Brezhnevleadership
respondsto this and other problemswith pronouncedbureaucraticrigidity
(Bialer,1980).
348
Lebow
The frangibilityof the SovietEmpirewould not only presenta serious
problemto Moscow but also to Washingtonwhichwould have to confront
a seriesof difficultand altogetherawkwardchoices. Put crudely,is it in the
interestof the United States to encourage"cracks"in the Soviet monolith
with the aim of sapping Soviet strengthor should Washingtonassist in
shoring up the Soviet empire in the hope of avoiding the risk of confrontation the threat of fragmentationis likely to create? Ought we to
try to underminethe Soviet capabilityto challengethe West of their perceivedneedto do so?
Arguments,political,economic,and moral,can be madein supportof
both positions and already have been in connection with the Western
responseto Poland's default on her hard currencydebt. The controversy
over Poland and before it, that which surroundedthe question of a grain
embargo, took place in vacuo, unconnectedfor the most part with any
conceptionof how the decisionsmade were likely to affect the long-term
security interests of the United States and Western Europe. These
controversiesalso revealedthe range of domesticpolitical, economic, and
bureaucratictugs and constraintsthat affect policy decisionsof this kind
and will continueto do so in the future. This latterproblemis unavoidable
but its effects might be minimized by the commitment of this or a
subsequentadministrationto a more coherent and carefully articulated
approachto the problem. The first step toward this goal is a thorough
analysisof the benefitsand costs of both strategiesand the trade-offsthat
must be made betweenthem. Studiesof this kind are a pressingpoliticalas
well as intellectualneed.
The second source of weaknessthat may influence foreign policy in
the coming decadeis external.Both superpowersare particularlysensitive
to the other'sstrengthsand their own weaknesses.For this reasonthey are
both likely to perceivethemselvesto be increasinglyon the defensivein the
years ahead. From the vantagepoint of Moscow, these weaknessesderive
from a frustratingwarin Afghanistan,a continuingconflictwith Chinaand
the declining political reliability of the Warsaw Pact. None of these
problemscan possiblybe offset by the prospectof greaterinfluencein the
ThirdWorld.
From the perspectiveof Washingtonthe world outlook is likely to
look equallybleak and threatening.America'sposition of leadershipin the
West will almost certainly continue to decline for both economic and
political reasons. This will result in a further deteriorationof NATO's
cohesion. In the ThirdWorld,Americaninfluencewill also wane, especially
in Latin America where Washington may confront even more serious
political-militarychallengesthan the ones it currentlyfaces in El Salvador
and Guatemala.A revolutionin South Koreaor the Philippinesthat took
The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?
349
on stronganti-Americanovertonesor anothershockin the MiddleEast, say
the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and the resulting demise of the
Westernposition in the Gulf, would furtheraggravatethe Americansense
of vulnerability.
By the mid-1980s,the world may witnessthe bizarreand frightening
phenomenon of two awesomely powerful but painfully vulnerable
superpowerseach acutely sensitiveabout its own sourcesof weaknessand
deeply fearfulof the other'sefforts to exploit them. If this portrayalof the
superpowersseems farfetched, the reader is reminded of the historical
precedentof WilhelminianGermany,awesomelypowerfulfor its day but so
insecurein its powerthat it acted in ways that made it the principlemenace
to the peaceof Europe.
The paranoia of the powerful can and has constituted a profound
sourceof internationalinstability.Policymakersin such circumstancestend
to exhibit an exaggeratedconcern for their credibility,convincedthat any
sign of weaknesswill only encouragefurtherchallengesfrom theiradversaries. In the case of Germanyit led to a series of aggressiveforeign policy
venturesthat broughtabout the very situationof encirclementshe feared
and ultimatelyled to war.
If anythingis moredisturbingthan a greatpoweractingin this manner
it is the prospectof two superpoweradversariesdoing so. Both alreadydisplay tendenciesin this direction.The United Stateshas a remarkable,some
call it pathological,concernfor its credibility.Democraticand Republican
policymakers alike have also exaggerated the extent to which Soviet
or Soviet-Cuban machinations lay behind every threatening Third
World upheaval. The Shaba invasion, Nicaraguaand, most recently, El
Salvadorare cases in point. All of this has promptedAmericanleadersto
cast about for cheap and dramaticways of displayingresolve. They have
succumbedto what could be called "The MayaguezMentality,"after the
first attempt to do this in the immediate aftermath of the Indochina
disaster.Not surprisingly,such displaysof force, of whichtherehave been
several,havemost often had the oppositeresultof whatwas intended.
Soviet policymakersalso appearto exaggerategreatlythe malevolent
influence their adversaryis capable of exercising.Soviet spokesmenhave
repeatedlychargedthe United States with responsibilityfor the turmoil it
confronts in both Afghanistan and Poland. Many of these charges are
propagandabut there is no reason to doubt that some of them actually
reflect the real views of Soviet officials, as sincerely held if equally
farfetched as some of the anti-Soviet charges made by their American
counterparts.This may be particularlytrue with regard to the Polish
situation which must pose a serious cognitivedilemmafor Soviet leaders.
To recognizeit for whatit is, a realworker'srevolutionagainsta bureaucra-
350
Lebow
tic dictatorship,imposedand maintainedby Moscow, would entail calling
into question the most fundamentalmyths of Soviet-styleMarxism.The
men of the Kremlin have therefore every psychological and political
incentiveto explainaway Polish developmentsby any meansthey can. The
long armof Americanimperialismcan play a useful role in this regardjust
as the Sovietcommunistconspiracywas invokedby Americansa generation
earlierto explaintheir"loss"of China.Unfortunately,such illusions,while
comforting, also tend to have damaging long-term foreign policy
consequences.
The acute sensitivitiesof the superpowers,especiallywith respectto
the arenasin whichthey feel the most vulnerable,must significantlyaffect
any evaluationof the trade-offsbetweendeterrenceand reassurance.To the
author this state of affairs suggests an even greaterneed for a policy of
reassurance.It also calls for some degreeof foreign policy restrainton the
assumptionthat the strategicgain of one-uppingone's superpowerrival in
any importantarena is likely to be more than offset by the cost of the
heightenedperceptionof threatit generatesamongits leaders.
The opposing argumentmust also be considered.Efforts to reassure
adversaries,particularlythose whose hostilityis long standingand intense,
hold out only a limitedprospectfor success.Theyare also ill-advisedif they
riskbeingmisinterpretedas signsof weakness,as spokesmenfor the Reagan
administrationallege. Administrationstrategistsaccordinglyadvocate an
intensifiedmilitarybuild-upas both a matterof prudenceand a means of
strengtheningdeterrence.
Both strategies entail considerable risk. Reassurance, if directed
toward an adversarywhose foreign policy is truly motivatedby aggressive
goals, is akin to appeasementand will succeedonly in whettinghis appetite
for furtherencroachments.Deterrence,on the otherhand, whenit takesthe
form of a massive military build-up and search for military alliances
abroad, will evoke similarbehaviorfrom an adversaryand lead to a rapid
escalationof internationaltensions. It may end up by makingmutualfears
of war self-fulfilling. The resultingtragedy would be greater still if the
adversaryin question, like its would-be deterrer,was motivated not by
aspirationsfor worldconquestbut ratherby concernfor its own security.
The third area in which trade-offs must be made betweendeterrence
and reassuranceis that of strategicweaponry.Unfortunately,the current
strategicdebatehas tendedto gloss over this requirement.Advocatesof the
two principalschools of Americanstrategicthought often even deny the
necessityof makingany trade-offs. Most "finitedeterrence"theoristsinsist
that war preventionis the only properconcernof nuclearstrategy.They
advocatesomethingsimilarto a strategyof reassurancein that they favor
strategicsystems that enhance the second strike capabilityof the United
The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?
351
States without at the same time threateningthe capability of the Soviet
Union to mount a retaliatorystrike. Finite deterrencetheorists generally
reject the notion that nuclearwar betweenthe superpowerscould have a
victor; instead, they think it likely to result in the destructionof both
protagonists."War-fighting"theorists evade the issue of trade-offs by a
neat cognitive sleight of hand; they assert that the capabilityto fight a
nuclearwaris also the best way to deterone.
Neither argument is convincing. Deterrencemay well fail despite
generalSoviet and Americanrecognitionof the destructivenessof nuclear
war. The refusal of many finite deterrenceadvocates to recognize this
unpleasant possibility will not diminish and may actually enhance the
chanceof a nuclearwar. For their part, most war-fightingtheoristserr by
denyingthe equallydisturbingtruth that efforts to improvethe American
capabilityto fight a nuclearwararein manywaysdetrimentalto deterrence.
The developmentof a time-urgentcounterforcecapability, an essential
of any war-fightingstrategy,is a casein point.As has often been
requirement
pointed out, by threateningthe survivabilityof the Soviet Union's second
strike capability, over 70% of which resides in its stationaryland based
missileforce, such capabilityenhancesMoscow'sincentiveto preemptin a
crisisif warappearslikely.
Perhapsthe most disturbingtendencyof the currentstrategicdebateis
the extent to which doctrine and force structureare so often analyzed
independentlyof the politicalcontextin whichthey exist. Whenthe broader
politicalsettingis consideredit puts the respectiverisksof the two strategies
in a sharper light. American doctrine and force structurehave shifted
towards a war-fightingposture at the same time as political relations
betweenthe superpowershave deteriorated.This can only havethe effect of
makingsuch a shift more threateningin Soviet eyes. For the same reason,
Soviet efforts to upgradetheir strategicarsenal,and with it their abilityto
conducta nuclearwar, appearmuch more provocativeto the United States
than they would otherwise. The intensification of superpowerhostility
thereforemakesthe trade-offsbetweenwar preventionand war-fightingall
the more starkand the correspondingneed for Washingtonand Moscowto
face them all the more imperative.Tragically,the intensificationof the
Cold War is likely to push both powers further in the direction of
developingtheirwar-fightingcapabilities.
CONCLUSION
The principalpolicy finding of the researchdescribedin this paperis
that policymakersmay be able to do very little to alleviate the kinds of
352
Lebow
pressuresthat encouragetheir adversariesto act aggressively.At the same
time, they may have it in their power to do quite a bit to intensify these
pressures. This points to the need for both superpowersto exercise
cautionin theirwordsand deeds.
Words are actions in their own right and significantlyaffect a state's
perceptionof the natureand intensityof the threatit faces. Carelessor illconsideredremarks,even those directedat an altogetherdifferentaudience,
can easily and dramatically exacerbate international tensions. Nikita
Khrushchev's famous boast-"We
will bury you"-caused
an instant
sensationin the West whereit was interpretedby many as an admissionof
Soviet willingness to resort to nuclear war to spread communism.
Khrushchev himself insisted that this was not at all what he had
said-translated properlyit would have come out: "We will attend your
funeral."His explanationdid little to dispelthe tensionthat his unfortunate
remarkhad created.
Sino-American hostility was similarly aggravatedin the 1960s by
Peking'sbrashand stridentlyreiteratedassertionsthat the UnitedStateswas
a "papertiger," that China would emergevictorious from a nuclearwar
with the West, and that ThirdWorld peoples constitutedan "international
proletariat"which, led by Peking, would rise up against American
imperialism.Lin Piao's articlecalling for such a world revolutionagainst
the United States, first publishedin 1965,was widelycirculatedin the West
(1965).We know today that most of thesediatribeswereactuallydirectedat
Moscow and other communistpartiesand can only be understoodin the
context of the Sino-Soviet split. At the time, however,they were taken as
proof by many Americansthat Peking was committedto advancingthe
causeof communismthroughbrushfireand guerrillawars.
Soviet and Chinese rhetoricin the early 1960s significantlyaffected
American perceptionsof events in Indochina. It encouragedAmerican
interventionin Vietnam,as it was seen by Washingtonas the very kind of
challenge Moscow and Peking had long been boasting about inciting.
PresidentKennedy,in particular,took Soviet and Chinesepronouncements
offering support of "wars of national liberation"very seriously. In the
aftermathof one of Khrushchev'smore bellicose speechesin this regard,
Kennedytold the American NewspaperAssociation: "[We] are opposed
around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies
primarilyon covert means for expandingits sphere of influence."The
struggle,Kennedywent on to say, had been switchedfrom Europeto Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, from nuclear and conventional weapons to
irregularwarfare, insurrection,and subversion. If those methods were
successful in countries like Laos and South Vietnam, Kennedy told
reporters,then "the gates will be opened wide"(Gaddis, 1982). For much
TheDeterrenceDeadlock:Is Therea WayOut?
353
the same reason, the Johnson administration continued Kennedy's
commitmentin Indochinawith resultsthat arewell-known.
Theseexamplesillustratehow propaganda,even propagandathat may
have been aimed at a domesticor an altogetherdifferentforeign audience,
can easily achieveunanticipatedsailencein the eyes of an adversaryand be
taken as confirmationof his worst fears or expectations.The spate of illconsideredstatementson the feasibilityof limited nuclearwar emanating
from the ReaganWhite House seems to have done just this, and may be
analogousin effect to Khrushchev'sbellicoseutteringsin the early1960s.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that Soviet officials have
repeatedly remarked, publicly and privately, that their concern about
Americanintentionshas been arousednot only by the recentemphasison
limitednuclearwar in Americandoctrine,whichafter all was noticeablein
the Ford and Carteradministrationas well, but by the fact that it has been
accompaniedby provocative statementsfrom the Reagan White House.
The combinationof Reagan'swords and actions, like Khrushchev'sbefore
him, impartsan acutesense of threatto foreignaudiences.GeorgiArbatov,
directorof the Instituteof the UnitedStatesand Canada,recentlydeclared:
"Rightnow, becauseof the Reaganadministration'srhetoric-and maybe
more than just rhetoric-some of our military people and even some
membersof the CentralCommitteebelieveAmericais preparingfor nuclear
war" (Time, 1982).
Perhapsthe most extremeSoviet reactionto these developmentshas
been the publicdemandby MarshalNikolai Ogarkov,Soviet chief of staff,
for a series of measuresto meet the Americanmilitarythreat that would
have the effect of putting the Soviet Union on a war footing. In a book
recentlypublishedby the Ministryof Defense, Ogarkovacknowledgedthat
the UnitedStateshas alwaysplannedto destroythe SovietUnion in the case
of nuclear war but argues that "This course has become particularly
dangerousin connectionwith the Reaganadministration'sconfrontational
preparationsfor war"(International
strategyand its directand all-embracing
Herald Tribune, 1982).
Certainly, the temptation exists to dismiss some of Moscow's
indignantreactionto Reaganrhetoricas self-servingpropagandaof its own.
However, the threateningportraitmany Americanstrategicanalystsdraw
of the Soviet Union is to a great extentattributableto that country'seffort
to developa war-fightingcapabilityand its periodicassertionsthat it would
emerge the victor in a nuclearwar. There is every reason to believe that
Soviet thinking has been similarlyinfluenced by recent developmentsin
Americandoctrineand force structure.The writingsof HenryTrofimenko
and Georgi Arbatov might be cited in evidence; they provide an object
lesson of how readilythe most alarmingimplicationscan be drawnaboutan
354
Lebow
adversary's intentions based on his capability and propaganda
(Trofimenko,1977).
Given the currentpolitical climate, the administrationshould take
care not to exacerbate any further the existing tensions by its
pronouncements.No doubt, some of the more extreme utterances of
Reaganand Weinbergerare motivatedby a perceivedneed to look "tough"
in the eyes of the Russiansand conservativeEuropeanopinion in orderto
compensate for Soviet strategic and Eurostrategic potency. The
administrationwoulddo well to rememberthat tough talk in the absenceof
powerhas a hollow ring to it. When backedby ample power, as no doubt
the Russiansperceiveit is, it is simply threatening.Either way it is selfdefeating.
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