The Zimmerman Telegram
Throughout history, the secret communication of information during times of war has always been of
the utmost importance. The historian Herodotus (5th century B.C.) provides one of the earliest
accounts of an attempt to pass on information secretly:
Herodotus also recounted another incident in which concealment was sufficient
to secure the safe passage of a message. He chronicled the story of
Histaiaeus, who wanted to encourage Aristagoras of Miletus to revolt against the
Persian king. To convey his instructions securely, Histaiaeus shaved the head of
his messenger, wrote the message on his scalp, and then waited for the hair to
regrow…upon arriving at his destination he then shaved his head and pointed it
at the intended recipient. – Quoted From The Code Book, Simon Singh
In modern times- in an era of e-mail, the internet, and cellular phones- encryption (the process of
relaying information through codes) is the only way that our privacy can be maintained.
Cryptography (the process of cracking codes) will also be a invaluable weapon in tracking the activity
of terrorists and maintaining our nation’s security.
Throughout the course of history, however, no single encrypted message has had more impact than
the Zimmerman Telegram. The American historian Barbara Tuchman states:
In itself the Zimmerman telegram was only a pebble on the long course of history.
But a pebble can kill a Goliath, and this one killed the American illusion that we
could go about our business happily separate from other nations. In world affairs
it was a German Minister’s minor plot. In the lives of the American people it was
the end of innocence.
The story of the Zimmerman telegram begins in a small room in Britain that was simply known as
Room 40. The first message on the morning of January 17, 1917 sent there by telegraph seemed to
carry no special significance. The officer on duty examined this message intercepted from German
intelligence and passed it onto the appropriate cryptographers in the inner room, completely unaware
that this telegram would alter the course of the war and of history.
In the inner room two civilian cryptographers were on duty. One was the Reverend William
Montgomery, a religious scholar with a gift for translation. He had distinguished himself by
deciphering a secret message hidden in a postcard addressed to Sir Henry Jones, 184 King’s Road,
Tighnabruaich, Scotland. The postcard had been sent from Turkey, so Sir Henry had assumed it was
from his son, a prisoner of the Turks. However, he was puzzled because the postcard was blank, and
the address was peculiar- the village of Tighnabruaich was so tiny that none of the houses had
numbers and there was no King’s Road. Eventually, the Reverend Montgomery spotted the postcard’s
encrypted message. The address alluded to the Bible, First Book of Kings, Chapter 18, Verse 4,
“Obadiah took a hundred prophets, and hid them fifty in a cave, and fed them with bread and water.”
Sir Henry’s son was simply reassuring his family that he was being well looked after by his captors.
Montgomery and his co-worker, Nigel de Grey, a publisher, noticed the message brought to them was
of unusual length, but still expected to find nothing of special significance. They expected yet another
exchange between Berlin and Washington about negotiating a peace to the war. Such messages were
being passed in abundance, and since a British ship had cut the German Trans-Atlantic cables on the
first days of the war the Germans had been forced to pass their messages along communication cables
owned by the Americans.
The Germans were convinced that the codes they used to pass these messages were undecipherable.
A seemingly minor event, however, gave the British access to the code books of the Germans which
allowed for the code’s decipherment. A German ship- the Magdeburg- had run aground in a fog off
the island of Odensholm. Through a break in the fog the ship’s captain had seen two Russian cruisers
bearing down upon him. Quickly he ordered his signalman to fetch the code book, row out to deep
water, and throw it overboard. Just as the dinghy was being lowered, a shot from the Russian guns
tore into it and, in his moment of death, the signalman’s arms clutched the code book to his body.
The Russian cruisers, closing in, destroyed the Magdeburg and proceeded methodically to the rescue
of the German sailors floundering in the water. Someone saw a floating body, which was hauled
aboard with the living; it was the dead signalman, still clasping the code book in his arms.
The Russians- exhibiting good sense- decided the book could best be used by the British and passed it
on to them. In this book were information about German codes which were the basis for the cracking
of the German codes.
Within a few hours, Montgomery and de Gray had been able to decipher a few chunks of the text of
the telegram and began to realize that they were uncovering a message of the utmost importance.
Drawing on earlier documents they deciphered, they eventually cracked the entire code:
This above version of the message is signed Bernstoff because it was sent to the German Ambassador
in Washington, von Bernstoff, who was to forward it to the German Ambassador in Mexico City,
Eckhardt. Before it made it there, however, the British had deciphered the terrible message: the
Germans again would begin unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1 and would propose an
alliance with Mexico, whom it would aid in acquiring territories lost to the U.S. (Texas, New Mexico,
and Arizona).
America had remained steadfastly neutral throughout the war. Woodrow Wilson, who was re-elected
in 1916 by using the slogan “He Kept Us Out of War”, was an idealist and believed peace could be
achieved through a negotiated settlement. Even the sinking of the ocean liner Luisitania by German
U-boats (submarines), which resulted in the death of 1,198 passengers including 128 Americans, did
not draw the U.S. into the war. Germany had assured America that in the future U-boats would rise
to the surface before attacking, a provision that was intended to avoid accidental attacks on civilian
ships.
Yet submerging before it made an attack took away the enormous advantage of the U-boat: the
element of surprise. German commanders thus convinced the Kaiser (the leader of Germany) that it
was time to renege on the promise to the U.S. Such unrestricted submarine warfare would result in
the destruction of U.S. ships and would almost certainly provoke the U.S. into declaring war on
Germany. Thus Zimmerman came up with the ingenious proposal of the alliance with Mexico: if
Mexico were to attack the U.S., it would be too preoccupied to enter the war in Europe and it would
not be able to tip the balance in the favor of the Allies.
British Intelligence instantly realized the magnitude of the news: certainly when the U.S. was
informed of the telegram they would declare war on the Germany and certainly tilt the war in favor of
Britain the Allies. The British, however, faced a dilemma: if they informed the Americans, and the
Americans reacted by publicly condemning Germany, then the Germans would certainly realize that
their codes had been broken. The Germans would respond with a newer and more difficult code, and
would thus cut the British off from a valuable source of intelligence. The solution was simply to wait:
the British would hope that the German renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare would bring
America into the war.
Unrestricted submarine warfare began again on February 1 as ordered by the Kaiser. America,
however, contrary to the expectations of the Allies, decided that it would continue to remain neutral.
The British, therefore, concluded that they would need to use the Zimmermann telegram to convince
America to enter the war.
In what is one of the greatest stories of the history of espionage, the British developed a plan to inform
the Americans of the contents of the telegram without giving away that they had cracked the code.
The British realized that von Bernstoff, the German Ambassador in Washington, would have to
forward the message to von Eckhardt, the German Ambassador in Mexico. If the British could
somehow obtain this Mexican version of the Zimmermann telegram, then it could be published in the
newspapers and the Germans would assume that it had been stolen from the Mexican government,
not intercepted and cracked by the British on the way to America.
British Intelligence contacted an agent in Mexico, known only as Mr. H, who in turn infiltrated the
Mexican Telegraph Office. Mr. H was able to obtain exactly what he needed: the Mexican version of
the telegram. It was this version of the telegram that British Intelligence handed to Arthrur Balfour,
the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On February 23, Balfour summoned the American
Ambassador, Walter Page, and presented him with the Zimmerman telegram, later calling this “the
most dramatic moment in all of my life.”
The telegram was released to the press and, at last, the American nation was confronted with the
reality of Germany’s intentions. Although there was little doubt among the American people that they
should retaliate, there was some concern with the U.S. administration that the telegram might be a
hoax, manufactured by the British to guarantee American involvement in the war. However, the
question of authenticity soon vanished when Zimmermann publicly admitted his authorship.
At the beginning of the year, Wilson had said that it would be a “crime against civilization” to lead his
nation to war, but by April 2, 1917, he had changed his mind: “I advise that the Congress declare the
recent course of the Imperial Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government
and people of the United States, and that it formally accept the status of belligerent that has thus been
thrust upon it.” A single breakthrough by Room 40 had succeeded where three years of diplomacy
had failed: the U.S. had entered World War I, thus shifting the balance of power in favor of the allies
and leading to their eventual victory.