Overcoming the Danger of Incumbency: The Case of Smer Party in
Slovakia
Peter Spáč, Vlastimil Havlík
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Studies
Masaryk University
Email: [email protected], [email protected]
Prepared for the ECPR General Conference, Montréal, 26-29 August,
2015.
Work in progress. Please, do not cite without prior permission of the authors.
The term populism has become an important issue in the current political science. However
there are very few studies dealing with development of populist parties after they gain electoral
success or even become part of a governing coalition. The main idea is that populist appeals are best
suited for parties outside the establishment. However, when populists succeed to enter the national
parliament or even the government, the credibility of their populist appeals becomes difficult to
sustain. Consequently, the support of populist political parties is expected to decrease after they
enter the system and become part of the establishment. However, the results of the empirical
research up to date are somewhat mixed. Some populist parties have been characterized by flash
performance, on the other hand there are examples of populist parties that “survived” their initial
electoral success and even their electoral support increased (or at least did not drop) after
participation in government. The question is what happens to populist parties arfter they enter the
government and, consequently, which factors (and how) determine their survival in the system.
Trying to fill the gap in the field, we focus on the case of Slovak political party Smer – Social
Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD). Why have we selected this case? First, Smer was
established as a so-called centrist (Učeň 2004) or exclusively (Havlík, Pinková 2012) populist party,
i.e. a political party which policy platform was based on populist appeals without any other coherent
set of values (in other words the populism of Smer was not accompanied by any “host ideology”).
Consequently, the theoretical expectations about the negative impact of the entry of populist parties
into the system are even more relevant in case of exclusively populist parties in comparison to other
populist parties which legitimization is based not only on populism but also on another set of values
as nativism of populist radical right parties (Mudde 2007) or anti-capitalism and egalitarianism of
populist socialist parties (March 2011). In other words, if populism of “ideological populist parties”
does not work anymore, there is still another policy programme that is more easily to pursue even
within government. Second, despite its bigger vulnerability caused by the centrist populist profile of
Smer, the party has emerged as one of the most successful cases of populist parties in Europe not
only to be able to win an electoral contest but also to form a single-party majority government. Last
but not least, although there are several studies dealing with (the effects) of governing participation
of (mostly) populist radical right parties in Western Europe, only very little attention has been paid to
centrist populist parties is Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, by analyzing the Smer party the
presented study aims to contribute to understanding the nature and perspectives of centrist populist
party in the region of Central and Eastern Europe after they enter the government. Even more
importantly, it shows that populist parties may resist the “danger of incumbency” successfully.
If populists become aware that their profile is rather incompatible with the new situation, a shift of
their character may be expected. First, in ideological terms, these parties may drop the populist
appeal and seek another programmatic basis. Second, this change may be reflected in the structure
of the electorate as different voters may be attracted by the new party's ideology. Finally, the
adaptation process of a populist party may be present also in reforming its internal organization and
building a structure resembling classical parties.
The main aim of the paper is to analyze the Slovak party Smer–SD (Direction) and its pathway
from populism to social democracy. The party emerged in 1999 and in the following years it has
become the core of the system with power influence on both national and subnational level of
domestic politics. The paper seeks to study its shift in three areas – the ideology, electoral support
(using national election studies and data from European Social Survey) and internal organization. It
shows that populist parties may successfully modify their original profile if they find it harmful for
their further ambitions and adapt for an existence within their earlier enemy - the establishment.
Power as a challenge for populists?
In recent period there has been a vast and increasing interest of political scientists in
populism in general and populist political parties in particular (Canovan 1999; Canovan 2004; Taggart
2000; Mudde 2007; Pop-Eleches 2010). The main focus has been paid to the ideological features and
– consequently - conceptualization of populism (Rooduijn 2013, van Kessel 2014). This discussion
contains several difficulties. As states populism is as unusual concept typical by “conceptual
slipperiness” (Taggart 2000). In other words this label is used in different fashion by various groups of
people including scholars, elite and voters.
In a more narrative way populism is often presented as a reaction to the failure of
democratic elites to keep the citizens satisfied with the quality of democracy (cf. Arditi 2004). This
concept is more elaborated by Margaret Canovan (1999) who differs between two faces of
democracy, the redemptive and pragmatic. While the former represents some kind of ideal the latter
falls down into power struggle. With politics taking more the shape of the latter face the
environment becomes more open for populists to appear. As Canovan implies populism is a shadow
cast by the democracy itself. Although the term populism remains still a bit fuzzy there is an
agreement on so-called analytical core of populism. To sum up this discussion three points are worth
mentioning (cf. Havlík and Pinková 2012). First, populism operates with a division of society into two
solid blocs – the people and the elites. Second, these two homogeneous blocs are set against each
other and a conflict between them is often stressed by populists. From the populism’s point of view
the elites are depicted in a fully negative way. The establishment is understood as a corrupted force
which has betrayed the people and its interests. Rather than representing the people the elites are
accused of following their own interest at the expense of a general good of the society. The third and
final point of populism is a call for a return of power back to the people. Populist parties often claim
that the people as a sovereign should have the upper hand with the elites subordinated to their will.
In real politics populists use to seek this ambition by demanding the introduction or strengthening of
tools of direct democracy.
While the concept of populism is vastly covered only a little focus has been devoted to
development of populism after these parties succeed in elections and/or become part of the
government (for exceptions see De Lange [2008], and most recently Albertazzi, McDonnell [2015]). It
seems unchallenged that all political parties seek power. Thus, becoming a parliamentary or
governmental party is usually understood as a success on this path. However, this may not be fully
true for populists. When populist parties succeed in national election their character may become a
potential burden. To summarize theoretical discussion of the effect of incumbency on electoral
fortunes of populist political parties, two different kind of explanations for the “incumbency
challenge” are provided. First, populist political parties will be affected negatively by their
government participation because of their inexperience and lack of competent personnel. The lack of
experience and competent policy-makers may be typical for all newly arisen political parties but
typical loose and leader oriented organizational structure makes it even worse for populist political
parties. As put it by Heinisch (2003): “[the] movement character of populist parties – that is their high
level of mobilisation, the frequent rotation of personnel and the de-emphasis of institutions – tends
to pose major problems when such groups enter the government, one of the most institutionalised
settings imaginable.“ Second, popularity of populist parties in power is expected to decrease due to
the values the ideology of populism is based on and due to unrealistic promises delivered by
populists during election campaigns. This expectation lies in the tension between the two faces of
democracy (pragmatic and redemptive) explained by M. Canovan (1999). In other words, there is a
gap between high voters` expectation about democracy and democratically elected politicians
(redemptive vision) and only limited capacity of politicians to meet this expectation (due to the fact
that democracy is „just“ a polity in which a peaceful way of conflict resolution is taken place, typical
by comprimises and institutional constraints). On one hand, it opens the space for populist
mobilization based on anti-establishment sentiments stressing the redemptive face of democracy.
On the other hand, once populists get into power, „its own inability to live up to its promises will be
revealed“ (Canovan 1999: 12). As Canovan (2004) correctly announces populists are most
comfortable in opposition. This insight is fully backed by the nature of populism. As mentioned above
the criticism of the political establishment is a prime mobilizing tool for populists. Objectively it is
easier to use this appeal when standing outside of "the system". In other words attacking the elites is
more persuasive when done by an outsider rather than by a member of the establishment. This
raises a question what may happen to populists after they lose their outsider status and whether
there is something they can do to prevent the expected decline of popularity.
To limit the comparative disadvantage of populist parties in power, two strategies seem to be
open for these parties. First, populists may remain on their original ideological background.
Following their roots these parties may continue with dividing society into two blocs and further
attack the elites from their betrayal on the people. Although it is unclear how this combination of
"insider" status and "outsider" profile allows them to keep the trust of their voters it definitely limits
the potential of populists to engage into long-term cooperation with mainstream parties. Populists
thus may seek a second option. If they become aware that their character is rather incompatible with
the new situation, a twofold shift based on theoretical discussion above may be expected. First, the
adaptation process of a populist party may be present also in reforming its internal organization and
building a structure resembling classical parties thus to be able to recruit personnel to to govern
both on national and subnational levels of a political system. Second, in ideological terms, these
parties may drop the populist appeal and seek another programmatic basis. This change may be
reflected in the structure of the electorate as different voters may be attracted by the new party's
ideology. In order to ensure the survival of a populist party in power, the change needs to be
effective and credible. Consequently, besides the agency role of the populist party (its willingness to
change and the actual change), several other factors need to be taken into consideration. The
character of the party system in which populists operates is crucial in this context. In other words,
the party system has to provide opportunity for a successful populist transformation, i.e. a niche
suitable for a transformed populist party.
To explain the story of successful transformation of SMER party in Slovakia, we will analyze the
ideological and organizational changes the party underwent after in entered the parliament and
government and will put into a broader context of party politics in Slovakia. A detailed analysis of the
SMER success will contribute not only to better understanding of Slovak politics but also to
understand the reasons why some populist parties survive and other disappears quickly.
SMER-SD – from an outsider to the core of the establishment
Party SMER (Direction in Slovak) was established in 1999 by Robert Fico a former high profile
representative of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL). The party was created as an act by Fico who
left SDL several months after national election in 1998. This election - crucial for the Slovak political
development – replaced the government of Vladimír Mečiar with a new cabinet led by Mikuláš
Dzurinda. Although Fico's occupied the post of a vice-chairman in SDL he did not get any executive
position which might have been one of the factors of his demise from his party (cf. Kopeček 2007).
In the second half of the 90s the Slovak party system was highly polarized. The crucial line
which divided the system was the stance towards the leader of the Movement for Democratic
Slovakia (HZDS) Mečiar. All the relevant parties aligned according their position to Mečiar which led
into existence of two separate blocs with no ability to cooperate. After Dzurinda’s government was
installed in 1998 this division started to fade, however it still divided political parties for several
further years.
Party SMER fully used this situation and declared itself as a subject standing beyond this
division and against the both mentioned blocs. Until 2002 election it kept its strong protest appeal
and scored third with more than 13 per cent of votes hence becoming a parliamentary party. With
four center-right parties able to create a majority government SMER remained in opposition,
however now turning to a more leftist profile (see more below). Since that it kept strengthening its
support and starting with 2006 it has won all national elections so far. Table 1 shows the party’s
electoral results since 2002.
Table 1: Results of SMER in national elections
Election
Votes
Votes (%)
Seats (out of 150)
2002
387,100
13.5
25
2006
671,185
29.1
50
2010
880,111
34.8
62
2012
1,134,280
44.4
Source of data: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
83
On the national level the party joined two governments till the present day. First it created a
coalition government in 2006 with HZDS and Slovak National Party (SNS). The government lasted for
the full term until 2010 election. The next two years witnessed SMER in opposition as the centerright government led by Iveta Radičová was formed. The government did not survive a veto of
confidence in 2011 which led to early election 2012. In this election SMER obtained a majority in
parliament and created a single-party government.
Apart from the national politics the party was able to secure strong positions on the other
levels. With the years following its emergence it gradually strengthened its gains in the elections on
the subnational level. The same counted for the elections to the EP as SMER clearly won this
competition in both 2009 and 2014 leaving its rivals well behind. In 2004 and 2009 the party
supported the winning candidate for the presidential office however in 2014 its chairman Fico was
defeated in the runoff to the independent Andrej Kiska.
To sum up the pathway of SMER to political power this began in 1999. During the time of its
emergence the party stood outside of the system and its only official representative was its chairman
Fico elected as MP in 1998 on the SDL list. Since that time the party continuously enhanced its
influence and spread its power into all levels of Slovak politics. During its peak in 2012 the party held
the majority in parliament, formed a single-party national government, had strong links with the
president, controlled the most of regions and finally was the most successful party on the local level
only behind the traditionally successful independents. In a nutshell in a relatively short time period
the party starting as an outsider became the main core of the political establishment and by doing so
it fully abandoned its populism. The further parts of the paper analyze the changes of SMER in three
dimensions – the ideology, the internal structure and the voters’ characteristics.
Shift of ideology
The ideological profile of SMER since its emergence went through a substantial modification.
In period before 2002 national election which Kopeček (2007, 284) labels as the "founding era", the
party openly refused any left-right inclination. On the contrary SMER adopted a hostile position to
any ideological classification. The party interpreted this stance by pointing to vast and important
problems of country and society which were also without ideological affiliation. Hence, SMER
proposed pragmatism as its leading principle and stressed the need to come with solutions based on
common sense.
From the beginning the party adopted a strictly negative appeal against the existing
establishment. SMER blamed all the elites from failure which was best portrayed in its theme "as
they stole under Mečiar, so they steal under Dzurinda" (Wienk and Majchrák 2003, 168). Although
pointing to specific persons this slogan was rather meant as a criticism of the whole politics before
emergence of SMER with names of both prime ministers as the main figures of these previous years.
The party accused the elites from being distant from people and this gap could be resolved only be
replacing the whole generation of political representatives (cf. Spáč 2012, 245).
The depicted profile of the party led authors to a consensus about characterizing it as
populist (cf. Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; Učeň 2004; Mesežnikov 2009; Spáč 2012). In his
work Peter Učeň (2003) claimed SMER to be a representative of the so called "centrist populism"
based on a combination of its populist features and negative stance towards any ideological
classification. Although SMER included some features which could lean it somehow to the left this
labeling quite precisely defined its true position. A criticism to this could be raised by pointing to the
addition of "Third Way" to the name of the party before 2002 election but this change did not prove
to have any substantial impact. First, the concept introduced by Giddens was rather or even fully
unknown to Slovak voters and second its usage rather pointed to the aim of SMER to stand beyond
the two blocs of parties in the polarized party system.
SMER entered the 2002 national election with a clear intention to win and become the main
governmental party with Robert Fico as the Prime Minister. The third position behind HZDS and
Dzurinda's newly created Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) and a gain of only slightly
more than 13 per cent of votes was however a disappointment. The party entered the parliament
but stayed in opposition as a center-right government led by Dzurinda was created. As the further
years showed the 2002 election was a crucial point in the party's development.
The party's low electoral result led to substantial modification of the ideological profile as
SMER began its publicly announced shift to social democracy. To support this trend the party
successfully merged with smaller leftist parties in 2004 including Fico's former SDL. This integration
was symbolically confirmed by a change of SMER's name to SMER – Social Democracy (SMER-SD).
The choice why to modify the party's profile particularly to social democracy had at least two
favorable reasons. First, Robert Fico spent the 90s as an important figure of the leading leftist Slovak
party SDL which secured him a substantial support among the voters oriented to the left. Second,
while first Dzurinda's government formed in 1998 was heterogeneous in ideological sense, this did
not work for his second cabinet. The government created after 2002 election comprised of four
center-right parties and began to conduct vast liberal economic reforms. Together with a disastrous
result of the leftist parties in 2002 election (cf. Fitzmaurice 2004) a gap on the electoral market was
open on the left part of the spectrum. Hence, SMER made a pragmatic decision to move to area
where it already had some links due to its chairman's past and where it was able to mobilize
significant amount of new supporters.
The ideological changes of SMER-SD affected also its populist face. The main attributes of
populism were kept however they became milder and oriented not universally against elites in
general but against the parties of Dzurinda's government. Before 2002 election the party openly
called for "order" and even for a rather far right understanding of social policy aimed against people
parasitizing on the society. After this election SMER-SD abandoned such claims and set the concept
of social justice as its main theme. Altogether during years 2002 and 2006 the party significantly
weakened though not eliminated its populist profile and parallel it gradually adopted the ideas of
social democracy (cf. Učeň 2007).
National election in 2006 was another breaking point in development of SMER-SD. The party
entered government as a senior partner with HZDS and SNS and Robert Fico became Prime Minister.
Hence, SMER-SD became the core of the ruling coalition and with rising strength on the other levels
of political arena (e.g. local and regional) also the core of the whole political system. The later years
only secured this trend as SMER-SD became the dominant part of the party system with no rival of
comparable power.
The governmental experience enhanced the changes of SMER-SD's profile launched after
2002 election. The party improved and deepened its social democratic agenda. This was fairy visible
in the party's campaign before 2012 election with the theme "People deserve securities" referring to
the need for a more generous social policy. On the other hand since 2006 SMER-SD nearly fully
abandoned its once dominating populist profile. In its new role of the main core of the establishment
the party was unable to continue with its anti-elite appeals. On the contrary, on several occasions
Robert Fico started to divide the Slovak party system into "standard" and other parties. While the
former referred to SMER-SD and several other established parties the latter term was pointing to a
group of new subjects including the populist Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO)
created in 2011. The irony is that although the profile of OLaNO fairly resembles the ideology of
SMER before 2002 Robert Fico assigns this party in a group of "political fools and half-fools". Hence,
with such a terminology SMER-SD officially proclaimed its affiliation as a mainstream party firmly
attached to the establishment.
To sum up this part in less than one decade SMER-SD changed from a clearly populist party
refusing any ideological classification to a social democratic formation openly stressing this
affiliation. The ideological transformation had three main stages. First, which occurred after party's
emergence and lasted until 2002 election, witnessed SMER-SD as an anti-establishment party calling
for a change of the whole generation of politicians. The failure in 2002 election led to reassessment
of its own profile and to adaptation to new conditions as a parliamentary opposition party standing
against a center-right government. During this period SMER-SD officially adopted social democratic
profile and gradually weakened its populist appeals. The third and final stage began after 2006
election when the party entered the government. Since then SMER-SD secured its social democratic
profile, proclaimed its alignment to the mainstream parties and even adopted a negative stance
against populists which happen to resemble its beginnings in 1999. Although the social democratic
profile of SMER-SD somehow differs from an agenda of its Western European counterparts (cf. Učeň
2007) it might be concluded that the party of Robert Fico has accomplished a successful major shift
of its ideology which allowed it to endure in the Slovak party system and even become its strongest
part.
Changes of organizational structure
After its emergence in 1999 the party SMER aimed primarily at mobilizing voters at the
expense of building a thorough organizational structure. The party was created as a sole act of its
founder Robert Fico what was reflected in its internal framework and processes. The original
"structure" of SMER consisted only of chairman, general manager and a central executive committee,
however overshadowed by the party leader. No positions of vice-chairmen were created. The party
also fully resigned on forming a territorial organization and for the first two years of its existence the
regions were maintained only by regional managers. This partly changed in 2001 after the national
parliament passed a law which led to emergence of regional self-government. In September of this
year SMER approved creation of "classical" regional structures and started to build its own
organization on the county level (cf. Kopeček 2007, 286).
During its "founding era" the organizational face of the party was in full accordance with its
populist profile. In his work Pop-Eleches (2010) includes populists into a group of parties based not
primarily on ideology but on rather other sources. According to him one of the features of populist
parties is a prominence of their leaders for whom the parties' structures serve only as a tool for
achieving their own personal aims. Rooduijn (2013, 33:34) expresses this even more explicitly. Based
on him the populist parties tend to be centralistic with a strong position given to their leader. To
allow a necessary direct link between the leader and the supporters the organization of these parties
is rather loose and does not include intermediate bodies. The rationale is that leaders prefer a direct
communication style when speaking to citizens; a way which could be blocked by "inconvenient"
party bodies. Taggart (2000) expresses a similar stance about the leaders of populist parties.
In case of SMER the above mentioned notes fully fall on its organizational structure. The
party emerged from the will of its leader Fico who became a clearly dominant force without any
relevant rival. In the first years the party had a very loose organization lacking both strong national
bodies and a classical territorial structure. This framework allowed Fico to use direct and unmediated
way of communicating with supporters without any obstacles. The changes in 2001 and
establishment of subnational organizations had only limited effect at least until 2002 election.
The failure of SMER to win its first national election led not only to reassessment of its
ideology but also had an impact on its internal structure. The party aimed to follow two objectives.
First, it sought for external partners. In a situation where the center-right government provided
thorough liberal economic reforms SMER was able to enter cooperation with the Trade unions. This
partnership was formalized in 2005 which secured the support of Trade unions for SMER in the
subsequent elections. Second, alongside its ideological shift the party succesfully merged with
smaller leftist parties in 2004. In December of that year SMER remained the only party on the left
side of the spectrum and to confirm this status quo the party adopted a new name SMER - Social
Democracy. Merging with smaller parties was highly beneficial form SMER-SD as its membership
nearly doubled and the party also inherited an already built territorial organization on local and
regional level and a property of relevant amount too. What is more the merging process opened the
way for SMER-SD to be internationally recognized (cf. Kopeček 2007, 291-293).
In the following years the party pursued its established organizational aims. After the
integration process with the leftist parties the membership of SMER-SD stabilized at around 15-16
thousand people; an amount relatively high in Slovak politics. With the fading HZDS which dropped
out of parliament in 2010 SMER-SD became the party with the most members leaving other parties
fairly behind. The increase of membership allowed the party to maintain strong positions on the local
and regional level. While in 2002 local election SMER-SD stood well behind all relevant parties since
2006 its results far outreached all its rivals except the traditionally successful independents. A similar
trend was true for regional elections; a competition opened only for political parties.
As for the international recognition the integration of the left parties proved helpful to
SMER-SD. In May 2005 the party became a member of Party of European Socialists (PES) and later it
joined the Socialist International. In 2006 the PES temporarily paused SMER-SD's membership due to
its cooperation with far right SNS in the national government. This period lasted until 2009 when PES
restored SMER-SD's membership although the government including SNS was still in office. Among
possible reasons of this decision might be the party's strength in domestic politics which belonged
to the highest in Europe (cf. Mesežnikov 2007; Mesežnikov 2010). Together with change of name
from SMER to SMER-SD the formal inclusion to PES represented one of the main symbols of the
party's publicly announced shift from populism to social democracy.
The development of the organizational structure of SMER-SD followed a development
parallel to its ideological transformation. During the first years of its existence the party adopted only
a loose organization which was best suited for a strong leader directly communicating with the
supporters. The shift to "classic" internal structure began after introduction of the regional selfgovernment in 2001 and was fostered after 2002 national election. Following this election the party
successfully sought both external partners for cooperation and integration with smaller leftist
parties. As a result by the end of the first decade of its existence SMER-SD had an established
territorial organization, numerous amounts of members, officially cooperated with Trade unions and
was integrated in the most important social democratic supranational institutions. The only relict
from its initial era which remained nearly unchanged is the strong role of its leader Fico whose
position has never been questioned despite huge organizational transformation that his party has
accomplished since its creation in 1999.
Characteristics of voters
The final part is devoted to the changes in the voters' support of SMER-SD. As the prime
source the data from European Social Survey (ESS) were used. Note that Slovakia did not take part in
the first round of ESS conducted in 2002. For this year data from a Slovak survey conducted shortly
before the 2002 election were used for the analysis. Hence the data for 2002 are from a national
study while the data starting with 2004 are from ESS. The variables used in both data sources are
fully compatible and allow comparisons between the findings. To track the characteristics of voters
their gender, age, education, income and left-right orientation were analyzed.
First to present are the descriptive results (Table 2). The outcomes clearly show a substantial
change in the composition of SMER-SD's voters in time. In 2002 the party's populism was at its peak.
In that time SMER-SD had slightly more supporters among men than women. As for the age the
party's voters were of younger and middle age. Note that only less than six per cent of the party's
voters were of age of 60 and more years. In respect to education most of supporters of SMER-SD had
secondary education and nearly all belonged to lower or middle income groups. The most interesting
variable is the left-right dimension. Despite the addition of the "Third way" to the party's name until
2002 SMER openly refused any ideological classifications and mostly presented itself as a formation
standing beyond such divisions. This was reflected in the support of the party as more than half of
the voters positioned themselves in the centre. However some prevalence of left voters over the
right was present which might be due to Fico's political past in leftist SDL.
Table 2: Composition of voters of SMER-SD in 2002 - 2012
Gender
Age
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Men
54,9
56,5
49,3
35,8
39,3
41,3
Women
45,1
43,5
50,7
64,2
60,7
58,7
18 - 24
19,9
10
7,3
2,3
4,6
2,8
25 - 34
25,7
24,3
20,3
8,4
8,2
8,8
Education
Left-Right
dimension
Income
35 - 44
28,8
15
16,5
9,9
6,8
13,4
45 - 59
19,9
32,1
32
32,4
35,1
30
60 and more
5,8
18,6
23,8
47
45,3
45
Primary
17,3
12,5
18,6
16,1
17,3
16,6
Lower secondary
39,1
34
35,3
35,4
31,1
30,6
Higher secondary
33,8
43,1
36,1
37,2
41,4
41,6
University
9,8
10,4
10
11,2
10,1
11,2
Left
31,1
42,9
46,6
62,5
64,6
58,4
Centre
54,4
47,9
44,2
32,6
30,5
30,7
Right
14,4
9,3
9,2
4,9
4,9
10,9
Low
34,5
31,6
17,8
19,9
35,6
Middle
59,5
59,2
61,7
47,1
50
High
5,9
9,2
20,4
33
14,4
Note: Data about the income are not available for 2008. Source: IVO survey 2002; ESS rounds two (2004) to five
(2012).
After 2002 election SMER-SD began its openly declared transformation to social democracy
and alongside it gradually decreased its populist profile. This change found its reflection in the
composition of supporters. In accordance with the party's shift to the left the share of its supporters
claiming this orientation started to steadily grow. While in 2002 less than one third of voters of
SMER-SD had leftist orientation in 2004 this amount rose by more than ten percentage points. After
2008 three out of five party's supporters were of leftist orientation. On the contrary the share of
people leaning towards the centre continuously decreased from 54.4 per cent in 2002 to around 30
per cent in 2012. Hence the voters' composition followed the ideological shift that the party
presented after 2002 election.
Among other changes age is an interesting case. In 2002 only a marginal part of voters of
SMER-SD were of old age (60 and more years). In the following years this share dramatically
increased and since 2008 this age group made nearly one half of all the supporters. Together with
the group of 45 to 59 years these two segments rose from around one quarter of the party's voters in
2002 to more than three quarters. On the other hand the youngest voters who made a relevant part
of the supporters in 2002 nearly disappeared with time. While in 2002 SMER-SD had more than 45
per cent of its voters of less than 35 years, ten years after that only one out of ten of party's
supporters belonged to such age group. SMER-SD thus witnessed a substantial aging of its voters; a
process enhanced by fading of HZDS which was traditionally supported by elder people. This change
also explains the prevalence of women supporters visible from 2008 as due to different life
expectancy women compose the majority of older people in society.
Keeping an eye on the remaining variables the changes here were of lesser size. The
structure of voters based on their education remained nearly the same for the whole time with a
slight regrouping between the segments of secondary education. Finally the income witnessed some
shifts. Interestingly the share of people belonging to higher income groups has risen over time
although this trend was not observed in 2012. However in all of the analyzed years the vast majority
of supporters of SMER-SD belonged either to lower or middle income groups with the stress on the
latter which only once dropped below 50 per cent.
The descriptive results have presented the changes of voters' composition of SMER-SD in
time. However to get a better understanding of the variables a binomial logistic regression is applied.
The independent variables remain the same and the dependent variable maps whether the
respondents have chosen SMER-SD as their closest party. Table 3 presents the results.
Table 3: Results of logistic regression
Constant
2002
0,196***
(0,373)
2004
0,083***
(0,688)
2006
0,69***
(0,499)
2008
0,100***
(0,603)
2010
0,061***
(0,650)
2012
0,153**
(0,633)
0,723*
(0,148)
0,920
(0,282)
1,361
(0,207)
1,158
(0,191)
0,919
(0,241)
1,174
(0,209)
0,889
(0,22)
0,964
(0,202)
0,540**
(0,234)
0,192***
(0,342)
0,545*
(0,303)
1,103
(0,266)
1,036
(0,268)
2,681
(0,541)
1,361
(0,574)
0,939
(0,496)
0,810
(0,539)
0,914
(0,559)
0,947
(0,447)
1,715
(0,431)
2,430*
(0,418)
1,739
(0,402)
2,364*
(0,375)
1,751
(0,385)
0,819
(0,377)
1,110
(0,323)
1,004
(0,311)
0,752
(0,588)
0,644
(0,561)
0,758
(0,534)
1,307
(0,534)
1,357
(0,336)
1,982*
(0,279)
1,307
(0,268)
0,582
(0,625)
0,628
(0,636)
1,742
(0,561)
1,909
(0,557)
1,394
(0,445)
1,148
(0,387)
1,811
(0,358)
0,621
(0,606)
0,724
(0,601)
1,083
(0,567)
1,169
(0,567)
3,192**
(0,425)
2,145*
(0,347)
2,260**
(0,317)
2,105***
(0,201)
1,707**
(0,17)
9,165***
(0,433)
5,599***
(0,416)
16,473***
(0,305)
5,845***
(0,275)
24,039***
(0,293)
5,520***
(0,284)
65,273***
(0,41)
8,692***
(0,389)
10,474***
(0,276)
3,443***
(0,267)
0,948
(0,299)
0,920
(0,281)
1,147
(0,526)
0,668
(0,47)
1,157
(0,351)
1,218
(0,246)
0,396**
(0,347)
0,650
(0,269)
0,934
(0,333)
1,023
(0,293)
Men (ref.)
Gender
Women
18 - 24 (ref.)
25 - 34
Age
35 - 44
45 - 59
60 and more
Primary
Education
Left-Right
dimension
Lower
secondary
Higher
secondary
University (ref.)
Left
Centre
Right (ref.)
Low
Income
Middle
...
...
High (ref.)
Nagelkerke R Square
,091
,203
,287
,351
,502
,281
Note: Standard error in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Source: IVO survey 2002; ESS rounds
two (2004) to five (2012).
In accordance with the previous findings in 2002 lower odds to vote SMER-SD are estimated
for women, older age groups and people of primary education. Although the party refused to classify
itself in ideological means until 2002 election the analysis shows that its voters were nevertheless
rather from the center to the left. This might have been affected by political past of Robert Fico as a
high representative of leftist SDL in the 90s.
Starting with year 2004 the left-right dimension takes the lead and completely overshadows
all the other variables. The estimated parameters fully support the expectations of changing
composition of SMER-SD's voters. After the party failed in 2002 election and declared its
transformation to social democracy this change was reflected among its voters. The results show a
clear shift of the party's supporters to left and this trend gradually improved with time. The peak of
this trend is found in 2010 when the odds of leftist voters to support the party were more than 65
times higher than for rightist voters. In case of centrist voters the odds are fairly lower however still
significantly higher when compared to voters on the right. In 2012 the value of parameters
substantially decreased--though still remained strong--which might be due to incredible support of
SMER-SD that gained more than 44 per cent of votes in national election; the highest result of any
party since 1989 in Slovakia. To accomplish this SMER-SD dominated not only among the leftist
voters but gained a relevant support in the more centrist segments and partially also in the group of
rightist citizens.
In addition the results of logistic regression point to an interesting finding mainly in respect
to age. Table 2 showed a substantial aging of SMER-SD's supporters in time. However interpreting
this as an important influence of age on the party's support would be incorrect. As the regression
analysis showed the impact of age is nearly fully overlaid by the left-right dimension. Hence while the
people of 45 and more years gradually became the core of SMER-SD's voters it is not due to their age
why they support the party. On the contrary it is the left-right position of voters that matters mostly
and leaves the other variables fairly behind. This may be observed from a comparison of Tables 3 and
4; the latter calculated without the left-right dimension variable. With the presence of this variable in
Table 4 the parameters estimated in Table 4 get weaker or even fully insignificant. The aim of SMERSD to transform from a rather non-ideological formation to a social democratic party was successful
also in terms of electoral support as it was able to substantially attract the leftist voters and in a
lesser extent also the citizens positioning in the center.
Table 4: Results of logistic regression (left-right dimension omitted)
Constant
2002
0,261***
(0,361)
2004
0,267*
(0,590)
2006
0,240***
(0,405)
2008
0,394*
(0,461)
2010
0,206**
(0,457)
2012
0,358*
(0,525)
0,711*
(0,147)
0,949
(0,258)
1,288
(0,181)
1,222
(0,160)
1,086
(0,192)
1,062
(0,185)
0,915
(0,22)
0,989
(0,217)
0,617*
(0,230)
0,231***
(0,336)
0,489*
(0,300)
1,051
(0,264)
2,011
(0,473)
1,1801
(0,497)
0,976
(0,438)
0,922
(0,474)
0,675
(0,524)
1,093
(0,417)
2,772**
(0,369)
1,983
(0,359)
2,395**
(0,336)
1,998*
(0,346)
1,125
(0,327)
1,417
(0,286)
1,164
(0,480)
0,813
(0,461)
1,326
(0,434)
1,882
(0,432)
1,425
(0,281)
2,453***
(0,242)
1,032
(0,478)
0,784
(0,493)
3,404**
(0,426)
3,525**
(0,422)
2,972**
(0,340)
2,455**
(0,295)
0,883
(0,517)
1,104
(0,511)
1,735
(0,482)
2,059
(0,480)
2,951**
(0,366)
1,936*
(0,311)
Men (ref.)
Gender
Women
18 - 24 (ref.)
25 - 34
Age
35 - 44
45 - 59
60 and more
Primary
Education
Lower secondary
Higher secondary
0,982
(0,266)
1,701
(0,401)
1,170
(0,273)
1,031
(0,297)
0,985
(0,279)
1,581
(0,487)
0,977
(0,437)
1,824*
(0,301)
1,398
(0,216)
1,466
(0,231)
2,860***
(0,273)
1,921*
(0,285)
0,529*
(0,275)
0,768
(0,213)
1,137
(0,289)
1,330
(0,259)
University (ref.)
Low
Income
Middle
High (ref.)
Nagelkerke R Square
0,074
0,055
0,046
0,063
0,148
0,078
Note: Standard error in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Source: IVO survey 2002; ESS rounds
two (2004) to five (2012).
Conclusion
This paper analyzed the development of Slovak party SMER-SD and its shift from populism to
social democracy. The party emerged in 1999 and adopted a clearly populist profile while refusing
the traditional ideological division into left and right. From the beginning it used a harsh criticism of
the establishment combined with the proclaimed need to change the whole generation of political
representatives. Although SMER-SD aimed to win its first national election and become the main
ruling party it scored only three and ended in opposition.
In the new situation the original populist profile was seen as a rising burden and the party
officially proclaimed its transformation to social democracy. This paper sought this shift in three
areas. In respect to ideology, the first stage of the changing process took its part between 2002 and
2006. During this time SMER-SD adopted a social democratic stance and largely abandoned its once
populist appeals. After 2006 election when the party made it to the government, the ideological
transformation was finalized as SMER-SD proclaimed itself to be a "standard" party and a firm
member of the establishment.
Second, the party realized a transformation of its internal structure. Originally SMER-SD
created only a loose structure with no aim to build a territorial organization. Such a structure which is
often present in populist parties allowed the leader to have a direct link with the supporters without
any mediation by party bodies. After founding the subnational structures in 2001 the failure in 2002
election led the party to integrate with smaller leftist formations; a step which helped SMER-SD to
obtain access to higher membership, local and regional representation, property and international
recognition among international social democratic institutions.
Third, the party's shift found its reflection in the composition of its voters. In its first national
election in 2002 SMER-SD was supported by rather younger voters, people of centrist orientation and
of middle income groups. In the later years this image substantially changed. The core of party's
voters moved to older citizens, women and mainly the people of leftist ideological orientation. The
regression analysis confirmed this trend but based on this result it might be concluded that it is the
left-right dimension that dominantly influences the odds of people to support SMER-SD.
The party thus made a successful shift to social democracy and dropped its formerly
dominating populism. In about ten years period SMER-SD completely transformed its profile and
became a standard part of the political establishment. Its case shows that populist parties which
might witness themselves uncomfortably in their new "insider" position may successfully go through
their own transformation not only to endure in the system but to become its core part.
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