October 5, 2015
Dale Deiter
Jackson District Ranger
USDA Forest Service
Bridger-Teton National Forest
P.O. Box 1689
25 Rosencrans Lane
Jackson, WY 83001
Re: Comments for Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS), Bridger-Teton National Forest (BTNF), Wyoming
“The most picturesque of our nation’s land lives and breathes wildland fire every summer season. . . . Wildland fire is a natural part of this mountain landscape.” Kathy Clay, Battalion Chief and Fire Marshall, Teton County, Wyoming, Fire/EMS (Clay 2014:35)
District Ranger Deiter:
Please accept these scoping comments for the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) from the Sierra Club Wyoming Chapter. The Sierra Club is a
conservation organization representing approximately 2.4 million members and supporters nationwide
who value the Bridger-Teton and the Caribou-Targhee National Forests, including the public lands
within and surrounding the proposed Teton to Snake project area and the Palisades Wilderness Study
Area (WSA). The mission of Sierra Club is to explore, enjoy and protect the planet. We support
maintaining and improving the safety of the public, US Forest Service (USFS) personnel, and
emergency responders and pledge to participate in helping keep our community safe.
The Teton County, Wyoming, 2012 Comprehensive Plan recognizes the significance of the region's wildlands and wildlife in the Vision statement: “Preserve and protect the area’s ecosystem in order to ensure a healthy environment, community and economy for current and future generations.” (Teton County 2012) We agree with the statement from the Comprehensive Plan that quality of life for residents and
visitors is enhanced by a healthy ecosystem. The lands in and around the proposed project area
support many types of wildlife habitat and provide high quality recreational opportunities and, in many
areas, wilderness qualities important to residents of Teton County, visitors, Sierra Club members and
1 supporters. Our members and supporters and their families have long enjoyed this area of US Forest
Service public lands in many ways including hiking, fishing, hunting, camping, photography, skiing,
enjoying solitude, enjoying untrammeled wilderness values, and other ways. Our members expect the
USFS to protect the wilderness characteristics, wildlife habitat, and other values in the Palisades WSA
and Teton to Snake Project Area. Our members have participated in the Teton to Snake public
comment processes and have attended public meetings to address the threats of cutting, logging,
thinning and prescribed burning of forests and shrublands that are proposed by the BTNF in the Teton
to Snake Project Area. The proposed mechanical and other treatments proposed by the BTNF in this
area will harm the natural characteristics of this area and harm the interests of our members and
supporters and their families.
Palisades Wilderness Study Area. L. Dorsey 1. Introduction: The Palisades Wilderness Study Area (WSA) is 134,500 acres of USFS lands on the western
flank of the Jackson Hole Valley. The WSA spans a defining mountain range of Jackson Hole, the
Snake River Range that is viewable throughout the region. Much of the Teton to Snake Project Area is
within the WSA. In the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act (WWA), Congress declared that WSAs
contain significant wilderness characteristics that warrant protection. (WWA, Pub. Law 98-­‐‑550, 98
Stat. 2807, § 102(a)) The Wyoming Wilderness Act mandated the Forest Service to administer the WSA “so as to maintain its presently existing wilderness character and potential for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System.” In the 2006 ruling in a case pertinent to the WSA, Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Timchak, 2006 WL 3386731 (D. Idaho 2006), the court stated unequivocally, “…Congress has directed the Forest Service to maintain the 1984 wilderness character of the area. That is the primary duty of the Forest Service, and it must guide all decisions as the first and foremost standard of review for any proposed action.” 2 The 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act required that the BTNF complete and submit to the respective committees in Congress an accurate map of the Palisades WSA which, for 30 years, the BTNF did not do. It was only because of steadfast advocacy led by Phil Hocker and Ann Harvey that the BTNF was convinced to comply with federal law regarding the Palisades WSA and completed and submitted the map. Meanwhile, for decades, the BTNF has not managed the Palisades WSA lawfully. The BTNF’s DEIS for High Mountains Heli-­‐Skiing, document dated December 2003 page 36, admitted, “Private snowmobiling use is increasing [in the SUP] as off trail riding becomes more popular and snowmobile technology improves.” The BTNF admitted in this sentence, that it is not complying with the 1984 WWA to manage snowmobiling “in the same manner and degree as was occurring” prior to passage of the Act. The BTNF still does not manage snowmobiling use in the WSA in compliance with the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act. The BTNF has also allowed mountain biking to increase in the WSA beyond what was occurring, if any, at the time of the passage of the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act. In fact the BTNF has facilitated mechanically-­‐constructed mountain biking trails to be constructed in or adjacent to the WSA. For many years, the BTNF failed to properly manage livestock grazing in the project area resulting in damage to streams and riparian plant communities. “Until 2013, the coverage, structure, and regeneration of willows in the riparian zone of the lower reach of Fall Creek was negatively affected by cattle browsing and trailing; reducing forage availability and cover for moose. Willow condition in this area is now improving in response to grazing adjustments.” (DEIS:135) The case, Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Timchak, was decided in 2006 and the BTNF was instructed by the court to manage the WSA according to the letter of the law and intent of Congress. The BTNF may not creatively interpret the Wyoming Wilderness Act in order to expand motorized uses. The Sierra Club stipulates in these comments that the BTNF may not implement fire-­‐industrial projects that harm protected lands and wildlife in the WSA, either. “The Act abides no diminishment, however much is left,” said Judge Winmill. In every case where the BTNF does not manage the Palisades WSA to protect its “presently existing wilderness character and potential for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System” the BTNF violates the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act (WWA). We are disappointed that some of the messages included in the DEIS are incorrect and misleading which we point out in these comments. In some places in this DEIS, the rationale is difficult to understand because it appears to disregard available science and dismisses proven methods that have a high rate of success in protecting homes and other structures near the forest boundary. This DEIS gives the public the impression that implementing treatments on USFS lands-­‐ in some places miles from private property-­‐ will protect homes and other structures outside the 3 USFS boundary. Absent from this DEIS are alternatives that focus on Firewise treatments for homes and other structures and do not include treatments on USFS lands. Amazingly, the USDA-­‐
Forest Service is a co-­‐sponsor of the Firewise program (www.firewise.org/about) which offers science-­‐based actions that, when applied to and around structures, significantly reduces the threat of damage or destruction to structures from wildfire. The BTNF mischaracterizes science and appears to purposefully emphasize reports that support mechanical and other treatments of forests and shrublands while dismissing the science-­‐ some from the USFS itself-­‐ that not only casts doubt on the value of treatments but science that time and again supports putting resources at the structures instead of treating forests. The BTNF minimizes the input from years of engagement by the public seeking a more effective and less costly and less environmentally harmful outcome. This DEIS appears to be merely an exercise leading to a predetermined outcome to implement vast expanses of treatments in the Palisades WSA and surrounding National Forest. The Sierra Club has the highest commitment to the safety of the public, the safety of USFS employees, and for emergency responders. There are much better ways to make homes and neighborhoods safer in the inevitability of a wildfire other than putting people at risk to fight fires or to conduct treatments on USFS lands. “No one’s home is worth sacrificing firefighters’ lives in exchange.” (Clay 2014:36) The following opinion editorial, authored by George Wuerthner and printed in the Missoulian online, is an excellent description of the incorrect premises driving the BTNF’s Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project: Outdated ideas driving wildfire policies
Our wildfire policy paradigm needs a dramatic overhaul. Current wildfire policies are driven
by outdated ideas about fire behavior as well as ignoring the important ecological role of
wildfire in maintaining healthy forest ecosystems.
Wildfires are driven by climate/weather conditions. When the right conditions exist – which
includes drought, low humidity, high temperatures and wind – you cannot stop a blaze.
It’s critical to understand this simple idea. Climate/weather drives big fires, not fuels.
And until the weather changes, firefighters cannot control a blaze. They are only wasting tax
dollars and putting their lives at risk. Typically when the weather does turn, the blazes are
destined for self-extinguishment, and only then can we put them out.
Therefore the call for more firefighters and more money to pay for fire-fighting efforts makes
as much sense as throwing dollar bills on the blaze for all the good it will do.
4 What is well-established by scientists is that the larger blazes in the past few decades (however,
not more than during previous past major drought period) are the consequence of
progressively warmer and drier climate due to human-caused global warming. This has
lengthened fire seasons and increased severity of fire weather.
In other words, the conditions that support fire spread and growth have improved.
Comparisons with the mid-1900s (roughly 1940 through the 1980s) ignore the fact that for
much of that time period, the climate was cooler and moister – thus resistant to large fires.
Beginning with 1988 when there were large fires in Yellowstone and other areas of the West,
we have seen a shift towards warmer, drier conditions, hence more large blazes.
Furthermore, the flawed presumption that fuel reductions can preclude large fires ignores fire
behavior during wind-driven blazes.
During large blazes, wind-blown embers jump over, around, and through fuel reduction
projects and fire lines making them largely ineffective.
Demanding more logging to “fire-proof” the forest is a fool’s errand. We can’t predict where a
blaze will occur, and thus most fuel reductions are not even in the path of a fire. Furthermore,
over time, all fuel reductions decline in effectiveness as trees and shrubs grow back.
The only reasonable response that has been proven to work is to keep people from building in
the “fire plain” (analogous to a flood plain) by zoning and to reduce the flammability of
existing homes.
Research has demonstrated that fire-wise practices on homes is the most effective means of
protecting communities. Reducing fuels in the home ignition zone no more than 200 feet from a
structure is all that is needed. Logging the hinterlands miles from homes provides no additional
benefits.
We need to adopt a new paradigm for living with wildfire. Protect the home and edge of
communities by adopting fire-wise practices, and allow wildfires to assume their important
ecological role in rejuvenating forest ecosystems.
Until we change our wildfire paradigm, we will only be wasting tax dollars in a futile efforts to
halt unstoppable blazes and putting fire fighters at risk.
George Wuerthner 2015 In the following sections of our comments on the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project DEIS we offer additional concerns and recommendations for appropriate and effective actions that should be implemented. 5 2. Palisades Wilderness Study Area: “Considering 97 percent of all wildfires are extinguished before they consume 10 acres (CoreLogic, 2013), every fire put out could easily be viewed as one fire still to happen, or one fire simply put off.” Kathy Clay, Battalion Chief and Fire Marshall, Teton County, Wyoming, Fire/EMS (Clay 2014:35) Public Law No. 88-577 Stat. 890, established a National Wilderness Preservation System
composed of congressionally designated wilderness areas; 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1311 (a). This law is known
as the 1964 Wilderness Act. “Wilderness” is defined as “an area where the earth and its community of
life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” 16 U.S.C. Sec.
1311(c). Further,
An area of wilderness . . . . (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces
of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five
thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in
an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of
scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.
Wilderness areas must be managed to preserve their “wilderness character,” (16 U.S.C. Sec.
1133(b). Among things that are generally prohibited in wilderness areas are temporary roads,
motorized vehicle use, and motorized equipment, among other things. (Id. 1133(c)).
The 134,500 acre Palisades Wilderness Study Area (WSA) on the Bridger-Teton National
Forest located south of Hwy 22, west of the Snake River, and east of the Idaho-Wyoming border, was
protected under the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act. In the Wyoming Wilderness Act (WWA),
Congress declared that WSAs contain significant wilderness characteristics that warrant protection.
WWA, Pub. Law 98‐550, 98 Stat. 2807, § 102(a); see also Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Timchak,
2006 WL 3386731 (D. Idaho 2006), at *6 & *8 (“The Palisades WSA has been carved out by Congress
for special protection.”).
In the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project DEIS the Forest Service’s treatment of
impacts on wilderness character due to timber cutting in the WSA is erroneous under the Wyoming
Wilderness Act. The Forest Service’s duties under section 301(b) of the Wyoming Wilderness Act are
to “maintain [the WSA’s] presently existing wilderness character” as of Oct. 30, 1984, and to maintain
the area’s “potential for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System.” Regarding the
first of these duties, the Forest Service’s obligation is “to not authorize any use that would diminish the
wilderness character of the Palisades WSA as it existed in 1984.” Greater Yellowstone Coalition v.
Timchak, No. CV-06-04-E-BLW, 2006 WL 3386731, at *2 (D. Idaho Nov. 21, 2006). The Forest
Service’s analysis in the DEIS misunderstands the agency’s duties under the Wyoming Wilderness
Act. The Forest Service admits that implementing the 825 acres of mechanical treatments under
Alternative 2 “may not” satisfy the Wyoming Wilderness Act duty to maintain presently existing
wilderness character as of 1984, but contends that implementing the 391 acres of mechanical
treatments under Alternative 3 “would comply with the Wyoming Wilderness
6 Act.” (DEIS:76). However, with respect to the WSA’s wilderness character as of 1984, “the Act
abides no diminishment, however much is left.” Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 2006 WL 3386731, at
*6. Thus, diminishing the WSA’s wilderness character across 391 acres does not comply with the Act
any more than diminishing the WSA’s wilderness character across 825 acres.
The BTNF violates the WWA by claiming that the 483 acres of logged areas that existed in the
WSA in 1984 provides the agency with a “free pass” for 483 acres of new timber cutting for the Teton
to Snake project. Thus, the Forest Service claims that Alternative 2 would yield only 342 more acres
of mechanical treatment disturbance when “compared with the timber harvest cutting within the
[WSA] in 1984,” rather than the 825 acres of mechanical treatment disturbance that is actually
proposed. (DEIS:70) This 342-acre calculation reflects the 825 acres of planned disturbance for the
proposed action less the 483 acres of logged areas that existed in the WSA in 1984. (DEIS:64) This
claim by the BTNF fails because the planned new mechanical treatment disturbance under Alternative
2 will inflict a cumulative impact on the WSA’s wilderness character that will add to, not substitute
for, the impact on wilderness character caused by the 483 acres of logged areas that existed in the
WSA when it was designated in 1984. The Forest Service appears to try to evade this point by
asserting that past timber harvest will not be deemed to impact an area’s wilderness character “where
clearcuts have regenerated to the degree that canopy closure is similar to surrounding uncut areas,”
(DEIS:61), and suggests that this is the case with respect to pre-1984 logging in the WSA,
(DEIS:64) The Forest Service admits, however, that the young trees in these old logging units “are
obviously younger compared with the surrounding landscape.” (DEIS:64)
The Forest Service suggests that the Wilderness Act’s definition of wilderness character is
modified by section 4(d)(1) of the 1964 Wilderness Act, which authorizes the Secretary to carry out
“such measures … as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to such
conditions as the Secretary deems desirable.” (DEIS:59). The Forest Service’s reliance on this
provision is wrong for at least two reasons:
The 1964 Wilderness Act defines wilderness character in section 2(c), not in section
4(d)(1). Section 2(c) defines wilderness as, among other things, “an area where the earth and its
community of life are untrammeled by man, … retaining its primeval character and influence,” and
which “generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of
man’s work substantially unnoticeable.” Section 4(d)(1), by contrast, does not define wilderness
character but instead is part of the Wilderness Act’s regulation of the “use of wilderness areas.” The
Wyoming Wilderness Act requires the Forest Service to maintain the Palisades WSA’s 1984
wilderness character, which implicates the wilderness definition of section 2(c) of the Wilderness
Act. See Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 2006 WL 3386731, at *2 (borrowing wilderness definition
from Wilderness Act section 2(c) to define wilderness character under Wyoming Wilderness
Act). However, the Wyoming Wilderness Act does not otherwise import Wilderness Act provisions,
including section 4(d)(1), into requirements for WSA management. The Forest Service claims to the
contrary in the DEIS, citing section 203 of the Wyoming Wilderness Act. (DEIS:59) However, that
provision addresses management of Wyoming wilderness areas – not WSAs – and requires that they be
managed in accordance with the Wilderness Act. WSA management is separately addressed in section
301(c) of the Wyoming Wilderness Act, which establishes its own requirements and does not require
management pursuant to the Wilderness Act. Accordingly, this Forest Service claim is incorrect, and,
7 more fundamentally, the agency’s reliance on section 4(d)(1) to suggest that fuel treatment measures
are consistent with wilderness character is wrong.
Even if section 4(d)(1) of the Wilderness Act were applicable to the Forest Service’s
compliance with the Wyoming Wilderness Act – which it is not for the reason stated above – the
Forest Service’s proposed action still would not satisfy legal requirements under section 4(d)(1)
itself. Section 4(d)(1) is not a blank check for mechanical thinning or other treatments within
wilderness areas.
It is incorrect for the BTNF to claim that it is acting in the interest of protecting any elements of
the WSA by implementing any of the three alternatives in the DEIS. Alternative 1 is the status quo of
suppressing 100 percent of the natural ignitions in the WSA (DEIS:Summary Table 2 vii) and thereby
does not
“allow fire to play its natural role in the ecosystem as a process of ecological change” (Abendroth
2013:8 quoting the BTNF Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP)). Suppressing 100 percent
of natural ignitions under Alternative 1 does not comply with the BTNF Forest Plan Fire Prescription:
“Fire management emphasizes preservation of Wilderness values and allows natural process of
ecological change to operate freely.” (BTNF LRMP as amended 2015:264) Allowing fire and other
natural phenomena to operate freely is essential to complying with the laws that should protect the
wilderness characteristics of a Wilderness Study Area.
In addition to the BTNF LRMP as amended 2015, the BTNF has two other documents that they
use to guide how they manage naturally ignited wildfires the Palisades WSA. One is the 2004 Fire
Plan Amendment Decision Notice; another is 2015 Fire Management Plan (FMP). Some salient
excerpts from both documents:
“Specific direction for fire suppression strategies and fuels strategies will be addressed in the
Fire Management Plan instead of the Forest Plan.” (BTNF Fire Plan Amendment Decision
Notice 2004:3)
“Wildland fire use is authorized Forest-wide, consistent with Forest-wide and DFC emphasis
and direction.” (BTNF Fire Plan Amendment Decision Notice 2004:10)
“Desired Future Condition 6A-6D and 6S Wildernesses, Wilderness Study Areas, and Wild
Rivers Decision Wording Protection: Fire Prescription Fire management emphasizes
preservation of Wilderness values and allows natural processes of ecological change to operate
freely. The number, size and intensity of fires approximate the natural fire regime.” (BTNF
Fire Plan Amendment Decision Notice 2004:14)
“Desired Future Condition 6A-6D and 6S 1,391,300 acres (41%) Wildernesses, Wilderness
Study Areas, and Wild Rivers Theme: A mostly pristine area where the presence of people is
rarely or never noticed. Protection: Fire Prescription Fire management emphasizes
preservation of Wilderness values and allows natural processes of ecological change to operate
freely. The number, size and intensity of fires approximate the natural fire regime.” (BTNF
FMP 2015:34)
8 While some of the direction included in the 2004 Decision Notice and the 2015 Fire
Management Plan tier to the BTNF LRMP and, seemingly, to the 1984 WWA, there is a significant
error in the FMP as well as an indication that the BTNF has strayed from the prevailing authority that
directs the lawful management of the Palisades WSA, the 1984 WWA. The 2015 BTNF FMP is
incorrect at 3.2 Fire Management Considerations for Specific Fire Management Units map on p. 25. It
shows much of the Palisades WSA in the color red which indicates Fire Management Unit (FMU)
Protection, rather than Fire Management Unit Palisades WSA. It appears that the FMP adopts the
2005 CWPP WUI areas within the Palisades WSA and puts that large area in the Protection FMU.
Additionally, in the 2015 BTNF FMP at 3.2.4 Palisades Wilderness Study Area FMU Snap Shot, p.32,
it states that “WUI occurs along fringes of the south and east boundaries of the WSA.” This is
incorrect as the 2005 CWPP (Community Wildfire Protection Plan) WUI zone consisted of 50,178
acres (Rojo 2012:8) in or adjacent to the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project area including vast
areas within the Palisades WSA. Indeed, the 2015 BTNF FMP decreases the Palisades WSA to 58,471
acres. The Palisades WSA is actually 135,840 acres (Rojo 2012:4). While the 2015 BTNF FMP does
not appear to include the portion of the Palisades WSA that is in the Caribou-Targhee National Forest
east of the Idaho-Wyoming border, the transfer of part of the Palisades WSA to the Protection FMU is
evidence that the BTNF does not intend to manage the WSA according to the 1984 Wyoming
Wilderness Act and the BTNF LRMP that require preservation of Wilderness values and allowing
natural processes of ecological change to operate freely. That the BTNF suppresses 100 percent of
the natural ignitions in the project area including in the Palisades WSA is further evidence of
noncompliance with the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act, the National Forest Management Act, and the
BTNF Land and Resource Management Plan.
As described above, it appears that the BTNF adopts the WUI designation in the 2005 CWPP
as the prevailing directive under which to manage all or part of the Palisades WSA. As mentioned
elsewhere in these comments, the WUI zone has grown even larger in the 2014 CWPP than determined
in the 2005 CWPP, as indicated in the maps toward the end of that document. In the 2012 “An
Analysis of Non-suppression Management Strategies of Unplanned Wildland Fire in the Palisades
Wilderness Study Area,” Rojo states that without fuel treatments in the WSA “like those described in
the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project (2010), long term management actions will remain
limited because of the conflicting objectives of the Teton County Community Protection Plan (2005)
and Wyoming Wilderness Act (1984).” (emphasis added) Rojo errs, as does the BTNF, by perceiving
that the CWPP, whether it is the 2005 or the 2014 version, can counter and indeed supersede the
mandates of the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act. Further indication that the BTNF defers to the
CWPP: “As a result of the no action alternative, certain areas would remain at risk for high intensity
wildfire and would be more vulnerable to stand replacing wildfire under extreme conditions. In
addition, the USDA Forest Service might be viewed as not meeting commitments it has made as a
member of the community and the Teton Area Wildfire Protection Coalition (TAWPC).” (Buhl
2011:14) Such examples of apparent default by the BTNF to the CWPP objectives as indicated by
suppressing 100 percent of natural ignitions, and the 2015 FMP and the Teton to Snake Fuels
Management proposal, cannot be accepted as an intractable stalemate between equally prevailing legal
directives that results in an acceptable status quo. The prevailing legal directive is the 1984 Wyoming
Wilderness Act. As the decision (described above) resulting from Greater Yellowstone Coalition v.
Timchak reminded the BTNF, the BTNF must “maintain presently existing wilderness character,” in
the Palisades WSA. The BTNF LRMP also got it right when it states that the WSA must be managed
for the “preservation of Wilderness values and allows natural process of ecological change to operate
9 freely.” (BTNF LRMP as amended 2015:264.)
Unfortunately it appears that the BTNF has steadily moved away from managing the WSA
according to the 1984 WWA and defers to the objectives and the arbitrary and ever expanding WUI
zone in the CWPP by suppressing all lightning fires (“The Jackson District Ranger has always chosen
suppression of fires that start in the protection zone.” (Rojo 2012:15)) and implementing and
proposing treatments in the WSA. In the Fire Regimes and Ecosystem Processes Report prepared
for the Jackson Ranger District of the BTNF it states, “There are areas of the Teton to Snake project that would have experienced fire disturbances one to several times over the past 100 years, if managers intent on protecting developments had not interfered.” (Abendroth 2013:25). The
BTNF cannot use as bait the allowance of mechanical treatments in the WSA in order for the public to
buy into the rationale that only then, after extensive treatments, will the BTNF manage the WSA
according to the 1984 WWA. Additionally The BTNF’s decision to proceed with an activity, 100
percent suppression of natural ignitions, that it claims has caused deleterious impacts to wilderness
characteristics and other resources, and that violates several substantive mandates including the
National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) and the Bridger-Teton LRMP. NFMA and its regulations
require that actions taken on National Forest system lands be consistent with the relevant land
management plan, 16 U.S.C. 1604(i), 36 C.F.R 219.15, and that each “project or activity approval
document must describe how the project or activity is consistent with applicable plan components.” 36
C.F.R 219.15(d). The current management regime in the Palisades WSA, regardless of how it follows
the CWPP or doesn’t, does not comply with the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act, the National Forest
Management Act and the BTNF LRMP.
The two very similar action alternatives in the DEIS, Alternatives 2 and 3, which would
implement mechanical treatments and prescribed fires in the WSA not only degrade wilderness
characteristics both short and long term, but require continued suppression of 50 percent of natural
ignitions (Alt 2) and 60 percent of natural ignitions (Alt 3) thereafter ((DEIS:Summary Table 2 vii);
again violating law by not allowing fire to play its natural role in the ecosystem as a process of
ecological change in the WSA.
Additionally, the BTNF barely mentions and omits from consideration in the DEIS the virtual
certainty of repeating the treatments unlimited times in the future after the vegetation grows back.
Such repeated incursions on wilderness character belie the Forest Service’s claim that implementation
of the action alternatives would improve the WSA’s wilderness character over the long term. For
example, “(L)ocal fire managers implemented small scale mechanical thinning in 2003 along portions
of the private land/national forest boundary from Red Top Meadows to Teton Village . . . . However
the increase in defensible space did not appreciably reduce the overall likelihood of a wildfire escaping
from the national forest onto non-federal lands. . . . . Thus managers must still aggressively suppress
nearly all fires in the area to minimize the probability of wildfire reaching and threatening the
neighboring homes. . . . fire managers need to have viable options for containing the spread of a fire
before it leaves the national forest system lands.” (DEIS:3) Now, twelve years after the first
treatments, the BTNF wants to institute more mechanical treatments in the same areas. The BTNF also
proposes to retreat areas near the Town of Star Valley Ranch in Lincoln County, Wyoming. In 2005
and 2006 they implemented a silviculture project in the area “to reduce fuel loading in the event of a
wildfire.” They call this a “Maintenance Project” to “re-treat areas treated in the original project and
treat some adjacent areas.” (BTNF 2015b)
10 Additional examples of the likelihood of retreating the treatment areas are described by Ann
Harvey in her comments on the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project:
The need for re-treatment following mechanical thinning or prescribed burning is widely
discussed in the scientific literature and is an area of active research, but the DEIS does not
mention this. For example, with regard to the duration of time that areas treated with prescribed
fire might be effective in reducing subsequent wildfire severity, Kauffman (2004, p. 880)
states, “Fuels begin to reaccumulate the day after treatments end. Without proper follow-up, the
treatments will lose their effectiveness in a relatively short period of time.”
Reinhardt et al. (2008, p. 2001) say, “Fuel treatments are transient…We must think of fuel
treatment regimes rather than single fuel treatment projects. A common misconception is that
fuel treatments are durable and will last for a long time. In reality, fuel treatments have a
somewhat limited lifespan that depends on a number of factors, mainly pretreatment conditions,
the effectiveness of the treatment, and the productivity of the vegetation on the treatment site.
Prescribed fire treatments can be expected to result in tree mortality with subsequent snagfall
contributing to surface fuel loads. Tree crowns will eventually expand to fill canopy voids
created by the treatment, tree regeneration will eventually lower canopy base height, and
undergrowth will respond to increased light and water to achieve greater cover and height.
More importantly, intact tree canopies will continue to drop leaf, cone, and woody litter at a
rate that is dictated by ecosystem productivity and stand composition. Fuel treatment
effectiveness spans are also reduced if the treatment did not reduce the seedling layer on the
forest floor…
“…Prescribed fire may consume the resident fine and coarse woody debris, but it will
also kill trees, and that dead material will eventually fall onto the fuelbed. This means that
additional treatments will be needed to reduce the fuels created by the first treatment
[emphasis added].”
Agee and Skinner (2005, pp. 92-93) say, “If…a long time has elapsed since treatment
(generally 10-15 years or more), they will be less effective in fragmenting the landscape fuel
loads, and their efficacy at the stand level can be overwhelmed by intense fires burning in
adjacent areas.” With regard to prescribed fire, the say, “Initial fires will consume substantial
biomass, but will also create fuels by killing understory trees, so that surface fuel biomass may
return to or exceed pre-burn levels within a decade, but with an increased canopy base height.”
They also say, “Any standing dead fuels created by the prescribed burn will, of course, fall to
the ground…Within 5-10 years after treatment, potential surface fire intensity will increase
where such fuels were created, although height to live crown will have been increased by the
prescribed fire. A second prescribed fire treatment would be required in such cases to maintain
low surface fuel loads.”
Rhodes and Baker (2008, p. 1) say, “The duration of post-treatment fuels reduction…
likely varies regionally with factors affecting vegetation re-growth rates, but fuels in western
U.S. forests generally return to pre-treatment levels in 10-20 years (p. 2).” Rhodes and Baker
also say, “…Treatments cannot reduce fire severity and consequent impacts, if fire does not
affect treated areas while fires are reduced. Fuels rebound after treatment, eventually negating
11 treatment effects. Therefore, the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for fuel treatment
effectiveness is that a fire affects a treated area while the fuels that contribute to high-severity
fire have been reduced.”
Rapp (2007) says, “Fuel treatment effectiveness was clearly related to treatment age.
Treatments that reduced surface fuels were effective for up to a decade, but older treatments of
any type were not found to have a significant effect on fire severity at any site.”
Hudak et al. (2007) point out that “The number of hectares treated is the current measure of
success for hazardous fuel reduction projects, but this does not tell us whether and how much
fuel treatments mitigate severe fire effects, what types of fuel treatments are most effective, or
how long fuel treatments remain useful as fuels accumulate over time. Fuels may take 10 to 20
years to recover to pre-treatment levels, but this will vary by ecosystem, depending on rates of
production, decomposition, and rates of plant establishment and mortality.”
In a recent paper written by scientists from the USDA Forest Service Aldo Leopold Research
Institute, Parks et al. (2015, pp. 1485-1487) examined remotely sensed data identifying fire
activity over the last four decades to explicitly quantify the ability of wildland fire to limit the
progression of subsequent fires. They examined four federally protected areas in the western
US, and found that “…the ability of wildland fire to limit the progression of subsequent fire is
strongest immediately after a fire, but decays over time. Based on our threshold in which
wildland fire no longer acts as an effective fuel break… the effect lasts ~6 years in GAL [Gila
and Aldo Leopold Wildernesses] and ~16 years in the three northern study areas [Frank
Church-River of No Return Wilderness, Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, and Crown of the
Continent Ecosystem]…. Large wildland fires in FCW, SBW, and CCE are >75% effective at
limiting the spread of subsequent fires for up to four years, diminishing to ~50% 11 years after
fire.” The study also found “The length of time for which a fire can effectively serve as a fuel
break…is shorter under extreme vs. moderate weather conditions (99th vs. 50th percentile ERC)
in all four study areas.”
From these examples above, it is reasonable for the public to expect that the BTNF intends to
re-treat the treatments in the Teton to Snake project area including the Palisades WSA every 10-12
years or so.
The BTNF has made it clear their intent is to keep fire from exiting USFS lands onto private
lands to protect those private lands. In the Purpose section of the DEIS the BTNF proposes to institute
mechanical treatments in the WSA not to benefit the WSA but clearly to protect private lands east of
the Teton to Snake Project Area. Purpose 1: “Improve firefighter safety and public safety; reduce
expected fire flame length to less than 4 feet and reduce the potential for crown fires within the defense
zone.” It is evident that this purpose is not to allow fire to play its natural ecological role in the WSA
but to alter natural fire behavior in order to fight and suppress a fire- whether it’s in a WSA or notostensibly before it leaves USFS jurisdiction. Purpose 2: “Reduce wildland fire spread potential to and
from national forest system and state and private lands.” (DEIS:3-4) This is self evident; however, if
the ignition is natural (i.e., from lightning) and fire starts on an adjacent jurisdiction to the USFS, and
if the BTNF intends to allow fire to play its ecological role on USFS lands, it must better explain why
such a fire would not be allowed to burn onto USFS lands. Is this the plan for the BTNF wherever
12 USFS lands abut other jurisdictions? The BTNF claims that that the proposed Teton to Snake treatments implemented over 5-­‐10 years “would effectively reduce fire behavior,” and, “mak(e) fire suppression efforts safer and more effective.” (DEIS:163) This sheds further doubt that the
BTNF would indeed welcome and manage fire as a natural ecological process in the WSA or any other
USFS lands.
At Purpose 3, “Increase the probability that managers can respond to natural fire starts using
tactics that are lighter on the land and allow fire to operate more freely in contributing to natural
ecosystem processes,” (DEIS:4) the BTNF explains that “nearly 100 percent of all fires within the
project area are suppressed due to the probability of wildfire spreading from the national forest and
Palisades Wilderness Study Area onto adjacent lands.” The BTNF is portraying this Purpose under a
guise of decreasing harm to “the untrammeled and natural attributes of wilderness character desired in
the wilderness study area” yet applies this rationale as a surrogate to avoid “resource impacts to other
lands; and fighting such fires is very costly to both the agency and taxpayers.” (DEIS:4) The DEIS
here describes how the BTNF has used “aggressive actions” to suppress natural fires in the WSA to
protect adjacent private property, how the BTNF needs to undertake “proactive fuel treatment” and,
eventually, “over the next 20 years” may reduce costs and achieve “a greater portion of fire perimeters
managed without aggressive suppression tactics.” (Id.) The BTNF has already admitted that under the
two action alternatives they will continue to suppress 50 percent to 60 percent of natural ignitions in
the WSA. And, at Purpose, some suppression efforts will continue to be “aggressive” and implies that
some will be less so. Fire suppression within the WSA, including aggressive suppression, will not
stop. And, as explained above, they have indicated that treatments will need to be retreated. Under
these alternatives in this DEIS, there is no reason that the public should not expect treatments to need
re-treating and fire not allowed to fulfill its ecological role in the WSA. The BTNF has said as much.
The BTNF cannot protect and manage the Palisades WSA sometimes according to law, and sometimes
not. For example: “The Jackson District Ranger expressed a willingness to implement nonsuppression strategies for fires moving from Wilderness into the protection zone, but to suppress fires
that start in the protection zone.” (Rojo 2012:14) “The Jackson District Ranger has always chosen
suppression of fires that start in the protection zone.” (Rojo 2012:15 emphasis added) Clearly, the
reasons for the proposed treatments in this DEIS are not to protect the WSA but to protect nearby
private lands.
Under “Project Need” in the DEIS, it states “The Forest Service is bound by law and policy to
be a good neighbor.” (DEIS:4) “(T)he Forest Service is committed to protect the human communities
from wildfires originating on public lands by implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects on
federal lands within the wildland-urban interface.” But the BTNF offers little evidence in the DEIS
that homeowner neighbors along the boundary of the project area have reciprocated by implementing
Firewise actions at and around their homes. In fact, at an August 12, 2015, public meeting convened
by the Wyoming Wilderness Association to hear George Wuerthner speak about wildfire and forest
ecology, and to discuss the Teton to Snake Project with the public, agency personnel were asked what
percentage of homeowners in Teton County have implemented Firewise standards at their homes, and
an answer was given verbally: “Less than 10%.” It appeared to this writer that all agency personnel
attending that meeting, including BTNF staff, agreed that it was in the single digit percentage of
implementation of Firewise standards. Yet, the DEIS states that the wildland-urban interface
community is “on track to meet Firewise standards,” and have also achieved other objectives.
(DEIS:4-5) However, the DEIS “Appendix E: Projects Considered for Cumulative Effects”
13 (DEIS:323-327) lists “Firewise Activities” as a Project Name and merely describes the activities as,
“Landowner and community education, home evaluations.” (DEIS:327) No metrics are given for how
many homeowners have followed through on the education and evaluations and have actually
implemented the Firewise standards, if any. See the Section on Firewise in these comments for more
specific detail on these inconsistencies and gaps in the DEIS.
The USFS’ own research scientist, Jack Cohen, states that, “Given nonflammable roofs,
Stanford Research Institute (Howard and others 1973) found a 95 percent survival (of homes during a
wildfire) with a clearance (of vegetation around the homes) of 10 to 18 meters, and Foote and Gilless
(1996) at Berkeley found 86 percent home survival (experiencing a wildfire) with a clearance (of
vegetation) of 10 meters or more (around homes).” (Cohen 1996:191-192 parentheses added). Cohen
further states, “The evidence indicates that home ignitions depend on the home materials and design
and only those flammables within a few tens of meters of the home (home ignitability). The wildland
fuel characteristics beyond the home site have little if any significance to W-UI home fire losses.”
(Cohen 1999:193)
The 2014 Teton County Community Wildfire Protection Plan, for which the BTNF served as a
cooperating agency, determined that, “it was more effective for landowners to focus on creating
defensible space around their homes and to thin between homes and on community-owned lands
within the community to be most effective in reducing wildfire hazards regardless if fuel breaks were
present.” (CWPP 2014:19) The CWPP provides additional emphasis on this point by citing the
USFS’ Jack Cohen, "The two main factors affecting a structures (sic) ability to survive a wildfire are
the exterior building materials and the amount of defensible space surrounding the structure within 100
feet to 200 feet of the structure, known as the Home Ignition Zone (Cohen 2008). The home ignition
zone typically is located on private property, which requires property owners to recognize the hazards,
take ownership and responsibility of the hazards, and mitigate the hazardous fuels to a level that will
increase the survivability of the structure." (CWPP 2014:22-23)
The public can be left with no other conclusion than the BTNF is willing to sacrifice the
Palisades WSA and other public lands to protect nearby homes by excluding fire from- and
implementing repeated mechanical treatments on- public lands, and that such a sacrifice does not
comply with legal directives and, finally, is not even needed to protect nearby homes.
3. Firewise: The BTNF needs to include Alternatives in this DEIS that consider the impacts of
various levels of implementation of Firewise actions on private lands along and near the Forest
boundary:
See also our comments at section, “The DEIS fails to consider a reasonable range of
alternatives.
In the DEIS at “Alternatives Considered but Eliminated from Detailed Study,” p. 53, it
describes two alternatives, “2. Reduce the scope of the proposed action to create defensible space
and decrease flammability in home ignition zones and around the powerline. (and) 3. Create
defensible space and decrease flammability in home ignition zones.” Both of which the DEIS
eliminated from detailed study for the following reasons:
14 “These two proposals are the same as Alternative 1, No Action. The Forest Service does not
have the authority to treat private land or require homeowners to conduct fire management
activities on their land. Treating just around the powerline and just a small area near structures
would not meet the purpose and need for this project to reduce fire behavior across the
landscape. The Forest Service does work with homeowners through the Firewise program to
provide methods to reduce losses to life and property from wildfire. Continuing Firewise
outreach is an element of all alternatives.” (DEIS:53)
(The following two paragraphs are from our section: The DEIS fails to consider a reasonable
range of alternatives.)
NEPA mandates that federal agencies “[s]tudy, develop, and describe
alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves conflicts
concerning alternative uses of available resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). One of the
primary purposes of an EIS is to “inform decision makers and the public of the
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the
quality of the human environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. The alternatives analysis is
“the heart of the environmental impact statement,” id. § 1502.14. The purpose of
analyzing alternatives is to “present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the
alternatives” and to “thus sharply defin[e] the issues and provid[e] a clear basis for
choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. To
that end, the agency must “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable
alternatives.” Id. If an alternative is eliminated from detailed study, the agency must
“briefly discuss [its] reasons” for doing so. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). Courts will
overturn NEPA documents that fail to consider a reasonable range of alternatives.
WWP v. Abbey, 719 F.3d 1035, 1050-53 (9th Cir. 2013). (Dorsey et al. 2015:7)
Importantly, agencies “shall” “[i]nclude reasonable alternatives not within the
jurisdiction of the lead agency.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(c). See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe
v. U.S. Forest Service, 177 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 1999) (Forest Service was required
to consider purchasing lands as alternative to land exchange, even though “it was not
clear that the funds would be available for such a purpose,” and the agency had not
requested the funds). (Dorsey et al. 2015:7) The court in the 1999 Muckleshoot Indian
Tribe v. USFS case found, “the alternative clearly [fell] within the range of such
reasonable alternative, and should have been considered.” Other cases in which courts
found it necessary for agencies to fully consider reasonable alternatives even if they are
outside their jurisdictional authorities are National Wildlife Federation v. National
Marine Fisheries Service, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1154 (D. Wash 2002), and Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972.
Additionally, the BTNF has recently included an alternative outside the USFS’
jurisdiction to require in the EIS for the 2008 proposed PXP 136-well gas field in the
Upper Hoback Basin of the BTNF. (in McGee 2013:2-3)
In adopting the above rationale not to include and analyze the impacts from alternatives that
focus on the effects of implementing Firewise on private lands (DEIS:53), the BTNF is ignoring their
own precedent in the PXP EIS and ignoring the direction offered by courts indicating that they must
15 include in the EIS reasonable alternatives despite such alternatives being entirely or partially outside
their authority to implement.
Regarding the BTNF’s claim that such an alternative does not meet the Teton to Snake Fuels
Management Project’s Purpose and Need, see our comments at: Palisades Wilderness Study Area:
“The BTNF has made it clear their intent is to keep fire from exiting USFS lands onto private
lands to protect those private lands. In the Purpose section of the DEIS the BTNF proposes to
institute mechanical treatments in the WSA not to benefit the WSA but clearly to protect private
lands east of the Teton to Snake Project Area. Purpose 1: “Improve firefighter safety and
public safety; reduce expected fire flame length to less than 4 feet and reduce the potential for
crown fires within the defense zone.” It is evident that this purpose is not to allow fire to play
its natural ecological role in the WSA but to alter natural fire behavior in order to fight and
suppress a fire- whether it’s in a WSA or not- ostensibly before it leaves USFS jurisdiction.
Purpose 2: “Reduce wildland fire spread potential to and from national forest system and state
and private lands.” (DEIS:3-4) This is self evident; however, if the ignition is natural (i.e.,
from lightning) and fire starts on an adjacent jurisdiction to the USFS, and if the BTNF intends
to allow fire to play its ecological role on USFS lands, it must better explain why such a fire
would not be allowed to burn onto USFS lands. Is this the plan for the BTNF wherever USFS
lands abut other jurisdictions? This sheds further doubt that the BTNF would indeed welcome
and manage fire as a natural ecological process in the WSA or any other USFS lands. “
“At Purpose 3, “Increase the probability that managers can respond to natural fire
starts using tactics that are lighter on the land and allow fire to operate more freely in
contributing to natural ecosystem processes,” (DEIS:4) the BTNF explains that “nearly 100
percent of all fires within the project area are suppressed due to the probability of wildfire
spreading from the national forest and Palisades Wilderness Study Area onto adjacent lands.”
The BTNF is portraying this Purpose under a guise of decreasing harm to “the untrammeled
and natural attributes of wilderness character desired in the wilderness study area” yet applies
this rationale as a surrogate to avoid “resource impacts to other lands; and fighting such fires
is very costly to both the agency and taxpayers.” (DEIS:4) The DEIS here describes how the
BTNF has used “aggressive actions” to suppress natural fires in the WSA to protect adjacent
private property, how the BTNF needs to undertake “proactive fuel treatment” and, eventually,
“over the next 20 years” may reduce costs and achieve “a greater portion of fire perimeters
managed without aggressive suppression tactics.” (Id.) The BTNF has already admitted that
under the two action alternatives they will continue to suppress 50 percent to 60 percent of
natural ignitions in the WSA. And, at Purpose, some suppression efforts will continue to be
“aggressive” and implies that some will be less so. Fire suppression within the WSA,
including aggressive suppression, will not stop. And, as explained above, they have indicated
that treatments will need to be retreated. Under these alternatives in this DEIS, there is no
reason that the public should not expect treatments to need re-treating and fire not allowed to
fulfill its ecological role in the WSA. The BTNF has said as much. The BTNF cannot protect
and manage the Palisades WSA sometimes according to law, and sometimes not. Clearly, the
reasons for the proposed treatments in this DEIS are not to protect the WSA but to protect
nearby private lands.”
16 “Under “Project Need” in the DEIS, it states “1. The Forest Service is bound by law
and policy to be a good neighbor.” (DEIS:4) “(T)he Forest Service is committed to protect
the human communities from wildfires originating on public lands by implementing hazardous
fuel reduction projects on federal lands within the wildland-urban interface.” But the BTNF
offers little evidence in the DEIS that homeowner neighbors along the boundary of the project
area have reciprocated by implementing Firewise actions at and around their homes. “
The other three elements of Need in the DEIS are:
2. Firefighter safety cannot be compromised. (DEIS:5)
3. The rising cost of suppression and resource impacts associated with suppression activities is
unacceptable. (DEIS:6)
4. Continuing to suppress all fires within the Palisades Wilderness Study Area does not meet
the obligation to maintain wilderness character. (DEIS:6-7)
The DEIS errs when it states that crafting alternative(s) around creating defensible space and
decreasing flammability in home ignition zones and around the powerline. (and) . . . creating
defensible space and decreasing flammability in home ignition zones, as quoted above, would not meet
the Purpose and Need of this project. While the name of this DEIS is a “Fuels Management Project”
the Purposes and Needs point to, for the most part, concern for and a need to protect nearby private
homes. In the context of protecting communities from some effects of wildfires, the homes and
other structures and vegetation immediately surrounding the structures are fuel. “A wildland fire
does not spread to homes unless the homes meet the fuel and heat requirements sufficient for ignition
and continued combustion.” (Cohen 1999:190 emphasis added) At DEIS:5 the BTNF indicates a high
level of concern for wildfire damaging or destroying homes when it states, “There are 1,579 private
lots within one-half mile of the project area boundary.” “Lots” in this context are private lands where
people build and live in homes. All the Needs described in this DEIS are linked directly to and
predicated on protecting people’s homes. Since the BTNF recognizes that “Wildfire knows no
boundaries,” (DEIS:5) wildfire, as with other natural landscape scale elements such as wind, rain,
snow, and wildlife, cannot be reasonably or completely excluded from land. The BTNF knows this
because the USDA-Forest Service endorses the Firewise program (National Fire Protection
Association 2014 Firewise program website); in areas where wildfire is common and likely, the
purpose and results of Firewise are, when implemented, to enable the survival of homes and structures
when wildfire burns through a homesite or neighborhood. The success of treatments on nearby USFS
lands at preventing wildfire from crossing a homesite or neighborhood is questionable at best. We
offer in these comments scientific references that indicate that treatments on USFS lands are not
effective or minimally effective. Regardless of the science supporting or dismissing fuels treatments
on USFS lands, since the BTNF has expressed such a concern for the protection of nearby homes in
the Purposes and Needs described in the DEIS and above, it is required to fully include and analyze the
impacts of implementing Firewise on nearby lots in varying degrees. “The essential question remains
as to how much reduction in flammables (e.g., how much vegetative fuel clearance) must be done
relative to the home fuel characteristics to significantly reduce the potential home losses associated
with wildland fires.” (Cohen 1999:190 parentheses in original) Implementing Firewise elements prior
to wildfire in or near the project area will be far safer for firefighters, cost less, and alleviate some
concern about allowing natural ignitions to burn on USFS lands. It is unnecessary to put fire fighters
at risk at the front of any fire to keep it away from structures when it is so much safer to implement
17 Firewise practices ahead of time and allow natural ignitions to modify forest and shrubland fuels on
USFS lands. Allowing naturally ignited fires to burn will reduce fuels and modify fire behavior. “This
analysis does not reflect the possible future threat-reduction benefits of allowing RO managed fires to
occur (Miller and Davis 2009). That is, an RO managed fire this year may limit the size or severity of
wildfires occurring in future years (Collins et al. 2009).” (Scott et al. 2012:137)
This ensures safety of not only firefighters but the public as well. Indeed such alternatives would be
the epitome of being “a good neighbor.”
While still a proponent of fuels treatments on public lands, which we are not, Teton County,
Wyoming, Fire Marshall and Battalion Chief, Kathy Clay, indicated in a recent article that the
occurrence of wildfire in private lands neighborhoods (referred to as “lots” in the DEIS) is expected:
“In the event of a wildfire, trigger points will be preplanned and will determine protection
methods before a fire, during the fire event and when it is appropriate to return to the
subdivision after the fire has moved through the area. . . . . When the trigger point is realized,
crews will evacuate the subdivision, let the fire burn through, and then re-enter to catch small
fires and save what structures that can be saved.” (Clay 2014:36 emphasis added)
“Ensuring current homeowners understand the importance of defensible space and recognizing
potential ignition fuel beds will help them prepare before evacuation in the event of a wildland
fire. With the local fire department pre-incident planning knowledge, risk to firefighters will be
properly addressed and hazards identified. . . . Through TAWPC (Teton Area Wildfire
Protection Committee), community education efforts will continue to inform homeowners
about the risks associated in living in the WUI, the potential impact to their homes and the
mitigation efforts they may take to protect their homes.” (Clay 2014:37)
“With managed fuel loads, defensible space, “clean” areas around structures and fire resilient
construction, there is no reason a wildfire couldn’t be viewed as a “weather event”” (Clay
2014:37)
It is apparent from the above that the duty(-ies) alleged by the BTNF in this DEIS to “prevent
fires from crossing onto lands managed by other jurisdictions,” and to, “reduce the probability of
wildfire originating on the national forest from burning onto adjacent lands” (DEIS:5) are not expected
to be successful by the Teton County, Wyoming, Fire and EMS department. Additionally, since the
USDA-Forest Service is a co-sponsor of the Firewise program which describes actions to implement
on and around a structure to protect it from damage and destruction when a wildfire arrives on that
property and at that house, the USFS must not themselves expect to keep wildfire only on USFS lands.
Furthermore, “It should be noted that treatments on national forest land would reduce fire intensity and
crown fire potential but may not directly protect all homes. Studies indicate that wildfire mitigation
focused on structures and their immediate surroundings is the most effective way to reduce structure
ignitions (Cohen 1999, 2000, 2003; Scott 2003).” (Buhl 2011:19) And, finally, since it is the US
Forest Service’s own Research Physical Scientist, Jack D. Cohen, who wrote such reports as,
“Reducing the Wildland Fire Threat to Homes: Where and How Much? (Cohen 1999), “WildlandUrban Fire- A different approach (Cohen, unknown year), it is readily apparent that the US Forest
Service itself doesn’t believe that wildfires burning on USFS land can be kept only on USFS
lands.
18 “Managing wildfires for resource objectives (i.e., allowing wildfires to burn in the absence of
suppression) is an important tool for restoring such fire-adapted ecosystems. . . . (L)and managers wish
to restore fire by managing wildfires, but are concerned about the threat to residential buildings. . . “
(Scott et al. 2012: in Abstract) Since Scott et al. is specific to the BTNF, this indicates that the main
concerns are not about the National Forest, but about the nearby homes. Therefore, again, “The
essential question remains as to how much reduction in flammables (e.g., how much vegetative fuel
clearance) must be done relative to the home fuel characteristics to significantly reduce the potential
home losses associated with wildland fires.” (Cohen 1999:190 parentheses in original)
“(N)aturally ignited fires (e.g., lightning) could be managed for resource objectives (Stephens
and Ruth 2005). . . . In this paper, we refer to these as resource objective (RO) wildfires. . . . The use of
RO wildfires is especially important in designated and proposed wilderness area (Parsons et al. 2003),
which, according to the Wilderness Act of 1964, are to be protected and managed to preserve (and
restore) natural conditions. The suppression of wildfires in wilderness is a human manipulation that
can alter natural conditions, and therefore does not support the intent of the Wilderness Act (Miller
2003). Nonetheless, suppression of ignitions, natural or anthropogenic, has been the dominant wildfire
management strategy in most wilderness areas. A major reason that fires are suppressed in wilderness
is the potential for fires to become large and threaten resources and assets on adjacent nonwilderness
lands (Miller and Landres 2004, Black et al. 2008). In addition to restoring natural conditions, RO
wildfires also have the potential to mitigate fuel hazards at relatively large scales (Miller et al. 2000,
Parsons et al. 2003, Davis et al. 2010.).” (Scott et al. 2012: 126 emphasis added)
Again, under “Project Need” in the DEIS, it states “The Forest Service is bound by law and
policy to be a good neighbor.” (DEIS:4) “(T)he Forest Service is committed to protect the human
communities from wildfires originating on public lands by implementing hazardous fuel reduction
projects on federal lands within the wildland-urban interface.” No metrics are given in the DEIS for
how many homeowners have followed through on the education and evaluations and have actually
implemented the Firewise standards.
Whereas the 2014 Community Wildfire Protection Plan, for which the BTNF is a cooperating
agency (CWPP 2014:6), indicates at a table titled, “The following is a breakdown of completed
projects by treatment from 1999 to 2014:” that from 1999 to 2014 only 22 homes throughout Teton
County had implemented “Defensible Space Around Homes (about 1 acre for every home) 22.0.”
(CWPP 2014:14 emphasis added) Again, the Teton to Snake DEIS states, “There are 1,579 private
lots within one-half mile of the project area boundary.” (DEIS:5) These lots could be assumed to be
in the Teton Village, Fish Creek Road, Wilson, Red Top Meadows, and Fall Creek Road communities
but the DEIS doesn’t contain information or maps actually showing where they are nor which homes
have and have not complied with Firewise. Since a large component of Purpose & Need in the Teton
to Snake Project tiers to protecting private lands and structures (DEIS:3-5 and elsewhere in these
comments) the USFS must reveal this critical information in an EIS.
There appears to be no additional calculations in either the DEIS or the 2014 CWPP for how
many private lots there are within one-half mile of all federal lands boundaries in Teton County in the
communities of Hoback Junction, Buffalo Valley, Spring Gulch, JH Golf & Tennis, Moose-Wilson
Road, South Park, Airport, Kelly, Twin Creek, and Town of Jackson, etc.. “In Teton County, there are
19 currently around 3,000 dwelling units located within the WUI(.)” (Riginos and Newcomb 2015) If the
1,579 private lots noted in the DEIS are at least one-half of all such lots in Teton County, then
implementing defensible space on only 22 of the lots in the WUI in all of Teton County, per page 14 of
the 2014 CWPP, would indicate that Teton County has implemented Firewise on only .0069 of all the
lots within one-half mile of US Forest Service lands or Grand Teton Park. Even if all 22 homes were
located on the “1,579 private lots within one-half mile of the (Teton to Snake) project area,” (DEIS:5)
it would indicate that .013 of the lots have implemented “Defensible Space Around Homes” according
to the 2014 CWPP. This figure amounts to slightly more than one one-hundredth (1%) of the lots near
the proposed Teton to Snake project area have complied with some elements (e.g., “Defensible
Space”) of Firewise.
The Teton County Comprehensive Plan states at Policy 3.5.b:
“Strive not to export impacts to other jurisdictions in the region. The Town and County will
remain conscious of the impacts of all land use decisions on the greater region and ecosystem.
It is not the goal of the community to overextend our resources or jurisdiction into adjacent
communities or State and Federally managed lands. The Town and County will work with
neighboring jurisdictions and State and Federal agencies to develop common goals related to
growth, work toward solutions, and identify resources that can benefit all parties. We will lead
by example through planning that considers the entire region. "
The above policy from the Comprehensive Plan is commendable, and Teton County leaders,
Fire/EMS, cooperating agencies, and residents must accept more of the responsibility of ensuring the
safety of the public, communities and emergency responders by implementing Firewise actions on
private lands. Expecting the BTNF to cut and burn the National Forest to protect homes on private
lands is completely backwards.
The DEIS states that, “the Forest Service is bound by law and policy to take reasonable actions
to prevent fires from crossing onto lands managed by other jurisdictions. Wildfire knows no
boundaries.” (DEIS:5) The DEIS does not elucidate as to what such “law and policy” may be. The
DEIS goes on to state in the same paragraph that, “Homeowners are responsible for meeting county
code and making their homes, “Firewise,” not only to protect their own home from a wildfire, but also
to protect their neighbors. Likewise, the Forest Service has a complementary responsibility, as a good
neighbor, to reduce the probability of wildfire originating on the national forest from burning onto
adjacent lands.” In the July 28, 2015, cover letter for the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project
signed by Dale Deiter, it states as one of the five purposes of the proposal, “reduce the likelihood of
wildfire spreading to private lands;” (BTNF July 2015b:1 emphasis added)
Since the main elements of the proposed (#2) and preferred (#3) action Alternatives in this
DEIS are extensive treatments consisting of cutting, thinning, logging or burning many thousands of
acres of National Forest it is obvious that the BTNF intends to implement the treatments to fulfill their
alleged “law and policy” obligations to “prevent fires from crossing onto lands managed by other
jurisdictions,” or, “reduce the probability of wildfire originating on the national forest from burning
onto adjacent lands,” (DEIS:5 emphasis added) or, “reduce the likelihood” of wildfire spreading to
private lands? (BTNF July 2015:1 emphasis added) Yet, as shown above, the BTNF cannot really do
any of the three. Despite full suppression efforts including aerial attack with helicopters and fixed
20 wing assets, the 2001 Green Knoll Fire burned onto adjacent private land. The BTNF, despite their
assertion that their responsibility is codified in law and compels them to “prevent fire from crossing
onto nearby non-USFS lands,” (DEIS:5 emphasis added) the Green Knoll Fire appears more to be an
example of the DEIS’ assertion that, “Wildfire knows no boundaries.” (DEIS:5) The BTNF has
offered no explanation or examples of repercussions or consequences when fire crosses jurisdictional
boundaries. Additionally, even if the treatments proposed in this DEIS were to occur, “Large, longduration wildfires simply have ample time to go around or through fuel treatment areas.” (Scott et al.
2012:137) Further obfuscating what the BTNF’s actual “law and policy” mandates are regarding
wildfire, the DEIS describes a very different mandate by stating that the BTNF has only to “reduce the
probability of wildfire originating on the national forest from burning onto adjacent lands.” (DEIS:5
emphasis added); and then there is the phrase “reduce the likelihood” in the cover letter. This is far
short of saying that “law and policy” require the BTNF to “prevent” fire from crossing from USFS to
non-USFS lands. Which is it, prevent? or simply reduce the probability? or reduce the likelihood?
Whereas, “what the current scientific literature suggests is that, although forestspecific/location-specific treatments may, under certain conditions lessen fire intensity, the best
method to safeguard private property in the wildland-urban interface is to create defensible space
around private property and decrease the flammability of the buildings themselves (e.g. by choice of
fire resistant roofing and deck materials). E.D. Reinhardt et al, “Objectives and considerations for
wildland fuel treatment in forested ecosystems of the interior western United States,” Forest Ecology
and Management 256 (2008) 1997-2006, 1999. (in McGee 2013:2)
The DEIS and the 2014 Teton County Community Wildfire Protection Plan both indicate that
the shared responsibilities of “being good neighbors” aren’t equitably shared at all. Yet the CWPP, on
which the BTNF served as a cooperating agency, determined that, “it was more effective for
landowners to focus on creating defensible space around their homes and to thin between homes and
on community-owned lands within the community to be most effective in reducing wildfire hazards
regardless if fuel breaks were present.” (CWPP 2014:19 emphasis added) The CWPP provides
additional emphasis on this point by citing the USFS’ Research Scientist Jack Cohen, "The two main
factors affecting a structures (sic) ability to survive a wildfire are the exterior building materials and
the amount of defensible space surrounding the structure within 100 feet to 200 feet of the structure,
known as the Home Ignition Zone (Cohen 2008). The home ignition zone typically is located on
private property, which requires property owners to recognize the hazards, take ownership and
responsibility of the hazards, and mitigate the hazardous fuels to a level that will increase the
survivability of the structure." (CWPP 2014:22-23 emphasis added)
Again, the USFS’ own research scientist, Jack Cohen, states that, “Given nonflammable roofs,
Stanford Research Institute (Howard and others 1973) found a 95 percent survival (of homes during a
wildfire) with a clearance (of vegetation around the homes) of 10 to 18 meters, and Foote and Gilless
(1996) at Berkeley found 86 percent home survival (experiencing a wildfire) with a clearance (of
vegetation) of 10 meters or more (around homes).” (Cohen 1999:191-192 parentheses added). Cohen
further states, “The evidence indicates that home ignitions depend on the home materials and design
and only those flammables within a few tens of meters of the home (home ignitability). The wildland
fuel characteristics beyond the home site have little if any significance to W-UI home fire losses.”
(Cohen 1999:193)
21 The 2014 Teton County CWPP further states: "An aggressive program of evaluating and
implementing defensible space for structures will be the best approach to limit fire related property
damage in the Wild-land Urban Interface." (CWPP 2014:17 emphasis added) All of this casts
significant doubt that any of the three Alternatives in the DEIS really do address the Purposes and
Needs as well as “aggressively” implementing defensible space to save nearby structures would. This
clear statement (re: defensible space for structures) is well supported by scientific studies, most notably
from the USFS’ own Research Physical Scientist, Jack D. Cohen, working out of the Fire Sciences
Lab, Rocky Mountain Research Station in Missoula, Montana. Again, Cohen’s “research indicates
that home losses can be effectively reduced by focusing mitigation efforts on the structure and its
immediate surroundings.” (Cohen 1999:192) See also the quote from E.D. Reinhardt et al. above
from McGee 2013:2.
As stated elsewhere in these comments and in consideration of the above, the public can be left
with no other conclusion than the BTNF is willing to sacrifice the Palisades WSA and other public
lands to protect nearby homes by excluding naturally ignited fire from- and implementing repeated
mechanical treatments on- public lands, and, finally, that such a sacrifice does not comply with legal
directives and is not even effective or needed to protect homes.
Merely “continuing Firewise outreach,” and “landowner and community education; home
evaluations” (DEIS:53, App E:327) in the 3 alternatives in this DEIS does not fully consider
reasonable alternatives and does not comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 40
CFR Sec. 1502.14. Research indicates that treatments are not necessary on USFS lands to protect
private lands. Science has shown it is not necessary to suppress 100 percent of natural ignitions in the
project area to protect private lands. The USFS acknowledges the values of implementing Firewise
actions (see CWPP 2014, Cohen, 1999, 2008. etc., and the Firewise.org website) which
(implementing) is far different than merely recommending the program. The USFS clearly must
analyze reasonable alternatives involving implementing Firewise that do not also include treatments
even if outside their authority (see McGee 2013). Such new Firewise-themed alternatives that do not
also include treatments on USFS lands should incorporate allowing natural ignitions to burn in the
project area. The US Forest Service own researcher concurs:
“(T)he evidence suggests that reasonable levels of fire suppression cannot prevent WUI
fire disasters. The inevitability of wildfires, including the extreme wildfires that account for the
one to three percent of the fires that escape control, is axiomatic. But WUI fire disasters occur
during this one to three percent of uncontrollable wildfires. This might suggest the inevitability
of WUI fire disasters; however, it is the home ignition zone that principally determines the
potential for WUI fire disasters. The continued focus on fire suppression largely to the
exclusion of alternatives that address home ignition potential suggests a persistent
inappropriate framing of the WUI fire problem in terms of the fire exclusion paradigm.”
“Preventing WUI fire disasters requires that the problem be framed in terms of home
ignition potential. . . . . Preventing wildfire disasters thus means fire agencies helping property
owners mitigate the vulnerability of their structures. The continued fire management focus on
fire suppression suggests the WUI fire problem persists largely as a consequence of framing the
WUI fire problem primarily in terms of the fire exclusion paradigm.” (Cohen 2008:25)
22 The Sierra Club is committed to the safety of USFS personnel, emergency responders, and
community members. We stand ready to assist all stakeholders with implementing Firewise
components on private lands near the project area. We can help by seeking potential funding and other
resources to assist stakeholders in implementing the elements of Firewise.
4. Purpose and Need: The BTNF improperly defined the Purpose and Need for the project, arbitrarily selected the
goals of the CWPP, and minimized alternatives which violates the National Environmental Policy Act.
The stated purpose and need for a federal action determines the range of alternatives, and as courts
have cautioned, “One obvious way for an agency to slip past the structures of NEPA is to contrive a
purpose so slender as to define competing ‘reasonable alternatives’ out of consideration (and even out
of existence.)” Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1119 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Simmons v. United
States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, “(A)n agency may not define the objectives of its action in terms so unreasonably
narrow that only one alternative . . . . would accomplish the goals of the agency’s action . . . (as) the
EIS would become a foreordained formality.” Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 196.
When defining the purpose and need of a project, an agency cannot define its objectives in
unreasonably narrow terms such that the outcome is preordained. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n,
606 F.3d at 1070; Alaska Survival v. Surface Transp. Bd., 705 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013). Courts
assess the reasonableness of a purpose and need statement by considering the statutory context of the
federal action. (Dorsey et al. 2015)
In the Purpose and Need for Action section of the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project
DEIS the BTNF attempts to justify extensive treatments on USFS lands, including within the Palisades
Wilderness Study Area (WSA), by referring to the 2001 Green Knoll fire where, “winds quickly drove
the fire onto adjacent private lands, with spotting observed one-quarter mile ahead of the fire front.”
(DEIS:3) Subsequent to the Green Knoll fire, “local managers implemented small scale mechanical
thinning in 2003 along portions of the private land/national forest boundary . . . However, the increase
in defensible space did not appreciably reduce the overall likelihood of a wildfire escaping from the
national forest onto non-federal lands. . . . Thus, managers must still aggressively suppress nearly all
fires in the area to minimize the probability of wildfire reaching and threatening the neighboring
homes. To manage wildfire in the project area with less than a full suppression response, fire
managers need to have viable options for containing the spread of a fire before it leaves national forest
lands.” (DEIS:3) We have addressed the issue of the ability of the USFS being able to keep wildfire
on their jurisdiction elsewhere in these comments at the Firewise section.
In describing this description of and consequences from the Green Knoll Fire at the beginning
of the Purpose and Need for Action section the BTNF has clearly indicated its intent to craft this EIS in
a manner that will inevitably lead to an outcome that is designed around aggressively treating the
forests and aggressively fighting forest fires. In the BTNF’s own rationale, how else could fires stop at
the USFS boundary (if indeed they can be stopped at all) other than by eliminating forest and shrub
fuels on USFS land, altering fire behavior, and fighting the fire with personnel and equipment? By
crafting the Purposes and Needs in such a manner there could be no other conclusions, which violates
the National Environmental Policy Act. However, as described and quoted above, the USFS has
23 acknowledged that structures are themselves fuels for fires. (See Cohen 2008) By including only 3
Alternatives, this DEIS does not adequately acknowledge structures as the fuels needing modification
to accomplish purposes or needs.
The two action Alternatives, 2 and 3, differ hardly at all. The following two paragraphs are
from our comments in the section, The DEIS fails to consider a reasonable range of alternatives:
Alternatives 2 and 3 are very similar in that they include a variety of treatment types
(Commercial thin, Noncommercial thin, Hand cut, Lop and scatter, Machine cut, etc.) and
supporting actions such as the construction of temporary roads, “General maintenance” of
existing roads, which is really upgrading existing roads significantly, log landings, fire control
lines, etc.. (DEIS:18-20) The biggest differences between Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 is
that Alternative 2 proposes to thin 2,526 acres, and Alternative 3 proposes to thin 1,757 acres;
Alternative 2 proposes to treat with prescribed fire 19,991 acres throughout the project area,
and Alternative 3 proposes to treat with prescribed fire 12,524 acres. There are other minor
differences between the two action alternatives briefly described in the DEIS at “Table 1.
Proposed activities by alternative,” Summary iv. “Table 8. Alternative 2 proposed treatment
units with acres by special land allocation” (DEIS:25-26) lists the 48 “units” proposed for
burning, thinning, etc.. More differences between Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 are described
in part at “Table 12. Treatment unit modifications made to the proposed action to address issues
in alternative 3” in the DEIS pp. 31-35. It appears the biggest differences between Alternative
2 and Alternative 3 are that 11 of the 48 units were “dropped”, some were reduced in size, and,
of course, the reduced acreage proposed for treatments in total as described above.
Since, as shown above, the two action alternatives, Alternatives 2 and 3, are very
similar in types and only differ in size they do not portray a reasonable range sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of NEPA. “(T)he agency must “[r]igorously explore and objectively
evaluate all reasonable alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. Merely adjusting slightly downward
the numbers of acres proposed for a treatment unit or eliminating some altogether, as noted
above, does not make the two action alternatives very different in effects for a project area of
this scale.
The BTNF claims it must meet its “responsibilities under national law and policy and help meet
Teton County goals under the Community Wildfire Protection Plan. To be successful, managers must
reduce the risk of fire escaping outside of national forest boundaries, while at the same time ensuring
firefighter safety, controlling cost, and avoiding adverse effects from suppression activities.” (DEIS:3)
The BTNF may not divest itself of the authority to protect National Forest lands, including the
Palisades WSA, by adopting the goals of the Teton County Community Wildfire Protection Plan
(CWPP 2014). “The 2014 Teton County CWPP is designed to be a programmatic document that
utilizes a new prioritization process that facilitates and maximizes fuels mitigation efforts within the
County.” (CWPP 2014:4) According to the CWPP, this process will, allegedly, lead to a “Fire
adapted community . . . more resistant to ongoing wildfire threats.” (Id.) “Hazards are identified from a
landscape level.” (CWPP 2014:7) “A CWPP must identify and prioritize areas for hazardous fuel
reduction treatments . . . “ (CWPP 2014:8 emphasis added) However well intended the CWPP may
be, it may not usurp the authority of the USFS over Forest Service lands, nor may the BTNF transfer
its authority to manage USFS lands to the CWPP.
24 An enormous WUI (Wildland Urban Interface) boundary was identified by the Teton Area
Wildfire Protection Coalition (TAWPC) on which the USFS-BTNF participated; “Areas within the
WUI boundary have the potential to support a wildland fire posing a direct threat to the values”
defined in the CWPP. Such values are “Capital improvements, houses, private land, significant utility
and transportation corridors, and communication sites.” (CWPP 2014:9)
In the CWPP, the goal of achieving “hazardous fuel reduction treatments” is tied to the WUI
area spanning all jurisdictions in Teton County wherein fuels reduction projects may occur.
Astonishingly, “There could be areas outside the current WUI boundary that warrant fuels mitigation
work(.)” (CWPP 2014:16) The WUI area is shown on 6 maps titled, “Teton County Wyoming
Community Wildfire Protection Plan Proposed Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) 2014” at the end of
the CWPP. No figure is offered for the amount of acreage or square miles in the “Proposed” WUI area
in Teton County, however in the area of the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project it appears that
the WUI zone is larger than the Teton to Snake project area which is approximately 80,000 acres.
It is very clear from reading the 2014 CWPP, seeing the enormous areas delineated on the WUI
maps, and attending some of the TAWPC meetings that a main purpose of the CWPP is to implement
fuels reduction projects on the federal lands, primarily the USFS lands, in Teton County under the
guise of protecting “values.” While the CWPP offers a token statement about “Teton County has been
shaped by the influences of wildland fire,” the main thrust of the CWPP is to cut or prescribe burn
timber and shrubs on public lands. The BTNF has many other responsibilities to protect the wildlands
values on USFS lands and it must recognize that wildfire is a natural ecological process that must be
allowed to continue to shape the plant communities on our public lands. And, as stated above, the
BTNF may not transfer its authority to manage USFS lands to the CWPP.
One of the best parts of the CWPP that the BTNF should pay more attention to is the statement,
“An aggressive program of evaluating and implementing defensible space for structures will be the best
approach to limit fire related property damage in the Wildland Urban Interface.” (CWPP 2014:17
emphasis added) This, and many other examples offered in these Sierra Club DEIS comments,
indicates that the limited types of alternatives allowed by the narrow Purposes and Needs in the DEIS
do not adequately address the issues of community safety. Merely clearing and thinning timber, snags,
and shrubs off of public lands does not protect homes and neighborhoods, does not address firefighter
or public safety, does not address costs, and does not allow fire to play its ecological role on the land.
See, again, our comments above in Section 3.
Under Project Purpose (DEIS:3-4), the DEIS lists:
1. Improve firefighter and public safety; reduce expected fire flame length to less than 4 feet and
reduce the potential for crown fires within the defense zone.
2. Reduce wildland fire spread potential to and from national forest system and state and private
lands.
3. Increase the probability that managers can respond to natural fire starts using tactics that are
lighter on the land and allow fire to operate more freely in contributing to natural ecosystem
process.
Under Project Need (DEIS:4-8), the DEIS lists:
25 1. The Forest Service is bound by law and policy to be a good neighbor.
2. Firefighter safety cannot be compromised.
3. The rising cost of suppression and resource impacts associated with suppression activities is
unacceptable.
4. Continuing to suppress all fires within the Palisades Wilderness Study Area does not meet the
obligation to maintain wilderness character.
Again indicating that the BTNF has constructed the Purpose(s) and Need(s) in narrow terms in
order to arrive at a predetermined outcome, the DEIS states:
“Meeting the purpose and need for this project is measured by the effects from the alternatives to
modeled fire behavior, hazardous snags removed, and acres of aspen enhancement. To be successful,
fire behavior must be reduced to a level that allows future wildland fires to be managed with the least
intrusive methods possible and allows fire to contribute to freely operating ecosystem processes within
the wilderness study area whenever possible. Hazardous snags must be removed to allow firefighters
to work safely within the defense zone as needed. Promoting healthy aspen communities to slow the
spread of fire contributes to meeting the purpose and need to reduce potential impacts related to
wildfire. The success of this project in addressing the need for action and reaching project goals is
measured by:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Fireline Intensity expressed as flame length: . . . .
Fire type: . . .
Snag density levels: . . .
Aspen enhancement: . . ” (DEIS:7 italics added)
The only way to reduce flame length, according to the BTNF, is to implement mechanical
treatments and prescribed fires on USFS forests. The only way to decrease snag densities which,
according to the BTNF, is directly tied to ensuring firefighter safety is to mechanically remove the
snags. The only way to ever allow any naturally ignited fires to contribute to ecosystem process in or
around the project area is to mechanically treat swaths of forest and fight and suppress most naturally
ignited fires. The only way to “be a good neighbor” and never allow fire to spread from USFS lands
onto other jurisdictions is to fight and eventually suppress the fire before it leaves the USFS
jurisdiction. The only alternatives that will “meet() the purpose and need for this project,” are
alternatives that focus on cutting, thinning, removing and burning forests and shrublands on USFS
lands. Thus, the purpose and need is “unreasonably narrow” and violates NEPA.
The BTNF also states, “Most suggested alternatives were not studied in detail because they would
not effectively meet the project’s purpose and need as described in chapter 1.” (DEIS:53) The BTNF
dismisses some alternatives suggested by the public during scoping thus: “The purpose and need to
reduce fire behavior across the project area would not be met.” (DEIS:53 italics added) By using this
phrase numerous times in the DEIS, the BTNF is clearly intent on preventing or altering a naturally
occurring ecological process (wildland fire) across a vast area by cutting, thinning, removing and
burning the forest and shrublands and fighting and suppressing natural fire; by dismissing other
alternatives and allowing only these few kinds of responses (forest and shrubland treatments and
firefighting and suppression), the BTNF has predetermined the action alternatives by narrowing the
purpose and need. The BTNF even fails to recognize a key statement in the 2014 CWPP: “An
26 aggressive program of evaluating and implementing defensible space for structures will be the best
approach to limit fire related property damage in the Wildland Urban Interface.” (CWPP 2014:17
emphasis added) Since virtually all the purpose and need tiers to protecting nearby homes, the BTNF
is misdirected in its approach by focusing on cutting and prescribed burning of USFS lands when it
should be focused on implementing defensible space for structures. See our comments at Section 3.
A far better purpose and need could be,” Manage naturally occurring wildfire as a necessary
and beneficial ecological process while ensuring community safety on the western portion of the
Jackson Hole Valley.” Such a Purpose and Need would encourage and allow a range of
community-based, science-based, less expensive, reasonable, and effective alternatives; such a
purpose and need would incorporate “implementing defensible space for structures,” (not just
education and evaluations) and would comply with NEPA and other legal directives.
5. The DEIS Fails to Consider Reasonable Range of Alternatives: “Ironically, the more fire is allowed to play its natural role, more natural breaks in fuel
continuity may result in reduced risk to those same values we have tried to protect through
suppression.” (Rojo 2012:11)
NEPA mandates that federal agencies “[s]tudy, develop, and describe alternatives to
recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves conflicts concerning alternative uses of
available resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). One of the primary purposes of an EIS is to “inform
decision makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse
impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. The alternatives
analysis is “the heart of the environmental impact statement,” id. § 1502.14. The purpose of analyzing
alternatives is to “present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives” and to “thus
sharply defin[e] the issues and provid[e] a clear basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker
and the public.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. To that end, the agency must “[r]igorously explore and
objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.” Id. If an alternative is eliminated from detailed study,
the agency must “briefly discuss [its] reasons” for doing so. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). Courts will
overturn NEPA documents that fail to consider a reasonable range of alternatives. WWP v. Abbey, 719
F.3d 1035, 1050-53 (9th Cir. 2013). (in Dorsey et al. 2015:7)
Importantly, agencies “shall” “[i]nclude reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of
the lead agency.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(c). See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 177
F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 1999) (Forest Service was required to consider purchasing lands as alternative
to land exchange, even though “it was not clear that the funds would be available for such a purpose,”
and the agency had not requested the funds). (in Dorsey et al. 2015:7)
The court in the 1999 Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. USFS case found, “the alternative clearly
[fell] within the range of such reasonable alternative, and should have been considered.” Other cases
in which courts found it necessary for agencies to fully consider reasonable alternatives even if they
are outside their jurisdictional authorities are National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine
Fisheries Service, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1154 (D. Wash 2002), and Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972. Additionally, the BTNF has recently included
an alternative outside the USFS’ jurisdiction to require in the EIS for the 2008 proposed PXP 136-well
27 gas field in the Upper Hoback Basin of the BTNF. (in McGee 2013:2-3)
This DEIS considers only three Alternatives in detail:
Alternative 1 (no action) represents the current condition, including the continuation of fire
suppression throughout the project area.
Alternative 2 is the modified proposed action.
Alternative 3 was developed in response to issues identified during scoping.
Alternatives 2 and 3 are considered the action alternatives throughout the DEIS. (DEIS:17)
Alternatives 2 and 3 are very similar in that they include a variety of treatment types
(Commercial thin, Noncommercial thin, Hand cut, Lop and scatter, Machine cut, etc.) and extensive
supporting actions such as the construction of temporary roads, “General maintenance” of existing
roads, which is really upgrading existing roads significantly, log landings, fire control lines, etc..
(DEIS:18-20) The biggest differences between Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 are that Alternative 2
proposes to thin 2,526 acres, and Alternative 3 proposes to thin 1,757 acres; Alternative 2 proposes to
treat with prescribed fire 19,991 acres throughout the project area, and Alternative 3 proposes to treat
with prescribed fire 12,524 acres. There are other differences between the two action alternatives
briefly described in the DEIS at “Table 1. Proposed activities by alternative,” Summary iv. “Table 8.
Alternative 2 proposed treatment units with acres by special land allocation” (DEIS:25-26) lists the 48
“units” proposed for burning, thinning, etc.. More differences between Alternative 2 and Alternative 3
are described in part at “Table 12. Treatment unit modifications made to the proposed action to address
issues in alternative 3” in the DEIS pp. 31-35. It appears that the most notable differences between
Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 are that 11 of the 48 units were “dropped”, some were reduced in size,
and, of course, the reduced acreage proposed for treatments in total as described above. Both
alternatives contain virtually the same types of actions.
Since, as shown above, the two action alternatives, Alternatives 2 and 3, are very similar in
types and only differ in size they do not portray a reasonable range sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of NEPA. “(T)he agency must “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all
reasonable alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. Merely adjusting slightly downward the numbers of
acres proposed for a treatment unit or eliminating some altogether, as noted above, does not make the
two action alternatives very different in effects for a project area of this scale.
Examples other than the Table comparisons above that indicate the overall similarity of the two
action alternatives:
“The effects analysis and determination are the same for alternatives 2 and 3 because
the degree of habitat change and disturbance from both alternatives would be virtually the same
for this (grizzly bear) species. . . . The differences in the intensity and duration of effects
between the two alternatives, principally those associated with vegetation changes (coverage of
early seral communities) and project-related disturbance on grizzly bears, would not be
measurable.” (DEIS:105)
“Implementing alternative 2 or 3 would have adverse effects to lynx and lynx habitat,
28 but would not impede the recovery and delisting of this threatened species. . . . This
determination is analogous to “Likely to Adversely Affect” in Section 7 consultation
(Endangered Species Act) . . . . “ (DEIS:102)
“By reducing vertical forest structure, canopy cover and decadence (snags and wood
debris), mechanical treatments applied in subalpine forests would have negative effects on
boreal owl habitat (Haywood et al. 1993, Knight 1994, and Murphy 2012, draft assessment).”
(DEIS:116)
By including only the two very similar action alternatives that treat mechanically and/or
by prescribed fire portions of the project area, and indicating that nothing can change as far as
100% fire suppression throughout the project area in the No Action alternative if extensive
treatments are not implemented in the Palisades WSA and elsewhere, the BTNF has failed to
consider a reasonable range of alternatives that their own reports and scientific research have
shown are not only reasonable but that meet many of their own Purposes and Needs better and
address the safety of everyone. As the DEIS admits at p.53-54, the public offered a range of
other alternatives during scoping. Additionally, other alternatives including those proffered by
the public, would likely be less expensive.
An example of the BTNF-USFS’s own research that casts doubt on the effectiveness of all
three alternatives in the DEIS and indicates that there should be more options considered than the three
Alternatives in this DEIS, is described in Scott et al., 2012, "Quantifying the Threat of
Unsuppressed Wildfires Reaching the Adjacent Wildland-Urban Interface on the B-T National
Forest, Wyoming, USA." The paper addresses a larger geographic area than just the Teton to Snake
Project Area, and the authors assume the WUI defense zone is federally managed land within 400 m of
private residential land, instead of the vast expanses that the County has actually designated WUI in
the 2014 CWPP. This paper simulated the ignition and unsuppressed growth of wildfires starting in a
zone designated by the BTNF called the RO (resource objective) zone. They supplied the model with
actual weather data from 1990 to 2010, and allowed the simulated wildfires to grow until the end of the
fire season. They also gathered real fire occurrence data from 1990-2009. This paper indicates several
determinations and options for reasonable alternatives not included in alternatives considered in this
DEIS. “(R)elatively few wildfires originating in the RO start zone and left unsuppressed appeared
capable of reaching the WUI defense zone- even without RO rules. . . . (E)ven early-season fires had a
low likelihood of reaching the WUI. Careful selection of early-season ignitions for resource-objective
management (based on location and weather) coupled with limited fire suppression actions to
minimize spread toward the WUI, could be a viable strategy for mitigating the threat of RO fires
reaching the WUI defense zone on this landscape.” “This is consistent with the finding of Carey et al.
(2009) that ignition management and weather affected fire likelihood more than simulated fuel
treatments.” (both quotes from Scott et al. 2012:136) “We hypothesize that the effect of fuel
management on BP (burn probability) could be smaller than what has been found for short duration
problem fire simulations. Large, long-duration wildfires simply have ample time to go around or
through fuel treatment areas.” (Scott et al. 2012:137 parentheses added) This strongly indicates that
the treatments promoted by the BTNF in Alternatives 2 and 3 will have limited if any effectiveness,
and that full suppression of all natural ignitions in the project area- including the Palisades WSA- is
not necessary, does not comply with legal directives, is not reasonable, and is not based on the best
available science. We submit the entire Scott et al. 2012 paper as an attachment to these comments.
29 The DEIS, Table 22, p.75, indicates that even with the extensive mechanical and prescribed fire
treatments in the project area, Alternative 2 would still necessitate "50 percent suppression";
Alternative 3 would necessitate "60 percent suppression," of ignitions. Yet, in Rojo 2012 at App E,
p.51 (Rojo 2012 is referenced in the DEIS:264), is a chart that estimates the percent of fires the BTNF
wouldn't suppress "across the North Zone" of the Forest under current management protocol. The
BTNF would not suppress 25% of fires in July; in August, the BTNF would not suppress 45%; in Sept,
not suppress 60% of fires. However, despite this protocol developed by the BTNF, the BTNF
currently suppresses 100% of ignitions in the project area regardless of the month or weather or
moisture content, density, or types of fuels. “Currently, nearly 100 percent of all fires within the
project area are suppressed due to the probability of wildfire spreading from the national forest and
Palisades Wilderness Study Area onto adjacent lands.” (DEIS:4) “All historic fires in the Palisades
Wilderness Study Area have been suppressed. . . . Miller (2010) states suppressing lightning caused
fires “removes one of the most important natural processes from fire-dependent ecosystems, and runs
counter to the untrammeled characteristics for . . . wilderness. A transition from suppression to nonsuppression strategies is desired for the Palisades Wilderness Study Area to align with The Wilderness
Act in maintaining Wilderness character.” (Rojo 2012:iv) This BTNF policy of 100 percent
suppression of fires in the project area, including the Palisades WSA, (DEIS:4) would obviously
persist under the No Action Alternative 1.
The complete suppression of natural ignitions in the project area including in the Palisades
WSA does not comply with other options available to the BTNF (Scott et al. 2012, and Rojo 2012),
agency protocol (Rojo 2012:App E), legal directives (1984 WWA, NEPA, etc.), nor with available
science. And, despite indicating otherwise throughout the DEIS, adoption of either of the two action
alternatives in the DEIS (which would supposedly still include suppression of 50-60 percent of natural
ignitions in the project area) would not significantly change the status quo and ignition suppression
policy. This is despite the BTNF’s own direction in its revised 2004 LRMP to allow fires to burn in
the WSA: “The Bridger-Teton National Forest strives to manage wildland fuels and fire in Wilderness
and Wilderness Study Areas by transitioning from full suppression to use of natural fire as directed by
the Bridger-Teton Land and Resource Management Plan Revision of Fire Management Standards and
Guidelines (2004) which states: “Fire management emphasizes preservation of Wilderness values and
allows natural processes of ecological change to operate freely.”” (in Rojo 2012: 13)
Rojo 2012 errs at page v in stating that, “Implementation of fuels treatments in those (threat)
areas would aid in allowing natural processes in the Palisades Wilderness Study Area.” Information in
Rojo’s own report, (and in Scott et al. 2012 and Cohen 1999) clearly show that fuels treatments do not
support nor are they necessary for allowing a natural fire regime nor are they necessary or effective to
protect nearby homes. If, as Rojo 2012 declares, his study “intends to provide Bridger-Teton National
Forest line officers and North Zone fire management staff with science base information for decisions
on management strategies of naturally ignited fires in the Palisades WSA,” his intent failed because the
3 Alternatives in the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project DEIS do not rely on or include all very
readily available science (as shown here) in Alternatives 2 and 3, nor does the No Action Alternative 1
rely on available science to suppress all ignitions. Rojo’s intent of providing science for resource
managers is commendable and is, indeed, a requirement of NEPA. As is the requirement of a
reasonable range of alternatives described above.
30 Missing from the DEIS are alternatives that do not contain treatments but do include allowing
some or all ignitions in the project area, including the WSA, to burn as is expressed quite clearly in the
BTNF’s own LRMP and in a commissioned report and a paper (Rojo 2012 and Scott et al. 2012).
Rojo 2012 describes the outcomes of modeled fires allowed to burn in some of the project area, by
linking suppression or no suppression to the current or anticipated Burning Index. An example of the
outcome of Rojo’s modeling: “Several fires moved into the WUI protection zone and remained in the
WSA. Since these fires did not impact private property buffers or highways, they were not counted as
impacting values.” (Rojo 2012:29) Excluding such alternatives from the DEIS not only violates
NEPA but appears to intentionally steer the public away from information that the BTNF should have
included in the DEIS and information that should have strongly influenced the development of a
reasonable range of alternatives beyond those considered in the DEIS. We submit the entire Rojo
2012 report as an attachment to these comments.
Also absent from the Alternatives considered in the Teton to Snake Fuels Treatment DEIS are
alternatives that include various levels of implementation of Firewise standards at private homes and
other structures near the boundary of the Teton to Snake Project Area. As stated elsewhere in these
comments, it is clear that the purpose of current 100 percent fire suppression in the Teton to Snake
Project Area, and the purpose of implementing the treatment projects is based on the perceived threat
of wildfire impacting nearby homes as alleged by the BTNF. The BTNF knows full well there are
other alternatives that have been proven effective in protecting homes from damage or destruction
from wildfire, and the BTNF knows that elements of those alternatives are contained in the Firewise
program that “is co-sponsored by the USDA Forest Service, the US Department of the interior, and
the National Association of State Foresters.” (Firewise website, About Firewise 2014, viewed
September 23, 2015, emphasis added)
The 2014 Teton County CWPP, on which the BTNF served as a cooperating agency,
determined that, “it was more effective for landowners to focus on creating defensible space around
their homes and to thin between homes and on community-owned lands within the community to be
most effective in reducing wildfire hazards regardless if fuel breaks were present.” (CWPP 2014:19
emphasis added) The CWPP actually provides additional emphasis on this point by citing the USFS’
Research Scientist Jack Cohen, "The two main factors affecting a structures (sic) ability to survive a
wildfire are the exterior building materials and the amount of defensible space surrounding the
structure within 100 feet to 200 feet of the structure, known as the Home Ignition Zone (Cohen 2008).
The home ignition zone typically is located on private property, which requires property owners to
recognize the hazards, take ownership and responsibility of the hazards, and mitigate the hazardous
fuels to a level that will increase the survivability of the structure." (CWPP 2014:22-23) (This
paragraph is duplicated in the Palisades Wilderness Study Area elsewhere in these comments.)
The BTNF cursorily dismisses the possibilities that implementation of the Firewise program at
and around homes could provide essential elements for alternatives in the DEIS. For example, the
DEIS “Appendix E: Projects Considered for Cumulative Effects” (DEIS:323-327) lists “Firewise
Activities” as a Project Name and merely describes the activities as, “Landowner and community
education, home evaluations.” (DEIS:327) No metrics are given in the DEIS for how many
homeowners have followed through on the education and evaluations and have actually implemented
the Firewise standards. Yet the USFS’ own research scientist Jack Cohen, and the 2014 Teton County
Community Wildfire Protection Plan (for which the BTNF served as cooperating agency) strongly
31 endorse implementing Firewise standards “regardless if fuel breaks were present.” Merely offering
evaluations or recommendations does not equate to readying a neighborhood for a wildfire by
implementing the Firewise recommendations.
See our comments at the Palisades Wilderness Study Area section for more on the NEPA
requirements of considering a reasonable range of alternatives.
Given that the BTNF solicited input from Rojo 2012, and Scott et al. 2012, and the BTNF
participated as a cooperating agency in the 2014 Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP), and
given that the USDA Forest Service co-sponsors the Firewise Program, and the USFS Research
Scientist Jack Cohen indicates that Firewise is critical in protecting homes and neighborhoods in the
face of wildfires, the BTNF must include alternatives in the DEIS that focus on allowing some or all
natural ignitions to burn in and around the project area based on current or projected Burning Index or
other indices; additional alternatives beyond the three included in this DEIS must also include and
consider effectively implementing Firewise standards on nearby homes and other structures; such new
alternatives should not include the elements of fuels treatments in the Palisades WSA or elsewhere on
USFS lands in the project area. Such alternatives should comply with legal directives and fulfill several
of the objectives identified by the BTNF including allowing fire to play its natural ecological role in
the project area and in the Palisades WSA; such alternatives would be much “lighter on the land”; and
the alternatives would consider and protect public and firefighter safety and likely be less expensive
than Alternatives 1, 2 and 3.
6. Failure to consider cumulative impacts, other reasonable foreseeable actions, and take a hard look at consequences: Actions are “connected” if they “automatically trigger other actions which may require environmental impact statements; cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously; or are interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.” Id. at § 1508.25(a)(1)(i–iii). Cumulative actions are those “which when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts.” Id. at (a)(2). “Similar actions” are those that “when viewed with other reasonably foreseeable or proposed agency actions, have similarities that provide a basis for evaluating their environmental consequences together, such as common timing or geography.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3). An agency should analyze similar actions together in the same environmental analysis when doing so is “the best way to assess adequately the[ir] combined impacts.” Id. (Dorsey et al. 2015:11)
NEPA requires federal agencies to “take seriously the potential environmental consequences of
a proposed action” by taking a “hard look” at the action’s consequences in an Environmental
Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402
F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The statute’s twin objectives are (1) to ensure that
agencies “consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action” and (2)
to “inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking
process.” Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Kern
32 v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.2002)); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). ( in Dorsey et al. 2015:10)
The EIS must take a “hard look” at the action’s consequences, and this “must be taken
objectively and in good faith, not as an exercise in form over substance, and not as a subterfuge
designed to rationalize a decision already made.” Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir.
2000). An EIS must include a “discussion of adverse impacts that does not improperly minimize
negative side effects.” Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir.2006),
abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
“Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to
implementing NEPA.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). “[G]eneral statements about possible effects and some
risk do not constitute a hard look absent a justification regarding why more definitive information
could not be provided.” Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th
Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). (in Dorsey et al. 2015:10)
From our comments on the Palisades WSA, relevant here: (T)he BTNF barely mentions and omits from consideration in the DEIS the virtual
certainty of repeating the treatments unlimited times in the future after the vegetation grows
back. Such repeated incursions on wilderness character belie the Forest Service’s claim that
implementation of the action alternatives would improve the WSA’s wilderness character over
the long term. For example, “(L)ocal fire managers implemented small scale mechanical
thinning in 2003 along portions of the private land/national forest boundary from Red Top
Meadows to Teton Village . . . . However the increase in defensible space did not appreciably
reduce the overall likelihood of a wildfire escaping from the national forest onto non-federal
lands. . . . . Thus managers must still aggressively suppress nearly all fires in the area to
minimize the probability of wildfire reaching and threatening the neighboring homes. . . . fire
managers need to have viable options for containing the spread of a fire before it leaves the
national forest system lands.” (DEIS:3) Now, twelve years after the first treatments, the BTNF
wants to institute more mechanical treatments in the same areas. The BTNF also proposes to
retreat areas near the Town of Star Valley Ranch in Lincoln County, Wyoming. In 2005 and
2006 they implemented a silviculture project in the area “to reduce fuel loading in the event of
a wildfire.” They call this a “Maintenance Project” to “re-treat areas treated in the original
project and treat some adjacent areas.” (BTNF 2015b)
In DEIS Appendix E. Projects Considered for Cumulative Effects, beginning on p. 323, the
DEIS lists 4 large treatment projects that total 41,659 acres. (Hill Creek Reduction, 4959 acres; Teton
Pass Fuels Reduction, 14,700 acres; Sorenson Creek Fuels Reduction, 12,000 acres; and the Snake
River Canyon Wildlife Habitat Improvement, 10,000 acres.) The Hill Creek Reduction appears to be
completed. The Snake River Canyon project was decided in 1999, but appears to await the Teton to
Snake EIS process to “inform a subsequent 18.1 review.” This 18.1 review needs to be adequately
explained to the public. The Sorenson Creek and the Teton Pass projects have yet to occur. The total
of these projects (41,659 acres) is fully half the size of the Teton to Snake Project Area, which is
80,000 acres. Other than cursory mention of the Snake River Canyon project to the south of Teton to
Snake, the Teton to Snake DEIS does not adequately consider the cumulative effects of all these
33 projects. Nor does the DEIS adequately consider the cumulative effects of re-treating fuels treatment
projects every 10-12 years or so in perpetuity. (See our comments on retreatments in the Palisades
WSA section in these comments showing that the BTNF will likely retreat the treatment projects.)
Additionally, describing the Teton to Snake project: “The timeframe considered is approximately 10 years in the future at which time the proposed treatment activities would be completed. Re-­‐entry for maintenance prescribed burning will be essential in maintaining effectiveness and may be needed in the future.” (Buhl 2011:13 emphasis added) Without adequately considering the cumulative effects of other projects on USFS lands and
considering the re-treating of projects in the future, this DEIS does not comply with NEPA.
7. The BTNF has apparently excluded or minimized the significance of available research in
order to support only a limited range of alternatives:
In this DEIS, it appears that the BTNF excludes or minimizes the importance of reports that
cast a negative or less than enthusiastic assessment of the effectiveness or need for treatments; in this
DEIS the BTNF appears to exaggerate the significance of reports that support treatments. When the
selection of information is biased towards one viewpoint, and information that offers other viewpoints
is purposefully minimized or excluded from the public, the information is not high quality. "NEPA
procedures must insure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens
before decisions are made and before actions are taken. The information must be of high quality." (40
CFR §1500.1 Purpose. (b)) If there is relevant information that the Forest Service has omitted by
choice from the DEIS, that fact and the reasoning must be explained in the DEIS. (40 CFR § 1502.22)
The BTNF emphasizes reports such as “a supplemental analysis by Helmbrecht and Scott
(2011)” which “suggests” that the treatments in alternatives 2 and 3 would, “have an effect on burn
probability and mean fireline intensity within the project defense zone.” (DEIS:162) The DEIS
continues that according to the supplemental analysis, the decrease in mean annual burn probability
would be 14 percent from implementing Alternative 2, and 7 percent reduction with Alternative 3, the
preferred alternative. “Mean fireline intensity” would be reduced, according to the modeling by
Helmbrecht and Scott, 24 percent under alternative 2, and 11 percent under alternative 3. This appears
to be a minimal change in both indices from 10 years worth of implementing 22,500 acres of
treatments (Alt 2) or 14,200 acres of treatments over 10 years (Alt 3). The DEIS is silent on how the
alleged effectiveness of such treatments will diminish with time as the vegetation grows back. The
DEIS, Table 22, p.75, indicates that even with the extensive mechanical and prescribed fire treatments
in the project area, Alternative 2 would still necessitate "50 percent suppression"; Alternative 3 would
necessitate "60 percent suppression," of ignitions. There does not seem to be much of a gain from
implementing either of the action alternatives.
The BTNF also highlights a USFS General Technical Report, “A study conducted by Graham
and others (2009) of wildfires during the summer 2007 in Idaho that burned over 500,000 acres within
central Idaho found that the limited loss of structures and resource damage was largely due to the
existence of fuel treatments and how they affected suppression activities.” (DEIS:163) The treatments
and suppression were “effective” and still burned 500,000 acres? Did the suppression activities
34 actually put the fire(s) out? Were the treatments in Wilderness or Wilderness Study Areas? For this
example to be believable, the DEIS must offer more information.
However, the DEIS also notes, “It should be noted that treatments on national forest land would
reduce fire intensity and crown fire potential but may not directly protect all homes. Studies indicate
that wildfire mitigation focused on structures (type of construction) and their immediate surroundings
is the most effective way to reduce structure ignitions (Cohen 1999, 2000, 2003; Scott 2003).” But the
DEIS goes on to diminish the value of such proven scientific conclusions from Cohen and others, by
stating, “relying solely on such treatments would forego strategic opportunities for controlling fires
within the wildland-urban interface area.” And, “research shows that treatments need to go beyond the
home ignition zone for other resource values (Graham et al. 2004)” (DEIS:163) The DEIS doesn’t
mention what “other resource values” are, nor why it would be important to control fires “within the
wildland-urban interface area.”
As noted in these comments elsewhere, the WUI zone on the maps near the end of the 2014
Teton County Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) apparently extend over a larger
geographic area than the 80,000 acre Teton to Snake Project Area, indeed many miles away from
homes or other values. At page 53 in the Teton to Snake DEIS, the BTNF states, “Treating just around
the powerline and just a small area near structures would not meet the purpose and need for this project
to reduce fire behavior across the landscape.” (DEIS:53 emphasis added) Furthermore, “These
combined treatments would complement the purpose and need goals for fire and fuels management by
reducing wildland fire threat. In addition, public and firefighter safety would be improved due to
reducing snag density levels within the defense zone and from other project activities in the adjacent
area.” (DEIS:164)
It appears from the rationale cited above that the BTNF denies the effectiveness of
implementing the Firewise program endorsed by the USDA-Forest Service and supported by their own
USDA Forest Service Research Scientist, Jack Cohen. The BTNF astoundingly cites research on fires
that burned 500,000 acres before they either were extinguished or naturally went out to support the
perceived need to implement thousands of acres of treatments in the Teton to Snake Project Area.
Rather than focus on protecting the nearby homes and other values using tried and true methods as
described in Firewise and Cohen’s research, and other research described below, the BTNF insists that
they need to treat the forests and shrublands and “reduce fire behavior across the landscape.”
Evidently the BTNF intends to control fire throughout the entire “wildland-urban interface area” which
according to both the 2005 CWPP and the 2014 CWPP are vast areas encompassing part of the
Palisades WSA and stretching into Idaho. Much larger even than the 80,000 acre Teton to Snake
project area. Such a goal is enormous in scale and does not comply with the 1984 Wyoming
Wilderness Act nor with the BTNF LRMP.
An example of the BTNF-USFS’s commissioned research that clearly indicate that there are
more options to ensure the safety of the public and firefighters, and protect nearby homes than the
three Alternatives in this DEIS, is Scott et al., 2012, and show that the DEIS does not analyze a
reasonable range of Alternatives, is: "Quantifying the Threat of Unsuppressed Wildfires Reaching
the Adjacent Wildland-Urban Interface on the B-T National Forest, Wyoming, USA." It
addresses a much bigger area than just Teton to Snake, and the authors assume the WUI defense zone
is federally managed land within 400 m of private residential land, instead of the vast expanses that the
35 County has actually designated WUI in the 2014 CWPP. This paper simulated the ignition and
unsuppressed growth of wildfires starting in a zone designated by the BTNF called the RO (resource
objective) zone. They supplied the model with actual weather data from 1990 to 2010, and allowed the
simulated wildfires to grow until the end of the fire season. They also gathered real fire occurrence
data from 1990-2009. Most importantly, this paper indicates several determinations and options for
reasonable alternatives not included in alternatives considered in this DEIS. Yet, curiously, while this
paper considered conditions specific to the BTNF including the Teton to Snake project area it was not
included in the DEIS.
“(R)elatively few wildfires originating in the RO start zone and left unsuppressed appeared
capable of reaching the WUI defense zone- even without RO rules. . . . (E)ven early-season fires had a
low likelihood of reaching the WUI. Careful selection of early-season ignitions for resource-objective
management (based on location and weather) coupled with limited fire suppression actions to
minimize spread toward the WUI, could be a viable strategy for mitigating the threat of RO fires
reaching the WUI defense zone on this landscape.” (emphasis added) “This is consistent with the
finding of Carey et al. (2009) that ignition management and weather affected fire likelihood more than
simulated fuel treatments.” (Scott et al. 2012:136 emphasis added) “We hypothesize that the effect
of fuel management on BP could be smaller than what has been found for short duration
problem fire simulations. Large, long-duration wildfires simply have ample time to go around or
through fuel treatment areas.” (Scott et al. 2012:137)
Additional excerpts from Scott et al. 2012 are worth including here:
“Managing wildfires for resource objectives (i.e., allowing wildfires to burn in the absence of suppression) is an important tool for restoring such fire-­‐adapted ecosystems. . . . (L)and managers wish to restore fire by managing wildfires, but are concerned about the threat to residential buildings. . . “ (Scott et al. 2012: in Abstract) “(N)aturally ignited fires (e.g., lightning) could be managed for resource objectives (Stephens and Ruth 2005). . . . In this paper, we refer to these as resource objective (RO) wildfires. . . . The use of RO wildfires is especially important in designated and proposed wilderness area (Parsons et al. 2003), which, according to the Wilderness Act of 1964, are to be protected and managed to preserve (and restore) natural conditions. The suppression of wildfires in wilderness is a human manipulation that can alter natural conditions, and therefore does not support the intent of the Wilderness Act (Miller 2003). Nonetheless, suppression of ignitions, natural or anthropogenic, has been the dominant wildfire management strategy in most wilderness areas. A major reason that fires are suppressed in wilderness is the potential for fires to become large and threaten resources and assets on adjacent nonwilderness lands (Miller and Landres 2004, Black et al. 2008). In addition to restoring natural conditions, RO wildfires also have the potential to mitigate fuel hazards at relatively large scales (Miller et al. 2000, Parsons et al. 2003, Davis et al. 2010.).” (Scott et al. 2012: 126) “The Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest (BTNF) fire management staff established an RO start zone to identify where ignitions may be considered for RO management. “ (Scott et al. 2012:128) 36 “Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest staff anticipates that only a fraction of wildfires originating in the RO start zone will be managed for resource rather than protection objectives. . . . In total, an estimated 43% of ignitions would be managed for RO. These rules stipulate that . . . . many late-­‐season fires will be managed for resource objectives (Table 1).” (Scott et al. 2012:128) “Seasonal timing of starts matters when simulating the likelihood of a fire reaching the WUI defense zone because early-­‐season fires tend to burn longer and therefore become larger than mid-­‐ and late-­‐season fires.” (Scott et al. 2012:133) “Assuming all fire starts grow without suppression, the expected annual area burned is 14431 ha yr, largely (71%) from fires starting during July and August (Table 4). The application of RO rules reduced the expected annual acres burned by two-­‐thirds to 4861 ha yr, with 76% occurring in fires starting in July and August (Table 4). By contrast, observed fires originating in the RO start zone from 1990 to 2009, which were managed primarily for protection objectives (i.e., full suppression of all starts), burned an average of just 207 ha yr, illustrating the magnitude of the effect of fire suppression (including preparedness and initial attack) on annual area burned. Fires reaching the WUI defense zone arrived from all directions and tended to start near the WUI defense zone (Figure 5).” (Scott et al. 2012:134-­‐135) “Despite the higher propensity for an early-­‐season fire to reach the WUI, the relatively low historic occurrence rate of early-­‐season fires means that they did not account for a large fraction of fires that eventually reached the WUI (Table 5).” (Scott et al. 2012:135) “The RO rules alone reduced the annual number of fires expected to reach the WUI by 70%.” (Scott et al. 2012: 136) “These results confirmed local staff’s expectation that they would favor protection objectives for early-­‐season wildfires, but resource protection objectives for late-­‐season wildfires.” (Scott et al. 2012:136) “(E)ven early-­‐season fires had a low likelihood of reaching the WUI. Careful selection of early-­‐season ignitions for resource-­‐objective management (based on location and weather) coupled with limited fire suppression actions to minimize spread toward the WUI, could be a viable strategy for mitigating the threat of RO fires reaching the WUI defense zone on this landscape.” (Scott et al. 2012:136) “In practice, the selection of wildfires for RO management is not random, but informed by a variety of factors known to fire managers at the time of a wildfire start, including the spread potential at the location of the start, and the past and forecast weather. “ (Scott et al. 2012:136) “This analysis does not reflect the possible future threat-­‐reduction benefits of allowing RO managed fires to occur (Miller and Davis 2009). That is, an RO managed 37 fire this year may limit the size or severity of wildfires occurring in future years (Collins et al. 2009).” (Scott et al. 2012:137 emphasis added) This strongly indicates that the treatments promoted by the BTNF in Alternatives 2 and 3 will
have limited if any effectiveness, and that full suppression of all natural ignitions in or outside the
project area- including in the Palisades WSA- is not necessary, is not reasonable, nor is it based on the
best science. We submit the entire Scott et al. 2012 paper as an attachment to these comments.
In another report instigated by the BTNF, Rojo 2012, An Analysis of Non-Suppression
Management Strategies of Unplanned Wildland Fire in the Palisades Wilderness Study Area,
describes the outcomes of modeled fires allowed to burn (i.e., not suppressed) in some of the project
area, by linking suppression or no suppression to the current and/or anticipated Burning Index (BI).
Rojo modeled unsuppressed wildland fires resulting from 108 different ignition locations, without fuels
being affected by the treatments contained in alternatives 2 and 3 in the DEIS, at three levels of
Burning Index: 50%, 70% and 90%. Rojo’s modeling, admittedly incorporating worst case variables
in many respects such as winds persisting for days and no reduced fuels after unsuppressed fires,
indicated that under the moderate and low Burning Indices, “5 percent or less of fires starting in the
Palisades WSA will impact values surrounding the study area.” (Rojo 2012:37) Rojo further noted the
value over time of allowing natural ignitions to burn unsuppressed: “Even if only a small percentage
of fires burned as modeled, portions of the landscape would be impacted by changes in fuels
characteristics, such as that exhibited by the Green Knoll fire. These impacts, especially in the
“Identified Risk” area, would reduce the potential for future large fire growth.” (Rojo 2012:37)
Yet another USFS research paper that “provide(s) an assessment of the current fuels and fire
behavior hazard within the Teton to Snake project area of the Bridger-Teton National Forest” is the
Teton to Snake Fuels and Fire Behavior Assessment by Don Helmbrecht, December 30, 2009.
Helmbrecht is a Fire and Fuels Specialist at the Fire Modeling Institute, USDA Forest Service Rocky
Mountain Research Station in Missoula, Montana.
This 2009 paper is a fire modeling study, much like what was used for the DEIS fire section,
but the results appear to be very different. Helmbrecht says only 2% of the project area, and 2% of the
WUI, has the potential for active crown fire under the 95th percentile ERC (G) moisture conditions,
whereas the DEIS says (Table 28, p. 152) that 11% of the defense zone and 12% of the threat zone
would experience crown fire under "a dry fuel moisture scenario with 25 mph upslope 20-foot winds".
[ERC means "energy release component" and "is a commonly used indicator of drought and fire
potential that is calculated from fuel moistures and is used to assess the fire season." The 95th
percentile likely means very high fire potential.] Amazingly, the DEIS doesn't say what actual
percentile ERC they used—they just say they used a "dry fuel moisture scenario." The Fire and Fuels
specialist report also fails to mention what percentile they used. The DEIS must reveal under what metrics or Burning Index the maps at Fires 8, 9, 10 and 11 were modeled. At these maps, and at Table 28, p.152, the DEIS must include more information than, “Potential fire behavior characteristics modeled under dry fuel moisture scenario with 25 mph upslope 20-­‐foot winds.” The DEIS must explain what percent of a fire season over the years in the project area the model exhibits. I.e., do these conditions occur 100 percent of a fire season? 50 percent? 5 percent? Less?
38 With regard to flame length, the two analyses are very different too. Helmbrecht 2009 says
only 13% of the project area and 2% of the WUI have the potential for flame lengths over 4 feet under
the 95th percentile ERC. The DEIS says 42% of the defense zone and 44% of the threat zone have the
potential for flame lengths over 4 feet under their "dry fuel moisture scenario." These are radically
different outcomes of their models—44% versus 2%. (DEIS Table 28:152) [The WUI encompasses
both the defense zone and the threat zone—the defense zone is within one quarter mile of private
property and the threat zone is the rest of the WUI.] Again, the DEIS must explain what a “dry fuel
moisture scenario” means.
Comparing the map on p. 10 of the Helmbrecht 2009 report with the maps on pp. 150-151 of
the DEIS, these maps show potential fire types in the project area. The Helmbrecht map has very little
active crown fire; the DEIS maps appear to indicate extensive areas of flames in excess of 11 feet
(Figure 8), and large areas of “Active” fire type (Figure 9). The BTNF needs to explain the
discrepancies compared to Helmbrecht 2009.
The Helmbrecht 2009 report says, "The majority of the project area is expected to experience
surface fire with low flame lengths and rates of spread. This is primarily due to the high percentage of
fire behavior models that exhibit these characteristics even under dry conditions. Areas with the
potential for passive crown fire are spread across the project area with heavier concentrations in
Phillips and Black Canyons and on the border with the Caribou-Targhee National Forest. There is a
low percentage of the project area with active crown fire potential however these areas are also
concentrated in Phillips and Black Canyons."
Rojo (2012) notes that much of the project area already has natural fire breaks consisting of
Grass/Shrub communities. “Note: Grass/Shrub fuels do not carry fire beyond the extent of forest
fuels.” (Rojo 2012:22 caption of Figure 12 photo of Green Knoll Fire) “ In “real life” many areas of
the perimeter (of a fire) burn themselves out and/or cease to contribute to fire growth over time. This
is particularly true for lighter fuels such as the grass and shrub models.” (Rojo 2012:23)
Helmbrecht 2009 used a high ERC and fairly high winds (as did Rojo 2012), and still his model
showed only 13% of the project area and 2% of the WUI having flame lengths over 4 feet. The
Helmbrecht 2009 results cast doubt on the need to do intensive fuels treatments, and also on the
BTNF's alleged need to suppress 100% of fires (DEIS:4; Rojo 2012:15) unless they "treat" the forest
first.
Helmbrecht's results are a lot more in keeping with the findings of the Scott et al. 2012 and
Rojo 2012 fire modeling papers, both of which found a very small percentage of fire starts would
actually spread to the zone close to private property except under the most extreme burning
conditions. Rojo’s model used sustained winds and, “Especially true in the 90th percentile range where
winds are held consistently high through the 14 day FARSITE simulations . Winds in the study area
are generally not sustained for more than 3-4 days using a 12mph average. In fact, for the time period
between 2001 and 2010, winds averaging 6.5 mph, and 90th percential BI over a 4 day period
accounted for only 5.7 percent of days (Appendix I).” “Tendencies toward overprediction fill the role
of measuring “worst case” scenarios, which is of interest for the Jackson District Ranger.” (Rojo
2012:28)
39 The DEIS uses the extreme fire modeling results presented in the Fire chapter as the heart of
the "need" to go out and do all these treatments. P. ii says, "Fuel conditions vary widely throughout the
project area. Field surveys and modeling indicate that 42 percent of the defense zone and 44 percent of
the threat zone have potential fire behavior characteristics that would require aggressive suppression
methods rather than less-intrusive ground crews and hand tools, particularly in areas close to homes
and critical infrastructure. In the defense zone, many of the areas proposed for treatment are densely
stocked and have developed ladder fuels as well as increased concentrations of surface fuels due to
insect and disease mortality and natural forest succession. With concentrations of fuels, individual
trees or groups of trees may torch and fire could continue through the tree crowns aided by high winds.
Ignition in many of these areas could produce extreme fire behavior and threaten private land and other
valued resources. In addition, concentrations of fuels may hinder the ability of firefighters to construct
fireline and control fires." As stated above, this dire assessment of “potential fire behavior” does not
agree with Helmbrecht 2009.
Both Scott et al. 2012, and Rojo 2012 were essentially commissioned by the BTNF, as was
Helmbrecht 2009. Both Scott et al. 2012 and Rojo 2012 showed that at least some natural ignitionsacross a large landscape- could be allowed to burn under certain conditions and without the
treatments proposed in the Teton to Snake DEIS in alternatives 2 and 3, and not affect homes or
other values. J. Cohen, employed by the USDA-Forest Service, recommends that the focus be on
homes and values and not forest treatments. Helmbrecht 2009 indicates far less severe fire behavior in
the project area that does the DEIS. Incredibly, the BTNF largely dismissed these research efforts and
deferred to Helmbrecht and Scott (2011) and Graham et al 2004, to support the contention that the
fuels treatments in alternatives 2 and 3 were necessary to achieve the purpose and need. Despite this
research essentially commissioned by the BTNF and pointing out the undeniable values of allowing
natural fires to burn and, subsequently, reduce fire behaviors, the BTNF excluded from analysis in this
DEIS alternatives that would allow some natural ignitions to burn in or near the project area without
the proposed fuel treatments.
The BTNF offers a curious phrase defending the findings of “Graham and others (2009)”:
“Their observations suggest fuel treatments that create irregular forest structures and compositions,
both within and among stands, tend to produce wildfire resilient forests.” (DEIS:163) What is a
“wildfire resilient forest”? Aren’t the forest structures in the Teton to Snake project area already
“irregular”? Why wouldn’t the BTNF include the peer reviewed paper from Ecological Applications,
“Wildland fire as a self-regulating mechanism: the role of previous burns and weather in limiting
fire progression” that addresses the role of natural fire regimes “in landscapes that are both selfregulating and resilient to fire”? (Parks et al. 2015:Abstract) “Wildland fire clearly acts as a fuel
break and is a barrier to subsequent fire spread(.)” (Parks et al. 2015:1489)
Oddly, although the Scott et al. 2012 is a peer reviewed research paper in the journal Fire
Ecology (Vol 8, Issue 2, 2012) and the BTNF District Ranger Dale Deiter is thanked in the paper, as is
the BTNF North Zone Fire Management Office, M. Johnston, the DEIS does not appear to mention
this paper. One of the authors of the paper, Sean A. Parks, is actually employed at the USDA Forest
Service Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute in Missoula, Montana. It appears that the BTNF
in this DEIS ignored or dismissed the importance of the USFS’ own research (Cohen 2009, etc.;
Helmbrecht 2009; Rojo 2012; Scott et al. 2012) perhaps because the findings do not align with the 100
percent suppression of natural ignitions in Alternative 1, nor do their findings align with the treatment-
40 based action alternatives and the apparent predetermined outcomes of this DEIS. This DEIS dismisses
the science that indicates that mechanical fuels treatments are not effective and are not needed to allow
fire to operate freely on this landscape. Nor are treatments effective at protecting homes.
“Q What is the best defense for home survivability?
A Creating and regularly maintaining an HIZ is a homeowner’s first and best line of
defense. Survival or destruction of homes exposed to wildfire flames and firebrands is not
determined by the overall fire behavior or distance of firebrand lofting but rather, the condition
of the HIZ- the design, material and maintenance of the home in relation to its immediate
surroundings within 100 feet. For more information regarding HIZs go to
http://csfs.colostate.edu/pages/wf-protection.html or www.firewise.org.” USFS Fourmile Canyon
Fire Findings July 2012 Questions and Answers
Focusing only on research that supports the action alternatives and excludes other reasonable
alternatives from the DEIS not only violates NEPA but appears to intentionally steer the public away
from information that the BTNF should have included in the DEIS and information that should have
strongly influenced the development of a reasonable range of alternatives beyond those considered in
the DEIS. 8. The DEIS mischaracterizes the fire regime in the Palisades WSA as no longer natural: The Forest Service's assertion that the fire regime in the Palisades WSA and surrounding areas
is no longer "natural" appears to be based largely on a report titled, “Project Update: Teton to Snake
Project Area Aspen Mapping” by Alyson Courtemanch of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department,
dated January 1, 2015. The DEIS (p. 6-7) says, "As a result of years of fire suppression in the project
area, the fire regime has been altered…This change in the fire regime is most evident in the Douglasfir forests where fire-scarred trees show a history of frequent low- and mixed-severity burns, but no
burning for approximately the last 100 years (Wyoming Game and Fish Department 2015)."
It appears from the Courtemanch report that the number of fire-scarred trees found and sampled
in the entire 80,000-acre project area is ten. The ten fire scarred trees were not scattered throughout the
project area, but were clustered on two locations just north (n=4) and just south (n=6) of the North
Fork of Fall Creek.
Eight were Douglas fir, one was lodgepole pine, and one was subalpine fir. The report doesn't
say what the vegetation communities were like where the samples were taken.
From the fire-scarred conifers, the Forest Service has apparently extrapolated and constructed a
complete narrative of how the existing vegetation patterns and fire regime are no longer "natural." The
WGF study found that there was a "large-scale fire event" in 1934 [a drought year] that burned 5 of
their sampled trees. Four of the five trees sampled by Courtemanch that were burned in 1934 were in
one drainage, the South Fork of Fall Creek.
They also found three trees on Taylor Mountain that were scarred by a fire in 1893. Other than
the scars left by the 1893 and 1934 fires, the WGF found 6 other more recent fire scars, some on the
same trees that were scarred in the earlier fires. From these scars the WGF concludes that there were
41 "many smaller scale events." There is no discussion of how large each of these smaller fires might
have been. Most fire ignitions in our ecosystem don't turn into large fires, even when unsuppressed,
unless conditions of drought and wind lead to a larger fire. But the Forest Service evidently concludes
from this sample of 10 trees that an entire fire regime (frequent low- and mixed-severity burns) used to
exist and no longer does due to fire suppression. This appears to be an unsupportable determination.
“Most of the state of knowledge about fire return intervals, for example, is determined from
sampling fire-scarred trees, which are difficult to extrapolate from, and not always present.”
(Abendroth 2013:10)
The DEIS further errs by stating that there has been "no burning for approximately the last 100
years.” (DEIS:7) Yet, the Courtemanch report states, “A large-scale fire event occurred in 1934(.)”
(Courtemanch 2015:2) Five of the fire-scarred trees exhibited scars from fires that occurred during the
1940’s through the 1970’s. (Courtemanch 2015:Figure 8) yet somehow the DEIS concludes there has
been no burning in the project area for the last 100 years.
In Abendroth, 2013, the estimates for fire regimes offer ranges that are several times the lower estimate for the higher estimate for various types of forests. (Abendroth 2013:11 Table 2). Some of the longer estimates for fire return cycles are as much as 300-­‐500 years. Since suppression of virtually 100 percent of fires in the project area dates back much less than a century, the presence of fire scars from the 1940’s to 1970’s indicates that the forests in the project area cannot be determined to be out of a natural fire regime. The above calls into question
the rationale and subsequent conclusions by the BTNF in determining what is a natural fire regime and
what isn’t in and around the project area.
9. The DEIS attempts to justify treatments in Inventoried Roadless Area which violates the 2001
Roadless Rule:
In order to justify treatments within Inventoried Roadless Areas (IRAs), the DEIS alleges that it
meets the exception in the 2001 Roadless Area Conservation Rule (36 CFR 294.13 (b) (ii):
To maintain or restore the characteristics of ecosystem composition and structure, such as to
reduce the risk of uncharacteristic wildfire effects, within the range of variability that would be
expected to occur under natural disturbance regimes of the current climatic period. (DEIS:61)
However, as our comments show above, offering reports by Courtemanch and Abendroth, the
BTNF may not claim that the forests of this area, including portions of the BTNF that are IRAs, are not
characteristic of natural ecosystem composition and structure. Therefore, proposed treatments in IRAs
are not necessary or allowed under this exception.
10. Monitoring and Enforcement: Among the most difficult elements of any project occurs after the work has been done and the time comes for monitoring effects, mitigating the harmful sometimes indirect impacts of the actions, and enforcing laws and regulations to protect the USFS lands. Such work may be needed for many years after projects are implemented. 42 An insidious impact from the Teton to Snake Project is likely to be the spreading of noxious weeds. Already, “Fourteen species of noxious weeds exist in the project area.” (DEIS:xvii) Undoubtedly, if the treatments are allowed to take place, “The threat to habitat from noxious weeds persists wherever there is ground disturbance. “ (DEIS:xvi) As with many projects approved by the BTNF, the assertion is that harmful effects can be reduced or eliminated. Noxious weeds grow in front country and backcountry areas of the BTNF and other protected lands in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem; suppressing weeds after treatments or other disturbances or after or during human uses (e.g., OHV or horse trails) has limited success. If fuels treatments of forests and shrublands are allowed through the Teton to Snake EIS decision, the BTNF admits that “(I)t is likely that not all weeds would be found and controlled, and that further introductions of weed propagules would occur in the near future under circumstances beyond our control.” (DEIS:xvii) The DEIS admits that the “least disturbance” of the landscape is best to minimize “introducing and spreading noxious weeds.” (Id.) The DEIS admits that actually fighting fires contributes to the spreading and introducing noxious weeds. For example, the bulldozer lines associated with the Green Knoll Fire. (DEIS:6) It is probable that hand scraped fire control lines also contribute to the spread of noxious weeds. One of the benefits of having a large landscape such as the Palisades WSA in pristine condition, is that weeds and other evidence of human effects are minimized. “Noxious weeds are present in localized disturbed areas but are not widespread (in the WSA).” (DEIS:63 parentheses added) Implementing treatments in the WSA will change this. Although the BTNF will pledge to mitigate (“There are design features in place to limit this indirect effect.” (DEIS:238)) the probability of spreading weeds in wilderness quality lands, as pointed out above, persists; “further introductions of weed propagules would occur(.)” (DEIS:xvii) Temporary and existing roads, log landings and hand scraped firelines (aka, fire control lines), as much as eleven miles of such lines, will all contribute to the spread of noxious weeds. And since the proposed treatments target pristine and wilderness quality lands that exhibit little evidence of human incursion, such manipulations inherent by design in the treatments will spread noxious weeds into areas that currently have none. “Humans and ground disturbance are the major vectors for the introduction of noxious weeds.” (DEIS:244) The infestation of noxious weeds is a good surrogate by which to consider the harmful impacts and consequences of actions yet to be taken, as well as the unintended or unknown adverse consequences of proposed actions. Since the BTNF is chronically understaffed and underfunded, monitoring and enforcement of laws and regulations is always challenging across such a large landscape of 3.4 million acres; as is controlling degradation to habitat and resources, and restoring habitat and resources. It is unlikely, if the thousands of acres of new treatments are allowed to be implemented, that the BTNF will be able to undertake all the monitoring and enforcement and remedial work that such treatments will necessitate. It would save money and resources-­‐ natural resources and personnel resources-­‐ not to undertake the fuels treatments. 11. Climate change: 43 The DEIS states: “(G)iven that there likely would be more fire on the landscape in the future in response to a changing climate, the need to intervene with fire processes would become a more common occurrence as would the need to use more aggressive suppression tactics due to the higher potential of forest fuels to produce crown fires and high flame lengths (Riginos and Newcomb 2015, Westerling, et al. 2011).” (DEIS:67) Riginos and Newcomb’s report, “The Coming Climate,” predicts “longer fire seasons, with more frequent fires,” and, “Several very large fires (at least as large as the 1988 fires) by mid-­‐century,” (Riginos and Newcomb 2015:15 parentheses in original). Indeed, their report concludes, “forest cover is likely to decrease substantially in the future if fire frequency increases as predicted.” (Id.:16) Riginos and Newcomb present information calling into question whether there will eventually even be any forest crowns “to produce crown fires and high flame lengths,” because, their report states, “1988-­‐type conditions (will) occur numerous times.” (Id.:15) Riginos and Newcomb conclude, “In reality, there may not be enough forest cover left by the 2075 to support large forest fires. If forests are replaced by shrublands and grasslands, fires would probably still occur regularly(.)” (Id.) Riginos and Newcomb cite sources showing that the costs of “fighting wildfires” is climbing. They state that homes “within the WUI” “are expected to come under ever-­‐increasing threat from wildfires under the predicted and plausible scenarios of climate change.” (Riginos and Newcomb 2015:17. The BTNF DEIS indicates that the Riginos and Newcomb report supports the “need” to “use more aggressive suppression tactics” or implement treatments on USFS lands to somehow stave off the impacts or eventualities of a warmer drier climate. Riginos and Newcomb do indeed offer “possible examples for the GYE” in response to the General Adaptation Strategy category, “Protect areas, species, or processes in the system that are disproportionately important to the functioning of the system.” (Riginos and Newcomb 2015:Table 2 p.25) Some of the possible examples include: Protect highly species-­‐rich areas or key habitat areas from wildfire; Public education on wildfire management, fuels treatment, anthropogenic fire ignition in the WUI or recreational areas; and Maintain tree cover and forest dynamics through wildfire suppression and management of low-­‐severity fires. Prior to Table 2, Riginos and Newcomb explain: “In Table 2 we provide some examples of possible adaptation strategies for the GYE. This is not meant to be a comprehensive set of strategies, but rather to suggest the types of actions that might be considered. Careful consideration and, in some cases, further research is necessary before adopting any of these measures as there are almost certainly potential actions that would favor some species or communities at the expense of others. Some measures may be impractical-­‐ too difficult or expensive to achieve. In yet other cases, there may be little that can be done to lesson the impacts of climate change; in those situations, we may have little choice but to accept completely new ecological regimes or dynamics for which there is no precedent.” (Id.:23-­‐24) We have shown in these comments by citing peer reviewed and other research that the fuels reduction and prescribed fire measures on USFS lands “suggested (for) careful consideration and . . . further research,” by Riginos and Newcomb are not the appropriate steps to take to address the issues in the Teton to Snake Project Area including the Palisades WSA and Inventoried Roadless Areas. We have clearly shown how homes in the WUI can be protected. 44 Riginos and Newcomb also state, “some of the most important steps we can take to mitigate climate change are to support national and international policies to curb greenhouse gas emissions and raise the level of education, awareness, and dialogue about this issue. . . . . (On a local level in Teton County) reducing fossil fuel emissions associated with transportation is one of the most significant measures that can be taken to promote behaviors in line with what is likely to be a more carbon-­‐limited future.” (Id.:23 parentheses added) Sierra Club supports these measures to address climate change. A reading of Westerling et al. 2011 Abstract (also referenced by the DEIS) does not indicate a “need” to “use more aggressive suppression tactics” or implement treatments on USFS lands to somehow stave off the impacts or eventualities of a warmer drier climate. Treating large portions of the Teton to Snake Project Area would actually cause areas to dry out and allow wind to accelerate through treated areas artificially amplifying the effects of wildfire. Fuel treatments can cause fires to burn hotter and faster because the open canopy can allow surface fuels to dry out, and the thinned forest can allow higher wind speeds. The BTNF has excellent information available from the USFS Research Station in Missoula, Montana (e.g., Cohen 1999, 2008, etc.) and from other scientists and reports that offer very worthwhile and practical paths forward to manage our public lands and protect our communities: The BTNF must consider Firewise-­‐based Alternatives in an EIS. 12. Conclusion: “Recognizing the inevitability of wildland fire occurrence coupled with how homes ignite
during wildland fires suggests a mitigation approach specific to wildland-urban fire. Given a
wildland-urban fire, the home ignition zone principally determines the potential for home
ignitions. This suggests a management approach that focuses on preventing home ignitions.
That is, we reduce a community’s vulnerability to wildland fire rather than attempting the
elimination of wildland fire encroachment. This implies an approach of community
compatibility with wildland fire.” From Jack Cohen unknown year. Wildland-Urban Fire- A different
approach
It is unfortunate, unnecessary, and not compliant with NEPA that there are only three Alternatives in this DEIS. These Alternatives threaten the work of generations of citizens who helped protect the Palisades WSA through the passage and implementation of the 1984 Wyoming Wilderness Act. The three Alternatives in this DEIS that offer only the choices of putting out all naturally ignited wildfires, or implementing mechanical and other artificial fuels treatments to forests and shrublands in perpetuity will harm the habitats and wilderness characteristics and not allow ecological processes such as fires and plant succession to operate freely. Imposing logging trucks, chainsaws, heavy equipment, and drip torches on the project area harms the wildlife values, solitude and renowned recreational values this area is known for. 45 Implementing the proposed fuels treatments on USFS lands would turn this area into a fire-­‐
industrial complex, an artificial and human manipulated landscape. As we and others have shown, the BTNF is required by legal directives to consider other alternatives in an EIS that focus on the home ignition zone to protect values outside the USFS lands as their own scientists recommend. The BTNF is required to manage the Palisades WSA according to law including allowing natural ignitions to burn. The BTNF is required to offer an accurate and legal EIS to the public, one that complies with the National Environmental Policy Act and other laws. The BTNF must offer the public an EIS that presents and discusses an array of information that is not biased towards a predetermined outcome; the EIS may not omit or diminish materials that support the wisdom of other choices. As we state above, in the context of
protecting communities from some effects of wildfires, the homes and other structures and
vegetation immediately surrounding the structures are fuel. “A wildland fire does not spread to
homes unless the homes meet the fuel and heat requirements sufficient for ignition and continued
combustion.” (Cohen 1999:190 emphasis added) The BTNF must offer the public an EIS that also includes alternatives that thoroughly discuss and analyze the results of implementing Firewise actions on private lands. “Research for the Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) that includes modeling, experiments, and case studies indicates that effective residential fire loss mitigation must focus on the home and its immediate surroundings.” (Cohen 1999: Abstract emphasis added) Such alternatives and analyses must include allowing all or some natural ignitions to burn in and around the project area. The Sierra Club continues our strong commitment to the safety of the public, our community, USFS employees, and for emergency responders. We will continue to assist the BTNF and community members to seek and achieve sustainable lawful management of the renowned values in the Bridger-­‐Teton and Caribou-­‐Targhee National Forests, and help protect our neighbors and communities into the future. We can further help in identifying funding and other resources to implement the actions of Firewise on the ground and on structures in our communities. “I hope that, like Aldo Leopold, who came to “think like a mountain” in respect to wolves, we can begin to think like a mountain when it comes to wildfire. If we truly begin to think like a mountain, we will come to celebrate wildfire and to welcome its presence on our landscape.” George Wuerthner 2006 We respectfully offer these comments and attachments on behalf of Sierra Club’s 2.4 million members and supporters. Please keep us apprised of any developments in this and connected issues. Sincerely, Lloyd Dorsey Conservation Director Sierra Club Wyoming Chapter Box 12047 Jackson, WY 83002 46 307-­‐690-­‐1967 [email protected] www.sierraclub.org/wyoming John Spahr Co-­‐lead Our Wild America Sierra Club 1885 E. Limber Pine Rd Jackson, WY 83001 307-­‐699-­‐0548 [email protected] and on behalf of: Ann Harvey Box 976 Wilson, WY 83014 307-­‐413-­‐0473 [email protected] Debra Patla Box 420 Moran, WY 82013 307-­‐543-­‐0975 [email protected] Wilderness Watch Gary Macfarlane Board Member Box 9175 Missoula, MT 59807 406-­‐542-­‐2048 or 208-­‐882-­‐9755 [email protected] www.wildernesswatch.org ### Palisades WSA J. Hebberger 47 References: Abendroth, D. 2013. Fire Regimes and Ecosystem Processes Report. Prepared for the Jackson Ranger District Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest. February 14, 2013 Updated February 19, 2014. Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest 2004. Decision Notice Finding of No Significant Impact and Finding of Non-­‐significant amendment BTNF Management Plan Revision of Fire Management Standards and Guidelines. Jackson, WY. Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest. April 2015. Land and Resource Management Plan as Amended. Jackson, WY. Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest. July 2015. Draft Environmental Impact Statement Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project. Jackson, WY. Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest July 2015b. Cover letter for the Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project DEIS. July 28, 2015. Signed by Dale Deiter. Jackson, WY. Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest. 2015. Fire Management Plan 2015. Jackson, WY. Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest. 2015b. Star Valley Ranch Wildland Urban Interface Maintenance Project. Scoping notice dated April 22, 2015. Afton, WY. Buhl, T. 2011. Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project. Fire and Fuels Report. Prepared for Jackson Ranger District Bridger-­‐Teton National forest. Jackson, WY. Clay, K. 2014. Code Officials: Keeping (Wild) Fire in its Place. Article in Building Safety Journal Online, Building Safety Month Maximizing Resiliency, Minimizing Risk. April 2014 pp. 35-­‐37. Cohen, Jack D. 1999. Reducing the Wildland Fire Threat to Homes: Where and How Much? USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-­‐GTR-­‐173. 1999. Fire Sciences Lab, Rocky Mountain Research Station, PD. Missoula, MT. Cohen, Jack D. 2008. The Wildland Urban Interface Fire Problem: A consequence of the fire exclusion paradigm. Forest Service Fire Sciences Laboratory. Missoula, MT. Cohen, J. Unknown year. Wildland-Urban Fire- A different approach” . USDA Forest Service Rocky
Mountain Research Station. Missoula, MT.
Courtemanch, Alyson. 2015. Project Update: Teton to Snake Project Area Aspen Mapping. January 1, 2015. 48 Dorsey, Lloyd. Ruether, K., Ratner, J., Lasley, L., Wilbur (Wilbert), C., Spahr, J., Hockett, G.. 2015. Western Watersheds Project et al. objections submitted to Nora Rasure, Regional Forester, USFS, re: Alkali Feedground FSEIS and Draft ROD. March 16, 2015. Hailey, ID. McGee, L. 2013. Scoping comments for Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project from Wyoming Outdoor Council. Submitted to BTNF March 22, 2013. Jackson, WY. National Fire Protection Association. 2014. Firewise program website www.firewise.org. Last viewed September 23, 2015. Parks, Sean A. Holsinger, L., Miller, C., Nelson, C. 2015. Wildland fire as a self-­‐regulating mechanism: the role of previous burns and weather in limiting fire progression. Ecological Applications. 25(6), 2015, pp. 1478-­‐1492. Rapp, Valerie. 2007. Tested by Fire: What Happens When Wildfires Meet Fuel Treatments? JFSP Briefs. Paper 53. US Joint Fire Science Program at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska-­‐ Lincoln. Reinhardt, E.D. et al. 2008. Objectives and considerations for wildland fuel treatment in forested ecosystems of the interior western United States. Forest Ecology and Management 256 (2008) 1997-­‐2006, 1999. As quoted in L. McGee 2013 and A. Harvey in comments on Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project 2015. Rhodes, J.J. and W. L. Baker. 2008. Fire probability, fuel treatment effectiveness and ecological tradeoffs in western U.S. public forests. The Open Forest Science Journal. 1:1-­‐7. As quoted by A. Harvey in comments on Teton to Snake Fuels Management Project 2015. Riginos, Corinna. M. Newcomb. 2015. Ecological and Economic Impacts of Climate Change on Teton
County. A study by the Charture Institute and the Teton Research Institute of Teton Science Schools.
Teton County, WY. Rojo, Anthony. 2012. An Analysis of Non-­‐Suppression Management Strategies of Unplanned Wildland Fire in the Palisades Wilderness Study Area. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for TFM 26. Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest, Jackson, WY. Scott, Joe, H. Helmbrecht, D.J, Parks, S.A., and Miller, c. 2012. Quantifying the Threat of Unsuppressed Wildfires Reaching the Adjacent Wildland-­‐Urban Interface on the Bridger-­‐Teton National Forest, Wyoming, USA. Fire Ecology Vol. 8, Issue 2, 2012:125-­‐142. Missoula, MT. Teton County, Wyoming. 2014. Community Wildfire Protection Plan. Teton County, Wyoming. Teton County Wyoming. 2012. Comprehensive Plan. Available at www.tetonwyo.org/compp/ Teton County, WY. US Forest Service. 2012. Four Mile Canyon Fire Findings. July 2012. http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr289/FourmileCanyonFireFindings_QAs.pdf 49 Westerling, A. L., Turner M.G., Smithwick, E.A., Romme, W.H., & Ryan, M.G.. 2011. Continued warming could transform Greater Yellowstone fire regimes by mid-­‐21st century. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 13165-­‐13170. Abstract only http://www.pnas.org/content/108/32/13165.abstract Wuerthner, George. 2006. The Wildfire Reader: A Century of Failed Forest Policy. Published by the Foundation for Deep Ecology. Island Press. Sausalito, CA. Wuerthner, George. 2015. Outdated ideas driving wildfire policy. Opinion in Missoulian online August 28, 2015. Typos corrected in these comments. 2011 Red Rock Fire, BTNF. Taken July 2015. L. Dorsey 50 51