Conservative Authoritarianism and Crises of Liberal Democracy in
Turkey
Introduction
This paper is aimed to exploring the crises of liberal democracy in Turkey with
regards to conservative authoritarianism. Although Turkey has been classified as a
‘flawed democracy’ for a very long time, the current regime shows that it clearly fits
the definition of competitive authoritarianism. Turkey has identified as an “illiberal
democracy” that enjoys free elections, but not basic rights and freedoms, after
previously promising a model of moderate Islamist democracy by Justice and
Development Party (AKP).
These debates become more important with my central question of how we
can explain the rise of conservative authoritarianism in Turkey under the AKP’s rule.
This paper aims to explain this phenomenon with the understanding of the AKP’s
establishment principles. This point is important because the AKP was born of the
conflict between Ozal’s conservative neo-liberalism and Erbakan’s Milli Görüş
movement. The AKP identified itself as a ‘conservative democrat’, but the AKP’s
conservative democracy transformed into conservative authoritarianism due to the
reduction of the AKP’s winning coalition in Turkey under Erdogan’s leadership.
So, the burning question is; what is the real reason of the rise of Islamism
under the AKP rule? This research offers two important phenomenons to understand
the rise of conservative authoritarianism under the Erdogan’s leadership: AKP’s
Winning Coalition and Erdogan’s Catonism.
1
AKP’s Winning Coalition
As said in the last chapters, when the AK Party established in 2001 and won
the elections in November 2002, the winning coalition included both domestic and
external supporters such as; the European countries and the United States, liberal
intellectuals within the country, moderate Islamist groups like Gülen Movement,
conservative citizens of Turkish society –as their votes determine who would be
elected in elections–, centre right voters faith-based non-profit organisations,
Western
style
business
institutions
like
TUSIAD
and
conservative
businessmen among many others like MUSIAD when the party first assumed power
in 2002. However, this coalition has begun to smaller after the second term of the
AKP period between 2007 and 2011. Some parts of society like the Western style
business sector or secular bureaucratic elites have serious concerns about the AKP
in the light of secularism. Although the conflict between the AKP and armed
forces/secular bureaucratic elites helped to democratise and normalise Turkish
politics according to liberal scholars, the second term of the AKP is when it began to
fight opponent groups in illiberal ways, but it weakly demonstrates the rise of
authoritarianism and the rise of political Islam. Indeed, the real breaking point of the
AKP’s anti-democratic governance and going to minimum winning coalition as small
as possible was after the 2011 election, in terms of the rise of political Islam.
Following the victory of the AKP in the 2011 election, the AKP’s conservative
democratic
identity
has
tumbled.
The
AKP’s
shift
towards
conservative
authoritarianism marked the end of the long-time alliance between independent, nonparty liberal democrats/moderate Islamists/centre right voters and religious
conservatives. As a result, the AKP under Erdogan’s leadership has become more
Islamic. Moreover, most of the members of AKP’s winning coalition in 2001, have
withdrawn their support to AKP after the Erdogan’s third term. Turkish society divided
into two camps after the Gezi Park Protests and the clash between AKP and
Fethullah Gülen Movement, as Erdogan’s opponents vs. Erdogan’s supporters or
Erdogan’s minimum winning coalition.
2
The coalitional politics or political alliance is explained by many scholars and
one of the well-known theories comes from De Mesquita and his colleagues as
‘selectorate theory or winning coalition theory’. This theory is directly related to
political survival of political parties or leaders in terms of democracy or
authoritarianism. The Logic of Political Survival, which has been written by De
Mesquita and his colleagues in 2003, mentions about the notion of political survival
within the concept of game theory. This theory focuses on leaders’ interest in their
political survival in the countries. Leaders must gain a winning coalition which is
formed by ‘selectorate’ to control and manage their countries easily. The three core
variables in politics, for the authors, are the size of the winning coalition needed the
size of the selectorate that the winning coalition can be drawn from, and the amount
of cash available to spread around. In small-coalition political structures like
dictatorships, leaders can stay in power through the judicious use of private rewards.
On the other hand, selectorate is large in democratic countries. Leaders in largecoalition polities therefore distribute more public goods - that is, they must actually
govern in the public interest, at least to a greater degree, to stay in power (Bueno De
Mesquita, et al, 2003).
Following of this book, De Mesquita and Alastair Smith published his wellknown work ‘The Dictator’s Handbook: Why bad behavior is almost good politics’ in
2011. De Mesquita and Smith show three political dimensions of when the political
landscape can be broken: the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate and the
winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita&Smith, 2011, p.14). The nominal selectorate,
includes every citizens who has some say in choosing the leader or political party.
The real selectorate includes those whose support is truly influential. The most
important one, a winning coalition, includes essential supporters whose support
translates into a victory for leaders. According to this theory, if the winning coalition is
small and the selectorate is large, the leader has a great chance to control the whole
country. This situation is become like authoritarian regimes or dictatorships. On the
other hand, if the winning coalition and selectorate is large, it provides the least
amount of stability to a leader’s occupancy of power, with such a system known as a
‘democracy’ (Bueno De Mesquita&Smith, 2011, p.15).Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
3
(2011,p.21) point out that; there are five basic rules leaders can use to succeed in
any system;
The first two rules are that; leaders should keep their winning coalition as
small as possible and keep their nominal selectorate as large as possible. A small
coalition helps a leader to rely on very few people to stay in power and leaders can
easily replace any troublemakers in their coalition due to the large nominal
selectorate in this theory. The authors give an example of North Korea and early
Soviet regime to understand and explain these rules within the authoritarian states
(Bueno de Mesquita&Smith, 2011, p.22). The third rule is to control the flow of
revenue. De Mesquita and Smith (2011,p.22) says that; the most effective cash flow
for leaders is one that make lots of people poor and redistributes money to keep their
supporters wealthy and Pakistan’s Zardari government is good example for this
phenomenon. The fourth rule is that the leaders should pay their supporters just
enough to support them. When Mugabe was faced with a threat from military in
Zimbabwe, he pays his army to keep his power in the country. The last rule of
leader’s political survival in authoritarian states is that they should not take money out
of their supporter’s pockets to make the people’s lives better. De Mesquita and Smith
(2011, p.23) say that; effective policy for the masses doesn’t necessarily produce
loyalty among essentials and it’s darn expensive to boot. Myanmar’s General Thans
Shwe controlled food relief and sold his military supporters rather than letting aid go
to the people during the 2008 Nargis cyclone (De Mesquita&Smith, 2011, p. 23-24).
As said before, the AKP’s history has some similarities in terms of De
Mesquita and Smith’s political survival rules. Especially the first two rules have been
implemented by Recep Tayyip Erdogan between 2007 and 2014. Although De
Mesquita uses the example of third world countries under dictatorships rules, I try to
engage this theory with the example of AKP. Indeed, nominal selectorate for AKP is
every Turkish citizen who choose the leader of Turkey. As we said before, the AKP
government was established with big support from a large coalition, which included
liberals and centre-right views. It means that, this coalition shows the ‘real
selectorate’ of AKP.
AKP has taken important steps with national reform
4
programmes in terms of democracy and human rights. Real selectorate’s effect is
influential for these improvements As a result; this coalition has survived until 2007.
AKP started to fight opponent groups after 2007 and I think that AKP’s coalition
started to dwindle due to this conflict. After 2011, the support of liberals and centreright actors decreased due to AKP’s autocracy. AKP’s winning coalition has become
smaller it was in than first years of AKP. Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP government
should keep their nominal selectorate as large as possible. Nearly 50 per cent of
Turkish citizens voted for the AKP’ in the 2011 and November 2015 elections; they
are considered to be the ‘nominal selectorate’ and choose a leader and political party
to govern Turkey. The main result of this phenomenon is the change in Erdogan’s
and the AKP’s policy after 2011. The ex-members of the AKP’S winning coalition,
such as liberals, centre-rights, Kurds, moderate Islamists, etc., regard themselves as
‘secular and liberal’. Therefore, Erdogan must be forced to become more
conservative and more authoritarian during the third term of the AKP. However, De
Mesquita’s and his colleagues’ approach has experienced various problems in
exploring this phenomenon.
Indeed, De Mesquita and his colleagues offer a positivist approach within the
IR theory and their political survival theories based on the quantitative methods
especially in their book of ‘The Logic of Political Survival’. Moreover, they claim that;
the control of the whole economy helps to create an authoritarian regimes in the
states such as the African countries. I believe that, this is an American approach
against the third world countries and has many problems in terms of the colonial or
imperial legacies. As mentioned above, the other three rules are related to the
economic policy in the countries. Although Erdogan creates his oligarchs who
support him as a leader, there is no certain evidence that the Erdogan government
control the whole economy in Turkey. It is clear that; the relation between Erdogan’s
political survival and the rise of conservative authoritarianism in Turkey need to be
explained by other factors such as cultural or social images or Erdogan’s discourse.
So, this research needs to explore Erdogan’s political survival and his winning
coalition with regards to the discourse analysis rather than the De Mesquita’s
positivist and economic-based approach. This chapter focuses on the Barrington
5
Moore’s Catonism in order to understand Erdogan’s conservative/authoritarian
discourse and the rise of Islamism under the AKP.
Barrington Moore’s Catonism: The Case of Erdogan
As discussed above, Erdogan’s political survival is directly related to the rise of
Islamism and authoritarianism in Turkey under the AKP, but De Mesquita and his
colleagues’ approach is not enough to explain this phenomenon. This research will
try to explore Barrington Moore’s well known thesis, ‘Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World’ with regards
to the Erdogan and AKP’s policy. Before exploring this relation, this study
summarizes Moore’s book. Moore’s thesis is a comparative analysis of America,
England, France, India, China and Japan in terms of their modernization process.
Moore (1966, p.413) offers three alternative routes for these countries in order to
understand their modernisation history:
1) Capitalist Democratic Route: This route was exemplified by Britain,
France and United States. The successful bourgeoisie revolution which
commercializes
and
modernizes
the
countryside
and
assimilates
aristocracy and peasantry into the modern economy in these countries.
The presence of strong bourgeoisie class causes democratization in
capitalist democratic route. The peasant has been eradicated by the
bourgeoisie and the aristocracy allied itself with the bourgeoisie or failed to
oppose its democratizing efforts. As a result, capitalism and parliamentary
democracy combined after a series of bourgeoisie revolutions in these
countries.
2) Capitalist Reactionary Route: The conservative revolution has been
occurred in some countries like Japan and Germany, Moore explains these
countries within the capitalist reactionary route. According to Moore, the
6
bourgeoisie revolution is either aborted or never takes place in these
countries. The capitalist transformation has been managed by industrial
and landed elites rather than bourgeoisie and there is a huge conservative
alliance between elites and aristocratic elements against the peasantry. As
a result, this alliance bolstered an autonomus, occasionally state capable
of being controlled by fascist leader within the concept of conservative
revolution.
3) Communist Route: This route has been realized in China and Russia
which is affected by communist revolution. Urban classes and bourgeoisie
were too weak to constitute even a junior partner in order to process
capitalist transformation in these countries. The peasantry was strong and
independent enough from aristocracy. A huge and alienated peasantry
provided the main revolutionary force and communist regimes emerged
from revolution by peasants.
The Importance of Moore’s thesis in the case of Turkey and AKP
As mentioned above, Barrington Moore focuses to explore the origins of
dictatorship and democracy with some cases like Germany or Japan. Indeed,
Turkey’s early Republican period under the Mustafa Kemal’s regime may become a
case for Moore’s thesis. Following the abolishment of the Caliphate, Mustafa Kemal’s
regime began a social and cultural revolution in order to achieve civilisation and the
Westernisation process. He and his associates aimed at transforming all the cultural
and symbolic aspects associated with the Islamic way of life, including equal rights
for women, reforming the language, and the creation of a new national and cultural
identity, that of being Turkish. However, Mustafa Kemal changed the direction from a
reformist liberal approach to militant and authoritarian secularism and modernisation
process due to the lack of bourgeoisie in Turkey. Some of the authors like Murat
Belge make a connection between early republican period of Turkey and Moore’s
reactionary route as fascist countries. Murat Belge; in his book which called “Militarist
Modernisation: Germany, Japan and Turkey” discusses modernization process of
Turkey and defends modernization became exist under the control of army as Japan
7
and Germany (Belge, 2011). The document, unlike Moore, the axis of the comparison
is not feudal property relations and soil but militaristic approach and the role of army.
Indeed, Kemalist modernisation process may become Moore’s one of the
cases such as Germany and Japan in terms of the capitalist reactionary and
authoritarian routes in modernisation process. However, Moore’s perspective can be
expanded as AKP’s and Erdogan’s history with regards to the last part of Moore’s
book and his point of Catonism (Moore, 1967, p.484). Moore focuses economic
relations between the classes in order to explain the modernisation process of the
countries and economy is one of the most important indicators for democratic or
authoritarian states. Moore rejects the assumption that the behavior of a class in any
particular situation is determined by the "economic factor" rather than the "religious
factor" or the "diplomatic factor." Social class is the unit of analysis, but in its cultural,
ideological, and political concreteness, not only in terms of its members' abstract
economic interests. However, in the last part of his book, he mentions the
conservative or radical imagery for understanding the origins of dictatorship in Asian
and European countries like Japan or Germany. According to Moore, radical and
conservative rhetoric help to control the whole country within the authoritarian
regimes. Moore gives a very good example from the ‘Cato the Elder’ to explain this
phenomenon and this research tries to engage Cato/Catonism with AKP’s policy
under the Erdogan’s leadership.
Cato the Elder
Marcus Porcius Cato, as known Cato the Elder or Cato the Censor, was a
Roman senator and historian known for his conservatism and anti-Helenization in
Rome. Cato was born of plebeian stock and fought as a military tribune in the Second
Punic War. His oratorical and legal skills and his rigid morality attracted the notice of
the patrician Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who helped him begin a political career
at Rome. Cato was elected quaestor (205), and praetor (198) in Sardinia, where he
8
suppressed usury.1 Following of these successful developments for the Cato, he has
elected as ‘censorship’ (who was responsible for maintaining the census,
supervising public morality, and overseeing certain aspects of the government's
finances) in 184.
Cato’s censorship period in Rome demonstrated the clash between the old
and the new due to the Cato’s conservative policies. Cato believes that; the Roman
people are influenced by Greek traditions (Forde, 1975). Cato wished to restrain all
elements in traditional Roman life, the Senate, the People, the Latins and Italians and
to keep them within the traditional concept which history had prescribed for them
(Scullard, 1973, p.153) Scullard (1973, p.154) points out that, Cato championed the
last real attempt of the old-fashioned Romans to re-establish a more austere manner
of life in face of the social and moral decline which was resulting from Rome’s
expansion in the Mediterranean world and her contacts with the East. Roman Empire
was a transition in progress. According to Cato, intellectual power and arts were
provided by the monopoly of philosophical education which is affected by Greeks.
Bajram (2014,p.7) points out that, Cato the Elder stood for punishing anyone who
misuses public goods, as well as anyone who acts contrary to the moral norms in the
family. For instance, he managed to expel Manilius who was a candidate for consul
because he hugged his wife in public, before their own daughter (Bajram, 2014,p.8).
Moreover, he opposed woman’s spending on luxury in Rome and he wanted to
control the family life during his censorship (Forde, 1975).
It is clear that Cato tried to prevent a Greek influence on Roman people. He
believed that this influence is dangerous and threatens to undermine traditional
Roman education and the upbringing of young people; thus there is a strong Roman
tradition. New or open-minded developments/understandings of issues were
unacceptable for him due to the threat of a Greek influence (Astin 1978,340).
However, Cato’s method of preventing a Greek influence has some anti-democratic
features. For instance, Cato claims that if people are affected by a Greek influence
and opposed to traditional Roman values, they must be tried by courts in Rome
1
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Marcus-Porcius-Cato-Roman-statesman-234-149-BC
9
(Kuloglu,1990,p.323). Most of the opponents of Cato’s censorship were heavily
pressurised by Cato due to his conservative and authoritarian style. Cato believed
that Greeks or foreigners wanted to destroy the Roman people and his
paranoid/xenophobic thoughts were revealed in, for instance, a letter to his son;
“In due course, my son Marcus, I shall explain what I found out in Athens
about these Greeks, and demonstrate what advantage there may be in looking
into their writings (while not taking them too seriously). They are a worthless and
unruly tribe. Take this as a prophecy: when those folk give us their writings they
will corrupt everything. All the more if they send their doctors here. They have
sworn to kill all barbarians with medicine—and they charge a fee for doing it, in
order to be trusted and to work more easily. They call us barbarians, too, of
course, and Opici, a dirtier name than the rest. I have forbidden you to deal with
doctors” (Astin, 1978, p.332).
Indeed, Cato the Elder has combined both conservatism and authoritarianism
with regards to his Anti-Hellenistic perspective in Rome. Scullard (p.156) says that;
Cato, like his great rival Scipio, could not justly claim the title of statesman, but at
least he tried to re-establish that widespread sense of duty and moral responsibility
which was the prerequisite of any far-reaching reforms. This Cato’s politics is
transformed into Catonist policies and Catonism by Barrington Moore’s thesis and is
used to understand the reactionary/conservative images in authoritarian states.
Catonism
Barrington Moore defines Catonism in his book Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy as "advocacy of the sterner virtues, militarism, contempt for
'decadent' foreigners and anti-intellectualism" (Moore,1966, p.484). Moore is inspired
by Cato the Elder’s life and his policy in Rome to explore the Catonist policies in the
world. This research classifies the important notions of the Catonism with regards to
the Moore’s thesis:
10
a) Anti-Intellectualism: As said above, Cato the Elder against the antiintellectual environment in Rome due to the threat of Greek in his lands.
Cato believes that; anti-intellectualism comes from Hellenistic ideas and it
is a serious threat for the protection of traditions in Rome. This perspective
can be used to understand Catonist policies with regards to the antiintellectualism. Indeed, the main issue for Catonists is the moral
regeneration in the society. Moore (1966, p.489) says that; it is a good
working rule to be suspicious about political and intellectual leaders who
talk mainly about moral virtues; many poor devils are liable to be badly
hurt. It is not quite correct to assert that the morality lacks content;
Catonism seeks a specific kind of regeneration, though it is easier to
specify what Catonism is against than what it is for (Moore, 1966, p.489490).
b) Traditionalism: Cato the Elder claims that; Rome should be prevented the
threat of Greek with protecting the Roman traditions. His speeches before
the Senate included traditional beliefs in terms of certain issues from the
everyday life. He always stood for the established custom and moral
regeneration, opposing the impacts brought by the new time and the new
constellation of relations from Hellenistic ideas. As a result of Cato’s
perspective, Barrington Moore points out the other important rule for
Catonism as ‘traditional politics’. Moore (1966, p.490) indicates that; the life
in Catonism is supposed to be an organic whole. ‘Organic’ and ‘whole’ are
favourite terms for Catonist policies. The organic life of the countryside is
better than modern urban civilization or modern science in Catonism.
Moore (1966, p.491) says that; traditional religious piety with archaising
overtones becomes fashionable. The case of Japanese Shinto or
Germany’s concepts of ‘Gemeinschaft, Genossenchaft,Heimat’ are an
example of this phenomenon according to Moore (Moore, 1966, 491-492)
c) The importance of family: When this research looks at the Cato the
Elder’s life, the importance of family and family environment is one of the
most important issues in order to protect Roman tradition from the
Hellenistic influence. Cato raised his son, Marcus, with the concept of
11
traditional family values in Rome. This Cato’s point of family life was
reflected to Catonism. Moore gives an example of Nazi Germany’s family
police ‘Kinder, Kirche, Küche’ (is a German slogan translated as “children,
kitchen, church”. At the present time it has a derogative connotation
describing an antiquated female role model) which offers a healthy
domestic environment for womens (Moore, 1966, p.493). Moore explains,
sex has to be the basis of the home, the family, the state. Modern urban
civilization has made human relationship as ‘cold’ and ‘impersonal’ and
human warmth seems to be as decisive an element as the notion of moral
regeneration (Moore, 1966, p.493-494).
d) Art must be traditional: Cato the Elder criticized the new developments in
Roman art because he believes that; these developments have come from
the Greek and it has threatened the Roman tradition. According to
Catonists, art must be health and traditional. Moore (1966, p.494) explores
the main features of Catonist arts as below; “Catonistic artistic notions
center around folk and provincial art, an effort on the part of educated
urban classes to revive peasant costumes, dances and celebrations. Once
sharing power, it seems that the Catonist outlook on art merges with a
general tendency noticeable in all regimes concerned with maintaining
social cohesion, to promote traditional and academic art forms”. Moore
gives an example of Nazi and Stalinist art in order to understand the
traditional art in Catonism (Moore, 1966, p.495).
e) Anti-rationalism and anti-modernism with lower-class mythology:
Modern life and modern civilization has been shaped by Greek or
Hellenistic lifestyle in Rome according to Cato the Elder and he stands
against this threat for Roman tradition. Moreover, he opposed the luxury
because he came from the upper-class in Rome. These two important
notions have been combined by Barrinton Moore’s Catonism. Indeed,
Catonism attributed to peasants because they should be one of the
important actor in the society against the bourgeoisie and aristocracy.
Modernization and rationalization demoralizes honest peasants and
liberalism damages small farmers in the economy. As a result of this
Catonism provides the critics of rationalism/liberal democracy. Moore
shows the difference between liberalism and Catonism and he says; “… In
12
aristocratic liberalism they are brought together as intellectual weapons
against irrational authority. Catonism, on the other hand, lacks of any
conception of pluralism or the desirability of checks on hierarchy and
obedience” (Moore, 1966, p.497).
Examples from Catonism in the World
Although Catonist policies are based on the teaching of Cato the Elder’s life,
there are some specific country examples of Catonism in the 20th century. Moore
(1966, p.489) points out that; modern versions of Catonism arise too out of the
adoption by the landed upper classes of repressive and exploitative methods in
response to the increasing intrusion of market relationship into an agrarian economy.
Junker circles in Germany or the Nöhon-shugi movement in Japan was an example
of Catonism in the 19th century. Catonism was an important component in the fascist
countries in Europe like Italy and Germany in the 20 th century. Moreover, Moore
gives a case of Chiang Kai-shek’s political leadership in China to explore the
Catonism in the Asia (Moore, 1966, p.490).
The other modern versions of Catonism are mentioned by other scholars
within the European, Asian or African authoritarian regimes. For instance, Gideon
Sjoberg (1964) applied Moore’s Catonism to Portugal under the Salazar regime. As
mentioned above, Catonism refers to a repressive social order that supports those in
positions of power, prevents new developments like revolution that would probably
affect the peasantry, and opposes progressive social changes in the societies. Moore
claims that; peasant’s attachments to soil should become ‘subject of much praise but
little action’. This perspective of Moore’s Catonism was well substantiated by the
pastoral ideology of Salazar in the Portugal. This ideology was based on a
romanticised vision of a rural way of life rather than modern and urban civilization
(Sjoberg, 1964, p.128). Brettell (2003, p.65) says that; the pastoral ideology was
designed to suppress any feelings of class antagonism or animosity. Peasants must
13
be forced to accept the class difference with the aggrandizing the rural life by Salazar
regime.
One of the other important examples comes from Moi’s authoritarian regime in
Kenya. Daniel arap Mori is a former Kenyan politician who served as the second
President of Kenya from 1978 to 2002. Michael Chege explains that; Catonism is
useful to understand Moi’s populism in Kenya. Chege summarizes how the Catonism
works in Kenya under the Moi’s regime as below;
“… Defence to ordinary rural people is a canon of the Moi regime. It was
central to Ujamaa, and it is a recurring theme in radical Kenyan creative writing
like that of Ngugi wa Thiongo. That Moi’s brand populism took such a repressive
turn owes more to the poorly reasoned and corrupting zeal that characterized its
implementation than to any substantive generic difference from the other
manifestations of populism. On the economic plane Catonism finds succor in
physiocratic notions of peasants as the sole producers of economic surplus,
which subsequently is appropriated by other parasitic classes, often in collusion
with foreigners. For solutions, it dotes on wholesale spiritual regeneration and
abhors mass industrial urbanism, which is seen as spiritually corrupting and
dehumanizing”. (Chege, 1994, p.281)
According to Chege, in both its left and right wing cases, Catonism assigns
moral regeneration to the peasants. Elements of these ideas can be found in varying
combination in the socialist Tanzania of the 1960’ and the capitalist Kenya of the
1980’s (Chege, 1994, p.281-282).
Moore’s thesis on Turkey: Erdogan’s Catonism
As mentioned in the last chapters, the rise of Islamism and authoritarianism in
Turkey under the AKP can be explained in terms of Erdogan’s political survival.
However, political survival theories, like the winning coalition theory, led by De
14
Mesquita and his colleagues, face certain methodological problems in explaining this
phenomenon. Quantitative methods and the positivist approach are not useful for
understanding the rise of political Islam under the AKP. This research offers political
discourse analysis to combine Moore’s Catonism and Erdogan’s political survival to
explain the main hypothesis.
“We have seen that political discourse analysis first of all should be able
to define its proper object of study: What exactly is 'political discourse'? The
easiest, and not altogether misguided, answer is that political discourse is
identified by its actors or authors, viz., politicians. Indeed, the vast bulk of studies
of political discourse is about the text and talk of professional politicians or
political institutions, such as presidenta and prime ministers and other members
of government, parliament or political parties, both at the local, national and
international levels” (Van Dijk, 1997, p.12).
As seen Van Dijk’s definition, political discourse analysis is a field of discourse
analysis which focuses on discourse in political forums (such as debates, speeches,
and hearings from politicians or political actors) as the phenomenon of interest. When
this research analyses and explores the rise of Islamism with an authoritarian style in
Turkey, it needs to use Erdogan’s discourse. Erdogan has made his winning coalition
smaller since 2007. Following this development, he must be forced to become more
conservative and authoritarian because the ex-members of his coalition identify
themselves as ‘secular’ and ‘liberal’. Erdogan has needed to change his discourse in
his speeches and policies to consolidate his supporters. Interestingly, these changes
in Erdogan’s discourse share many similarities with Moore’s Catonism.
Erdogan’s Conservative and Authoritarian Discourse
The first term of the AKP has many important developments and successions
in terms of democracy. Additionally, from 2001 to 2004, the relationship between
Turkish bourgeoisie and the AKP was rather cooperative. In fact, Turkish Western
15
style economic institutions like TUSIAD tended to describe the AKP government as
an opportunity for economic and political stability and for economic and social
transformation that the country had been longing for. As seen Moore’s thesis slogan,
‘No bourgeoisie, no democracy’, AKP has a good relations with the bourgeoisie in
Turkey and democratic stability has been in progression between 2002 and 2007.
However, the rise of authoritarianism and Islamism in Turkey has been occurred
especially after 2011 under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan. This situation has not
been caused due to the lack of bourgeoisie’s power in Turkey. Indeed there have
been some clashes between the AKP and its leader Erdogan and Western global
businessmen/ economic institutions due to the rise of Erdogan’s authoritarianism/ the
creation of the AKP’s oligarchy and the impact of the 2008 economic crisis. Following
the 2008 economic crisis, the relations between the AKP and Western businessmen
was getting worse, but the AKP did not take a position against neo-liberalism.
Erdogan has created Islamic bourgeoisie and neo-liberal policies have continued
alongside redistributive policies in the Turkish economy during the AKP period since
2008.
Although Moore’s slogan is ‘no bourgeoisie, no democracy’, Erdogan
government shows, ‘yes bourgeoisie (Islamic), no democracy’. Indeed the important
point for AKP and Erdogan’s history within the Moore’s book is ‘Erdogan’s Catonist
policies and discourse’. This research looks at Erdogan’s discourse within the five
important themes of Catonism in Moore’s thesis which is mentioned above.
a) Erdogan’s Anti-Intellectualism: Recep Tayyip Erdogan was born in
Kasımpasa, which is one of the poor urban places in Istanbul. Erdogan
comes from a lower class family in Istanbul, like Cato the Elder. Politics is
always most important than other issues, like education, for Erdogan and
he has been in Turkish politics since he was young. As a result Erdogan’s
political background is superior to his educational background. This
situation affects Erdogan’s point of view, which goes against those of
intellectuals, elites or well-educated people in Turkey. When Erdogan’s
winning coalition started to become smaller after 2007, he began to show
16
his perspective on the dichotomy between ‘White Turks’ and ‘Black Turks’.
White Turks here are the well-educated, well-to-do Kemalist elites
fashioning themselves on (some of) Ataturk’s ideas.2 They are often
associated with state bureaucracy and the military. Black Turks are those
that the White Turks see as low-educated, lower-class and either still
peasants in Anatolian or rural areas or unable to have shaken off their
peasant heritage.3 Following of the Gezi Park Protests which has been
forced by these elites and White Turks of Turkish society, he speaks about
them as below:
“According to them we don’t understand politics. According to them we don’t
understand art, theatre, cinema, poetry. According to them we don’t understand
aesthetics, architecture. According to them we are uneducated, ignorant, the
lower class, who has to be content with what is being given, needy; meaning, we
are a group of negroes.”4
As seen this speech, Erdogan hates the people of elites or intellectuals in
urban or modern cities in Turkey and he has used these differences in
order to polarize the Turkish society. He said that; “In this country there is a
segregation of Black Turks and White Turks. Your brother Tayyip belongs
to the Black Turks”5. One of the other groups for the demonstrating of
Erdogan’s anti-intellectualism is ‘academics’. Before the 2011, most of the
liberal academics supported the Erdogan’s government due to his attempt
of civilization process against the role of army and peace process for
Kurdish issue. However, after the collapse of this coalition, Erdogan has
increased his critics against academics. This research gives a current
example about this phenomenon. On 11 January 2016, an initiative from
Turkey, Academics for Peace, released a petition signed by 1,128
academicians which calls on the Turkish government to end state violence
and prepare negotiation conditions with the Kurdish political movement.
There are many discussions and critics against this initiative such as
2
http://whynationsfail.com/blog/2013/2/20/black-turks-white-turks.html
http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_erdogan-says-he-is-proud-to-be-a-black-turk_391793.html
4
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12484/white-turks-black-turks-and-negroes_the-politics-o
5
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-case-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan.aspx?pageID=438&n=the-case-of-receptayyip-erdogan-2002-02-06
3
17
Erdogan’s reaction. However, Erdoğan’s reaction was mostly directed at
academicians. Erdoğan said referring to academics “lumpen”, “half-portion
intellectual”, and “crappy so-called” and he said that;
“There is no old Turkey anymore where a handful of lumpen calling themselves
intellectual, academics rule. Half-portion enlightenment, same circles have never
changed. These lumpen circles once again have showed their true faces. They
ripped off their mask. They have directly showed the terror propaganda they have
been conducting indirectly for years by means of the declaration. They can
struggle as much as they want. There is no old Turkey anymore where those selfproclaimed wise, calling themselves intellectual, academic used to rule”6.
Overall, Erdogan’s anti-intellectualism shares similarities with Cato the
Elder’s perspective. Cato believed that the Hellenistic influence and
positive impact of the intellectual environment in Rome can be threat for
the Roman tradition and lower classes in Rome. Similarly, Erdogan stands
against the intellectuals or elites in Turkey because these groups are
identified as a ‘possible enemy’ for the lower classes, who support
Erdogan/the AKP and Erdogan uses this discourse to increase his support.
b) Erdogan’s traditionalism: Erdogan would like to protect the traditional
values against the Western influence in the Turkish society during his
leadership. In his speech to Turkish graduate students going to study
abroad in 2008, Erdogan made some controversial remarks that met with
strong reactions in Turkey”s mainstream media. Erdogan said, “The poet
who penned Turkish national anthem (the Islamist Mehmet Akif Ersoy) said
that we should compete with art and science of the West; but unfortunately
we adopted the West’s immoralities that are contrary to our values”7.
As mentioned before, Cato the Elder tried to create Roman traditional
youth who is opposed the Hellenistic views. Erdogan used this metaphor in
most of speeches with regards to the creation of traditionalist and
conservative Turkish youth. One of them, he said; “we will raise a
6
7
https://bianet.org/english/politics/171334-president-erdogan-lumpen-half-portion-intellectual
http://www.jihadwatch.org/2008/01/turkish-pm-erdogan-we-got-the-immorality-from-the-west
18
generation that is conservative and democratic and embraces the values
and historical principles of its nation”.8
c) The importance of family life for Erdogan: The family life is so important
for Erdogan like the Cato’s and Catonism’s perspective about this issue.
Erdogan tries to control the whole family life and the sex for the state
interests. For instance, Erdogan has called on Turkish families to have at
least three children since 2008. He said that the strength of a nation lies in
its families and the strength of families lies in the number of their children.
“One or two children mean bankruptcy. Three children mean we are not improving
but not receding either. So, I repeat, at least three children are necessary in each
family, because our population risks aging. We are still on the good side, as we
still own a young and dynamic population. But we are slowly aging. Presently, the
whole western world is trying to cope with this problem. Please do not take our
susceptibility lightly, this is a very serious issue”.9
Moreover, Erdogan strongly opposed the birth control methods. For
example, Erdogan called abortion as a ‘murder’. 10 In May 2012, the AKP
government prepared a draft law whose stated goals were to increase
fertility across the country. The draft law aims to restrict women’s rights by
imposing an abortion ban after the fourth week of pregnancy. Indeed, all
extramarital affairs between man and women in society are big problems
for Erdogan. As a result, he has interfered the lifestyle of Turkish people
who has not been established a family. For instance, On Feb. 23 in 2012,
Prime Minister Erdogan targeted Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)
Chairman Devlet Bahçeli due to his criticism of the government in the
ongoing corruption investigation, saying: “He does not have any concept of
family. He has no such concern. We know what children mean,”11 in an
8
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/debate-on-religion-takes-over-politics-inankara.aspx?pageID=238&nID=12814&NewsCatID=338
9
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-reiterates-his-call-for-threechildren.aspx?pageID=238&nid=38235
10
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18297760
11
http://www.todayszaman.com/national_pms-discourse-over-no-family-children-offensivehurtful_341412.html
19
obvious reference to Bahçeli's unmarried status. The other speech from
Erdogan is related to mixed-gender situations in residences or student
flats. In November 2012, Erdogan promised to end mixed-sex student
residences, not only dormitories but also private student residences and
flats. Kaya (2015, p.58) points out that; many people, including the then
Prime Minister, disapprove of mixed-gender living situations as counter to
Islamic beliefs and laws. It is reported that during a closed-door meeting,
Erdogan said that ‘this is against our conservative, democratic character . .
. We witnessed this in the province of Denizli, an inland town in the Aegean
Region. The insufficiency of dormitories causes problems. Male and female
university students are living in the same accommodations. This is not
being checked’.12 As seen all these speeches, Erdogan tried to create
Turkish family values with regards to the traditional and conservative
concept such as the point view of Catonism on the family issues.
d) Traditional Art during the Erdogan’s period: According to Catonism, art
must be traditional and Erdogan has continued this Catonist policy
argument in this area. Mehmet Aksoy who is the Turkish sculptor and
called the ‘Anatolian Michelangelo’ has made the ‘Statue of Humanity’
which depicted two human figures with hands reaching out to each other in
terms of the reference of relations between Turkey and Armenia. 13
However, described the monument as a "freak" (Turkish: ucube) during a
visit to Kars in January 2011. In spite of protests, the city authority decided
to remove the statue. In April 2011, works began to demolish it. Erdoğan
insists that this was merely a question of aesthetics, yet according to The
Economist the demolition could have been an attempt to appeal to
nationalist sentiment ahead of the 2011 general election.14 According to
Erdogan, the Western art tried to influence the Turkish traditions negatively
especially in the early republican period under the Ataturk’s regime.
12
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/female-male-students-living-together-is-against-our-character-turkishpm.aspx?pageID=238&nID=57343&NewsCatID=338
13
http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_famed-turkish-sculptors-mother-earth-sculptureremoved_409057.html
14
http://www.economist.com/node/17905911
20
Erdogan gives an example of conservative/traditionalist author, Necip
Fazıl, to explain this phenomenon:
“The Turkish Republic brought a new alphabet and language as well as a new
understanding of culture and arts to Turkey. During the single party period, all of
these spheres were confined to certain templates. All of the bridges with the past
were burned and links with our traditions were slashed. While we were becoming
estranged from our own culture, Necip Fazıl managed to get us in touch with our
past and maintained that struggle with determination”.15
e) Erdogan’s lower class mythology with anti-liberalism: As discusses
above, Moore shows the importance of peasants for Catonism and this
Catonist policy agenda should aggrandise the peasants in villages rather
than the aristocracy and bourgeoisie in a country. Although Turkey does
not have the class of peasants described by Moore, Erdogan uses this
lower class metaphor in his speeches. Following the AKP’s second term,
Erdogan began to treat uneducated people as ‘Black Turks’, like himself.
Peasants or people who live in villages are completely ‘Black Turks’ in
Erdogan’s classification because these people were pressurised by
Kemalist elites during the early Republican period. ‘White Turks’ or
Kemalist
elites
have
always
mocked
them
due
to
their
uneducated/conservative identity. This research gives an example of
Erdogan’s mukhtar (local headperson in villages) meetings. Since January
2015, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has delivered monthly speeches to
mukhtars, invited in groups to his presidential palace in Ankara. The first
meeting he said that;
"They were mocking me and all my mukhtar brothers by saying 'He cannot even
be a mukhtar'. However, this nation elected me deputy, made me the Prime
Minister and then elevated me to the office of Presidency by making me the first
directly-elected President of the Republic of Turkey. I would like to sincerely
15
http://www.turkishweekly.net/2014/11/03/news/president-praises-turkish-intellectuals-heritage/
21
express that being elected by the nation is one of the highest, greatest honors of
this world. Being honored by the trust of this nation is really the highest rank of all
whether you are a mukhtar or a mayor or a deputy or the President. Our mukhtar
brothers, who are elected by the people, are in an extremely important office. The
vision to become a great state begins with the local administrations. If the
perspective and direction of the country does not match with the perspective of
our smallest administrative unit, our villages and neighborhoods, we cannot
achieve a healthy growth.”16
As seen in this speech, Erdogan demonstrates the role of peasants and
villages in the progress of the country. Similarly, Moore uses the same
metaphor for Catonist policies. Catonism claims that these speeches are
always implemented by governments that identify themselves as
‘progressive/reformist’. Erdogan uses this discourse for mukhtars and one
of these meetings he said that; “the stronger the culture of democracy gets
in houses, villages and neighborhoods, the stronger it gets in the whole
country and the higher its standards get. Actually, our mukhtars are the
essence of democracy”.17 However, Erdogan’s method for this policy is
anti-liberal in order to raise its power in the country like Catonist politicians.
“I expect support on this issue from our mukhtars as well. I know my
mukhtars are aware what kinds of people live in which house. They need to
go to their governors or police chiefs and report this to them in an
appropriate and calm manner,”18 he said. This speech reminds us George
Orwell’s cult novel, 1984 with regards to the understanding
of
authoritarianism.
16
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3406/president-erdogan-addresses-to-mukhtars-the-vision-to-become-agreat-state-begins-at-the-local-level.html
17
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3406/president-erdogan-addresses-to-mukhtars-the-vision-to-become-agreat-state-begins-at-the-local-level.html
18
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/contents/articles/originals/2015/08/turkey-erdogan-intelligence-supportfrom-headmen.html
22
Conclusion
As seen these speeches and policies, Erdogan has become like Catonist
politicians who try to control the private lives of people with the conservative agenda
in order to control the whole country and to raise his power. Additionally, Erdogan
has insulted the liberals, intellectuals, academics, elites in many times (like the
Erdogan’s heavy critics against academics in last days) and when he increased his
critics against these parts of society, the other parts (especially conservatives) of
society has supported him more than in terms of the Catonism. As said above, these
policy instruments always parallels with the happiness and progress in the countries
in the concept of Catonism. The similar situation is totally valid for the case of
Erdogan’s AKP. Erdogan and AKP government identify these developments as the
establishment of ‘advanced democracy’ in Turkey although the authoritarianism and
conservatism has been raised in Turkey under the AKP government.
Indeed, Moore’s thesis is so important to understand the Turkish
modernisation and secularisation process in the early Republican period under the
Mustafa Kemal’s regime. The case of Mustafa Kemal’s authoritarian modernisation is
process may become one of the examples for capitalist reactionary routes. Moreover,
this book is useful to analyse AKP’s conservative authoritarianism under the
Erdogan’s regime. Moore explains the notion of Catonism in order to understand the
reactionary imagery in the authoritarian states and Erdogan’s AKP is a very good
case to explore this phenomenon and combine with the Erdogan’s winning coalition
in order to explore the rise of Islamism in Turkey.
23
Bibliography
Astin, A. E. (1978), “Cato the Censor”, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bajram, Esin Kranli, ‘Conservative Roman Rhetoric of Marcus Portius Cato
(Cato the Elder)’, Iustinianus Primus Law Review, Vol. 5:2, 2014, p.1-11.
Belge, Murat, (2011), “Militarist Modernization: Germany, Japan and Turkey”,
Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinlari,
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Morrow, James; Smith, Alastair, Siverson,
M.Randolph, (2003), “The Logic of Political Survival”, The MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Smith, Alastair, (2011), “The Dictator’s
Handbook: why bad behaviour is almost always good politics”, Public Affairs, New
York.
Chege, Michael, (1994), “Swapping Developing Strategies: Kenya and
Tanzania after Their. Founding Presidents”, in David E. Apter and Cari G. Rosberg,
(eds.) Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Chariottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994, pp. 247-290.
Forde, Nels W. (1975), “Cato the Censor”. New York: Twayne.
Kaya, Ayhan, (2015), ‘Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule:
Empowering Family, Faith and Charity’, South European Society and Politics, 20:1,
47-69.
24
Kuloglu, Meliha, ‘Marcus Porcius Cato’, Ankara University Journal of
Languages and History-Geography, Vol.33, No.1, 1990, p.321-329.
Moore, Barrington, (1966), ‘Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World’, Beacon Press, Boston.
Scullard, H. H. (1973). Roman Politics, 220-150 BC (2nd ed.), Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Sjoberg, Gideon, (1964), ‘The Rural-Urban dimension in pre-industrial,
transitional and industrial societies’, in Roberrt E.L Faris, (ed.), Handbook of Modern
Sociology, Chicago: Rand McNally, pp.127-159.
Van Dijk, Teun A., Key-note address Congress Political Linguistics. Antwerp,
7-9 -December 1995. In Jan Blommaert & Chris Bulcaen (Eds.), Political
linguistics.(pp. 11-52). Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1997.
25