Defining the Other
We understand the world through oppositions. Speaking of One always implies the Other. In the
meeting between people, and in that sense in the meeting between different cultural relations, it is
always relevant to analyse how the One describes, and in that way defines the Other. The Other is in
this meeting always the one other to oneself. We could see the Other as the unknown, as the
diametrical opposite to oneself or as the stranger, a description Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman 1998) uses.
In any case, is the definition of the Other strongly related to the definition of the One defining. And
speaking of the stranger, there is an odd thing about this stranger: the stranger cannot per definition be
a stranger anymore as soon as the stranger becomes the object of a description, then the stranger
becomes known. And the question is who is a stranger anyway, and in that sense a Other? In Jacques
Derrida's terminology we are all together Other (Derrida 1996). In that sense we are all just creating
Others.
Richard Jenkins puts ‘the making of the Other’ as an external definition (Jenkins 1997), and no
matter if we are talking about individual or collective definitions, it will always be part of a social act.
Furthermore the definition of the Other will always be an act of identification. In groups we could talk
about exclusion and inclusion, where the Other is the excluded, while the One is the included. In this
case there are many power relations involved in the definition process. The meeting with and the
definition of the Other is an actual part of everyday life. This meeting and the process of definition and
identification will here be examined through a theoretical discussion.
The production and reproduction of the Other
One question arises: why do we at all produce and reproduce definitions of the Other?
As Derrida puts it: “every other is every other other, is altogether other” (Derrida: 77). We are all
other in sum; on the one hand every One is also an Other to somebody else and on the other hand
every One is per definition also an Other “in oneself” (Derrida: 77), which Derrida explains through an
otherness in the unconsciousness (Derrida 1996). In that case everybody is per definition the Other,
and therefore will the making of the Other also be the making of the One. In other words, everybody
(groups or individuals) have to define Others to define themselves.
Bauman shares the point of view, that the production or invention of what he calls “strangers” is
1
an irreducible aspect of the production of identities.
1 We will here make no distinctions between the terms Other and stranger.
1
“And they [the strangers] are, indeed, invented, zealously and with gusto – patched
together from protruding and salient or minute and inobtrusive distinction marks.
They are useful precisely in their capacity as strangers; their strangehood is to be
protected and caringly preserved.” (Bauman: 30)
Also in Bauman’s view, the strangers or the Others, are invented and in that sense socially produced.
They are here defined through “distinction marks” put upon them as groups, being signs of their
otherness. The Others are categorised in a specific way, in the category of “strangehood”. The category
is to be preserved accurately because of the process of identification. The identity draws a borderline
between the Other and the One, in the search for itself (Bauman: 30).
In general we can conclude, that One always has to define the Other, to produce an momentary
identity.
The process of producing the Other
Now that we are aware of the identity constitutional aspect of the otherness, a second question arises:
how is the Other produced? The process of production can here be either individual or collective, but
will by definition always be interpersonal and in that sense social. As Jenkins points out, would even
an individual process of definition require an audience (Jenkins: 53).
Jenkins is examining the definition process in relation to a question of ethnicity. But as we see
ethnicity as one of the key concepts in identity constructions, we also here see the question of
otherness arising. For an analytical purpose Jenkins splits the definition processes into two definitions:
“processes of internal definition” and “processes of external definition” (Jenkins: 53) and it is in the
meeting of the two processes, “that identity, whether collective or individual, is created” (Jenkins: 54).
Furthermore, in this sense he differs between "groups" and "categories" (Jenkins: 54).
Processes of internal definition take, in Jenkins description, place when individuals or groups are
defining themselves, are ascribing meaning to themselves or in other words are defining their own
identities. Processes of external definition take place when individuals or groups are being defined by
somebody else. The One is here defining the Other. Jenkins remarks, that the external process one the
one hand consensually is the validation of one identity (group or individual) by others; an external
validation of an internal definition. While there on the other hand is a conflict zone, where identities
are questioned or attributed to others – here a question of power and authority comes into play
(Jenkins: 53).
2
The differentiation between internal and external processes are, by Jenkins, explained through the
similar differentiation between groups and categories:
“A group is a self-conscious collectivity, rooted in processes of internal definition,
while a category is external defined.” (Jenkins: 54)
In this sense a group is internally defined, while a category is externally defined. A group is first of all
internally defined in its size. It is an accumulation of individuals self-aware of certain values and so
on, defining themselves as a group through inclusion and exclusion of members. Even though a group
always also will be part of external definitions, both from group members, differing themselves from
others, and from outsiders, a category is more radical in its external definition – it is mostly a
definition created by scientists analysing social relations (Jenkins: 54). If we broaden Jenkins
terminology, we could say, that the making of the Other is always an act of external definition, and in
that sense the Other will always be a category – but in this case not only created by scientist, but by
everybody in everyday life.
In Bauman’s view all societies produce strangers and each society produces strangers in its own way
2
(Bauman: 17). He sees two main reasons for this occasion: the pleasure and the sliminess of the
stranger (Bauman: 27f). On the one hand, the stranger is here sticky, greasy, disgusting and not to get
rid of. The Other is something to be afraid of and in that sense something to distinguish from:
“Each is ‘slimy’ to the other; but each fights the sliminess of the other in the name
of the purity of its own.” (Bauman: 29)
The One will also define the Other as slimy, and differentiate from the sliminess to keep pure. But, as
in Derrida’s definition, the One is always the Others Other. What we see, is in other words a dialectical
process where everybody is describing everybody else as slimy.
On the other hand “the ‘stranger’ is as pleasurable as the surfing beach” (Bauman: 28). This
analysis is for a great extent oriented in the Western World of today. We see the Other, the slimy
fellows, working in our cities, driving our taxies, cleaning our houses, making our food and so on.
2 He borrows this term from Mary Douglas’ sociological perspective on Jean-Paul Sartre’s analysis of the slimy
(Bauman: 26).
3
Seeing Bauman’s approach in perspective with Jenkins, we can again, as Derrida, say, that the
other is everywhere, because everybody is other to everybody else. We seem to understand the world
through oppositions. If we therefore see ourselves as One’s, no matter if as individuals or in groups,
we must have someone Other to differ from. This has some enormous consequences, because if the
Other is our opposite, it will always be our opposite in any relation; if we have great values, the values
of the Other must be poor; if we see ourselves as good, the Other must be evil and so on. We are
therefore producing categories in which to but the Others; e.g. as slimy, pleasurable and so on.
These categories will always be imagined, because the meeting with the Other will also be a
meeting with the unknown; a meeting with something we cannot understand with our own logic, but
certainly try to describe and categorise through our logic. The conclusion must therefore be, that the
picture the One draws of the Others, by categorising them, is a result of the One’s own logic. And in
that extend in the actual meeting, we can never examine the Other but must always examine the
remedies (e.g. discourses) of the One drawing the picture and setting up categories.
This assignment contents 1.442 words.
____________________________
Merlin Christophersen - May 2007
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Literature
•
Bauman, Zygmunt: Postmodernity and its Discontents. London, Polity Press, 1998
•
Derrida, Jacques [trans.: Prenowitz, Eric]: Archive Fever – A Freudian Impression [Mal
d’Archive: une impression freudienne]. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1996
[Éditions Galilée, 1995]
•
Jenkins, Richard: Rethinking Ethnicity. London - Thousand Oaks - New Delhi, Sage
Publications, 1997
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