The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet
Landlocked States
Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer1
Abstract: The landlocked location of several post-Soviet states has significantly
constrained their foreign policy options, helping shape their foreign policy orientations. This article asks how lack of sea access has influenced foreign policy patterns of these states. Three case studies, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan,
are ­detailed. Based on field research, including interviews with policy makers, the
case studies are used to look at maneuverability in foreign policy as well as how geographic proximity to the sea seems to be an important dividing line, distinguishing
the foreign policy orientations of the new states, especially in terms of integration
and cooperation with Europe and the United States, and relationships with Russia.
T
he breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the establishment of
nine new landlocked states. Landlocked states are ones that have no
seacoast (Glassner, 1970, p. 2). Such states are a growing phenomenon in
international political and economic systems. The breakup of the Soviet
Union and that of Yugoslavia led to a dramatic increase in the number
of landlocked states: close to half of the new states that have joined the
United Nations since 1991 are landlocked. Today, over a fifth of the world’s
states now have no direct access to the sea. Prior to the twentieth century, the number of landlocked states was trivial: 10 in all. Landlocked
states need to attain and maintain access to infrastructure and facilities in
neighboring states and they need to transit these states with their goods
in order to participate in international trade. Thus, landlocked states face
a ­powerful constraint on their foreign policy options.
Dr. Avinoam Idan teaches in the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Management, University of Haifa, [email protected]; Dr. Brenda Shaffer (corresponding
author) is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Political Science, University of Haifa, bshaffer@
univ.haifa.ac.il. The authors would like to thank Professor Benjamin Miller, Professor Markus
Fisher, Professor George Breslauer, Miles Pomper, and an anonymous reviewer for their
insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1
241
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2011, 27, 3, pp. 241–268. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.27.3.241
Copyright © 2011 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved.
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IDAN AND SHAFFER
Despite the rapidly growing proliferation of landlocked states in recent
decades, no major studies have been published on the influence of landlocked location on foreign policy. In addition, in its discussions on buffer
and neutral states, the discipline of international relations has overlooked
the fact that the great majority of these states are landlocked. In area studies on Central Asia and the Caucasus, a number of important works have
been published on the influence of landlocked location on economic and
infrastructure trends (Lloyd, 1998; Raballand, 2003). However, no studies
have examined the influence of the landlocked factor on these states’ foreign policies. In the discipline of geography, a number of studies have been
published on traits of landlocked states, but none of these looked at their
foreign policy. The geography literature on landlocked states has focused
on three aspects: (1) categorization of the geographic traits of landlocked
states (East, 1960; Glassner, 1970, 1990; Hodder, Lloyd, and McLachlan,
1998); (2) the status of landlocked states under international law ­(Glassner,
1970; Sinjela, 1983; Vasciannie, 1990; Hodder, Lloyd, and McLachlan, 1998);
and (3) the influence of location vis-à-vis the sea on economic power
(Spykman, 1938a, 1938b). Economists have looked at the economic traits
and development challenges of landlocked states ­(Hausmann, 2001; Faye
et al., 2004; Raballand, 2003; Arvis, Raballand, and Marteau, 2010).
A glance at the world map (Figure 1) shows that the post-Soviet space
is distinctive in that it encompasses a number of landlocked zones.
This article examines the foreign policy patterns of the post-Soviet
landlocked states. It attempts to identify the influence of the lack of sea
access on the particular foreign policy patterns of the landlocked states of
the former Soviet Union and on developments in the post-Soviet region.
The article details three case studies of post-Soviet landlocked states in
their first two decades after independence: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan. As new states, these countries debated and articulated their
foreign policy doctrines and orientations. These discussions provide a
window for understanding the influence their landlocked status has had
on their foreign policies. The case studies are based on field research in
these three states, including interviews with policy makers and analysis
of a number of leaders’ unpublished speeches that the authors recorded.
This article claims that landlocked states have much less maneuverability and narrower policy options than their coastal counterparts and
this affects their foreign policy decisions. Study of the landlocked factor is
a useful analytical tool in understanding foreign policies of states of this
type. In the post-Soviet space, the landlocked location of a number of the
post-Soviet states placed a significant constraint on their foreign policy
options and thus, was an important factor shaping their foreign policy
orientations. In the former Soviet space, geographic proximity to the sea
seems to be an important dividing line distinguishing the foreign political
orientations of the new states. Integration and cooperation with Europe
and the United States were enabled by the ability to trade with these states
and reduction of vulnerability to Russia’s trade and supply obstructions.
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 243
Fig. 1. The world’s landlocked states.
Analysis of the case studies suggests that the leaders and foreign policy makers of the post-Soviet landlocked states were deeply aware of their
landlocked status and often articulated it as a factor affecting their foreign
policies, for instance by integrating transportation issues into their foreign
policies. The foreign policies of the cases of landlocked states examined
in this article display three distinct characteristics: (1) a multi-directional
strategic orientation, which entails refraining from joining exclusive alliance systems and maintaining cooperation with competing alliance systems; (2) special policies toward their transit states, including significant
concessions and actions taken to foster good relations with the transit
states, stability in the neighboring states, and continuity of the transit; and
(3) investments in infrastructure in their port states. In addition, the major
energy exporters among the landlocked states also conducted a policy of
establishing multiple oil export pipelines. The dependence of landlocked
energy exporters on their transit states is more significant than that of ordinary landlocked states due to a relative lack of flexibility in finding alternative transit routes for oil and gas once infrastructure is established.
LOCATION AND FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the domestic boundaries between
Soviet republics became international borders and the majority of the new
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states were landlocked. The landlocked post-Soviet states are Belarus,
Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.2 The fact that over half of the post-Soviet
states are landlocked is an important factor that has significant influence on political and economic outcomes in a given region. While many
of the post-Soviet states may have wanted greater integration with the
West, those with access to the sea had more ability to follow such a course.
Accordingly, with the exception of Russia, all the states that have joined
or have attempted to join the Euro-Atlantic strategic and economic alliances and structures are the former Soviet states that possess seacoasts:
­Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, and Ukraine. In contrast, the landlocked states—Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and all the states
of Central Asia—have remained strongly connected to Russia economically and strategically or have adopted a balanced policy toward Russia
and the West.
Analysis of the membership of the former Soviet states in the major
military and economic groupings available to these states reveals a strong
divide in strategic orientations between landlocked and non-landlocked
states. Moscow has been much more successful in preserving its influence in the landlocked post-Soviet states than in those with coasts. Russia
succeeded in maintaining military installations primarily in landlocked
post-Soviet states. With the exception of Ukraine, all the states that still
host Russian military installations and troops are landlocked: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Table 1
presents the memberships of the former Soviet states (with the exception
of Russia) in significant economic and security organizations and military
cooperation frameworks.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has used economic tools
on numerous occasions with other former Soviet states to try to force them
to adopt certain political and economic decisions.3 Post-Soviet states were
particularly vulnerable to these sanctions as most possessed resourcebased economies. Sea access enabled the non-landlocked states to trade
globally and consequently has rendered them less vulnerable to ­Russian
economic sanctions. Due to their access to the sea, these states could mobilize alternative supplies and markets, and break their dependence on
­Moscow. Moreover, access to the sea has allowed the non-­landlocked states
to develop alternatives to the Russian infrastructure system, ­especially in
the sphere of energy, and thus renders them generally less vulnerable to
Although not landlocked, Russia itself has very limited coastal access. For an oil exporter,
such limited access generates a major policy challenge. The drive to improve its transit options
is a major vector of Russia’s economic development and foreign policies. As the former chief
of Russia’s Transneft pipeline monopoly, Semyon Vaynshtok, noted, “For Russia, transit is
a sacred cow.” Russia’s drive to build energy export pipelines that circumvent transit states
such as Ukraine is intended to reduce Moscow’s vulnerability to these states.
3
For an overview and analysis of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy, see Breslauer (2009).
2
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 245
Table 1. Memberships of Post-Soviet States in Major Economic
and Security Alliancesa
NATO
European
Union
Membership
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Requested
membership
Georgia
Ukraine
Georgia
CIS
CSTOb
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Armenia
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Source: Authors’ data.
Collective Security Treaty Organization
a
b
coercion. However, the landlocked states in the former Soviet Union that
Russia threatened with denial of transit routes or access to its markets
often could not attain alternatives. Thus, landlocked former Soviet states
were more likely than those states with access to the sea to succumb to
Moscow’s demands and ditch policies that Moscow opposed.
A number of concrete examples illustrate the effect of sea access on
the degree of vulnerability to Russian trade sanctions. In the first decade
of the twenty-first century, Moscow wielded a series of economic measures aimed at Lithuania. For instance, Russia periodically halted oil
supplies to Lithuania to pressure Vilnius to adopt certain stances on a
variety of issues such as allowing Russian companies to purchase the
Mazeikiai refinery, and it attempted to dissuade Lithuania from supporting the Eastern European deployment of a US-led missile defense shield.
The interruption of Russian oil supplies not only deprived Lithuania of
revenues from the refinery but also created the need to acquire oil for
its own consumption from new sources. However, the Mazeikiai refinery is linked to the port of Butinge, which allows Lithuania to import oil
and substitute oil from other sources for the Russian pipeline deliveries.
While Lithuania did lose revenue from the loss of the Russian oil transit and refining, ­Vilnius was able to persevere in its policies since it did
not lose access to vital commodities due to their substitution by imports
at its ports. Russia also wielded formidable economic sanctions against
­Georgia in its attempts to sway Georgia’s policies in the two years leading
up to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. In spring 2006, Russia imposed a ban
on imports of ­Georgian wine, mineral waters, and agricultural produce,
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claiming ­“sanitary and ­epidemiological dangers” from the Georgian products. Until this ban, Russia was the primary market for these products,
and these goods were the Georgian economy’s primary output. Moscow
increased its economic pressure in October 2006 by adding the sanction of
cutting all air, sea, land, and railway links with Georgia as well as postal
communications. Because of its sea access, Georgia was able to find substitute markets for its goods, and the country’s economic growth in 2006 was
strong (8.5 percent) despite the loss of the Russian market. Consequently,
the measures did not lead to any modification of Georgia’s policy goals of
joining NATO and the European Union and hosting US troops.
In contrast, the landlocked post-Soviet states were much more vulnerable to Moscow’s military sanctions and changed their political
paths when Russia applied economic sanctions. For instance, through
most of the post-Soviet period, Turkmenistan has continued to export
the bulk of its natural gas to Russia, despite the relatively low price it
receives from ­Moscow. Turkmenistan has expressed an interest in building a trans-­Caspian natural gas export pipeline to link up with an export
route through ­Azerbaijan. However, Russia has disrupted Ashkhabad’s
gas exports through Russian territory each time Turkmenistan has taken
concrete steps in this direction. Likewise, Kazakhstan has refrained from
building a trans-Caspian oil export pipeline that would join the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan network, bowing to Russian pressure. The exception to this
trend is Azerbaijan, which has established its main transit route through
neighboring ­Georgia and thus, is less vulnerable to Russian dictates. Even
here, since the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, Azerbaijan has moved closer to
the pattern followed by the other landlocked states. That conflict made
it clear that the ­Azerbaijan-Georgia transit route is still vulnerable to
­Russian military action. Following the war, Baku initiated gas exports to
Russia and it has subsequently expanded these exports (Mammadyarov,
2010).
Three of the nine post-Soviet landlocked states face special challenges
since they are major energy exporters. These are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan. Production and export of oil from landlocked producers is a quite different process than production and export of oil from
coastal states. Today, oil is primarily transported to world markets by sea
tankers, and few international pipelines to export oil have been built in
recent decades. Oil trade by sea is a predominantly commercial transaction with little room for politics to impact the flow of supply. In contrast, landlocked oil exporters establish pipelines to export their oil and
subsequently depend on transit states for the export of what is generally
their largest and thus most strategic product. The permanent nature of the
infrastructure between suppliers and consumers makes such shipments
far more vulnerable to disruption and to political manipulation along the
supply line (Shaffer, 2009a). This is similar to the risks faced in the natural
gas trade. In addition, gas export from landlocked states is especially complicated since it must involve transit states. Natural gas supply involving
transit states is generally less stable than direct supplies (Shaffer, 2009a).
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 247
Moreover, due to the high cost of building energy export pipelines,
the lengthy time factor in mobilizing finance and building the pipelines,
and the geographic limitations on venues, energy-importing and energyexporting states are limited in their supply venue options, and it takes
years to establish alternative routes if a transit state disrupts the supply
flow. In addition, the power of the transit states grows after infrastructure
has been built since importing and exporting states have little flexibility
once a pipeline is in place. Consequently, the dependence of landlocked
energy exporters on their transit states is more significant than that of
ordinary landlocked states, which may at least be able to take advantage
of multiple road and rail options to move other types of goods. Accordingly, in the post-Soviet space, the influence of the landlocked factor on
the foreign policy pattern and leaders’ articulation of awareness of this
factor is even more pronounced among the energy-exporting landlocked
states than the non–energy exporters.
To reduce their vulnerability, the landlocked energy exporters in the
former Soviet Union have adopted the very expensive and complicated
policy of establishing multiple export infrastructure. This policy is quite
exceptional in comparison to the policies of oil exporters that possess seacoasts; these do not tend to establish multiple export venues.
While vulnerable to disruption of their main export item, at the same
time, energy-exporting landlocked states enjoy the asset of high inter­
national interest focused on them. Therefore, the energy-exporting landlocked states have succeeded more than their energy-poor landlocked
counterparts in conducting multi-directional foreign policy and cooperation. This multi-directional foreign policy pattern contrasts with the
­foreign policy conducted by the majority of the non-landlocked oil exporters: the majority of the top 10 oil and natural gas exporters have adopted
a clear foreign policy orientation. For instance, a large percentage of the
top oil and gas exporters conduct strategic cooperation with the United
States.
CASE STUDIES: KAZAKHSTAN, AZERBAIJAN,
AND UZBEKISTAN
Study of the new states that were established after the fall of the Soviet
Union creates a fruitful opportunity for understanding the influence of
the landlocked factor on these states’ foreign policies. As the heads of new
states, their leaders debated and articulated their strategies and openly
referred to this factor in state documents, parliamentary debates, and
their speeches and writings. The case studies selected for analysis include
two energy exporters (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) and one non–energy
exporter (Uzbekistan).
The fall of the Soviet Union created a number of regional systems in
which the influence of the landlocked factor is prominent. As Figure 2
shows, all of the states of post-Soviet Central Asia are landlocked. Of the
three states of the Caucasus, only Georgia has sea access. Three of the
Fig. 2. Landlocked states of Central Asia and the Caucasus.
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FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 249
post-Soviet landlocked states border the Caspian Sea. However, this body
of water is an inland sea and does not allow open sea access to its coastal
states.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is the world’s largest landlocked state. Since independence, Kazakhstan has been led by President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The
state borders Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
Kazakhstan also borders on two inland seas, the Caspian Sea and the
Aral Sea. Three of Kazakhstan’s neighbors are also landlocked states:
­Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
Kazakhstan’s economy is based primarily on exporting natural
resources, first and foremost, oil. Oil constitutes 60 percent of ­Kazakhstan’s
exports and is the source of 40 percent of the government’s revenue. In
the Soviet period, all of Kazakhstan’s oil was transported by pipeline to
­Russia. At independence in 1991, Kazakhstan made the strategic decision
to focus on developing its oil production and exporting it as the major
source of income for the new state. In contrast to coastal states, which
export their oil primarily by tankers, Kazakhstan faced a decision early
on about the route for the state’s major oil export pipelines. Thus, from
its inception Kazakhstan was clearly aware of its unique predicament as
a landlocked state and integrated this consideration into its early state
strategies.
Study of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy reveals significant influence of
the landlocked factor. There are clear expressions of the fact that their
policies aimed to address the landlocked challenge, including: (1) a multidirectional foreign policy; (2) the use of multiple pipelines in its oil export
policy; (3) large investments in transport and export infrastructure in port
and transit states; and (4) distinctive concessions to transit states.
Leaders’ Perspectives
Almost from independence, Kazakhstan’s leaders openly articulated their awareness of the state’s landlocked status and the accompanying political, economic, and security challenges. President Nursultan
­Nazarbayev and Foreign Minister Kasim-Zhomart Tokayev, who served
as Foreign Minister (1994–1994 and 2003–2007) and Prime Minister (1994–
2002), frequently commented on the influence of the landlocked issue on
Kazakhstan’s policies. In addition, the landlocked factor appeared in the
young state’s first national security documents and its formal documents
on principles of foreign policy.
In one of his early speeches laying out the basic principles of Kazakhstan’s national security strategy and foreign policy, Nazarbayev asserted
the influence of the state’s landlocked situation:
[T]he lack of direct outlet to the open seas and communicative
resources makes the republic’s participation in international
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e­ conomic relations difficult. … For the development of trade and
economic relations with other countries and the greater diversification of these relations, it’s essential that Kazakhstan secure for
itself, in accordance with contemporary law, unimpeded access to
the sea. Without the consolidation and specification of this right
with neighbors in bilateral treaties and agreements, Kazakhstan
will find itself in a dependent position, which could undermine
not only its economic, but its political independence (quoted in
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, May 16, 1992).
Nazarbayev stated that because of Kazakhstan’s lack of access to
the sea, the state should devote special attention to developing cooperative relations and “complete trust with contiguous states, primarily with
­Russia and China, which, for us, are the gates to world lines of communication. At the same time we are studying the possibility of an outlet to
the Mediterranean and Black Sea via the Caspian, southward” (quoted in
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, May 16, 1992).
Kazakhstan has undertaken a special role in promoting the interests of
landlocked states in international and regional fora. Kazakhstan hosted the
United Nations’ Ministerial Conference of Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries in 2003. This forum produced the Almaty Programme
of Action of the United Nations (Almaty Programme of Action, 2003),
which is the most recent major UN document addressing the needs of
landlocked states. An additional vector of its activity to promote the status
of landlocked states has been within the framework of its 2010 Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Kazakhstan has declared on numerous occasions that one of its main goals
of its chairmanship is promotion of the rights of landlocked states.
“Multi-vector” Foreign Policy
After the Soviet breakup, the new states adopted strategic orientations toward global and regional powers. Kazakhstan clearly articulated
adoption of what it termed a “multi-vector” foreign policy that strives to
­balance the foreign relations of the new states with all the major global
and regional powers: Russia, China, United States, Iran, and Turkey. By
refusing to join an exclusive alliance system, Kazakhstan maintains multiple transit options.
As part of its multi-vector foreign policy, Kazakhstan has joined
a large number of regional security organizations, many of which possess contradictory orientations and which are led by opposing powers,
including Russia, the United States, and China. For instance, Kazakhstan
is a member of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States’
(CIS) Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) at the same time
that it participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and has developed
an ­Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. Kazakhstan’s
troops conduct maneuvers with both of these alliances and also with the
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 251
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Kazakhstan has also sent a military
contingent to the US-led operation in Iraq since summer 2003.
In addition, Kazakhstan has also been an initiator and active player in
multiple regional cooperation organizations that can help sustain transit
options for the state. For instance, Kazakhstan was one of the initiators in
establishing the CIS after the Soviet breakup. The CIS’s founding document is known as the “Almaty Declaration.” The influence of the landlocked factor was clear in this decision: Nazarbayev stated in the young
state’s first major foreign policy program document that the preservation
of the CIS means “assurance of the transit of our freight to Europe and the
Near East” (quoted in Kazakhstanskaya pravda, June 4, 1992).
Kazakhstan and most of the other post-Soviet landlocked states were
the most adamant voices arguing for preserving several different forms
of formal cooperation between the former Soviet states that are centered
on Russia. These frameworks facilitate continuation of transit. Along with
other landlocked states, Kazakhstan was part of the nucleus of post-Soviet
states that promoted preservation of frameworks such as the CIS Customs
Union and the Eurasian Economic Community for a post-Soviet united
economic market. Nazarbayev also opposed establishment of customs
points with its post-Soviet neighbors and other impediments to trade
(quoted in Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino, February 18, 1992).
Multiple Oil Export Pipelines
In contrast to sea-abutting oil exporters, which tend to export to
world markets via tankers from their sea ports, landlocked Kazakhstan
had to establish export pipelines through neighboring transit states.
­Kazakhstan’s potential export venue options for its oil were Russia’s Black
Sea ports, Georgia’s Black Sea ports (transit through or under the ­Caspian
Sea and through Azerbaijan), Turkey’s Mediterranean ports (transit
through or under the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan and Georgia),
Iran’s ­Persian Gulf ports (through or under the Caspian Sea), and directly
to China (with no access to world markets). Kazakhstan adopted the most
costly option of establishing multiple export pipelines (see Figure 3). This
way, however, Kazakhstan is less vulnerable to the whims or instabilities
of a single transit state. Foreign Minister Tokayev articulated ­Kazakhstan’s
multiple pipeline policy quite clearly:
Geographically, Kazakhstan is a landlocked country, so we have
to think about how we could transport our hydrocarbons to the
external markets. Our view is quite simple. The more pipelines we
will have, the better this will be for Kazakhstan (Tokayev, 2003).
The first and the main export pipeline that Kazakhstan established in
the post-independence period is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).
Inaugurated in 2001, it transits Russian territory and ends at Russia’s Black
Sea port of Novorossiysk. Kazakhstan also exports oil to Russia through a
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direct pipeline link to the Russian oil distribution system (Atyrau-Samara).
Kazakhstan has also built a smaller-volume export pipeline to China (the
Atasu-Alashankou pipeline) that became operational at the end of 2005.
In addition, Kazakhstan sells oil to Iran’s northern provinces.4 Tehran
in turn exports additional supplies to world markets at its Persian Gulf
ports, saving transportation costs to both sides. Additionally, Kazakhstan
sends limited amounts of oil for export by barge across the Caspian Sea
via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. Kazakhstan also exports oil
from Georgia’s Batumi port, first shipping it by barge across the Caspian
Sea and then by rail to Georgia.
Investments in Infrastructure in Port States
From the early period of its independence, Kazakhstan has focused
the activity of state-controlled financial institutions such as KazTransGas
and the Kazakhstan State Investment Fund on acquiring ownership of
export infrastructure in its port states. Kazakhstan focused these investments on Georgia’s Black Sea ports, and, to a lesser degree, on Baltic Sea
ports. Kazakhstan’s government authorities did not invest in Russian or
­Chinese ports since these states would not have allowed foreign control
and management of their infrastructure. In contrast, Georgia courted
investments from Kazakhstan state enterprises and encouraged it to
acquire Georgian ports as its own property (Papava, 2008). During a 2000
visit senior Kazakhstani officials made to Georgia’s Black Sea ports, former
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze stated openly, “Let these ports
be Kazakhstan’s property” (quoted in Interfax, April 27, 2000). In addition to economic motives, Tbilisi aimed to foster Kazakhstan’s interest in
Georgia’s stability. As Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Karim ­Massimov put
it, “One of the highest priorities of Kazakhstan is the stability of Georgia”
(Massimov, 2006). Subsequently, in 2007 Kazakhstan became Georgia’s
largest foreign investor.
Distinctive Foreign Policy toward Transit States
In order to foster good relations with its transit states, Kazakhstan
carried out very accommodating policies toward its neighboring transit
states in a number of spheres. First, Kazakhstan presented very conciliatory positions on border delimitations with China, Russia, and Uzbekistan.
This policy included Kazakhstan’s positions on Caspian Sea delimitation.
In establishing the border between the two countries in the Caspian Sea,
Kazakhstani officials made significant concessions to their Russian counterparts. According to a senior official who participated in the negotiations, as a landlocked state, Kazakhstan decisively relinquished claims
In June 2010, the oil shipments from Kazakhstan to Iran were suspended as part of
Kazakhstan’s compliance with sanctions on Iran.
4
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES Fig. 3. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan’s multiple pipelines.
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to the benefit of Russia in order to achieve delimitation and thus, to
remove obstructions to the export of the bulk of its oil. In the words of
one of Kazakhstan’s chief negotiators with Russia, “Kazakhstan decided
that as a landlocked state that is dependent on its neighbors for export,
it had to achieve a border delimitation agreement with Russia” (Former
­Kazakhstani Official, 2002). He stated in addition that before a crucial
meeting with Russian representatives, President Nazarbayev made it clear
to the negotiating team that, “It is better to export oil from 90 percent of
the territory we claim, than zero from 100 percent of what Kazakhstan
claims in the Caspian.”
In addition, as part of its concessions policy, Kazakhstan also
granted Russia a long-term lease to the Baykonur space station and the
­Semipalatinsk missile launch site, which are both in Kazakhstan’s territory. Kazakhstan agreed in 1995 to give the Russian soldiers and officials
in these installations extraterritorial status, so they would not be subject
to Kazakhstani law.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is a landlocked state bordering Russia, Georgia, Armenia,
Iran, and the Caspian Sea. One of Azerbaijan’s major regions, Nakhchevan,
does not possess territorial continuity with the main part of the state. It
borders on Turkey, Iran, and Armenia. Like Kazakhstan, from independence, Baku saw developing its oil and gas production as a strategic interest of the state and the means to build its economy. Oil and natural gas
exports account for 90 percent of Azerbaijan’s exports and are the source
of 55 percent of the government’s revenues.
Azerbaijan inherited a territorial conflict with its neighbor Armenia,
centered on control of the Nagorno-Karabagh region. The conflict emerged
prior to the Soviet breakup and turned into all-out war during the independence period of the new states. In this war, over 20,000 Azerbaijanis
were killed and over 800,000 became refugees or internally displaced persons. Azerbaijan’s early statehood challenges were compounded by the
conflict, the disputed status of Azerbaijan’s borders, and its large refugee
population.
After independence, Azerbaijan had a short-lived democratically
elected government, led by President Abdulfez Elchibey (1992–1993). In
this period, the public in Azerbaijan tended to view Elchibey’s policies as
contributions to Azerbaijan’s losses in the war, and thus, his government
lost public support and he fell from power. He was replaced by President
Heydar Aliyev, who led Azerbaijan until his death in 2003. His son, Ilham
Aliyev, was elected as president of Azerbaijan on October 15, 2003.
This analysis will focus on the period of Presidents Heydar and Ilham
Aliyev, beginning in 1993. Azerbaijan’s location as a landlocked state had
the following influences on is foreign policy: (1) multi-directional foreign policy; (2) multiple oil export pipelines policy; (3) distinctive policies
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 255
toward its transit states; and (4) transportation as a major foreign policy
issue.
Multi-directional Foreign Policy
For most of its post-independence period, Baku has conducted a balanced policy toward the regional and global powers that are active in
the Caucasus, primarily Russia, the United States, Turkey, and Iran. In
its major national strategy document, the “National Security Concept of
the Republic of Azerbaijan,” it declares that “The Republic of Azerbaijan
pursues a multidimensional, balanced foreign policy and seeks to establish it with all countries” (Ministry of National Security of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, 2007). Accordingly, Azerbaijan conducts strategic cooperation
with both Washington and Moscow. Azerbaijan is a notably active member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and has an advanced IPAP
with the alliance.5 At the same time, Azerbaijan cooperates with Russia on
security issues, and allows Russia to maintain the Qabala strategic radar
station in Azerbaijani territory.
As part of its multi-directional foreign policy, Azerbaijan has joined
a number of strategic groupings even though some of them appear to be
opposed to each other. For instance, Baku is a member of the CIS, the
NATO Partnership for Peace, the OSCE, the Economic Cooperation Council (led by Iran), GUAM, the Council of Europe, and the Islamic Conference
Organization. At the same time, Baku is not a member of the Russian-led
CSTO military alliance, although it does host a Russian military installation at the Qabala radar station.
Distinctive Policies toward Transit States
From independence, Baku decided to develop its oil and natural gas
resources for export as the major base of its economy. As a landlocked
energy exporter, Azerbaijan faced the challenge of forming a relationship with a main transit state and establishing an export infrastructure
through that state. Azerbaijan’s transit options were southward through
Iran, northward through Russia, and westward to Georgian Black Sea
ports or through Georgia to Turkish Mediterranean ports. The state of
war reigning between Armenia and Azerbaijan precluded a westward
pipeline through Armenia to Turkey.
Stability of transit could be achieved only by choosing a transit state
that had a strategic interest in preserving the energy transit. President
Heydar Aliyev decided that the main export pipeline should be built on
an east-west route, through Georgia and into Turkey, and led primarily by
Western oil companies. Aliyev made this strategic decision based on three
For a discussion of the closely related topic of Azerbaijan’s relationship with the European
Union, see Franke et al. (2010).
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chief considerations: (1) the pipeline should transit a state with which
Azerbaijan had few security disagreements; (2) ideally this would be a
state over which Azerbaijan had some sway in order to reduce Baku’s vulnerability to transit stoppage; and (3) preferably it would be a state that was
not itself a major oil exporter. Accordingly, Georgia was the most attractive transit option for Azerbaijan. Washington also supported an east-west
route through Georgia and Turkey. In contrast, many of the leading oil
companies, including US-based firms, were promoting establishment of
pipeline routes through Russia or Iran. In interviews, Azerbaijani officials
involved in the decision on the pipeline venue stated that when weighing
the different pipeline direction options, Baku’s assessment was that, as oil
exporters, Russia and Iran would always give priority to their own energy
exports over those from Azerbaijan, and thus, these states could not be
reliable transit states for Azerbaijan (Azerbaijani Officials, 2004). Transit
fees are generally not very lucrative and thus, strong states like Russia and
Iran did not have an economic or strategic interest in ensuring stable transit through their territory and would clearly often be tempted to use the
stoppage of transit as a lever over Baku. Georgia, in contrast, needed the
transit fees as a source of income and also the geopolitical role that energy
transit gave it, and thus was most likely to preserve stable transit. The fact
that Turkey was a NATO member and Georgia was aspiring to join NATO
added an additional stability factor to the transit as well as the support
this route enjoyed from Washington. Baku did not decline the Iranian
option because of pressure from Washington. Rather, the ­Heydar Aliyev
government did not seriously entertain the idea of building the ­Iranian
route as its main export pipeline (Azerbaijani Officials, 2004; Quluzade
2009).
Azerbaijan conducts an exceptional foreign policy toward Georgia,
its main transit state. On multiple occasions, Azerbaijan has attempted
to strengthen Georgia’s stability, at times through voluntary concessions
on issues of major interest to Baku. For instance, Baku chose, against the
advice of and despite pressure from the World Bank and other inter­
national institutions, to sell natural gas to Georgia at a relatively low
price in order to strengthen Tbilisi’s economic stability (Political Advisor,
2003). Next, Baku strongly encouraged the ethnic Azerbaijani minority in
Georgia to support the ruling governments in Tbilisi and to integrate into
Georgian state institutions, often to the chagrin of the local Azerbaijani
minority. This minority constitutes close to 7 percent of the population of
Georgia and 10 percent of the population of the capital (Major Findings of
First General National Population Census of Georgia, 2004). Third, ­Azerbaijan
has offered conciliatory positions on border delimitation with Georgia
in order to smooth the process. In addition, Azerbaijan invests funds in
infrastructure in Georgia, especially in the transport sector. Azerbaijan
has taken it upon itself to fund the Georgian section of a major railway
project—the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway—that is being established to link
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 257
Azerbaijan has made a number of major strategic concessions toward
its other transit states. As part of this policy, Azerbaijan has allowed
­Russia to maintain the Qabala radar station and a formal military base in
­Azerbaijani territory. This station monitors launches of ballistic missiles
and is an important element in Russia’s strategic monitoring system.
Azerbaijani national companies have also acquired ownership of facilities and infrastructure in the ports of their transit states. For instance, the
Azerbaijani state oil and natural gas company, SOCAR, has acquired the
Kulevi oil terminal in Georgia. It also owns a refinery and other installations in the Turkish oil port of Ceyhan.
Multiple Oil Export Pipelines
After the Soviet breakup and the independence of the Soviet republic
of Azerbaijan in December 1991, the new state sought to develop its oil and
gas resources. As discussed, states rarely possess multiple energy export
infrastructure and sea-abutting oil exporters generally export their petroleum by way of ports. In contrast, landlocked exporters like ­Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan needed to build export infrastructure through their
neighbors (see Figure 3). Azerbaijani leaders have stated frequently that
they would like to establish multiple situations of export infrastructure
for their oil and natural gas. As stated clearly by Azerbaijan’s Foreign
­Minister Mammadyarov, “[T]he major feature of our energy export is
diversification” (Mammadyarov, 2009a).
In discussing proposed pipeline projects, at some points, Azerbaijan’s
leaders have cited the state’s landlocked status as part of their calculations. On the eve of the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and BakuTbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipelines, President Ilham Aliyev remarked
that “These projects will ensure predictable access for exports of landlocked countries to world and regional markets” (Aliyev, 2004). On the
subject of Azerbaijan’s energy exports, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov
stated: “Our first decision was ‘how’ to deliver to the world market. As
you can see on the map, Azerbaijan is a landlocked country. This created
the decision of the BTC” (Mammadyarov, 2009b).
In the early 1990s, Azerbaijani leaders and diplomats discussed the
importance of “multiple pipelines” in most of their public statements and
diplomatic meetings. Baku had hoped to be able to build multiple export
pipelines to offset its dependence on one transit state. In this period, Azerbaijani diplomats in Washington even plastered stickers proclaiming that
“Happiness is multiple pipelines” on the bumpers of their cars and their
office doors. The campaign seemed to be intended to promote this goal
concretely, but also to signal to both Washington and Moscow that Baku
would like to build pipelines in both their directions. In early statements
on the proposed pipeline routes, President Aliyev tended to state that two
pipelines would be built: “One to the Black Sea via Georgia and one to
the Black Sea via Russia” (Heydar Aliyev quoted on Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi, in “Aliyev on Ties with U. S., Pipeline Route, Karabakh,” Foreign
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Broadcast Information Service [FBIS-SOV-95-204], October 23, 1995). President Heydar Aliyev explained the policy:
When transporting such large quantities of oil, it would be risky
to use only one route, since even under ideal circumstances it is
difficult to preclude any surprise. Therefore we need alternative
routes.… The existence of two oil pipelines creates conditions for
uninterrupted deliveries and this is very important. We pursue
an open policy and take this or that step in accordance with our
interests (quoted in Rossiyskaya gazeta, June 21, 1997).
In its initial post-independence period, Azerbaijan exported oil
through multiple venues: through Georgia to the port of Supsa, and
through Russia to Novorossiysk, with occasional export swaps via Iran.
For its main export pipeline, Baku decided on an east-west route, and in
2005, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline became operational. Baku’s choice
of this route is closely connected with its situation as a landlocked state.
As stated earlier, Azerbaijan’s leadership aimed to designate the state least
likely to disrupt the flow of its exports as its main transit state. Accordingly, President Heydar Aliyev articulated the idea that both “strategic as
well as commercial factors” will determine the route of their export pipelines (quoted by B. Clark in Financial Times, May 8, 1995).
As part of its multiple pipeline policy, Baku continues to maintain
and export some oil through Russia on the northern route (the Baku­Novorossiysk pipeline). In addition, Azerbaijan maintains a pipeline to
the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa and exports small amounts of oil
by rail at the Georgian port of Batumi. Azerbaijan also conducts swaps at
times with Iran.6 During the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, when the BTC was
not operational, Baku significantly increased the amount of oil exported
via Iran.
In 2005, Azerbaijan’s first major natural gas export project became
operational. It is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), commonly known
as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline, which runs parallel to the BTC oil
pipeline and then divides from it in Turkish territory. In the sphere of
natural gas, the extent of Azerbaijan’s proven reserves will enable it to
build additional export routes in the future. At the 2010 World Economic
Forum meeting, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev commented that
­“Azerbaijan can export gas in four directions: Turkey, Georgia, Iran and
Russia” (quoted by M. Champion, M. Walker, and S. Fidler in Wall Street
Journal, January 28, 2010), illustrating Baku’s intention to employ additional export routes in its next natural gas export phase.
In June 2010, Azerbaijan suspended its oil swaps with Iran to complement sanctions on
Iran.
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FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 259
Leaders’ Perspectives and Transportation as a Foreign Policy Issue
A unique attribute of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is that transportation is a major foreign policy issue. Azerbaijan’s presidents and foreign
ministers have promoted and dealt with transport and transportation
issues throughout the post-independence period. In most of the statements issued relating to Azerbaijan’s foreign ministers’ official visits to
other countries or reception of foreign leaders in Baku, the sides are said
to have discussed transportation and transport topics. Azerbaijan’s leadership saw building of transport and transportation infrastructure and
energy export pipelines as a means to overcome their landlocked state:
Without the BTC, Azerbaijan would still be a landlocked country.
The railroad being built is even more important than the BTC.
Long after the oil runs out, railways will continue … Railways
built the United States. We noticed that (Mammadyarov, 2008).
Baku played a prominent role in the initiation and activities of the
GUAM organization (a pro-NATO grouping of states that focuses on
transportation and the security of energy infrastructure).7 This regional
grouping focused on cooperation involving an energy corridor running
from Azerbaijan through the member states and the security of this
energy corridor. In Azerbaijan’s “National Security Concept,” the state
articulated the idea that Azerbaijan participates in GUAM in order to provide security for its energy transportation networks (Ministry of National
Security of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2007).
Azerbaijani leaders and foreign ministry officials have also been
strong proponents of the European-led TRACECA (Transport Corridor
Europe-Caucasus-Asia) program. This program, which was established in
1993, aims to establish and improve transportation links between Europe
and Asia, specifically within the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Baku is also striving to become a major transit state itself, focusing on
trade and transport to and from the greater Caspian region. Thus, Baku
promotes export projects that would transport Central Asia’s natural gas
and other commodities through Azerbaijan.
Uzbekistan
As a landlocked state Uzbekistan is unique in that it is doubly landlocked and must transit two states in each direction in order to reach
the open sea. (The only other doubly landlocked state is Lichtenstein.)
­Uzbekistan has been ruled by President Islam Karimov since independence. Russia is Uzbekistan’s main trading partner and a major ­transit state.
GUAM stands for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. During 1999–2005,
Uzbekistan was also a member of this group so in that period the organization adopted the
acronym GUUAM.
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However, this trade to Russia must first transit Kazakhstan. ­Uzbekistan
borders five states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, ­Turkmenistan,
and Afghanistan.
In the Soviet period, Uzbekistan served as a regional transportation
hub and thus, at independence, inherited relatively good links to and
through its neighbors. This is quite different from the transport and transportation situations of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan at independence, since
these states were located on the periphery of the Soviet transportation
system. However, these Soviet-era links retained Uzbekistan’s primary
infrastructure link as the one to Russia. In addition, two of Uzbekistan’s
neighbors, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, have faced conflicts in the postSoviet era that have threatened Uzbekistan’s security and reduced its
transit options.
Unlike Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan does not possess sufficient oil reserves to be a major oil exporter. While it produces some oil
and natural gas and exports natural gas to its neighbors, energy exports
are not dominant in its GNP, as in the first two cases. However, its energy
reserves enable Tashkent to provide for all its domestic consumption and
thus, Uzbekistan does not have to contend with the issues of supply and
transit of energy. At the same time, Uzbekistan possesses very modest
water resources and receives water from its neighbor, Kyrgyzstan. The
major sector of Uzbekistan’s economy is agriculture and its main export
commodity is cotton. Thus, the transit of the bulk of its trade is based on
conventional forms of transportation: roads and railways.
Uzbekistan’s location as a landlocked state had the following influences on its foreign policy: (1) its leaders’ articulation of the influence of
the landlocked factor on its foreign policy decisions; (2) transportation as
a foreign policy issue; and (3) Uzbekistan’s special relations with Russia as
its main export state and Kazakhstan as its key transit state.
Leaders’ Perspectives
Since independence, Uzbekistan’s leaders, and especially President
Islam Karimov, have clearly and frequently discussed Uzbekistan’s
landlocked status and its influence on their foreign policy decisions. In
his main political treatise, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First
­Century, President Karimov declared:
World experience testifies, and Uzbekistan is another proof, that
a country having no direct access to international waters significantly suffers in international economics. This is why we continue
to seek new solutions to the problem of providing our exports
with an effective transportation system and obtaining access to
international waters (Karimov, 1998).
In Uzbekistan’s major official foreign policy documents, Tashkent also
frequently referred to the landlocked factor in its policies. For instance,
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 261
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “Objectives of Uzbekistan’s Foreign ­Policy
Course” states:
The geographic isolation of Central Asia causes serious problems for our countries. In this respect, Uzbekistan will continue
its efforts towards “disenclavization” of Central Asia by creating
alternative transport and communication corridors (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2008).
Transportation as a Foreign Policy Topic
Uzbekistan’s officials have treated and continue to treat transportation
as a major foreign policy issue. Tashkent has signed a number of bilateral
and multilateral agreements related to transport and transportation. For
instance, like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan has been a strong proponent of the
European-led TRACECA program. In addition, Uzbekistan was a member of the GUAM (GUUAM when Uzbekistan was a member) group, an
organization that focused on the security of transport and transportation,
for five years (1999–2005).
Foreign Policy toward Russia: The Main Market and Transit State
Twenty years after independence, Russia has remained Uzbekistan’s
main export market and a primary transit state. This link and the resultant dependence serve as major constraints on Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Uzbekistan’s dependence on Russia is shaped by a number of factors
connected to its landlocked status: not only is Russia Uzbekistan’s major
export market, with Tashkent’s exports to Russia running to about a quarter of all its exports, but the bulk of Uzbekistan’s trade with Europe transits
Russia as well. Second, Uzbekistan inherited transportation infrastructure from the Soviet period that situated the new state as a transport hub
(flights, rail, and roads) for Central Asia that connected to Russia. Third,
due to the instability that raged in Tajikistan and Afghanistan through
most of the 1990s, during this period southern routes, toward ports in
India and Pakistan, were obstructed.
As a regional and global power, Russia clearly has extensive influence on and the means of coercing the former Soviet states. However,
Moscow has extreme influence on landlocked states like Uzbekistan that
also depend on Russia as both the major export market and the major
transit state. Thus, Tashkent has limited wiggle room on security policies,
and, accordingly, on most major issues in this sphere it bows to Moscow’s
dictates. Uzbekistan’s policies in the security and political spheres in the
post-Soviet period often zigzagged and manifested puzzling changes. For
example, Uzbekistan enthusiastically joined the GUAM grouping in 1999
and then withdrew its membership in 2005. In addition, following the
September 11, 2001 attacks, President Karimov called Washington to offer
Uzbekistan’s territory for US bases to operate in Afghanistan. Yet in 2005,
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while the war was still being waged, Tashkent forced the US to abandon
these bases. However, when the landlocked factor and Russia’s parallel
changes in positions on these issues are taken into account, Tashkent’s
changes in position become understandable.
Foreign Policy toward Kazakhstan: A Key Transit State
Kazakhstan is a key transit state for Uzbekistan, since Tashkent’s trade
with Russia and Europe transits its territory. Accordingly, ­Uzbekistan
invests effort and makes concessions in order to preserve a cooperative
relationship between the states and prevent disruptions to its trade. An
example of Tashkent’s special policy toward Kazakhstan is the history
of border delimitation with its neighbors. Uzbekistan had difficult and
long, quite contentious border delimitation processes with all of its postSoviet neighbors except Kazakhstan. For example, at the time of writing,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have not concluded an agreement on border
delimitation. In contrast, with Kazakhstan, the process was very short
and efficient despite the fact that Uzbekistan’s border with Kazakhstan is
its longest (2,203 kilometers). The border agreement, signed in September
2002, was reached through direct and intensive negotiations conducted
by the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Prior to the agreement,
the two sides disputed the border in over 500 locations. Delimitation of
the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan border was an exceptional process. The sides
made a number of complicated and potentially domestically risky compromises, including relocating residents of a number of villages in the
border area in order to attain agreement and preserve cooperation.
Additional Landlocked States in the Former Soviet Union
While it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the foreign policy patterns of all the landlocked states of the former Soviet Union as case
studies, it should be noted that additional landlocked states in the region
conduct foreign policies that show the influence of the landlocked factor. Two very clear examples are Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan
has attempted to conduct multi-directional foreign policy; it is the only
state in the world that hosts both US and Russian military installations,
and Bishkek has discussed deployment of air force troops in Kyrgyzstan
with Beijing. In addition, in its foreign policy Armenia has taken great
pains to maintain its existing transit venues and it engages intensively to
establish additional routes. Armenia’s most vital transit route is through
Georgia, since this links Armenia to trade with Russia, Yerevan’s main
strategic backer. Therefore, Armenia has treated co-ethnics in neighboring Georgia very differently than Armenians residing in Azerbaijan and
other states. Despite the secessionist demands made by representatives of
the Armenian community in Georgia in the post-Soviet period, ­Yerevan
has refrained from offering support to this community for breaking
away from Tbilisi, in clear recognition that opening conflict with ­Georgia
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 263
would cut off Armenia’s main transit artery (Senior Armenian Official,
2002). This policy of Yerevan toward co-ethnics in Georgia contrasts
strongly with its support for the secessionist Armenians in neighboring
Azerbaijan, itself a landlocked country and thus not an important transit
artery. While ­­­Russia did not intend to block Armenia’s transit as part of
its goals in the war, Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia illustrated to Armenia
the tenuous nature of its transit through Georgia to Russia and Europe.
Following the war, Yerevan invigorated political efforts to open its border with Turkey and thus to establish additional trade opportunities and
transit routes, in light of the vulnerability of its route through Georgia.
Future studies on the influence of landlocked location on developments
in the post-Soviet region and on states’ foreign policies should encompass
Armenia, ­Kyrgyzstan, and other post-Soviet landlocked states.
CONCLUSIONS
This article examined the influence of landlocked location on former
Soviet states’ foreign policies. Despite the expanding presence of landlocked states in the international system, this is the first study to examine
the influence of the landlocked factor on foreign policy. This article claims
that the landlocked location of a number of the post-Soviet states placed
a significant constraint on their foreign policy options and thus was an
important factor shaping their foreign policy decisions. The foreign policies of the landlocked states examined in this article display three distinct
characteristics: (1) multi-directional strategic orientation, which entails
refraining from joining exclusive alliance systems and cooperation with
competing alliance systems; (2) special policies toward their transit states,
including significant concessions and actions intended both to foster relations and to promote these transit states’ stability; and (3) investments in
infrastructure in their port states. In addition, the major energy exporters
among the landlocked states also conducted a policy of establishing multiple oil export pipelines.
The prominence of each of these characteristics differed from case to
case, but in all the cases studied and in looking beyond the post-Soviet
space, the characteristic most common to all three cases, and the most
­significant element of the foreign policies of the landlocked states, is their
distinctive foreign policies toward their transit states. This policy includes
the exceptional tendency of landlocked states to make significant concessions to the transit states, among these, yielding territory. Landlocked
states undertake these exceptional policies toward the transit states in
order to preserve stable transit through their neighbors. In general, states
rarely concede sovereignty over territory unless forced to do so. However,
the landlocked states examined in this study offered attractive border
delimitations, control over strategic facilities, and other dispensations in
order to facilitate cooperative relations with their transit states. For example, as seen in one case study presented here, in the mid-1990s, ­Kazakhstan
conducted very accommodating negotiations with Russia on Caspian Sea
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delimitation in order to establish stable energy transit through Russia.
In another example of territory yielded, Uzbekistan was conciliatory in
demarcating its border with Kazakhstan, its main transit state, in contrast to its delineation process with other neighboring states. Azerbaijan
yielded to Georgia when a border dispute arose in 2009 in order to diffuse
a potential border dispute and avert endangering its transit and cooperation with Georgia.
Transit states possess a significant kind of power, which allows them,
tacitly or directly, to coerce a landlocked state into making concessions.
Thus, in looking at the relations between a landlocked state and neighboring transit states, the transit factor should be factored into the power relations between these states. This power factor is not evident when looking
at traditional factors such as military power, GDP, or population. However, it strongly constrains the foreign policy options of the landlocked
state and empowers the transit state and therefore should be figured into
analysis of relations between landlocked states and their neighbors. Since
the landlocked states are keenly aware of the means of coercion that the
transit states possess, these states conduct special policies toward them
that attempt to mitigate their vulnerability, and reflect their comprehension of the dynamics of the relations between landlocked and transit
states.
Accordingly, the main consideration of landlocked states in selecting
their primary transit state is the goal of reducing transit vulnerability.
When it can, a landlocked state will select as its main transit state the one
that is least likely either to obstruct the transit or to use the transit as a
lever to advance other goals vis-à-vis the landlocked state. In some cases,
this is the weakest of their neighbors, since such a state is more likely
to need the benefits from the transit and the cooperative relations with
the landlocked state than a strong state. In addition, the landlocked states
examined in this article tend to promote stability in their neighboring
transit states as an additional means of preserving stable transit.
Study of the landlocked factor may provide insights into issues that
have been examined in international relations, yet this examination has
failed to look at geographic factors as an explanation. For instance, over
the years, researchers have attributed multi-directional foreign policy to
states classified as neutral or buffer states. However, this study indicates
that in many cases geographic factors shape these states’ distinctive foreign policy orientation: over half of the neutral states in the international
political system are landlocked ones.
Study of the landlocked factor can provide insights into the foreign
policies of states and the politics of regions encompassing landlocked
states, such as the Caucasus and Central Asia. The collapse of the Soviet
Union led to the establishment of nine new landlocked states, and the landlocked factor has influenced political and economic developments in the
former Soviet Union. The influence of this factor is especially ­pronounced
in landlocked regions such as Central Asia. As shown in this article, those
states with seacoasts were more successful in integrating into US- and
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 265
European-led economic and security structures than landlocked ones,
while the landlocked former Soviet states remained closely integrated
with Russia. The landlocked states were much more dependent on ­Russia
and vulnerable to its demands, while sea access enabled the coastal states
to find alternatives to trade with Russia. Looking at the foreign policies
of newly independent states has provided a window into the influence of
the landlocked factor, especially since the new states debated and articulated broad new security doctrines, and thus the factors influencing their
policies are detectable. As was seen in the case studies, the leaders of the
new states were quite aware of their landlocked predicament and articulated the fact that this was a consideration in their foreign policies. These
states incorporated transportation issues into prominent facets of their
foreign policy. They also attempted to achieve influence and control over
the transport infrastructure and ports in their transit and port states. The
states studied attempted to conduct multi-directional foreign policy, aiming to balance their cooperation with Russia and the United States, and to
maintain strong ties with other regional powers, such as China, Iran, and
Turkey.
The major energy exporters among the post-Soviet landlocked states
were more successful in realizing long-term, multi-directional cooperation due to extensive international involvement in energy export projects and consequent Western security interests in these states. While
non–energy exporting landlocked states such as Kyrgyzstan attempted
to conduct multi-vector foreign policy, the energy exporters were more
successful in building cooperation with powers in addition to Russia. At
the same time, the stability of oil and natural gas transit is much more
vulnerable to disruption in the long term. Accordingly, the nature of a
landlocked state’s exports seems to affect the ability of other countries
to exert influence on its foreign policy. Countries that transport goods by
road or railway have some flexibility, i.e., the possibility of shifting their
transport arteries. However, the oil and natural gas exporters constructed
permanent transport routes and thus approached this issue strategically.
Consequently, they seem to have been forced to consider more seriously
the influences exerted by their unique geography and issues of transport
on their foreign policy, and to articulate their policies on the issue early
in their policy-building formation. Moreover, in contrast to coastal state
exporters, the landlocked oil exporters built multiple export pipelines.
Understanding the influence of the landlocked nature of the majority
of the post-Soviet states can aid in analyzing the foreign policies of the
post-Soviet states and understanding the constraints on these states. For
instance, awareness of the landlocked factor can help the United States in
deciphering various Central Asian states’ changing decisions and shifting
stances on granting permission to Washington for the basing rights necessary to conduct the campaign in Afghanistan. Given the dependence
of the landlocked states of Central Asia on Russia for transit and as their
major export market, Washington needs to understand that to achieve
sustainable basing in these Central Asian states, it must acquire Moscow’s
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agreement and interest in any security arrangement. Accordingly, appreciation of the landlocked factor can help states craft appropriate policies
toward the landlocked regions of the post-Soviet sphere, such as Central
Asia.
Future research on landlocked location and foreign policy should
address the issue of conflicts. Lack of access to the sea or limited access
can serve as an incentive for conflict. Part of Iraq’s calculation in invading
Kuwait in 1990 was Baghdad’s goal of expanding its seacoast. Iraq’s seacoast stands at 26 kilometers, which is quite small for a major oil exporter.
Russia’s interest in wresting control of the disputed region of Abkhazia
from Georgia stemmed in part from the region’s large seacoast.8 Decisions
to allow regions to succeed may be influenced by whether the secession
entails loss of coastal access. Prague’s decision to agree to an ­amicable
divorce from the Slovak Republic may have been influenced by the fact
that the separation from the landlocked Slovak Republic did not geographically handicap the Czech Republic. Serbia’s drive to retain control
of former Yugoslav territories may have been affected somewhat by its
drive to maintain sea access.9 The location of ethnic groups in landlocked
territories seems to affect their chances to gain independence. A large
proportion of the world’s major ethnic groups that have not ­succeeded
in acquiring statehood are in landlocked nations. Among these are the
Kurds, Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Chechens.
In recent decades, the existence of intercontinental missiles, the importance of transnational identity, and terrorist networks, and the immense
interconnectivity of world financial, political, communications, and legal
systems, have all numbed our interest in analyzing the impact of local
geographic factors. At the same time, the number of landlocked states
has been growing rapidly, leaving more and more states handicapped
in terms of full participation in the ever more globalized economy and
polity. Moreover, the number of landlocked states in the world system is
anticipated to keep growing with the rising trend of the establishment
and recognition of new mini-state units, such as Kosovo, as the prevailing means to attempt to resolve ethnic conflicts. A large portion of these
mini-states are landlocked. Future research on landlocked states, and specifically on their foreign policies, should be expanded and should include
cases from multiple regions around the globe. In addition, the foreign
policies of transit states are a topic for future research. With the expansion
in the number of landlocked states, half of the world’s states are transit
states and possess a powerful foreign policy tool for use with their landlocked neighbors. This analysis shows that landlocked states have much
Following the Soviet breakup, Russia was left with quite limited sea access, especially in the
winter, when most of its ports are frozen and cannot accommodate oil tankers. For more on
Russia’s coastal incentive, see Shaffer (2009b).
9
We thank the reviewer for these two examples of possible influence of the landlocked factor
on the behavior of states in conflicts.
8
FOREIGN POLICIES OF LANDLOCKED STATES 267
less maneuverability and narrower policy options than their coastal counterparts and this affects their foreign policy. Understanding this factor
can be a very useful analytical tool in international relations studies. In
addition, adding the landlocked factor to analysis can be helpful in understanding various policy decisions of states in the former Soviet Union and
their relations with each other.
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