JOINT CRISIS
VIETNAM DIVIDED
21ST JULY 1954
NORTH VIETNAM
Introduction
Welcome, esteemed delegates. This committee has been convened on the 21 st day of
July, 1954, in order to determine the most appropriate future for your respective sides.
On this day, the Geneva Accords have been signed by all parties, and are being
implemented. The details of these agreements are provided below. Delegates are,
therefore, provided with the opportunity to solve this brutal conflict that has cost so
much in terms of lives, history, and kinship.
While both sides certainly consider themselves to be the rightful rulers of a unified
Vietnam, all present must remember one thing: their mission is to do what is best for the
people of their country. All sides must realize that the costs of this war are outweighed
by nothing, and that a unified, peaceful Vietnam is the ultimate goal. One must,
however, be realistic. In a time when propaganda messages, assassination attempts,
and political dissention are a regular fact of life, delegates cannot expect that this
committee will be easy. Nor will it be safe. Delegates must exercise constant vigilance,
and walk the fine line between trusting those in your room, and suspecting their
motives; for, no single delegate can create a unified Vietnam. Delegates must also bear
in mind that a true resolution to the crisis may, in fact, come from the other side of the
17th parallel. However, again, be vigilant. External pressures and civil paranoia may
cause members of both governments to act illogically.
You are tasked with creating a future for Vietnam. Protect your people. Weigh external
pressures against your own opinions. Fight the enemy, and prove to their people that
their leaders are misguided. But always remember: the one that plots your
assassination can be a General in the other room, or your own leader.
PART I: VIETNAM FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE
1.1 The Colonial Project
On the morning of September 1st, 1858, a French military officer landed on the
shore of the Port of Tourane, modern-day Da Nang, Vietnam, and laid a paper at the
entrance to the Fort de l’Aiguade. The paper contained a summons demanding that the
Vietnamese within the fort surrender themselves to a French naval flotilla assembled in
the bay outside the city. No response was received. Diplomacy having failed, the
French opened fire, and the fort—and the city—fell in short order.
The Siege of Tourane, as it became known, was the opening engagement in
what proved to be a nearly half-century long process of colonization and consolidation.
During the period from 1858 to 1895, France
slowly conquered, consolidated and subjugated
the territories of modern Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos, bringing an end to the independent rule of
the Vietnamese Nguyen dynasty and creating a
new colonial project known as French Indochina.
This process, which proceeded in a fragmented,
disjointed manner, produced an equally
fragmented, disjointed colony. These divisions
would find startling parallels in the breakup of the
country in the aftermath of the Second World
War.
The 1858 French attack on Vietnamese
soil did not lead to immediate colonial gains, but
a treaty affirming the rights of Vietnamese
Catholics.
European missionaries had been
coming to the country for centuries, but rising
persecution by the Nguyen rulers chafed with the
imperial ambitions of French Emperor Napoleon
III. These ambitions were not checked by the
treaty of 1858: in 1862 the French demanded,
The progression of the French conquest and received, three provinces in the south of
of Vietnam, with dates
Vietnam and access to ports in the central and
northern areas of the country. In 1867 the French established a “Protectorate” over
Cambodia, and between 1883 and 1888 they progressively annexed the remainder of
Vietnam, although the Nguyen remained as puppet rulers of Annam and Tonkin, the
central and northern regions. Cochinchina, formed chiefly from the three provinces
originally acquired in 1862, remained under direct French rule. Together, they
constituted French Indochina.
French rule in Vietnam, although undisputed internationally, faced early
challenges internally from the very beginning. The Vietnamese organized uprisings and
attacks on the colonial authorities from the start of colonial rule, and it was not until
1895 that the last defenders of independent Nguyen rule were defeated by French
forces. From that point on, anti-colonial movements conceived of an independent
Vietnam in ways that differed entirely from what had come before.
Nonetheless, the colonial project was
not endlessly disturbed by the spectre of
rebellion: the French embarked on an
ambitious project of modernization and
Francization.
Known semi-officially as the
“Mission Civilizatrice,” it aimed to make
Vietnam essentially “French,” by introducing the
Latin alphabet in the place of Chinese
characters, educating in the French language,
spreading Catholicism and creating a modern
industrial economy. These ambitions, however
civilized in principle, were nevertheless pursued
in a classically colonial spirit, and amounted to
little more than the creation of a veneer of
modern accoutrements—modern railways and
bridges, monumental European architecture
and
industrial
plantations—overtop
a
ramshackle regime of brutal exploitation and
racist inequality.
The Opera House in colonial Saigon, one
of many manifestations of the French
presence that still exist today in the “Paris
of the East”
One of the many Vietnamese with whom this state of affairs sat none too kindly
would later be remembered as the face of the independence movement, and more
specifically of communist Vietnam. In 1919, when he famously tried to petition
American President Woodrow Wilson for the rights of the Vietnamese and colonized
peoples at the Paris Peace Conference, he was known as Nguyen Ai Quoc. Today, he
is better known as Ho Chi Minh. In the 1920s, Ho was one of many educated
Vietnamese at the forefront of a new anti-colonial movement, one that had more in
common with modern nationalism than the old, Confucian-inspired anti-colonialists who
had come before them. In the aftermath of the First World War, having fought for the
French empire abroad, many Vietnamese questioned their continued subjugation after
having shed blood for their colonial oppressors. Over the course of the 1920s, new
movements adopted radical platforms calling for the violent overthrow of the colonial
state, and the establishment of a new country. These movements were divided
between competing visions of what that new country would look like, most either taking
inspiration from the Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary principles as embodied by the
Nationalist movement of Chiang Kai-shek’s China, or from Vladimir Lenin’s philosophy
as manifested in the Soviet Union of Joseph Stalin. Some Vietnamese remained
content with the French, and others saw possibilities in working to reform the colonial
state from within, but they were an increasingly marginalized minority.
These moderate voices were steadily silenced by the turmoil of the 1930s, which
saw the outbreak of violence on a scale unmatched in preceding times. In 1929 and
1930, Nationalist Party-inspired revolutionaries tried to use the colonial militia to begin a
full-scale rebellion against the colonial state. The attempt failed spectacularly, and
prompted a bloody French crackdown that nearly eliminated the modern non-communist
nationalist movement. In 1930, a second, larger rebellion broke out in the peasant
villages of Vietnam. The communists quickly asserted leadership of the movement, and
the French once again moved swiftly and brutally to suppress the rebellion. They
bombed villages and arrested, tortured and executed scores of suspected and real
revolutionaries. These outbreaks of violence nearly destroyed even Ho Chi Minh’s
newly created Indochinese Community Party, and the man himself spent some time in a
Chinese prison.
However, although the most active remaining nationalists spent much of the rest
of the decade in prison, in exile or in silent protest, the embers of rebellion smouldered
on. It would not be long before they once again burst into flame.
1.2 The Coming of Independence
In September 1939, France and its colonial empire once again found themselves
entwined in war. Indochina was largely removed from the initial stages of the war, and
when France fell in June 1940 the local authorities quickly and quietly switched their
allegiance to the new Vichy government. This did little to deter the ambitions of another
imperial power, for when Japanese forces reached the northern border of Indochina
their nominal alliance with Vichy did not stop them from occupying the whole of the
colony. However, they left the French colonial government in place, which the
Vietnamese found out to their peril when a hastily-organized rebellion was put down
exactly as their predecessors had been.
Despite the repeated setbacks they had faced, the communist movement—led
by Ho Chi Minh—remained determined to realize independence. Realizing that the
Japanese were just as hostile to the idea of an independent Vietnam as the French, Ho
Chi Minh and his allies pushed for the adoption of a new anti-colonial strategy. In 1941,
they succeeded in convincing the remaining party members to found the Viet-Minh, an
ostensibly non-ideological movement dedicated to armed rebellion. Although the
movement had little success in fighting the Japanese, it swiftly built a wider popular
base than the Communist Party had ever done on its own, and asserted Ho Chi Minh’s
position as the leader of the dominant anti-colonial movement.
The end of the war provided the opportunity that the nationalists had been
looking for: in March 1945, with France liberated, the Japanese decided to do away with
the colonial government, dismantling the Vichy regime in Indochina and imprisoning its
police, soldiers and officials. When Japan surrendered in turn in August 1945, Vietnam
found itself without the means to enforce foreign rule for the first time in nearly 100
years. The Viet Minh stepped into the void, and quickly persuaded the nominal Nguyen
emperor, Bao Dai, to abdicate. On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh read a statement
from the balcony of the Opera House in Saigon (pictured above) declaring Vietnam
independent.
This declaration, although momentous
in itself, did not signal anything lasting. British
forces, supporting the wishes of the newly-reestablished Paris government, arrived in turn to
occupy southern Vietnam in the name of
colonialism, while Chinese forces soon arrived
to occupy the north. As 1945 turned into 1946,
French forces and administrators arrived to try
to re-establish their own rule and to begin the
process of negotiating with the Viet Minh. The
discussions were uneasy from the start, and a
conference organized at Fontainebleau in
France in mid-1946 ended in failure. By the
end of 1946 both sides had largely abandoned
all pretense of negotiating, and full-fledged war
between the French and the Viet Minh seemed
inevitable.
Ho Chi Minh (centre) arriving in France
for the Fontainebleau Conference, July
1946
PART II: THE NORTH
2.1 The Nation Divided
With the conclusion of the Geneva accords, North
and South Vietnam were divided from each other, and
within themselves. Although Ho Chi Minh and his fellow
northerners had achieved the independence for which
they had so long fought, the spirit in Hanoi was hardly
one of elation. Ho, Giap and others within the Northern
politburo who supported the Geneva Accords struggled
to convince their fellows that the decision to allow the
separation of the country was appropriate. The victory at
Dien Bien Phu had been complete, but the moderates in
the communist party argued that it had not fundamentally
altered the balance of power in Vietnam, and that a
settlement was necessary to protect their gains and
avoid the prospect of American intervention. Above all, it
was the spectre of American involvement that frightened
all northern politicians, and all efforts to reunite the
country between 1954 and 1965 took this aim into consideration. To the moderates, the
Geneva Accords achieved this goal, consolidating the northern achievements and
forestalling internationalization of the conflict. They placed their faith in the prospect of
future elections and negotiation with the new government of the southern State of
Vietnam.
Other elements in the party disputed this position. More militant members like Le
Duan, a southerner, did not
believe for a moment that the
southern government would fulfill
its obligations (admittedly, the
moderates had their doubts as
well).
They balked at the
prospect of adhering to the
Geneva Accords, which meant
abandoning
or
withdrawing
communist cadres from the
south. Instead, they advocated
undermining
the
southern
Le Duan (sitting left, with Ho Chi Minh at right), the most
prominent advocate of a “south-first” strategy, later
member of the politburo and de-facto leader of North
Vietnam
government through communist agitation and rebellion, and the pursuit of military
means of reunification if necessary. However, this party was outnumbered and
“outgunned” in the aftermath of Geneva, as the most powerful politburo members
adhered to the moderate line.
Two opposing camps developed in the northern government, one advocating a
“north-first” strategy, the other a “south-first” strategy. The moderates comprised the
first group, advocating the consolidation of their gains by repatriating communist forces
from the south and focusing on building a strong socialist society at home. Economic
development and reconstruction were to be prioritized, and reunification was only to be
pursued once the nation was strong once again. Those in favour of southern agitation
comprised the second group.
As part of the agreements, the northern leadership were able to remove their
forces from the south, to the consternation of the militants. The moderates believed that
any attempt to foment revolution in the south would be seized upon as an excuse to
derail the process of reunification agreed-to at Geneva. To that end, Viet Minh and
other communist armed forces in the south withdrew above the 17 th parallel. Giap
hoped to use the time bought by the accords to modernize his forces, and retrain and
replenish the cadres. However, even the moderates did not withdraw completely from
the south. Some cadres stayed to establish relations with groups sympathetic to
communists, and to create contacts inside influential groups in the south—Catholics,
civil servants and the military—in the hopes of showing them that the northern
leadership could be trusted to respect all Vietnamese in the event of reunification. For
the initial period after the signing of the Geneva Accords, the southern cadres therefore
focused on propaganda above all, to the further dismay of the militants in the party. Le
Duan, who with Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Chi Thanh formed the core of the hardliners,
was one of those who stayed in the south after the withdrawal of most northern forces.
2.2 Domestic Issues
Those who believed in the “north-first” approach prioritized the resolution of
major domestic issues. Chief among these was the reconstruction and modernization
of the northern economy, which had long been less developed than the centre and
south under French rule. During the course of the First Indochina War, the northern
economy had also suffered greatly from the depredations of war, and was in desperate
need of shoring-up. These reforms were pursued according to socialist dogma, which
demanded the redistribution of land and state-directed industrialization. As Vietnam
remained predominantly agrarian—particularly in the north—land reform was the
centrepiece of the leadership’s economic program.
Led chiefly by Truong Chinh, General-Secretary of the Communist Party, the
process of land reform involved the reorganization of the ownership and management of
agricultural land in the north. The program was intended to destroy the power of old
landowners and the old elite of the villages, and redistribute the land to peasant farmers
and a new class of leaders imbued with the party spirit. However, apart from its most
superficial goals the reform quickly proved to be a disaster.
Most villages in the north began the program with a preliminary campaign against
the worst of the landlords, forcing them to return part of the rents they had collected
over the years, but largely leaving the land in their hands. The campaigns were
organized by party cadres, who were sent into the villages to persuade the peasants of
the wrongs being perpetrated against them and the need to defeat their exploiters.
However, the cadres were overzealous and generally took charge of the reform
campaign rather than allow the peasants to direct it themselves. During the campaign
proper, the attacks against landlords escalated. Executions began, but rather than be
directed solely against the rich and the powerful, party members and middle-class
peasants were also rounded up and killed. The death toll is widely disputed, ranging
from the thousands to tens of thousands, but the most widely accepted estimates are in
the range of 100,000 dead.
The campaign seriously discredited the northern government, and particularly its
doctrinaire backers, like Truong Chinh. In 1956, at the conclusion of the land reform
program, Truong was forced out of his position as General-Secretary and other
moderates favouring the north-first strategy found themselves increasingly sidelined on
the politburo. These shifts in the internal
balance of power mark one of the most
significant moments in the northern
movement toward a more aggressive
strategy of intervention in South Vietnam.
During this early post-Geneva
period, the northern government also
faced additional internal challenges that
prevented the government from shifting
its focus entirely to the processes of
reunification. Most prominently, North
Vietnam had to address the challenge of
substantial emigration to the south as a
result of the Geneva Accords.
The
agreement had allowed a period of 300
days for the voluntary migration of
North Vietnamese citizens move from a French
ship to the USS Montague during Operation
Passage to Freedom, August 1954
Vietnamese across the 17 th Parallel to relocate across the border, and to its surprise the
northern government soon faced an exodus of its own citizens. The impetus for this
sudden movement came chiefly from the Catholic population in the north. The fears of
a communist-imposed atheistic regime led priests in the north to tell their congregations
that there would be soon be famine and flooding, that the Pope had ordered all
Catholics to move south or face “the loss of their souls,” among other fear-mongering
tactics.
Many in the northern government ascribed these movements to the
machinations of the South, the Americans and the Catholic Church, and they were at
least partly right. As part of Operation Passage to Freedom, the French Air Force and
Navy supported the movement of civilians, backed by the American fleet. Those moved
across the border included Vietnamese soldiers, members of the French army, and
northern citizens. A Central Intelligence Agency-backed propaganda campaign was
also organized on behalf of Catholic South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem’s
government, encouraging Catholics to move south.
These migrations were a particularly serious problem for the North Vietnamese
government, as it interpreted these movements as an attempt to influence the
scheduled elections and undermine support for a North Vietnam-led reunification. The
North immediately began attempting to dissuade its citizens from leaving. Cadres were
ordered to make contacts with Catholic communities and entice them with promises of
religious freedom, among other propaganda initiatives. However, these efforts met with
limited success. In fact, the actions of the northern government likely induced further
emigration, particularly after an unfortunate incident in November 1954 when North
Vietnamese troops fired on 300 Catholics seeking passage southward, killing four. On
other occasions, the Catholics themselves stirred up trouble, protesting against the
government and assaulting civilian officials and military personnel. Ultimately, most of
the Catholic population in North Vietnam moved south; between 1954 and 1955,
930,000 northern citizens left for South Vietnam, of whom some 676,000 were Catholic.
The setbacks that North Vietnam had faced at home in the early period after
Geneva had in part been suffered in the hope that they would allow the reunification of
the country through elections. Ultimately however, the northern government’s hopes
and fears for the expected 1956 election proved to be moot, as Ngo Dinh Diem’s
southern government was unwilling to cooperate and completely opposed to
compromise with the north. Fortunately, the North was not left completely without
options in 1956, in part due to its efforts in the intervening time to build its connections
abroad.
2.3 Foreign Issues
In 1954, the government in Hanoi was nearly as preoccupied with matters abroad
as it was with Vietnamese affairs. The north was poor, weakened by years of war and
facing an uncertain future, while the south, although unstable, at least had the benefit of
profiting from powerful benefactors. Although France had been that benefactor for
many years, the United States was increasingly taking up the role of the primary backer
of South Vietnam. Succeeding years would see American money, arms, and political
capital gradually take the place of French support. By January 1955 the American
government was bypassing French governmental agencies and providing assistant
directly to Saigon. The prospect of further international involvement in Vietnam
infuriated and worried those in Hanoi, particularly those who recognized the strong
position that Western forces had still maintained even after the decisive victory of Dien
Bien Phu. The possibility that America might actually intervene militarily against the
north was not a realistic consideration at the time, but even the hint of American
involvement was sufficient to help strengthen the northern resolve to commit to the
Geneva Accords.
When the Hanoi government issued a policy statement in September 1954
affirming its commitment to the letter of the conference agreement, it not only confirmed
the dominance of the “north-first” strategy, but also provided the basis for a policy of
diplomatic warfare against the United States. North Vietnam would henceforth make
clear to the world its own commitment to the peaceful, negotiated reunification of
Vietnam, and expose for all to see the barriers that the American government was
putting up to prevent this. This was not only a ploy to win over the nations of the world
and discredit the United States and its allies, but indirectly also a plea to the people of
the South, in the hope of winning the “hearts and minds” of the population. The whole
idea was encapsulated in the national slogan “Oppose the Americans, Oppose Diem,
for Peace, for Unification.”
The Vietnamese began their work
immediately,
pushing
the
American
presence out of the north by forcing the US
Consulate in Hanoi to shut down its wireless
connection to Washington. Denunciations
of the Americans and their warmongering,
oppositional stance became the staple of all
northern diplomatic overtures. However,
Hanoi was not only committed to attacking
the Americans; its foreign affairs officials
also worked assiduously to strengthen
contacts abroad, particularly among the Flags line the podium at the Bandung
developing nations and communist states Conference in 1955, organized by Indonesian
president Sukarno to show solidarity among
what became known as the “non-aligned”
nations of the developed world
that would be most likely to support its stance. In 1955, North Vietnam attended the
Bandung Conference of developing and non-aligned nations in Indonesia, where prime
minister Pham Van Dong spoke of the northern commitment to Geneva and its belief in
a peaceful approach to reunification. Soon after, Ho Chi Minh led a delegation to the
Soviet Union and China, the only nations which could realistically be expected to
provide the kind of support that the north would need if it was to match the backing the
south could expect from the United States and other western nations.
Despite the northern attempts to denigrate the United States and other backers
of the State of Vietnam in the south, its approach to the southern government was far
more conciliatory. Pham Van Dong went so far as to tell western journalists that the
north was prepared to make “substantial” concessions to the southern regime in the
hopes of uniting the nation peacefully. However, although critical language was phased
out of propaganda broadcasts and northern diplomats made a concerted effort to
accommodate their southern counterparts, Ngo Dinh Diem remained stonily opposed to
any cooperation with the communist regime. His intransigence, as noted previously,
would prove the most significant obstacle to northern plans and would fatally undermine
the attempts to bring about a peaceful reunification—as Diem realized all too well that
such a settlement would disproportionately benefit the north.
In its efforts abroad, Hanoi had some greater measure of success. It largely won
the battle to establish itself in the minds of others as the aggrieved, peace-seeking
party—at least in the minds off developing nations and others sympathetic to the
communist cause. It also succeeded in obtaining concrete support from the two giants
of the Comintern world. At the beginning of its program of economic modernization,
North Vietnam had only 30 technical specialists and advisors capable of brining the
program to fruition, for a population of more than 13 million. However, Hanoi found that
in exchange for accepting the “counselling moderation” of the Chinese government, its
northern neighbour would willingly provide financial support and many thousands of
advisors and specialists who could help revive the flagging northern economy. The
Soviet government provided its own assistance as well, in both military and economic
terms.
However, it would not be long before it became clear that support from Moscow
and Beijing could not be relied upon unconditionally. First, there was the matter of the
“counselling” of the self-proclaimed leaders of the communist world—and the
counselling of the two powers was not always aligned. This problem would become
more pronounced as Hanoi moved away from peaceful strategies to a more militarilyinclined option, but from the beginning the north had to manage the appearance of
deferring to China and the USSR in a manner sufficient to mollify its allies’ egos.
As time went on, this balancing act became more and more challenging,
particularly as Premier Nikita Khrushchev solidified his base of support in Moscow.
Then suddenly, in 1956, North Vietnam’s whole international strategy was thrown into
uncertain waters, as Khrushchev publicly denounced his Joseph Stalin, his
predecessor, and proclaimed the need for “peaceful coexistence” with the western, noncommunist world. The idea behind this pronouncement was to reduce the potential for
Premier Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev delivering his “Secret Speech”—officially “On the Cult
of Personality and its Consequences” to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union, at
which he denounced Stalin and Stalinism, shocking the delegates, and the world.
direct conflict—and nuclear war—between the US and USSR and relieve pressure on
the Soviet economy. In the long term, the assumption of the communist powers
remained that the weaknesses inherent in capitalism would sooner or later bring about
the weakening of the United States. However, the effect proved more profound for
inter-communist relations. In particular, it has been seen as the first crack in SinoSoviet relations, which would culminate a few short years later with the “Sino-Soviet
split,” a fundamental break in relations that would split the communist world. Mao
Zedong’s regime in China had already fought a costly war with the US in Korea, and
had received massive support from Stalin’s regime—not to mention the inspiration that
Stalin’s USSR had served as for Mao and his compatriots. Khrushchev’s denunciation
was galling and concerning, all the more so since China increasingly saw itself as the
leader of the international communist movement.
For Vietnam, Khrushchev’s pronouncement was both a blessing and a curse.
For Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam was already following the main tenets of “peaceful
coexistence.” However, at the same time, it could not completely rule out the possibility
of war in the pursuit of its objectives, as Moscow had done. Furthermore, with the
Chinese on their border—and generally providing more substantial aid than their Soviet
counterparts—the Vietnamese were unwilling to upset the Beijing government.
Consequently, 1956 also marked the beginning of an increasing movement for the
Vietnamese away from Soviet-backing and toward a Chinese-supported movement. As
noted previously, this would prove more noticeable as Hanoi drifted closer and closer to
war with the south. Chinese leaders had very specific ideas about the way that warfare
should be conducted against a capitalistic enemy, and when the Vietnamese started
using Chinese tanks and weapons they found those shipments accompanied by more
than instruction manuals.
Nonetheless, in 1954 these concerns were not foremost in the minds of
Vietnamese leaders, nor should they be in the minds of the delegates. Instead, the
more fundamental questions will be which policy direction to choose in the pursuit of
reunification. Will it be possible to bring about unity at a price less than that that the
Vietnamese were forced to pay between 1954 and 1975, or will this path prove an even
more destructive one? There’s only one way to find out.
Part III: The Geneva Conference of 1954
3.1 Intended Purpose
By the time the Geneva Conference was officially called the war in Vietnam had been
raging for five years. After the battle of Dien Bien Phu, French leadership realized that
the chances of French control over Indochina were next to none. If France could not
take the area militarily, their next option was to try and diplomatically assert itself in the
form of negotiations. The stated purpose of the conference was to determine a solution
to the issue, and which states, groups, and ideologies will rule what allocations of land
and population. Though not pertinent to this committee, a second topic of discussion
was solving outstanding issues on the Korean Peninsula. On the 8 th of May, 1954, the
conference began in Geneva, Switzerland, jointly chaired by the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union.
3.2 During the Conference: Negotiations
Invited countries to these negotiations included the Soviet Union, United States, France,
United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, State of Vietnam, Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV), Laos, and Cambodia. For the French, negotiations were made
extremely difficult by their loss at Dien Bien Phu one day earlier. This significantly
weakened their negotiating position, and strengthened that of the Republic of Vietnam.
A brief summary of each country’s desired outcomes are as follows:
France




Salvage as much control over the entirety of Indochina as possible
Limit the humiliation suffered from the battle of Dien Bien Phu by strengthening
their position in other Indochina countries (Laos, and Cambodia)
Consider long-term benefits and costs of maintaining French control over
Vietnam
Upon the election of Pierre Mendes-France, France’s negotiations shifted
dramatically to support a ceasefire within one month
United States



Support any group willing to fight against the Vietminh and their communist
backers
Ensure that the Domino Theory does not come into fruition in South East Asia
Discourage the USSR and China from engaging any further in the Vietnam
conflict, such that capitalism may be promoted
United Kingdom

Lead by Anthony Eden, British aims were to truly seek a diplomatic resolution to
the conflict and see Vietnam unified under one flag, so long as that flag was
determined diplomatically
Democratic Republic of Vietnam







Lead by the political leader Pham Van Dong, the DRV sought…
A ceasefire
Separation of opposing forces
Ban on the introduction of new forces into the entirety of Indochina
Exchange of prisoners
Independence and sovereignty for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
Democratic elections in all countries
State of Vietnam



The state of Vietnam disagreed heartily with the north, and instead wanted to
see…
Unification of Vietnam under Southern control
A fast conclusion to the negotiations such that the DRV could not gain more
territory while negotiations were continuing
Soviet Union



A ceasefire, monitored by a council headed by impartial India
Opportunities to spread communism throughout the entirety of Indochina and
South East Asia
The chance to use Vietminh support as a proxy for spreading communism and
fighting against capitalism
People’s Republic of China



Believed that Indochina should be looked at from a country-to-country basis
Disliked foreign intervention (including Soviet, but especially French and
American) on continental Asia
Believed that all countries should be recognized as sovereign, and were willing to
help fight to ensure this was the case
Laos and Cambodia



Believed colonial rule was detrimental to their country, regardless of colonizer
Sought sovereignty throughout negotiations from France, America, USSR, and
China
Wanted democratic elections and proper representative governments
3.3 Results
On the 21st of July, 1954, the Geneva Accords
were signed by delegates from France, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos. The provision of greatest
importance was the division of Vietnam along the
17th parallel, the so-called “provisional military
demarcation line” [right]. On either side of this line,
all parties will be given 300 days to fully withdraw
troops, and ensure that no troops are present
within three miles of the demarcation line. Further,
the Accords stipulated that all French and State of
Vietnam troops were to withdraw to the south of
this line, and all Soviet, Chinese, and DRV troops
were to withdraw to the north. In order to prevent
future clashes of powers, it further stated that
neither side would seek any additional
international support, nor enter into a military
alliance that could jeopardize the security
established by the accords.
The split of Vietnam along the 17 th
parallel, and the three mile demilitarized
zone.
Finally, there was one last vital aspect to the Geneva Accords. The International
Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), made up impartial countries Canada,
Poland, and India, was established in order to monitor the ceasefire. The ICSC worked
in such a way that if the parties within Vietnam were unable to resolve a crisis, it would
be sent to the ICSC for a verdict. If this body could not reach a verdict, they would send
the issue to the chairs of the Geneva Accords (the UK and USSR), at which point either
they would hand down a verdict, or they would reconvene the original members of the
Geneva Conference to find a resolution.
It is vital to point out that this commission is operational for the first time today. Though
this does sound like a truly ideal way to maintain peace in Vietnam, there are no
guarantees that it will do so. Delegates will have to wait, along with the rest of the world,
to see whether or not the ICSC will be able to carry out its mandate. It is vital to point
out, however, that the ICSC and the Geneva Accords have the support of the five
largest world powers, indeed many of the stipulations were proposed by these very
powers, and for a country like Vietnam, those powers are not to be trifled with.