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Confucian pluralism and China's dream of a harmonious world
Peter T. C. Chang
China Information 2014 28: 382
DOI: 10.1177/0920203X14553371
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CIN0010.1177/0920203X14553371China InformationChang
china
Article
Peter T. C. Chang
Monash University, Australia
INFORMATION
Confucian pluralism and
China’s dream of a
harmonious world
China Information
2014, Vol. 28(3) 382­–404
© The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0920203X14553371
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Abstract
This article will critique three aspects of the conservative re-sacralization project
deemed incongruent with China’s dream of a harmonious world. The first pertains to
the prevailing Han-centric rendition of the Confucian tradition. Rebuttals are made in
support of an emerging multicultural ‘global Confucianism’, an international movement
that would further the Chinese quest for a universal ethical order. The next criticism
relates to the proposal by conservatives for a Confucian church and the installation of
Confucianism as China’s state religion. In response, counterarguments are advanced for
the re-institution of ‘civil Confucianism’. One key issue is whether scholar-officials or
clerics can restore a more holistic, pluralistic re-enchanted China. The final contention
addresses the conservative melancholic Hobbesian worldview. The Confucian vision, I
explain, is essentially sanguine and the clash of civilizations not inevitable. Moreover, China
and the United States share core values for both to jointly sustain a harmonious world.
Keywords
Confucianism, civil religion, pluralism, civilization, Sino-US relations
Decades of rapid modernization are presenting the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
with unprecedented moral, social, and geopolitical dilemmas. As is widely reported,
Confucianism is being co-opted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a positive
cultural force to secure stability at home and promote goodwill abroad. The extent and
manner in which this ancient Chinese tradition will affect China’s future and Beijing’s
dream of a harmonious world, however, remain an open question. One key reason is the
CCP–PRC residual prejudice against traditional beliefs, notwithstanding the regime’s
Corresponding author:
Peter T.C. Chang, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Menzies Building, Monash
University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia.
Email: [email protected]
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recent calculated change in tack. Another complicating factor is the conflicting viewpoints emanating from within contemporary Confucian circles, ranging from statesponsored Confucian think tanks whose aim is to sustain the current socialist status quo
to conservative intellectuals advocating changes based on a particularistic interpretation
of the Confucian heritage.
This article will make the case for a stronger affirmation of Confucian liberal traits as
a prerequisite for advancing the Chinese quest for harmony. The Confucian tradition, I
contend, exercises a form of ‘inclusive supremacy’ where diversity plays a vital role in
its moral endeavour. It is by exhorting these pluralistic attributes that the noble vision of
a common humanity can be accomplished more easily. This thesis will be developed and
framed around three contentious aspects of conservative propositions which are thought
to be incommensurate with the Confucian universal ideals.
The first proposition pertains to the traditional Han-centric exposition of Confucianism.
I argue that the Chinese can no longer lay claim to being the sole patron of the Confucian
tradition. In today’s globalized reality, the evolving Confucian identity is also being
defined by voices from outside of China. An inherently multicultural ‘global
Confucianism’ is emerging where practitioners beyond the mainland are becoming legitimate stakeholders in the Confucian enterprise.1
Following this is an analysis of the controversial call by conservatives to establish a
Confucian Church and install Confucianism as the state religion of the PRC. In pre-communist China, Confucianism was dominant but Daoism and Buddhism were also an integral part of the Chinese collective ethos. To revive the Confucian tradition pivoted around
an ecclesiastical authority, even if freedom of religion is assured, would undermine this
multidimensional facet of Chinese religiosity. The restoration of ‘civil Confucianism’ as
opposed to ‘religious Confucianism’ will educe a more faithful recomposition of the
Confucian holistic, ecumenical milieu where a plurality of traditions can coexist in equanimity and organically contribute towards a unified yet pluralistic Chinese spirituality.
This study ends with a confutation of the melancholy motif, namely the thesis of the
clash of civilizations which is instigating the conservative push to project China’s soft
and hard power abroad. From the Confucian perspective, conflicts between human societies are not foredoomed. The Confucian sages in fact recognized diverse moral traditions
as worthy collaborators in humanity’s quest for a grand harmony under the Heavens.
There are commonalities in the foundational civilizational values of Confucian China
and Jeffersonian America for these global powers to attain a peaceable coexistence and
to cooperatively uphold a new world order.
Overview of contemporary Confucianists’ competing
voices2
Some of the earliest Confucian voices to emerge during the reform era were liberal
Confucianists represented by the likes of Feng Youlan, Cheng Chung-ying, and Tu
Weiming. These academics in general adopt a more universal perspective in diagnosing
and prescribing the ills afflicting today’s China. Among various initiatives, they advocate
political reform along the lines of greater governmental accountability, transparency, and
respect for civil liberty, though not wholly in the mould of Western liberal democracy.
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The next ensemble, socialist Confucianists (spearheaded by Li Xianghai, Zheng
Yawei, and Fang Keli), are so designated for their conjecture that Confucian communitarianism is fundamentally commensurate with Marxist collectivism. To that end, the
aim of this group of thinkers is to re-appropriate traditional Chinese resources to ameliorate the current regime’s advancement of an egalitarian communalistic order. On this
account, socialists are in dissonance with liberals, disapproving of what they perceive are
attempts by liberals to promote among others capitalistic individualism, the bane of both
socialism and Confucianism.
Socialists are not alone in controverting liberals. Conservative Confucianists (which
include figures such as Kang Xiaoguang, Jiang Qing, and Luo Yijun) in like manner have
assailed the liberal agenda as an importation of foreign maxims incongruous with the
Chinese cultural heritage. They reject the inordinate fixation on rights and freedom,
appealing instead for a renewal of the time-honoured sense of solidarity and responsibility towards the whole, as do socialists.
These traditionalists, however, are at odds with the socialist Confucianists’ endorsement
of the communist status quo. Marxism is berated as alien and detrimental to China’s cultural identity and integrity. Kang and Jiang have as a matter of fact called for the
‘Confucianization’ of the CCP and the re-anchoring of China on a Confucian foundation.3
On this score, conservatives and liberals are one in envisaging a post-Marxist China,
but they differ over how Confucianism should fill the void. By and large, the former take
a nativistic strategy that is to resolve China’s predicament with a home-grown remedy
imbued with authentic ‘Chinese characteristics’. The latter are open to a more cosmopolitan approach, seeing the elixir for modern China’s ailments in universal potions that
may incorporate unorthodox ingredients.
This brief survey reveals contrariety among the contemporary proponents of
Confucianism. Varied forces and complicated motivations have helped delineate these
contending orientations. It is fairly obvious to some that the socialist stance is borne out
by their close proximity to the government, hence evincing the stamp of today’s existing
power.4 The conservative and liberal factions are not without detractors, each bearing
their share of risks. The obsession of conformists with concocting an indigenous prescription could result in a narrowing of perspective and in turn undermine China’s connectedness to the wider world. On the other hand, an overreach by non-conformists
towards the universal runs the hazard of diluting Chinese particularism, thus subverting
Confucianism’s effectiveness in resolving predicaments peculiar to China.
One theoretical paradigm from which to analyse these contentions is to frame them in
terms of perennial universal and particular, global and local, dialectics. Conventional
wisdom advocates harmony, though what constitutes the point of equilibrium is oftentimes elusive, if not controversial.5 Having said that, in light of a rising nationalistic
fervour, there are grounds to surmise that the scale may be erring towards excessive
cultural nationalism. As the PRC regains its stature as an economic superpower on the
world stage, studies are reporting an increasingly assertive China that is decidedly chauvinistic in behaviour, with regard to state and non-state actors alike.6 Some of these
antipathies are perceptible in the exhortations by conservatives to go ‘back to the roots’,
an inward-looking proclivity that contradicts Confucian universal ideals and one that
may prove inimical to Beijing’s outward quest for a harmonious world.
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Confucian pluralism and multiculturalism
The ru (儒) tradition, meaning Confucianism, is generally received as the chief marker
of the Han identity. For conservatives, the Confucian ethos constitutes the Chinese cultural DNA, the foundational building blocks of the Sinic world. The fate of China is thus
seen as indelibly bound with Confucianism, without which the Chinese civilization loses
its soul.7
The framing of Confucianism and the Chinese civilization as indistinguishable and
indissoluble leads us to ask whether the Confucian way of life can subsist outside of the
Han milieu. To embody and exude Confucianism, does one have to become ‘Chinese’?
This line of questioning is critical as the PRC faces challenges and responsibilities
beyond the mainland. If a Confucian-inspired China does ascend to global leadership,
would its moral influence be transmitted only through the Chinese cultural convention?
It is instructive to take a comparative look at the Christian tradition. Since its inception two millennia ago, the Christian church has assumed features radically different
from its primal Near Eastern legacy. In the more recent modern era, from the viewpoints
of East Asians, Christianity is the personification of European cultural attributes. And
this association with the West is beginning to be supplanted by further transformations.
Christianity today is a truly global phenomenon, in geographical as well as cultural
terms. In Africa, Latin America, and Asia, the Christian faith is lived through an assortment of tongues and scripts.
The theology underpinning this multicultural metamorphosis is the Christian universal vision. To start with, in a departure from the prevailing Mosaic worldview, Christ
proclaimed a radically new gospel intended for all of humanity, superseding the Old
Testament narrative where divine favour is bestowed exclusively on God’s chosen people, to wit, the Israelites. Accompanying this historic breakthrough is the claim that the
spirit of Christ is ‘above culture’, meaning that the Christian Good News encapsulates
truisms that transcend time and space, and hence are not bound to any earthly hosts and
can be incarnated in multifarious cultural habitats.8
A similar evolution of worldview is discernible in China. As with most primitive
societies, the earliest Chinese social political order was organized around tribal kinship.
Then, gazing up to the Heavens, figuratively speaking, the classical Confucian sages
visualized a grand moral edifice that embraces the entire human race. Henceforth, this
became the standard exacted upon rulers of Imperial China, to effectuate a benevolent
reign under Heaven for the peaceful coexistence of all people.9
As one of the Axial Age religions, Confucian universalism is an accepted axiom. Like
Christianity, the Confucian tradition upholds an all-encompassing telos, to consummate
a body politic that incorporates humankind. What is not immediately apparent is whether
Confucians share the Christian multicultural approach in pursuing this utopia on earth.
Mengzi’s theory of human nature does assert that each and every individual, regardless
of ethnicity and race, possesses the innate potential to do good. Can this sanguine view
be extended to aver that a person or peoples, in spite of cultural heterogeneity, are capable of sustaining an ethical existence that manifests the Heavenly Ways?
The successful transplantation of the Confucian tradition in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam
provides empirical support for an affirmative answer. The Confucian manner of living
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centred on rituals with emphasis on family, respect for elders, priority to communal
cohesion, and so on, seems to have taken deep roots in non-Han cultural terrain. This
attests to the fact that the wisdom emblematized by the ru tradition can and does thrive
outside of the Chinese world. In theological terms, like Christianity, the spirit of
Confucianism can be said to be ‘above culture’ in that the Heavenly Principles (天理) it
embodies are not captive to particular earthly vessels and can be cultivated in manifold
environments.
The linkage between Confucianism and China needs to be placed in perspective. The
former is arguably an intrinsic constituent of the latter’s cultural anatomy. The Chinese
civilization’s destiny, as purists such as Kang and Jiang have claimed, is intertwined with
Confucianism, a conceivably valid pronouncement. The converse deduction however is
not true. The constitution of Confucianism is not wholly beholden to the Chinese civilization. As history has verified, the former can flourish over and above the latter. This
means that, among others things, the Han idiom is not the solitary medium to promulgate
the Heavenly Principles. And there is no imperative for a person to be culturally Chinese
before he or she can embrace the Confucian way of life.
Putting this differently, the Chinese world has no monopoly over Confucianism or
exclusive access to the Way (道). Other mores and conventions can epitomize the
Confucian wisdom.10 The implication therefore is that as modern China begins to project
its soft power abroad, including Confucianism, there is no doctrine stipulating that this
venerable tradition is transmittable only in the Chinese form. To insist otherwise and to
impose the adaptation of Han culture as a precondition to embracing the Confucian way
would be tantamount to ‘cultural imperialism’. Like Christianity, the propagation of
Confucianism is better served if this universalistic moral tradition is made more readily
transplantable into social contexts other than that of the Han.
Herein lies a general criticism of this age-old Chinese tradition. Compared to Axial
Age religions such as Christianity and Buddhism, Confucianism is perhaps the least
universal and most monocultural. Although extolling a global aspiration, its actual geographical imprint remains localized, confined to the Northeast Asian region. Culturally it
is still predominantly a Chinese-based philosophical-religious tradition.
This phenomenon is explained in part by Confucianism’s preferred mode of transmission, specifically, through exemplary moral leadership. The early Chinese sages were
convinced that if a benevolent ruler’s conduct is in alignment with the Way, then wuwei
(无为, effortlessly), like the Northern Star, all things under Heaven will revolve around
him.11 A relevant illustration is the Confucianization of Korea and Japan. Drawn to its
touted ethical kingship, scholars from these neighbouring polities travelled to the Middle
Kingdom, immersed themselves in the Confucian way of life, then returned to plant the
Confucian seed in their homeland.12
Clearly an advantage of this modus operandi is the absence of coercive conversion.
But there are drawbacks. An obvious feature is the slow expansion of Confucianism
beyond the Chinese frontiers when compared to missionary-sending traditions such as
Christianity and Buddhism. Operating on the premise that dissemination is best initiated
by the inbound seekers, the consequence is a lack of outbound action on the part of the
Han Chinese to fashion their venerated tradition into a more transcultural form, readily
transportable across the globe. The result is that after two millennia Confucianism
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remains a regional movement and, albeit with slight East Asian variations, a culturally
homogeneous tradition.13
Recent initiatives suggest a departure from this customarily passive approach. Although
controversial, the establishment of Confucius Institutes across the globe, for instance,
signifies a historic shift in the Chinese predilection, towards a pro-active engagement with
the world at large. In terms of a prospective harmonious commonwealth under the
Heavens, this strategy is a positive step in expanding beyond the geographical footprint of
mainland Confucianism. What remains problematic, however, pertains to the cultural
form. The Confucian tradition is still being promulgated essentially as part of the Chinese
heritage, which in and by itself is not an issue.14 However, if there is no alternative linguistic medium for others to receive the tradition then the prevailing unicultural approach may
face the risk of being misconstrued as a chauvinistic imposition of ethnic Chinese values.
To avert such misapprehensions it is expedient to adorn Confucian customs and norms in
a more multicultural garb. And here is where non-Han Confucianists have a role to play,
and where their status in relation to Han Confucianism should be re-assessed.
During the Imperial era China maintained a suzerain relationship with its immediate
neighbours, Korea and Japan. Sovereignty was preserved, and these vassal states were
obliged to pay homage to China’s political-military power. A similar pecking order is
discernible within the East Asian Confucian family. Over time, Korean Confucianism
and Japanese Confucianism have established their own forms, with features distinct from
China. Even so, they exist under the shadow of and in deference to the elder within the
fraternity – Han Confucianism.
At the turn of the 20th century, the collapse of Imperial China followed by a decadeslong maelstrom of anti-tradition movements saw Han Confucianism on its knees, and
this familial hierarchy was upended. As China became embroiled in turmoil it fell to
Confucianists outside of the homeland to ‘keep the faith alive’. In Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Southeast Asia and the West, a generation of Confucian refugees established domiciles
in exile. Together with these dislocated Chinese, satellite states such as Korea and Japan,
heretofore in the background, found themselves thrust into the forefront with the task of
defending and perpetuating the Confucian way of life.
Stepping into the new millennium, Confucianism in China is relishing a new lease of
life and the movement’s centre of gravity is reverting back to the mainland. A greater part
of today’s Confucian scholarship is in actuality focused on unearthing this ancient cultural cache to meet the demands and needs of modern China. The resetting of the
Confucian spotlight back onto Chinese soil is not unexpected. China is, after all, the
tradition’s birthplace and, by virtue of its size, it is likely to re-dominate the narrative of
21st-century Confucianism.
However, the rebirth of mainland Confucianism ought not to lead to a re-marginalization of overseas Confucianists and the discounting of their potential contributions to the
Confucian enterprise. While there may be understandable resistance, especially from
conservatives, in relation to foreign-based Confucianists’ role in resolving the PRC’s
domestic predicaments, the latter’s input towards Beijing’s international aspiration is
less contentious, such as the present venture to disseminate the Confucian precepts
abroad. This global outreach warrants a more multicultural vehicle. And some of these
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Confucian diasporas possess the skills and experiences to create such an eclectic
conduit.
One relevant example is ‘Boston Confucianism’, a name coined to represent a coterie
of academics based in the United States.15 Working primarily in the English language,
these scholars’ enunciation of Confucian theories and practices undoubtedly rendered the
quintessentially Chinese tradition accessible to a wider audience. It is by tapping into
non-Han expertise such as this that Confucianism will become more universal in its cultural complexion and geographical reach.
Contributions from these overseas Confucianists extend beyond the mere issue of
linguistic genre into more substantive conceptual exegesis. The protracted debate over
the compatibility of Confucianism with liberal democracy is a case in point. Arguments
for greater political reform are mainly championed by liberal Confucianists based in the
West. Their aim is to help steer this ancient Chinese school of thought into alignment
with contemporary international standards and expectations.
To sum up, the ongoing intra-Confucian discourses between the mainland and overseas Confucianists underscore a vital point: the importance of affirming and supporting
a sprouting transnational global Confucianism. Beyond continental China, practitioners
are enriching the tradition with diversities moulded by their distinct geographical and
historical, linguistic and ethnic experiences. These internationalists deserve to be recognized as legitimate transformers and transmitters of the Confucian way. And arguably in
the current endeavour to introduce this pre-modern Chinese tradition to a postmodern
worldwide audience, the cause is better served when global Confucianism is conferred at
least a supporting if not a leading role.
Confucian pluralism, holism and multiple religiosity
Returning to challenges on the home front, an overriding concern confounding Confucianists
is the lingering disenchantment prevailing in modern China. By most measures the PRC
remains a secularized state where the ruling elites continue to relegate the sacred realm to
the fringes of national life. A chief aim of the ongoing restoration of traditional values
therefore is to breach this retaining wall and re-enchant China’s public domain. Conservative
Confucianists have, as already noted, issued calls to ‘Confucianize’ the CCP and to resacralize the republic. And a centrepiece of their efforts is to enshrine Confucianism as
China’s state religion and inaugurate a ‘Confucian church’ modelled after the Church of
England.16 In light of the current political climate this controversial proposal will unquestionably encounter major obstructions from the ruling party-state. For the purposes of this
article, however, the more critical issue pertains to the presuppositions underpinning the
conservative church-based project that contravene the primeval Chinese worldview and are
at variance with how the sacrosanct was constituted in ancient China.
Diffused holism
The Christian worldview is founded on radical dualism where a great chasm sets apart
the created and creator, finite and infinite, temporal and eternal, imbuing Christianity
with a profound sense of good and evil, and engendering a bifurcated order partitioned
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along overt divine and profane boundaries. Another feature is a marked division of
labour whereupon the monarchy and papacy are designated separate spheres of responsibility. The king’s jurisdiction is confined first and foremost to matters pertaining to
earthly governance. The church’s province, on the other hand, is to above all lay the
groundwork for the consummating transition into the heavenly kingdom.
Ancient China’s view of the world, by comparison, is defined by holism. While the
yin–yang polarity informs Chinese cosmology, this dualism is framed in correlative
terms where the transcendent and mundane, Heaven and Earth, are adjudged as ultimately one. It bespeaks a ‘transcendence as immanence’ theology that instilled into the
Chinese consciousness a unified organic vision. In this there is a less absolute deduction
of good and evil, with the demarcation between the divine and profane at times left
ambiguous. Neither is there a rigid compartmentalization of authority. Consecrated as
the Son of Heaven, the Chinese Emperor reigned as the political ruler as well as the paradigmatic priest. And Confucians, as philosophers-cum-bureaucrats, dispense their ethical prescripts on matters relating to the other-worldly as well as this-worldly domain.17
With regard to the conservatives’ project, if the Christian model is adapted in its totality, the proposed Confucian church would be acceding to a relatively restricted mandate.
Their purview would be restricted to the sacred eternal realm with the secular temporal
dominion delegated to the state – a constriction that would essentially contravene the
Confucian holistic vision of oneness. Having said that, there is nonetheless no indication
on the part of conservatives to jettison in principle Chinese holism for Christian dualism.
Their strategy appears to be driven by pragmatism, to utilize the Confucian church as a
platform to re-enchant the current disenchanted milieu.
Now, even if this is the case, pivoting this re-sacralization campaign around an episcopal centre may prove inadequate for the task at hand. Basically, the problem is associated with the institutional layout. Set within a dualistic social paradigm, the Christian
church exists as a detached entity in a sacred enclave segregated from the wider secular
domain. For instance, when the church attempts to exert its power to influence the government, bishops and priests do so chiefly as outsiders akin to external auditors making
pronouncements from a distance.
In many ways Confucian temples and certain private academies such as the Hanlinyuan
operated in similar fashion. Somewhat removed from direct Imperial control, members
of these establishments would, figuratively speaking, stand outside the palace gates to
lament and remonstrate against the Emperor in a manner reminiscent of the Biblical
prophets of old.18 This nevertheless was not the main channel through which Confucians
exerted their moral authority. In the past it was applied primarily from within the walls
of the Imperial courts. As official bureaucrats, the Confucians infiltrated the state
machinery and exacted potent leverage in the day-to-day administering of the Empire. In
Christendom individual Christians too were appointed to high offices within the government. In China’s case, however, the Confucian penetration of Chinese officialdom was
by far more systematic and extensive.19
In addition to the Imperial bureaucracy, Confucians also exerted their influence on the
wider Chinese milieu from the inside. In Christianity, the church is the chief custodian of
Christian beliefs and values. The masses in general turn to the pastorate for moral instruction and spiritual direction. In Confucianism, the temple plays an analogous role but is not
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the sole source of ethical tutelage. Traditionally, Confucian virtues are similarly propagated via non-religious social units such as families, schools, academies, clan associations
and trade guilds. The home is above all the most critical, deemed as the basic building
block of the Confucian edifice. It is through the inculcation of filial piety and observance
of rituals such as ancestral worship within the local household that Confucian propriety is
perpetuated from one generation to the next. The other social entities in varying fashions
and degrees jointly serve as loci where Confucian teachings are espoused and transmitted.
This phenomenon has led scholars to classify Confucianism as a ‘diffused’ as opposed to
an ‘institutionalized’ religion, whereupon its activities are not confined to religious sites
such as temples, shrines and memorial halls but rather permeate into a multitude of interconnected non-religious social networks.20 And in so doing, Confucians achieved a comparatively more pervasive presence in every segment of society.
Here we have a second set of critical comments on the proposal by conservatives.
Even without adopting Christian dualism, the church model has inherent practical limitations. Compared to the pervasive presence of Confucianists, the physical presence and
scope of direct influence of Christians in the general milieu is restricted. The former’s
participation within the Imperial bureaucracy as scholar-officials grants them extensive
access to the levers of the state machinery. Entrusting the duties of moral cultivation to
parents, teachers, and community elders means that the Confucian enterprise has nearubiquitous coverage on the ground. It is these laities rather than the professional priesthood that are the foot soldiers of the Confucian movement. Without question, by
becoming embedded in practically every stratum of the social infrastructure, Confucianism
has attained a more in-depth penetration of society at large vis-a-vis Christianity.
Confucian conservatives are aware of this phenomenon and have ambitious agendas
to rejuvenate Confucian activism. These include, to name a few, plans to reintroduce the
Confucian classics into the public school curriculum and to revive the civil examination
as part of the induction process into the state bureaucracy.21 Yet what appears to be out of
step with this grass-roots programme is the move to install the proposed Confucian
church as the supreme religious authority – a strategy that presumably will see the
Confucian core elite retreating into a sacred enclave removed from the wider milieu.
This would be an unprecedented development simply because the Confucian temple has
never possessed centralized power on a par with that of Lambeth Palace, let alone the
Vatican. Insofar as there was a unified command, it was those Confucian bureaucrats
nested within the state who exercised de facto overall authority. The Confucian-manned
Ministry of Rites is an apt example, which for all practical purposes exercised executive
discretion over every religion-related issue in Imperial China. Hence Confucian literatiofficials rather than clerics sat at the apex of the Confucian hierarchy.
Again, conservatives are mindful of this reality and have plans to restore the preeminence of Confucian bureaucrats. In Jiang Qing’s wide-ranging political blueprint, for
instance, there is an intriguing conceptualization of a tricameral legislature which would
include a House of Exemplary Persons, whereby the Confucian scholarly class could
reclaim their seat within the highest echelon of power.22
Thus, as things stand, it is apparent there are two opposing strands with regard to the
reconfiguration of the Confucian power structure: the traditional order where centralized
moral leadership is exacted through scholar-officials implanted within the state organs;
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and the unconventional cathedral model that would see clerics asserting authority from a
sacred outpost detached from the broader secular domain. The fact that both are under
consideration simultaneously, one could surmise, reveals a degree of internal contradiction within the conservative albeit still open-ended exploratory plans.
The church-based scheme is not without merits. One discernible advantage is the
sharper focal point such a religious body could provide in rallying and rehabilitating a critically debilitated tradition. Moreover, considering the alternative that entails wresting control of the state apparatus, setting up a detached albeit controversial ecclesiastical centrifugal
power may be viewed as posing less of a direct threat to the current one-party-state regime.
Indeed, the church could effectuate an institutionalized separation of Confucians and the
state – a dissociation of critical significance in view of the intimate link between Chinese
mandarins and the royal court during the Imperial era, which entailed risks. The gentry
class was susceptible to the Emperor’s whims, manipulation and retaliation. Given this
historical vulnerability, retreating into a secure enclosure could provide Confucians with a
buffer zone against undue intervention by the powers that be. This is perhaps the strongest
justification for establishing an independent, dominant Confucian church.
Be that as it may, there are downsides to the church option, one of which relates to fallouts from the aforementioned institutional withdrawal into a sacred sanctuary. A general
consequence from such a retreat is a dilution of the presence and sway of Confucians within
the wider domain. More specifically, an ascendant clergy will have the converse effect of
diminishing the literati-officials’ stature, hence weakening the longstanding Confucian prerogative to exert direct oversight on the state. What is at stake here is an erosion of the influence of Confucianists within the palace in exchange for the security gained inside the
cathedral. Is this an acceptable trade-off for the sake of mitigating the Chinese mandarin’s
vulnerability?23 Before tackling this question, we will first deal with another perplexity vexing the conservative proposition, and this one pertains to religious pluralism.
Pluralistic ethos
The conservative’s avowal to enshrine Confucianism as China’s state religion inevitably invites the question: how would the PRC with a state-sanctioned Confucian church
deal with the multifarious traditions represented in China? At one level there is a
straightforward response to this concern. As in England, where Anglicanism enjoys a
favoured status, a China with Confucianism as its state religion could constitutionally
guarantee the freedom of belief. Various religious believers would be accorded constitutional rights to practise their respective creed, which to some extent is already the case
in post-reform China.
That being said, if the ultimate aim of the ongoing re-sacralization project is to recompose China’s traditional ethos, then these modern legal provisions do not encapsulate the
full essence of Chinese religiousness. In the pre-modern era China’s diverse philosophies
and religions were not merely tolerated but were engaged in active interaction and indepth integration. It was not uncommon to find, for instance, a Chinese identifying him
or herself as a Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist all at the same time. Likewise, in Imperial
sacred ceremonies, for example, the state sacraments often involved motifs drawn from
creeds other than Confucianism.24
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This phenomenon calls attention to the syncretic nature of Chinese spirituality. Even
with distinct beliefs and etiquettes, these traditions are open to organic fusions whereupon each adds to the mix peculiar ingredients to brew a blended religious stew. This
ecumenism of faiths, however, is not an alliance of equals. Confucians presumed superiority and sought to assert their authority over the rest. Nevertheless, the brand of supremacy Confucians practise may still be deduced as inclusive insofar as there was no claim
to an exclusive monopoly of virtues. Chinese sages recognized the ethical efficacy of
non-Confucians and were open to partnership within a singular albeit Confucian-headed
multireligious moral enterprise.25
Hence, though Confucianism was dominant, Imperial China’s corporate ethos was an
amalgam of multiple religiosities. Contemporary Confucianists, including conservatives
such as Kang and Jiang, do not deny the inherent heterogeneity of Chinese spirituality.
There are tacit commitments to promote such a pluralistic religiousness even when the
Confucian tradition is accorded preferential treatment.26 If this is the case (and there is
no reason to doubt the sincerity of conservatives), then to designate Confucianism as
China’s state religion would be counterfactual. One preferable alternative is to assign it
as China’s ‘official ideology’, a title that lends a more open interpretation of the traditional Chinese unified yet diversified national faith.
The main conundrum with the conservative plan nonetheless pertains to the proposed
Confucian church, specifically whether Confucian clergymen could provide the needed
stewardship in resurrecting the traditional Chinese religiosity. This contention stems not
least in part from the fact that, historically, religious syncretism occurred chiefly outside
of the Confucian temple precincts, in the everyday setting of Chinese society at large.
The Chinese family is a primary locus and the funeral service of a parental figure is a
fitting illustration. Here we see the vigil, centred around the core Confucian ethos of
filial piety, embellished with elaborate Daoist or Buddhist solemnities to apotheosize the
spirit of the deceased parent in the other world. The same goes with clan associations and
trade guilds, whereupon while Confucianism furnishes ethical guidelines for social or
business codes of conduct, bonds between members are further reinforced through the
veneration of ancestors, local heroes, village deities, and crafts- or trade-related divinities. And this is repeated at the highest level, in the Imperial courts. The annual offering
of sacrifices by the Chinese Emperor to Heavenly Lord (上帝), for instance, was adorned
with formalities and etiquette informed by alchemists, astrologers, and geomancers.
Added to this was the worship of a pantheon of other lesser celestial beings, such as the
natural gods of wind and fire.27
These ‘non-religious’ and ‘pseudo-religious’ social institutions, as pointed out earlier,
are an integral part of the Confucian-diffused presence within society at large. What the
above reveals is that they actually function as ecumenical incubators to nurture the pluralistic Chinese religiosity, whereupon Confucianism’s social-ethical sagacity is supplemented with esoteric-metaphysical acuity drawn from disparate sources. This syncretic
exercise is in marked contrast to the Confucian temple’s sectarian role, namely, to preserve and propagate the Confucian credo.28
Now, what may be inferred from these observations and analyses is the existence of
two distinct branches of Confucianism. The first, which is categorized as religious
Confucianism, is focalized through the priesthood, which acts principally as apologists
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of the Confucian faith. The other can be classified as civil Confucianism, represented by
non-clerical agents (namely, parents, community leaders and scholar-officials) whose
aim is not the mere conservation but the transformation of the Confucian tradition via
extraneous fusion.
The religious branch with its august temples and sacred liturgies is the face of
Confucian orthodoxy. As the showcase and custodian of the cult of Confucius, their
symbolic significance is unmistakable. On the other hand, the civil branch’s open social
spaces and syncretic rituals are the epitome of Confucian heterodoxy. As host and facilitator of interreligious interaction, they are the principal actors who mould the variegated
Chinese religiosity. In point of fact the Confucian scholar-officials rather than the clergy
were the chief architects responsible for framing and maintaining China’s pluralistic
national moral character.
With these distinctions made we have a different, broader perspective to evaluate the
re-sacralization project currently underway. As a general critique, the priority of conservatives at this time is by most accounts directed at the narrower objective of religious
Confucianism, that is, to rehabilitate Confucian orthodoxy. Now if the ultimate goal is to
reconstitute the broader and more diverse Chinese collective ethos, then the present
focus has to be expanded to include restoring civil Confucianism’s predominance.
This brings us back to the controversies surrounding the proposed Confucian church.
When installed as the supreme moral authority, the elevation of religious Confucianism
will inevitably cause the prominence of civil Confucianism to wane. Do Confucian clerics possess the wherewithal to supplement or take over the scholar-officials’ ecumenical
leadership? Based on the conservative scheme as currently propounded, the answer has
to be no. Modifications and augmentations are required before the proposed Confucian
church can effectively execute such an undertaking.
For one thing, to be consistent with an expanded mandate, the church would have to
be renamed (the National Ecumenical Council, for example).29 Next, and more critically,
is the question of the procurement of the relevant skill sets. As elucidated, this complex
process calls for delicate cross-fertilization of ideas, involving creative discernment and
technical expertise covering a wide spectrum of creeds and belief systems. The conventional Confucian priesthood plainly lacks the civil Confucianists’ interfaith and multireligious competencies. Therefore the prospective ecclesiastical authority must, at the
very least, enhance its proficiency in inter-philosophical and inter-religious interactions
prior to taking on the task of recovering and sustaining China’s pluralistic milieu.
Apart from this conundrum of religious pluralism, another contention besetting the
conservative plan is connected to a different aspect of the Chinese quest for holism, this
time in terms of harmonizing the sacred and secular tension – a dialectic the Confucian
church may have difficulty balancing.
Balanced holism
While religious Confucianism has its temple, the institutional base for civil Confucianism
is less apparent. The state bureau would seem the obvious answer, but this is not exactly
the case. Though operating within officialdom, Confucian scholar-officials were mere
civil servants of their political masters, namely, the Imperial Household. In reality, to the
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extent a ‘home’ could be ascribed to civil Confucianists, it would be the loose networks
of academies and literati associations.
This is an important observation. The fact that civil Confucianism’s home base is
neither the temple nor the palace points to three distinct groups of actors and their corresponding spheres of influence: the sacred priesthood, civilian scholar-officials, and
noble aristocrats. More crucially, what this tripartite constellation underscores is the civil
Confucianists’ centrist status, namely, as mediating agents reconciling the competing
demands of the ecclesiastics’ other-worldly aspirations and the temporal ruler’s thisworldly ambitions.
Indeed civil Confucianists epitomize a unique form of ‘all-round’ scholastic leadership. As philosophers they lay the ethical groundwork for an earthly existence that is in
alignment with the Heavenly principles. At the same time, as government agents they
attend to the day-to-day affairs of the Empire, enacting laws and administering public
policies so as to sustain a functional sociopolitical order. Long idolized as exemplary
personhood, that is, junzi (君子), these sage-bureaucrats are astute in matters that have
implications and consequences for the mundane realm and beyond. More significantly, it
is on the basis of such multifaceted expertise that civil Confucianists presided over the
Chinese quest for a holistic way of life, to forge a flourishing civilization that exudes
interior and exterior, physical and spiritual vibrancy, where human advancements are
pursued in deference to the wider living nature, and terrestrial goings-on are conducted
in obeisance to the celestial forces.
As history attests, in the headlong scramble to embrace modernity, 20th-century
China has renounced its ancient ways. With atheistic technocrats at the helm, scientific rationality sets the drumbeat for a new Chinese march in search of a de-sacralized
utopia – a century-long (mis)adventure that has bequeathed a lopsided legacy,
namely a deeply materialistic milieu with thin metaphysics, an anthropocentric pursuit of progress that has defiled the sanctity of the ecosphere, and an existence devoid
of enchantment. Contemporary Confucian activists, liberals and conservatives alike,
have roundly denounced the excesses of radical secularism. In invoking the past,
their aim is not the mere pushing back of modernity but the recovery of an environment that fosters a constructive synthesis between the sacred and secular realm.
Herein lies the next critique of the conservative strategy. If the goal is to restore
equilibrium, then to anchor this effort around an all-powerful Confucian church
could prove counter-productive.
At the outset, as an interested party in the sacred and secular dialectic, the church’s
impartiality and ability to mediate is open to question. In essence, unlike the challenge of
religious pluralism, this undertaking lies outside the clergy’s purview because it requires
theological and non-theological expertise; in modern terminology, this means possessing
generalist yet comprehensive knowledge in the humanities, law, economics, and sciences. With a narrower pedigree of divinity, the conventional clerical cohort plainly
lacks the multidisciplinary scholarship to replicate the literati-officials’ critical role as
mediator.
That said, the vision of conservatives of a post-modern China is likely to retain a berth
for civil Confucianists. But as alluded to, with a Vatican-like hegemon dominating the
new landscape, the standing of scholar-officials will be diminished with the inevitable
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dilution of their ability to bridge the sacred and secular divide. The more adverse impact
of conservatives’ church-centred scheme is that it will exacerbate the existing schism,
with the first and third estates becoming locked into an antagonistic bipolar stand-off. To
be fair, the fact that Confucians have been able to reclaim a national voice is an improvement on the present state of affairs. But this falls short of the intended outcome as China
remains fractured with a structural antithetical dualism that is diametrically opposed to
the ancient Chinese vision of a unified whole.
Hence if the endgame is an undivided China, greater focus should be accorded to
restoring a commanding school of philosophers cum bureaucrats, centrally situated
within the power nexus to mediate the sacred and secular tension. When reinstituted, the
civil Confucian intelligentsia could then act on the ultimate goal, that is, to shepherd
21st-century China towards a holistic path where the tangible and intangible, the human
species and the planetary whole, the here-and-now and the hereafter, are conferred the
balanced attention they deserve.
It is imperative at this juncture to revisit a pivotal concern, to wit, the bureaucratic
literati’s susceptibility to Imperial tyranny, which is a historical vulnerability that must
be redressed if Confucians are to reclaim their vocation within modern China’s officialdom. As has been noted, it is this inherent risk that provides the strongest justification for
the establishment of a matching ecclesiastical counterweight. Yet to relocate the
Confucian headquarters to a sacred fortress has consequences. Aside from a regression
in their ‘diffused’ representation it has ramifications for sustaining a pluralistic and balanced order. All in all, the fallout from a weakened civil Confucianism in return for the
safe refuge of a bolstered religious Confucianism is questionably excessive. This is a
trade-off with severe repercussions on the efforts underway to reconstitute the traditional
Chinese holistic order.
The more efficacious strategy to deal with the Confucian institutional weakness lies
in initiating comprehensive political reforms. One possibility is to subdivide the government into distinct branches, namely, the legislative, executive, and judiciary. If endowed
with commensurate prestige, these independent institutions could provide the body polity with critical internal checks and balances. Additional devices include introducing
democratic procedures such as open elections and a viable opposition that would impose
restraints on the governing party. When implemented, well-established modern statecraft
can mitigate the threat of autocratic rule, paving the way for civil Confucianists to reassume their conventional position. Such a scenario would then confute the main rationale for the creation of a supreme Confucian church and the corresponding need to retreat
into such a sacred haven.30
By way of drawing this section of the article to a close, it is pertinent to address a
related broader question: was Imperial China ever a theocratic state? This is a relevant
inquiry, since Kang had advocated revamping China into the mould of a theocracy.
Insofar as the primeval Han civilization was imbued with a holy reverence for the ethereal and its noble sovereigns reigned as the Sons of Heaven, the dynasties in China were
sacred principalities. But the Sinic kingdoms were not a standard theocracy because the
Chinese monarchs were attended to chiefly by an assemblage of literati-bureaucrats in
lieu of a council of clerics. Imperial China was, to be more precise, a ‘civil theocracy’ as
opposed to a ‘religious theocracy’, which is a form of divine kingship grounded on civic
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cornerstones where the sacred and secular are held in reciprocal polarity rather than the
former superseding the latter within a linear hierarchy.
Looked at from this perspective, the conservatives’ ecclesiastic Confucianism-based
project may be faulted as an over-correction. While China’s incumbent rulers, avowedly
atheistic, have erred to one extreme, to counter it with a theocratic-like political system
is to move towards the opposite extreme. A judicious re-centring would be to reconfigure
post-Marxist China into a sacred yet civil nation-state. That being said, the proposed
Confucian church does have a function in contemporary China. Like its predecessor
temples, these religious institutions are hubs for rehabilitating orthodox Confucianism.
On the broader task of resurrecting China’s collective pluralistic ethos, the spotlight
should be trained on civil Confucianism. The re-empowering of the scholar-official
ranks will bring forth a more faithful recovery of the traditional Chinese sacred-political
order, thus validating the ongoing Confucian renaissance with clearer historical continuity and greater legitimacy.
As a prelude to the next topic, it is worthwhile to discuss – albeit in brief – Chen
Ming’s perceptive promotion of the Confucian tradition as a civil religion. In refuting the
privatization of spirituality, Chen argues for a form of popular Confucianism that engages
society at large. Against sectarianism, he espouses a Confucian-based moral enterprise
that incorporates religious diversity.31 Chen’s rendition, concentrating on the civic
dimension of Confucianism, by and large comports with this article’s effort to highlight
the holistic and pluralistic attributes of the Confucian tradition.
The other intriguing feature of Chen’s project is his usage of the term civil religion,
which of course was famously employed by Robert Bellah to describe the religiosity of
the United States. Even without a state religion or national church, Bellah observed that
Americans pledge allegiance to a civil yet sacred credo that unifies the republic’s diverse
denominations.32 As the following section will show, there are fundamental similarities
between Confucian China and Bellah’s depiction of American civil religion. This commonality provides the basis to refute another contention in relation to the conservative
Confucianists’ movement, namely, their melancholic view of the world and adversarial
perception of America in particular.
Confucian pluralism and civilizations
As today’s two main global powers, China and the United States are locked in rivalry,
jostling for economic pre-eminence and geopolitical and military dominance. Disputes
over issues such as human rights and liberal democracy add layers of complexity to the
Sino-US relationship. For some, these competitions and conflicts, cultural or otherwise,
vindicate Samuel Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilizations. Conservative thinkers
in the East, such as Kang, have embraced Huntington’s worldview. They perceive China
and America as the exemplification of two blocks of human populations carved out of
radically incommensurate cultural constituents. As such, the prospect for coexistence is
remote. What is realistic is to strive for a modus vivendi whereupon human societies
agree to exist side by side for the sake of mutual self-preservation. To arrive at this state
of equilibrium it is imperative that the PRC bolsters its hard and soft power, including
reviving a ‘muscular’ Confucianism to counteract the reigning American hegemon.
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Is the chasm between human civilizations so wide that the only realistic option is to
exist together under a Hobbesian social contract? Is antipathy the inevitable accent that
defines the relationship between the Han-Chinese and the Anglo-American world? As
alluded to, there are complementary ‘civil’ traits in Imperial China and Republican
America. Though without a decreed state religion, both retain a collective cognizance
and awe of the transcendental. Furthermore, their national sacred ideology is informed
and shaped chiefly by rational ethical principles rather than extra-rational theological
axioms. Beneath these surface semblances are deeper philosophical-religious commonalities. This is especially true when we compare Confucianism and deism, a relatively
obscure pseudo-religious English sect that exacted indelible imprints upon the American
Founding Fathers’ worldview, most notably Thomas Jefferson’s.33
An offshoot of Christianity, deists, like Confucianists, espouse a universal vision
where all people, regardless of race, are endowed with the innate potential to cohabit
amicably as one human family. However, contrary to Christianity but similar to
Confucianism, these admirers of the ancient Stoics adopt an open disposition affirming
the agency of diverse traditions in realizing this idealized order.34 The principle of inclusiveness upheld by deists was forged in the furnace of 17th-century English religious
warfare. Ecclesiastical intolerance, fed by theological dogmatism, fuelled violence
towards fellow Christians and non-Christians alike. Appalled by the atrocities committed
in God’s name, these English rationalists pleaded for reasonableness and temperance in
matters of belief.35
Deism’s appeal to reason brings to the fore another common attribute that they share
with the Confucians: an aversion to extremes. In all things, modesty is a virtue, and
above all on subjects pertaining to the supernatural, rational restraint is imperative. Both
deism and Confucianism extol choosing the middle pathway, to hold in delicate tension
the dialectic between the passionate impulses of the heart and the impassionate prowess
of the mind.
This brief comparative overview offers another paradigm with which to evaluate the
Sino-US relationship. From the ‘big picture’ perspective of these general yet foundational philosophical-religious similarities (universalism, pluralism, moderation), the
intractable East–West discord over liberal democracy, as a case in point, need not be cast
as a clash of fundamental values between civilizations. Certainly there are critical dissonances, but they may be viewed as subsidiary contentions over the practical means to
achieve the ultimate aspirations of both the Chinese and the Americans, namely, to realize the grandiose vision of one humanity.
If these shared tenets are upheld, then the Sinic and Anglo-American worlds are not
foredoomed to be mired in a ‘cultural’ Cold War. Just as manifold traditions were incorporated into the Confucian enterprise, there are prospects for these two civilizations to
coalesce into an alliance.36 Arguably, Confucian China and Jeffersonian America could
form the vanguards of a global ethical movement to counteract some of the exigencies of
the 21st century.37 But before expanding on this thesis some clarifications are warranted
with regard to the Confucian perspective on leadership.
For much of Imperial China’s history, the superiority of Confucianism had always
been presumed. As first among equals, Confucians exercised considerable clout over the
rest. Is the Confucian seat at the summit unavoidable and indisputable? At the outset,
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there were no doctrines to sanction Confucianism’s claim to absolute supremacy. The
early Chinese sages did not espouse any equivalent Old Testament notion of the chosen
race or tradition so that the supremacy of Confucianism could be irrefutably established.
Nor is there a parallel to the American sense of manifest destiny whereby Confucian
China would be extolled as the predestined leader. Rather, Confucianism may be said to
be founded on a meritocracy. It is conferred by virtue of the tradition’s astute discernment and ardent pursuit of the Heavenly Ways. The implication is that the Confucian
leadership is not a given. It is contingent on its adherence to a way of life that conforms
with the Way. If the movement strays from the Way then the legitimacy to govern is
forfeited. To some extent the history of modern China is demonstrative of one such
period. When internal decay reduced this venerable tradition to irrelevance, it was
accordingly banished from the mainland. Thus the Chinese moral philosophers who
invoked Heaven (天) to exact accountability from the Emperor were evenly subjected to
the litmus test of the Mandate of Heaven.
The Way embedded in Confucianism, as noted earlier, is above Chinese culture with
roots successfully planted in non-Han soil. The Way also supersedes the Confucian tradition and could be realized in conjunction with or in spite of Confucianism. In other
words, the Way of Heaven is greater than the Chinese Confucian civilization and may
metamorphose in a non-Chinese, non-Confucian world. It is therefore presumptuous to
postulate that the Chinese, or specifically Confucians, will be at the helm of an emerging
post-Cold War world order. The rightful accession to such eminence is contingent on
Confucian China proving itself meritoriously, namely, securing the moral mandate to
lead. Added to this and perhaps more important is the need to recognize the candidacy of
other worthy traditions, not merely as junior associates in a Confucian-commanded collaboration but as peers with the potential for co-leadership.
Jeffersonian America is conceivably one such prospect whereby an alliance of equals
with Confucian China could be formed. As elucidated, Confucianism and deism share
profound philosophical-religious ideals. And if these enlightened values are actualized,
the Chinese and Americans could form a united front to jointly tackle some of the exigencies afflicting humanity today.
The Axial Age legacies are a root strand binding these two civilizations, a universal
aspiration that has obvious present-day significance as ethnocentrism continues to assail
the human family. The Chinese and Americans are of course not immune to this malaise,
historically as well as in contemporary times. Race is undoubtedly a factor complicating
today’s Sino-US relationship. Both peoples have chequered track records with respect to
dealing with ethnic chauvinism. Nonetheless, if their forebears’ dream of one humanity
is reaffirmed and realized, then Confucian China and Jeffersonian America would have
a common moral platform to work on, breaking down the colour barriers at home and
overcoming xenophobia abroad.
Another contingency at hand is the after-effect of excessive secularism. As already
discussed, more than three decades of unrelenting industrialization in the PRC have ameliorated corporeal well-being and at the same time spawned a deepening spiritual crisis
and a withering natural habitat. Secular modernity’s narrow definition of progress has
similarly begotten in the United States a materialistic lifestyle underlaid by an inner
sense of futility. Chinese and Americans alike are retreating into traditional spiritualities,
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yearning for a more wholesome existence. Herein lies another arena for cooperation.
Both the Sinic and Anglo-American civilizations possess indigenous philosophicalreligious resources to counteract the malady of disenchantment. If these pre-Enlightenment heritages are adeptly retrieved, a re-enchanted China and America as the reigning
economic superpowers could provide the rest of humankind with ethical and technical
leadership in developing a more holistic model of growth.
At the opposite end of secularism is the peril of religious extremism. The global community today is to some extent being held hostage by radicalized religious movements.
America and China have suffered their share of religiously inspired violence from within
or from across their borders. Though the US counter-response has been forceful,
American resoluteness is dictated more by a rational calculus than a non-rational theological dogma, reflecting an inner national psyche moulded partly by the deistic dispassionate ethos. Although a God-fearing people, it is civic high-mindedness rather than
religious zealotry that defines the best of the American character.
Until recently, the CCP-PRC attitude towards religion has been prejudicial if not
hostile. The religious revivalism currently taking place and permitted on the mainland
is a promising rectification. As discussed earlier, the re-establishment of civil
Confucianism in particular will recapture a traditional Chinese holistic-pluralistic ethos
and its centrist approach in balancing the mundane and transcendent dialectic. If this
sacred humanism is restored, Confucian China will have another reason to see an ally
in Jeffersonian America. On the basis of their shared sober religious temperament they
could represent a united moderate front to renounce the extremism of religious passions
unchecked by reason.
To recap, if Beijing is committed to the pursuit of a grand harmony between nationstates, then the Chinese dream ought to be underpinned by Confucianism’s sanguine
optimism in lieu of the Hobbesian melancholic pessimism among conservatives. Of
equal importance is for Confucian China to realize its dispensability and to recognize the
leadership worthiness of other traditions. Indeed, as argued, if contemporary Chinese and
Americans would stay true to their forefathers’ visionary ideals, then these two civilizations could provide the future One World order with a collective moral authority to refute
ethnocentrism, to embark on a holistic developmental pathway that skirts the excesses of
secularism and to present a concerted voice of moderation in repudiating religious
fanaticism.38
Conclusion
China today is in the midst of a cultural renaissance in part to mend the social moral
fabric of the mainland and to meet overseas exigencies. This restoration project is nevertheless pervaded by a strong nationalistic undercurrent as manifested by a Han-centric,
particularistic reinterpretation of the Confucian legacies by conservatives and a melancholic view of the world beyond. These chauvinistic tendencies run contrary to
Confucianism core ideals and are detrimental to China’s hoped-for harmony at home and
abroad. At their very best Confucians embrace a universal, inclusive and sanguine worldview. And it is in upholding these Confucian liberal pluralistic values that the Chinese
vision of a harmonious world is better advanced.
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To that end one directive is to promote the advancement of an as yet embryonic global
Confucianism whereupon international Confucianists could serve as cultural intermediaries for the non-Chinese world to access a predominantly Han-centric tradition. And in
turn it expedites the construction of a Confucian-based universal ethical order that is
truly cosmopolitan. Another vital re-alignment of the conservative trajectory is to refocus the ongoing restoration project towards civil Confucianism which historically midwifed the symbiotic union of China’s diverse religious traditions. A reconsolidated
scholar-official rank and civilian officialdom will facilitate a fuller recovery of the traditional Chinese holistic and pluralistic milieu. Finally, this inclusive strategy entails
acknowledging potential civilizational cohorts in an evolving new multipolar world.
Beijing’s dream of harmony under the Heavens is enhanced if Confucian China together
with Jeffersonian America would provide the global village with a unified moral
leadership.39
Notes
1. Not all foreign inputs are introduced from beyond the mainland. Scholars such as Daniel A.
Bell and Bai Tongdong (a returnee) are exerting ‘outside’ influences from ‘inside’ China.
They represent a new constituency that no doubt will grow in stature as China continues to
open up.
2. This overview is based on the following works: Jiawen Ai, Two sides of one coin: The Party’s
attitude toward Confucianism in contemporary China, Journal of Contemporary China 18(61),
2009: 689–701; Daniel A. Bell, Reconciling socialism and Confucianism? Reviving tradition
in China, Dissent 57(1), Winter 2010: 91–9; and John Makeham, Lost Soul: ‘Confucianism’
in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia
Center, 2008.
3. Kang Xiaoguang, Confucianization: A future in the tradition, Social Research 73(1), Spring
2006: 77–120; Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi Ruxue: Dangdai Ruxue de zhuanxing, tezhi yu fazhan
(Political Confucianism: The transformation, special characteristics, and development of contemporary Confucianism), Beijng: Sanlian shudian, 2003.
4. Sure enough, most of these socialist Confucianists are attached to governmental agencies or
are associated with state-sponsored universities and think tanks. See Jiawen Ai, Two sides of
one coin.
5. This dialectic has been variously framed by Gan Chunsong in terms of the tension between
pluralism/cultural relativism on the one hand, and centralism/universalism on the other. For
an extensive and astute treatment of this subject, see Gan Chunsong, Zhidu Ruxue ji qi jieti
(Institutionalized Confucianism and its collapse), Beijing: People’s University of China
Press, 2011.
6. An aggressiveness that could paradoxically mask underlying deficits in the country’s healing but still fragile self-image. See Peter Hays Gries, A ‘China threat’? Power and passion
in Chinese ‘face nationalism’, World Affairs 162(2), Fall 1999: 63–76; James Leibold, More
than a Category: Han Supremacism on the Chinese Internet, The China Quarterly 201, 2010:
539–59.
7. Kang, Confucianization.
8. H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, New York: Harper & Row, 1951.
9. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1985.
10. As will be elaborated further on in this article, the Way actually eclipses Confucianism, and
Heaven will prevail regardless of this Chinese moral-ethical tradition.
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11. James Legge, Confucian Analects, The Great Learning: The Doctrine of the Mean, Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960.
12. Gina L. Barnes, The Rise of Civilization in East Asia: The Archaeology of China, Korea and
Japan, London: Thames & Hudson, 1993.
13. An additional explanation for this parochialism is the Confucian doctrine of concentric circles. Its basic premise is to recognize the stages of engagement, with local obligations generally taking precedence over global matters. Followers are exhorted to resolve family matters
ahead of acting on challenges at the village, provincial and national level. Putting this colloquially, until one’s household is in order, it is inappropriate and premature to meddle with
affairs of the outer circles. The Confucian ‘mind your own business first’ priority has unintended effects. It has moulded in the Chinese psyche a preoccupation with domestic issues
and a corresponding reluctance to engage others. This partly explains why the Sino civilization, despite exhorting a universal vision, rarely ventures beyond its immediate boundaries to
interact with the world at large.
Idealism is another feature that impacts on the Chinese global ambition. Confucius’s critique of Mozi’s universal love is a case in point. The Mohists’ attempts to appease the frontier
tribes with concords underpinned by utilitarian calculus were dismissed as superficial alliances founded on an ‘ethics without father’. For Confucians, if there are inter-civilizational
contacts, such communion ought to be bound in fiduciary benevolence, in the manner of
intimate familial ties. Indeed, Confucians perceive the earthly dominion as the family-writlarge, with the Emperor as the paternal figurehead. This idealistic vision posits a separate set
of complications with regard to the Chinese universal aspiration. Simply put, the Confucian
moral edifice, more specifically, its communitarian ethos, is difficult to replicate elsewhere.
The Confucian way of life is the outgrowth of elaborate rituals and intricate webs of relationships. One example is the Chinese observance of filial piety and its corollary veneration of
the dead. While not impossible, virtues such as these are hard to extricate from the Chinese
cultural habitat. This raises another potential complexity in the current globalization effort,
namely, how to universalize and transplant the Confucian ‘thickly textured’ ethical tradition
into another milieu.
14. As it stands now, most of the established Confucius Institutes operate as de facto ‘cultural
centres’ with Chinese language classes as their core and most popular offering. Other activities include the promotion of arts and crafts, with some branches even providing trade and
business-related services. Still at an early stage of inception, programmes that elucidate
Confucianism as a moral-political philosophy remain underdeveloped. However, this could
change as the Confucius Institute project matures into a more scholastic venture. See James
F. Paradise, China and international harmony: The role of Confucius Institutes in bolstering
Beijing’s soft power, Asian Survey 49(4), 2009: 647–69.
15. Robert C. Neville, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World,
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
16. See Kang Xiaoguang, Wenhua minzu zhuyi lungang (A theoretical outline of cultural nationalism), Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and management), no. 2, 2003: 9–27; Jiang Qing, Guanyu
chongjian Zhongguo Rujiao de gouxiang (On the reconstruction of Chinese Confucian religion), http://www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?id=2149, accessed 8 September 2014.
17. Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study, Tokyo: Kodansha
International, 1977. See also Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian and Taiping ‘Heaven’: The
political implications of clashing religious concepts, Comparative Studies in Society and
History 4(4), 1962: 436–53.
18. Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1991.
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China Information 28(3)
19. This integration process commenced with the civil service recruitment examination, where
candidates were tested on their knowledge of the Confucian classics. Successful individuals
were then dispatched across the Empire and, depending on qualifications, were assigned to
positions ranging from magistrate in provincial courts to ministers in the Imperial capital. The
Confucian intelligentsia formed the administrative backbone of the Chinese dynasties. Their
ethos so permeated the state apparatus that, for good reason, Imperial China is commonly
referred to as Confucian China.
20. C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of
Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1961.
21. Kang Xiaguang, Renzheng: Zhongguo zhengzhi fazhan de di san tiao daolu (A policy based
on the sense of humanity: The third way of Chinese political development), Singapore: Global
Publishing, 2005; Jiang, Zhengzhi Ruxue.
22.Jiang, Zhengzhi Ruxue. For Jiang’s latest elaboration of a re-Confucianized China, see Jiang
Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Political
Future, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping Fan, trans. Edmund Ryden, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2012.
23. This line of argument is premised upon a secular model such as in England, where there is
a constitutional separation of church and state. Conservatives do not consistently adhere to
this framework. At times Jiang and especially Kang speak of a post-Marxist China in theocratic terms, a dominion without a clear demarcation between church and state. Obviously,
in this configuration, Confucians will retain a diffused presence but their vulnerability to
abuse remains. And as will be shown later, the theocracy hypothesis is problematic for other
reasons. See Kang, Wenhua minzu zhuyi lungang.
24. Julia Ching, Chinese Religions, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993.
25. By contrast, in Christianity, a believer rarely lays claim to a multiplicity of faiths. This attests
to the Christian sense of superiority, a trait Christians share in common with Confucians.
However, unlike the latter, the former’s supremacy is non-inclusive. This is due to the
Christian dogma that as the sole recipient of God’s special revelation, the Christian church
alone possesses that which is indispensable for human salvation. For this reason, notwithstanding some liberal exceptions, mainstream Christianity, especially the fundamentalists,
disregard the efficacy of the other world religions. In point of fact they consider any form of
religious syncretism as practised by the Chinese to be sacrilegious. See Paul F. Knitter, No
Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes toward the World Religions, Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis Books, 1985.
26. Jiang, Guanyu chongjian Zhongguo Rujiao de gouxiang; Kang, Confucianization.
27. Julia Ching, Son of Heaven: Sacral kingship in ancient China, T’oung Pao, Second series,
83(1/3), 1997: 3–41.
28. To be sure, Chinese syncretism also takes place in religious settings in Buddhist and Daoist
temples. Such activities, however, are rarely held within the confines of the Confucian temples, memorial halls or academies.
29. Jiang’s comprehensive blueprint in fact includes the House of Cultural Continuity, designed
to host representatives from traditions such as Daoism, Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity.
The controversy surrounding Jiang’s vision concerns the proposed Confucian church which,
as argued, could undermine the effectiveness of institutions such as the House of Cultural
Continuity. See Jiang, A Confucian Constitutional Order.
30. Even as the need for political reform is acknowledged, conservatives are averse to embracing
liberal democracy. They have countered with ingenious variants such as the aforementioned
Jiang’s tricameral parliament that consists of the House of Exemplary Persons, the People’s
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403
Chang
House, and the House of Cultural Continuity. In any case, despite these differences in strategies the key point here is a common recognition that the church is not the only or the best
solution for addressing the institutional vulnerability of Confucianists.
It has to be conceded that the criticism of conservatives of Western-style liberal democracy is not entirely unjustifiable. Liberal democracy is not a flawless system as it suffers from
structural weaknesses (such as short-term preoccupation with (re-)election that undermines
the capacity for policymaking over a longer range of time). Therefore significant reform is
needed to mitigate these shortcomings, perhaps with the aim of developing a post-liberal
democracy political order. On this account one can concede that in Jiang’s innovative ideas
are the outlines of a potentially viable alternative governing structure.
31. Chen Ming, Modernity and Confucian political philosophy in a globalizing world, Diogenes
56(1), 2009: 94–108; Chen Ming, On Confucianism as a civil religion and its significance for
contemporary China, Contemporary Chinese Thought 44(2), Winter 2012: 76–83.
32. Robert N. Bellah, Civil religion in America, Daedalus 134(4), 2005: 40–55.
33. David L. Holmes, The Faiths of the Founding Fathers, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006.
34. Peter Gay, Deism: An Anthology, Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1968.
35. As was the case, the Pilgrim Fathers fled to the New World seeking refuge from religious
persecution at home. And subsequently the Founding Fathers set in ink religious liberty as the
cornerstone of the new republic.
36. Confucian inclusiveness is not unconditional. Historically, Mohism and various Buddhist
sects, among others, were excluded from the Confucian order on grounds of incompatible
­values. In modern times, religious movements with extremist or militant tendencies, for example, could face similar censure. In some ways, the contemporary conservative Confucianists’
reservations about aspects of Christianity may have some validity. This is true with regard to
the Christian view of other belief systems, especially the position of fundamentalists which
forbids any form of interreligious cooperation (see footnote 25). Exclusivity on the part of
Christians would lead Confucians to dismiss the former as unworthy partners.
37. The term Jeffersonian America is used to underscore the Founding Fathers’ deistic vision and
the civic virtue that shaped the American national ethos.
38. For a fuller analysis of potential Chinese and American cooperation, see Peter Chang,
Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Beyond liberal democracy, Asian Studies Review
35(1), 2011: 43–62.
39. This global alliance is by no means an exclusive Sino-US partnership. Other civilizations
could equally rise to the occasion and provide the world with uni- or multilateral leadership.
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