The Future of Egypt’s Democracy
The Voice of the Egyptian Voter
4%
29%
15%
14%
7%
31%
1
2
The Future of Egypt’s
Democracy
The Voice of the Egyptian Voter
Report
Danish-Egyptain Dialogue Institute
By:
Jakob Erle
Jakob Mathias Wichmann
Alexander Kjærum
3
Table of Contents
Executive Summary...................................................................................................... 6
1
Introduction: the Future of Egypt’s Democracy........................................................ 8
2
Party Landscape in Egypt...................................................................................... 9
2.1
The Main Political Parties
10
2.2
The Voting Systems and Coalitions
12
2.3
Dividing Lines of Egyptian politics
13
2.4
Socio-Demographic Profile of Key Blocs of Voters
16
3
Political Interest and Participation........................................................................ 21
3.1
Current Situation
21
3.2
Political Participation
23
3.3
Political Interest
25
4
Trust and Evaluation of Institutions...................................................................... 28
4.1
Trust
28
4.2
Evaluations of Institutions
30
5
Political System Preferences................................................................................ 33
5.1
State System
33
5.2
Political System
36
5.3
Values Provided by Democracy
38
6
Future Prospects................................................................................................ 39
6.1
Worst Case Scenario
39
6.2
Political Prospects
40
6.3
Economic Prospects
41
Endnote
42
Bibliography
43
4
List of Tables
Table 1: Major parties in Egypt..................................................................................... 11
Table 2: Main political coalitions in Egypt....................................................................... 13
Table 3: Socio-demographic characteristics of the three groups......................................... 16
Figure 1: Party preferences.......................................................................................... 10
Figure 2: Voter value segmentation............................................................................... 14
Figure 3: Segmentation of the undecided voters............................................................. 15
Figure 4: Geographical distribution............................................................................... 16
Figure 5: Age distribution............................................................................................ 17
Figure 6: Gender distribution....................................................................................... 18
Figure 7: Education level............................................................................................. 19
Figure 8: Income level................................................................................................ 20
Figure 9: Most pressing issues...................................................................................... 21
Figure 10: Most pressing issue – comparison.................................................................. 22
Figure 11: Current situation......................................................................................... 22
Figure 12: Political participation.................................................................................... 23
Figure 13: Reasons for non-participation........................................................................ 24
Figure 14: Political interest – comparison....................................................................... 25
Figure 15: Primary practice to show political interest....................................................... 26
Figure 16: Facebook account – comparison.................................................................... 27
Figure 17: Trust in societal institutions.......................................................................... 28
Figure 18: Trust in the media....................................................................................... 29
Figure 19: Government policies.................................................................................... 30
Figure 20: Government policies effect – comparison........................................................ 31
Figure 21: Political parties........................................................................................... 31
Figure 22: Political institutions...................................................................................... 32
Figure 23: Model country............................................................................................. 33
Figure 24: Saudi Arabia preference – comparison........................................................... 34
Figure 25: Preferred state system................................................................................. 34
Figure 26: Preferred state system – comparison............................................................. 35
Figure 27: Preferred political system............................................................................. 36
Figure 28: Impact of multi-party system in Egypt........................................................... 37
Figure 29: Politicians................................................................................................... 37
Figure 30: Primary right to be provided in a democratic country....................................... 38
Figure 31: Future scenarios......................................................................................... 39
Figure 32: Egypt’s political prospects............................................................................ 40
Figure 33: Economic prospects..................................................................................... 41
5
6
Executive Summary
This report presents the most comprehensive study of the Egyptian voters’ attitudes and values since the
January 25 revolution. It is based on two voter surveys conducted in August and September implemented
by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies each with 2400 respondents across 22 governorates.
In a party landscape in a state of flux with a clear diving line between secular and non-secular parties
and liberal and socialist parties The Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood) has emerged as the
strongest party looking to gain 40% of the decided voters (around 45% of the voters are still undecided) in
the upcoming parliamentary elections (for the People Assembly).
The election law also plays a significant role in the composition of the People’s Assembly. A total 498 members
will be elected to the assembly:
o
166 candidates or 1/3 of the seats will be elected from 83 single voting constituencies with a
majority election of two candidates from each constituency.
o
332 candidates or 2/3 of the seats will be elected from 46 party constituencies where 8-12
candidates are elected in each constituency based on the proportional representation of each
party (or coalitions of parties) in the constituency.
This election system for the People’s Assembly favors large parties as candidates from both types of
constituencies are elected constituency based and not according to the proportional representation of the
parties across Egypt as a whole.
The 166 members elected from the single voting constituencies are likely to be from to be from a popular
family or clan in locality or be a well-known candidate from the former governing party: The National
Democratic Party.
The 322 candidates elected from the 332 party constituencies are likely to represent large parties or coalitions
of parties as the threshold for getting a candidate elected is going to be very high – possibly a threshold
of 8-12% depending on the number of candidates elected from the particular constituency. This favors the
Freedom and Justice Party. Strong and wellknown candidates on the lists may very well have a big impact
on the actual results of voting.
The Egyptian public is likely to remain relatively passive in the upcoming political process as there is a general
lack of both formal and informal political participation that stems from a general sense of distrust in the
political actors (parties and politicians), the societal institutions (religious groups, civil society organizations,
etc.) and a negative perception that participation will not help much to create positive outcomes. This is also
related to the fact that most Egyptians think that the outcomes of the political system in terms of concrete
policy initiatives have a negative impact on their daily life. Despite this general lack of trust and support for
the political institutions, there is a great deal of support for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces with
the Egyptians feeling they have performed well and will transform Egypt into a democracy, transfer power to
a civil government and secure a transparent electoral process.
With economic deterioration being a primary concern for most Egyptians, 40% of the public prefer a state
modeled as Saudi Arabia with the hopes of being able to emulate their strong economic performance. This
favorable perception is brought about by the many Egyptian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia sending home
remittances for their families, Saudi Arabia’s heavy economic support for Egypt through loans and investment
projects and Saudi Arabia’s status as the religious epicenter for the Muslim world.
The concern for economic security should also guide our understanding of the state model Egyptians prefer
with 38% wanting an Islamic state and 53% wanting a civil-democratic state indicating a strong divide in
Egypt. This should be seen as a divide on which system better equipped to bring economic security and
social justice and not as divide over religious or liberal values, with both having lesser importance than social
equality and justice.
Despite the hardship, tensions and societal division in the Egyptian public there is a general sense of optimism
in Egyptian society and a majority believe that the political and economic future of Egypt is bright
7
1
Introduction: the Future of Egypt’s Democracy
“If democracy develops and thrives in Egypt it will be a force for democratisation in the Arab world for years to
come; if it stumbles and retreats, the forces of authoritarianism and conservatism will gain the upper hand”1
Throughout January 2011 protest spread from Tunisia to many parts of the Arab world. On 25 January 2011
Egyptian protesters went to the streets of Cairo to protest against corruption, the abuse of power, and the poor
governance associated with Hosni Mubarak’s thirty years in power. On 10 February, President Mubarak was
removed from office and all his powers were transferred to the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF).
From mid- to late February, a committee of legal experts appointed by the SCAF prepared nine constitutional
amendments (including shortening of the presidential term, introducing term limits, judicial supervision over
elections and obliging the president to appoint a vice-president). On 17 March the amendments were put to a
referendum with a 77 % majority and for Egypt high electoral participation (some 41% of the 45 million eligible
voters). The amendments opened the electoral system up for a more competitive and transparent electoral process
in the parliamentary elections that is currently scheduled to be held in November 2011. The new parliament is
expected to formulate a new constitution to be adopted in a referendum.
Over the past months, numerous initiatives to form new parties and reinvigorate existing ones have emerged, but
so far the political landscape is still very fragmented. The referendum in March was for several of the movements
and activist groups an eye-opener, exposing their limitations in affecting voter behaviour and the strengths in this
area held by the core players from the past order.
Against this background, it has become obvious that many emerging political parties in Egypt are not sufficiently
prepared to neither execute an effective campaign for the upcoming parliamentary- and presidential elections nor
play a strong role in the constitutional process.
In the current political environment the main political battle is centered on the issue of religion and its role in
politics. On one side of the dividing line, The Freedom and Justice Party, an offspring of the religious Muslim
Brotherhood, advocates religious influence in politics. On the other side of this dividing line there are numerous
newly founded secular liberal parties advocating a clear separation of religion and politics. The voters share this
division and are divided on Egypt’s future political path.
The upcoming parliamentary election will significantly determine the future path of Egypt as it is tasked with
drafting a new constitution. Thus it is a defining moment in Egyptian history. The composition of the new parliament
is critical and the political battle between the secular and religious parties will likely be decided by their ability to
attract the large group of undecided voters.
This study has been conducted to fill the gap between the political parties and the voters in Egypt. It is based on
one of the most comprehensive studies today of the values and interest of the Egyptian population. The results
of this study will be critical to the political parties’ abilities to engineer a political program that will maximize their
votes and sway the undecided voters in their favor.
The report contains the following sections:
8
·
Chapter 1: Party Landscape in Egypt
·
Chapter 2: Political Interest and Participation
·
Chapter 3: Trust and Evaluation of Institutions
·
Chapter 4: Political System Preferences
·
Chapter 5: Future Prospects
2
Party Landscape in Egypt
Summary:
·
In a political landscape in a constant state of flux the Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood)
has emerged as the strongest party.
·
The main dividing line in Egyptian politics is between the Freedom and Justice Party on one side and
secular liberal parties on the other.
·
The secular liberal parties have a strong foothold amongst the youth and the Urban and Upper Egypt
governorates, while the Freedom and Justice Party has a strong presense throughout Egypt and in
particular among the well-educated Egyptians.
The party landscape in Egypt remains in a constant state of change as new parties are formed, alliances emerge
and others fall apart. The results of this survey show that 14 different parties would gain at least 1 % of decided
voters and more than 50 parties have formed.
The party system remains fragmented as the parties differ on the role of the state and religion. The major parties
include liberal parties (Free Egyptians Party, Egyptian Freedom Party), social-liberal parties (Egyptian Social
Democratic Party, Wafd Party and Revolutionary Youth Council) and religious parties (The Nour Party, The Wasat
Party and The Freedom and Justice Party). While these ideological affiliations exist there has been a convergence,
with the political parties moving towards the centre of the political spectrum. This movement can be explained by
the fact that the parties are uncertain of the voters’ preferences and therefore a move towards the centre allows
the parties to appeal to the widest spectrum of voters.2
Adding to the complexity of the political landscape is the changing legislation with regards to the voting system.
The electoral law was revised by the SCAF in September 2011, but the SCAF later retracted the amended law
following protests. A new electoral law was agreed upon in the beginning of October.
To provide a clearer picture of the moving political landscape in Egypt this section will give an introduction
to the political system including the political platform of the main parties in Egypt and the political coalitions.
Furthermore this section will provide an in-depth description of the most important dividing line in the values of
the Egyptian voters.
9
2.1
The Main Political Parties
Egyptian politics was for many years dominated by one big party, National Democratic Party. Following the
ousting of Hosni Mubarak a surge of new political parties formed and the party landscape remains in a flux with
new parties emerging, alliances changing and party platforms developing. As in most democratic transition
processes a large number of political parties are expected to run for the elections. The first post-revolutionary
parliamentary elections in Egypt are to be held November 28 2011 according to the SCAF. The elections are only
held for the lower house of the parliament (the People Assembly), while elections for the upper house (the Shura
Council) are expected to be held 2-3 months after the elections for the People Assembly. The political parties are
competing for seats in the People’s Assembly from which 100 parliamentarians will be chosen to draft the new
Egyptian constitution.
The many new formed political parties has added to the fragmentation of the political landscape in Egypt with
parties forming all along the political spectrum; liberal, socialist and religious.
The chart below shows the party preferences of the decided voters and thus gives an indication of the likely
electoral success of the major Egyptian parties. A major part of the voters however still remain undecided so the
electoral success of the parties is still very uncertain.
Figure 1: Party preferences
Party Support in August and September (% of Decided Voters)
Freedom and Justice
31,5%
39,0%
Al-Wafd Party
14,8%
Al-Nour Party
6,0%
The Free Egyptians Party
7,5%
Al-Adl
Al-karama Party
20,0%
2,6%
1,9%
6,8%
6,0%
Other
35,7%
4,7%
3,8%
19,6%
August
September
As visible the Freedom and Justice Party are in a strong position ahead of the upcoming elections and the secular
parties thus face a tough battle from the religious segments of the political spectrum. Furthermore the graph also
reveals that the new formed parties have had a hard time convincing the voters and creating awareness about
their political projects. The Al-Nour Party is so far the most successful of the new parties looking to gain 6,8 %
of the votes.
One reason for the lack of support according to the polls may be that the political programs of the many new
formed political parties have yet to be developed in detail. The table below is a highly tentative summary of the
political platform for the major political parties.
10
Table 1: Major parties in Egypt
Party
Votes
(%)
Political platform
·
The Freedom and
Justice Party (Muslim
Supporting the establishment of a civil state with Islam as state
religion and Islamic law as legislative source.
39 %
·
Brotherhood)
Calls for a parliamentary system with only a symbolic role for the
president.
·
Promoting a market economy with social justice.
·
Promoting economic development through neoliberal, free market
principles.
The Wafd Party
20 %
·
Supporting cultural and religious rights for all Egyptian citizens,
regardless of race or sect.
·
Decentralizing the political system by delegating enhanced
powers to local governing institutions.
Al-Nour (Salafist)
7%
·
Implementation of Shari’a in Egypt.
·
Preservation of right to propriety and free economic competition
as long as it does not hurt the interests of society.
The Free Egyptians
Party
·
Separation of state and religion.
·
Free economy while ensuring social justice – social market
6%
economy.
·
Strong focus on liberal rights such as freedom of expression,
equality in front of the law and religious freedom.
·
Liberal economic system that aims to achieve social justice, equal
opportunities and balanced growth for all Egyptians.
Justice Party (Al Adl)
5%
·
The local and foreign private sector plays a key role while the
state plays the role of observer, catalyst and organizer.
·
Decentralization in management, security, development and
investment.
Dignity Party (Al
Karama)
Tomorrow Party (Al
Ghad)
The Revolutionary
Youth Council3
Egyptian Social
Democratic Party
4%
4%
2%
1%
·
alleviation.
·
Supports a social market economy.
·
Believe in a strong regulatory role for the state, but wants to
eliminate state monopoly on the media.
·
Emphasizes protection of civil rights and liberties.
·
The coalition both contains strong liberal and religious elements.
·
Market economy committed to social justice.
·
Social justice in the form of : equal opportunities, minimum
income, decentralization of capital and fair distribution of wealth.
·
Egypt’s Freedom
Party
Socialist party with strong focus on social justice and poverty
1%
Freedom in economic activity is to be guaranteed by the state
with consideration to social justice.
·
State should be more involved in education.
·
Increase respect for human rights, freedom and justice
11
2.2
The Voting Systems and Coalitions
In the beginning of October the SCAF proposed the second version of the election law that most likely will be the
final. The law has the following key elements:
·
498 members will be elected to the Peoples Assembly:
o
166 candidates or 1/3 of the seats will be elected from 83 single voting constituencies with a
majority election of two candidates from each constituency.
o
332 candidates or 2/3 of the seats will be elected from 46 party constituencies where 8-12
candidates are elected in each constituency based on the proportional representation of each
party (or coalitions of parties) in the constituency.
This election system for the People Assembly favors large parties as candidates from both types of constituencies
are elected constituency based and not according to the proportional representation of the parties across Egypt
as a whole. This implies that parties (or coalitions of parties) need to have very strong support in order to gain
seats in the parliament.
The 166 members elected from the single voting constituencies are likely to include both candidates that represent
a party and candidates that do not represent a particular party. The latter candidates are likely to be from a
popular family or clan in locality or be a well-known candidate from the former governing party: The National
Democratic Party.
The 322 candidates elected from the 332 party constituencies are likely to represent large parties or coalitions of
parties as the threshold for getting a candidate elected is going to be very high – probably a threshold of 8-12%
depending on the number of candidates elected from the particular constituency.
There is a keen awareness among the parties about this favoring of large parties, like the Freedom and Justice
Party, resulting in parties forming electoral coalitions to maximize individual parties chances of electoral success.
What may further change the actual results of the elections compared to the survey are voters preferences for
strong individual candidates from the different parties making the parties’ ability to attract strong candidates
essential for their electoral success Names of specific candidates were not known at the time of data-collection
12
Table 2: Main political coalitions in Egypt
Name
Major parties
Democratic
Alliance for
Freedom and Justice Party
Political view and strength
·
Includes both liberal, socialist and Islamist elements
·
The coalition has seen a lot of internal conflict and several
parties have left the coalition, notably Nour and Egypt
Egypt
Presently in
no alliance
Freedom Party
·
Al Wafd Party
and Egyptian Social
Democrats, Al Ghad Party
2.3
and religious views of Freedom and Justice Party rendered
the alliance between the two parties unsustainable
Free Egyptian Party
Egyptian Bloc
An inherent conflict between the liberal views of Wafd
·
Mainly include liberal and socialist elements an opposes
an Islamic state in Egypt
·
This bloc is more coherent than the Democratic Alliance
for Egypt and thus less fragile
Dividing Lines of Egyptian politics
The future of Egyptian democracy is associated with a great deal of uncertainty with the upcoming elections being
a decisive event. It is however possible to form a clearer picture of the preferences of the voters that share values
that are indicative for their future voting behaviour – although many are undecided as to what particular party
they will vote for.
The analysis of the survey data gives the opportunity to discern the main political diving lines among Egyptian
voters that have decided to support a political party and among that large proportion of voters who are yet to
decide. Furthermore the analysis opens the possibility of showing the weakness and strength of different parties
to attract the undecided voters.
Two main political value dimensions that differentiate the Egyptian voters are the roles that religion and
government should play in Egyptian politics.
-
One the religious dimension voters at one end of the scale favour religious influence and involvement
in politics while on the other end voters prefer no interference from religion in politics (secularism). In
today’s Egypt it is difficult to contemplate a situation with a hard division of religion and state as most
voters and parties accept some religious influence.
-
On the government dimension voters at one end of the scale favours a strong government to provide
security, jobs and equality and on the other end voters emphasize civil liberties and more open market
competition.
13
The graph below captures the views of the Egyptian voters’ position in relation to the role of government and
religion.
Figure 2: Voter value segmentation
Political values of voters of different parties/segments
Religion (Secular-Religious)
40
State larger role and Religion
State smaller role and Religion
Nour (Salafi)
35
Wasat
30
Freedom and Justice
Revolutionary Youth Coalition
25
Wafd
Undecided
20
Egyptian Social democratic Party
Adl
Nasserite
Dignity
Free Egyptians
15
Ghad
State larger role and seculars
10
10
15
State smaller role and Seculars
20
25
30
35
40
Government role (Large-Smaller)
While there may be a centrist convergence amongst the political parties, the voters seem to be more clearly
divided and also perceive the political parties as being significantly different from each other.4 The strongest
partisanship and main dividing line in terms of Egypt’s democratic future seem to be the dividing line between the
voters that prefer liberal/secular parties and the voters that intend to votes for the Freedom and Justice Party.
This dividing line manifests itself in many different domains of Egyptian society, amongst others in the future
governing of the Al-Azhar institution.5
The rest seems to consist of a large group of undecided voters together with another large group of voters, who
are somewhere in between the main dividing line – especially voters for the Wafd Party. In the secular, liberal
group there is the Social Democratic Party, Free Egyptians Party and the Ghad Party. This group represent 10 %
of the decided voters. On the other side the The Freedom and Justice Party is dominating with its 39 % of the
decided voters, which gives them a clear majority. This is not a complete surprise as the secular liberal parties are
all newly founded and are thus still in the process of creating awareness and attention to their political projects.
14
The large group of undecided voters can also be segmented according to the same value dimensions:
Figure 3: Segmentation of the undecided voters
As the graph shows a large majority of undecided voters find themselves in the secular bloc with strong government
tendencies. There is, however, also a considerable group, of the undecided voters, who are in the religious bloc.
Only a small group of the undecided voters are in the secular liberal bloc. This indicates that the liberal parties
are far from the centre of Egyptian politics. This puts the Freedom and Justice Party and The Democratic Coalition
for Egypt in a strong position to attract the undecided voters, without having to comprise their political basis too
much. However, as religion is a major dividing line, the 81 % who are secular will likely either create their own
bloc or move towards the Egyptian Bloc, especially if the Egyptian Bloc is open to compromise on its liberal, small
state convictions. This development may already be underway with the Popular Alliance Party in June calling for
a united front of socialist and liberal parties to counter the religious groups.6
The next section describes what type of voters the secular liberal group and Freedom and Justice Party consist
of and how they compare to the group of undecided voters in terms of socio-demographic variables. Based on
this comparison it is possible to add another layer to the above evaluation of the possibilities for the two sides to
attract the undecided voters.
15
2.4
Socio-Demographic Profile of Key Blocs of Voters
Below is a summary of the socio-demographic profile of the secular liberal voters, the Freedom and Justice Party
voters and the undecided voters. The table shows that there are considerable differences between the three
groups on all the socio-demographic indicators.
Table 3: Socio-demographic characteristics of the three groups
Characteristics
Secular liberals voter
Freedom and Justice
base
Party voter base
Geographical
Urban/Upper Egypt
distribution
governorates (75%)
Age
Broad based in all of Egypt
Youth (18 – 30 year olds)
Middle aged (31 – 50 year
(44%)
olds)(48%)
Both male (55%) and
Gender
Primarily male (63%)
female (45%)
Educational level
Income level
Undecided voters
Broad based in all of
Egypt
All age groups
Both male (53%) and
female (47%)
High School or above
High school or above
Illiterate or primary
(77%)
(77%)
school (43%)
Medium (30% with income
High (42% with income
Low (22% with income
above 600 LE)
above 600 LE)
above 600 LE)
The secular liberals are very weak in the Delta governorates
The Freedom and Justice Party has a diversified geographical profile very similar to that of Egypt and the undecided
voter. This also reflects that the party is well organized and able to cover the whole of Egypt.
Figure 4: Geographical distribution
Distribution of segments across governorates
Upper Egypt
49%
Coastal Governorates
25%
Urban Governorates
27%
Secular liberals
16
40%
38%
39%
42%
47%
44%
16%
17%
Undecided
Total
19%
Freedom and Justice Party
The secular liberals have a stronger representation in the Upper Egypt1 and Urban governorates,2 but are less well
represented in Delta governorates.3 This geographical affiliation (or lack of) gives the Freedom of Justice Party
a favourable position in attracting the undecided voters, whose geographical distribution is similar to the party.
None of the two blocks appeal to the elderly voters
The secular liberal parties primarily attracts the youth vote (18 – 30 year olds) while the Freedom and Justice
Party are better represented amongst the 31-50 year olds.
Figure 5: Age distribution
Distribution of segments across age groups
36%
18-30
44%
48%
31-50
39%
50+
17%
16%
Secular liberals
Freedom and Justice Party
38%
40%
40%
38%
23%
22%
Undecided
Total
The undecided voters’ age distribution is roughly similar to the general age distribution in Egyptian society. Both
the secular liberal parties and the Freedom and Justice Party seem less attractive to the elderly population.
1
2
3
Upper Egypt governorates: Aswan, Luxor, Qena, Menia, Assuit, Beni Sueif, Fayoum, Giza
Urban governorates: Cairo, Suez, Port Said and Alexandria
Coastal governorates: Ismailia, Damieta, Monofia, Kafr Sheikh, Garbia, Kaliobia, Behera, Sharkia
17
The Freedom and Justice Party has very weak support from females
The Freedom and Justice Party seems to have little appeal to the female voters, which might be related to their
uncertain stand on the inclusion of women in their party. The Freedom and Justice Party allows women to run for
election, but find it inappropriate to nominate a woman as head of the party.7
Figure 6: Gender distribution
Distribution of segments across gender
Male
55%
53%
51%
47%
49%
Undecided
Total
63%
Female
45%
37%
Secular liberals
Freedom and Justice Party
The more balanced gender appeal of the secular liberal parties may give them a strong advantage in attracting
the female voters.
18
The Freedom and Justice Party has a favourable position among the elite
Both the Freedom and Justice Party and the secular liberals voters are better educated than the average Egyptian
not surprisingly indicating that the voter’s that already have decided to vote tend to have higher education.
Figure 7: Education level
Distribution of segments across education groups
Illiterate and primary school
23%
23%
43%
Middle/high school - middle diploma
58%
54%
43%
College Graduate and above
19%
Secular liberals
38%
23%
Freedom and
Justice Party
46%
14%
16%
Undecided
Total
The average Freedom and Justice Party voter has a higher education than the average secular liberal voter. This
may be related to the younger voter base of the secular liberal parties, whereby a larger part of their voters may
still be enrolled in the education system.
The undecided voters are on average less educated than the average Egyptian. The profile of the secular liberal
parties, which is more attractable to the less educated groups, can then be an advantage in attracting the
undecided voters.
19
The Freedom and Justice Party voter base also has a higher average income than the average Egyptian and the
secular liberal voters.
Figure 8: Income level
Distribution of segments across income groups
200 LE or less
201-300 LE
29%
20%
28%
37%
36%
17%
17%
16%
13%
301-600 LE
21%
24%
22%
25%
601-1000 LE
17%
14%
1001-2000 LE
2001-5000 LE
12%
16%
15%
2%
7%
1%
8%
1%
Secular liberals
Freedom and Justice Party
Undecided
Total
1%
42 % of the Freedom and Justice Party voters earn more than 600 LE per month, with only 25 % of the undecided
voters in this income category and 30 % of the secular liberal voters. This is related to the higher levels of
education amongst the Freedom and Justice Party voters, which gives a clear picture of an elitist voter base.
Again the lower income levels of the secular liberal voters is probably related to their lower average age, which
means that a large group of their voters may not be inside the labour force and have not yet achieved high-paying
jobs.
The income distribution of the different groups shows that the secular liberal parties can have an advantage in
attracting the undecided voters, who are more similar in terms of income, to the secular liberal voters than the
Freedom and Justice Party voters. Despite the elitist profile of the Freedom and Justice Party they are usually still
very competent in attracting voters from the large segment of the Egyptian population who are illiterate and poor.
20
3
Political Interest and Participation
Summary:
·
Materialist values such as economic and physical security are the primary concerns of the Egyptian
population.
·
There is a clear lack of both formal and informal political participation, which is mainly due to a lack of
belief in positive outcomes as a result of participation.
·
Even though socio-economic differences persists there is a general interest in following politics, which
primarily results in a passive consumption of political news and not from an active mode of seeking an
discussing politics.
·
Facebook is mainly used by the elite segments. This indicates that the Egyptian elites where instrumental
in organising the revolution, as Facebook were the primary organizational tool.
This section will describe and analyse the political interest and participation patterns of the Egyptian population.
3.1 Current Situation
There are three major issues concerning the Egyptians today: security, inflation and youth unemployment. The
Egyptian population thus show a clear focus on material needs rather than post-materialist values such as
freedom and personal autonomy.
Figure 9: Most pressing issues
Comparison between August and September 2011 on most pressing
issues
August
Security / Stability
September
27%
40%
Reducing Daily Living Expenses
27%
23%
Unemployment
18%
21%
Other
28%
16%
21
Figure 10: Most pressing issue – comparison
Comparison between income groups on most pressing issues
Highest
14%
15%
13%
Other
Lowest
Total
10%
Economic development
3%
4%
Remove the remaining ex-regime process
3%
4%
9%
Provide new work opportunity
6%
6%
7%
15%
20%
18%
Youth unemployment
37%
22%
Security/ stability
27%
9%
Essential goods prices’ monitor
31%
27%
Physical security is the primary concern for the higher income groups in Egypt. For the poorer segments of the
population their primary concern is unemployment and inflation. Inflation is also a more pressing issue for this
segment as rising prices on essential goods will have a more negative effect on low income families than high
income families as these spend a larger portion of their income on essential goods.
Concerns over the economy of Egypt are however widely shared in the population.
Figure 11: Current situation
Concerns over the current state of the economic and political situation
Good
Bad
91%
75%
25%
75%
25%
9%
Egypts current economic situation
22
Family’s current economic situation
Egypt’s current political situation
The economic hardship of the past years has thus been felt by almost all layers of the Egyptian population and
it will be a key challenge for the new parties to come up with solutions to the deteriorating economic conditions
in Egypt.
The revolution of January 25th does not seem to have improved the political situation in Egypt significantly as 3
out of 4 Egyptians think the current political situation is bad. This indicate that there is a general feeling in the
Egyptian population that the revolution has yet to deliver positive results and create a more favourable political
situation in Egypt. A positive election process in November might change these sentiments.
3.2
Political Participation
Political participation can take the form as formal or informal participation. Formal political participation happens
within the formal rules governing the relationship between the citizen and the state. This behaviour is typically
defined as voting in elections and membership and active involvement in political parties. Informal participation
is usually characterized by a form of participation seeking to expand the realm of formal politics by adding issues
to the political agenda. This behaviour typically involves signing petitions and demonstrating. 8
Figure 12: Political participation
Levels of formal and informal political participation
Yes
1%
2%
3%
98%
97%
Membership of civil
society organization
Participation in protest
after February 11th
13%
76%
No
99%
87%
24%
Current membership
in a political party
Intention of political
participation during
the upcoming
Formal participation
Voting in upcoming
parliamentary elections
Informal participation
As evident the formal participation in Egypt is low. Membership in political parties is almost non-existent, active
participation is low, but the voting intention is high and would become the highest in recent Egyptian history.
Informal participation fares even worse and shows very little informal political participation in Egypt. This general
lack of active political participation can be explained by a historical gap that separates citizens from politicians,
which takes time to change. Political participation has not been required by the citizens and development of
a sense of obligation to participate takes time. Furthermore this general lack of participation is a result of the
pessimistic view on the political situation and a general feeling that participation does not matter as evident from
the figure below.
23
Figure 13: Reasons for non-participation
Reasons for not participating in elections
No benefit of elections result
43%
Not enough time
27%
Not registered in voters’ listing
24%
Other
6%
Furthermore it also indicate that political participation is conditioned on a certain level of economic security in the
country; Egyptians are too preoccupied with earning money and securing their basic needs that there is no time
to spare on political participation. Higher levels of economic growth thus might increase political participation and
move Egypt towards a participatory political environment and remove the gap between citizens and government.
24
3.3
Political Interest
While active political participation is low, there is generally a high level of interest in politics with 78 % saying
they are interested in following political developments. This heightened awareness and interest in politics in Egypt
may be attributable to the revolution which has brought politics to the forefront of Egyptian peoples’ daily life.
Figure 14: Political interest – comparison
Comparison of education level and gender on political interest
Interested
66%
71%
85%
96%
Not interested
34%
29%
15%
4%
Illiterate and primary school College Graduate and above
Education
Females
Males
Gender
The heightened political interest has however not been distributed evenly across Egyptian society as there are
large differences between the political interest of the lowest and highest social segments and between males
and female. The explanation for these differences lies in the fact that these groups find it difficult to understand
politics which is the main reason for a lack of interest in politics.
Political interest mainly takes a passive and observatory form in terms of following political programs on national
or Egyptian satellite.
25
Figure 15: Primary practice to show political interest
Differences in practice to show political interest
National radio Non-egyptian radio
Discussing political news with colleagues and relatives
1%
Internet
4%
1%
4%
Egyptian newspaper
4%
Arabic satellite
38%
National television
13%
36%
Egyptian satellite
The active pursuit of political news from alternative sources such as searching the internet for political news,
buying a newspaper or discussing politics with friends and relatives remain low. Differences however remain in
Egypt and higher social groups, with more economic leeway, are also more active users of other news outlets such
as Arabic satellite, newspapers and internet.
26
The use of social media and the internet has been described as instrumental in the revolution that brought down
the Mubarak regime. Some 800,000 Egyptians have a Facebook account and it is the third most visited website in
Egypt, after Google and Yahoo. That social media is being used for political means is also evident by the fact that
86% of Egyptians with a Facebook account say they use it for political practice. Facebook was also instrumental
in 2008 demonstrations against the Mubarak regime over its ties with Israel.9
Figure 16: Facebook account – comparison
Comparison of gender, education level and income level on use of
Facebook
Yes
0%
4%
11%
25%
29%
No
100%
96%
89%
Female
Gender
96%
75%
71%
Male
4%
College graduate
and above
Illiterate and
primary school
Education
Highest
Lowest
Income
The use of social media is however very unevenly distributed in Egypt and is highly contingent on gender, education
and income levels. As Facebook was instrumental in organising the revolution, this shows that the revolution was
very much an elite project and elite organised with the general public being drawn in and convinced to participate
by the elites.
27
4
Trust and Evaluation of Institutions
Summary:
·
There is a general distrust of societal institutions which hampers the legitimacy of these institutions and
their ability to implement programs and policies.
·
Public support for political institutions is crucial to a stable democracy and Egypt faces a major problem,
as a majority of Egyptians believe the output of the political system has a negative impact on their daily
life.
·
This negative image is however diminished by the overall positive evaluations of the societal entities,
especially the SCAF, which has crucial support for is transitional governing.
This section will describe and analyse the trust that Egyptians have in the media and societal institutions such as
the police force, military, religious groups, etc. Secondarily it will describe and analyse the Egyptians evaluation
of political institutions such as the military, the government and the police force.
4.1
Trust
There is a general lack of vertical trust – trust between citizens and institutions - in Egypt. Vertical trust is a key to
effective and well-functioning societal institutions, as vertical trust enhances the legitimacy of societal institutions
and thus enhances the likelihood that citizens will comply with the programs and policies these institutions
implement.
Figure 17: Trust in societal institutions
Differences in trust between various societal institutions
61%
40%
39%
37%
30%
24%
Islamic charities
Religious groups
and parties
Police force
Civil society
organizations
Unions
Political parties
As shown above Islamic charities are the only societal institution that a majority of the Egyptians trust. The
lacking trust in institutions is probably related to decades of corruption that has eroded the public trust in the
ability of the institutions to deliver fair and equal services to all citizens. This lack of vertical trust also explains
28
why there is a lacking political participation. The distrust, especially towards political parties, discourages citizen
from active involvement as the benefits from involvement seem unlikely. The high level of distrust towards the
political parties is also supported by the fact that when asked which party the voters trust the most 70% reply
”none”. Politicians do not fare much better than the political parties they represent; only 24% of Egyptians believe
that politicians are honest people who want the best for the country.
The media as society’s “watchdog” has apparently been better to gain the publics’ trust.
Figure 18: Trust in the media
Differences in trust in media institutions
66%
47%
Press
Satellite TV
The capacity of the press to act as a reliable source of information is thus not completely hampered. There is still
however a majority of Egyptians who distrust the press, which is a democratic problem. The lack of trust stems
from the fact that much of the media is state-owned and has been seen as serving the regime, as evidenced
by the fact that many of the news outlets denied the existence of any protests during the revolution.10 This
lack of credibility hampers the ability and propensity of ordinary citizens to obtain knowledge of the societal
developments and limits the extent to which the public is informed. A general knowledge of societal developments
is obviously desirable in a democracy as this increases the likelihood of an informed, rational process for decisionmaking. Furthermore a lack of trust in the press hampers its ability to act as society’s “watchdog” which leaves
more room for i.e. corruption. A higher degree of trust in the press would thus be desirable for the democratic
process in Egypt, which may be brought about by greater independence for the state-owned media.
29
4.2
Evaluations of Institutions
Related to trust in societal institutions, likewise are positive sentiments towards the institutions conducive to
democracy as this enhances their ability to implement policies and compliance from citizens. Citizens’ support for
institutions is crucial to their maintenance and survival.
Figure 19: Government policies
Views on effect of government policies on daily life
Highly positive impact
15%
Sort of positive impact
25%
No impact
5%
Sort of negative impact
34%
Severe negative impact
21%
As shown the general public in Egypt has a negative image of government policies with a majority of 55 %
claiming that government policies have a negative impact on their lives. This is very critical for the political
system in Egypt as this lack of support is a major impediment for its ability to contribute to a positive societal
development in Egypt.
The perception of government policies is distributed unevenly in Egypt. The youths have a more negative
perception than the elder parts of the population, which is one of the reasons for the revolution in January which
was mainly caused by dissatisfaction from unemployed youths.
30
Figure 20: Government policies effect – comparison
Comparison between highest and lowest income group on effect of
government policies
20%
Highly positive impact
38%
15%
4%
Sort of positive impact
16%
No impact
4%
Sort of negative impact
20%
Severe negative impact
22%
34%
28%
Highest income group
Lowest income group
More significant than age, however, is the gap between the highest and lowest income group. The lowest income
group clearly has a very negative perception of the effects of government policies, which indicates that the
government has not done enough to redistribute wealth in society. This is confirmed when these results are
compared to the highest income group, where a majority has a positive perception of the effects of government
policies. This suggests that while the rich benefit from public policies the poor is neglected.
The ability of political parties to play an effective role in the current political situation is similarly not perceived
very positive.
Figure 21: Political parties
Views on the effective role of political parties
47%
32%
22%
Yes
To an extent
No
31
This adds to the overall picture of a general mistrust in political parties and their ability, which relates to the low
levels of active political participation. Socio-economic differences exist with the highest income group and welleducated having a more negative perception of the political parties’ ability. This may reflect these group’s abilities
to affect government policies through other channels than political parties, causing them to diminish the effect
and role of political parties.
These results also put into perspective the low levels of trust in politicians. While the Egyptians also generally
distrusts politicians, 88% of the voters believe that society needs politicians and that they therefore can play a
positive role.
While the perception of government policies and political parties indicate a low level of public support the
evaluation of different political institutions are more favourable.
Figure 22: Political institutions
Differences in evaluations of various political institutions
11%
20%
30%
Very good
42%
31%
42%
47%
Good
20%
44%
18%
23%
13%
Moderate
Bad
Very bad
7%
16%
6%
1%
4%
2%
SCAF
Sharaf’s cabinet
Judiciary
9%
14%
Police force
Especially the SCAF has apparently handled the transition period to the liking of the general Egyptian public with
86% giving them positive evaluations. This positive perception of the SCAF is also reflected in the Egyptian public’s
overwhelming trust in the SCAF’s ability to achieve democracy in Egypt, transfer power to a civil government
and securing a transparent electoral process. This high level of support for the SCAF is essential for the SCAF to
perform its role as a transitional governing entity.
The only institution to receive a negative evaluation is the police force which may be due to the widely held
perception that the police force is corrupt, abuses civil rights and killed peaceful protesters during the revolution.11
32
5
Political System Preferences
Summary:
·
There exist a clear conflict between voters who want an Islamic state and voters who want a democraticcivil state.
·
The political system should be a presidential system with few parties as there is a general feeling that a
multi-party system will have a negative impact on Egypt.
·
The political system should primarily secure social and economic rights, such as right to education and
equality, with civil and political rights coming second.
“The first phase showed agreement on the goal of unseating dictators. After initial success, however, no consensus
exists about the second phase: what system of government and society should be chosen to replace it.”12
This section will describe and analyse what type of state and political system and what values that should be
provided according to the Egyptian voters.
5.1
State System
There is a clear division in Egyptian society over which state system is most desirable.
Figure 23: Model country
Views on the country Egypt should consider a model country
41%
10%
Saudi
Arabia
USA
10%
China
9%
Turkey
8%
Japan
6%
5%
4%
UAE
France
Malaysia
1%
UK
1%
Iran
As the above graph shows a clear majority prefers Saudi Arabia as a state model. However compiling the secular
liberal models (Japan, USA, Turkey, France, UK) adds to the weight of those Egyptians who prefer this type of
state model. The favourable perception of Saudi Arabia’s may be related to three factors: (1) The remittances
from the roughly 1 million (in 2004) Egyptians working in Saudi Arabia, (2) the large economic support from
Saudi Arabia to Egypt, such as the pledge of USD4 billion in loans and grants in May and large investment projects
in Egypt and (3) Saudi Arabia’s position as a religious epicentre for the Muslim world. With the economy being
a key concern for many Egyptians the strong economic performance of Saudi Arabia will seem very attractive.
33
Figure 24: Saudi Arabia preference – comparison
Comparison between income groups and education levels on preference
for Saudi Arabia as a model country for Egypt
56%
54%
26%
19%
Highest
Lowest
College graduate or above
Income
Illiterate or primary school
Education
The above figure clearly shows the impact of remittances and the perception that Saudi Arabia is helping Egypt’s
economy. The high support amongst the lowest social segments (illiterate and low income groups) is probably
due to the impact remittances from Saudi Arabia have on their daily lives.
Furthermore the secular liberal voters are not very supportive of Saudi Arabia as a state model probably due to
their poor track record in respecting liberal values such as human rights.
The division on which state system is most desirable is also evident from the graph below.
Figure 25: Preferred state system
Preferences for different state systems
53%
38%
9%
Democratic- civil state
34
Islamic state
Strong state even if not democratic
There is a slight majority in Egypt favouring a democratic-civil state, but is it closely followed by a large portion
favouring an Islamic state. This shows that the democratic credentials in Egypt’s political culture remains fragile
and the sharp division, with no clear majority, presents a major challenge during the current transitional period.
Sharp dividing lines exist in Egyptian society over the most suitable state model for Egypt.
Figure 26: Preferred state system – comparison
Comparison of different voter groups on the preferred state system
Freedom and Justice Party
Secular liberals
Total
70%
58%
53%
38%
36%
27%
6%
Islamic state
Democratic-civil state
9%
3%
Strong state even if not democratic
The division between the Freedom and Justice Party and secular liberal voters are clear in this instance as a
majority of the Freedom and Justice Party voters prefer an Islamic state, while the secular liberal voters clearly
prefer a democratic-civil state. Other dividing lines also exists, such as the divide between urban and rural
Egyptians; only 32% of urban dwellers prefers an Islamic state, while 49% of rural dwellers prefer an Islamic
state.
The outcome of this sharp divide is likely to be determined by the outcome of the parliamentary elections. The
preference for an Islamic state by the Freedom and Justice Party voters and their current lead in the electoral
race makes an Islamic state a likely future scenario. Interestingly the Freedom and Justice Party has consistently
proclaimed its support for the establishment of a civil state in Egypt, contrary to the majority of their voters.13
The Freedom and Justice Party will likely stick to their civil state convictions as the political parties in Egypt are
not allowed to run on a religious basis, but it remains to be seen how the party is going to act in the parliament
and in drafting the new constitutions. Here the voters’ preference for an Islamic state may become central.
35
5.2
Political System
A presidential system is characterised by the executive branch being elected independently from the legislative
branch as opposed to a parliamentary system where the head of state is not directly elected, but chosen by the
legislative branch. The parliamentary system is the most popular political system in Europe.
Figure 27: Preferred political system
Preferences for different political systems
51%
30%
16%
Presidential system
Parliamentary system
Mixed system
The Egyptians clearly prefer a presidential system, which is similar to the system in place prior to the revolution.
This vests more power in the executive branch than a parliamentary system. This generally reflects a desire
in Egyptian society for a political system that is not marred by a lot of political hackling between a plethora of
political parties, but an effective political system with a strong executive leader and a small number of parties in
the legislative branch. The latter point is evident by the fact that a majority believe that a multi-party system will
have a negative impact on Egypt.
36
Figure 28: Impact of multi-party system in Egypt
Views on the impact of a multi-party system in Egypt
49%
27%
24%
Positive impact
To an extent
Negative impact
This is furthermore supported by the fact that 43 % thinks that Egypt should at the most have two big parties
and only 17 % prefer a large number of parties.
Even though a large part of the Egyptians believe in a non-secular state model for Egypt this is not reflected in
their view on the skills and abilities politicians should possess.
Figure 29: Politicians
Preferences for qualities a politician should have
Serve his community
Religious
2%
12%
Intellectual and understand many fields
29%
Biased to the poor
13%
19%
Modest
24%
Able to balance between the poor and the rich
37
As visible the Egyptians primarily want skilful politicians. Furthermore there is a strong emphasis on social justice
with a large part of the population either wanting politicians biased to the poor or someone able to balance
both the interest of the poor and the rich. Interestingly even the Freedom and Justice Party voters do not value
religious qualities in politicians significantly more than the average Egyptians. The only social grouping in Egypt
that has a strong emphasis on religious qualities is the highest income group with 22% emphasizing religion as
the primary quality.
5.3
Values Provided by Democracy
The classical values a liberal democracy is supposed to provide to its citizens are equality in front of the law, civil
liberties and human rights with western culture often focusing on civil and political rights. The emphasis on social
justice with regards to the primary qualities of politicians seems to trump the classical focus on civil and political
rights.
Figure 30: Primary right to be provided in a democratic country
Preferences for rights a democracy should provide
Religious equality
Freedom of press and expression
4%
5%
Equality in front of the law
8%
36%
Right to education
Respect of human rights 12%
32%
Equality
As visible the primary emphasis in Egypt is on social and economic rights such as right to education and (economic)
equality. The classic liberal civil and political rights such as freedom of speech, equality in front of the law come
only secondary to this. This is probably a result of the fact that “Since 1952, liberalism has been systematically
undermined as an ideology and practice” in Egypt.14 Furthermore the neoliberal economic policies pursued by the
Mubarak regime led to an increase in societal inequality and increased poverty. The Egyptians thus want a new
political system that can distribute the wealth and roll back the effects of many years of crony capitalism.15
38
6
Future Prospect
Summary:
·
Egyptians most pressing concern is that the security conditions will worsen in the future. In general
however the Egyptians are optimistic about the future of their country.
·
The voters are also optimistic towards the political and economic future of Egypt and are realistic that the
process of turning Egypt into a democracy will not be completed overnight.
This section will describe and analyse Egyptians view on the future in terms of worst case scenarios, political
prospects and economic prospects.
6.1
Worst Case Scenario
As with the most pressing issue in Egypt today, the worst case scenario is also the issue of security and the
worsening of the security situation in Egypt.
Figure 31: Future scenarios
Feared future scenarios
68%
18%
8%
Security condition will
get worse and chaos
Islamists will take over
Military will take over
3%
Egypt will transfer to a
western secular state
Secondarily roughly 1 out of 5 voters fear an Islamist take-over and 1 out of 10 fear a military take-over. Obviously
the Freedom and Justice Party voters are less concerned with an Islamist take-over than the secular liberals who
attach much greater importance to this scenario given it almost equal weights as the security conditions. The
incoming Egyptian parties should thus highly concentrate on improving the security conditions for the Egyptian
population as this is a key concern.
Generally the Egyptian population remain optimistic about Egypt’s future with 80% saying they are either
optimistic or very optimistic. Interestingly the secular liberal voters are almost equally optimistic about Egypt’s
future as the Freedom and Justice Party voters. This seem to indicate that they either are not so worried about
the possibility that the Freedom and Justice Party will become the biggest party in the upcoming parliamentary
elections or that they feel confident that they can catch-up to the Freedom and Justice Party’s lead in the polls.
39
6.2
Political Prospects
The general optimism in the Egyptian population also seems to translate into political optimism.
Views
onpolitical
the development
Figure 32:
Egypt’s
prospects
revolution
Complete democratic state
of the political system a year after the
34%
50% Semi-democratic state
15%
Situation will remain constant
Optimism and realism with regards to the political development is crucial to actually fulfilling the goals of the
public. There seem to be a good sense of realism in the Egyptian public as a majority thinks that Egypt within a
year will become a semi-democratic state and aware that a process of moving towards democracy may take time.
This could however also indicate that achieving complete democracy is not the primary priority of Egyptians.
Optimism is visible in terms of the Egyptians view on the future of the political parties. A clear majority of
84% believe that the conditions for political parties will become better within the next three years. This may
indicate that the negative view on political parties in Egypt is contingent on the voters believing that conditions
surrounding the political parties are not conducive for them to play an effective and trustworthy role.
Another positive finding is that the sense of political optimism is generally shared among the different social
groupings in Egypt.
40
6.3
Economic Prospects
Just as the somewhat optimistic view on the political future of Egypt, the voters are also confident that Egypt’s
economic situation will become better. This may explain the lack of economic concerns as a worst case scenario.
Figure 33: Economic prospects
Views on the development of the economic situation a year after the
revolution
13%
Will become much better than now
14%
Will become better than now
53%
Will remain the same
13%
Will become worse than now
15%
Will become much worse than now
5%
4%
Egypt’s economic stand
Family’s economic stand
52%
17%
14%
As evident a clear majority are optimistic that Egypt’s economy is moving in the right direction. Furthermore
there is clear connection between the general economic well-being of national economy and the economy of the
family. The Egyptian voters apparently seem to believe that it is not possible to improve the household economy
without a general improvement in the national economy.
41
Endnotes
1
(Salem, 2011)
2
(Ottaway, 2010)
3
The Revolutionary Youth Council received a strong support of 16% in the first survey, but only 2% in the
second survey. The reason being that in the first survey they were among the 15 parties on a list shown to the
respondents, while in the second survey they were deleted from the list. The party seems finally determined
to run in the elections as of primo November 2011.
42
4
(Ottaway, 2010)
5
(Brown, 2011)
6
(Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2011)
7
(Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2011)
8
(Hay, 2007)
9
(Attia, Aziz, Frie, & Elhusseiny, 2011)
10
(Brown, 2011)
11
(Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2011)
12
(Salem, 2011)
13
(Freedom and Justice Party, 2011)
14
(Krajeski, 2011)
15
(Joya, 2011)
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