136th Bergedorf Round Table
Turkey as a Partner for European Foreign Policy
in the Middle East
February 23rd –25th, 2007, Istanbul
CONTENTs
Picture Documentation
Participants
Summary
1
20
21
Annex
Participants
Recommended Literature
Index
Previous Round Tables
The Körber Foundation
Imprint
87
94
96
99
111
112
Protocol
Welcome
23
I.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP
A New Openness and Activity in the Region ?
“Kemalists” and “Modernists”
The Role of the Military
Rising Nationalism ?
25
25
33
36
39
II.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Turkey’s Accession Process and EU Foreign Policy
Would EU Membership Affect Turkey’s Foreign Policy ?
Turkish Membership as an Asset for EU Foreign Policy ?
Turkey’s Regional Role as an Argument for EU Accession
The Suspension of the External Relations Chapter
42
42
43
45
46
III.Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East
1. Is Turkey the EU’s Bridge to the Region ?
2. Turkey’s Image in the Middle East
3. The Ottoman Past — A Burden for Turkish Policy ?
4. Turkey as a Model for Middle Eastern Countries ?
5. Turkey’s Debate on Islam: Model for the EU and the Middle East ?
6. Do Middle Eastern Countries Want Turkey in the EU ?
7. A Triangle of Turkey, the EU and Key Regional Players ?
47
47
49
50
51
54
56
57
IV. Potential and Mechanisms of Cooperation
1. Where do Turkish and EU Interests Coincide ?
2. Can the EU and Turkey Achieve More as Partners ?
61
61
62
V.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
64
64
65
67
71
73
75
79
80
82
Challenges in the Region
Modernizing the Region and Spreading Democracy
Stabilizing Iraq
Turkish Policy towards Northern Iraq and the PKK
Sectarian Conflicts
The Middle East Peace Process
Talking with Hamas ?
A CSCE for the Middle East ?
Influencing Iran and Syria
Energy and Water
Initiator
Dr. Kurt A. Körber
CHair
Prof. Dr. Volker Perthes
Director, German Institute for International and
­Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
participants
İshak Alaton
Chairman of the Board, Alarko Holding A. Ş., Istanbul
Prof. Dr. Sadik Al-Azm
Emeritus Professor of Modern European Philosophy,
Damascus University
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağci
Professor of International Relations, Middle East
­Technical University, Ankara
Cengiz Çandar
Chief Columnist, Referans, Istanbul
Ambassador Altay Cengizer
Director-General for Policy Planning,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara
Robert Cooper
Director-General, External and Politico-Military Affairs,
General Secretariat, Council of the European Union,
Brussels
Ambassador Dr. Eckart Cuntz
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Ankara
Ambassador Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu
Chief Advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
Ankara
Mehmet Dülger
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Grand National Assembly, Ankara
Dr. Mark A. Heller
Director of Research and Principal Research Associate,
Institute for National Security Studies,
Tel Aviv University
Gerald Knaus
Founding Director, European Stability Initiative (ESI),
Istanbul
Dr. Heinz Kramer
Head, EU External Relations Research Unit, German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP),
Berlin
Ambassador Dr. Hossein Mousavian
Vice President, Center for Strategic Research (CSR),
Expediency Council of Iran, Tehran
Dr. Rolf Mützenich, MdB
Chairman of the German-Iranian Parliamentary Group,
German Bundestag, Berlin
Michel Naoufal
Editor in Chief for Arab and International News, ­
Al-Mustaqbal Daily Newspaper, Beirut
Dr. Thomas Paulsen
Managing Director, Bergedorf Round Table,
Körber Foundation, Berlin
Ruprecht Polenz, MdB
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
­German Bundestag, Berlin
Volker Rühe
fmr. Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of
­Germany, Hamburg
VLR I Ralph Tarraf
Deputy Head of Policy Planning, Federal Foreign Office,
Berlin
Michael Thumann
Foreign Editor, DIE ZEIT, Hamburg
Dr. Antje Vollmer
fmr. Vice-President of the German Bundestag, Berlin
Matthias von Kummer
Consul General of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Istanbul
Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker
fmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Berlin
Dr. Klaus Wehmeier
Vice Chairman of the Executive Board,
Körber Foundation, Hamburg
Ambassador Yaşar Yakiş
Chairman of the EU Commission, Grand National
Assembly of Turkey, Ankara
Dr. Fareed Yasseen
Senior Advisor to Iraqi Deputy President
Adil Abdul Mahdi, Baghdad
Dr. Gottfried Zeitz
Office of President Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin
Cüneyd Zapsu
Special Assistant and Information Coordinator to
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara
20
SUMMARY
I. Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP
A presentation by Ahmet Davutoğlu examined the historical background of
Turkish foreign policy and the proactive approach of the AKP government. The
speaker also presented his vision on how Turkey as a member state could contribute to the EU’s policies in the Middle East (pp. 25–32). In the following
discussion, the participants addressed the internal Turkish controversy between
“Kemalists” favoring a defensive stance in foreign affairs and “Modernists” supporting a more ambitious diplomacy (pp. 33–36). The question was raised whether
the role of the Turkish military as “guardian of secularism” is compatible with
European standards (pp. 36–39). Some speakers observed a rise of Turkish nationalism and partly explained this with Western behavior towards the country
(pp. 39–41).
II. Turkey’s Accession Process and EU Foreign Policy
Would accession to the EU transform the Turkish foreign policy agenda in the
Middle East? What would be the result (p. 42) ? Would the membership of a populous country with a predominantly Muslim population weaken the EU’s coherence and hamstring the CFSP ? Or would it offer new opportunities by way of
raising prestige and weight (pp. 43–45)? Does the partnership of Brussels and
Ankara in the Middle East lend arguments to supporters of Turkey’s EU integration (p. 43) ? What consequences will the suspension of the “External Relations”
chapter of the accession negotiations have for the Middle East policies of both
sides (p. 46)?
III. Turkey’s Relations with Europe and the Middle East
Most participants rejected the metaphor of Turkey being a “bridge to Europe” on
account of the country’s long tradition of Western orientation (pp. 47–49). There
was a strong consensus that Turkey’s regional prestige has improved recently — ­
partly as a consequence of the accession prospect (pp. 49–50). Some speakers saw
the imperial Ottoman past as burden for Ankara’s diplomatic ventures in the
Middle East while others doubted such a connection (pp. 50–51). There was a spirited discussion as to whether Turkey could serve as a model for Middle Eastern
states. Would such a function mainly cover issues like westernization, democratization, human rights, and a market economy (pp. 51–55)? Or could Turkish
debates on a modern Islam also help open up Middle Eastern countries on a religious level (pp. 54–56)? Some speakers agreed that the states of the region want
21
Turkey to become member of the EU because they think they would benefit
from such a turn of events (pp. 56–57). One participant presented the idea of
a broad “triangle cooperation” between Turkey, the EU and regional players
(pp. 57–60).
IV. Potential and Mechanism of Cooperation
There was consent that European and Turkish interests in the Middle East are
congruent, even if the region’s problems are more directly felt in Turkey (pp. 61–62).
There was no consensus, however, on whether foreign policy cooperation in Middle Eastern affairs between Ankara and Brussels would be beneficial at present.
Possible institutional frameworks for such a joining of forces were discussed
(pp. 62–63).
V. Challenges in the Region
The participants made concrete suggestions as to the issues on which the EU and
Turkey could cooperate constructively. The common goal of democratization and
strengthening human rights in the Middle East was stressed, but there were
doubts as to the existence of a clear strategy for achieving these goals (pp. 64–65).
Some speakers suggested common European-Turkish initiatives for stabilizing
Iraq (pp. 65–67). But there were objections that Turkey, which has its own interests
in northern Iraq, e. g. in relation to border traffic, the PKK, and the status of
Kirkuk, could not serve as mediator (pp. 67–71). One speaker’s suggestion that
Turkey could strengthen the Sunni camp in the sectarian conflicts with the Shiites was discussed controversially (pp. 71–73). The participants considered possibilities on how Turkey and the EU could help bring the Middle East peace process
back on track (pp. 73–75). Should existing Turkish ties to Hamas be used to leave
behind the Western states’ boycott strategy or should that policy remain in place
(pp. 75–79)? Would it be a good idea to export the CSCE model to the Middle East
(p. 80)? Could Turkey assist in reducing tensions between Syria and Saudi Arabia
or influence Iran to cooperate with the UN on the nuclear issue (pp. 81–82)? Finally, Turkey’s new role as an important energy corridor was reviewed. Solutions
based on European models for water conflicts between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria
were also considered (pp. 82–84).
22
PROTOCOL
Welcome
Welcome to the 136th Bergedorf Round Table “Turkey as a Partner
of European Foreign Policy in the Middle East.” Can Turkey and
the EU tackle the challenges in the Middle East with a completely
new clout if they join forces ?
A major argument of proponents of Turkish EU membership
is that Turkey’s European ambitions must succeed to enable Turkey
to become Europe’s bridge to the Middle East. As a country with a
Muslim population and a secular, democratic system it could, they say, serve as a
model and thus stabilize the region. Also, as an EU member Turkey could increase
the diplomatic power of the Union in the Middle East significantly through its close
diplomatic and economic relations to countries in the Islamic world.
Others claim, though, that Turkey is neither accepted as a model in the Islamic
world nor exerts exceptional influence in the region regarding problems like Iraq,
the Iranian nuclear program or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And some who
believe Turkey can have an important stabilizing influence dispute that EU membership is necessary to make use of this potential.
We have gathered policy makers from Turkey, the Middle East and the EU to
explore the substance of the respective arguments. Volker Perthes will moderate
the discussion.
23
von Weizsäcker
Perthes
We will analyze Turkey’s potential as a strategic partner of the EU
in the Middle East in three steps.
First, Turkey’s foreign policy — especially in the Middle East:
What historical factors have shaped this policy and what is new
about the AKP government’s approach ?
Second, the interdependence between Turkish EU accession
and Turkey’s and the EU’s respective role in the region: How has
the prospect of EU membership transformed Turkish policy and does it affect
Ankara’s standing among regional players ? How would, on the other hand, Turkish accession change the EU’s role in the Middle East ?
Third, concrete areas of cooperation. What exactly can Turkey contribute to
EU policy in the region ? What common principles should guide European-Turkish
initiatives in the Middle East ? Which issues should be tackled together, what exactly can such cooperation achieve and where are its limits ?
The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ spoken contributions.
24
I. Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP
1. A New Openness and Activity in the Region ?
Ahmet Davutoğlu, the main foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, will analyze the traditions of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East
and its evolvement in recent years. As the author of Strategic Depth, a book many
see as theoretical blueprint for the foreign policy of the AKP government, Mr.
Davutoğlu brings together outstanding academic expertise and in-depth know­
ledge of the policy-making process.
Perthes
Europe could have an inestimable partner to bring peace and stability to today’s
fragile and dangerous Middle East — Turkey. If only the EU took advantage of what
Ankara can offer: a modern, constructive and proactive foreign policy, a firm commitment to EU integration and the unique position of having excellent relations
to all relevant players in the Middle East and in the West.
Present-day Turkey feels the pulses of two worlds at the same time: one Western/transatlantic pulse and one Middle Eastern/Asian and Muslim pulse. With
this background, Turkey has developed a forward-looking foreign policy which
combines a vision for the Middle East with a courageous internal reform agenda
that will allow us to join the European Union. Turkey has learned from history
that in a dynamically changing environment one must develop and implement a
vision for a new order.
A short historical review: Today is not the first time that Turkey, the Middle
East and Europe find themselves in a period of transformation. There have already
been three comparable transformations, each starting with an armed conflict and
resulting in a subsequent rearrangement of the international order:
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 was the first direct encounter between
Europe and the region in modern times, and Bonaparte brought about major
changes in all territories he had ruled:
In Europe, after the victory of Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia had
ended the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 established a new
political balance of monarchies. But Napoleon’s modernization of the judicial and
administrative systems (Code Civil) also had a lasting impact on the political structure. Certain principles of Enlightenment, adopted by the French Revolution and
implemented politically by Napoleon, were now incorporated in the system of the
monarchies that were to rule Europe for another 100 years, the Prussian Reforms
of Stein, Hardenberg, Scharnhorst and Humboldt being a prime example.
Davutoğlu
25 A New Openness and Activity in the Region?
Turkey could be an inestimable partner
for the EU in the Middle East
On three occasions, wars transformed
Europe, the Middle East and Turkey
at the same time
Turkey has developed a forward-looking foreign
policy which combines a vision for the Middle
East with a courageous internal reform agenda
that will allow us to join the European Union.
Davutoğlu
The Ottoman Empire responded
to Napoleon by initiating reforms
The defeat in World War I paved
the way for the Turkish Republic
Nevertheless, Napoleon’s impact was no less important in Turkey ! Here the
modernizing principles of his rule were taken up with the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the judicial and administrative system that fundamentally transformed
the country. At the same time, the Middle East started to modernize: Egypt, having been exposed to principles of enlightenment and modern state structures,
thoroughly changed under Kavali Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Ottoman Vice Roy who
took office in 1805. Irrigation projects, agricultural reforms and industrial development as well as political modernization regenerated the country.
The next major transformation came with the end of the First World War and
the subsequent semi-peace and the attempt to create a new international system
symbolized by the League of Nations.
Europe saw the end of imperial traditions when, for example, the 1918 Revolution in Germany sent Wilhelm II into exile and the fragile Weimar Republic began
its short-lived existence. In Russia, the February Revolution brought the downfall
of the Romanov dynasty. But the new democratic order was wiped out by the
Bolsheviks and the country embarked on a path to establish Communism under
Lenin and subsequently Stalin. Nationalist ideologies were on the rise, violent
repercussions of a rapid modernization and revolutions of the social structure:
In 1921, Hitler became leader of the National Socialist Party that would come to
power in Germany twelve years later, and Mussolini founded the Italian Fascist
Party in 1920.
In Turkey, defeat in the First World War and Allied ­occupation led to a much
more positive development: the rise of General Kemal Pasha’s — ­Atatürk’s — National
Movement that liberated occupied Turkish territory, abolished the Ottoman Empire’s Sultanate and established the Turkish Republic with its principles of laicism/
secularism, the republican state and social peace, adopting, for example, Swiss
Civil Law and Italian Criminal Law.
In the Middle East, the map was drawn anew through European colonization.
According to the guidelines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, after the end
of the war the former Ottoman territory was divided into a French and a British
sphere of influence. The French now ruled over today’s Syria and Lebanon while
1919 saw the establishment of the British Mandate Mesopotamia which became
a constitutional monarchy under the name of Iraq in 1921. The British Mandate
over Palestine (today’s Jordan, Israel and the territories under the control of the
Palestinian Authority) was established in 1920, and Afghanistan’s independence
from Great Britain was recognized in the Kabul treaty of 1921.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 26
The end of the Second World War brought about the marginalization of Europe compared with the superpowers U. S. and Soviet Union. But simultaneously,
the nucleus of what was to become the EU came into being — with Churchill’s
speech in Zurich in 1946, the foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949 and the
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Turkey established a multi-party democracy, and the Middle East saw the rise of nation states
and of Arab nationalism. New borders and new identities came into being.
The Cold War was a war, too, like the Napoleonic Wars or the two World
Wars — but its end has not yet brought about a new international system as it had
arisen in the peace periods after previous wars. There has been no new international regime, no new order which Turkey or the region could have adopted and
the chaotic international environment has created a serious threat of insecurity,
especially in the Middle East. The long ceasefires in Kosovo, Abkhazia, Nagorno
Karabakh, Palestine and Iraq between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the
attacks of September 11, 2001 affected Turkey’s neighboring regions, the Balkans,
the Caucasus and the Middle East.
Turkey therefore, had to adapt its foreign policy orientation, while at the same
time coordinating its response with its efforts to integrate with the EU. We have
developed a strategic approach, turning our history and geographic location into
an asset that will allow us to strengthen peace and stability in our neighborhood.
Turkish foreign policy today pursues six basic principles:
The first is to establish positive relations between international and domestic
structures and a balance between security and freedom in Turkey and in the region. The sacrifice of freedom for security leads to autocratic regimes while the
sacrifice of security for freedom leads to anarchy like in today’s Iraq. Turkey has
achieved harmony between freedom and security by balancing the democratization process with our foreign policy orientation — despite the risks on a global and
a regional scale after 9/11 and extensive wars and tensions in neighboring regions.
The goal of European integration has been consistent with this objective.
Second, Turkey pursues a “zero-problem policy” with its neighbors. Problems
with one’s neighbors endanger security and thus make domestic reforms to increase freedom impossible. In the 1990s, we have had fluctuating relationships
with our neighbors, today we have excellent relations with almost all of them.
This gives us the latitude we need to pursue our internal reforms.
Third, Turkey wants to be a peace-builder contributing to stability in its neighboring zones which threaten to produce instability: the Balkans, the Middle East,
27 A New Openness and Activity in the Region?
The end of the Cold War did not bring
about a new international order
Turkish foreign policy has six basic principles:
Balancing security and freedom
in Turkey and in the region
‘Zero problems’ with our neighbors
Turkey wants to be a peace-builder contributing
to stability in its neighboring zones.
Davutoğlu
Turkey wants to be a peace-builder
Foreign relations must be consistent
A dynamic diplomacy responding
to a dynamic world
the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Earlier on, Turkey used to be concerned mainly
about its territorial security, about fending off dangers by keeping them out of our
territorial borders. Today we realize that only a soft power influence beyond one’s
borders prevents regional problems from coming to your doors. Where did the
refugees from Kosovo or Bosnia in the 1990s go ? Where did the Kurds of northern
Iraq go when Saddam attacked them ? To Turkey. The historic role and responsibilities of Turkey in its relations with these neighboring zones makes it a center
of attraction in positive or negative circumstances. Especially in the case of Iraq,
a crisis which we do not prevent will spread to Turkey. No more closing our eyes
and an end to the wait-and-see approach! We are now very active in the Middle
East, as can be proven, for example, by the recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister
Olmert, our extensive consultations with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and
numerous other meetings and initiatives.
Fourth, after the end of the bipolar world, Turkey’s relations with different
partners around the globe no longer contradict each other but must be complementary. Our relations with the U. S., within and outside NATO, are not an
alternative to our relations with the EU. Likewise, the strengthening relations to
our important neighbor Russia, with whom we have fought so many wars in the
past and with whom we have finally established a strong and mutually beneficial
partnership, are in no way contradictory to our relations with the U. S. or the EU.
The relations with the EU remain, of course, the backbone of our foreign policy.
Fifth, a new dynamic and active diplomacy approach has been adopted responding to a dynamic international and regional environment. This approach
has been supported by relevant economic and cultural instruments. In the past,
Turkey was perceived by some observers as having strong muscles, a weak stomach, a troubled heart and a mediocre brain. A strong army, weak economy, lack of
self-confidence and insufficient scientific and strategic thinking. This perception
is changing radically. Turkey needs strong muscles to guarantee security but also
a strong economy to support it and needs self-confidence in global, regional and
domestic affairs. Such a self-confident, balanced country is stable enough to turn
challenges into opportunities. Today, we have a Turkey with a stable economy, a
capable security infrastructure, a self-confident, proactive and constructive diplomacy. Let me give you some indications of this change. Many foresaw a crisis
during the recent visit of Pope Benedict XVI, but the visit became an asset. In the
case of Cyprus, we followed a constructive and creative policy regarding the referendum on the Annan Plan. Let us remember that it was the Greek, not the Turkish
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 28
Turkey has direct access to areas where the EU
has to become more active in the future.
Davutoğlu
side that rejected the plan. I believe that our constructive role is appreciated by all
today despite the fact that the EU continued to punish the constructive Turkish
Cypriot side and awarded the rejectionist Greek Cypriots. The same new approach
and image is true for the Middle East. 90 percent of all articles in the Arab or Israeli
Middle Eastern press assess Turkey’s role and its soft power positively — again due
to our very proactive, creative and constructive initiatives in the region.
Sixth, Turkey wants to be more visible in all international fora, relevant not
only to our immediate national interests but regarding the different aspects of
the life of humanity. We started the Alliance of Civilizations to contribute positively to tackling the central challenge of preventing a violent clash among different civilizations. Turkish citizens have taken significant posts in international
organizations in recent years: Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu is Secretary General of the
OIC and Kemal Derviş heads the UNDP while Hikmet Çetin, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs, served as chief civil administrator in Afghanistan until last year.
Due to its multidimensional character, Turkey has been a member of different
international and regional organizations such as NATO, OECD, G-20, OIC, BSEC,
ECO, D-8 etc. Turkey will continue to be an active and leading participant of these
organizations. On the other hand, Turkey has established new links with other
significant organizations in recent years. Turkey has enjoyed an observer status in
the African Union since 2005. Prime Minister Erdoğan was the guest of honor at
the AU’s Eighth Summit of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa at the
end of January 2007 on account of Turkey being one of the rising donor countries
in Africa besides China. In addition to this, institutionalized relations between Turkey and the Arab League have been established and Prime Minister Erdoğan and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gül have been invited as guest speakers of the summits
of the Arab League in 2006 and 2007. We want to contribute to world peace and
open Turkey’s society to the world, because, when our citizens think more globally,
that also makes them open for ambitious domestic reforms.
The increasing frequency with which European and Middle Eastern leaders
visit our country is testimony to the fact that Turkey’s new active foreign policy is
recognized abroad. Last year, for example, German foreign minister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier came to Turkey three times.
What is Turkey’s strategy for the Middle East ? The Middle East is a top concern
for the EU as well. Turkey has direct access to areas where the EU has to become
more active in the future. Why ? There are three questions here that need to be
answered.
29 A New Openness and Activity in the Region?
A strong involvement in international
fora and organizations
The Middle East of 2015 requires ­extensive
political dialog and needs to have established
a security system like the Helsinki Act of 1975.
Davutoğlu
A crisis in the Middle East directly affects
both Turkey and Europe and therefore
they have to act as partners in the region
Turkey has a vision for the
Middle East in the year 2015
We need a regional equivalent
to the Helsinki process
Middle Eastern cities must
maintain their multiculturalism
First of all, why is the situation important today ? Today the Middle East is faced
with serious ethnic and sectarian tensions which threaten stability and peace. We
follow these tensions with the greatest concern and know that it is impossible to
solve the region’s social and economic problems without addressing these issues.
Secondly, why is this important for Europe ? Middle Eastern questions are
not “isolated” issues like other regional crises; they are extremely hard to contain.
Their cultural and historical background connects them to political camps all
over the world and citizens from the region now living in the EU or the U. S. are
emotionally linked to the problems in the Middle East to such an extent that Middle Eastern developments cannot be ignored by these countries. The importance
of the region for global energy security makes the Middle East relevant even for
those who would prefer not to care at all.
Third question: why is this situation in the Middle East important for Turkey ? There is a direct link between the situation in the Middle East and Turkish
political, economic and security concerns. Turkey therefore has no choice but to
actively and quickly develop strategies to prevent instability and foster welfare in
the region as a whole.
Let me present you with our vision for the Middle East in 2015. We are confident that in 2014, when we commemorate the 100th anniversary of the beginning
of the First World War, Turkey will most probably be a member of the EU or on
the verge of accession. In which type of Middle East do we want to act then, as a
member state of the EU ? There are three basic political, cultural, and economic
dimensions of our vision regarding the Middle East.
First, the political dimension: The Middle East of 2015 requires extensive political dialog and needs to have established a security system like the Helsinki Act
of 1975. Today, leaders and decision-makers in the Middle East do not have enough
dialog and consultations for the future of the region. Turkey has been trying to
institutionalize these mechanisms. We initiated conferences of Iraq’s neighboring
countries before the war and will continue this forum until Iraq is stabilized. We
are establishing a Turkish-Arab forum in cooperation with the Arab League. Some
prejudices and psychological barriers stand in the way of a constructive dialog.
The Middle East can no longer tolerate such obstacles.
Second, cultural coexistence: The litmus test of multicultural societies is city
life and urban culture. In cities where the main streets have churches, mosques
and synagogues as in Istanbul, Cairo, Jerusalem or Damascus you see the best examples of Middle Eastern multiculturalism — the region never was and never will
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 30
be unicultural. In Jerusalem, Beirut, Kirkuk, Baghdad or Basra, this coexistence of
different ethnicities and religious traditions or sects must continue by any means !
What a nightmare it would be to have cities and neighborhoods with different
ethnic and religious compositions segregated from each other ! With this vision
we initiated the Alliance of Civilizations project.
The third principle of Turkey’s vision for the Middle East is economic interdependence as the basis for peace. The EU is a prime example of how economic
interdependence can serve as a basis for peace and stability in Europe. On the basis
of the same principle, we continue deliberately to have good economic relations
with Iraq in general and northern Iraq in particular. Furthermore, we have signed
free trade agreements with Syria and Egypt this year and have developed special
economic relations with the Gulf countries. Our economic relations with Iran
continue to expand.
To achieve our vision is a necessity: A Middle East characterized by political
dialog, cultural coexistence and economic interdependence will be an asset. However, if we fail, we will face disaster in 2015 — worse than the conditions of World
War I in the region. That is why the EU and Turkey must work together and the EU
must make use of our potential for stabilizing the region ! Ankara’s potential for
positive contributions in the Middle East is one of the main assets of EU-Turkish
foreign policy cooperation. The EU is one of the locomotives of Turkey’s transformation process, and together they can be a locomotive of transformation in
the region. Also, both can contribute to countering the rising anti-American and
anti-Israeli sentiments in the region — the EU with its experience in dialog and
tolerance, Turkey with its unique position of having good relations to all relevant
players in the region. There is little prejudice against Europe in the region.
But do we use our potential, share a strategic vision and possess adequate
instruments ? Unfortunately not. Why ? When the Council of the EU took its decision in December about how to react to the stand-off regarding Cyprus, we were
surprised that the External Relations chapter of the negotiations was suspended.
Why did Brussels do that ? It would have been understandable to suspend the Customs Union chapter, but everybody knows that 2007 can be the most critical year
in two decades in the Middle East and at other focal points like Kosovo — and the
EU suspends the External Relations chapter with Turkey ! It was impossible for us
to grasp what message this was supposed to send. Either the Europeans have no
strategic vision and see neither risks nor assets or they have motives which we
do not understand.
31 A New Openness and Activity in the Region?
Economic interdependence
fosters political stability
A crisis in the accession talks
involves political risks
To use soft power, to act as donor to many
­countries, to become a peace builder — ­
these were all new ideas in the
Turkish foreign policy discourse.
Bağci
Nonetheless, I sincerely hope that in the near future Turkey and the EU can
come to an agreement about how to cooperate in the most effective way on stabilizing the Middle East. We should concentrate on how Turkey and the EU can
cooperate for regional and global peace, prosperity and stability rather than being
misled by misperceptions and hijacked by narrow political agendas. It is a historic
opportunity for both Turkey and the EU to develop a common vision and a shared
agenda for a brighter future in Europe, the Middle East and the world.
Bağci
Turkey’s new foreign policy discourse
was initiated by academics
Naoufal
Turkey has to stabilize neighboring
regions in its own best interest
Knaus
Turkey has evolved from a security-consuming to a security-producing power.
Former Foreign Minister Ilter Türkmen once proclaimed that the Turkish approach to international affairs has always been reactive; waiting until something
happened and then defending the own stance.
In the wake of the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, academics from
Bilkent University like Duygu Sezer and Ali Karaosmanoğlu challenged this with
the idea of a “grand strategy” for Turkish foreign policy. Instead of remaining at
the sidelines of events, Turkey was supposed to become aggressive in a positive
sense, trying to be present everywhere and to contribute its share to regional as
well as to global developments. To use soft power, to act as donor to many countries, to become a peace builder — these were all new ideas in the Turkish foreign
policy discourse. In recent years, a rapidly changing globe forced our politicians
to adjust their foreign policy along these lines.
This change is reflected in the Turkish media as well: On any given day, they
cover international issues extensively, be they policy- or be they business-oriented.
Foreign policy expertise is expanding.
Turkey has no choice but to conduct a non-aggressive “zero-problem policy” because it belongs to several regional subsystems. This gives the Turkish diplomacy
European, Balkan, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, Caucasian and Asian concerns
and dimensions, all at the same time. The balance and stability in these regions
depend directly on the moderating influence the Turkish model is exercising. In
that geo-strategic position, Ankara must develop friendly relations with all of its
neighbors, promote multilateral institutions and fora and try to resolve disputes
peacefully.
Turkey should make even greater use of its soft power and have more self-confidence to open up to outside influences, to let diversity be an asset. It used to be
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 32
the official Turkish policy to discourage learning Arabic in the regions bordering
Arab countries. That has changed, luckily, but still a lot remains to be done. Let
me give you an example:
Turkish is widely spoken in the suq of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city. Huge
crowds of Turkish visitors go there regularly. But across the border in the Turkish
town of Antakya, it is virtually impossible to find newspapers in Arabian, even
though many local people speak the language. If Turkey wants to make full use of
its potential, it should encourage diversity and bilateral exchange.
Turkey should embrace cultural exchange
How can one describe the relations of the Turkish Prime Minister with the leaders
in the region ?
Perthes
It is a great asset that the Turkish government has such good relations to all relevant players. Which other leader can easily call Olmert, Bush, Ahmadinejad and
Assad on one day ?
Bağci
The fact that Prime Minister Erdoğan is acknowledged throughout the Muslim
world as a devout Muslim is crucial for his recognition in Muslim countries in
the Middle East. He is one of the few who has access to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali
Chamenei.
Zapsu
I am not too much impressed by the fact that a Turkish Prime Minister has phone
conversations with all leaders from the region as well as the American President
in the course of a few hours. This is due less to an appreciation of our government’s active foreign policy than to Turkey’s geopolitical position. And if today Turkey can be a neutral player, this is, ironically, possible also thanks to the previous
reactive and defensive foreign policy. That approach made us into a logic arbiter
in conflicts to which we are not a party.
Çandar
2. “Kemalists” and “Modernists”
Is the modern and active Turkish foreign policy dependent on the AKP or based
on a broader reorientation of the whole political spectrum due to structural social
and economic changes ? Would Kemalist or nationalist parties subscribe to the
same principles when they come to power ?
33 Kemalists” and “Modernists”
Mützenich
Present-day foreign policy discourses
in Turkey are more dichotomized
than they were just a few years ago.
Kramer
Kramer
‘Kemalists’ and ‘Modernists’ are struggling
over Turkish foreign policy
‘Kemalists’ stress the security aspect
‘­Modernists’ think Turkey
should be more open
The ‘Kemalists’ are losing ground,
but they are still strong
Present-day foreign policy discourses in Turkey are more dichotomized than they
were just a few years ago. Turkey no longer has a uniform doctrine any more but
diverging discourses and a changing political landscape in which more modern
perceptions are gaining ground. The traditional or Kemalist approach competes
with the more modern, pluralistic one to which Mr. Davutoğlu subscribes and
which has recently gained importance.
Kemalists place a strong emphasis on securitization of foreign policy. They
view relations with the outside world first and foremost under the aspect of their
possible impact on the national security of the Republic as founded by Mustafa
Kemal. Consequently, they favor a reactive, state-centered and inward-looking posture in which zero-sum considerations prevail. The Turkish military is the bulwark
of this position and Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanit an outspoken “Kemalist” in
this sense.
The “Modernists,” on the other hand, deemphasize security, support a more
active stance and are generally more open to the outside world. They are looking
for win-win situations with other countries. The prevalent evaluations of Turkey’s
position in the Middle East and its policy options in this respect are a good example of these diverging foreign policy discourses.
Describing such an antagonism between two mutually exclusive philosophies
is nonetheless a bit reductive. Regarding concrete policies, both sides are not necessarily constantly at odds with each other. Security considerations, for example,
dominate the Modernists’ standpoint on the Kurdish issue also. But clear camps
do exist.
It is difficult to assess the relative sizes of the opposing camps. Since 2002,
when the first one-party government in decades came to power, it has become
more difficult for the Kemalist thinking to carry the day. But the old Kemalist
ideas still exist and are articulated by influential people. They have their basis in
the general public as well as their citadels in important segments of society and
the state bureaucracy.
The securitized approach to Turkish foreign policy tends to be perpetuated by
national socialization agents such as the public education and the military education systems. The outcome of the current debate is not clear. It depends largely
on the outcome of the broader Turkish debate about the “correct identity” of the
Kemalist Republic. It follows that a meaningful policy directed towards engaging
Ankara in international structures has to take into consideration both sides of the
internal Turkish debate on foreign policy.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 34
In a contested field of divergent ideas,
it is far from certain that
the proactive stance will prevail.
Bağci
Becoming a global and a regional player has led to unprecedented divisions in
debates on foreign policy among Turkey’s politicians and citizens. In the Cold War,
the general lines were static and we had bipartisan consensus. Today, in a contested field of divergent ideas, it is far from certain that the proactive stance will
prevail. The traditionalists’ emphasis on security is, to a certain extent, founded
in our historical experience.
Bağci
There are contradictory statements in Turkish foreign policy these days. When
Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Gül stress the necessity of talks with
authorities in northern Iraq, President Sezer and General Büyükanit strictly oppose such contacts the next day. Ultra-national and ultra-liberal voices in the media
join the debate with shrill declarations and Turkish businessmen develop their
own pragmatic approaches by establishing vital ties with northern Iraq. But this is
simply the reality of a pluralistic society. The result is a rich marketplace of ideas.
Dülger
Foreign policy will be one of the biggest issues in the upcoming elections and the
AKP will have some trouble convincing the public of their course. Yet, in times of
political campaigns, one should not mistake polemical attacks for fundamental
opposition. Those who condemn proactivism today might change corners as soon
as they are in power.
Bağci
I am not sure whether foreign policy will be a major topic in the Turkish electoral
campaign. Foreign policy debates in the media do not take place between the
Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition but rather between the Prime
Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Cuntz
When Turkish voters decide this year, foreign policy will not be at the forefront of
their thoughts. Rather, they will consider the fact that they have experienced the
first single-digit inflation rate in thirty-five years. But the general public’s interest
in foreign policy processes has increased significantly in recent years.
Cengizer
The alleged conflict between two schools of foreign policy is rather a matter of
cracks in our establishment. The founding principles of Turkish foreign policy
remain intact to this very day. The republic that rose out of the debris of a collapsed empire sensibly chose to conduct a pro-status quo, security-oriented and
defensive policy.
Çandar
35 Kemalists” and “Modernists”
The debates on foreign policy
are testimony to Turkish pluralism
The republic that rose out of the debris
of a collapsed empire sensibly chose
to conduct a pro-status quo, securityoriented and defensive foreign policy.
Çandar
Atatürk’s foreign policy principles
are still valid today
Davutoğlu
The commonalities between politicians
and the military are increasing
Zapsu
Not much has changed today. Turkey’s parliament refused the American intervention in Iraq not because of a new modern policy, but because the U.S. interventionalist policy was at odds with the traditional defensive stance. Only once did a
Turkish leader steer away from the sacrosanct course: Turgut Özal when he tried
to make our country a key member of the coalition in the Kuwait War.
We will find a foreign policy consensus in Turkey. There is no clear-cut dichotomy
in Turkish foreign policy concepts any more, but a dynamic process to redefine
our country’s status in the world. This process needs some time. Radical changes
of engrained positions only occur in revolutionary situations. And if oppositional
attitudes of the military and of civilians do still exist, it is healthy for a democratic
and free society to have an open discussion about them.
Our politicians were divided during the Iraq invasion or on the Cyprus issue in
2004. But recently, both politicians and the military have made similar statements
about northern Iraq, e. g. on how to deal with Kirkuk.
Still, I must admit that sometimes individuals create unnecessary turbulence
by making very strong statements. Business people, the media and civil society
organizations should act more responsibly, if only to avoid a detrimental effect on
Turkey’s image abroad. We need an administrative framework in which individual
responsibilities are clear — who has the right to make statements about specific
issues at what time.
Overall, we are making progress. But if a national consensus will assist us in
accession talks with the EU and in fostering peace and stability in the Middle East,
we cannot afford to lose time.
A new positive role of Turkey in the world demands reconciliation with our past,
overcoming societal taboos and the positive formulation of Turkish identity. We
are the sons of Ottomans and should not be ashamed of it. Allowing people
to speak Kurdish in public or to read Arabic will neither break up the Republic nor will wearing a headscarf be tantamount to introducing the rule of the
Sharia.
3. The Role of the Military
Yakiş
The role of the military will most probably evolve in Turkey in light of two dilemmas:
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 36
The military will have to find
a balance between its historical role and
the EU requirements as to the role of
the military in a democratic society.
Yakiş
The first dilemma pertains to the military establishment itself. The military
establishment has always served as a forerunner of the modernization efforts of
Turkey since the Ottoman era. In fact, the first initiatives to modernize the Ottoman State started in the military fields. This practice continued in the republican
era. If the army finds itself in the position of being seen as the only remaining
obstacle to Turkey’s modernization process, it could never explain this shift to its
own ranks. Therefore it will have to find a balance between this historical role and
the EU requirements as to the role of the military in a democratic society.
The second dilemma concerns the EU. The EU would like to see the secular
regime to be maintained in Turkey. On the other hand, the military establishment
identifies itself as the best guardian of the secular regime. Many argue that the
guardian of the secular regime in a country should be the entire nation rather
than the military alone. Both arguments are debatable in Turkey. Notwithstanding, the EU may acquiesce in a reduced role of the military in the Turkish society
without insisting on eliminating its role entirely.
The role of the army in Turkey is most likely to be determined by the outcome
of these two dilemmas.
The army cannot abandon its
The EU does not want the Turkish military to retain a strong political position in
order to ensure Turkey remains secular. The way leading representatives of the
military interfere with politics is profoundly un-European. This has to be rectified
if Turkey wants to accede. We understand the historical role of the Turkish military and nobody is asking Turkey to go as far as the Germans who made a civilian,
the Minister of Defense, the Commander-in-Chief.
But it is not acceptable that uniformed Turkish officers still make political
statements and participate in political rallies. Three years ago, I was present during a speech of Mr. Denktaş at the military academy here in Istanbul. 400 officers
in uniform celebrated him frenetically with standing ovations and stomping feet
for opposing elements of the Annan Plan for reunifying Cyprus. In Germany, they
would have all been fired for making a political statement like that, the generals
in particular.
We are not talking about a legitimate exercise of free speech based on democratic principles here. The European understanding is that if you wear a uniform
you have to obey and you can no longer say what you want. The present Turkish government in fact deserves praise for initiating reforms with that goal in
mind.
Rühe
37 The Role of the Military
tradition of Western orientation
If Ankara wants to accede, the role of
the Turkish military has to change
Negative historical experiences have
taught all European countries that
the military has to stay out of politics.
Cooper
Zapsu
Turkey is a democracy where everyone, including the military, is invited to join
debates. But the decisions rest with the politicians. Overemphasizing the significance of the private opinions of people like General Büyükanit unnecessarily devalues the prerogatives of the government.
Çandar
General Büyükanit’s comments are not merely the private opinions of some representative of the military. While visiting the United States recently, Büyükanit
was received by Vice President Cheney. Turks as well as our partners consider
Büyükanit a strong man whose word carries weight in politics. This role of the
military distinguishes us from all EU member states.
Cooper
The separation of military and political issues is a crucial qualification for EU
membership. Negative historical experiences have taught all European countries
that the military has to stay out of politics. This dawned rather recently on the
Germans. But the English collective memory still remembers the repercussions of
the military coup in 1648 whereas France had its own negative historical experiences with figures like Napoléon and Boulanger. The idea of a special role for the
military in state affairs is deeply un-European, even if it is for the protection of
the core principles of the Republic such as secularism.
Bağci
Our military’s role in politics must be acceptable by Western standards when
the American Vice President receives General Büyükanit. Or is there a difference
between the American West and the European West ?
Cooper
In a European state, a general would not run for president or serve as foreign
minister as in the U. S.
Al-Azm
Europe should accompany the transformation of Turkey with patient empathy,
not with “take it or leave it” demands. This is a process of reform, not an upheaval. Further, European critics of the military’s role in Turkish society must be
reminded of the fact that only full membership in the EU immunized countries
like Spain, Portugal and Greece against a renewal of authoritarianism. In Turkey,
recent reforms are not yet irreversible and the EU could become the ultimate
guarantor against a) the military reverting to type and meddling into the affairs
of the state and b) Islamic parties like the AKP reverting to some form of fundamentalism.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 38
The EU should be patient because the position of the military in our society is
the result of particular historical circumstances. Our army used to be under the
civilian command of the defense minister, too. The military leadership trusted
our first two Presidents Atatürk and Inönü who were both former generals. But
when civilians started to serve as Presidents and Prime Ministers, the military
coup of May 27th, 1960 came about. We are still struggling with its repercussions.
We are open for debate on how we can further reduce the role of the military and
we ask for the strategic patience of our friends while we work on the necessary
modifications.
Bağci
The military’s role is changing,
but more patience is required
4. Rising Nationalism ?
Is there a danger of nationalism gaining ground in Turkey ?
Perthes
Nationalistic themes are a byproduct of opening up the discussions on Turkish
foreign policy. Politicians and the media used to be gatekeepers deciding what information should be disseminated or withheld or played down. With widespread
access to the Internet, discussions have emancipated from hierarchal control. Inconsistent or nonexistent policies of our Western allies towards the Middle East
and Turkey are also fuelling the nationalistic rhetoric in certain segments of our
society.
Zapsu
Turkish foreign policy makers are increasingly required to take into account the
position of the intellectual and media elite as well as that of civil society. This
started about a decade ago but has intensified in the more recent years.
Civil society organizations are also split between “Traditionalists” and “Modernists”. Large parts of the grassroots of the AKP support a modern foreign policy.
So do both parts of the Turkish business community: the classic secular Istanbul-centered businessmen and the so called “Islamist Calvinists” who adhere to
traditional religiously founded practices in their private life while also favoring
an open and outward-looking economy which would secure their economic success. More traditional Kemalist elements of civil society such as the associations
for Kemalist thinking, on the other hand, tend to support the more exclusionist,
securitized approach to foreign policy. In doing so, they have contributed to the
rise of nationalistic sentiments that have dominated the Turkish foreign policy
debate in the last couple of months. Consider the growth of anti-Americanism,
Kramer
39 Rising Nationalism?
Civil society influences foreign policy …
… and this is partly demonstrated
by nationalistic themes
Nationalism is rampant in Turkey these days
and it is tearing the country apart.
Çandar
the denouncing of any attempts at reconciliation with Armenia, the recurrent demands to invade northern Iraq (“reconquer the vilayet of Mosul”) or the passionate
reactions to the European Union’s suspension of several chapters of the accession
negotiations, including the External Relations chapter !
Cengizer
Nationalism does not influence the foreign policy discourses or decisions in Turkey. There are no well-established, widely circulated periodicals disseminating
sophisticated nationalistic foreign policy ideas and formulating coherent objectives.
Çandar
Nationalism is rampant in Turkey these days and it is tearing the country apart. It
should not be measured in terms of the low circulation numbers of newspapers
but by terrible events like the murder of Turkish-Armenian intellectual Hrant
Dink by a young nationalistic zealot.
Following the AKP success in the 2002 elections, the West worried about Islamism in Turkey. However, it became apparent that the chauvinistic threat is much
more real and dangerous. This new phenomenon has nothing to do with traditional
Turkish nationalistic ideologies like Pan-Turkism or Turanism, both of which are
promoting Turkey as the heartland of larger regions of ethnically related people. It
is Turkey-oriented, isolationist, xenophobic and state-centered. This trend is crosscutting our society and has its impact on influential people: Ertuğrul Özkök, the
Chief Editor of Hürriyet, Turkey’s largest and most influential newspaper, openly
declares himself time and again in his column to be a nationalist. The leader of
the main opposition party, Murat Karayalçın, a would-be prime minister of Turkey,
who happens to call himself a Social Democrat, is subscribing to the nationalists’
ideas. So is Justice Minister and Governmental Spokesman Cemil Çiçek.
Turkish nationalism has a new quality
and is supported by influential people
Cengizer
Scattered chauvinistic outbursts
do not qualify as nationalism
Çandar
If we regard nationalism as an ideology with sophisticated disseminators, the
individual chauvinistic outbursts in Turkey do not qualify as the work of nationalists. Let us not ascribe too much power to them and to the writers who seize upon
their emotions.
The new nationalism results from two developments that put Turkey under pressure. First, the possible disintegration of Iraq has raised the specter of an independent Kurdish state which might lay claim to Turkish territories. Second, the
EU accession negotiations put us under immense pressure from Brussels. Matters
Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 40
would get worse if Nicolas Sarkozy were elected President of France and would
stick to his hostile rhetoric towards Turkey’s European aspirations.
The rise of Turkish nationalism is partly due to pressurizing and inconsistent attitudes and rhetoric of some EU representatives towards Turkey. European politicians and diplomats should not turn a blind eye to this important factor.
Yakiş
While nationalism and patriotism may be on the rise, racism is completely alien
to Turkish culture.
Bağci
The Turkish nationalists want to lock up our country against globalization — as
do the fundamentalists, the isolationists and the terrorists. But Turkey can only
persist if it opens up to global trends and embraces the possibilities they offer.
Çandar
41 Rising Nationalism?
II. Turkey’s Accession Process and EU Foreign Policy
1. Would EU Membership Affect Turkey’s Foreign Policy ?
Perthes
Would Turkey be able to continue its current foreign policy if it joined the EU ?
How would integration into the EU structures affect Ankara’s options and priorities ?
Rühe
Turkey will lose some of its independence in foreign policy when it joins the EU.
It will be part of the common European foreign policy, whatever that will look
like in 10 or 15 years’ time.
Would a successful nation state like Turkey, with numerous options for partnerships and coalitions at its disposal, benefit from partly sacrificing its independence ? Multilateralism is easy for a state whose political, economical, military, and
moral system is almost destroyed, such as Germany’s after the Second World War.
European integration bereft Germany of none of its options at the time but offered the only viable path to the future. The situation is different for Turkey. Are
Turkish elites aware of that, and are they prepared to accept it and to sell it to
their electorate ?
Accession implies that Turkey would lose
some of its foreign policy options …
Cooper
… but it also would gain weight
on the international stage
But Turkey would benefit from EU membership, too, because it would increase
its clout. Today Prime Minister Erdoğan can call all leaders in the region on the
phone as the Turkish participants here pointed out. That is an asset. But can he
make the regional leaders do what he wants, which is diplomacy’s ultimate goal ?
He might have more punch if he called them as Prime Minister of an EU member
state.
Çandar
Part of Turkey’s influence on its neighbors in the Middle East depends on our EU
accession perspective. Countries in the Middle East believe that perspective makes
us a potentially more important partner.
Polenz
Turkey’s influence in the region depends to a certain extent on the perspective of
its becoming an EU member.
Vollmer
Will Turkey continue its positive policy in the Middle East once it is sure that it
will join the EU or will it return to a zero sum game approach when it no longer
needs to impress Brussels ?
Turkey’s Accession Process and EU Foreign Policy 42
2. Turkish Membership as an Asset for EU Foreign Policy ?
How will the EU’s position in the world, especially in the Middle East, change if it
integrates Turkey, a large country with a predominantly Muslim population ?
Perthes
The EU needs Turkey to be a global player in a globalizing world. Europe must be
big to preserve its wealth and liberty in the face of new major actors like China.
With Turkey, Ukraine and Belarus the EU will represent 7 % of the world’s population in 2050, without them only 4 %.
Many people argue that the potential for EU integration has been exhausted.
Including new and diverse countries would further weaken the effectiveness of
a European Union that worked best when it had only six member states. This is
short-sighted and dangerous. We need to adapt the structure of the EU to its size
and then enlarge further to survive.
There is no need to define the EU’s borders now. Let us keep all options open
and see whether Turkey or Ukraine realize their European potential by adapting
political and economic structures according to EU standards.
Rühe
Major challenges for the EU’s foreign policy lie in the Middle East. Consequently,
the Union will to a certain extent have to shift its strategic focus from its Eastern
to its Southern borders. It needs Turkey to succeed.
If Brussels rejects Turkey because it is not European — “they are not us” — that
will reflect negatively on the EU’s relations with the Islamic world. But a European Turkey would be an asset in several regards. First because it adds weight and
second because it adds political connections to the Middle East, adds the experiences and traditions of Turkey in the region and changes the nature of the EU into
something that is culturally closer to the countries of the Islamic world.
Turkey would neither be an instrument of the EU nor would it join an unchanged Union. Instead, a changed Turkey would become part of an entity that
substantially alters its nature in the course of Turkish accession. Maybe during
the accession process the candidate has to adopt the acquis chapter by chapter,
but once you are in, everything becomes part of a negotiation process. European
reality and identity, what the EU means by “us,” will be different when Turkey is
part of the family.
One major challenge will be to ensure a common European foreign policy
with Turkey as a new big member state. Turkey would add weight but also increase
Cooper
43 Turkish Membership as an Asset for EU Foreign Policy?
The EU only has a future if it is
ready to change and to expand
The EU transforms Turkey,
but Turkey also transforms the EU
Turkish EU membership would accelerate
the opening up of societies in our neighborhood.
Cengizer
the danger of incoherence. The EU needs more coherent and not more divergent
individual foreign policies.
Rühe
Turkey’s accession would bring
a new dimension to the EU
The value of Turkish EU membership would not lie in acquiring a bridge or an
interlocutor but in adding a new dimension of European identity.
With every round of enlargement in the last 35 years a new set of experiences and regional expertise was integrated. Great Britain added a long tradition
of world-wide diplomacy in 1973. Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) added
a new focus on the Mediterranean world and its contact lines with North Africa
and the Middle East. The Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, is a symbol of that.
When Sweden and Finland joined in 1995, the Northern and Baltic focus was
stressed and the “Northern Dimension” emerged in 1997. Finally, the Middle and
Eastern European states brought in the experience of forty years of Soviet Communist rule and will leave their imprint on the Eastern policy.
Turkey could add a whole new dimension: its particular historical experiences
and its diplomatic clout in the Middle East could help the EU become a major
player in the region.
Bağci
To become a global player and to influence the development of Turkey and the
Middle East the EU needs Turkey as a member state. That is a unique window of opportunity for reconciling East and West: Refusing Turkey would alienate millions
of young Muslims from Western principles of democracy and freedom, driving
many of them into the arms of fanatics.
Cengizer
Turkish membership would help Europe stabilize the Middle East because Turkey
would bring standards of democracy and human rights to the region as part of a
widely accepted entity.
The EU is respected as an entity ensuring peaceful cooperation between modern nations, so most Middle Eastern countries support Turkish EU integration.
Turkish EU membership would accelerate the opening up of societies in our neighborhood. Together with Greece and Cyprus, we could be a powerful pillar of the
EU’s Mediterranean house.
The EU is regarded as a reliable partner
in the Middle East …
Davutoğlu
… and, in combination with Turkey,
might be able to stabilize the region
We are convinced that Turkey’s EU membership is the way to end 100 years of
disorder in the Middle East. In 1914, World War I started to destroy the Ottoman
Empire and left behind political, territorial and sectarian problems we are still
Turkey’s Accession Process and EU Foreign Policy 44
European leaders should muster the
strength to explain to their electorate that
Turkey would be an important asset in
tackling the challenges in the Middle East.
von Weizsäcker
struggling with today. We hope that by 2014 an EU strengthened by Turkish membership will finally make substantial progress in clearing the 100 year-old political
minefield called ‘The Middle East.’
Turkey will not be a member of the European Union by the year 2014. Unrealistic
time frames nurture future disappointments. What we can and should do is to
keep the accession process on track. This is difficult enough taking into account
the volatility and lack of rationality of political processes.
Rühe
3. Turkey’s Regional Role as an Argument for EU Accession
In the EU’s discussions of Turkey’s membership aspirations Ankara’s potential to
stabilize the Middle East should play a larger role. Populism with a short-sighted
focus on the next election usually prevails in EU member states. European leaders
should muster the strength to explain to their electorate that Turkey would not
be dead freight but an important asset in tackling the challenges in the Middle
East.
von Weizsäcker
So far, Turkey has done a better job in convincing European elites than the general
public that Turkish EU membership would be beneficial.
Many citizens fear that Turkey would bring its unstable neighborhood to the
borders of the European Union. Ankara should make it widely known that Turkey
would add to the strategic strength of the EU and help stabilize its neighborhood
with its positive influence in the Middle East.
More contacts between European and Turkish parliamentarians to discuss
foreign policy involving representatives of the media could influence the public
discussion positively.
Cuntz
If Turkey wants to convince Europe’s citizens of its EU accession it should make
its potential as a partner for the EU in the Middle East known. Ankara has ten
to fifteen years to persuade governments and the wider public in Europe that
they need Turkey as a member state. From a Turkish point of view, identifying
supporters and then organizing a long, gradual campaign would be smart policy
now.
45 Turkey’s Regional Role as an Argument for EU Accession
Europe’s citizens do not yet support
Turkish EU membership …
Cooper
… so Turkey should promote the idea
with skill and with patience
4. The Suspension of the External Relations Chapter
Perthes
Due to the controversy on Cyprus, the Council suspended the External Relations
Chapter of the accession talks with Turkey in December 2006. Does that have
repercussions on European-Turkish cooperation in the Middle East ?
Davutoğlu
We deplore the suspension especially because of the psychological factor. It is a
morning gift for those in Turkey who argue that the EU is a closed, inward-looking, mono-cultural entity and that Turkey should be, too. We did not utter harsh
statements, though, but tried instead to demonstrate to European leaders in private talks how much clout they can gain in the region through a joint EU-Turkish
foreign policy.
Cuntz
The suspension of the external relations chapter does not prevent us from cooperating very closely on foreign policy challenges in the Middle East and also in the
Balkans, Afghanistan or Sudan.
Cooper
The suspension of the negotiations relating to the external relations chapter has
not had any effect on our practical work. The external relations chapter is mainly
about trade policy, and should be comparatively easy for Turkey. Foreign policy
goes on just the same.
Çandar
Cooperation is a universal attitude, not a grab bag. Suspending an important chapter of the accession talks while demanding cooperation is inconsistent. It has irked
our policy makers and galvanized Turkish nationalists.
Turkey’s Accession Process and EU Foreign Policy 46
III. Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East
Turkey’s potential as a partner for the EU in the Middle East depends on how Turkey is related to Europe on the one hand and how it is connected to the states in
the region on the other. How should its position be defined ?
Perthes
1. Is Turkey the EU’s Bridge to the Region ?
How is Turkey related to Europe ? Many talk of a bridge function, but many Turks
reject that notion, claiming instead that their country is a part of Europe.
Perthes
Turkey belongs to Europe. It should not have been kept waiting at the front steps
of the European house for decades while many other countries bypassed it on the
fast track.
What makes Turkey European ? First, Ottoman Turkey has been present on
the European continent since the 1350s, one hundred years before capturing Constantinople in 1453. Second, if secularity is a litmus test, is Ireland really more
secular than Turkey ? Third and most importantly, modern Turkey came into being
through the European catastrophe of World War I. Turkey’s path to the modern
world is, in a sense, a practical application of Goethe’s philosophical concept from
West-Östlicher Divan, “Stirb und werde” — “Die and become.” We lost millions of
our citizens in this European war. The death of the Ottoman Empire made us
anew as Europeans. Six countries participated from the first year on in Europe’s
“great seminal catastrophe” of the 20th century, World War I: France, Great Britain,
Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary — and Turkey. All but the first two saw their
empires crumble to dust as a result of the war. Turkey was shattered and rebuilt
fundamentally. When the victory nations decided in Sèvres in 1919 to piece up the
heartland of the Ottoman Empire, war broke out anew. At the end of the hostilities, the Treaty of Lausanne gave birth to a new Turkish Republic within secured
borders. How can our Europeanness be questioned ?
I admit that Riga is culturally closer to Berlin than Istanbul. Its architectural
heritage testifies to the German-Hanseatic influence in the region. But the Southern European countries have been in cultural exchange with Turkey for centuries.
We should have been receiving structural funds just like Portugal, and we are a
logical candidate for EU membership in a way which would be inconceivable for
other countries, e. g. Morocco.
Cengizer
47 Is Turkey the EU’s Bridge to the Region?
Turkey has been part of Europe ever
since the Middle Ages and it is not just
that this identity is still questioned
A bridge is only needed if a permanent
divide separates East and West.
Al-Azm
Çandar
Turkey has always had a Western vocation. The Erdoğan government’s commitment to European integration is even more important than its policy of improving relations with the Middle East. And Turkey’s attraction for Middle Eastern
countries lies exactly in its Western orientation and in the country’s capability to
connect the Middle East with Europe.
Cooper
Istanbul as a city proves that there are not two distinct Muslim and Christian
civilizations. Therefore, the “Alliance of Civilizations” project, admirable as it is,
is misnamed. There are not two “civilizations.” Defining Turkey as Muslim and unEuropean will seriously diminish its potential as a partner for European foreign
policy in the Middle East because the region’s states will take close notice of that
definition.
The concept of two civilizations,
one Christian, one Islamic, is misguided …
Perthes
Is it appropriate to call Turkey a “bridge” between Orient and Occident, or between
the EU and the Middle East ?
Al-Azm
The bridge metaphor is too static to convey the dynamic “identity in the making”processes reshaping Turkey and the EU. A bridge is only needed if a permanent
divide separates East and West. But we are beyond thinking in fixed cultural categories. Some sort of gap does exist, but its nature is changing in a way we do not
fully grasp yet. A plausible metaphor for Turkey’s role is therefore hard to find
but important — metaphors play a crucial role in processes of thought and public
discussion and influence the emotional connotations of a topic.
… and this is why we do not need a bridge
Cooper
A bridge lies between two entities, but Turkey wants to belong to Europe. The
bridge metaphor implies that culture and religion separate Turkey from the rest
of the continent and that Turkey is partly a Middle Eastern country.
Rühe
Turkish guides often tell Western tourists that they are about to “enter Asia” when
they cross the Bosporus. Nice phrase — but incorrect and damaging! Just because the
Romans called Anatolia “Asia Minor,” it is not part of Asia in our sense of the word.
Çandar
Turks detest the bridge metaphor. Many modern bridges are suspension bridges,
suspended between two entities and belonging to neither. I suggest the Nokia
metaphor instead: “Nokia — Connecting People.” That is Turkey’s mission — connecting people and regions.
Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East 48
The perception of Turkey in the Muslim
world has changed profoundly.
A few years ago, we used to be seen as
Kemalists first and as ­Muslims second.
Zapsu
Making Turkey an interconnection between East and West is an old idea. When
I was an advisor to Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in 1977, one of the election slogans of our Justice Party said, “Turkey will not be a deadlock between
Rotterdam and Singapore.” We knew that we would had to overcome the Ottoman image of hampering trade lines and impeding cultural exchange. Europe had resources enough to circumvent the Ottoman roadblock anyway, so
the Turkish citizens paid the price with the relative backwardness of their
country. The technological quantum leap of the past years and our new role
as energy corridor will help us close that chapter of our history once and
for all.
Dülger
Seen from an Iraqi perspective, the concept of Turkey as a bridge to the rest of
Europe makes perfect sense. This Turkish short-cut would facilitate transportation
of people, goods and ideas to Europe. This is not a new thing — recall the Baghdad-Berlin rail link of the early 20th century. Such a project should be revived and
expanded to reach Basra and the Gulf.
Yasseen
Only in our time, Turkey has been able
to connect East and West
2. Turkey’s Image in the Middle East
Turkish policy makers nowadays care how their country is perceived abroad. They
would have shrugged off negative comments 15 years ago, taking a “They simply
do not understand us”-attitude. But the AKP’s proactive foreign policy is explicitly
aimed at improving Ankara’s image in the world. The potential of Turkey as a
partner or member of the EU also depends on Ankara’s influence and image in
the region. Have both changed in the past years ?
Perthes
The perception of Turkey in the Muslim world has changed profoundly. A few
years ago, we used to be seen as Kemalists first and as Muslims second. Today, a
Turk is head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Lebanese so­
ciety welcomes our peacekeeping presence in the country.
Zapsu
The democratic, economic and technological progress of the last eight years has
made our neighbors in the Middle East envious of our achievements. And the
upsurge of Turkey’s presence in the Middle East has profoundly changed our country’s image in the region in a positive way.
Bağci
49 Turkey’s Image in the Middle East
Cengizer
A few years ago, Arab nationalists constantly reminded their people of Ottoman
domination and Turkish disinterest towards the Middle East. But our new foreign
policy approach has transformed Turkey’s image.
Mützenich
Turkey is now seen as a serious, reliable and stabilizing actor by its neighbors. Prime
Minister Erdoğan was one of the few leading politicians to visit Iran’s Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Chamenei last year. Turkey was also the conduit when Syria, in
2004, tried to reopen a negotiation channel to Israel on the status of the Golan
Heights. And Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri and his Israeli counterpart
Silvan Shalom chose Istanbul as the location for their meeting in September 2005.
Turkey is valued as a place
for diplomatic encounters
Yakiş
Turkey is geographically close, has ethnic links and shares cultural traits with the
countries of the region. Turkish politicians understand the emotional dimension
of controversial issues in Arab countries and can better anticipate their reactions
to envisioned policy steps.
Cooper
Important visitors from the Middle East seem to be pouring into Turkey now.
The director for Middle Eastern affairs in the Turkish Foreign Ministry told me
recently that although he started his job only three weeks ago, eight major visits
had already taken place.
Also, trans-border trade and development projects in the Middle East often
involve Turkey. A large part of the two billion dollars the U. S. spends in Iraq every
week goes to construction companies from Istanbul.
3. The Ottoman Past — A Burden for Turkish Policy ?
Vollmer
How does the Ottoman heritage relate to Turkey’s role in the Middle East ? Does
that centuries-long imperial rule no longer influence Arab leaders’ perception of
Turkey ? When Japan aspired to be a bridge between East and West its imperial
past prevented it from succeeding.
Tarraf
Is the observation correct that Turkey’s imperial period plays a rather limited role
as a topic in debates on Turkey’s position in the Middle East ? Germany by contrast
is still well aware of the Kaiserreich’s colonial ventures in Africa, although that
was a minor aspect in German history compared to the role the Ottoman Empire’s
rule played for Turkey.
Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East 50
The Ottoman history comprises much more
than the Arab revolt and Lawrence of Arabia.
It is the history of a long peaceful cohabitation.
Cengizer
The Ottoman legacy constrains Turkish influence in the Middle East. Exerting
soft power and having “zero problems” with our neighbors sounds good theoretically. But every day as a diplomat in Damascus, Riyadh and Cairo I experienced
how alive the memory of the negative sides of the Ottoman rule still is in certain
quarters of the public opinion.
Yakiş
Why should the Ottoman legacy be a stumbling block for Turkish cooperation
with Middle Eastern countries ? This would reduce the whole Ottoman period to
the few years of bitter Arab anti-Turkish resentment following the hangings of
Arab patriots in Damascus and Beirut in 1915 and 1916. But the Ottoman history
comprises much more than the Arab revolt and Lawrence of Arabia. It is the history of a long peaceful cohabitation which gave Greeks, Armenians and Arabs
great space to develop their identity and pursue their own interests. This patrimonial orientalist empire was not driven by the force of imperialistic exploitations.
Cengizer
Europeans are not in a position to focus only on the negative sides of the Ottoman Empire. Many parts of Europe and the Middle East lived quite happily under
its rule. Indeed, in the concept of European integration, ideas derived from lost
empires linger on in the back of the mind as positive inspiration. Some see a
revival of the Roman Empire, others of the Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher
Nation. I shall be happy to sell Turkish membership of the EU as the reuniting of
the Eastern and Western Roman Empires.
Cooper
In Arab countries, the Ottoman past
is still mentally present
Long-lost empires inspire the concept
of a unified Europe positively
4. Turkey as a Model for Middle Eastern Countries ?
Can Turkey serve as a model for Middle Eastern countries regarding modern standards of democracy, economy and the relationship between state and religion ?
Perthes
Which aspect of Turkey exactly is supposed to be a model for the Middle Eastern
countries ? The transformation of an authoritarian and economically backward
country into a modern democracy with a secular society and a competitive market
economy ? Then why should countries in the Middle East look at the derivative version of a Europeanized Turkey instead of the original, Great Britain or France ?
Should they choose Turkey because of its cultural kinship relating to religion ?
But a major part of Atatürk’s revolution was secularization. Why should Mus-
Heller
51 Turkey as a Model for Middle Eastern Countries?
If Turkey is supposed to be a model,
what does it stand for ?
Why should Muslim societies which believe
in an Islamic state orient themselves towards
­Turkey, which separated Islam from politics?
Heller
lim societies which believe in an Islamic state orient themselves towards Turkey,
which separated Islam from politics ?
Cengizer
Turkey did not reject Islam, therefore Islamic countries can relate to us. The traditional Islamic way of life has always been alive — without interfering with the
Kemalist principles. Strong religious convictions on a private level and secularist
principles in state affairs are compatible.
But if you talk about a “Turkish model,” there never was a roadmap to modernity with which we tried to proselytize our Middle Eastern neighbors. Coming to
grips with modernity is a universal pattern of cultural transformation.
Al-Azm
In the triangular relations between the EU, Turkey and the Middle East, Turkey can
serve as a model of a Muslim society with democratic, secular and free principles
that function reasonably well.
The Middle East badly needs this example because the only other options are
Talibanism, Wahhabism in the Saudi fashion or direct theocracy as in Iran. Much
depends on the success of Turkey’s model functioning well.
Compared to the Turkish model,
the alternatives are much less attractive
Bağci
Turkey should not consider itself a model for the Middle East. We might share
the religion with our neighbors but we have fundamentally different historical
experiences and structures in the political, intellectual and cultural fields. Turkey
is a unique country. Therefore it was often misunderstood in the Middle East in
the past.
Dülger
To be a model should not be our main objective because then we would have to
focus on being accepted as a model by our neighbors. But our image in the eyes
of Middle Eastern countries should not be our main concern. We have to do our
homework and initiate reforms for our own sake. What others make of that is
their choice.
You cannot choose to become an example,
others have to accept you
Al-Azm
Major political groups in Arab societies are deeply influenced by the evolution of
the Turkish model.
Syria’s socialists, Islamists and nationalists alike have undergone a paradigm
shift: During the Cold War, the Syrian left had nothing good to say about Turkey — ­
mainly because of its NATO membership. But when a faction of former Communists
and a lot of leftists recently became the most vociferous Syrian defenders of democ-
Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East 52
racy, human rights and the circulation of power, the only nearby example they
could cite for at least the partial good functioning of these principles was Turkey.
Syria’s Islamist groups envy and admire the AKP for ascending to power democratically and peacefully. They have failed to achieve similar successes, and political attempts at power by Islamic groups in other Arab countries have led to various
catastrophes as in Algeria, Syria, Egypt and Sudan.
Even the Syrian nationalists have abandoned their traditional anti-Turkish rhetoric. They used to explain the backwardness of the Arab world with the fallout of a
“retrograde Turkish occupation.” They even omitted the word “Ottoman” to create
the impression of continuity and blame the post-Atatürk Turks for the sins of their
fathers. But nowadays, they are praising Ankara’s policies for having served the
Turkish national interest in a way that Arab leaders have been unable to achieve.
Political groups in Syria have
chosen Turkey as their model
Turkey cannot be a model for Saudi Arabia or for Egypt. However, Syria is another
matter because of its geographical proximity. It is encouraging that Syrian political groups now orient themselves on Turkish examples.
Rühe
Turkey’s transformation cannot serve as an example to Saudi Arabia or Syria without an internal desire to open up to democratization and societal reform. Either
the political leaders or the people would have to regard Turkey as a model.
Bağci
The concept of Turkey as a model for Arab countries has been kicked around for decades, to no avail. Every new Arab leader in the past 60 years has claimed to be the next
Atatürk. But only Nasser even came close to initiating similarly profound structural
and cultural transformations, and most of his projects fell far short of completion.
Heller
Turkey could have a certain model function for moderate Islamists in the Middle
East. Many Islamists in Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain or Jordan admire how the AKP
evolved into a governing party of Muslim conservatives. For some of them the way
is still long while for others government participation lies within closer reach. In
Morocco, the Islamic PJD, which is in the process of transforming itself into a party
of moderate conservatives, is a front-runner in the elections in the fall of 2007.
Thumann
The success of the AKP has been noticed in Iraq, and some Islamic parties want to
benefit from the AKP’s experience. They organize themselves to become, like the
AKP, a successful democratic party with a large grassroots base.
Yasseen
53 Turkey as a Model for Middle Eastern Countries?
Imitating Turkey has been talked
about for decades — to no avail
Are we in Europe really prepared to let
Islamists compete for government ­
positions and accept their victory ?
Mützenich
Al-Azm
The Muslim Brothers in both Egypt and Syria have scrapped their rhetoric about
the Koran being the true constitution, about restoring the Caliphate and about
applying the Sharia in judicial matters. Their programs now almost resemble
something out of Montesquieu or Diderot. They would have had neither the will
nor the cheek to produce such texts without the Turkish example. Whether they
adhere to their new principles when they are in power is an open question.
Mützenich
Turkey as a model for integrating moderate Islamists as constructive players in
a functioning democratic system can help the region in finding its own way to
democracy. But are we in Europe really prepared to let Islamists compete for government positions and accept their victory ? Or is the concept only fashionable
among think tankers and politicians craving for a new model because all the others have failed ? As to the region itself, is there a real debate in the media or among
intellectuals in the Arab world today about Turkey being a model ? And would the
ruling classes accept such a new function for religious groups ? Could they live
with a moderate Islamist party in power ?
Are Western politicians ready
to accept Islamic parties in power?
Al-Azm
The rise to power of Islamic parties will be accepted in Arab countries if the elections are fair and if the party programs represent a moderate Islam that is perceived as useful by the business community. If Islamists of the old stock come to
power, though, that might result in revolt and civil war, just as in Algeria.
Cengizer
Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East is guided not by the idea of being a
model but by the idea of a positive “expansion” of progressive political concepts.
In competition with modern and dynamic regions, static and backward-looking
societies are destined to fail, especially as many of their gifted people will leave
for more modern and economically healthy parts of the globe.
Turkey wants to become part of the European model and expand its attraction
to the countries of the Middle East, opening them up for modernization. Turkey’s
new positive image in the region allows it to perform that task.
Turkey aspires to expand the attraction
of modernization to the Middle East
5. Turkey’s Debate on Islam: Model for the EU and the Middle East ?
Polenz
Turkey could also help modernize the Middle East by more actively disseminating its theological discourses about the relationship between Islam and politics.
Arguments discussed in the theological faculty of Ankara University are close to
Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East 54
Turkish intellectuals could help improve
the debates on Islamic and Western values
in European countries.
Knaus
the modern Christian understanding of the Bible and of the role of religion in
society.
Spreading the Turkish discussion about a modern Islamic theology would not only
positively influence the Middle East but also European countries. Many of the
Imams in Britain have no idea what life in a modern society is like and base their
judgment on a traditional understanding of Islam. Therefore, the advice they provide, especially to already disoriented and alienated younger people, is potentially
worthless and destructive.
Cooper
Turkish intellectuals could help improve the debates on Islamic and Western values in European countries. Today, these debates are populist, marred by stereo­
types and covered by the media in a sensationalist way. This leaves a bad impression on Middle Eastern elites. If Europe were to lead discussions on the level they
are led in Turkey, Islamic elites would feel their religion is treated adequately and
with respect. Unfortunately, the protagonists of the Turkish debates on a modern
Islam do not speak English while English-speaking Turkish elites who get around
in the world are often estranged from religious matters or unwilling to discurs
them.
Knaus
Turkey is perhaps the only Muslim country in which a modern interpretation of
Islam can be discussed without running the danger of ending up in prison. The
Egyptian Constitution provides that no law may run counter to the principles of
the Koran while the Turkish Constitution says that laws in Turkey cannot be based
on religious principles, thus separating both areas strictly. Blasphemy is not a
punishable crime in Turkey. The liberty to lead an open discourse on Islam allows
for a discussion that could certainly emanate into Middle Eastern countries.
Yakiş
Istanbul would be the perfect place to hold a formalized dialog between different
schools of Islamic thought. This is desirable from an Iraqi perspective, given the
positive impact that such a dialog could have on the situation in Iraq. As it could
be difficult for the secular Turkish Republic to sponsor such a dialog, Turkish civil
society organizations, e. g. foundations, could fill this void.
Yasseen
In Turkey, debates about a modern interpretation of Islam take place within the
seminaries, whereas the formal religious institutions in Arab countries are ex-
Al-Azm
55 Turkey’s Debate on Islam: Model for the EU and the Middle East?
European debates on Western vs. Eastern
­values are marred by stereotypes
Secularism is what makes open
religious debates in Turkey possible
If Turkey is mostly seen as a country
where interesting discourses about
the Koran take place, that might harm
Turkey’s image as a secular country.
Cuntz
tremely conservative and hostile towards such discussions. Only non-theologians
discuss new modernist and fundamentalist interpretations — and their statements
are not authoritative. To prevent theologians in the Arab world from getting out of
touch with important currents in Islamic theology and to encourage a modernization of Islam, Turkey’s debates should be communicated to its Arab neighbors.
Cuntz
Indeed, the discourse about Islam in Turkey is interesting for Muslims in the Arab
world and in Europe. We encourage this discourse and its dissemination by hosting
annual meetings of Turkish and foreign experts at the German Embassy’s summer
residence in Tarabya where religious, social and political matters are discussed.
But if Turkey is mostly seen as a country where interesting discourses about the
Koran take place, that might harm Turkey’s image as a secular country.
6. Do Middle Eastern Countries Want Turkey in the EU ?
Perthes
How are the Turkish EU aspirations viewed in Middle Eastern countries ?
Çandar
Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors want Turkey in the EU. This also holds true
for ethnic groups in the region striving for autonomy. The Prime Minister of the
Kurdish Regional Government, Barham Salih, who is now Deputy Prime Minister
of Iraq, once told me how eager the Kurds in northern Iraq were for Turkey to join
the EU. “Then,” he said, “we will only be a few miles away from Europe.”
Arabs want Turkey to succeed
with its European aspirations …
Davutoğlu
The countries in the Middle East support Turkey’s efforts to join the EU because
they believe they will benefit from it. 200 journalists from Middle Eastern countries were in Brussels in December 2004 to report about the opening of accession
talks with Turkey. The public in the Arab world is very interested, and it carefully
evaluates Brussels’ steps. People in the region observe the EU’s behavior towards
Turkey particularly closely because they see it as a test of whether the European
Union discriminates against states with a Muslim population.
Çandar
Turkey’s treatment in the accession process by the EU is seen as indicator for the
prevailing attitudes in the West with regard to Muslims. If Turkey is rejected or
treated without respect, this will be seen as a rejection and humiliation of all
Muslims and Arabs. In the post 9/11 world this would have a political dimension:
Western influence on governments in the Middle East would further diminish.
… but if the accession talks fail, Western
influence in the Middle East will decrease
Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East 56
If Turkey is rejected or treated without respect,
this will be seen as a rejection and
humiliation of all Muslims and Arabs.
Çandar
Complications in the Turkish accession negotiations have increased EuropeanTurkish tensions. Ankara’s ties to the U. S. — which used to be a mediator in earlier
crises between the Europeans and the Turks — have also loosened in recent years.
Polenz
Both Turkey and the EU have a lot to lose in terms of their influence in the Middle
East if the Turkish accession process is stalled. Turkey’s “zero problem” policy towards the countries in the Middle East is not an alternative to EU integration. The
states in the region want an EU country as their neighbor. Consequently, Ankara’s
increased prestige depends on the combination of the AKP’s proactive foreign
policy and the perspective of EU accession. Taking away the accession perspective
would mean decreasing the Turkish prestige in the Middle East.
Thumann
Iraq supports Turkey’s efforts to join the EU. Becoming a neighbor of the European
Union with which we are engaged in negotiations relating to a technical cooperation agreement, would bring substantial benefits for Iraq.
Yasseen
The EU represents the state of the art for peaceful cooperation of modern nations
in a global context. Because of that reputation, our neighbors support the Turkish
EU vocation. Some of the strings attached, transparency or public participation
for example, are distressing to the more autocratic rulers. Nevertheless, there is
widespread support.
Cengizer
Ankara’s regional strategy is not designed
as an alternative to EU integration
7. A Triangle of Turkey, the EU and Key Regional Players ?
Turkey’s position as a bridge between the EU and the Middle East offers great
potential for stabilizing the region. If Ankara makes further efforts to become
a player respected by all countries in the region, it can be an invaluable Muslim
partner for the EU. Such a partnership could make the EU a major actor in the Middle East. A trilateral cooperation of the EU-Turkish duo with key Middle Eastern
countries as third partner would contribute significantly to stability and prosperity and counterbalance U.S. unilateralism in the region.
But all three partners must change their policies before that vision can become a reality. To be an influential player and thus a useful partner to Brussels,
Turkey must acquire more credibility in the Muslim world. It must focus not only
on the EU but also much more on the Middle East and thus develop into a multiregional power, linked equally with the EU and the region and exerting influence
57 A Triangle of Turkey, the EU and Key Regional Players?
Mousavian
A diplomatic triangle would be able
to stabilize the Middle East …
… but in order to achieve that all sides
have to change their policies
To be an influential player and thus a useful
partner to Brussels, Turkey must acquire
more credibility in the Muslim world.
Mousavian
Turkey cannot make full use of its
potentials — it is not trusted yet
Is EU accession more important to Turkey
than its relations to the Middle East?
in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans, too. The EU, on the other hand,
has to develop an independent policy in the Middle East, emancipate itself from
the U.S. and make it clear that it does not want to Europeanize the region. Finally,
the states in the region have to learn to cooperate with each other to be able to
act as reliable and strong partners for the EU and Turkey.
First to Turkey: Today, Turkey does not make full use of its potential in the
­Middle East. It enjoys more political and economic stability than most of its neighbors and has substantial military power. That could allow it to play an important
role in the region. But Ankara is not yet an independent actor trusted by all ­Middle
Eastern countries. To be frank, Turkey does not play a major role in any of the key
issues of the region which include Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli
peace process, disarmament, terrorism and energy. Ankara must commit significantly more resources to achieve that status.
Why is Turkey not trusted ? The Ottoman legacy creates a deep mistrust, even
to such an extent that during the Balkan crisis in the 1990s the U.S. cautioned
Turkey not to engage too much because that could trigger the impression of neoOttoman policy. Kemalism has made Turkey’s Muslim and Arab neighbors deeply
suspicious. It favored French-style laicism instead of Anglo-Saxon style secularism
at least until 1960, and Kemalists have a traditionally negative view of Arabs. Their
policy of “peace in the country, peace in the world” avoided engagement in ­Middle
Eastern political affairs, limiting relations to trade and economics. Regional states
used to see Turkey as a merchant country ready to do anything for profit. Even
Turkish Islamists differ much from their counterparts in the Middle East. They
are so influenced by Turkish nationalism that Middle Eastern Islamists see them
as pro-Western, even liberal forces. Finally, territorial disputes with Iraq and Syria
and the strengthening of its relations with Israel in the 1990s increased the mistrust of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors.
Ankara does not do enough to overcome this distrust. It values relations to
its Middle Eastern neighbors less than EU accession and it seems that Turkey
postpones the full development of its policy in the region after that goal has
been achieved. Some even think that until then it instrumentalizes its relations
to ­Middle Eastern countries for speeding up the accession process by advocating
itself as a mediator. This estranges Turkey from the region because countries here
are not so stupid as to allow themselves to be used for Ankara’s purposes.
Turkey has made some important steps and increased its activities in the region.
Ankara’s refusal to let U.S. troops open a second front in the Iraq war from Turkish
Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East 58
soil strengthened its reputation as an independent power. Also, Ankara’s role in
creating a safe zone for Iraqi Kurds in the 1990s was appreciated and the need for
Turkey as a stabilizing factor in post-Saddam Iraq has improved relations between
Turkey and the Arab countries. Finally, Prime Minister Erdoğan is widely recognized
as a devout Muslim committed to Islamic values and is therefore much more popular in the region than any of his predecessors. Turkey is no longer seen as the West’s
Trojan horse. That is shown by the trust invested in Ankara e. g. when Lebanese
Prime Minister Siniora requested Turkey as mediator in his country.
In spite of this, Turkey needs to do more to become an indispensable partner
for the EU as a multiregional power. Ankara’s relations with Iran, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia as major players in the Middle East have not been fully developed. Only
after about another decade of really committed and active foreign policy in the
Middle East, will Turkey have overcome distrust and established itself as a trusted
partner. Ankara should not stop cooperating with the EU and the U. S., but it must
take the region’s countries’ interests, and especially those of the key players, as
seriously as its own and those of the West. Developing an independent position
regarding Iran’s nuclear file would be one further important step to create trust
in Turkey.
As to the EU, it must speak with one voice and emancipate itself from the U.S.
Today, the EU rarely dares to cross American red lines in the region. It submits
itself to the U.S. demand of strategic following instead of strategic partnership.
Furthermore, the positions of the EU member states regarding key issues like
the Arab-Israeli conflict are not coherent. It seems that Brussels lacks sufficient
resolve to play an effective role in the Middle East. At the same time, some in the
region fear that the EU wants to export its political systems and values — Brussels
must make clear that it respects the traditions of the Middle East if it wants to
become a major player.
For Turkey and the EU to establish a trilateral cooperation with the region, the
regional actors also need to do their share: they must establish regional cooperation. Today, many of them prefer relations with foreign countries over the expansion of ties with their neighbors. Key players like Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are
indispensable for a successful triangular cooperation.
If Turkey established strong relations with all regional powers, if Turkey and
the EU were effective partners, and if the Middle Eastern countries could cooperate with them on the basis of regional integration, what could be achieved by that
trilateral cooperation ?
59 A Triangle of Turkey, the EU and Key Regional Players?
More distance from the American agenda
would bolster the EU’s credibility
Maybe Europe rarely crosses American red
lines in the Middle East. We have a different
­objective: to move the American red lines.
Cooper
Turkey could be an ideal arbiter
in the human rights dialog
First, as a NATO member with the second largest army and good relations to
the U. S. and being a Muslim country, Turkey is predestined for peacekeeping operations in the region. People here trust Muslim peacekeepers from Turkey if regional
players like Iran, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia support their deployment.
Second, regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey and the EU could establish a European Middle Eastern initiative aimed at implementing the Palestinians’
rights. Also, Turkey with its close ties to both sides of the conflict could, in close
cooperation with Egypt and Iran, launch a UN-supported regional initiative to
solve the conflict. Turkey can be an important facilitator. The Center for Strategic
Research in Tehran is working out a detailed plan for such an initiative.
Third, in Lebanon, Turkey can play a more significant role than deploying
troops along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Ankara could cooperate with Iran regarding Lebanon, using Tehran’s capacities for stabilizing the country.
Fourth, Turkey is a major transit route for drug smuggling and organized
crime to Europe. Turkey has done a lot in suppressing corruption and in implementing projects to fight these crimes. But in a joint effort with Iran and the EU,
these efforts would be more effective.
Fifth, Turkey can be an ideal partner for the EU’s efforts to promote human
rights through soft power in the region and thus to eliminate the roots of Muslim extremism. Many tensions in the human rights dialog between the region’s
countries and the European Union stem from a different understanding of what
human rights are. Turkey has acquired significant experience in its own dialog
with the EU over human rights. This experience can be very useful for improving
the dialog between the EU and Middle Eastern powers regarding, e. g., the rights
of women or of religious minorities.
Finally, Turkey’s geopolitical position between the Caspian Sea, the Middle
East and Europe will allow it to become a major energy hub also regarding Iranian
and Iraqi oil and gas. That will reduce the EU’s dependence on the U. S. and the
Middle Eastern countries.
Yakiş
A trilateral cooperation of the EU, Turkey and of countries in the Middle East
should be explored.
Cooper
Maybe Europe rarely crosses American red lines in the Middle East. We have a
different objective: to move the American red lines. That may be less visible and
may seem less determined but it is more effective in the long run.
Turkey’s Relation with Europe and the Middle East 60
IV. Potential and Mechanisms of Cooperation
1. Where do Turkish and EU Interests Coincide ?
Where do Turkish and EU goals in the Middle East coincide and where do they
conflict ? And in which area would both sides benefit from cooperating ?
Perthes
Politically, Turkey wants stability, peace, democratization and the rule of law. Economically: market economy, modernization and industrialization, transparency
and freedom from corruption. All this is in harmony with the EU’s objectives. The
approaches might differ slightly and a full integration among the Middle Eastern
countries may not be practical. However, cooperation on selective projects among
the willing countries seems to be a more reasonable option.
Yakiş
Turkish and European interests and priorities in the Middle East are congruent:
Both want stability, peace and solutions for the immediate crises. They both see
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the situation in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear program as
the most urgent problems. Finally, they agree on the long-term goals of modernizing Arab societies, strengthening human rights in the region and increasing
participation in the political process.
Polenz
European and Turkish interests
in the Middle East are congruent …
Turkey’s approach to the Middle East is coherent with EU policies: using soft
power, solving conflicts through dialog rather than by military force and deploying peace-keeping forces. But there is a difference in intensity. The problems are
more immediately felt in Turkey, which creates a stronger urge to find solutions.
It is one thing for a European foreign minister to declare the Middle East a priority and another for a whole governmental apparatus to be affected by developments in a neighboring country, as the Turkish is by the increased PKK activity
in northern Iraq.
Cooper
Turkey may be a useful partner for European policy in the region, but can the same
be said vice versa ? What added value does a partnership with the EU have to offer
to Ankara’s vision for the Middle East ?
Heller
The accession process has unleashed economic development and reform pro­cesses
which strengthen Turkey and allow it to support its Middle Eastern neighbors, e. g.
by providing financial assistance. This is an effective way for the EU to contribute
to Turkish policy in the Middle East.
Cuntz
61 Where do Turkish and EU Interests Coincide?
… but regional problems are
more directly felt in Turkey
Mützenich
The integration process forces Turkey to align its foreign policy with the EU’s
policy. Will that restrict Turkey’s options for a proactive and open policy in the
region ? Might countries in the region view Ankara more skeptically once Turkey
becomes a full member of the EU ?
2. Can the EU and Turkey Achieve More as Partners ?
von Weizsäcker
Different experiences would make
Turkey and the EU perfect partners
The EU’s security depends on stabilizing the Middle East, and for that Brussels
needs strong partners. We must take advantage of what Turkey can offer. Bringing together the strengths of European experience with overcoming animosities
through multilateral cooperation and of Turkish regional influence and insight in
traditions and the political landscape of the Middle East is a perfect match.
Heller
If Turkey’s active policy in the Middle East is linked closely to the perspective of EU
membership, then what vision of foreign policy will prevail if that objective does
not materialize, as seems increasingly likely ? Would Turkey still be looking for
win-win situations and pursue zero-problem policies ? Or would the traditionalist
approach carry the day ?
Yakiş
The EU can achieve its goals in the Middle East without cooperating with Turkey. However it may achieve the same goals more easily, with fewer human and
financial resources and with less acrimony in case it cooperates with Turkey. We
have a concrete example of this that took place in 2003. The Turkish parliament
refused, in 2003, to allow the U. S. troops to cross the Turkish territory with a
view to opening a second front in the north of Iraq. The U. S. authorities pointed
out that they could invade Iraq without cooperating with Turkey. They actually
did it. However, two years later, the U. S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
admitted that, if Turkey had authorized the U. S. troops to cross the Turkish territory, the insurgence in Iraq would not have gained that much strength. This is a
belated admission of the possible contribution that Turkey could make in a Middle
Eastern crisis.
Cengizer
The EU could multiply its impact in the region by exerting its soft power in its
south-eastern neighborhood with Turkey as a partner at eye level. Together we
could solve the fundamental territorial, political and economic conflicts in the
Middle East. But if the upcoming elections in France and Turkey stop the Euro-
Potential and Mechanisms of Cooperation 62
If the EU wants to make full use of
Turkey’s potential, we need an
institutional framework for integrating
Turkey into the CFSP policy-making.
Kramer
pean-Turkish rapprochement this will not materialize. Given this uncertainty, we
should not expect any coordinated initiatives for the Middle East in 2007.
The upcoming election restricts Turkey from launching far-reaching new initiatives in the Middle East: Concrete projects between Brussels and Ankara might
have to wait until 2008.
Polenz
If Europe wants to make full use of Ankara’s influence in the region, we need a
mechanism to coordinate our policies. Our concepts are complementary but differ
in details — this has to be managed.
Cuntz
The EU and Turkey have no well-established institutional framework for formulating goals and developing policies together. The partnership works on an ad-hoc
basis and relies on recognizing confluent interests and ideas in specific situations.
The two foreign policy processes continue to exist independently of each other.
Ad-hoc cooperation is useful. But if the EU wants to make full use of Turkey’s
potential, we need an institutional framework for integrating Turkey into CFSP
policy-making. When the Western European Union experienced a brief second
spring in the early 1990s, Turkey became associated to it. This could be a model
for a structure which grants Ankara a direct voice in defining Europe’s strategy
towards the Middle East.
Kramer
The Turkish participation in UNIFIL II can be assimilated to a joint venture between Turkey and Europe. So far the operations have had the following effects:
– UNIFIL II paved the way to an unprecedented role of the European Union.
– It also initiated a Mediterranean-European action that benefits from the support
of big powers without being hindered by American provocations.
– It allowed Turkey to enter the scene as a factor of stabilization in the Middle East,
matching the Iranian strategy of regional penetration in reason of its obvious
Islamic identity.
– I t gives shape to a direct Turkish-European cooperation that doesn’t refer to
NATO, as is the case in Afghanistan and the Balkans.
And we can reasonably presume that the same formula could be applied in Gaza
and the West Bank. In fact, the idea of sending a force of interposition (NATO +
Islamic contingents including Turkish ones) has been debated a year ago.
Naoufal
63 Can the EU and Turkey Achieve More as Partners?
The partnership works on an ad-hoc-basis;
but it needs a firm framework
The engagement in Lebanon could mark
the start of a new regional policy
V. Challenges in the Region
Perthes
Let us now explore what the EU and Turkey could do together to tackle the challenges in the region concretely.
1. Modernizing the Region and Spreading Democracy
Perthes
Is “modernization” of the Middle East a common goal of the EU and Turkey ?
Cengizer
Modernization is related to the concepts of democracy and human rights. It is in this
sense that Turkey considers itself a transmitter of modernization to the ­Middle East.
Modernization is much more than erecting a modern consumer society.
Tarraf
Largely due to the Iraq War, the imperative of promoting freedom, human rights
and democracy seems to have become discredited. There can be no doubt that
democracy and human rights guide EU foreign policy. But we seem to have lost
a clear sense on how best to pursue these goals. Are we supposed to shelve our
concerns about the state of affairs in many Middle Eastern countries ? If we
still believe in promoting democracy and human rights we might need new approaches. How important are these aspects for Turkey’s policy towards the Middle
East ?
The EU supports democracy and human
rights — but what exactly is to be done?
Cooper
The EU has not ceased to believe in democracy as a basic principle of its foreign
policy. The European Union is above all a community of law. It believes in spreading the rule of law which is the basis for freedom and democracy. The EU may not
talk about “democratization” as such, but it continues to pursue this goal.
Yasseen
In its interactions with Iraq, the European Union is promoting its democratic
values in the Middle East not through abstract declarations but by supporting
concrete projects. Here are two examples. One is the “EU JUST LEX” initiative,
which aims to promote good governance in the judiciary system by training Iraqi
judges, police officers and prison wards in Europe regarding basic human rights.
Another has been the EU’s support for elections in Iraq through concrete assistance to Iraq’s electoral process and institutions.
Thumann
To enhance credibility in Middle Eastern societies, the West needs a consistent
policy regarding oppositional forces in the authoritarian countries of the region.
Challenges in the Region 64
Turkey is in a privileged position among Iraq’s
neighbors: it has inherently good relations with
almost all major components of Iraqi society.
Yasseen
While it used to be fashionable for some time to talk to liberals or to Muslim
Brothers, the governments are once again becoming our main allies. This focus
on stability has emboldened the authoritarian leadership in countries like Egypt
and Saudi Arabia. A progressive voice like Ayman Nour in Egypt is now confined
within prison walls and the U. S. and their European allies are merely paying lip
service to his liberation.
Ever since 9/11, the West has neglected
­oppositional forces in the region
2. Stabilizing Iraq
How can Turkey and the EU cooperate in Iraq ?
Perthes
Turkey is heavily involved in attempts to defuse the Iraqi crisis. Since the removal of
Saddam’s regime, Turkey has supported economic reconstruction of Iraq. Thousands
of Turkish businessmen and workers are active in that country. The Americans who
seemed omnipotent in Iraq in the wake of the invasion now needed to ask for Turkish help for various purposes. Turkey assisted them in reconciling the Iraqi Sunni
community with the new political process and to convince them to participate in
the first elections. We could be of similar assistance to EU initiatives in Iraq.
Yakiş
Turkey is in a privileged position among Iraq’s neighbors; it has inherently good
relations with almost all major components of Iraqi society. Even when problems
or disagreements arise, say with Iraqi Kurds, there are many other dimensions in
their interaction that might help resolve differences. As such, Turkey can exert a
constructive and balancing influence in Iraq. Turkey has been supportive of Iraq’s
political process, including, as early as May 2004, the return of authority to an
Iraqi government. It helped Iraq’s electoral process by encouraging broad participation in it, particularly within Iraq’s Sunni community.
Yasseen
Because of the Iraq invasion, people in Turkey are extremely critical of the American approach towards the Middle East which they see dominated by military considerations. They favor the European method of diplomatic initiatives and want
the EU to assume a bigger role in the region in cooperation with Turkey.
Bağci
The EU and Turkey have good relations to all three power centers in Iraq. They
can be peace builders between the U. S. and the UK, the Sunni minority and the
Shiites.
Mousavian
65 Stabilizing Iraq
Because Turkey is neutral in the internal
­conflicts, it can mediate in Iraq
Yakiş
A break-up of Iraq would have
serious ­consequences for Turkey
Yasseen
The EU supports federalism in Iraq whereas
Turkey is in favor of centralism
The political stability of Iraq is more important to Turkey than to the EU because
a break-up of the country would immediately affect our internal situation. Refugees would cross the border into Turkey, requiring shelter and support. We could
lose huge Turkish investments in northern Iraq and be cut off from our oil supply
lines from Kirkuk, which would endanger our economic progress. Finally, the
PKK might find a more suitable ground to carry out terrorist acts directed at the
Turkish interests.
Turkey and the EU both support a multiethnic and a unified Iraq in accordance
with the principles of the Iraqi constitution. Nevertheless, the approaches of Turkey and the EU towards Iraq are not quite in accordance regarding centralism
vs. federalism. The EU is funding a federalism project to counter regional and
sectarian strife in our country. Turkey’s experience is different. It is a centralized
country, wary of separatism, and may be reserved vis-à-vis further devolution of
authorities to regional governments in Iraq, particularly the Kurdish Regional
Government. The Iraqi view is that federalism will reinforce Iraqi unity. Iraq is a
diverse country, and giving regional political leaders more authority and leeway — ­
within the framework of the constitution — can only reconcile them with the
more general idea of a unified Iraq.
There are several issues that concern the Turkish government. These issues,
such as the status of Kirkuk and the presence of the PKK, need time to be resolved.
On the one hand, these issues are complex and often have broad ramifications.
On the other, a political agreement on these issues needs a consensus to emerge
between all major political players in Iraq. This tends to be a drawn-out process
because several rounds of input and discussions are needed before a broad consensus can be formulated.
Polenz
To prevent a break-up of Iraq the West needs to involve Syria and Iran in negotiations. The EU and Turkey should collaborate to convince the U. S. not to continue
rejecting the Baker/Hamilton Report’s suggestion of creating a support group
including these countries. Turkey has initiated consultations with Syria, Jordan,
Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and Iran on which the support group could build.
Yakiş
Long before the Allied invasion, Turkey had initiated consultations among the
foreign ministers of the countries bordering on Iraq. The “Conference of the
Neighbours of Iraq” remains alive as a process. Unfortunately, neither the Ameri-
Challenges in the Region 66
cans nor the EU have so far made proper use of this forum in attempts to solve the
conflict.
Cultural coexistence or “multiculturalism” has been described by participants as
a strategic goal of Turkey not only for the future of Iraq but for the whole Middle
East. That comes at a time when former champions of the concept of multiculturalism in Europe like Great Britain and the Netherlands seem to be rethinking the
entire concept. Does Ankara understand “multiculturalism” in the same way as
Brussels, London or The Hague ?
Tarraf
3. Turkish Policy towards Northern Iraq and the PKK
Turkey’s disputes with the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq concerning border traffic, the future status of Kirkuk and the activities of the PKK
worry many governments. Do these disputes undermine Turkey’s capacity to act
as a peace builder ?
Perthes
Instead of engaging our neighbors, the Kurds, and trying to turn the massive
Kurdish interest in Turkish business into an asset, the government’s actions
are self-contradictory and bound to alienate the Kurds. While some are giving
positive signs of friendship, others are brandishing guns and threatening intervention. The toll of this unpredictability comes down on both the Turkish
business community and on the Kurds in what used to be northern Iraq and is
now a de facto-independent state. The tens of thousands of Turks already working there in the interest of Turkish business are reliant upon functioning border trade traffic. But truck drivers face enormous bureaucratic obstacles at the
Khabour border gate. They are often delayed for several weeks. Kurds see Turkey as unreliable and indolent towards Kurdish suffering. Increasingly, they are
taking their business to our competitors from Syria, Iran or Kuwait. The future
of our business community in the Kurdish market now looks uncertain. This is
all the more frustrating because enhancing the Turkish position is in line with
the principles of our government’s proactive “zero problem policy” towards the
region.
Alaton
Our policies towards northern Iraq are pragmatic, cautious and directed at creating good neighborly relations and economic exchange.
Davutoğlu
67 Turkish Policy towards Northern Iraq and the PKK
Turkish policy is self-contradictory
which alienates Iraq’s Kurds
Our government should accept
that there is a state called Kurdistan
on our southeastern border.
Alaton
The Kurds in northern Iraq do not
follow up on their promises
Despite all provocations and the PKK’s activities, not one of our political leaders has used threatening language.
We have urged our Kurdish partners to open a second or even third and fourth
border gate. If Turkish trucks have to wait for days at our border to Iraq, it is because the Kurds so far have not followed up on their promises to open new crossings. They also collect high tolls at the border which has become a major source
of income for the Kurdish Regional Government. Nonetheless, we did not use our
leverage by interrupting substantial energy and food supplies to northern Iraq
in an attempt to force them into compliance. Turkish foreign policy will never
employ anti-humanitarian means.
Cuntz
The Turkish stakes in Iraq regarding the PKK and Kirkuk prevent Ankara from
acting as an arbiter there in the way it does in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in
Lebanon or in talks on the Iranian nuclear program.
Yasseen
There is already a significant and welcome presence of Turkish businesses in
Iraq today, and not only in the north. Walking the streets of Baghdad one sees
very clear signs of this, whether it is Turkish-made goods stocking the shelves of
grocers or the ubiquitous billboards carrying the names of Turkish manufacturers. Increasing competition to Turkish businessmen in the KRG in northern Iraq
can be more than compensated by increasing economic opportunities in other
parts of Iraq, especially in Baghdad and the south of the country. These regions
are ripe for building a consumer market and for development through state­f inanced projects, projects in which Turkish construction companies can play
a role.
Iraqis welcome the economic activities
of Turks in their country
Alaton
Turkey should finally treat northern Iraq — Kurdistan — as a priority in the Middle
East. The government seems more interested in good relations with the Arabs
and with the Israelis. But 11 million Kurds are living in Turkey as compared to less
than 1 million Arabs and about 25,000 Jews. The Kurds in northern Iraq are in as
dire need of assistance as the Palestinians. Turkey should provide warranties for
investments or back co-sponsored Turkish-Kurdish industrial projects.
Our government should accept that there is a state called Kurdistan on our
southeastern border. The Kurdish Regional Government under President Massoud
Barzani controls six provinces and in three of them its rule is granted in accordance with the Iraqi constitution in the form of autonomy.
Challenges in the Region 68
We cannot tolerate attempts to craft
mono-­ethnic provinces or cities,
forsaking the age-old tradition of
multicultural identities of cities in Iraq.
Cengizer
If Kurdistan becomes a real entity, we will recognize this reality and align our
policies toward Iraq accordingly. But the international community still adheres to
the “One Iraq” principle. Turkey cannot act on its own in recognizing Kurdistan
now, thereby anticipating the constitutional process in Baghdad and antagonizing
the Iraqi government. This has nothing to do with a hostile disposition towards
the Kurds. Look at Azerbaijan: Turkey recognized the establishment of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic only because it happened within the framework of
the Azeri constitution.
Davutoğlu
Turkey has been supporting the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq for well over a
decade. 4,000 lorries are crossing the Turkish border to northern Iraq daily, that
makes about a million in a year. And the Turkish business community in Iraq is
operating with our backing, laying the groundwork for trans-border cooperation.
There was no brandishing of guns, but strong Turkish assistance to finding solutions, e. g. our initiative for engaging Iran, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Jordan
in the Iraq Neighbours’ Conference.
We cannot tolerate, however, attempts to craft mono-ethnic provinces or cities, forsaking the age-old tradition of multicultural identities of cities in Iraq and
thus creating trainloads of new problems. Therefore we opposed holding an artificial referendum on the status of Kirkuk that does not even meet the guidelines
the Iraqi parliament has set for such a plebiscite.
Cengizer
If we fail in Kirkuk, we cannot stabilize Iraq. Kirkuk is the only city in the country
where almost all ethnic and sectarian groups are represented; Kirkuk is a small
Iraq. If cultural coexistence and political cooperation fails there, it will set a terrible precedent for the rest of the country. And since Iraq is itself a small Middle
East, there will be repercussions for the whole region. Turkey is committed to the
idea of a multiethnic Iraq on a national, regional and communal level. This is why
we tried to convince Shiites in Basra that driving the Sunnis out of the area will
foreshadow the break-up of the whole nation.
Turkey is opposed to a local referendum in December 2007 on the question
whether Kirkuk should belong to the area under control of the Kurdish Regional
Government and its President Massoud Barzani. The Iraqi government says that
holding such a referendum is mandated by Article 140 of the country’s new constitution which asks for a “normalization” of the situation in the region. This implies
a reversal of Saddam Hussein’s policy of forced Arabization. But under the terms
Davutoğlu
69 Turkish Policy towards Northern Iraq and the PKK
Turkey cannot act on its own in
recognizing a new Kurdish state
For the sake of the whole Middle East,
Kirkuk has to remain multicultural
A referendum only makes sense
if it is supported by all sides
A referendum is a double-edged sword — you may hurt yourself if you do not use it rightly.
Davutoğlu
and options that have been proposed, this referendum will only lead to more ethnic strife. A referendum is a double-edged sword — you may hurt yourself if you do
not use it properly. Boiling down a complicated political situation to the alternative “Do you want to belong to Kurdistan or not ?” creates more problems than it
solves. And the outcome of a referendum will only be accepted if fair participation
of all groups and citizens is guaranteed. Even if the Kurds win a majority because
they are the biggest group and Arabs and other minorities stay away from the ballots, the majority would most likely not be higher than 60 %. This means that at
least 40 % of the local population, Sunni-Arabs, Turkmen, Christians, will remain
alienated from Kurdish rule. Violence would break out, spreading to the Sulaymaniah and Erbil regions which are already under the commonly recognized control
of the Kurds. The only relatively stable region of Iraq would become destabilized
and Shiite-Sunni tensions would be supplemented by Arab-Kurdish tensions. This
would hurt the Kurdish leaders as well. We suggest bringing the “wise men” of
all societal groups together to formulate a common proposal acceptable to the
overwhelming majority of their respective communities. Such a solution would
find 80–90 % approval in a referendum.
Cengizer
After listening to Turkey, the Americans
started to understand the complex
situation in northern Iraq
The U.S. is finally listening to our assessment communicated before the invasion
that the complicated ethnographic situation in northern Iraq could lead to ethnic
strife and increased terrorist activities if the central power of Baghdad is destroyed.
Conservative American foreign policy strategists and think tanks long regarded
the Kurds in northern Iraq as Washington’s main allies in that region. The views of
these “experts” were so simplistic that some of them declared a political takeover
of the Kurds in northern Iraq the most natural thing to happen. We hope that
our more sophisticated input will now lead to changes in American policies and
help defuse the danger of tensions deriving from a Kirkuk referendum based on
false premises.
Cuntz
The EU and Turkey should cooperate on northern Iraq. Can terrorism only be
fought by military means or can political measures be integrated in the approach ?
How to help people in northern Iraq that depend entirely on Turkey as a transfer
country regarding their oil exports and their economic supplies ?
Alaton
Terrorism is often related to economic conditions. Turkey should fight the PKK
not only through military action but also by facilitating Turkish financial invest-
Challenges in the Region 70
Turkey could evolve into a counter-force
matching Tehran’s strategy of penetrating
the Middle East.
Naoufal
ments and thereby fostering economic progress in northern Iraq. The Turkish
private sector has realized this and is acting upon it, but will our politicians and
the military catch up ?
The PKK in northern Iraq is not a foreign policy issue but a domestic security issue
for Turkey, a national existential question even. A terrorist organization tries to
use a neighborly region as operational basis for their attacks on Turkey. We have
to and will follow them wherever they are. We lost 3,000 people and had to spend
50 billion from our national budget to fight PKK terrorism in the 1990s. That endangers our economic development and restricts us from using funds for foreign
policy assistance programs. We will not allow this to happen. This is in no way
directed against the Kurds or against the Kurdish region in Iraq.
Nevertheless, the policy of the Kurdish Regional Government is unacceptable.
While Syria suppressed PKK activities on their soil, Kurdish leaders in northern
Iraq let PKK representatives make declarations on regional TV on a daily basis.
These terrorists are not just hiding on the Qandil Mountains, they are roaming
unhampered around the countryside or in the cities. The Kurdish leaders have to
dissolve the PKK. There is no grey area in dealing with terrorists.
Davutoğlu
The Kurdish Regional Government
has to take action against the PKK
4. Sectarian Conflicts
Since the Iraq invasion, sectarian strife increasingly threatens stability in the region. What is Turkey’s position in these conflicts ?
Perthes
The political elites in Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Cairo perceive Turkey as a
Sunni rampart and welcome that role. Today, Iran is increasing its influence by
supporting Shiite and pro-Iranian groups throughout the region. The cases of
Yemen and Sudan are significant for that matter. As a result, this policy intensifies the clash and threatens the functioning of institutions not only in Iraq but
also throughout the whole Arab world. Public opinion in the Arab world sees
Turkey as a logical counterbalance to Tehran’s ambitions. Turkey could evolve into
a counter-force matching Tehran’s strategy of penetrating the Middle East. This is
certainly how policy makers and observers in Lebanon conceived the EU-Turkish
cooperation on UNIFIL II.
In the final analysis, Turkey is considered a part of the Western side and the
international community accepts its policy. Its diplomacy has therefore additional
Naoufal
71 Sectarian Conflicts
In Middle Eastern sectarian conflicts,
Turkey is seen as part of the Sunni camp
credit to plead in favor of Damascus, which is not the case with Iran, a country
that is practically isolated on the international level because of its nuclear policy.
In the short or medium term, we can foresee a Turkish pressure of a kind to facilitate a rapprochement between Syria and Saudi Arabia. Turkey being secular and at
the same time a recognized Sunni power, it benefits from convincing strong cards.
With the Sunni-Shiite rupture on the regional level, the value of Turkey’s geostrategic position is also enhanced. And let’s not forget the Kurdish dilemma — a
dilemma which is shared between Turkey, Iran and Syria — for it contributes to
the tightening of the links based on fear and feelings of threat.
The presence of Turkey in Lebanon in the framework of UNIFIL II allows Ankara to have a say in the European matter. Its withdrawal would put the Europeans
in a very difficult situation. As things go, nothing should stop Mr. Erdoğan from
forging ahead in his initiative in Lebanon, for he masters all the elements of the
crisis and has direct relations with all the Lebanese parties. Moreover, his mediation is required by Lebanese and Syrians for he is reliable to be a good link between
Syria and Saudi Arabia, on one side, and Syria and Europe on the other side. And
we can add that Turkey’s weight can counterbalance the Iranian breakthrough in
the region and reinforces the wavering Saudi-Egyptian influence.
Mousavian
The Shiites will remain an integral part
of Middle Eastern societies
It surprises me to hear a Lebanese person criticizing Iran for its alleged strategy
of regional penetration without at least condemning Israel’s policy at the same
time. After all, it was the Israeli, not the Iranian army, which invaded the country.
­Teh­ran only assisted Hezbollah in fighting a foreign occupation.
Neither the EU nor Turkey should join ranks with one side in the complex
relationship between Shiites and Sunnis. It would threaten stability and would
also be useless: Whether one likes it or not, Shiites have existed in Lebanon for a
very long time and they are there to stay.
Vollmer
The idea of Turkey as a force in the Sunni camp counterbalancing Iran’s support
for the Shiites troubles us Europeans. We do not take sides, we talk to all the states
and groups in the region and would like to see Turkey pursue a neutral role too.
Bağci
Turkey is not a Sunni power. We are first and foremost a democratic, secular and
free society. Ankara will not get involved in Middle Eastern sectarian conflicts but
will rather stay out of that minefield.
Challenges in the Region 72
We Europeans do not take sides, we talk to all
the states and groups in the region and would
like to see Turkey pursue a neutral role too.
Vollmer
Turkey has to keep out of the sectarian conflicts in the Middle East. As a secular
country, we cannot and must not choose one sect over another. Bringing around
Iraq’s Sunni community to participate in elections was not partisanship — we remained and remain equidistant to both sides.
Yakiş
Turkey’s role in Lebanon could contribute to stabilizing the situation on the
ground, a contribution which would help managing the crisis. In the short run,
no solution seems to be envisioned, with the exception of a status quo of a sort
and the respect for some programmed events (e. g. the presidential election). It
seems quite obvious that a new war is of no interest to any of the Lebanese parties
as none of them could bear the consequences of such a catastrophe.
Should the Lebanese dead end last till the spring and the Arab Summit be held
in March, the role of Turkey would probably reassure Syria, but not Iran.
Naoufal
5. The Middle East Peace Process
What policies should the EU and Turkey adopt in order to give new momentum
to the Middle East peace process ?
Perthes
Only solving the Arab-Israeli conflict will enable us to solve other conflicts like
the sectarian strife in Lebanon and Iraq or to engage Syria in a constructive dialog.
This issue is so emotionalized for Arabs that its repercussions reach far beyond the
Middle East. Israel must realize that unilateral actions with military means are
not enough to create a secure environment and the Palestinians must overcome
their internal differences.
Zapsu
The success of the peace process depends on the international community’s acknow­
ledging the Palestinians’ rights and no longer letting Israel do everything it wants.
Mousavian
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a long-term outgrowth of the British rule in the
Middle East.
Bağci
In improving our relations with the Arab countries and with Iran, cutting the ties
to Israel is not an option. The good Turkish-Israeli relations did not result merely
from Turkey’s estrangement from the Arab world during the Cold War. Ever since
the Middle Ages, the relationship has been well-based on historical affinities and
Cengizer
73 The Middle East Peace Process
Solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
is the key to solving all other problems
Turkey should only become part of the ‘Middle
East Quartet’ if the EU, the UN and Russia stop
playing the background choir for an American
soloist and become more active themselves.
Çandar
on mutual respect. Our good normal relationship between two people is not directed against anyone, and we will not mortgage it against contacts with other
countries.
Polenz
Turkey should be a member
of the ‘Middle East Quartet’…
Because of Turkey’s close ties to both conflict parties, it should be attached to the
“Middle East Quartet.” During the German EU presidency, the Quartet has become
more active again and attempts to align the Arab League with its proposals. Turkish
involvement might assure the Israelis that their interests are not sold out in a deal
with the Arabs. On the other hand, Turkey has a good relationship with the Palestinians and had contacts with Hamas which is boycotted by the EU and the U.S.
Yakiş
Turkish cooperation with the “Middle East Quartet” is an inspiring option but the
partnership does not have to be formalized. If we cannot agree on all issues, a
selective partnership might be the better option.
Çandar
Turkey should only become part of the “Middle East Quartet” if the EU, the UN
and Russia stop playing the background choir for an American soloist and become
more active themselves. Then Turkey’s attachment could create an effective Quintet one day — just as the “G7 plus Russia” evolved into the “G8.”
I suggest an institutionalized Turkish-European mechanism for solving the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It could benefit from Turkey’s experience in Middle
Eastern affairs and its involvement in Muslim platforms such as the meetings of
representatives from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Pakistan recently held upon the initiative of Islamabad.
… but only if the Quartet is not
dominated by the Americans
Yakiş
The trust invested in Turkey by both the Israelis and the Palestinians is demonstrated by the Erez industrial project. Even though EU countries have larger financial resources, Turkey was asked by both conflict parties to redevelop this industrial zone in the northern part of Gaza. Until the resurgence of Palestinian-Israeli
hostilities in 2000, the Erez industrial site had provided employment to thousands
of Palestinians, especially to textile workers. Its reopening could lead to the economic upswing so badly needed by Gaza’s failing economy. The declarations on the
project were signed in January 2006. It will be run under the aegis of the “Union of
Chambers and Commodities Exchanges of Turkey” (TOBB), the umbrella organization representing the private sector. Major investments by Turkish companies are
expected and there might also be room for a number of European firms.
Challenges in the Region 74
The Erez industrial zone is an exemplary project because the Turkish government has encouraged private investments to boost economic development. This
is directed at improving the living conditions in Gaza, drying out the swamps that
beget Palestinian radicalism and violence. Why do Turkish politicians not follow
the same rationale in northern Iraq ?
Alaton
Although the creation of the Erez industrial zone is currently the only tangible
and meaningful initiative within the framework of the peace process, its results
are wanting. The aim is to improve the economic situation in Gaza by providing
employment and encouraging commercial activity to destroy the basis for violence there. Because they have trust in Turkish know-how and in our neutrality
toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, both sides asked Ankara to manage the
project. This is the kind of credit granted to the Turks on which the EU could rely
with regard to the Middle East.
But so far, no construction has taken place in Erez. Two crucial contracts have
not been signed yet: First, a BOT-agreement according to which the Palestinians relinquish their property rights in Erez for 49 years to Turkish entrepreneurs; this would
give international investors security. Second, an agreement with Israel which guarantees free access to the industrial zone and usage of the Israeli ports of Ashkelon
and Ashdod for shipping goods from and to Gaza. The internal strife between Fatah
and Hamas complicates things. For instance: Since Israel does not recognize the current Palestinian government, before every tripartite agreement, Hamas has to transfer its authority temporarily to President Mahmoud Abbas so that he can sign it.
Çandar
Reconstructing Gaza’s industry with
Turkey’s help is a drawn-out process
6. Talking with Hamas ?
Attaching Turkey to the “Middle East Quartet” would bring back momentum because of Turkey’s diplomatic ties to countries in the region and its nuanced approach to Hamas. Turkey’s government could talk to Hamas leaders where EU and
the U. S. still keep a distance. However, the West should recognize some conciliatory moves of Hamas such as the statement of the leader Khaled Mashal that
Israel is a “reality.” In the Middle East, we must talk not only to those we like but
also to those we do not like but who play a crucial role. For a start with Hamas
it might be useful to identify some topics of dialog and some people with whom
politicians in the West would like to talk. Hamas was successful in free elections.
The ensuing isolation on the international stage has only made them stronger at
75 Talking with Hamas?
Thumann
The West should respond to positive
signs sent by Hamas
In the Middle East, we must talk not only
to those we like but also to those we
do not like but who play a crucial role.
Thumann
home. President Mahmoud Abbas, aware of his weakness, has accepted the Mecca
Agreement on forming a “national coalition government.” But the split between
Hamas and Fatah might still increase, shifting the balance of power in the Palestinian territories further into the direction of Hamas.
Rühe
The requirements of the Middle East Quartet are too rigid. Instead of asking for a
formal recognition of Israel, we should engage Hamas in talks in which the Israelis
are also represented in some form. This would be tantamount to a de facto-recognition of Israel by Hamas, already a big leap forward.
Cooper
Both the Turkish and the European stance on direct relations to Hamas is ambivalent.
The Turkish public is split and the politicians in Ankara have decided to put
the talks on ice until Hamas realizes that as a governmental force they cannot act
as if they are still the opposition party.
The EU, on the other hand, is not particularly happy to be cut off completely
from Hamas. The rule of diplomacy dictates that you have to talk even to people
you dislike, but we are not following this principle. Making use of Turkey’s familiarity with Khaled Mashal could be a way of getting Hamas out of the corner.
Heller
Weakening the Quartet’s stance on the “three principles” is not flexibility, as
some in the EU call it, but fecklessness. If you establish basic rules of engagement,
you have to stick to them. The principles have been formulated for good reason.
In addition to Israel and the U. S., the EU has also formally characterized Hamas
as a terrorist organization.
Thumann
Reevaluating the “three principles” of the Quartet does not have to mean abnegating their content. The Quartet could establish a temporal hierarchy of immediate and ultimate obligations of the Palestinian government. The most important
principle is renouncing the use of violence. Its recognition is a precondition for
negotiations. The formal recognition of Israel can happen during negotiations — as
long as it is made clear from the beginning that it has to come at some point in
the future.
There are short- and long-term goals
for talks with Hamas …
Cooper
The “three principles” of the Middle East Quartet are not the conditio sine qua
non before talks with Hamas can start. The original document, formulated on
Challenges in the Region 76
How could Ankara justify talking to
Hamas ­terrorists when it would certainly
denounce any efforts of its partners
to legitimize a dialog with the PKK?
Heller
January 30, 2006, says “that future assistance to any new government would be reviewed by donors against that government’s commitment” to the three principles.
If we want to follow this au pied de la lettre, having direct contacts with Hamas
is not ruled out.
Despite all the press reports to the contrary, Hamas is not particularly interested in receiving financial support from the West because it receives enough
money from sources in the Middle East.
What Hamas wants is some kind of recognition and the West has to be careful
in judging under which circumstances and at what point it will grant it. We need
to differentiate between long-term objectives and tactical approaches.
The objectives and principles of our policy are absolutely clear: we want a twostate solution for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. And the Palestinians have
to renounce violence and to recognize Israel’s right of existence unambiguously.
But developing some sort of contact with the present Palestinian government
is another matter. It means unnecessarily limiting our options to state that we
will not even speak with Hamas until they have signed on the dotted line of our
demands.
… but the renunciation of
violence is not negotiable
Dealing with Hamas in a division of labor between the EU and Turkey rather than
in a common approach could best serve everyone’s interest. While the EU as part
of the Middle East Quartet can stand firm on the “three principles,” Turkey, which
is not part of the Quartet, has a free hand in trying to engage Hamas in a dialog.
The only problem would be reconciling an apparent contradiction: How could
Ankara justify talking to Hamas terrorists when it would certainly denounce any
efforts of its partners to legitimize a dialog with the PKK ?
Heller
PKK and Hamas are not in the same category of terrorist organizations. Hamas has
participated in, and won, free and fair elections. We all know that their participation was possible only with the silent agreement of the U.S. and Israel. Can we now
ostracize them just because we do not like the outcome of the elections ?
In contrast: Based on what kind of democratic process could the PKK claim any
legitimacy in representing the Kurds and be a potential partner in negotiations ?
Zapsu
One approach for enabling negotiations between the Hamas government and Israel could be the establishment of a peace-building platform under the umbrella
of the UN and supported by the EU and the OIC. It should encompass the Palestin-
Dülger
77 Talking with Hamas?
Starting to talk would imply a de facto
­recognition of Israel by Hamas
Creating the de facto-situation of negotiations
could contribute to overcoming the
current deadlock in the peace process.
Dülger
ian Authority and Israel as well as Turkey and Iran and be headed by a respected
envoy from a neutral country. In such a framework of indirect talks, the sensitive
issue of mutual recognition between Hamas and Israel would not have to be raised
at all. But creating the de facto-situation of negotiations could contribute to overcoming the current deadlock in the peace process.
Zapsu
Chastising Turkey for trying to involve Hamas in a constructive political dialog is
hypocritical.
Western governments presently cherish Turkey’s good relations with Iran and
want to use Ankara as an envoy relating the international community’s concerns
about the nuclear program. But the same people shook their heads a year ago
about our inviting the Hamas leadership to Istanbul.
However, the logic behind Turkey’s approach in both matters is the same —
­ talking to each other is necessary in order to solve political conflicts. We had to
give Hamas the opportunity to evolve into a reliable partner for negotiations with
the West. It was their decision to let that chance pass. But that does not legitimize
the “We told you so !”-critiques in hindsight from our partners.
Cengizer
The Turkish initiative to exert positive influence on Hamas by explicating the
Western countries’ position towards them was justified under the circumstances.
Even Javier Solana recognized later that it was the right thing to do at the time.
Hamas were victorious in the first untainted Arab elections ever. They had
a unique chance to reconsider their positions. In accordance with the principles
formulated by the Middle Eastern Quartet, we reminded Hamas leader Khaled
Mashal of that. As a messenger of the international community, we told him all
‘the right things,’ including that Hamas could shock the world in a positive sense
by greatly improving its stance towards Israel, not necessarily in one step, but in
due time.
After their success in free elections,
Turkish contacts with Hamas were justified
Çandar
The visit of Hamas leader Mashal
in Turkey was a mismanaged affair
Inviting Mashal to Istanbul last year was not a mistake in principle. But it was a
clumsily mismanaged affair which offended all of Turkey’s partners without scoring any points with the Hamas leadership or influencing Hamas positively.
The government was so concerned about the foreign perception of this visit
that it did not want to take responsibility for the invitation. Therefore the AKP
was declared the official host. After the visit, the Turkish media widely reported
that Prime Minister Erdoğan literally hid himself in a factory near the airport
Challenges in the Region 78
Maybe the time will come when the EU will
have to ask Turkey to establish a hidden ­
high-level contact with al-Qaeda on their behalf.
Mousavian
where Mashal was scheduled to arrive in order to avoid bumping into him. Mashal
personally told me a month later that he felt offended by the Prime Minister’s
refusal to meet with him.
The success was zero. Officially, the purpose of the meeting was to force
Hamas to comply with international demands and to prevent them from moving
closer to Iran. But the next day Mashal visited Iran with generous photo opportunities with both Ali Chamenei and Mahmud Ahmadinejad. The Hamas-Iranian
rapprochement was rather facilitated than impeded by the Turkish invitation. All
that was achieved was that two important partners, the Americans and the Israelis, voiced strong opposition to the Turkish initiative.
A survey has shown that only 49 % of the Turkish public supported the government’s overtures towards Hamas whereas 23 % were against it.
Bağci
Turkey’s contacts with Hamas should be applauded, as should be their potential
to establish relations with Hezbollah, Jihad Islami or Amal. Maybe the time will
come when the EU will have to ask Turkey to establish a hidden high-level contact
with al-Qaeda on their behalf.
Mousavian
Since the time immediately following their election victory in January last year,
Turkey has been telling Hamas that they have to stop considering themselves a
resistance movement and start acting as a responsible governmental party.
Yakiş
What influence does Turkey really have on Hamas ? In the “Mecca Agreement,”
Saudi Arabia got Hamas’ commitment to form a “national unity government”
with representatives of Fatah. As Turkey has never provided financial or logistical
support to Hamas, it does not have the same clout with them as Saudi Arabia and
Iran do.
Çandar
7. A CSCE for the Middle East ?
How can the EU and Turkey contribute to creating a regional security infrastructure ?
Perthes
A regional multilateral security organization in which Turkey could play a key role
is not without precedents. The Sa’adabad Pact of 1937, a regional non-aggression
Yasseen
79 Talking with Hamas?
There are historical precedents
for a Middle Eastern CSCE …
… and this implies Turkey’s involvement
pact, involved Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Its aim was to promote peace
and security in the Middle East. It was followed up in 1955 by the Central Treaty
Organization or CENTO. Also known as the Baghdad Pact, the arrangement was
sponsored by the U.S. and the U.K. and was loosely based on the NATO model. It
comprised Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the U.K. Although both organizations
were not particularly successful and are now defunct, they could be revived to
strengthen regional stability.
Turkey should also get involved in discussions currently under way for applying the CSCE model of political dialog and stability to the Gulf region. Apart from
establishing mechanisms of conflict prevention, such discussions could evolve
into a forum where democratization, human rights and fundamental freedoms
can be discussed. Even though Turkey has no direct access to the Persian Gulf, its
experiences with the Sa’adbad and Baghdad Pacts and its good relations with major players like the EU, the U.S. and Russia who should participate in this forum,
could enable it to facilitate discussions and make such a forum a success.
Mousavian
The EU and Turkey should join forces to create a Persian Gulf variant of the CSCE
comprising all GCC countries, Iran, Iraq and probably Jordan. The idea had already
been suggested in 1990 by then-German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
to President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Minister Genscher got an Iranian carte blanche
for pursuing the project but failed because of American resistance. The project
should now be revived as an EU initiative.
Polenz
A Helsinki-type process for security and peace in the Gulf countries and the ­Middle
East must be launched in accordance with the U.S. Otherwise the security interests of some states in the region cannot be met. And in order to secure the broad
support of the international community, the EU, the UN and Russia also have to
sit at the table.
8. Influencing Iran and Syria
Perthes
Could Ankara’s good relations to many players in the region benefit efforts of
Western and Arab countries to influence difficult partners like Iran and Syria ?
Polenz
As Iran’s main neighbor, Turkey can contribute to incentives offered by Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the U.S. to stop Tehran from pursuing its
Challenges in the Region 80
The EU and Turkey should try
to involve Iran constructively into
the stabilization of Afghanistan.
Polenz
nuclear program. The UN Security Council resolutions state that negotiations on
political, economic and technological assistance to Iran can start only once the
country fully cooperates with IAEA and gives credible assurances that its nuclear
program has peaceful purposes. The “EU 3” have made their offer and Tehran has
not accepted. Turkey, which is not a member of the “EU 3 plus 3” could, in a ­double­track approach, try to convince Tehran to comply.
Also, the EU and Turkey should try to involve Iran constructively into the
stabilization of Afghanistan. Tehran abhors a destabilization of Afghanistan as
much as the West does and is heavily affected by drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Many Iranian soldiers have lost their lives in the fight against the so-called
narco-terrorists.
Turkey has good bilateral relations with
Could Turkey be an arbiter between the members of the Cooperation Council
for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) and Iran ? Saudi Arabia in particular seems
worried about the Iranian nuclear program and concerned about the sectarian
violence in Iraq. Some voices in Saudi Arabia seem to have urged the government
to shield the Sunni community in Iraq and to thwart Iran’s influence in case the allied forces will withdraw. Because the EU is engaged in a controversy with Tehran
over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it might not be perceived by the Iranians to be in a
position to act as an arbiter. Can Turkey play a constructive role here ?
Tarraf
The idea of a regional control over nuclear issues is getting more and more support in the Middle East, in EU states and within the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The Middle East needs to become a WMD-free zone. The barrier for such
a project is not Iran but Israel, the only country in the region which possesses
weapons of mass destruction and does not accept any form of international convention or regulation. The EU and Turkey should use their influence to commit
Israel to disarmament and observance of international rules.
Mousavian
Iran and can influence Tehran’s policies
Israel could make the Middle East
into a WMD-free region — by relinquishing its own arsenal
Prime Minister Erdoğan has access to Iran’s supreme leader Ali Chamenei — which is
a privilege not granted to many. The EU should make use of that Turkish linkage.
Cooper
Turkey does not have unique access to Iran just because Prime Minister Erdoğan
was received by the Supreme Leader. Ali Chamenei meets an average of over thirty
foreign visitors each year. Last month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was
among his guests.
Mousavian
81 Influencing Iran and Syria
Turkey’s becoming an energy hub
depends even more on the north-to-south
than on east-to-west supply lines.
Thumann
Al-Azm
Improved Turkish-Syrian relations give Ankara leverage to influence Syrian President Assad to start internal reforms. The Syrian government is isolated on the
international stage, but oppositional forces and civil society groups are in favor of
opening our country up, especially towards Turkey.
9. Energy and Water
Çandar
Turkey is turning into a major energy
­corridor towards Western Europe
Thumann
Russia’s policies are at odds with
the EU’s strategy of diversification
Europe must cooperate closely with Turkey which is about to become a major transit country for hydrocarbon materials into Europe. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or BTC
pipeline, which transports crude oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean,
is already operating, and more ambitious projects are in the planning stage: a) the
Nabucco project for two pipeline routes transporting Caspian or Iranian gas to
Europe via Bulgaria and Romania and via Greece and the Strait of Otranto to Italy;
b) expanding the Blue Stream pipeline which brings natural gas from Russia via
the Black Sea to Turkey with new routes leading through Turkey and Lebanon to
Ashkelon in Israel and, according to rumors, maybe one day to India, c) another
Trans-Caspian pipeline transporting gas from Central Asia and possibly from Iran
via Turkey to Europe. Some experts predict the creation of a Rotterdam-type of
stock exchange for hydrocarbon materials in the historical region of Cilicia in
Southeastern Turkey.
Turkey’s becoming an energy hub depends even more on the north-to-south than
on the often cited east-to-west supply lines, especially as far as gas is concerned.
These projects need political support to succeed which they still lack at the moment.
The Blue Stream pipeline through the Black Sea today brings Russian gas to
Turkey. The Russian monopolist Gazprom tries to expand it to supply the whole of
Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Alternatively, Gazprom is considering
a pipeline from Russia to Bulgaria if Turkey is slow to respond to their demands.
Gazprom is also concluding bilateral agreements with a number of European
energy companies to ensure that future natural gas exports from the Caspian Sea
region to Europe will be controlled by Gazprom.
The Russian strategy clearly contradicts the EU objective of diversifying energy supply. Despite growing support for “Nabucco” within the EU Commission,
the Austrian operator OMV has difficulties attracting major European companies
to this project for building a gas supply pipeline from the Caspian Sea and Iran via
Challenges in the Region 82
Turkey to South Eastern and Central Europe. Companies like E.ON and BASF are
afraid of antagonizing Gazprom and thereby Russia if they get involved. Without
political support the project will never succeed. This crucial part of the vision of
a Turkish energy hub is only possible if political momentum similar to the one
supporting the existing BTC oil pipeline is created. This is a common challenge
for the EU and Turkey.
Iran is particularly interested in Turkey as a transit route for its natural gas exports to Europe. Despite the frictions with the EU over the nuclear program, the
Iranians regard the Turkish attachment to the EU positively in terms of potential economic and financial benefits. A few days ago, Iranian Foreign Minister
Manouchehr ­Mottaki came to Turkey with a suitcase full of proposals on TurkishIranian energy projects amounting to billions of dollars.
Çandar
Water is potentially one of the most contentious issues in our region. We hope
that Turkey’s further involvement with the EU could make possible an amicable
and fair solution for disputes and disagreements on water among Turkey, Iraq and
Syria. Turkish efforts to meet European standards in environmental and water
policies are already under way. The EU’s “Water Framework Directive” calls on
all member states to endeavor the keeping of European standards of fair cooperation and mutual obligations even if parts of a relevant river basin extend beyond
the borders of the community. The application of these principles to the Tigris/
Euphrates basin would guard against unilateral actions and ensure equity in the
sharing of these water resources.
Yasseen
Regarding the utilization of the water of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, Turkey has suggested a three-stage plan to Iraq and Syria. This plan consists of determining the water potentials of the Tigris-Euphrates basin in the first stage.
The second stage will be determining the area of the agricultural land in the
same basin taking also into consideration the quality of the soil; and the third
stage will be equitably allocating the available water to the respective land. This
is in the best interest of all, because none of us is a water-rich country. Turkey has
annual per capita resources of around 1,800 m3, Iraq 2,100 m3 and Syria 1,500 m3.
Water-rich countries have 8,000 to 10,000 m3. Unfortunately, because of the unstable political situation in Iraq, talks on the three-stage plan are currently on
hold.
Yakiş
83 Energy and Water
EU water guidelines could be applied
to the Tigris/Euphrates basin
von Weizsäcker
Our discussion has not brought about unanimity about Turkey’s potential as a
partner for EU foreign policy in the Middle East. But we have agreed on some
substantial results regarding specific questions.
The participants might still differ as to how much Turkey can contribute to
the EU’s efforts to stabilize the region. We might also differ as to whether Turkish EU accession is a precondition for making full use of Ankara’s potential or
whether Turkey can be just as useful a partner without becoming a member of
the European Union.
It has become clear, however, that there is potential for cooperation that must
not be ignored. Turkey’s image in the region has improved to an extent that makes
it a major player and a power respected by the Muslim states of the Middle East.
The EU and Turkey both enjoy a favorable reputation among the actors in the
Middle East. Some of their basic goals and instruments — stability, the use of soft
power — coincide, and with regard to some challenges, the Turkish regional expertise and the EU’s financial clout and image as a soft power actor could complement
each other.
Both the EU and Turkey should take into account when judging Turkey’s EU
accession that the potential of their cooperation in the Middle East depends also
on how the accession process develops. Turkey’s clout in the region is related to
the accession perspective.
At the same time, policy makers on both sides must not link both aspects
too closely in a form verging on blackmail: They must refrain from joining forces
whenever there are problems in the accession process and from using the potential for cooperation in the Middle East as a token in the accession negotiations.
It would certainly be wise to actively explore more thoroughly — and not
merely on an ad-hoc basis — where both sides can significantly achieve more
together than alone. How to conceptualize, institutionalize and implement this
cooperation is to be decided depending on the challenge at hand. But in any
case, specific cooperation within a clearly defined format is possible, useful and,
taking into account the importance of the challenges in the Middle East, indispensable.
Challenges in the Region 84