The World’s Stateless
To end statelessness worldwide by 2024. That is the ambition of the
#ibelong campaign, spearheaded by UNHCR, which aims to galvanise
governments, civil society, UN agencies and others into action. It is a
bold but appropriate objective. Statelessness has been a cause of human
suffering for too long, and unnecessarily so: it is a man-made phenomenon
and bringing it to an end is – at least in theory – entirely feasible. The
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion is committed to helping to inform
and catalyse solutions for statelessness. In the hope of contributing to
a better sense of the task ahead, this inaugural World’s Stateless report
explores currently available statistical data and discusses the challenges
involved in accurately mapping or quantifying statelessness. From this
analysis, the report distils recommendations to states, UNHCR and civil
society on how to improve data collection and reporting on statelessness.
2014
The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion is an independent, nonprofit organisation dedicated to leading an integrated, inter-disciplinary
response to the injustice of statelessness and exclusion. Established in
August 2014, it is the first global centre of expertise and action committed
to promoting the rights of stateless persons and reducing statelessness
worldwide. We believe in the value of research, education, partnership
and advocacy. We aim to develop and share our skills and expertise with
partners in civil society, academia, the UN and governments, and to serve
as a catalyst for change.
The World’s Stateless
The World’s Stateless
a
The World’s Stateless
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion
December 2014
a
The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion is an independent, nonprofit organisation dedicated to leading an integrated, inter-disciplinary
response to the injustice of statelessness and exclusion. Established in
August 2014, it is the first global centre of expertise and action committed
to promoting the rights of stateless persons and reducing statelessness
worldwide. We believe in the value of research, education, partnership
and advocacy. We aim to develop and share our skills and expertise with
partners in civil society, academia, the UN and governments, and to serve
as a catalyst for change.
© Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, December 2014
[email protected] - www.institutesi.org
Cover photo credits
Top row, left to right:
Iraq © Karel Hendriks; Serbia © Praxis; South Africa © Daniel Boshoff
Middle row, left to right:
The Dominican Republic © Allison Petrozziello, OBMICA;
Malaysia © Helen Brunt; Latvia © Evelien Vehof & Els Duran
Bottom row, left to right:
Hungary & The Netherlands © Evelien Vehof & Els Duran; Cambodia
© Zahra Albarazi
Published by:
Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP)
PO Box 313
5060 AH Oisterwijk
The Netherlands
Email: [email protected]
www.wolfpublishers.nl
ISBN: 9789462402041
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, translated or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the Institute
on Statelessness and Inclusion. Whilst the authors, editors and publisher have tried to
ensure the accuracy of this publication, the publisher, authors and editors cannot accept
responsibility for any errors, omissions, misstatements, or mistakes and accept no
responsibility for the use of the information presented in this work.
The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion is a non-profit foundation
(Stichting) incorporated in the Netherlands. Chamber of Commerce
Registration Number: 61443840.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
1. THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
I. STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
II. CAUSES OF STATELESSNESS
III. IMPACT OF STATELESSNESS
IV. LINKS BETWEEN STATELESSNESS AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS
2. THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
I. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN QUANTIFYING STATELESSNESS
II. ‘HIDDEN’ STATELESS GROUPS
3. GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
I. GENERAL TRENDS
II. AFRICA
III. AMERICAS
IV. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
V. EUROPE
VI. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
VII. STATELESS REFUGEES VIII. STATELESS PALESTINIANS
4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ANNEX: UNHCR Statelessness Statistics (2013 Global Trends Report)
3
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23
28
32
37
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53
55
60
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78
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THE WORLD’S STATELESS
FOREWORD
This report is about ordinary people, living all over the world, who have
one extraordinary thing in common: they do not hold any nationality
at all. They are The World’s Stateless. When having a nationality (or
even multiple nationalities) is the norm, it is difficult to picture what
statelessness is like. It is difficult to find the right words to describe
the absence of something. More often than perhaps we should, those
of us who seek to convey the urgency of this issue and the severity of
its impact have fallen back on terms like ‘legal ghosts’ and ‘citizens of
nowhere’ to try to portray what statelessness means. Such labels may
be effective, and even rather poetic, in describing the phenomenon of
statelessness. Yet they are also misleading. As, perhaps, is the word
‘stateless’ itself.
The more we listen to the experiences of stateless persons around
the world, the more we understand about who they are and how
they view their own situation, the more we explore the root causes of
statelessness and the more we learn of the incredible scale and reach of
this problem, the more these terms seem inadequate. Yes, statelessness
presents unique challenges to those who it touches. It can trap people
in poverty, stigmatise, isolate and disenfranchise. While feeling lost,
rejected, unsettled and insecure are sentiments commonly expressed
by stateless persons, they should be no more defined – or confined – by
their statelessness than you or I by our nationality. These are people
with hopes, ambitions, talents, character, identity and in many cases
a deep sense of belonging to a community and of having a homeland.
To borrow an expression put forward by a leading scholar who has
commented on this issue, the stateless are perhaps better described
not as ‘citizens of nowhere’ but as ‘unrecognised citizens’.∗1They have
a place in this world, a country of their own, but this country does not
recognise them as its nationals. This must change, because everyone
has the right to a nationality.
* M. Gibney, “Statelessness and Citizenship in Ethical and Political Perspective”,
A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.), Nationality and Statelessness under
International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
1
FOREWORD
The photographs that we selected for the cover of this report offer a
glimpse at the lives of these ordinary people from around the globe
who are all experiencing something extraordinary. Their statelessness
sets them apart, but their humanity unites them and us. We hope
that this report will help to further engage people with the issue of
statelessness, without contributing to further isolate or stigmatise
those affected. Our ambition is to promote inclusion and participation,
for everyone.
Laura van Waas, Amal de Chickera and Zahra Albarazi
December 2014
2
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This World’s Stateless Report is the inaugural publication of the
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, which was established in
August 2014. We intend to publish a World’s Stateless Report every
two years as our flagship publication. Consequently, the launching of
this report is an opportune moment to acknowledge both those who
contributed to this publication, as well as those who have played a key
role in the establishment of the Institute.
The establishment of the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion would
not have been possible if not for the advice, guidance and support of
many people. While it is not possible to thank everyone who played
a role individually, we wish to express our gratitude to the following
people for their help:
- The first Trustees of the Institute – Rachel Brett, Stefanie Grant,
Nicola Jägers, Linda Kerber and Joop van Waas – who readily
accepted our invitation and who we are honoured to have on board.
- All those who responded with great enthusiasm and wise advice,
when we first told them of our plans to establish the Institute.
- Mark Manly and the UNHCR Statelessness Section, past and present,
for all their support.
- Our colleagues at Tilburg University and Equal Rights Trust for
encouraging us to take this big step.
- All colleagues in the statelessness field for welcoming us, endorsing
us and already showing willingness to collaborate with us.
- Sarah Davids for the wonderful website she created for us.
- All who contributed to our crowd funding campaign, whose
generosity made it possible for us to hit the ground running.
- Hamed Hashemi for helping us with our various video outputs.
- Our families and friends, for their incredible support as we embark
on this new journey.
The primary drafter of this report is Laura van Waas, with Amal de
Chickera also drafting some sections. Both Laura and Amal also edited
and finalised the report for publication. Zahra Albarazi provided input
on draft versions of the text.
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank the following persons for their advice,
assistance with compiling information, expert input or review of
earlier drafts of this report (listed in no particular order): Stefanie
Grant, Mark Manly, Anne Laakko, Radha Govil, Roselinde den Boer,
Tarek Abou Chabake, Bronwen Manby, Mirna Adjami, Chris Nash, Inge
Sturkenboom, Nicholas Oakeshott, Amit Sen, Juan Ignacio Mondelli,
Emmanuelle Mitte, Ceren Yuksel, David Baluarte, Adam Weiss, Ivanka
Kostic, Maureen Lynch, Helene Lambert, Helen Brunt, Jason Tucker,
Bridget Wooding, Francisco Quintana, Sangita Jaghai, Christina van
Kuijck, Denis Alma Kuindje and Paavo Savolainen. Their valuable input
enhanced the quality of this report and corrected some mistakes in
earlier drafts.
The images depicted on the report cover were kindly shared with
us by Karel Hendriks (Iraq), Praxis (Serbia), Liesl Muller & Daniel
Boshoff (South Africa), Bridget Wooding & Allison Petrozziello (The
Dominican Republic), Helen Brunt (Malaysia) and Evelien Vehof & Els
Duran (Latvia, Hungary & The Netherlands).
A special thank you to Willem Jan van der Wolf of Wolf Legal Publishers,
for his generosity, support and vision, without which it would not
have been possible to publish this report in hard copy. Thanks also
to Ditty Vos for the cover design and layout for this report, and for
her assistance in developing the house style for this and subsequent
publications of the Institute.
This report is dedicated to all persons who continue to endure the
injustice of statelessness in the 21st century. The Institute hopes
that this report will contribute towards enhancing our collective
understanding of statelessness so we may together be better equipped
to address and ultimately end statelessness in a decade.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Statelessness is a problem of global proportions. It affects people all
over the world and can have a harmful impact on them, their families
and the wider community. The recently launched #ibelong global
campaign, spearheaded by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with a view to galvanise further
action by governments, civil society, UN agencies and others, is a very
welcome initiative. It has a bold but appropriate objective: to work
to end statelessness within a decade. Statelessness is a man-made
phenomenon and bringing it to an end is – at least in theory – entirely
feasible. Yet, resolving situations of statelessness around the globe
does present a formidable task.
There are many different lenses through which statelessness can be
explored. This inaugural World’s Stateless report, focuses largely on
the question of statistical reporting on statelessness, with a hope to
contribute to a better sense of the task ahead: knowing who and where
the stateless are and how many people are afflicted by statelessness in
the world today can help to inform the campaign to end statelessness.
It is important to emphasise that the pursuit of statistical information
on statelessness, while being a useful exercise, should not happen in
isolation nor be an end in itself, and should always complement and
inform wider efforts to protect the stateless, reduce and ultimately end
statelessness.
Quantifying statelessness is our shared responsibility. States hold the
primary duty to identify stateless persons in order to implement their
international obligations towards these populations –under the two
UN statelessness conventions and in accordance with international
human rights law. In the fulfilment of its statelessness mandate,
UNHCR has been tasked to undertake and share research on various
aspects of statelessness, including on the scope of the problem.
Other UN agencies, NGOs and academia also have a role to play in
the identification and quantification of situations of statelessness. At
present, UNHCR is the only organisation which systematically collates
statistics and regularly reports on the number of stateless persons in
the world. Beyond UNHCR data, information on the scope and reach of
statelessness is dispersed across a wide array of resources.
5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The problem of statelessness
Under international law, a stateless persons is someone “who is not
considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law”.
Where a person lacks any nationality, he or she does not enjoy the
attached rights or duties, resulting in a lack of protection. Such gaps in
protection almost always amount to violations of international human
rights law. Historically, statelessness has been seen as a technical legal
issue. But its devastating consequences to real people are abundantly
clear. Equally evident, is that statelessness cannot be seen or addressed
in isolation. It impacts on – and is impacted by – other issues and
disciplines such as international development, humanitarian affairs,
human rights, children’s rights, economics, healthcare, democracy,
peace and security and forced migration. Statelessness will only be
successfully addressed if such disciplines recognise its relevance and
respond to it in an integrated way.
The challenge of mapping statelessness
Quantifying statelessness is a complicated task, requiring several
methodological hurdles to be overcome. Here are a few of those challenges:
• Definitional issues: The definition of statelessness is not as
straightforward as it appears to be. The term “not considered as a
national… under the operation of its law” has been authoritatively
interpreted as being both a question of fact and law. Consequently,
there are persons who would legally be eligible for a particular
nationality, who are nonetheless not considered as nationals by the
state, and whose statelessness is consequently hidden.
• Gaps in data collection tools: States may give insufficient priority to
the implementation of measures to identify statelessness or accurately
quantify it. Sometimes, there is even a deliberate strategy to deny
the prevalence of statelessness by asserting that such persons are
nationals of another country.
• Lack of adequate or comprehensive data collection: Even where data on
statelessness is collected, this does not always yield comprehensive or
reliable results, due to a wrong interpretation of the definition or poor
methodology. Furthermore, some such exercises have been limited in
their scope, focusing only on one ethnic group or geographical area of
a country and do not therefore produce a complete picture.
• Unwillingness or lack of awareness to self-identify as stateless: Many
stateless persons do not see themselves as being stateless. Even if they do,
there is often reluctance to draw attention to this. Thus, data collection
which relies on self-identification may not be entirely accurate.
6
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
• Protection considerations in the identification of statelessness:
Undocumented persons and those who are of undetermined
nationality may be at risk of statelessness and indeed, some of them
are likely to already be stateless. However, when such persons are in
their own countries, they will almost always receive greater protection
if confirmed to be nationals and the ‘stateless’ label can be counterproductive. Nevertheless, even in such situations, where the denial
of documentation is long-lasting (even inter-generational), there
would come a point when it is better to acknowledge such persons as
stateless.
From a practical perspective too, there are various gaps in the existing
data on statelessness:
• Not all countries in the world are able to report data on statelessness:
Today, UNHCR has reliable data on the number of stateless persons
in 75 countries. This means that statelessness remains unmapped in
over 50% of the world’s states.
• Figures for different countries are compiled from different data sets
– that use different methodologies – and do not always reveal the
full picture: The data collated by UNHCR is drawn from information
produced by different actors, in different places, using different
approaches – not all of which deliver the same level of reliability or
produce readily-comparable data.
• Only persons exclusively under UNHCR’s statelessness protection
mandate are reported in its statelessness statistics: UNHCR’s statistical
reporting on statelessness excludes stateless persons who also fall
within the protection mandates of other UN Agencies (at present, only
the UN Relief and Works Agency – UNRWA), and those who also come
under other UNHCR protection mandates (such as refugees, IDPs or
asylum seekers).
Global statelessness statistics
UNHCR estimates that there are ‘over 10 million’ stateless persons in the
world. Due to gaps in the collection of data by governments, the UN and
civil society, a full breakdown of this figure is beyond reach. Statistical
reporting by UNHCR, which uses data that has been collated from a wide
range of sources, currently covers only a total tally of some 3.5 million
stateless persons. A closer look at the data shows that 97.6% of the
number of stateless persons reported in UNHCR statistics globally can be
found in just 20 countries, which each is home to a stateless population
of over 10,000. Less than 84,000 stateless persons are spread across the
7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
remaining 55 countries for which a figure on statelessness is reported.
This perspective on the global statelessness figures demonstrates that
although it is an issue that affects people in all parts and indeed most
countries of the world, the spread of the problem is uneven.
In absolute numbers, statelessness is documented as affecting far more
people in Asia and the Pacific than in any other region of the world, with
UNHCR reporting a total of 1,422,850 persons under its statelessness
mandate in Asia. There are six countries in which the number of stateless
persons is reported to be over 10,000 and a further nine which are
currently marked by an asterisk in UNHCR’s statistics. This means there
are no less than 15 countries in which statelessness affects a significant
number of people (out of 45 countries in total) – also more than any other
region. It is also evident that statelessness is severely underreported in
Asia and the Pacific. It is safe to conservatively project that the true number
of stateless persons in Asia and the Pacific is more than double what
UNHCR is currently able to account for in its statelessness statistics. It may
be far higher if, indeed, there are widespread problems of statelessness in
India, Indonesia, Nepal and Pakistan, as some of the available information
suggests there might be.
In contrast, the Americas currently reports the lowest number of
stateless persons (at just over 200,000) and is indisputably the region
with the fewest people affected by statelessness. This demonstrates the
advantages of a jus soli approach to nationality (i.e. conferral of nationality
at birth to all children born in the territory), the norm in the Americas, as
this prevents statelessness being passed on to the next generation. Yet, the
situation that has unfolded in the Dominican Republic over the past year
is the most egregious new violation of international human rights norms
relating to nationality and statelessness that the world has witnessed in
the 21st century. Underreporting on the size of the population affected in
the Dominican Republic and the lack of reliable statistics on statelessness
in numerous other countries mean that statelessness affects far more
persons in the Americas than currently be reported by UNHCR – how
many more, is not known.
In (sub-Saharan) Africa, statelessness has proven to be exceedingly
difficult to accurately quantify. Only four out of 47 countries in this
region were accounted for in UNHCR’s end-2013 statistics; these are the
countries where there has been significant advocacy on the issue and
a parallel effort at reporting. There are many countries with significant
8
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
stateless populations who cannot at present be tallied in UNHCR’s
statistics (currently totalling 721,303 stateless persons). Alternative data
sources show widely varying estimates, for instance for Madagascar and
Zimbabwe. In other cases, there are no numbers at all, such as in the DRC
and South Africa. These gaps demonstrate that there is a severe problem of
underreporting on statelessness in the region. It appears safe to conclude
that, in Africa, statelessness is likely to actually affect more than double
the number of persons currently accounted for in UNHCR’s statistics, and
probably many more.
By comparison, statelessness is more comprehensively mapped in
Europe than any other region. Statistical reporting on statelessness has
been achieved in 40 out of the 50 countries that fall within the scope of
UNHCR’s Europe regional bureau. The total figure reported by UNHCR is
670,828, some 85% of whom can be found in just four countries (Latvia,
the Russian Federation, Estonia and Ukraine) – in all cases as a product
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thus, just as it is anywhere else in
the world, statelessness is in large part a home-grown problem in Europe.
Although the phenomenon appears, at first sight, to be largely mapped,
a closer look at the numbers gives reason to question whether this data
is truly accurate and comprehensive. In at least a number of countries
in Europe, there is a problem of persons being reported as holding an
‘unknown nationality’, which is obscuring the true number affected by
statelessness. While it is difficult to estimate how significantly current
statistics undercount statelessness in Europe, there are a significant
number of people across the region who have not been identified as
stateless and are not currently reported.
UNHCR reports a total of 444,237 persons under its statelessness mandate
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This figure excludes stateless
Palestinians. Furthermore, the absence of any data for three countries which
are known to have significant statelessness problems, points to substantial
under-reporting on statelessness in UNHCR’s statistics with respect to
MENA. Quantifying the problem is a massive challenge in this region
though, because of the diversity of the groups affected and the underlying
causes, as well as the high political sensitivity of questions of citizenship
and demography in many countries. On the basis of what incomplete data
there is, it is apparent that the UNHCR statistics for statelessness in the
MENA significantly underrepresent the problem and (excluding stateless
Palestinians and refugees such as the Rohingya) the lowest estimate for
how many stateless persons are currently unreported is 100,000 persons.
9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While not all stateless persons are refugees and, indeed, not all refugees
are stateless, there is some overlap between these two groups. A person
can be both stateless and a refugee for the purposes of international law.
However, stateless refugees are not included in UNHCR’s statelessness
statistics (so as to avoid double counting). This report also canvases
the world’s most significant stateless refugee populations, including for
instance Black Mauritanians, Faili Kurds, stateless Kurds from Syria and
Rohingya refugees. A conservative tally of the total number of refugees
affected by statelessness across these and the other groups discussed
suggests that there are currently at least 1.5 million stateless refugees and
former refugees around the world. Many of these persons are counted
within UNHCR’s refugee statistics and receive protection as refugees,
as appropriate (a significant exception being hundreds of thousands
of Rohingya in the Middle East and some Asian countries). Yet, they
are also stateless for the purposes of international law and should be
acknowledged within the overall tally for the number of persons affected
by statelessness globally.
Stateless persons of Palestinian origin are also largely excluded from
present statistical reporting. While, from the point of view of international
law, many Palestinians are likely to meet the definition of a stateless person,
their situation is nevertheless complex and deserving of a dedicated
discussion. Due to the mandate of UNRWA, established specifically to
provide assistance to Palestine Refugees within the UN system and under
international law, Palestinians also enjoy different statuses and these do
not align with the question of nationality status. This report discusses the
available data on three categories: Palestinians who fall under UNRWA
mandate, Palestinians under UNHCR’s refugee mandate and Palestinians
potentially under UNHCR’s statelessness protection mandate. The data
shows that there are more than five million Palestinians worldwide who are
stateless under international law or whose nationality status is currently
ambiguous. Upon clarification of Palestinian nationality law and who falls
within its scope, this number would need to be carefully reviewed.
Conclusion and recommendations
Our research confirms that the 3.5 million figure reported by UNHCR from
collated global statistics on statelessness significantly underrepresents
the scale of the problem. We found conservative estimates in other sources
that would account for an additional approximately 2.5 million stateless
persons. There are also approximately 2.1 million persons of Palestinian
origin, who were never displaced from the West Bank or Gaza Strip and
10
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
whose nationality status remains ambiguous in the absence of Palestinian
nationality regulations. This brings the tally of stateless persons who are
currently in some way statistically accounted for, to over eight million. The
true number of stateless persons is likely to be significantly higher, due to
the data gaps which were identified and could not be filled. Thus, it is clear
that UNHCR’s estimate of ‘at least 10 million’ persons exclusively under its
statelessness protection mandate is well founded. Furthermore, there are
also at least 1.5 million stateless refugees and around 3.5 million stateless
refugees from Palestine. When this is all tallied up, there are therefore
likely to be more than 15 million stateless persons worldwide today.
The report offers a number of recommendations to states, UNHCR and civil
society with regard to how to improve statistical data on statelessness:
Recommendations to states
1. States should adopt and/or strengthen measures to count stateless
persons on their territory. Where current data on statelessness
is unreliable or incomplete, states should consider conducting or
cooperating with dedicated statelessness mapping exercises.
2. States should include a definition of a stateless person in their
domestic law that is formulated, interpreted and applied consistently
with international law.
3. States with significant statelessness problems on their territory must
revisit the legal and policy framework which created statelessness
with a view to preventing and reducing statelessness.
4. States with stateless migrant populations should establish statelessness
determination procedures to identify the stateless.
5. States which host refugee populations that are also stateless (or at
risk of statelessness), must take their statelessness into account when
providing durable solutions.
6. States must fully cooperate with UNHCR to enable it to fulfil its mandate
towards the stateless.
7. States are encouraged to increase financial support towards enhancing
knowledge – both quantitative and qualitative – on statelessness.
Recommendations to UNHCR
1. UNHCR is encouraged to increase its engagement with states and
civil society actors in respect to the identification of statelessness, in
particular by continuing efforts to promote a unified approach to the
definition of a stateless person in accordance with international law.
2. UNHCR should continue to pursue and strengthen dedicated mapping
initiatives on statelessness.
11
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3. UNHCR should develop a way to reflect the true reach of statelessness
globally by also reporting on the number of stateless refugees and
asylum seekers.
4. In its periodic statistical reporting, UNHCR is urged to ensure that
any asterisks delineating significant but unquantified statelessness
situations are carried over from the table dedicated specifically to
reporting on persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate to also
be visible in the main (i.e. compilation) table of persons of concern to
UNHCR.
5. In carrying out refugee status determination, UNHCR staff should also
identify those who are stateless or at risk of statelessness.
6. UNHCR should seek every opportunity to strengthen collaboration
with other UN agencies engaged in activities relevant to data collection
on statelessness.
Recommendations to civil society, including academia
1. Civil society should more actively pursue the consolidation and
analysis of data on statelessness.
2. Civil society should work to identify pressing gaps in statelessness
data and conduct research to fill these gaps.
3. Through the collection, compilation and analysis of data, civil society
should contribute to the wider dissemination of information on
statelessness globally, including statelessness statistics.
4. Civil society should contribute to the strengthening of methodologies
for counting the stateless by sharing methodological approaches and
openly discussing challenges and good practices.
5. Civil society should continue to work to raise awareness of the
phenomenon of statelessness among relevant actors and the general
public. Wherever possible, civil society should also support UNHCR
in its identification, protection, reduction and advocacy work on
statelessness.
The report concludes by discussing that while the quest for clarity on
the magnitude of statelessness is a fascinating, compelling and useful
one, it is important to acknowledge that it should not be all-consuming.
Having comprehensive and accurate information about who is affected by
statelessness and where, is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Better
data will undoubtedly help in the campaign to end statelessness by 2024,
but the priority needs to rest firmly with addressing – not (just) mapping
– the issue.
12
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
INTRODUCTION
To end statelessness worldwide by 2024. That is the ambition of the
recently launched #ibelong global campaign, spearheaded by the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),1
which aims to galvanise governments, civil society, UN agencies and
others into action.2 It is a bold but appropriate objective. Statelessness
has been a cause of human suffering for too long, and unnecessarily so.
Nationality is our own bureaucratic invention and we wield the power
to exclude, but also to include. As such, statelessness is a man-made
phenomenon and bringing it to an end is – at least in theory – entirely
feasible.
Yet, resolving situations of statelessness around the globe does
present a formidable task. It is a problem that arises from a variety of
different causes and endures in many different and sometimes difficult
social, economic and political contexts. Ending statelessness requires
a higher intensity of purpose, action and collaboration from a wide
range of actors, including involvement of the stateless themselves.
There are many different lenses through which the world’s stateless
can be explored and it is the intention of the Institute on Statelessness
and Inclusion to publish a study of statelessness in the world every two
years, helping to track progress in the campaign to end statelessness
but also looking at the issue from different perspectives in order to
further our collective understanding of it. We hope that over the years,
we will be able to create a body of work which offers an interdisciplinary
view of statelessness; exploring, analysing and trying to come to terms
with the issue – and indeed searching for solutions – from different but
complementary perspectives. For example, future issues may focus on
the human rights protection of stateless persons, or the relevance of
statelessness to the international development agenda, or new work
on statelessness in the health and mental-health fields.
1
2
UNHCR is the UN agency which has been mandated by the UN General Assembly
to assist states in addressing statelessness.
The UNHCR led #ibelong campaign was launched on 4 November 2014. For
details about the campaign, see http://ibelong.unhcr.org/en/home.do.
13
INTRODUCTION
For this inaugural World’s Stateless report, we decided to focus largely
on the question of statistical reporting of statelessness, with a hope to
contribute to a better sense of the task ahead by providing an insight
into the scope of statelessness around the world.3 It seemed a logical
place to begin, given that knowing who and where the stateless are
and how many people are afflicted by statelessness in the world today
can help to inform a campaign to end statelessness. That being said, it
is important to emphasise that the pursuit of statistical information
on statelessness, while being a useful exercise, should not happen in
isolation. It should complement wider efforts to protect the stateless,
reduce and ultimately end statelessness.
While statistical reporting on statelessness may sound like a
straightforward topic, it is far from being so. The very definition of
statelessness is a complex one, and it is often difficult to assess whether
people are stateless or whether they have a nationality but are simply
undocumented and/or are at risk of becoming stateless. Furthermore,
the phenomenon remains largely hidden. Thus, statelessness is a
problem that is both massive in scale, yet hard to fully measure.
States hold the primary responsibility to identify and protect stateless
persons, prevent and reduce statelessness. Statelessness also falls
within the UNHCR mandate, which counts among its responsibilities,
that of collating information on statelessness and enhancing our
understanding of the scope of the issue. Other UN agencies, NGOs and
academia also have a role to play in this regard.
UNHCR estimates that there are ‘over 10 million’ stateless persons in
the world. Due to gaps in the collection of data by governments, the
UN and civil society, a full breakdown of this figure is beyond reach:
statistical reporting by UNHCR, which uses data that has been collated
from a wide range of government and other sources, currently covers
only a total tally of some 3.5 million stateless persons. At the same
time, a significant proportion of the world’s stateless do not appear
to be ‘seen’ at all by the international community. Those who are both
3
14
This report takes its inspiration from, among others; Refugees International,
Nationality Rights for All: A Progress Report and Global Survey on Statelessness,
2009. It has also drawn ideas from global reports on other human rights and
humanitarian phenomena, such as; UNHCR, Global Appeal Reports, 20142015 edition, and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Annual Global
Overviews 2014 edition.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
stateless and in a refugee situation are counted only as refugees and
remain beyond the reach of current statelessness statistics. The same
is true of those stateless persons who also fall within the mandate
of a UN agency other than UNHCR, which is the case for stateless
Palestinians who are registered by the UN Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA). Many millions of people are undocumented as nationals for
a variety of reasons (including discrimination against ethnic minorities
and the rural poor and the general weakness of state institutions and
identification systems in some countries), and it is not clear whether
they are stateless, or at risk of statelessness. As this report will discuss,
these factors mean that the picture of the present state of statelessness
around the globe is not fully complete.
This report has significant limitations. No new empirical research was
conducted for the purpose of this report and it does not present any new
statistical information. Instead, it is based primarily on desk research,
with additional information being provided by reviewers, who were
able to draw on their extensive field research on statelessness. Thus,
without pretending to offer a comprehensive overview of statelessness
in every country and region, and fully aware that the pursuit of greater
statistical data is in itself not an end, but rather one of many (at times
conflicting) means to achieving greater protection for the stateless and
ultimately an end to statelessness through the granting of nationality,
this report seeks to complement and build on UNHCR’s reporting on
statelessness by starting to fill in some of the aforementioned gaps. For
instance, where available, data from other sources is used to provide an
estimate of the number of stateless persons in those countries which
are widely acknowledged to host significant populations but for which
UNHCR is not able to report statistics at present. The report also looks
at available data relating to stateless refugee populations and stateless
populations under other UN mandates with a view to including all
persons who are “not considered as a national by any state under the
operation of its law”4 in this global snapshot of statelessness.
As the statistical picture gets clearer, we will in future be able to more
confidently estimate the global stateless population. As more mapping
of and research on statelessness is carried out by states, UNHCR, NGOs
and academia; as government data collection exercises and mechanisms
4
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 360
U.N.T.S. 117, 1954, Article 1(1).
15
INTRODUCTION
are adjusted to make the identification of statelessness possible (e.g.
in population registries and national censuses); as methodologies to
count stateless persons applied in different countries or contexts are
strengthened; as international guidance on the interpretation and use
of the definition of statelessness is increasingly applied by all actors,
we will be able to produce more comprehensive and accurate data on
statelessness. Thus, while acknowledging the need for further data
collection and analysis to fully map the issue and to track progress of
the campaign to end statelessness, this report hopes to contribute at
least as a first step towards a clearer picture of the world’s stateless.
The structure and content of this report
This report has four chapters, but does not need to be read sequentially
from beginning to end. As a reader, we hope you will pick and choose
the sections that are of interest and relevance to you.
Chapter one provides an overview of the ’problem of statelessness’.
The inclusion of such a chapter in this report is a reminder that
any discussion or action related to statistics should not happen in
isolation, but should always be related to and complement our efforts
to protect stateless persons and reduce statelessness. Appreciation
of the qualitative scope of the problem of statelessness focuses the
quantitative aspect of the problem (which is the subject of this report)
as one that demands serious and urgent attention in order to facilitate
the achievement of the ultimately more important protection and
reduction objectives. While many readers of this report will have a
sound understanding of statelessness and thus may choose to skip
this chapter, we also hope that this report will reach new audiences,
who will find this a useful overview and introduction to statelessness.
Furthermore, we hope that through this section, we adequately make
the case for statelessness being integrated and prioritised by persons
working in other disciplines that have an impact on, and are impacted
by statelessness.
Chapter two contains the core analytical content of the report – as it
identifies, analyses and critiques the key challenges related to mapping
statelessness. We believe that this text will be of most interest to persons
working on statelessness, and also those with statistical experience. In
this text, we identify some of the methodological challenges related
to the existing quantification of statelessness. We also identify further
16
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
challenges around populations that have not yet been included in
statelessness statistics. We hope that this chapter will serve to get
more people – in particular those with statistical expertise - thinking
about the statistical challenges related to quantifying statelessness,
and that it will catalyse action that results in stronger methodologies
being used and more groups being included.
Chapter three provides an overview of existing statistical information
on statelessness. This text was drafted primarily through reference to
desk research, but also benefited from the input of expert reviewers
with extensive field experience in various countries and regions. The
chapter is divided into sub-sections that provide regional overviews,
with a final two sub-sections looking at existing information on two
groups currently not included in statelessness statistics – stateless
refugees and stateless Palestinians. While some readers may find the
entire chapter relevant, we understand that most will be primarily
interested in the scope of the problem in their own country and/
or the countries relevant to their work. Therefore, we hope that the
information in this chapter has been organised in an easy to navigate
way (arranged by region and alphabetically under each region). The
purpose of bringing this information together was to provide a snapshot
of our collective knowledge of the statistical scope of statelessness in
the world today. I.e. this chapter does not claim to enhance our existing
knowledge, but rather presents it all in one place, so we may reflect
on where the biggest gaps lie, and what needs to be done in future
to further knowledge in this area. Please note that the chapter does
not discuss all countries in the world or address all significant country
situations in the same level of detail.
Chapter four reflects back on the previous chapters and provides a
series of recommendations to states (responsible for protecting all
persons on their territories and subject to their jurisdictions, including
the stateless), the UNHCR (the UN agency mandated to work on
statelessness), and civil society (that increasingly has a role to play on
the issue).
17
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
1
THE PROBLEM OF
STATELESSNESS
I. STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under international law, a stateless persons is someone “who is not
considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law”.5
Nationality, in this context, refers to a particular type of legal bond
between an individual and a state.6 It is a type of formal membership that
results in rights and duties on both sides. The individual, for instance,
holds the right to reside in the territory and the state a corresponding
duty of admission; the individual holds a duty of allegiance (which
may include a duty to perform military and/or national service) and
the state the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its
nationals abroad. Where a person lacks any nationality, he or she does
not enjoy the attached rights or duties, resulting in a lack of protection.7
A stateless person is seen and treated as a foreigner everywhere, as a
national nowhere.
5
6
7
See above, note 4.
Citizenship is commonly used as a synonym for nationality, also referring to this
specific type of legal bond between a person and a state. In some disciplines
and various domestic or regional contexts, nationality and citizenship can also
have distinct meanings, but within writing on statelessness – and in this report
– the two terms are used interchangeably.
It is important to note however, that all persons – including those who are
stateless – are protected by international human rights law. Thus, while the
stateless may not necessarily benefit from rights attached to citizenship (such
as the right to vote), they are entitled to the general protection of international
human rights law.
19
1 THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
Each state sets the conditions for acquisition and loss of its nationality
– an act which is an expression of self-determination and a legitimate
exercise of sovereignty – within the limits set by international law
(including in relation to the avoidance of statelessness). Whether
an individual is considered to be a national by a particular state will
therefore depend on that state’s domestic nationality law, including
how the rules are interpreted and applied in practice.8 A person is left
stateless either where he or she has failed to acquire any nationality to
begin with (i.e. at birth), or where he or she has lost or been deprived
a nationality that was once held, without acquiring another. For the
purposes of determining whether a person is stateless in accordance
with international law, it is not relevant how or when he or she came to
be without a nationality, only whether a nationality is held at the time
the assessment is being made.
The two core international treaties on statelessness are the 1954
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.9 As their names
imply, the former – very similar in content and structure to the 1951
Refugee Convention – sets out the protection framework for stateless
persons (complementing the subsequent international human rights
treaties), whereas the latter sets out the international standards
related to the avoidance and reduction of statelessness. In addition
to the two statelessness treaties, many human rights treaties also
contain standards that are relevant both to the protection of stateless
persons and the avoidance/reduction of statelessness. In terms of the
latter, the right to a nationality is well established under international
law, and the existence of statelessness can be viewed as the most
extreme violation of this right. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which enjoys almost universal ratification, contains a safeguard
against statelessness,10 and the Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Discrimination Against Women protects against gender
8
9
10
20
In applying the definition of a stateless person, determining whether a person
is “considered as a national by a state under the operation of its law”, requires
a careful analysis of how a state applies its nationality laws in practice, in that
individual’s case. UNHCR, Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, 30 June
2014, paragraphs 23-24.
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, U.N.T.S. 989,
1961.
See Articles 7 and 8, read in conjunction with Article 3, Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. A/RES/44/25, 1989.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
discriminatory nationality laws – one of the causes of statelessness.11
Thus, the identification of stateless persons and the collation of
statistical information on statelessness, is relevant not only to assess
states’ compliance with the statelessness treaties, but also with the
more widely ratified human rights treaties.
It is important to point out that in finding a person to be stateless, it is
not relevant where in the world that person is. A person can be stateless
in the country in which he or she was born, has always lived and has all
family ties. Equally, a person can be stateless in a migratory context –
for instance, losing nationality prior to, as a consequence of or at some
point after crossing an international border. Statelessness rests on the
fact of lacking any nationality, nothing more. Most stateless persons
have not moved from their homes and live in what can be described
as their own country. Yet, due to the added vulnerability of stateless
persons to discrimination, human rights abuse and even persecution,
statelessness can also prompt forced displacement. Some stateless
persons, then, become internally displaced persons (IDPs), asylum
seekers and refugees. Where a person who “is not considered as a
national by any state under the operation of its law” also falls within
the scope of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
he or she is a stateless refugee.12 That someone can simultaneously be
both stateless and a refugee, asylum seeker or IDP does not lessen their
experience of statelessness, which should be taken into consideration
when protecting and finding durable solutions for them.
With regard to the identification of stateless persons, for the
purposes of statistical reporting or otherwise, it is also important
to note the distinction between statelessness and the situation of
being undocumented, of undetermined nationality and/or at risk
of statelessness. As will be explored in the next section, universal
birth registration and the provision of other life documents remains
a significant challenge in many parts of the world. The lack of such
documentation can mean that the person is stateless (e.g. where
denied documentation because the state does not consider the person
to be a national), but more often, such lack of documentation does
not mean a lack of nationality, despite it being a significant barrier
11
12
Article 9, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, G.A. Res. A/RES/34/180, 1979.
See above, note 8, paragraph 15.
21
1 THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
to proving nationality. Indeed, persons without documentation are
at heightened risk of statelessness when compared with those who
do have adequate documents, and some may become stateless in
the future (e.g. where unable to establish or prove links to the state
of nationality such that this state no longer considers the person as a
national). Risk is always a question of degree, however, so the problem
is a complex one, deserving of further dedicated study. In some
countries, there is no commonly held definitive proof of nationality,
so evidence of statelessness may be built up over multiple rejections
for documentation by the state (refusal to register to vote, refusal of
ID card, refusal of passport…). When dealing with such persons, it is
pertinent to question if identifying them as stateless would serve any
protection purpose. The starting point must be to push for them to be
recognised as nationals by the country to which they have the strongest
links. This would often require scrutiny and assessment of nationality
laws and policies, their implementation and the documentation that
confirms nationality. If persons of undetermined nationality and/
or at risk of statelessness are ultimately recognised as nationals of
a particular country, without ever being deemed to be stateless, this
would be the ideal outcome. However, the question of how long their
status is to remain undetermined, before concluding that they are
actually stateless is a difficult one, to which international law does not
seem to have a ready answer. This grey area between ‘statelessness’
and ‘nationality’ shows that they are two sides of the same coin, and
that it can be harmful to address the one without sensitivity to the
impact on the other.
22
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
II. CAUSES OF STATELESSNESS
There are a variety of circumstances that give rise to statelessness
at birth or in later life, and this section highlights some of the most
common causes. As this section will elaborate, there is often an element
of discrimination and/or arbitrariness at play, when individuals or
entire groups become stateless. Discrimination and arbitrariness can
manifest itself in an obvious, aggressive and even persecutory manner,
such as when large communities are deprived of their nationality
based on ethnicity or religion; or it can be more subtle and latent, such
as the failure of states to prioritise legal reform that would plug gaps
in the law which could cause statelessness. Thus, it is worth reminding
ourselves that while states do have significant freedom to set out their
own membership criteria, they also have a responsibility to protect
against discrimination and arbitrariness, and to uphold international
standards. Statelessness most often occurs when states fail to do so.
Conflict of nationality laws
The classical example is where state A confers nationality by descent
while state B confers nationality by place of birth, but the combination
of a particular individual’s birthplace and parentage is such that
neither nationality is acquired. Neither state A nor state B necessarily
have ‘bad’ laws or have picked out the person concerned as being
undeserving of nationality, he or she simply fails to qualify under the
regular operation of the rules of either state with which he or she
has connections. Unless safeguards are in place in the law to prevent
statelessness from arising,13 the regular operation of these states’
nationality laws can leave people stateless. While this may seem
like an unlikely and marginal occurrence, the scale of international
migration today is such that conflicts of nationality laws are becoming
more commonplace, increasing the need for safeguards to ensure
the avoidance of statelessness. Brazil and Indonesia are among the
countries which have introduced such safeguards in recent years in
order to address significant problems of statelessness for their citizens
and their descendants living abroad.14
13
14
Such as those laid out in the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
Brazil reformed its constitution in 2007 to make it easier for children born
abroad, to Brazilian parents, to acquire Brazilian nationality. Indonesia
23
1 THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
State succession
A particular context in which the risk of a conflict of nationality laws
is high, and where a large number of persons may simultaneously be
affected, is that of state succession. When part of a state secedes and
becomes independent, or when a state dissolves into multiple new
states, the question emerges as to what happens to the nationality
of the persons affected. The new nationality laws of successor states
may conflict and leave people without any nationality, while the redefinition of who is a national of the original state (where it continues
to exist) may also render people stateless. Most often in the context of
state succession, it is vulnerable minorities who are associated with
either the successor or parent state who are deprived of nationality,
exposing the discriminatory motivations and arbitrary nature for such
exclusion. Common types of state succession which have resulted
in large-scale statelessness are the dissolution of federal states into
independent republics (for instance, in the countries of the former
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia15) and the more recent cases of state
secession (for instance, with the splitting off of Eritrea from Ethiopia
and South Sudan from Sudan16). Situations of emerging or contested
statehood complicate this picture further, leading to unique challenges
around nationality and statelessness (for instance, for the Palestinians17
and the Sahrawi18). Today’s world map looks very different from that
of a few decades ago and political upheaval is likely to continue to
bring changes to borders and sovereignty in the years to come. Solving
existing cases of statelessness that have already been created by
changes in political geography and forestalling new cases in the event
of future situations of state succession is one of the major challenges
that the international community faces in addressing statelessness.
The legacy of colonisation
While the de-colonisation process technically would be categorised
as a form of state succession, the unique challenges presented require
15
16
17
18
24
amended its nationality law in 2006 to limit the loss of nationality due to longterm residence abroad to those cases in which the person concerned would
not be rendered stateless.
See sections 3.IV and 3.V on statelessness statistics in Asia and Europe.
See section 3.II on statelessness statistics in Africa.
See section 3.VIII on stateless Palestinians.
See sections 3.VI and 3.VII on statelessness statistics in the Middle East and
North Africa and on stateless refugees.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
separate attention. Many of the most large scale and entrenched
situations of statelessness in the world today were born out of the
experiences of colonisation, de-colonisation and consequent nationbuilding. In such contexts, newly independent states (many of which
never had a common pre-colonial national identity) have had to deal
with borders arbitrarily drawn (often dividing ethnic groups) peoples
forcibly migrated (for labour) and the consequences of decades,
sometimes centuries of colonial rule which successfully pitted different
ethnic and religious groups against each other, privileging some and
marginalising others, as part of a wider divide and rule policy. It is not
surprising that many newly independent states thus struggled with
nation building, national identity and the treatment of minorities.
While colonial history does not justify in any way discrimination,
arbitrariness and disenfranchisement, this historical context must be
understood and addressed in order to reduce statelessness.
Arbitrary deprivation of nationality
Large-scale statelessness can also be caused by the arbitrary
deprivation of nationality outside the context of state succession.
Arbitrary acts can involve the collective withdrawal or denial of
nationality to a whole population group, commonly singled out in
a discriminatory manner on the basis of characteristics such as
ethnicity, language or religion, but it can also impact individuals who
are deprived of their nationality on arbitrary and discriminatory
grounds. In many cases, the group concerned forms a minority in the
country in which they live. Sometimes they are perceived as having ties
to another state, where they perhaps share common characteristics
or even ancestral roots with a part of the state’s population (such
as in the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar19 and persons of Haitian
descent in the Dominican Republic20); in other instances, the state
uses the manipulation of nationality policy as a means of asserting or
constructing a particular national identity to the exclusion of those
who do not fit the mould (such as in the case of the Kurds in Syria
in the 1960s and the black population in Mauritania in the 1980s21).
Nationality law may also be designed to restrict the access of certain
groups to economic power, especially the right to own property (such
as in Liberia or Sierra Leone, where only those who are ‘negroes’ or
19
20
21
See section 3.IV on statelessness statistics in Asia.
See section 3.III on statelessness statistics in the Americas.
See section 3.VI on statelessness statistics in the Middle East and North Africa.
25
1 THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
‘of negro-African descent’ may be citizens from birth). In some cases,
individuals or groups are targeted for their political beliefs, since
nationality is the gateway to political rights and its withdrawal can be
a means of silencing political opponents. Deprivation of nationality on
security grounds can also be arbitrary if certain criteria – including
due process standards - are not met. Other forms of discrimination in
nationality policy can also create, perpetuate or prolong problems of
statelessness. For instance, where a woman does not enjoy the same
right to transmit nationality to her child as a man, children are put at
heightened risk of statelessness. A stateless, absent or unknown father,
or one who cannot or does not want to take any steps that might be
required to confer his nationality to the child, can spell statelessness
because the mother is powerless to pass on her nationality. This form
of gender discrimination is still present in more than 25 countries
around the world and many more laws contain other elements of
discrimination against women – or sometimes men – in the change,
retention or transmission of nationality.22
Administrative barriers and lack of documentation
The hand of discrimination can often be seen at play when it comes
to obtaining documentation of nationality, with ethnic and religious
minorities, nomadic communities and the rural poor more likely to face
barriers than religious and ethnic majorities and urban populations. A
surprising number of situations of statelessness actually stem from the
poor administration or documentation of a country’s nationals during
the period of state formation or when the first citizenship registration
was carried out. In Thailand,23 Lebanon and Kuwait,24 for instance,
statelessness became a feature of the landscape many decades – and
several generations – ago, when the nationality laws were first being
administered by the state. Elsewhere, individuals and groups who have
had difficulties accessing birth or other forms of civil registration may
find themselves unable to satisfy the state that they have connections
with it. For example, without proof of place or date of birth, nor of
parentage, states may dispute these facts and fail to consider a person
as a national even if he or she would qualify under the law on the basis
22
23
24
26
See for more details on this issue UNHCR, Background Note on Gender Equality,
Nationality Laws and Statelessness 2014, 8 March 2014. See also the Global
Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights: www.equalnationalityrights.org.
See section 3.IV on statelessness statistics in Asia.
See section 3.VI on statelessness statistics in the Middle East and North Africa.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
of these ties. The risk of statelessness is greatest where those who
have been unable to access civil registration also belong to minority
or nomadic groups, migrant or refugee populations, or are affected
by state succession.25 The Roma in countries of the former Yugoslavia
and elsewhere in Europe are an evident example of where lack of
documentation and civil registration can evolve into a problem of
statelessness when several such factors converge.26
The inheritance of statelessness
The single biggest cause of statelessness globally in any given year
– in the absence of fresh, large-scale situations stemming from
one of the above problems – is the inheritance of statelessness.
Many contemporary situations of statelessness have their roots at
a particular moment in history, such as state succession, the first
registration of citizens or the adoption of a discriminatory nationality
decree stripping a whole group of nationality, as outlined above. Yet
these situations endure and even grow over time because the states
concerned have not put any measures in place to stop statelessness
being passed from parent to child – or do not implement existing
measures to that effect. Furthermore, these situations migrate to
new countries along with the (often forced) migration of stateless
persons abroad, as in migratory contexts too, statelessness is allowed
to continue into the next generations. This means that most new cases
of statelessness affect children, from birth, such that they may never
know the protection of nationality. It also means that stateless groups
suffer from intergenerational marginalisation and exclusion, which
affects the social fabric of entire communities.
25
26
See also UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on civil registration, 17
October 2013, No.111 (LXIV).
See section 3.V on statelessness statistics in Europe.
27
1 THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
III. IMPACT OF STATELESSNESS
This brings the discussion to the broader question of the impact of
statelessness. What difference does it make to people’s lives, in our
modern world, to not have any nationality? The simple answer: a
massive and often very harmful difference. Modern bureaucracies are
crafted in a way that takes the possession of a nationality as the norm.
Statelessness is the neglected, in fact largely forgotten state of exception.
To exercise rights or access services, to be treated as belonging or even
with respect – in practice commonly requires a nationality.
Human rights are those rights which are to be enjoyed by all of us,
by virtue of our belonging to the human race and in accordance
with human dignity. However, without any nationality, a number of
rights are immediately out of reach even according to the mechanics
of contemporary human rights law. Political rights in particular,
such as the right to vote or stand for election and to perform certain
public functions, may be restricted to a country’s citizens,27 such that
stateless persons are not owed them by any state. Disenfranchisement
therefore is an immediate and almost universal problem for stateless
persons,28 limiting their ability to influence laws and policies that
affect them or to call for reforms that would bring an end to their
statelessness. This undoubtedly also contributes to the invisibility of
and lack of attention to the problem of statelessness in general, and
its resultant manifestation and growth over generations. Developing
countries may also limit the enjoyment of economic rights by nonnationals in certain circumstances,29 which may be used to justify
27
28
29
28
Article 25, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G. A. Res 2200A
(XXI), 1976.
There may be some minor exceptions, where special arrangements with regard
to voting for non-nationals in certain elections or the recruitment of long-term
residents into public functions does create some political space for stateless
individuals. For instance, in Estonia, the country’s long-standing stateless
population is eligible to vote in municipal elections. Such arrangements are
far and away the exception, rather than the rule, and don’t necessarily mean
that the right of stateless persons to vote has been recognised, and can instead
mean that they have merely been granted a privilege that can be revoked.
Article 2(3), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), 1976.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
the economic disempowerment of stateless persons. With regards to
other rights, states can treat nationals and non-nationals differently
if that treatment can be justified by the pursuit of a legitimate aim
and if the principle of proportionality can be satisfied – providing
a margin of discretion that may be detrimental to the position of
stateless persons.30 All this means that the stateless experience a
degree of deficit of rights under international human rights law. Yet,
this should only be limited. As the UN Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has stated, any such restrictions must
be seen as an exception to the principle of equality and consequently,
“must be construed so as to avoid undermining the basic prohibition of
discrimination”.31 Similarly, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) has asserted that “The ground of nationality
should not bar access to Covenant rights (...) [which] apply to everyone
including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless
persons, migrant workers and victims of international trafficking,
regardless of legal status and documentation”.32 Furthermore, as the
Human Rights Committee, has stated, “in general, the rights set forth
[…] apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, irrespective of his or
her nationality or statelessness”.33
In practice though, the situation of many stateless individuals and
groups betrays a far greater problem: as a non-national generally and
as a stateless person in particular, actually effectuating rights can be
distinctly challenging.
The harsh reality for many stateless persons is a story of lack of
opportunity, of lack of protection and of lack of participation. They
face challenges in all areas of life, including: entering or completing
schooling; accessing healthcare services for preventative medicine
30
31
32
33
See further on the rights of non-citizens, Office of the High Commissioner For
Human Rights, The Rights of non-Citizens, 2006.
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation No. 30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, UN Doc.
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3, 2004, Para 2.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20:
Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 2, Para 2 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc.
E/C.12/GC/20, 25 May 2009, Para 30.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15: The position of aliens
under the Covenant, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, 1986.
29
1 THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
or to treat an injury or illness; finding
gainful employment or signing a
labour contract; buying or inheriting a
house; registering a car or a business;
obtaining a birth certificate, driving
license, marriage certificate or even
death certificate; opening a bank
account or getting a loan; falling back
on social security; and enjoying a
pension. Obtaining a passport or indeed
being issued any form of identity
Issa Abdul Faraj, Nubian elder,
documentation is extremely difficult if
formerly stateless, Kenya
you are not the national of any country,
such that many stateless persons have
no proof that they exist and no means
Transcribed from UNHCR, Kenya: Nubians
in Kibera (http://unhcr.org/v-4e5ca05e6)
by which to identify themselves in their
day-to-day interactions with the state
or with private entities. International
travel is almost inconceivable, unless by illicit – and dangerous –
means. Free movement within the state of residence, even if it is where
the person was born and has all of his or her ties, can also be difficult
due to the inability to provide proof of identity if stopped at a security
checkpoint or in a random check by the police. Arbitrary arrest and
detention, including in the person’s home country, is not uncommon.
In some cases, detention becomes prolonged or even indefinite, if the
state is intent on expulsion, but no other country can be found which
would allow the person to enter. Where a stateless person wants to
assert their rights, or where they have become a victim of crime or
exploitation, their statelessness can also stand in the way of getting help
from the authorities or finding their way to a court. Their complaint may
be readily dismissed or ignored, and they are powerless to take a stand
against this due to their status of disenfranchisement.
“In Kenya, if you do not have an ID
card, you don’t exist. Technically you
cannot even leave your house, because
if you leave your house and you are
challenged ‘Where is your ID?’ That is
considered a crime. Now, if you cannot
leave your house, how do you live? How
do you look for a job? You can’t even
open a bank account, you can’t transact
business, you cannot own anything,
because you don’t exist”
In some situations, statelessness actually becomes a conduit or
catalyst for human rights violations, be they perpetrated by the state
or because of a vacuum of state protection. Stateless persons may be
subjected to specific regulations or practices that do not apply to other
residents in a state. For instance, there may be restrictions on their
movement within the territory or they may be denied land rights. In
extreme cases, further debilitating and dehumanising restrictions
may also be imposed, such as on marriage or reproductive rights.
30
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Being slated as outsiders, not just by
“The price to pay for the perpetuation
their country but by all countries, may
of statelessness is high not only
indeed make the stateless easy targets
for the persons affected, but also
for victimisation within society as
for the countries in which stateless
they may be seen as less deserving of
persons live. Statelessness prevents
compassion, protection and support.
participation in socio-economic, but
also in public affairs, and results in the
They may be a target for exploitative
alienation of entire groups from society,
practices, such as forced labour or
which is passed on from generation to
extortion. Indeed, the treatment
generation”.
of stateless persons can, in certain
instances, amount to persecution.34
Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights
Moreover, the constraints that
stateless persons experience, coupled
with the fact of not being formally
recognised as a member of their – or indeed any – country, has an
evident impact on their well-being. A diminished sense of self-worth
and in some instances a confused sense of identity and belonging can
prompt sentiments of hopelessness, anxiety and depression.
The foregoing consequences of statelessness can also create a ripple
such that they are felt not just by those individuals who are directly
impacted because they lack nationality, but also by their family
members, wider society and the international community of states.
Statelessness of a single family member can create problems for all due
to the difficulties it causes and the tension and stress that can ensue. A
mother who holds nationality, but whose son is stateless because she
was not able to confer her nationality to him under the law, worries that
he will never have a family of his own because he is condemned to a life
without nationality and to pass this on to his own children, were he to
have any. A country in which a whole community has been excluded,
disenfranchised, stigmatised and perhaps even vilified through the
denial of nationality may face social tensions that affect both the
stateless and citizens alike. Mounting tensions between the ‘in’ group
and those portrayed as outsiders can also fuel conflict. Where conflict
arises or where the stateless face such severe restrictions or violations
of their fundamental rights that they are forced to seek sanctuary
elsewhere, their displacement becomes a concern for the receiving
country and the international community as a whole.
34
Consider the example of the Rohingya of Myanmar – see sections 3.IV on
statelessness statistics in Asia and 3.VII on stateless refugees.
31
1 THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
IV. LINKS BETWEEN STATELESSNESS AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS
In describing the causes and impact of statelessness, the intersection
between statelessness and a range of other international concerns
has already started to emerge. Given that statelessness, as a standalone issue, has not received the same kind of attention as many
other international challenges to date, it is helpful to identify these
links as a way to demonstrate how addressing statelessness can
contribute to solving other problems – and vice versa. The following
paragraphs therefore offer some brief reflections on the links between
statelessness and other international concerns.35
If people matter
Stateless persons are among the world’s most vulnerable. Stateless
persons are deemed and treated as foreigners – mostly unwanted - by
every country in the world, including the country in which they were
born, the country of their ancestors, the country of their residence,
the country they happen to find themselves in today and the country
they find themselves expelled to tomorrow. Stateless persons face an
extreme form of exclusion that impacts both their sense of dignity and
identity, and their ability to exercise even the most basic human rights,
like the right to education, the right to work, the right to health and
the right to marry. The marginalisation and discrimination that groups
such as ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, migrants or displaced
people all face becomes that much greater and more entrenched when
it is compounded by statelessness. So, if people matter, statelessness
matters.
If human rights matter
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” –
so opens the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The
contemporary human rights framework is premised on notions
35
32
Note that a version of this section was published as a letter outlining why
statelessness matters, in support of the launch of UNHCR’s #ibelong campaign
on 4 November 2014, and can be found online here: http://www.institutesi.
org/whystatelessnessmatters.pdf.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
of equality, liberty and dignity, on
the idea that we hold basic rights
“Everyone has the right to a nationality”
because we are human beings. Yet the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
universality of human rights also rests
Article 15
on the premise that everyone enjoys a
nationality (as laid down, as a right in
the UDHR and recognised under every
other major human rights instrument). The human rights system
recognises that states may reserve some rights for their citizens – such
as the right to participate in government – placing these out of reach for
stateless people. So until statelessness is eradicated, the fundamental
aspiration of universal human rights remains just that, an aspiration.
Moreover, in practice, statelessness is a proven barrier to the ability
to exercise a wide range of other rights. Far greater effort is needed
to ensure that these barriers are overcome and stateless people have
access to the protection of national and international human rights
law. So, if human rights matter, statelessness matters.
If children matter
Many of the world’s stateless persons are actually children. In fact, in
every region of the world, children are born into statelessness every
day. Some children inherit this status from their stateless parents,
creating an intergenerational problem. Others simply aren’t able to
acquire their parents’ or any other nationality due to discriminatory
laws and policies (such as laws which do not allow women to confer
nationality to their children) or the failure to of governments to include
or properly implement the few simple safeguards that should be found
in every nationality law to prevent childhood statelessness. Without a
nationality, can have difficulty exercising their rights, become outcasts
in their own country, struggle to feel like they belong and grow up
to be disenfranchised and excluded adults. So, if children matter,
statelessness matters.
If democracy matters
Nationality is the gateway to political participation. Stateless persons
cannot vote, stand for election or effectuate change through regular
political channels. Their statelessness suppresses their voices and
renders their opinions obsolete. In countries with large stateless
populations, whole sectors of the constituency are disenfranchised.
Elsewhere, statelessness is a tool in the arsenal of those who would seek
33
1 THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
to manipulate the democratic process, with deprivation of nationality
a means of silencing the opposition. To ensure a level and inclusive
democratic playing field, stateless persons must also be heard. So, if
democracy matters, statelessness matters.
If development matters
Difficulties accessing education and employment; restricted property
rights; lack of opportunities to own or register a business; limited
access to a bank account or a loan; and, in some cases, the threat of
extortion, detention or expulsion; these factors can trap stateless
persons in poverty and make it extremely challenging for them to
improve their circumstances. Where statelessness affects whole
communities over several successive generations – as it often sadly
does, such communities can be neglected by development actors and
processes. This can result in a significant lag behind others in the
country or region in terms of development. Statelessness means a
waste, of individual potential, of human capital and of development
opportunities. So, if development matters, statelessness matters.
If preventing displacement matters
Statelessness is a recognised root cause of forced displacement,
with stateless people fleeing their homes and countries in order
to find protection as IDPs or refugees elsewhere. In 1993, UNHCR’s
Note on International Protection acknowledged that preventing and
reducing cases of statelessness is “vital for the prevention of refugee
flows”.36 This link has been a key motivation for the agency to further
operationalise its statelessness mandate. At the same time, addressing
nationality disputes and tackling statelessness where it arises can be a
key tool in resolving refugee situations because it can pave the way for
successful voluntary repatriation and reintegration. So, if preventing
and resolving situations of displacement matters, statelessness
matters.
36
34
UNHCR, Note on International Protection, A/AC.96/815, 31 August 1993; see
also UN General Assembly, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/50/152, 9
February 1996.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
If peace and security matter
The vulnerability, exclusion, despair, frustration and sometimes
persecution experienced by stateless persons can spark other
problems. Casting a group as ‘others’ or ‘outsiders’ by denying them
access to nationality – in spite of clear and lasting ties to the country –
can contribute to attitudes of suspicion and discrimination. This may
cause a dangerous build-up of tension within and between communities
that may lead to conflict. Disenfranchised, discriminated against and
excluded, some stateless persons can also be more susceptible to the
negative influence of extremists who prey on desperation. On the
other hand, disputes surrounding nationality, membership, belonging
and entitlement can also hamper peace-building efforts. So, if peace
and security matter, statelessness matters.
If size matters
Many millions of people are affected by statelessness around the world
today. UNHCR estimates that there are at least 10 million stateless
persons, while further desk research conducted for this report
suggests that the true number likely surpasses 15 million (see further
section 4 below). That number does not include the many more who
feel the impact of statelessness, for instance because a close family
member lacks any nationality. There are enough stateless people to
create a medium-sized country: at 15 million stateless persons, such a
country would have the 70th largest population in the world – although
this is not suggested as a solution.37 So, if size matters, statelessness
matters.
37
According to July 2014 estimates of country population sizes offered in the CIA
World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html
35
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
2
THE CHALLENGE OF
MAPPING STATELESSNESS
As stated in the introduction, the primary focus of this report is to
explore the scope and reach of the problem of statelessness globally.
This is a distinct and extremely difficult challenge, particularly
because statelessness is often an invisible phenomenon. This section
of the report offers a summary of some of the main methodological
difficulties in quantifying statelessness, followed by a discussion of
situations of statelessness which are, at present, largely ‘hidden’ to
statistics.
States hold the primary responsibility to identify stateless persons on
their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, in order to implement
their international obligations towards these populations – be it under
the two UN statelessness conventions or in accordance with the broader
body of international human rights law. The UN General Assembly
has also requested UNHCR to regularly inform the international
community on the magnitude of the problem of statelessness.38 In
fulfilment of this request and of UNHCR’s statelessness mandate, the
Executive Committee of UNHCR has tasked the Agency to undertake
and share research on various aspects of statelessness, including on
the scope of the problem, and has encouraged states to cooperate
with UNHCR in this regard.39 Since 2004, UNHCR has reported, on
a country-by-country basis, the number of persons who fall under
its statelessness mandate, and remains the only organisation which
systematically collates statistics and regularly reports on the number
of stateless persons in the world.40 Just one other organisation has
38
39
40
See above, note 36, UNGA Resolution.
See for example, UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Identification,
Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons,
No. 106 (LVII), 6 October 2006.
Note that the source of the data which is reported by UNHCR varies from
37
2 THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
ever attempted such a global survey: Refugees International. The
report ‘Lives on Hold’, published in February 2005, includes a ‘Global
Review of Statelessness’, broken down by country.41 In the report, a
short narrative including, where possible, an estimate of the size of
the population, was provided for over 80 countries, and Refugees
International estimated the then global stateless population to be over
11 million.42 Refugees International’s global statelessness survey was
updated in 2009, with a new issue of the report, this time entitled
‘Nationality Rights for All’,43 concluding that “around 12 million people
worldwide” were stateless.44 These Refugees International reports
are the only other source, alongside UNHCR’s statistical reporting,
of country-by-country statelessness data and they have since been
at least partially superseded by developments or new information
in a number of countries, as well as by a further clarification of the
interpretation and application of the definition of a stateless person.45
Although the statistics collated by UNHCR are therefore the most
complete and up-to-date source of data on statelessness globally, this
does not mean that the responsibility for identifying and counting
stateless people falls exclusively upon UNHCR to perform. Indeed, as
mentioned, states must identify stateless persons on their territory,
in order to implement their international obligations towards these
populations. These obligations derive from the two UN Statelessness
Conventions,46 but also from general human rights law and thus all
states, not merely states which are party to the two Statelessness
Conventions have a responsibility in this regard. UNHCR, other UN
agencies, and civil society, including academia, can support the
41
42
43
44
45
46
38
one country to another. It may, for instance, be extracted from population
census data or population registries, come from a survey or mapping exercise
specifically undertaken to identify stateless persons or be based on crosschecked estimates provided by civil society or even media reports.
Refugees International, Lives on Hold. The Human Cost of Statelessness, 2005.
Ibid, page 7.
Refugees International, Nationality Rights for All. A Progress Report and Global
Survey on Statelessness, 2009.
Ibid, page 1. Note that this figure matches the UNHCR estimate for the global
statelessness population at the time. See UNHCR, Global Trends 2007, 2008;
and UNHCR, Global Trends 2008, 2009.
See above, note 8. See also, UNHCR, Summary Conclusions of Expert Meeting The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law, Prato, Italy, 2010.
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (note 4 above)
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (note 9 above).
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
identification and quantification of situations of statelessness by also
conducting data collection. Statistics on statelessness can thus be
found in a diverse array of reports and data sources.
When collating and reporting on the number of persons under its
statelessness mandate, UNHCR uses a range of sources in order to
ascertain or estimate how many stateless persons are in any given
country. Beyond what UNHCR reports, further data on the scope and
reach of statelessness is also dispersed across a wide array of reports
and documents. For instance, the United States Department of State
includes information on statelessness in its annual Country Reports
on Human Rights.47 Some data on the number of stateless persons in
specific countries may be found in these reports but this information
is not compiled separately in a single overview. Information, including
statistical data, on statelessness can further be found in, among others,
some state and stakeholder reports to UN human rights treaty and
charter bodies, documents of international, national and grassroots
NGOs with relevant missions (e.g. working on minority rights issues
or on forced displacement), media reports, national human rights
institutes and government documents or databases. Much of this data
is already in the public domain, but it is not easy to navigate, or verify
for reliability, accuracy, authenticity or being up-to-date. As such, there
is varying information (of varying quality) available on the situations of
statelessness which are not or not fully ‘counted’ in UNHCR statistics,
as explained below.
47
The most recent of these can be accessed at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
hrrpt/.
39
2 THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
I. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN QUANTIFYING
STATELESSNESS
Statistical coverage on statelessness has improved significantly in
recent years.48 Yet it is still difficult to get a full and reliable picture of
the magnitude of statelessness in all countries. In this respect, it must
be acknowledged that quantifying statelessness is a complicated task,
requiring several methodological hurdles to be overcome.49 Here are a
few of those challenges:
Definitional issues
The definition of statelessness is not as straightforward as it appears to
be. The term “not considered as a national… under the operation of its
law” has been authoritatively interpreted as being both a question of
fact and law.50 Consequently, there are persons who would – according
to the letter of the law - be eligible for a particular nationality, who are
nonetheless stateless because they are not considered as nationals by
the competent authorities of the relevant state.51 It may not be apparent
to the persons concerned, nor even to an outside observer, that they
are stateless. Thus, there will always be people whose statelessness is
hidden and who are not captured by the statistics. On the other hand,
there are also likely to be individuals who self-identify as stateless –
for instance because they do not feel connected to their state due to
either political beliefs or personal sentiments – even though they do,
in fact, hold its nationality. This too, is inevitable, given that acquisition
of nationality occurs automatically for most people (usually at birth),
without taking into account the views of the individual with respect
to the state concerned. Historic and enduring miscomprehension of
the scope and application of the definition of a stateless person also
48
49
50
51
40
See section 3.I on general trends in statelessness statistics.
See also UNHCR, Guidance document on measuring stateless populations, May
2011.
See above, note 8.
This is for instance the case for otherwise stateless children born in Lebanon
who, according to the letter of the law, acquire Lebanese nationality, but this
safeguard is not implemented in practice. See in this regard, Frontiers Ruwad
Association, Invisible Citizens: Humiliation and a life in the shadows. A legal and
policy study on statelessness in Lebanon, 2011.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
impedes the accurate quantification of statelessness. Moreover, many
states do not have a definition of statelessness in their domestic law
or maintain a definition – or an interpretation – that diverges from
that understood under international law, such that it is not applied
uniformly across all jurisdictions.
Gaps in data collection tools
In most countries, statelessness is not high on the political agenda.
Consequently, state authorities may not deem it important to put in
place measures to identify stateless persons and enhance the accuracy
of their figures on statelessness. In other cases, it is a deliberate
strategy to deny that there are any stateless persons, by asserting
that those who cannot obtain recognition of nationality are in fact
nationals of another country. Of the 142 national censuses between
2005 and 2014 for which the UN possesses questionnaires, only 112
include questions on nationality of which less than 25% provide for
statelessness to be recorded.52 The United Nations Statistics Division,
in the instruments it uses to collect data from states on an annual
basis (annual questionnaires) and following a census exercise (census
questionnaires) also does not request reporting on the number
of stateless persons, while it does ask for data on the number of
refugees as well as on the number of citizens, foreign or non-citizens
and persons of unknown citizenship status on a state’s territory.53
Furthermore, “although UNHCR and other UN agencies frequently carry
out registrations of refugees and in some cases internally displaced
people, it is not common for them to register stateless persons”.54 Thus,
it is not merely governmental data which is incomplete, the UN’s own
data often does not provide a comprehensive picture of statelessness.
Indeed, it may not be advisable for UNHCR to seek to conduct largescale registration of stateless persons because in the majority of cases,
stateless persons remain in their ‘own country’ whereby the ideal
solution for them is the grant of nationality by the state concerned, not
recognition and registration as stateless persons.55
52
53
54
55
UNHCR, Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014-2024, November 2014,
page 24.
These instruments can be downloaded here: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/products/dyb/dybquest.htm. See in particular section 2 of the
annual “Population Estimates Questionnaire” and table 20 of the “Population
Census Questionnaire: General Characteristics”.
See, for instance, UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees, 2012, at page 108.
See above, note 8, paragraphs 58-61.
41
2 THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
Lack of adequate or comprehensive data collection
Even where data collection exercises include information on
statelessness, this does not always yield comprehensive or reliable
results. For instance, a 2011 mapping study of statelessness in the
UK identified several methodological flaws in the UK’s statelessness
data.56 Furthermore, while there are reported to be 1,951 stateless
persons in the Netherlands, the real figure is likely to be much higher
because tens of thousands of persons have been registered as being
of ‘unknown nationality’ due to procedural difficulties in establishing
either nationality or statelessness for the purposes of registration
in the population database.57 This problem is often linked to the
definitional issues discussed above and how accurate any given figure
is will clearly depend on the methodology which underlies the data.
Some statelessness-specific data collection exercises that have been
carried out, such as in Myanmar and the Philippines, were limited in
their scope – i.e. collecting data only in part of the country or only with
respect to one particular target population affected by statelessness.
These studies offer an important contribution towards a clearer
picture of the problem but more research is needed to unearth the full
scope of statelessness in such countries.
Unwillingness or lack of awareness to self-identify as stateless
Many stateless persons identify with the country of their birth
and descent to the extent that they do not see themselves as
being stateless. Even if they do, there is often reluctance to draw
attention to this, due to the obvious disadvantages associated
with statelessness, which can range from bureaucratic difficulties,
to barriers to accessing socio-economic rights to increased
vulnerability to arrest and detention. This means that data
collection which relies on self-identification, such as is often the
case in a national population census, may not be entirely accurate.
To overcome this, for instance in the context of census data, it is
possible to undertake an informed analysis of other relevant data
56
57
42
UNHCR and Asylum Aid, Mapping statelessness in the United Kingdom,
November 2011.
Advisory Committee for Migration Affairs, No country of ones own. An Advisory
Report on treaty protection for stateless persons in the Netherlands, December
2013, English summary available at: http://www.acvz.org/publicaties/
summaryREPORT39.pdf. See also, section 3.V on statelessness statistics for
Europe in this report.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
(e.g. suitable proxies) which has been captured – such as that on
country of birth or what identity document is held.58
Protection considerations in the identification of statelessness
As explained, the categorisation of persons as stateless or not is not
always a straightforward exercise. Undocumented persons and those
who are of undetermined nationality may be at risk of statelessness and
indeed, some of them are likely to already be stateless. In a migratory
context, a presumption that such persons could be stateless and giving
them the opportunity to be identified as such in line with international
guidance, is likely to enhance protection.59 When such persons are in
their own countries however, they will almost always receive greater
protection if confirmed to be nationals and the ‘stateless’ label can be
counter-productive. Consequently, for persons in their own countries
it is better to begin with a process that scrutinises nationality law
and policy and its implementation against international standards,
and determines nationality. However, even in such situations, where
the denial of documentation is long-lasting (even inter-generational),
there would come a point when it is better to acknowledge such
persons as stateless, rather than leaving them in the limbo of having no
legal status. Such complexities mean that identifying and counting the
stateless can be a very difficult exercise, and that ultimately protection
and the reduction of statelessness must be at the heart of all such
actions.
58
59
For an example of a proposed method for analysing census data with a view to
identifying statelessness, see above, note 56, page 55.
Note that the process of statelessness status determination in the migration
context may also lead to the establishment of nationality – i.e. the person
concerned may be found to be a national of country x, resulting in the
prevention of statelessness and enjoyment of national protection.
43
2 THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
II. ‘HIDDEN’ STATELESS GROUPS
As mentioned above, since 2004, UNHCR has reported on the global
statelessness population. Yet, the data reported by UNHCR for the
number of persons under its statelessness protection mandate only
fills in part of the picture with regard to the global stateless population.
The following paragraphs explore three specific characteristics of
UNHCR’s statistical reporting on statelessness that have a big impact
on what the figures show and, more importantly perhaps, who remains
hidden as a result.
1. Not all countries in the world are able to report data on
statelessness
The first time UNHCR reported country-by-country data on persons
under its statelessness mandate, in its 2004 Global Trends report, it
identified a total of 41 countries with stateless persons for its reporting.
Of these, a reliable figure for the number affected was identified for 30
countries; the remaining 11 were marked with an asterisk. The total
number of stateless persons accounted for in this first set of UNHCR
statistics was just under 1.5 million,60 and no estimate was given for
the global number of stateless persons.61
A decade later, UNHCR now has reliable data on the number of stateless
persons in 75 countries.62 This means that statelessness remains
unmapped in over 50% of the world’ states. While the problem may not
exist on a significant scale in all of these countries, there is no denying
60
61
62
44
UNHCR, 2004 Refugee Global Trends, June 2005.
The first time a global population estimate was given in UNHCR’s Global Trends
reports was in 2005, when the number was estimated to be “at least 11 million
persons”. UNHCR had previously issued estimates for the overall magnitude
of the problem in its Global Appeal – a fundraising document not intended for
detailed statistical analysis. For instance, in its 2002 Global Appeal (published
in December 2001), UNHCR estimated there to be 8.9 million stateless persons
worldwide. This was the first Global Appeal to provide an estimate. In the same
report the following year, this dropped to one million, where it remained in the
2004 Global Appeal as well, before changing to ‘millions’ in the 2005 report.
See UNHCR, Global Trends 2013, 2014, for statistics for the stateless population as
at end-2013. This data is presented by UNHCR in a statistical table that is an annex
to the Global Trends report, and which has also been annexed to this report.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
that the data remains incomplete and many cases of statelessness do
not appear in the statistics. At a macro level, this problem is mitigated
by the extrapolation of an estimate for the actual number of stateless
persons globally (i.e. at least 10 million, while just 3.5 million are
accounted for in country-level data). At a regional and country level,
nevertheless, greater effort is needed to fill in the gaps in statistical
coverage. The goal set by UNHCR, as part of ‘Action 10’ in the campaign
to end statelessness, of achieving quantitative data coverage for 150
states by 2024 is therefore a welcome one.63
2. Figures for different countries are compiled from different
data sets – that use different methodologies – and do not
always reveal the full picture
Collecting data on statelessness is the primary responsibility of
governments, in order to implement their international obligations,
but may also be carried out by other actors in support of this or in
the execution of their own work. UNHCR collates this data to offer
a global snapshot of the available statistics on statelessness. It has
already been noted that gathering data on statelessness is a complex
task. That it is shared by different actors, in different places, leads
to a variety of approaches – not all of which are able to deliver the
same level of reliability or produce readily-comparable data. Some
government databases, for instance, do not disaggregate their data
such that stateless persons are identified separately from refugees
or from persons of unknown nationality. This could lead to both
over and under-reporting on statelessness. For example, for some
countries, the number includes persons of ‘undetermined nationality’
(e.g. in Sweden), even though not all such individuals will actually be
stateless;64 while in others it does not (e.g. in the Netherlands).65 Some
figures may include a number of stateless refugees, even though it is
UNHCR’s policy to report such persons in its refugee statistics only,
because the methodology used to collect the data by the organisation
or authority which did so – such as a government population registry –
63
64
65
See above, note 52.
See above, note 62 and Annex to this report, the introductory note at the top of
UNHCR’s statistical table on persons under its statelessness mandate.
Around 2,000 persons are registered as stateless in the population registers
in the Netherlands, but a further 80,000+ are registered as being of ‘unknown
nationality’, in part due to procedural difficulties in establishing statelessness
for the purposes of registration. For further details, see above, note 57.
45
2 THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
simply does not account for different types of residence or protection
status, only nationality. Some figures are based on census data, the
accuracy and currency of which is affected by the challenge of relying
on self-identification as a means to count stateless persons and by the
fact that a census is usually carried out only every 10 years.66 Data can
become outdated in the interim period between census exercises and
can fail to reflect newly emerging situations of statelessness, but also
efforts to reduce the number of cases through conferral of nationality.
Some statelessness figures are based on a specific data collection
exercise which only targeted part of the country or a specific stateless
population within the country – such that it does not account for
statelessness in other regions or affecting other groups. Examples
of this include Myanmar, where only stateless Rohingya who were
encountered in a survey conducted in three townships in Rakhine state
are included, to the exclusion of an estimated 500,000 more stateless
Rohingya found elsewhere in the county,67 as well as any of the other
populations affected by statelessness in Myanmar.68 This limitation
is acknowledged in a footnote in UNHCR’s statelessness statistical
table which points out that the number refers to “Muslim residents of
northern Rakhine State”. Another example is the Dominican Republic,
where the number of 210,000 stateless persons only accounts for the
first generation of persons of Haitian descent born on Dominican soil
who have been left stateless following a Constitutional Court ruling
stripping them of nationality. There is no data available on the second
and third generations which have been simultaneously affected, and
are therefore not included in the current statistics.69 In this case,
however, UNHCR has not included an explanatory footnote in its 2013
statistics table.
66
67
68
69
46
According to the footnotes in UNHCR’s statistical table, several of the
figures included in the Global Trends 2013 were actually drawn from a 2009
(Azerbaijan), 2010 (Russian Federation and Tajikistan) or 2011 population
census (multiple countries, including Croatia, Czech Republic and Poland).
Thailand’s figure is based on the country’s 2000 national census.
Fortify Rights, Policies of Persecution. Ending abusive state policies against
Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, February 2014.
See for instance, IRIN, The Forgotten Ghurkhas of Burma, 20 May 2014; Report
of the High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, 2001, page 60, available
at: http://www.indiandiaspora.nic.in/diasporapdf/chapter20.pdf.
United Nations Population Fund, Primera Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes en
la República Dominicana [First National Survey of Immigrants in the Dom. Rep.],
2013.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
The methodological difficulties of compiling statelessness data across
different countries have led to several situations where the number
of stateless persons reported substantially under-represents the true
scale of the problem. It is valuable to continue to include such data in
UNHCR’s overviews of country statistics even when it only tells a part
of the statistical story and helpful that in many cases this partial data
is noted through the inclusion of a footnote (as for Myanmar). Yet, it
would be beneficial if such countries were identified consistently, i.e.
in all cases, through an explanatory footnote which clearly indicates
that only partial data is available.
3. Countries where there is known to be a significant problem
of statelessness, but no reliable figure, are indicated with an
asterisk in UNHCR’s statistical compilations
Wherever UNHCR has “information about stateless persons but
no reliable data”, these countries are marked with an asterisk (*)
in the statistical table which identifies persons under UNHCR’s
statelessness mandate.70 UNHCR has taken this approach since it
first started to report country-by-country data on statelessness
and there certainly is an attraction to it. Usefully, it allows the
Agency to flag problems of statelessness and identify countries
where the response to statelessness perhaps needs to be stepped
up, while avoiding the publication of unreliable or unverified data
that could give a false impression of the situation. UNHCR presents
its statelessness data in the form of a simple table, without room
for more than a footnote’s explanation per country. This means
that there is no space to discuss the likely range of the stateless
population or comment on whatever estimates may be available for
the number affected. So, even if there is some data on the potential
magnitude of statelessness within one of the ‘asterisk countries’,
this is not included alongside the rest of the global statistics to
avoid misrepresenting the scale of the issue.
The asterisk, however, disappears when the data is transposed from
UNHCR’s statelessness-specific table to the main overview in which
UNHCR compiles all of the figures for its populations of concern. In
the latter table – the only one which is included within the body of the
70
As explained in a note at the top of this table.
47
2 THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
UNHCR Global Trends reports71 – the asterisks are replaced by dashes
(-), indicating that “the value is zero, not available or not applicable”.
The countries believed to be home to a significant stateless population,
then, do not stand out from those states for which no data for or
problem of statelessness has been flagged at all. This arrangement
should change, to ensure that countries with significant stateless
populations are also indicated in the main overview. What is also of
interest with respect to the ‘asterisk countries’ is just how long a state
can remain in this category. Of the 19 countries that are marked with
an asterisk today, five were already flagged in this manner in 2004 and
10 in 2005. This shows that the lack of reliable data on statelessness
can, itself, be a protracted and at times political issue – confirming that
it is important to identify such situations and that it does not make
sense to ‘wait’ to act decisively on statelessness until the problem has
been comprehensively mapped. Rather, initiatives to protect stateless
persons and to prevent and reduce statelessness should continue
and be further strengthened while also paying due attention to
opportunities to better identify and quantify statelessness.
Looking beyond UNHCR’s reporting on statelessness to alternative
data sources, it is possible to make at least a small start on filling
in some of the gaps in countries which currently have asterisks as
placeholders – even if this only means identifying a range of estimates
for a given country. For instance, it is evident that statelessness affects
tens of thousands of people at least in countries such as Lebanon and
Zimbabwe. Estimates for the total stateless population in the former
range from 80,000 to 200,000;72 in the latter from 80,000 to 600,000.73
While a precise quantification of the problem is still not possible on
the basis of such widely ranging estimates, what this information does
show is that, collectively, the asterisks in UNHCR’s table represent a
massive number of stateless persons who are not presently accounted
for in global statistics. Looking at these numbers helps to explain
why UNHCR has estimated that, despite only accounting for some 3.5
million persons under its statelessness mandate, the total number of
stateless persons globally is actually over 10 million.
71
72
73
48
To access the statelessness-specific table 7, users must download the full set of
statistical annexes to UNHCR’s Global Trends reports, which are made available
in the form of an Excel file, and pull up tab 7 in the spreadsheet.
See above, note 51.
See above, note 41; K. Ridderbos, “Stateless former form workers in Zimbabwe”,
Forced Migration Review, 32, 2008.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
4. Only persons exclusively under UNHCR’s statelessness
protection mandate are reported in its statelessness statistics
UNHCR has a separate programming and budget structure in place
to operationalise its distinct statelessness mandate (so-called ‘Pillar
2’). With this in mind, to ensure that data is made available in a way
that effectively informs the process of “crafting strategies”74 to address
statelessness under this part of its mandate and to avoid doublecounting of populations of concern, UNHCR’s statistical reporting only
indicates the number of persons exclusively under its statelessness
protection mandate. To reach the total figure for persons of concern
to UNHCR, this number is added to those from the other population
categories (refugees, asylum seekers, etc). Thus, while international
law defines a stateless person as anyone who is “not considered as
a national by any state under the operation of its law”,75 in UNHCR’s
statistical reporting on statelessness, stateless persons who also fall
within the protection mandates of other UN Agencies (at present,
only the UN Relief and Works Agency – UNRWA), and those who also
come under other UNHCR protection mandates (such as refugees, IDPs
or asylum seekers) are not counted as stateless. The below diagram
demonstrates the significance of this approach to the statistical picture
on statelessness globally:
74
75
See above, note 39.
See above, note 4, Article 1. The Article 1 definition of a ‘stateless person’ is
regarded as being part of customary international law and thus applicable to
all states, including those that are not party to the Convention.
49
2 THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
The total global
stateless population
The stateless population
within UNHCR’s protection
mandate (including refugees,
asylum seekers and IDPs)
The stateless population
exclusively
within UNHCR’s statelessness
rotection mandate
(i.e. non-refugees,
asylum seekers or IDPs)
UNHCR’s statistical reporting then, even if it were to capture reliable
data for all countries, excludes from its statelessness statistics a
significant number of persons who are stateless as a matter of
international law. While it does not mean that these individuals are
not ‘counted’ somewhere or do not receive appropriate protection,
it does make it difficult to see the full magnitude and spread of the
statelessness phenomenon.
The Rohingya are a good case study to demonstrate the statistical
complexities that emerge when one group has multiple protection
needs. While according to some estimations there are 1.33 million
Rohingya within Myanmar,76 there are also approximately a further
one – 1.5 million Rohingya who live outside Myanmar.77 Of the total
76
77
50
See above, note 67.
This includes some 31,000 registered Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and
another 40,000 registered in Malaysia, but also an estimated further 300,000500,000 unregistered Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, a few thousand
unregistered in Malaysia and in Thailand, tens of thousands in Pakistan and
hundreds of thousands in Saudi Arabia, as well as more scattered across a
number of other countries. See, for instance, the records of a Parliamentary
Debate in the United Kingdom, answers given by Ian Pearson based on
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
global Rohingya population of an estimated more than 2.5 million (of
which a significant majority are stateless), only 810,000 are counted
as stateless in the UNHCR statistics.78 The following groups are not
included:
- Rohingya refugees, asylum seekers and those in a refugee like situation
who are included in UNHCR refugee statistics - this includes the
31,145 registered refugees and 200,000 of the estimated 300,000 –
500,000 unregistered Rohingya population in Bangladesh, 40,660
registered in Malaysia and smaller numbers in other countries.
- Rohingya in a refugee like situation who are not included in
UNHCR refugee statistics – The unregistered Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh who are not included in the UNHCR refugee statistics
(between 100,000 and 300,000), the Rohingya in Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (totalling hundreds of
thousands) and the Rohingya who have been unable to register as
refugees in Malaysia, Thailand and other countries.
- Rohingya asylum seekers yet to be registered – throughout the world,
in much smaller numbers than the two above groups.
There is also uncertainty as to whether and how Rohingya IDPs in
Myanmar (of whom there are an estimated 140,000) and Rohingya
resettled refugees (likely to be a small group due to the lower numbers
of resettlement) are represented in the statelessness statistics. And
the Rohingya are not the only stateless group that suffer displacement
and persecution. As discussed later in this report, there are other
significant groups of stateless refugees who are also ‘counted’ only in
UNHCR’s refugee statistics.
Looking at stateless groups that fall under the mandates of other UN
agencies leads us to stateless Palestine refugees, registered by UNRWA,
who are also not reflected in UNHCR’s statistical reporting as refugees
or stateless persons.79
78
79
information from UK missions, on 1 February 2006, available at: http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060201/
text/60201w16.htm
See further sections 3.IV and 3.VII on statelessness statistics for Asia and
stateless refugees.
See further section 3.VIII on stateless Palestinians.
51
2 THE CHALLENGE OF MAPPING STATELESSNESS
Excluding these other stateless populations from the global
statelessness statistics can create confusion with regard to the situation
of particular populations as well as the application of international
standards. For example, since the onset of the Syrian crisis, the
number of stateless persons reported in the country has dropped from
300,000 at the start of 2011 to 160,000 at the end of 2013. Only part of
this reduction is due to efforts to resolve the situation, namely through
the naturalisation of a segment of the stateless group on the basis of a
specially adopted decree. Much of the decrease in numbers comes as
the result of forced displacement prompted by the conflict. A closer
look at how the figure has shifted indicates that only around half of
those who have now been removed from the statelessness statistics
have acquired a nationality – the others remain stateless, but are now
counted only as refugees. It is important to remember that for them
and other groups of stateless refugees, as well as stateless persons of
Palestinian origin, their statelessness is still a relevant fact with respect
to their treatment under international law. For instance, safeguards
against statelessness such as those found in the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child apply to all situations in which statelessness threatens,
necessitating their inclusion in the statistics in some manner.80
80
52
For a further discussion of the drawbacks of boxing individuals into just one
definitional category, see Amal de Chickera, “A stateless person, a refugee and
an irregular migrant walk into a bar…”, European Network on Statelessness,
July 2014, available at: http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/stateless-personrefugee-and-irregular-migrant-walk-bar%E2%80%A6.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
3
GLOBAL STATELESSNESS
STATISTICS
The total number of persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate
which is accounted for in its statistics today is approximately 3.5
million.81 A further 19 countries are marked with an asterisk,
signifying the presence of a significant but as yet unquantified stateless
population. It is still widely acknowledged that, despite a steady
improvement in statistical reporting, many situations of statelessness
continue to go unreported or are underrepresented in the figures.
Taking this into account and based on further information that UNHCR
has access to – but does not include in its statistical reports – UNHCR
estimates the actual total global stateless population today to be
“at least 10 million persons”.82
This chapter looks more closely at currently available statelessness
statistics – both those which have been collated and reported by UNHCR,
as well as data from other sources that are not included within UNHCR’s
statistical reporting. Firstly, a few further observations are offered with
regard to the general picture of statelessness data globally and some of
the regional trends. Then, a regional summary, which highlights some
individual countries of interest, is given. This summary looks at data
reported by UNHCR but also explores alternative statistical sources,
either where UNHCR is not presently able to indicate a figure or where
the UNHCR-reported figure may not represent the full situation. Finally,
the situation of stateless refugees and of stateless Palestinians is also
discussed – two groups not reported in UNHCR statelessness statistics
at present, for the reasons already outlined above.
81
82
Note that data from some countries also includes persons of ‘undetermined
nationality’, who may – if nationality verification or statelessness determination
were to be carried out – be confirmed as nationals of a particular country
rather than found to be stateless.
See above, note 62.
53
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
It should be noted that because this report is based on a desk review
and therefore uses secondary sources throughout, it has not been
possible to verify the quality of the estimates which are featured.
Regrettably, the method by which the data has been captured – and
even how the definition of statelessness has been used – is often not
specified in the respective reports and documents making it difficult
to assess whether it can be deemed accurate or comprehensive.
Nevertheless, this compilation of additional data which exists in the
public domain will hopefully complement the UNHCR-collated data
to offer a picture of where things currently stand with respect to the
mapping of statelessness globally.
54
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
I. GENERAL TRENDS
A figure or estimate for the total number of stateless persons
worldwide –over 10 million – only tells us a small part of the story
with regard to this phenomenon. It is of equal or even greater interest
to take a closer look at how that number is composed: where are the
world’s stateless people? There are several ways to approach this
question. One way is to identify which countries have the largest
stateless populations according to data currently reported by UNHCR.
While any global benchmark is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, this
report has adopted 10,000 persons as the cut-off point for what it will
consider to be significant stateless populations.83 At the end of 2013
there were 20 countries worldwide with a reported figure of over
10,000 stateless persons. These countries are shown, in order of the
magnitude of statelessness reported in each, in table 1 below.84
83
84
It is important to acknowledge that due to significant disparities in population
size between countries, a population of 10,000 or even of less stateless persons
in one country may be a highly significant issue, while in a country with a much
larger population this may be considered, domestically at least, to be a more
marginal phenomenon. Nevertheless, the 10,000 stateless persons cut-off has
been selected as an objective benchmark which can also be readily applied
against the available statelessness statistics.
Note that in some of these countries, such as Sweden and Poland, statelessness
exists as a largely migratory phenomenon – i.e. these states are not necessarily
significant source countries of statelessness, but host a sizeable number
of stateless persons from other parts of the region and the world on their
territory.
55
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
Table 1: Countries with >10,000 reported stateless persons
Myanmar
810,000
Côte d’Ivoire
700,000
Thailand
506,197
Latvia
267,789
85
Dominican Republic
210,000
Russian Federation
178,000
Syrian Arab Republic
160,000
Iraq
120,000
Kuwait
93,000
Estonia
91,281
Saudi Arabia
70,000
Malaysia
40,000
Ukraine
33,271
Brunei Darussalam
20,524
Sweden
20,450
Kenya
20,000
Germany
11,709
Kyrgyzstan
11,425
Viet Nam
11,000
Poland
10,825
Total reported in 20 countries
with >10,000 persons
3,385,471
85
It is of interest to note the total number of stateless persons who reside
in this limited set of countries is 3.385 million. Thus, 97.6% of the
number of stateless persons reported in UNHCR statistics globally
can be found in just 20 countries. Less than 84,000 stateless persons
are spread across the remaining 55 countries for which a figure on
The figure is for the total number of stateless persons reported by UNHCR in
Latvia – separated in UNHCR’s statelessness statistical table into two entries
(267,559 ‘non-Citizens of Latvia’ and 230 other stateless persons).
85
56
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
statelessness is reported. This perspective on the global statelessness
figures demonstrates that although it is an issue that affects people
in all parts and indeed most countries of the world, the spread of the
problem is uneven. Paying greater attention to (creating opportunities
to) resolving these few large-scale situations of statelessness is
necessary if real progress is to be made on the objective of ending
statelessness in a decade.
Another way to explore the statistics is by region. UNHCR organises
its work, including its reporting, into five regions: Asia and the Pacific,
Africa,86 Europe, the Middle East and North Africa and the Americas.
Table 2 provides an overview of the number of persons under UNHCR’s
statelessness mandate in each of these regions as reported in its end2013 statistics.
Table 2: Stateless persons reported per region
Asia and the Pacific
1,422,850
Africa
721,303
Europe
670,828
Middle East and North Africa
444,237
Americas
210,032
World total
3,469,370
In terms of absolute numbers, most of the persons UNHCR reports as
falling within its statelessness mandate can be found in Asia and the
Pacific. Africa and Europe, which come second and third respectively,
report approximately half the number of stateless persons found in
Asia.
Asia and the Pacific also stands out in terms of the number of countries
which are significantly affected. Of the 20 countries worldwide that
reported a figure of over 10,000 stateless persons (see table 1):
seven are in Europe, six in Asia and the Pacific, four in the Middle
East and North Africa, two in Africa and one in the Americas. Of the
nineteen countries marked with an asterisk, nine are in Asia and the
86
Covers Sub-Saharan Africa.
57
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
Pacific, six in Africa, three in the Middle East and North Africa, one
in the Americas and none in Europe.87 Thus, Asia and the Pacific has
not only the largest total number of reported stateless persons, but
also the most countries for which there is information of substantial
stateless populations, but no reliable figure to report. This suggests
that even if a full count of stateless persons were achieved globally,
the Asia and the Pacific region would likely remain that in which
statelessness affects the greatest number of people. It is important to
put this into perspective, however, by recalling that Asia and the Pacific
is home to far more people in absolute terms than any other region in
the world – the population is more than four times that of any of the
other regions.88 The Americas currently reports the lowest number of
stateless persons – all but 32 of whom are reported in a single country
– and there is just one country where there is information of further
statelessness issues but no reliable data.89 As such, the Americas is
indisputably the region with the fewest number of people affected by
statelessness. This demonstrates the advantages of a jus soli approach
to nationality (i.e. conferral of nationality at birth to all children born in
the territory), the norm in the Americas, when it comes to preventing
and reducing statelessness: even where statelessness were to arise, it
will not be passed on to the next generation.
87
88
89
58
The 19 countries are the Bahamas, Bhutan, Cambodia, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Libya,
Madagascar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe. An overview and a summary
of information available with regards to the stateless populations in these
countries is provided in chapter 3 of this report.
If overall population size is taken into account and the number of persons
identified as falling within UNHCR’s statelessness mandate were to be
expressed as a percentage of the total population, Asia and the Pacific would
actually show a smaller prevalence of statelessness. A rough calculation of
such percentages based on 2010 global population statistics from the UN
Department of Social and Economic Affairs (Population Division, World
Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, 2013) puts the number of reported
statelessness cases in Asia at 0.036% of the overall population, as compared
to for instance the Middle East and North Africa which would have the highest
prevalence rate at 0.103%.
This is a country with a total population of under 400,000 people, of whom
more than 80% are citizens (Bahamas 2010 Census of Population and Housing,
available at: http://statistics.bahamas.gov.bs/download/024494100.pdf).
Thus, even if statelessness affected a large proportion of the non-citizen
population, it would not add a significant number to the total number of
stateless persons in the Americas.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
More generally, if we were to assume that each of the 19 asterisked
countries also host a stateless population of over 10,000 persons,90
then the issue of statelessness is, at best, only half-mapped: There are
as many countries with significant stateless populations for which
there is no reliable data at all, as there are countries with significant
stateless populations for which data is reported. The data gap is not
just noteworthy in terms of the overall population that remains to be
properly captured, but also the spread of countries across which they
can be expected to be found.
The following sections provide a more detailed look at who is stateless
in each of the five regions into which UNHCR organises its work. The
report will provide a brief narrative on each region, before discussing
a selection of those countries which are reported to be home to more
than 10,000 stateless persons or marked by UNHCR with an asterisk
as having a significant, but as yet unquantified, stateless population. It
will also touch on a number of other situations of statelessness that are
presently un- or underreported in UNHCR’s statistics. Where available,
it will present alternative sources of statistical data on each of these
statelessness situations. The aim is to offer a fuller – though by no
means full – picture of who is stateless around the world, and where.
90
This may not, in fact, be the case for all countries marked with an asterisk but
is likely in the majority of these states (as set out further below under each of
the regional sections).
59
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
II. AFRICA
UNHCR reports a total of 721,303 persons under its statelessness
mandate in sub-Saharan Africa, but the phenomenon remains
largely unmapped across the region so the number of persons
affected is likely to be much higher. UNHCR’s current figure for
stateless persons in Africa is comprised almost exclusively of the data
reported for just two countries (Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya).91 There
are, at present, six countries in Africa where UNHCR has identified
statelessness to be a significant problem but is unable to report any
data. Four of these were indicated with an asterisk when UNHCR
first began statistical reporting in 2005,92 showing that a dearth of
information on the scope of statelessness in Africa is a protracted
problem.93
Table 3: Countries in Africa with over 10,000 stateless persons or marked with *
Côte d’Ivoire
700,000
Kenya
20,000
Democratic Rep. Congo
Eritrea
*
Ethiopia
*
Madagascar
*
South Africa
*
Zimbabwe
*
91
92
93
60
*
There are only two other countries for which UNHCR reports any statistic for
the number of persons under its statelessness mandate in Africa: Burundi
(1,302 persons) and Liberia (1 person). See above, note 62.
These are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia and
Zimbabwe. See UNHCR, 2005 Refugee Global Trends, June 2006.
See also on the challenges of quantifying statelessness in Africa, B. Manby,
“How will UNHCR’s statelessness campaign affect Africa?”, African Arguments,
12 November 2014, available at: http://africanarguments.org/2014/11/12/
how-will-the-unhcrs-statelessness-campaign-affect-africa-by-bronwenmanby/.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
The causes of statelessness in Africa include: the legacy of colonialism
and the impact of restrictive post-colonial nationality policies; more
recent cases of state succession; and mounted pressure on citizenship
policy with the spread of multiparty democracy.94 Discrimination
against minority and (perceived) immigrant groups, whereby the laws
of some African countries explicitly restrict citizenship rights on a
racial or ethnic basis,95 increase the risk of statelessness – particularly
against a backdrop of significant migration and displacement.
Discrimination against women also features in the nationality laws of
some African states and may be further compounding or perpetuating
situations of statelessness, with eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa
denying women equal rights to men with respect to the nationality of
their children.96 Other legal, political and sociological complexities,
including cross-border populations and nomads, the lack of adequate
protection for foundlings and other undocumented or vulnerable
children, mismanagement of civil status and nationality documentation
all also contribute to a difficult environment with respect to the
avoidance of statelessness.
Côte d’Ivoire
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 700,000
The explanatory note on Côte d’Ivoire in the statistical table in which
UNHCR reports a stateless population of 700,000 persons provides
a good indication of the context in which statelessness arises in
the country. It indicates that this figure is arrived at on the basis of
government estimates for ‘descendants of immigrants’ (400,000)
and ‘children abandoned at birth’ (300,000). In Côte d’Ivoire then,
statelessness stems primarily from the restrictive nationality rules that
were adopted at independence, tightened in 1972, and implemented
in an even more limited manner over the last two decades with
respect to historical migrants and their descendants born in the
country. Since before independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has drawn
migrants from neighbouring countries; indeed, for a period the French
colonial authorities had a policy of forcibly importing labour from
94
95
96
See, in particular, B. Manby, Struggles for Citizenship in Africa, Zed Books, 2009;
see further the resources posted by the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative
at: http://citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/.
This problem is found, for instance, in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Malawi and to
some extent Mali.
See above, note 22; and B. Manby, Citizenship Laws in Africa, 2010.
61
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
the territory of what is now Burkina Faso. The new nationality law
adopted at independence provided for ‘foreigners’ to be able to opt for
Ivorian nationality within one year, and also provided for children of
foreign parents born on the territory after independence to have the
right to opt for nationality at majority. But it was unclear who exactly
needed to take these steps, and in the context of widespread illiteracy
almost none did so. The right to opt was removed in 1973, creating a
nationality law founded purely on descent. Nevertheless, the long-lived
regime of President Félix Houphouët Boigny continued to encourage
immigration and integrated historical migrants and their descendants,
distributing to them national identity documents and granting them
full rights of citizenship, including employment in public services
and the right to vote. In the mid-1990s, after the death of Houphouët
Boigny, Ivorian political leaders adopted a series of measures to deny
identification documents to all those who were perceived to be of
foreign origin; this deprivation of citizenship rights was at the heart
of the rebellion that broke out in 2002. With the installation of a new
government, following an election accompanied by significant violence
in 2010, some reform measures have been undertaken. In September
2013, legislation restored, as an exceptional and temporary measure,
the right suppressed in 1973 for foreign-born residents living in Côte
d’Ivoire since before independence and persons of foreign descent born
in Côte d’Ivoire between 1961 and 1973, as well as some descendants of
these groups, to acquire nationality through a declaration procedure.97
Another law removed gender discrimination in the right of a person to
transmit nationality to his or her spouse.98 However, these exceptional
measures leave untouched the highly restrictive general provisions
of the nationality code.99 It also seems that many of those affected by
statelessness have not applied for nationality under the temporary
provisions.100
97
98
99
100
62
Loi n. 2013-653 Portant dispositions particulaires en matiere d’acquisition de
la nationalite par declaration, 13 September 2013.
Loi No.2013-654 du 13 Sep 2013 portant modification du Code de la nationalite
ivorienne.
Although with the country’s recent accession to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness – and given the country’s monist system – it may
be possible to directly invoke provisions of this instrument to address relevant
issues.
Mirna Adjami, Statelessness and Nationality in Côte d’Ivoire, UNHCR,
forthcoming.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimated size of
stateless population unknown
There are no available estimates for the number of stateless people
in DRC. Since 2005, UNHCR statistics have flagged the country as one
where statelessness is a problem (though the problem is much older),
but a mapping of the situation in the country has not been possible
due to the decades of civil conflict and the political sensitivity of the
issue. There has, in fact, not been a national census in DRC since 1984.
Statelessness is understood to affect members of the Banyarwanda
population.101 DRC’s nationality law was amended several times in
response to political concerns around the status of the Banyarwanda.
At its most restrictive, from 1981 to 2004, the law gave nationality only
to “any person one of whose ancestors was a member of one of those
tribes established in the territory of the Republic of Zaire as defined
by its frontiers of 1 August 1885”,102 the date on which the borders
of the Congo Free State were officially recognised. In November 2004,
a new nationality law was adopted, which returned the foundation
date for nationality to 1960, as it had been in 1971. This change was
confirmed in the 2006 constitution. Although naturalisation was
also made slightly easier, the law still bases Congolese nationality
of origin on membership of “the ethnic groups and nationalities of
which the individuals and territory formed what became Congo at
independence”.103 The continued disputed status of the Banyarwanda
population — some of them entitled to Congolese nationality under
the 2006 constitution, some of them more recent immigrants — is a
significant contributor to conflict in the eastern region.104 The total
101
102
103
104
The Banyarwanda are those speaking the language of Rwanda, descended
from various groups: those whose ancestors have always lived on the territory,
ethnic Tutsis who migrated to the territory of present day DRC centuries ago,
Hutus and Tutsis who were brought by the Belgian colonial powers from
Rwanda to work on plantations, and refugees from conflicts in Rwanda and
Burundi.
See above, note 94, chapter 3.
Article 6, Loi n°.04/024 du 12 novembre 2004 relative a la nationalité
congolaise.
See above, note 94. See also, “Who belongs where? Conflict, displacement,
land and identity in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo”, Citizenship
and Displacement in the Great Lakes Region, Working Paper No. 3, March 2010;
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC): Procedure and conditions for Congolese nationals of Rwandan origin to
reinstate their nationality, 24 January 2006, COD100961.FE; Célestin Nguya-
63
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
Banyarwanda population is not known, but is likely in the hundreds
of thousands, possibly substantially over a million. For example, the
government reportedly estimated it to be approx. 1.9 million in the
1990s.105 There are no recent statistics, nor any information about how
many within this population are affected by statelessness; indeed, state
institutions are mostly not effective in the zones affected by conflict.
Kenya
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 20,000
As reported in UNHCR’s statistics, statelessness is estimated to affect
some 20,000 persons in Kenya – mainly members of minority groups.106
A footnote in UNHCR’s statelessness statistical table for Kenya indicates
that this figure is based on “currently available information on several
communities in Kenya” and is “under review pending further research
and mapping activities” – it is, as yet, unclear whether the estimate
will be revised up or down as a result of further study of the situation
in Kenya. A new constitution was adopted by referendum in 2010 and
removed gender discrimination in nationality law, while permitting
dual nationality for the first time. A new citizenship act in 2011 also
created a temporary procedure for stateless persons who could trace
their ancestry in the country since independence to apply for Kenyan
nationality. However no regulations were adopted to implement the
law, and no cases of recognition of Kenyan citizenship have been
reported based on these provisions. Among the groups currently
under threat of non-recognition of Kenyan nationality are those of
Somali descent and Muslims in the coastal region, whose applications
for nationality documentation are subject to additional and highly
onerous screening measures, in the context of concerns about threats
from terrorist attack.107
105
106
107
64
Ndila Malengana, Nationalité et citoyenneté au Congo/Kinshasa: Le cas du Kivu,
Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001.
See A. Makombo, “Civil conflict in the Great Lakes region: The issue of
nationality of the Banyarwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, in A.
Yusuf (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 5 Afr. Y.B. Int’l L., 49, 1997.
See, for instance, A. Hussain Adam, Making of Stateless People – The Kenyan
Style, 2013; Open Society Justice Initiative, Citizenship Discrimination and the
Right to Nationality in Kenya, 2009.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, An Identity Crisis? Study on the
Issuance of National Identity Cards in Kenya, 2007; Kenya National Commission
on Human Rights and UNHCR, Out of the Shadows: Towards Ensuring the Rights
of Stateless Persons and Persons at Risk of Statelessness in Kenya, 2010; Muslims
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Madagascar
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimates for the size of
the stateless population: more than 2,200 – up to 100,000
Madagascar has a sizeable community of Muslims of Indo-Pakistani
origin, often referred to as the Karana, who have been in the country
for more than four generations – i.e. since long before independence.
Some among this community failed to acquire any citizenship (be
it Malagasy, French, Indian, Pakistani, or English) at the time of
Madagascar’s independence and have not been able to resolve this
since. Madagascar’s 1993 national census reports 0.2% of Madagascar’s
12.3 million population as foreign and 9.3% of these - or 2,200 persons
- as stateless.108 This is likely to be an underrepresentation of the
number currently affected. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the
limitations inherent in reporting the size of a stateless population
based on self-identification in a census alone, for people may not know
or be reluctant to indicate their nationality status as stateless. Secondly,
Madagascar’s total population has since grown significantly – up to
21.3 million by 2011109 – and a lack of safeguards in the nationality
law to prevent statelessness being passed to the next generation
means that problem of statelessness is likely to have grown with it.
Thirdly, the perpetuation of statelessness is further compounded by
the fact that Malagasy women experience difficulties transmitting
their nationality to their children – even though the law should
allow for this if the father is stateless, access to nationality remains
a problem in practice. The combination of gender discriminatory
law and historical ethno-religious discrimination has perpetuated
statelessness in the country. Furthermore, naturalisation processes are
inaccessible, including to the Karana community.110 There has yet to be
a comprehensive mapping of statelessness in Madagascar to confirm
the current number of persons affected. Other sources that touched on
this question concur that reliable data remains unavailable. Refugees
International has suggested that the Karana population number some
108
109
110
for Human Rights, Persistent Human Rights Violations and Harassment by the
State to Muslim Communities in Kenya, Muhuri, Mombasa, 23 July 2014.
The national census report is available here: http://www.gripweb.org/
gripweb/sites/default/files/databases_info_systems/Madagascar_RGPH%20
Vol2%20Tome1.pdf .
UN Statistics Division, World Statistics Pocketbook, 2011 population figure for
Madagascar.
C. McInerney, “Accessing Malagasy Citizenship: The Nationality Code and Its
Impact on the Karana”, Tilburg Law Review, Vol.19, 2014, pp.182-193.
65
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
20,000 and within that group, “only a handful of individuals hold
citizenship rights”.111 The US Department of State, in its annual human
rights reporting, cited Muslim leaders who estimate that up to 5% of
the approximately two million Muslims in the country may be stateless
– this would amount to up to 100,000 people.112 Preparations are now
underway for the next population census, which will take place in
2016 and may present an opportunity to gather new data on the scale
of the problem of statelessness in the country.
Nigeria
Unreported in UNHCR statistics. Estimated number of stateless persons:
unknown
In 1979, constitutional reform in Nigeria introduced an ethnic
dimension to the criteria for citizenship, repeated in the 1999
constitution currently in force, which provides for citizenship by birth
to be acquired by “every person born in Nigeria before the date of
independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents
belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria”. Although
this provision only refers to persons born before independence, the
emphasis on belonging to a “community indigenous to Nigeria” ensures
that recognition of citizenship at the moment of succession of states
is based on ethnicity, and continues in practice in the recognition of
nationality of those born since then. These provisions, reinforced by
provisions relating to the respect for Nigeria’s ‘federal character’ in
state appointments, have created a strong emphasis on ‘indigeneity’
that, despite the lack of laws providing any more detailed framework,
pervades identification systems and that impacts both internal
migrants and those who have come from other countries. There is
no document that serves as definitive proof of Nigerian citizenship,
and currently no requirement to hold a national identity card (this
is being introduced). Statelessness is likely to be a substantial but
currently hidden problem in Africa’s most populous country.113 A 2002
judgement of the International Court of Justice granted sovereignty
over the Bakassi peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon, and other
111
112
113
66
See above, note 43.
US Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 2013:
Madagascar.
B. Manby, Nationality, Migration and Statelessness in West Africa, A study for
UNHCR and IOM, forthcoming.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
territory, to Cameroon.114 The number of people affected was also
disputed between Cameroon and Nigeria, but was alleged by Nigeria
to be more than 150,000. Nigeria rejected the judgment. In 2006, a
bilateral agreement was reached at Greentree, New York, between the
two countries, by which Cameroon promised, among other things, not
to force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula to leave the
zone or to change their nationality. The territory was formally handed
over to Cameroon on 14 August 2008, though a Nigerian presence
remained during a five-year transitional period, ending in 2013. There
have been problems in establishing recognition of nationality both
for those Bakassi residents who remained in their homes, in what is
now Cameroon (whether of Cameroon or Nigeria), and for those who
relocated to the Nigerian side of the border. For the time being, all
former or current Bakassi residents should be regarded as being at
risk of statelessness.115
Zimbabwe
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimates for the size of
the stateless population: 80,000 – 600,000
Dual citizenship was permitted on attainment of majority rule in
Zimbabwe in 1980, but forbidden from 1984. The 2001 Citizenship of
Zimbabwe Amendment Act strengthened this prohibition by requiring
proof of renunciation of another citizenship under the relevant foreign
law, and not only a declaration under Zimbabwean law that only one
citizenship was held. The government applied this amendment to
mean that even those people with only a claim to a foreign citizenship
(but who had made no attempt to claim another citizenship in fact) had
to renounce that potential citizenship. The vast majority of persons
affected by the amendment were farm workers and other migrants born
in neighbouring countries or one of whose parents or grandparents
were born in neighbouring countries, such as Malawi, Mozambique,
and Zambia.116 Most of these individuals lack identity documents,
including birth registration, and were caught in the difficult position
of not being considered as Zimbabwean nationals while not being able
to prove their origins to obtain citizenship of their countries of origin
or proof of renunciation of that citizenship. The number of persons
114
115
116
International Court of Justice, Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria, Cameroon v. Nigeria, 10 October 2002.
See above, note 113.
See above, note 94.
67
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
affected is unclear. In 2005, Refugees International estimated that some
80,000 foreign farm workers and their family members might have
lost their nationality.117 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
released a report in 2008 indicating that in fact up to 600,000 people
could be affected (30% of an estimated two million farm workers were
reported to be of foreign descent) and Refugees International revised
its figure to match this in 2009.118 The US Department of State 2013
human rights country report indicated that ‘independent groups’
estimated as that many as two million may have lost their Zimbabwean
nationality,119 but again did not indicate how many were thereby
made stateless and this high figure is not reported elsewhere. None
of these sources provide a figure for the number of persons actually
left stateless by loss of Zimbabwean nationality, nor do they provide
insight into the methodology that was used to arrive at the estimates,
so further research is clearly needed. Some neighbouring countries
reported that they did not recognise as their citizens, those who were
rejected by the Zimbabwean government as Zimbabwean citizens.120
Constitutional amendments adopted in 2009 removed gender
discrimination in the law but did not resolve the issue of ‘potential’
dual nationality. A new constitution adopted by referendum in 2013
confirmed these changes, and for the first time since 1984 permitted
dual nationality for those who are Zimbabwean citizens by birth,
while giving parliament the power to prohibit it for citizens by
naturalisation or descent (born outside the country).121 In addition,
the new constitution contains a section on ‘restoration’ of Zimbabwean
citizenship (by birth) for those persons who were born in Zimbabwe
if one or both of the individual’s parents was a citizen of a member
country of the Southern African Development Community and the
individual was ‘ordinarily resident’ in Zimbabwe on the effective date
of the Constitution.122 Although those who had been affected by the
117
118
119
120
121
122
68
See above, note 41.
See above, note 73. See also, note 43.
US Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 2013:
Zimbabwe.
B. Manby, Statelessness in Southern Africa, 2011.
Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013, Chapter 3 (sections 35 to 43). See also, B.
Manby, Draft Zim constitution fails citizenship test, 11 October 2012.
The member states of the Southern African Development Community are
Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
previous rules began to re-apply for confirmation of Zimbabwean
citizenship, the registrar-general continued to deny passports to
those who were believed to be entitled to another citizenship, despite
court rulings in favour of specific individuals, pending a change to the
Citizenship Act (which still prohibited dual nationality in all cases). An
amended Citizenship Act was not yet proposed by mid-2014.
Other countries in Africa
In South Africa, research by Lawyers for Human Rights has identified
multiple groups who may be affected by statelessness – as well as
other groups at risk.123 These include an estimated 100,000-200,000
Zimbabwean born migrants with foreign parentage who may face
statelessness for the reasons described above and who currently live
as (largely undocumented) migrants in South Africa.124 There may
also be stateless persons among other migrant, asylum seeker and
refugee communities in South Africa and problems have been flagged
regarding access to citizenship for undocumented persons in border
areas as well as potentially for some orphans.125 It remains unclear
though what the overall stateless population in South Africa is.
Several situations of state succession have created problems of
statelessness in Africa. In Eritrea and Ethiopia, it has been established
that statelessness exists as a consequence of Eritrea’s independence
from Ethiopia in 1993 and affects persons in both countries – in
particular those of mixed Eritrean-Ethiopian origin or parentage and
those of Eritrean origin in Ethiopia. But no figures are available for how
many persons remain stateless in each country today. In 1998, at the
outbreak of the war between the two countries, there were still around
half a million people of Eritrean origin living in Ethiopia. An estimated
100,000 Ethiopians were living in Eritrea. During the war, each country
expelled 70 – 75,000 persons to the other. Those of Eritrean descent
who were not expelled and who remained in Ethiopia (an estimated
150,000) were not considered Ethiopians, but had not acquired
another nationality. In 2003, a new Ethiopian nationality law should
have significantly improved the situation, but implementation has
123
124
125
See J. George, Statelessness and nationality in South Africa, Lawyers for Human
Rights, 2013, at page 41,
See above, note 120.
See above, note 123.
69
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
remained problematic.126 More recently, the secession of South Sudan
from Sudan following a referendum in 2011 has created a population
of several hundred thousand at risk of statelessness, mainly persons
of South Sudanese origin still resident in Sudan, whose Sudanese
nationality has now been removed by law. This is the case even for
those individuals who have one parent who is Sudanese, who, under
the Sudanese constitution have “an inalienable right to nationality”.
UNHCR estimates that 300,000 – 350,000 South Sudanese living in
Sudan are at risk of statelessness. However, UNHCR has not included
this population within its statistics for stateless persons for the country
as of 2014 and most would have a theoretical right to South Sudanese
nationality under the very extensive attribution of nationality under
the law of the new state.127 Yet many of these individuals do not wish
for South Sudanese nationality, and in any event – in the context of
the renewed outbreak of conflict in South Sudan – have no way of
obtaining confirmation of South Sudanese nationality in practice. In
the meantime, those of South Sudanese origin have been deprived
of Sudanese identity cards, their state employment terminated,
and denied access to state services. In Benin, the nationality status
of about 2,000 persons living on a remote island is also unclear:
following a 2005 ruling by the International Court of Justice, Birds
Island was transferred to Benin after a border dispute with Niger that
had endured for almost half a century. Neither state considered the
determination of the nationality of the island’s inhabitants during
negotiations which has left them with an unresolved nationality status
– a problem aggravated by the fact that none of the island’s residents
have ever been documented and their births have not been registered. .
Other groups at risk of statelessness across all countries in Africa
include persons following a nomadic pastoralist lifestyle, who often
face difficulties in obtaining recognition of nationality in any of the
countries where they habitually graze their livestock; members of
126
127
70
Human Rights Watch, The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the
Nationality Issue, 2003; Refugees International, Ethiopia-Eritrea: Stalemate
Takes Toll on Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean Origin, 30 May 2008.
The 2014 UNHCR country operations profile for Sudan estimates that
“Between 300,000 and 350,000 South Sudanese live in Sudan and are at risk
of statelessness”, but the figure for stateless persons in Sudan is listed as zero,
See: www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html. See also B. Manby, The Right to
Nationality and the Secession of South Sudan: A Commentary on the Impact of
the New Laws, Open Society Foundations, 2012.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
ethnic groups that cross international borders, where both states
see them as belonging to the other; children of national mothers and
foreign fathers, in countries where gender discriminatory nationality
laws are still in place (or amendments repealing such laws are not
effectively implemented); and trafficked, abandoned and orphaned
children, including especially those born out of wedlock, whose identity
is not documented and who cannot establish nationality on reaching
adulthood. For instance, in Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau
and Mali, the Talibé – male children who are sent to study the Koran at
a madrasa – may be at risk of statelessness. Among these children are
some with foreign parentage who were separated from their parents
at such a young age that it is now virtually impossible to trace their
families, reconstitute their identity and establish their nationality.
Thus, although members of this and the other groups described
above may be eligible for nationality under the law, they may face
insurmountable problems in obtaining recognition of nationality
in fact. It is not possible to quantify these situations, but the overall
numbers affected, spread throughout the continent, will be significant.
The phenomenon of statelessness is exceedingly difficult to accurately
quantify in Africa at the present time. Only four out of 47 countries in
this region were accounted for in UNHCR’s end-2013 statistics; these
are the countries where there has been significant advocacy on the issue
and a parallel effort at reporting. Even if in the remaining countries,
statelessness is only a marginal issue affecting a few hundred or a few
thousand people, the total number of unreported stateless persons
would add up. Moreover, the foregoing examples of significant stateless
populations who are not tallied in UNHCR’s statistics – and for whom,
in many cases, there are no reliable numbers – demonstrate that
there is actually a severe problem of underreporting on statelessness
in the region. Although there is insufficient information to provide
an alternative estimate for the total number of persons affected, it
appears safe to conclude that, in Africa, statelessness is likely to
actually affect more than double the number of persons currently
accounted for in UNHCR’s statistics, and probably many more.
71
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
III. AMERICAS
Statelessness is a ‘smaller’ problem in the Americas than in other
parts of the world in terms of absolute numbers. UNHCR reports a
total of 210,032 persons under its statelessness mandate in the
Americas, almost all of whom are found in a single country, the
Dominican Republic. There also does not appear to be a serious
issue of known but unmapped situations of statelessness, such as that
which exists in Africa. Only one further country in the Americas has
been identified as presenting a significant, but as yet unquantifiable,
problem of statelessness.
Table 4: Countries in the Americas with over 10,000 stateless persons or
marked with *
Dominican Republic
Bahamas
210,000
*
As mentioned earlier in this report, an important reason for this low
number of stateless persons is the principle of jus soli which is common
to the countries in the western hemisphere: by granting nationality
to all persons born on the territory, regardless of parentage or other
circumstance, any situation of statelessness fades away automatically
with the next generation enjoying birth-right citizenship. As discussed
next, the two counties in which statelessness has surfaced as a real
problem are those in which restrictions have been placed on the jus
soli conferral of nationality.
Dominican Republic
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 210,000
Statelessness in the Dominican Republic (DR) concerns persons of
Haitian descent. Until 2010, the Constitution of the Dominican Republic
granted nationality automatically to any person born on Dominican
soil, with only the limited exception of children whose parents were
diplomats or ‘in transit’ in the country at the time. Individuals born
in the country thus acquired Dominican nationality, whether their
births were recorded in the Civil Registry or not. In practice, this
72
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
narrow exception has long been applied in such a way as to deny
many children of (presumed)128 Haitian descent access to Dominican
nationality, often leaving them stateless – despite an Inter-American
Court ruling which condemned these practices.129 The General Law
on Migration adopted in 2004 expanded the ‘in transit’ exclusion for
jus soli citizenship to children born to parents considered as ‘nonresidents’, which is understood to include temporary foreign workers,
tourists and students, among other categories. A 2005 ruling of the
Dominican Supreme Court further expanded this exception to include
all individuals without proof of lawful residence. This expanded
definition of the ‘in transit’ exception was then enshrined in the new
Dominican constitution adopted in 2010. Most recently, in 2013, the
DR’s constitutional court ordered that this new interpretation of ‘in
transit’ be applied to all individuals with Dominican citizenship born
in the DR to migrant parents (i.e. retroactively, as far back as 1929).
This process resulted in the arbitrary deprivation of nationality
on a massive scale. Those affected are left stateless because Haiti
has prohibited dual nationality until 2012130 so those who enjoyed
Dominican nationality could not also be Haitian.
There are no exact figures on how many Dominicans of Haitian descent
are affected by this series of amended laws. A survey jointly conducted
by the National Statistics Office and the UN Fund for Population
(UNFPOA) estimated that 209,912 individuals were born in the DR
of Haitian migrants.131 This matches the UNHCR figure of 210,000
stateless persons in DR at the end of 2013. The figure, however, captures
only the first generation of persons of Haitian descent, born in the
Dominican Republic. Given that the retroactive stripping of nationality
affected individuals who were born in the country as far back as 1929,
a far larger number of persons lost their entitlement to Dominican
nationality because their parents or grandparents are considered
never to have possessed it. For instance, Juliana Deguis Pierre, whose
case before the constitutional court figures at the centre of the current
problems, has four children herself. If Juliana is no longer considered
128
129
130
131
Often determined arbitrarily or on the basis of racial criteria.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic,
Series C, Case 130, 8 September 2005.
Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Haiti: Dual citizenship,
including legislation; requirements and procedures for former Haitian citizens
to re-acquire citizenship (2012-January 2013), 8 February 2013, HTI104293.E.
See above, note 69.
73
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
Dominican, they also lost their nationality– yet only she appears in the
statistic of 210,000 persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate. It
is not possible, at present, to estimate the size of the further population
affected – i.e. the second, third or even fourth generations born in DR
who were also stripped of their nationality – but the fertility rate in the
Dominican Republic is reported to be 2.8 children per woman.132 Thus,
while there are also some recent legislative developments that look set
to allow an estimated 10% of those affected to regain their Dominican
nationality, the assessment of civil society groups is that statelessness
actually threatens a far larger number of people in DR and the data
reported is significantly underestimating the problem.
Other countries in the Americas
The Bahamas is the only other country in the Americas which has been
identified within UNHCR statistics as having a significant statelessness
problem – it is marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. The
country generally adheres to the jus sanguinis principle, setting it apart
from most other countries in the region. While provision is also made for
jus soli acquisition of nationality, instead of an automatic entitlement at
birth there is a procedure which must be completed within a year after
reaching majority. Thus, under the Bahamian nationality law, children
born in the country to foreign parents, or to a Bahamian mother and
a non-Bahamian father,133 can only apply for Bahaman citizenship as a
matter of right after they turn 18 but before they turn 19. After the age of
19, they can still apply for citizenship, but it is granted at the discretion
of state authorities, and not by right. Persons of Haitian descent in
the Bahamas report facing discrimination and lengthy delays in this
citizenship application procedure.134 If they are also unable to access
Haitian nationality, statelessness may result. The 2010 Population
and Housing Census identifies a total of 39,144 persons of Haitian
origin/citizenship.135 An overview of other estimates of the size of this
132
133
134
135
74
L. Fletcher and T. Miller, “New perspectives on old patterns: Forced migration
of Haitians in the Dominican Republic” in Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2004.
See above, note 22.
College of the Bahamas and International Organisation on Migration, Haitian
Migrants in the Bahamas, 2005, in particular annex 2.
2010 Population and Housing Census of the Bahamas, available at: http://www.
soencouragement.org/forms/CENSUS2010084903300.pdf. See also Krystelle
Rolle, Census: Almost 40,000 Haitians in the Bahamas, Nassau Guardian, 22
November 2012.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
population can be found in a 2005 study – most lie between 30,000 and
60,000 (with the occasional outlier estimate).136 Among this group, the
number of stateless persons is unknown but may in fact be relatively
small: the aforementioned 2005 study also reported on a survey
conducted among the population of Haitian origin, which found that
approximately 86% of the respondents held a Haitian passport.137 This
must be interpreted in light of the fact that 90.7% of the respondents
were actually born in Haiti so were themselves migrants, rather than
descendants of migrants, making it less likely that they would have
experienced problems with their nationality. Nevertheless, it shows
that of the total population estimates for persons of Haitian origin in
Bahamas, certainly not all of this community is stateless or even at risk
of statelessness.138
A 2012 mapping study of statelessness in the United States revealed
that over the course of five years, several hundred persons whose data
was logged by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
(in the context, for instance, of an asylum application) were recorded
as stateless.139 It has been suggested that the total number of stateless
persons in the country is a few thousand, although the figure has not
been substantiated.140 Research in Canada shows a similar picture of
a few hundred persons logged as stateless in the asylum or migration
channels each year.141 Numerically more significant, over 66,000
stateless refugees from Bhutan, previously warehoused in camps in
Nepal, were accepted for resettlement to the United States in recent
years.142 They will hope to one day naturalise there and the new
generation will automatically be US citizens – indeed, resettlement is
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
See above, note 134, pages 12-13.
Ibid, page 58.
Note that some of the literature on ‘statelessness’ in the Bahamas uses this
term in a broader sense, to include persons who do hold a nationality but
whose nationality does not come with the protection generally associated with
nationality. See, for instance, K. Belton, “Arendt’s children in the Bahamian
context”, in The International Journal of Bahamian Studies, 2010.
See UNHCR, Citizens of Nowhere: Solutions for the Stateless in the U.S., December
2012.
See the Congressional record for the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Bill, House Report 112-091, 2012, page 123.
UNHCR, Statelessness in the Canadian Context: An updated discussion paper,
March 2012.
UNHCR, Refugee resettlement referral from Nepal reaches six-figure mark, 26
April 2013.
75
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
a recognised durable solution because it sets the refugee on a pathway
to eventual citizenship so resettled individuals are no longer counted
in refugee statistics nor tracked as refugees. In the meantime, however,
statelessness is a feature of their lives and the total tally for the number
of stateless persons in the Americas should also acknowledge such
populations until such time as they have successfully naturalised.
Elsewhere in the Americas, the statelessness figures which are
available suggest the problem is small – most reporting concerns
a handful of individual cases identified in the migration context.
For instance, Mexico reportedly hosted just 13 stateless persons
at the end of 2013. Statelessness may also continue to affect some
people in Suriname as a result of problems in the interpretation and
application of the nationality rules which were adopted by treaty with
the Netherlands in 1975 to address the distribution of citizenship
following Suriname’s independence.143 There are likely to also be cases
of statelessness caused by gender discrimination that remains in place
in some nationality laws in the region, specifically Barbados and the
Bahamas. Nevertheless, all of these numbers are likely to be relatively
small.
This brief exploration of statelessness in the Americas reveals a rather
mixed picture. It is a region in which, aside from the stark exception
of the Dominican Republic, statelessness has not arisen on a large
scale. As explained, this is likely due to the generous jus soli regimes
present in the majority of countries in the Americas as well perhaps
to a particular perception on the role of citizenship as a state-building
tool to unite people of different backgrounds under a system of civic
equality. It is, after all, a region which has historically been defined by
immigration and as such the approach to the regulation of nationality
may naturally be more inclusive than in those places where nationbuilding has involved asserting a particular ethnic, religious or
linguistic identity (to the exclusion of others). Yet, the situation that
has unfolded in the Dominican Republic over the past year is the most
egregious new violation of international human rights norms relating
to nationality and statelessness that the world has witnessed in the
143
76
See H. Achmad Ali, De toescheidingsovereenkomst inzake nationaliteiten tussen
Nederland en Suriname [The agreement on the assignment of nationalities
between the Netherlands and Suriname], SDU, 1998; see also, B. van Melle,
“Surinaams, Nederlands of geen van beide?” [Surinamese, Dutch or neither?], in
Asiel en Migrantenrecht, 2013.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
21st century. Statelessness is also a problem of the Americas, not just in
the Americas. Underreporting on the size of the population affected in
the Dominican Republic and the lack of reliable statistics on stateless
persons elsewhere – including, for instance, on the number of stateless
who have been resettled to the Americas under refugee resettlement
programmes mean that statelessness affects far more persons in
the Americas than currently reported in UNHCR’s statelessness
statistics – how many more, is not known.
77
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
IV. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
In absolute numbers, statelessness is documented as affecting far
more people in Asia and the Pacific than in any other region of the
world, with UNHCR reporting a total of 1,422,850 persons under
its statelessness mandate. There are six countries in which the
number of stateless persons is reported to be over 10,000 and a further
nine which are currently marked by an asterisk in UNHCR’s statistics.
This means there are no less than 15 countries in which statelessness
affects a significant number of people (out of 45 countries in total)
– also more than any other region. Moreover, as discussed below,
statelessness may also be a significant problem in other countries in
Asia which are currently not indicated at all in UNHCR’s statistics, such
as Afghanistan and China.
Table 5: Countries in Asia and Pacific with over 10,000 stateless persons or
marked with *
Myanmar
810,000
Thailand
506,197
Malaysia
40,000
Brunei Darussalam
20,524
Kyrgyzstan
11,425
Viet Nam
11,000
Bhutan
*
Cambodia
*
India
*
Indonesia
*
Nepal
*
Pakistan
*
Papua New Guinea (PNG)
*
Sri Lanka
*
Uzbekistan
*
Statelessness has surfaced in a number of different contexts across
Asia and the Pacific. In the countries of central Asia, including in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the table above, it is a product of state
78
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
succession. The dissolution of the Soviet Union left large numbers
of stateless persons in its wake across all of the successor states
and these situations are not yet fully resolved in Central Asia (nor in
Europe, as shown later in this report). Across South and South East
Asia, statelessness is a product of historic and contemporary migration
patterns, colonisation, the decolonisation process and the definition of
new states’ national identity following independence, administrative
issues and discrimination including on ethnic, linguistic and gender
grounds. In some countries, such as Malaysia, most of these factors
are present to one degree or another. The following paragraphs
take a closer look at the manifestation of statelessness in a selection
of countries in Asia and the Pacific, focusing in particular on those
situations which have received relatively little attention elsewhere to
date.
Afghanistan
Unreported in UNHCR-statistics. Estimates of the size of the stateless
population: 20,000 – 30,000 (Jogi minority only)
As a country with many ethnic minority groups, poor infrastructure
and weak institutions, as well as a long history of conflict and
displacement, Afghanistan is a place where one might expect to find
significant problems of statelessness. However, very little is known
or reported about stateless populations in Afghanistan and this is
likely the reason why UNHCR has not indicated it as a country where
statelessness is a significant concern. The only group which has so
far been concretely identified as experiencing difficulties with regard
to recognition of their nationality is the ‘Jogi’, a term commonly used
to describe one of the country’s traditionally nomadic communities,
belonging to the Jat ethnic minority. They are predominantly found in
the North of the country and are estimated to number between 20,000
and 30,000 people. Surveys have shown that the majority of the Jogi
are undocumented – they do not hold and cannot acquire the Afghan
ID card known as the tazkira, which provides proof of nationality. This
community is reportedly not recognised as citizens by the Ministry of
Interior, which has indicated that Parliament would have to adopt a law
to grant citizenship to the Jogi before it can issue ID cards to them.144
144
S. Hall and UNICEF, Jogi and Chori Frosh communities. A story of marginalisation,
2011.
79
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
Bhutan
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimate for the size of
the stateless population: 81,976
People of Nepali origin migrated to Bhutan as workers since the 19th
century, settling mostly in the South of the country, where they are
also referred to as Lhotshampas. Descendants of these ethnic Nepali
in Bhutan were granted Bhutanese nationality pursuant to the 1958
Citizenship Act. However, in the 1980s, they came to be seen as a
security threat. Bhutan passed a new Citizenship Act in 1985 with
strict nationality criteria that were applied retroactively, essentially
recognising only those who could prove their residence in Bhutan
prior to 1958 as nationals. Since the late 1980s, as the new Citizenship
Act was being enforced, Bhutan forcibly expelled over 100,000 ethnic
Nepali to Nepal, where they became stateless refugees.145 Many ethnic
Nepali remain in Bhutan where they are reportedly still affected
by statelessness, explaining why UNHCR marks the country in its
statistical table with an asterisk. The 2005 national census identified
81,976 people in Bhutan as ‘non-national residents’ – amounting to
approximately 13% of the total population of the country. Bhutanese
NGO groups claim that these are mainly ethnic Nepali and they are not
recognised as nationals.146 Human Rights Watch also reported in 2007
that those registered as ‘non-national residents’ in the 2005 census
were not being issued citizenship ID cards.147 There are no more recent
estimates of the size of the population but there is no information of
the problem being addressed in Bhutan148 and the overall population
of the country has since grown by a further 100,000, so it is likely that
the number of persons affected by statelessness has also increased.
145
146
147
148
80
See further, section 3.VII on stateless refugees in this report.
Bhutanese Refugee Support Group and Association of Human Rights Activists,
NGO Response to the second periodic report of the Kingdom of Bhutan under the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, July 2007.
Human Rights Watch, Last Hope. The need for durable solutions for Bhutanese
refugees in Nepal, 2007.
For a more recent discussion of the problem of statelessness in the country,
including of the 2008 constitutional changes which “formalise the high bar to
citizenship established by the 1985 Citizenship Act”, see M. Ferraro, ‘Stateless
in Shangri-La: Minority rights, citizenship and belonging in Bhutan’ in Stanford
Journal of International Law, Vol. 48, 2012.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
China
Unreported in UNHCR statistics. Estimated number of stateless persons:
unknown
The problem of statelessness has not been mapped in China and the
number of persons affected is unknown.149 Significant problems have
been reported with regard to access to birth registration, documented
in China through the family booklet called the ‘hukou’, which also
serves as the primary ID document. The hukou is key for access to
education, state welfare, legal employment, and is necessary for
daily life in China. According to the 2010 census around 13 million
children in China lack birth registration, although the true figure
could be higher.150 Independent analysis of the 2000 census revealed
a possible 37 million children lacked birth registration.151 One group
that is particularly affected is that of children denied birth registration
as a result of family planning policies, better known as the ‘one child
policy’. The Chinese government requires their parents to pay a ‘social
compensation fee’ for the violation of this policy.152 The fee is decided at
a provincial level, and is often as high as eight to ten years of the parent’s
disposable income.153 Until the parents have paid, their children are
denied birth registration.154 Other children are denied documentation
when mothers refuse to implement contraceptive measures following
the birth of their child.155 Furthermore, giving birth out of wedlock
is widely deemed to be illegal, and explicitly prohibited under
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
This section is based on research and analysis conducted by Stephanie Gordon,
Consultant and PhD Candidate specialising in the study of civil registration
laws and practices in China.
人民网, “统计局:中国1300万人没户口 绝大多数为超生” 人民网People, 10
May 2011, available at: http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/14523741.
html.
D. Goodkind, “China’s missing children: the 2000 census underreporting
surprise”, Population Studies 58 (3), 2004, pages 281-95.
人民网People, 2011.
For example Population and Family Planning Regulation of Fujian Province
(Promulgated 26 July 2002, Effective 1 September 2002).
S. Greenhalgh, “Planned births, unplanned persons”, American Ethnologist
30, 2006, pages 196-215; for case studies see: http://www.scmp.com/news/
china/article/1284550/single-mothers-china-face-higher-legal-hurdlesoutdated-policies, or http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/chinese-father-offour-commits-suicide-over-one-child-policy-fines-so-his-c.
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Congressional-Executive
Commission on China Annual Report, 2013, page 103.
81
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
many provincial laws.156 Single mothers are usually also fined social
compensation fees, and some mothers face great difficulty registering
their child’s birth even if they pay a fine, because they lack a marriage
certificate.157 Finally, some children who are informally adopted or live
in non-state orphanages are also denied birth registration.158 Adoption
is a political concern in China as the state attempts to prevent parents
circumventing family planning policies though this route.159 Across the
board, children lacking birth registration tend to be situated in poorer
rural regions.160 Girls are less likely to be registered than boys as
evidence suggests some parents are only willing to pay the fine if their
child is male.161 Many children manage to secure birth registration later
in their life, but some do not.162 At present, there is no indication that
the denial of registration in the hukou system leads to non-recognition
of Chinese nationality and therefore directly results in statelessness.
Yet, those who continue to be refused registration in the system are
denied legal identity, and may be at risk of statelessness, particularly if
they cross national borders.
Kazakhstan
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 6,942
As with most other successor states of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan
is also affected by statelessness. With the UNHCR reported figure of
6,942 falling under the 10,000 benchmark for ‘significant’ stateless
populations used throughout this report, Kazakhstan is not included
in the table above showing the largest situations of statelessness in
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
82
UK Border Agency “China: Country of Origin Information Report” COI Service,
2012, page160.
South
China
Morning
Post,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/1284550/single-mothers-%20china-face-higher-legal-hurdlesoutdated-policies.
See A. High, “China’s Orphan Welfare System: Laws, Policies And Filled Gaps” U.
of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review vol. 8, pages 127-176, 2013, page163 on
orphanages; and K. Johnson, Wanting a Daughter, Needing a Son: Abandonment,
Adoption, and Orphanage Care in China, Yeong & Yeong Book Co, 2004.
Ibid, K. Johnson.
S. Li, Y. Zhang, M. Feldman “Birth Registration in China: Practices, Problems
and Policies” Population Research and Policy Review, Vol. 29 (3), 2010, pages
297-317.
Ibid, pages 297-317; See also, Y. Cai (2013) “China’s New Demographic Reality:
Learning from the 2010 Census” Population and Development Review 39
(September), pages 371-396.
See above, note 158, K. Johnson.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Asia and the Pacific. Nevertheless, alternative sources of data suggest
that the number of stateless persons may be substantially higher.
Official data released by the Ministry of Internal Affairs indicates the
number of stateless persons with permanent residence in Kazakhstan
as of 1 October 2011 as 7,872. A further approx. 9,700 persons with
‘undetermined citizenship’ (identified as former USSR passport
holders) were also living in the country, some of whom may be
stateless. The Ministry of Justice has reportedly estimated that there
were in the region of 21,000 stateless persons in the country.163 In
the 2009 national census by the Agency of Statistics of the Republic
of Kazakhstan, 57,278 persons were identified as stateless. This was
based on self-identification by the census respondent and, in the
absence of other questions which would have enabled the censustakers to verify these responses, the data has not been recognised as
entirely reliable.164 Nevertheless, these alternative data sources suggest
that statelessness is likely to affect more persons in Kazakhstan than
currently reported by UNHCR.
India
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimated size of
stateless population: at least 60,000
India has been indicated with an asterisk in UNHCR’s statistical
reporting since 2005 so it has long been seen as a country
where statelessness is a real problem, but reliable data remains
unforthcoming. There are, in fact, multiple groups in India which are
reported to be affected by statelessness which makes it a complex
environment in which to map the issue. For example, the Chakmas
and Hajongs migrated to India decades ago from the Chittagong Hill
Tracts of what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and have
settled in Arunachal Pradesh. Despite a Supreme Court judgment in
favour of recognising the Chakmas as Indian citizens, this is reportedly
still not the case in practice.165 The number of Chakmas is estimated to
be some 60,000-65,000 persons.166 Other populations in India which
163
164
165
166
US Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 2013:
Kazakhstan.
Commission on Human Rights under the President of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, Special Report on the situation concerning the rights of Oralmans,
stateless persons and refugees in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2012.
D. Singh, Stateless in South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India,
SAGE Publications, 2010.
Ibid. See also, Calcutta Research Group, Executive Summary of the Report on
83
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
are reportedly affected by statelessness include: Hindus from Pakistan
who came to India after the 1947 partition riots and are not considered
as Indian citizens; inhabitants of the Chitmahals (Indian enclaves in
Bangladesh); persons of Chinese origin in Kolkata; Nepali speakers in
the north-eastern states; Bhutanese of Nepali origin living in eastern/
north-eastern India; Bihari Muslims from Bangladesh;167 and Rohingya
refugees in India. Neither the total size of these populations nor the
prevalence of statelessness among all them is clear – plus, in some
reporting on these groups it is not evident that the term ‘stateless’
is being applied in the sense of the international legal definition.168
Further research is being undertaken by the Calcutta Research
Group169 which should help to clarify the overall scale of the problem
but it appears likely to affect many tens of thousands more people, if
not even greater numbers.
Malaysia
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 40,000 (covering West Malaysia
only)
The UNHCR-reported figure for Malaysia is an estimate170 of the
number of “potentially stateless people in Peninsular Malaysia”.171
UNHCR has more recently clarified that this figure relates to ethnic
Indians (mainly Tamils) who are not being treated as Malaysian
nationals.172 They were brought to Malaysia from India several
generations ago while the country was under British rule and are
elsewhere described as ‘stateless Indians’.173 In all, ethnic Indians
comprise a total of 7.8% of Malaysia’s population, or 1.9 million
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
84
“The State of Being Stateless: A Case Study of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh”,
(undated).
Calcutta Research Group, Mapping the stateless in India – phase 2, 2011.
See, for instance, media reports relating to the enclaves between Bangladeshi
and India; The Economist, The land that maps forgot, February 2011.
Calcutta Research Group, Statelessness Project Concept Note, available at:
http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Statelessness/Statelessness_Concept.asp.
According to a footnote in UNHCR’s statelessness statistical table for Malaysia,
the estimate is “based on NGO and media reports, some citing official sources”.
UNHCR, 2011 Global Appeal Update: Malaysia, 2011, available at: http://www.
unhcr.org/4cd96fc59.pdf.
See, more recently, UNHCR, 2014-2015 Global Appeal: Malaysia, 2014, available
at: http://www.unhcr.org/528a0a320.html.
See, for instance, N. Ramalo, Stateless – Undocumented Indians, South East Asia
Human Rights Watch, 2011.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
people.174 The exact number of people affected by statelessness within
Malaysia’s Indian community remains highly contested (and heavily
politicised), with some suggesting it is as low as 9,000 and others
claiming that as many as 300,000 are stateless.175 Importantly, the
UNHCR figure does not account for other individuals or groups who
may be affected by statelessness, including those outside Peninsular
Malaysia (also known as West Malaysia), such as in the state of Sabah
in East Malaysia (one of the two Malaysian states on the island of
Borneo). There, unaccompanied minors or ‘street children’176 and the
Bajau Laut (also known as Sama Dilaut or ‘sea-gypsies’)177 are widely
reported to be affected by statelessness, although again the numbers
are unclear. Malaysia is also home to a large population of Indonesian
and Filipino migrant descent or Filipino refugees. According to the
last 2010 census, almost 900,000 of Sabah’s 3.2 million population
consists of non-Malaysian citizens.178 Even though it remains unclear if
this figure accounts for all the undocumented populations, an estimate
of 200,000 to 500,000 undocumented migrants live in Sabah.179 Within
this undocumented population, an unknown number of Indonesian
migrants or migrant workers may be affected by statelessness because
they lost their nationality on the basis of their more than five years’
residence abroad without consular registration under the pre-2006
Indonesian nationality law, and have not reacquired it.180 In the case
of irregular Filipino migrants, the absence of a permanent consular
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
DHRRA Malaysia, Mapping and registration factsheet, September 2014.
See, for instance, M.D. Izwan, “Najib debunks 300,000 stateless Indian claim,
says only 9,000”, The Malaysian Insider, 12 December 2012.
See, for instance, Greg Constantine’s work on the ‘Lost Children of Sabah’, part
of the Nowhere People project, available at: http://www.nowherepeople.org.
See, for instance, J. Clifton, et al., “Statelessness and Conservation: Exploring
the Implications of an International Governance Agenda”, Tilburg Law Review,
Volume 19, Issue 1-2, 2014.
Department of Statistics Malaysia, Population Distribution and Basic
Demographic Characteristics 2010, 2010, page 71, available at: http://www.
statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_
Penduduk_dan_Ciri-ciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf.
Compare the figures cited in the Malaysian press, here: http://www.
freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2011/08/28/illegal-immigrantsin-sabah-a-numbers-game/;
and
here:
http://www.theborneopost.
com/2012/06/02/najib-announces-setting-up-of-rci-to-probe-issue-ofillegal-immigrants-in-sabah-new/.
According to IOM statistics, Malaysia hosts well over a million labour migrants
from Indonesia. See http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/
mainsite/published_docs/Final-LM-Report-English.pdf.
85
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
presence for the Philippines due to the unresolved dispute between
the governments of Malaysia and the Philippines over the sovereignty
of Sabah combined with low levels of birth registration can result in
irregular Filipino migrants and their children lacking documentation
to prove their link to the Philippines, risking difficulties in proving
citizenship.
Therefore, part of the difficulty of ascertaining the size of the population
affected is the ambiguity surrounding the nationality status of persons
within these communities who are undocumented – i.e. the exact
relationship between lack of identity documentation and statelessness
is complex. This is particularly so with regard to children of Indonesian
or Filipino migrant descent.181 Estimates of the number of street
children who may be affected by statelessness range from 10-30,000,182
to 50,000,183 to 150,000.184 There are no estimates available for the
overall number of migratory maritime populations/groups185 affected
by statelessness in Malaysia, but the number of undocumented Bahau
Laut children is expected to be high due to their nomadic lifestyle even
if they are born in Malaysian waters. One report suggested that 60%
of one Marine Park’s 2,500 resident Bajau Laut population (or 1,500
people) were stateless.186 This is just a small proportion of the total
Bajau Laut population estimated at being approximately 450,000187
and it is unclear whether the level of statelessness among this group is
representative. Finally, Malaysia hosts a significant number of refugees
from Myanmar, including stateless Rohingya, as discussed later in this
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
86
See also C. Allerton, “Statelessness and the Lives of the Children of Migrants in
Sabah, East Malaysia”, Tilburg Law Review, Volume 19, Issue 1-2, 2014.
See above, note 176.
This NGO estimate was reported in the Alertnet special multimedia report on
statelessness, “Sabah’s stateless children seek official status”, Thomson Reuters
Foundation, 23 August 2011; the Asia Foundation similarly reported an
estimate of 52,000 stateless children in Sabah in a 2010 web-story, available at:
http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2010/12/08/sabahs-stateless-children/.
Various media reports citing other NGO estimates, including in Al Jazeera,
Malaysia’s stateless children in legal limbo, 16 July 2014.
Ethnicities/groups include sub-groups of Bajau (Sama) and Suluk (Tausug).
E. Wood, et al., Results of the 2006 Community Census, Semporna Islands Darwin
Project, 2007.
This is according to the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples,
and amounts to approximately 15% of the three million inhabitants of Sabah,
Malaysia. See: http://www.minorityrights.org/4542/malaysia/indigenouspeoples-and-ethnic-minorities-in-sabah.html.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
report. The overall picture is such that UNHCR’s statistical report on
statelessness in Malaysia appears not to be representative of the full
reach of statelessness in the country, where it could affect tens of
thousands more persons than presently reported.
Myanmar
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 810,000
Statelessness is a serious issue in Myanmar, both in terms of
its scope and its impact. The principle group affected are the
Rohingya, an ethnic, religious (Muslim) and linguistic minority who
predominantly live in northern Rakhine state. They have suffered
severe social and institutional marginalisation for decades and as a
result of the implementation of the 1982 Citizenship Act they were
arbitrarily deprived of their nationality.188 Described as one of the
most persecuted minority groups in the world, the treatment of the
Rohingya has attracted the attention and indeed condemnation of the
international human rights community.189 The UNHCR figure for the
number of persons under its statelessness mandate in Myanmar is
based on household surveys conducted in three townships in north
Rakhine state in 2010, since adjusted to take into account population
birth/death rates. As such, it accounts only for stateless Rohingya and
only for those found in that part of the country. The figure therefore
does not include stateless Rohingya in other townships in Rakhine
state, nor stateless Rohingya elsewhere in the country. Other sources
report a total estimate of at least 1.33 million Rohingya in Myanmar
(1.08 million of whom are in Rakhine state),190 almost all of whom
are stateless.191 None of these figures include other stateless persons
188
189
190
191
According to the 1982 Citizenship Act and a subsequent Schedule, automatic
acquisition of nationality is reserved for members of the 135 recognised ‘ethnic
nationalities’ of Myanmar. The Rohingya (and a few other ethnic groups) have
been excluded from this list. According to the letter of the law, most Rohingya
should still be eligible for naturalised citizenship (a ‘lesser’ form of citizenship
with fewer rights attached, the acquisition of which is not automatic and
which can, once acquired, be deprived on multiple grounds). However, due
to discriminatory implementation of the law and (related) lack or loss of
documentation, very few have been able to acquire citizenship by naturalisation.
See, for instance, Human Rights Council Resolutions A/HRC/19/L.30 of 20
March 2012; A/HRC/22/L.20 of 15 March 2013; and A/HRC/25/L.21 of 24
March 2014.
See above, note 67.
Ibid. This source suggests that only an estimated 40,000 Rohingya do hold
nationality in Myanmar and are therefore not stateless.
87
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
in Myanmar, i.e. non-Rohingya stateless. Other ethnic minority
populations are also reported to be affected by statelessness in
Myanmar as they are similarly excluded from the list of ‘National
Races’ to whom citizenship is attributed under the Burma Citizenship
Law. These include persons of Chinese, Indian and Nepali ancestries.192
According to Minority Rights Group International, persons of Chinese
descent account for some 3% of Myanmar’s population and persons of
Indian descent a further 2%.193 In 2001, the High Level Committee on
the Indian Diaspora estimated the number of persons of Indian origin
in Myanmar to be higher – as many as 2.5 million – and suggested that
despite the government of Myanmar continuing to grant citizenship
to this group in ‘small batches’, between 200,000 and 400,000 are still
stateless.194 There are no other reports on how many persons from
these, or indeed other minority groups in Myanmar, are stateless.
The UNHCR figure for the number of persons under its statelessness
mandate seems to therefore underreport the problem in Myanmar by
at least 500,000 persons, probably many more.
Nepal
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimates for the size
of the stateless population: an unknown percentage of 800,000 – 2.6
million persons
Nepal’s 1951 citizenship law granted citizenship through both birth
in the territory and descent. In 1990, Nepal revised its constitution
and citizenship laws, abandoning the possibility of acquiring
Nepali citizenship through birth on the territory and restricting the
acquisition of Nepali citizenship to descent from a Nepali father only.
As a result, millions of individuals in Nepal were unable to establish
their citizenship status. In 2006, Nepal revised its citizenship act
again, reviving granting citizenship by birth in certain circumstances,
provided concerned individuals make an application within a two-year
period. A subsequent nationality campaign enabled 2.6 million eligible
citizens to receive Nepali citizenship certificates within two years.
Nevertheless, a large number of people still do not hold citizenship
192
193
194
88
See, for instance on the vulnerability of ethnic Nepalese or Ghurkha descent to
statelessness, above, note 68.
Minority Rights Group, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples –
Myanmar/Burma, 2009.
See the country section of Myanmar in chapter 20 of the Report of the HighLevel Committee on the Indian Diaspora, 2001, page 60.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
certificates and their status is currently unclear. In 2011, UNHCR
published an estimate within its statelessness statistics of the number
of persons without citizenship certificates in Nepal to be 800,000.195
The Government of Nepal rejected that figure.196 Since then, UNHCR
has been in consultations with the Government of Nepal to clarify
the estimates of stateless persons in the country, acknowledging that
not possessing a Nepali citizenship certificate does not automatically
mean that the person concerned is stateless. UNHCR has subsequently
indicated Nepal with an asterisk in its statistical reporting.197 A recent
survey estimates the number of persons in Nepal without citizenship
certificates to be 4.3 million, but does not further analyse how many
of those are stateless.198 The U.S. State Department acknowledges the
range of estimates for stateless persons to be 2.3 to 2.6 million in Nepal,
but this may again reflect those who lack of citizenship documentation
which does not necessarily mean in all cases that the person is not
recognised as a national.199
Uzbekistan
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimates for the size of
the stateless population: 86,703 – over 500,000
UNHCR indicates Uzbekistan with an asterisk in its statistical reporting
as a country where statelessness is known to have been a by-product
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union but for which no reliable data
can yet be reported. An Uzbek news report from 2008 stated that a
source from the Interior Ministry had indicated that there were ‘over
500,000’ stateless persons in the country.200 This figure was also
reported in a 2009 Refugees International publication.201 The Uzbek
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
UNHCR, UNHCR Global Trends 2010, Table 1, page 37.
Anil Giri, “Govt Refutes UN’s “Stateless Nepalis” Report”, Kathmandu Post, 3
October 2012.
UNHCR’s Nepal country office website states as follows: “In 2011, UNHCR
reported the figure of 800,000 as an estimate of individuals who lack
citizenship certificates in Nepal. However, as individuals without citizenship
certificates are not necessarily stateless, UNHCR has been in dialogue with the
Government of Nepal to clarify and address the situation for future reporting.”
Please see: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487856.html.
M. Aryal, “Stateless in Nepal”, IPS News, 10 March 2014.
Please see the United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices 2013: Nepa.
“Uzbekistan’s stateless people”, UZnews.net, 15 January 2008.
See above, note 43.
89
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
state party report submitted to the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 2010 indicated that the country
hosted the far smaller (but still significant) number of 86,703 stateless
persons, according to data provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs
in respect of permanent residents in the country.202 It is unclear to what
extent there may be stateless persons without permanent residence in
the country who do not feature in these statistics, nor has there been
any further information issued since 2010.
Other countries in Asia and the Pacific
As UNHCR reports, there are over half a million stateless persons
in Thailand, predominantly members of various indigenous and
minority communities collectively known as ‘hill tribes’.203 In Brunei
Darussalam, according to UNHCR statistics, there are 20,524 stateless
persons, which is equal to 5% of the population or a remarkable one
in every twenty people in the country. Viet Nam has taken steps to
facilitate the naturalisation of part of its resident stateless population
in recent years, as well as to improve safeguards against statelessness
in the country’s nationality laws.204 Today, some 11,000 stateless
persons in the country still await a solution, including many women
who previously renounced Vietnamese nationality following marriage
to a foreign national and were left stateless. In the Philippines, UNHCR
reports 6,015 persons under its statelessness mandate but indicates in
a footnote that this figure is “from a 2012 survey undertaken by the
Government with UNHCR in southern Mindanao”. As such, it does not
account for any cases of statelessness in other parts of the country and
is likely to underrepresent the problem. On the other hand, Papua New
Guinea has been indicated with an asterisk in UNHCR statelessness
202
203
204
90
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Reports submitted by
States parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Uzbekistan, CERD/C/UZB/6-7,
31 March 2010.
There are many reports discussing the situation of this group. For a summary,
see the series of three blog posts drafted in the context of recent research in
Thailand by Laura van Waas entitled “Reflections on Thailand”, the first of which
is available here: http://statelessprog.blogspot.nl/2013/02/reflections-onthailand-1-protracted.html.
See, for instance, UNHCR, Statelessness: Former refugees win citizenship, and
now dream of home ownership, 15 September 201; US Department of State,
Government Responses to Statelessness, remarks by Senior Policy Officer for the
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, 28 February 2013, available at:
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/remarks/2013/207642.htm.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
statistics for many years, but in fact this may be in error. While there
is a sizeable stateless population in the country, this is reportedly
comprised of stateless West Papuan refugees and they are therefore
included within UNHCR’s refugee statistics (with a figure of 9,378
persons).205 In Cambodia, the populations of ethnic Vietnamese, ethnic
Chinese and children of other ethnic minorities have been variously
identified as possibly being impacted by statelessness.206 The extent
to which this is the case remains largely unmapped and the overall
size of these populations is also uncertain – perhaps unsurprisingly,
against the historic backdrop of persecution and ethnic cleansing of
minorities during the rule of the Khmer Rouge. For example, a report
looking in more detail at the position of Cambodia’s ethnic Vietnamese
commented on the diverging estimates for the size of this population –
from official government data provided to the UN treaty bodies which
put the number at some 72,000 to an estimate in the CIA World Fact
book that this group accounts for some 5% of the total population, or
750,000 person – but was unable to resolve the question or determine
the prevalence of statelessness among this population.207
In Sri Lanka, statelessness has largely been addressed by successive
legislative initiatives and in particular by a 2003 law recognising
the so-called ‘hill Tamils’ (Tamils of south Indian origin whose
ancestors were brought to ‘Ceylon’ as it was then known by the
British colonisers to work on hill country plantations) as nationals
and a subsequent citizenship campaign that distributed identity
205
206
207
However, the position of this report is that it is necessary and correct for these
and all other stateless refugees to also be included in statelessness statistics.
See further section 3.VII on stateless refugees.
See, for instance, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network webpage on Cambodia,
available at: http://aprrn.info/wiki/tiki-index.php?page=Cambodia; T. Duoos,
To be determined: Stories of people facing statelessness, 2012; M. Miller, Ethnic
and racial minorities in Asia. Inclusion or exclusion? Routledge, 2012; Jesuit
Refugee Service, Brief on the Khmer Krom, 2013; Radio Free Asia, Ethnic
Vietnamese left in limbo without citizenship, 19 March 2014. Relevant literature
also identifies the Khmer Krom as a group affected by statelessness in
Cambodia but in fact this group is likely to possess Vietnamese nationality on
the basis of previous historic residence in Viet Nam and the fact that access to
Cambodian nationality is experienced as problematic is erroneously conflated
with statelessness.
L. Nguyen and C. Sperfeldt, A boat without anchors - A report on the legal
status of ethnic Vietnamese minority populations in Cambodia under domestic
and international laws governing nationality and statelessness, Jesuit Refugee
Service, 2012.
91
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
documents as proof of citizenship to those concerned.208 There is a
lack of information about how many persons remain stateless to date
despite these reduction efforts, such that the country is currently still
indicated with an asterisk in UNHCR’s statelessness statistics. In the
other countries which UNHCR has indicated with an asterisk in its
statelessness statistics, it is very difficult to find information about
who is stateless and what the size of the populations are. In Mongolia,
official statistics count only a small number of stateless persons on
the territory but some other sources are reported as suggesting there
may be tens of thousands. The country’s ethnic Kazakh community,
a minority group, faces the problem of statelessness because after
thousands moved to Kazakhstan in the 1990s many returned to
Mongolia but had lost – or renounced – their Mongolian nationality
and were unable to reacquire it (and had also not managed to acquire
Kazakh nationality while resident there). A statelessness survey
conducted in 2010 uncovered several obstacles that stood in the
way of restoring Mongolian nationality, including lack of awareness
on the part of the population concerned as to their status and the
possibilities available to them to resolve it, but did not reveal the
number of persons affected.209
In Indonesia, statelessness had in the past affected large numbers of
persons of Chinese origin – as many as 300,000 in 1992, according
to one report.210 This appears to have since been largely resolved
due to both facilitated acquisition of Chinese citizenship by much of
this population and later the reform of Indonesia’s nationality law in
2006 which made it easier for ethnic Chinese to acquire Indonesian
nationality.211 It is suggested that as many as three million ethnic
Chinese in Indonesia still lack birth registration, but this is not an
uncommon problem among the wider population in Indonesia
either.212 It is therefore unclear to what extent there are residual
208
209
210
211
212
92
See, for instance, UNHCR, Sri Lanka makes citizens out of stateless tea pickers, 7
October 2004.
See UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: Mongolia, April 2010.
Minority Rights Group, World Directory of Minorities: Indonese – Chinese (undate.
L. Suryadinata, Ethnic Chinese in contemporary Indonesia, ISEAS Publications,
2008;
Indonesian Citizenship Institute, 32 Juta warga belum Punya akta kelahiran
[‘32 million people have not got a birth certificate’], 17 April 2014.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
cases of statelessness among this group,213 nor has there been any
reported mapping of other groups identified to face statelessness
in Indonesia.214 At present the country is marked with an asterisk
in UNHCR’s statistical reporting. The situation with respect of
statelessness in Pakistan, also marked with an asterisk, is similarly
hazy. A submission by UNHCR to the Universal Periodic Review
process on Pakistan explains the problem: “While the Government
of Pakistan considers Bengalis, Biharis and Burmese as illegal
immigrants and aliens, these population groups consider themselves
as citizens of Pakistan […] The governments of Bangladesh and
Myanmar do not consider these groups as their nationals”.215 The
U.S. State Department acknowledged that international and national
agencies estimated there are “possibly thousands” of stateless
persons in Pakistan.216 Other reports suggest that statelessness
may actually be a widespread problem among the two – 3.5 million
Bengali in Pakistan, signalling that statelessness could actually exist
on a far greater scale in the country.217 There is also potentially a
significant Rohingya population in the country, who have integrated
well, but may still be stateless. UNHCR is currently engaged in further
mapping the situation of statelessness in Pakistan.
As was the case for Africa, it is evident that statelessness is severely
underreported in Asia and the Pacific at present. From the presentation
of available data on a number of countries which are currently unor underreported in UNHCR’s statistics, it is safe to conservatively
project that the true number of stateless persons in Asia and
the Pacific is more than double what UNHCR is currently able to
account for in its statelessness statistics. It may be far higher if,
213
214
215
216
217
There are some more recent media reports which relate ongoing problems
but these do not indicate the scale of the issue. See, for instance, South China
Morning Post, Home is where the heart is for Indonesia’s stateless community, 2
May 2010.
See UNHCR Indonesia webpage on Stateless People, available at: http://www.
unhcr.or.id/en/who-we-help/stateless-people.
UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: Pakistan, April 2012,.
US Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 2013:
Pakistan.
Policy Research Group, Pakistan treats its own Bengali citizens as aliens,
October 2010; The Express Tribune, Identity crisis: “I was born here, live here
and work here. Why can’t I vote?” 13 April 2013.
93
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
indeed, there are widespread problems of statelessness in China, India,
Indonesia, Nepal and Pakistan, as some of the available information
suggests there might be.
94
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
V. EUROPE
Statelessness is more comprehensively mapped in Europe than any
other region.218 Statistical reporting on statelessness has been achieved
in 40 out of the 50 countries that fall within the scope of UNHCR’s
Europe regional bureau. The total figure reported by UNHCR for
persons under its statelessness mandate in Europe is 670,828.
Given that no European countries have been marked with an asterisk
and in light of the impressive reach of UNHCR’s data on statelessness
in the region already, as well as the stronger state systems for identity
documentation, the likelihood of there being further, large and hidden
stateless populations is low. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the
figures UNHCR reports for the number of stateless persons in countries
around Europe are not necessarily representative of the full scale of
the issue and there may be cases of underreporting. At the same time,
there may also be over-reporting, for instance where census data has
been used and this has become outdated due to a subsequent reduction
in numbers.
Table 6: Countries in Europe with over 10,000 stateless persons or marked
with *
Latvia218
267,789
Russian Federation
178,000
Estonia
91,281
Ukraine
33,271
Sweden
20,450
Germany
11,709
Poland
10,825
219
On the profile of stateless populations in Europe, see also M. Manly, “UNHCR’s
Mandate and Activities to Address Statelessness in Europe”, European Journal
of Migration and Law, Vol. 14, 2012.
219
Figure is for the total number of stateless persons reported by UNHCR in
Latvia – separated in UNHCR’s statelessness statistical table into two entries
(267,559 ‘non-Citizens of Latvia’ and 230 other stateless persons).
218
95
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
State succession is the primary cause of large-scale statelessness in
Europe. Some 85% of stateless persons reported in Europe can
be found in just four countries (Latvia, the Russian Federation,
Estonia and Ukraine) – in all cases as an enduring product of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The exact source of the significant
number of stateless persons who can be found in a number of other
European countries is more difficult to pin-point, but is likely to
arise as a result of: immigration of stateless persons from other
countries and regions, the presence of migrants who have become
stateless following their arrival in the country,220 and the operation
of the country’s nationality rules which fail to adequately safeguard
against statelessness arising from a conflict of nationality laws.221
Although beyond the countries affected by the dissolution of the USSR
and Yugoslavia, statelessness is commonly perceived as a migratory
phenomenon in much of Europe, it is of interest to note that where
further mapping has been undertaken, this shows that a large
proportion of stateless persons were born in the country they are
presently found in.222 Those who are stateless migrants also seem often
to be European in origin, contradicting the common assumption that
stateless persons have largely ‘arrived’ in Europe from other parts of
the world. A recent mapping study in Belgium concluded, for instance,
that “of the lawfully present stateless population in Belgium, almost
two thirds were born in Europe”.223
Germany
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 11,709
In UNHCR’s statistical reporting, it notes the following with regard to
the number reported for Germany: “The figure does not represent the
entire number of persons registered as stateless in the German Central
Aliens Register. The number of stateless persons holding a humanitarian
220
221
222
223
96
For instance, due to the dissolution of their state of origin.
For instance, due to absent, inadequate or poorly implemented safeguards
to guarantee that all otherwise stateless children born in the territory
acquire a nationality. See on such problems in Europe, European Network on
Statelessness, Preventing childhood statelessness in Europe: Issues, gaps and
good practices, April 2014
See, for instance, the comments on statelessness in Germany and the
Netherlands below.
The report goes on to identify successor states of the Soviet Union and the
former Yugoslavia as the important countries of origin of stateless persons in
Belgium. See UNHCR, Mapping statelessness in Belgium – Summary report, 2012.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
residence title (not all of whom are persons of concern to UNHCR) and
the number of stateless asylum-seekers have been deducted from it”.224
Thus, to avoid double-counting across UNHCR’s different mandates,225
only a sub-group of those identified as stateless in Germany are reported.
In contrast to its statistical approach to Sweden – see below – UNHCR
has not included persons registered in Germany as being of ‘unknown
nationality’, of which there were over 38,000 in the Central Aliens Register
in 2011.226 While not all of these persons will be stateless, one report citing
data from the late 1990s suggested that some 75% of those registered
with ‘unknown nationality’ were stateless Palestinian refugees from
Lebanon.227 There is no new information on this particular group, but it
is evident from this example that there are likely to be many thousands
of stateless persons among the population registered as ‘nationality
unknown’. What is furthermore of interest with respect to the statistics
in Germany is that although the phenomenon arises predominantly in a
migration context – i.e. it affects persons who are from outside Germany
– a significant proportion was born in Germany: almost 30% of those
recorded as either stateless or of unknown nationality in Germany were
born in the country.228 Statelessness is thus not just a problem in Germany,
but also of Germany, as it also affects many people who were born there.229
224
225
226
227
228
229
This is indicated by a footnote in the statistical table of the UNHCR 2013 Global
Trends report in which the data can be found.
Although, as UNHCR points out, the methodology adopted also means that
those who hold a humanitarian residence title but are not of concern to UNHCR
are extracted from the statelessness statistics even though they would not be
counted elsewhere as of concern to UNHCR.
See the data provided by the German statistical office in an overview
of non-nationals resident in Germany in 2011, available at: https://
www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/
M i g r a t i o n I n t e g r a t i o n / A u s l a e n d i s c h e B e v o l k e r u n g / Ta b e l l e n /
AuslaendischeBevoelkerungStaatsangehoerigkeit.xlsx?__blob=publicationFile.
Monika Kadur, Fadia Foda, “Cycle of Isolation: the Situation of Palestinian
Refugee Women in Germany”, in: Abbas Shiblak (ed.), The Palestinian Diaspora
in Europe – Challenges of Dual Identity and Adaptation, Refugee and Diaspora
Studies Series, No. 2, Institute of Jerusalem Studies / Palestinian Refugee
and Diaspora Centre, 2005. Note that as refugees they would be recorded in
UNHCR’s refugee statistics rather than its statelessness statistics.
This is calculated based on the statistics provided in respect to the registration
of the foreign population in Germany at the end of 2013, available at: https://
www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/
MigrationIntegration/AuslaendischeBevolkerung/Tabellen/Geburtsort.html.
See further on statelessness in Germany also K. Bianchini, “On the protection
of stateless persons in Germany”, Tilburg Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1-2, 2014.
97
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
Italy
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 470
UNHCR only reports a small presence of stateless persons in Italy – the
figure in the 2013 General Trends, which is actually based on data from
2011, is 470 persons.230 Yet other sources have indicated that there may
be a larger problem of statelessness in Italy. In particular, Italy is known
to be home to a sizeable Roma population, only 40-60% of which holds
Italian nationality.231 While many of the non-Italian national Roma will
hold the nationality of another country, it is suggested that among
those who came to Italy from the former Yugoslavia and have been
residing in the country for up to 30 years without any defined legal
status, there may be a significant number of persons who are in fact
stateless.232 Only one concrete estimate can be found to date, issued
by an Italian religious-based charity in 2008, which estimated that
10,000-15,000 Roma in Italy were stateless due to the aforementioned
circumstances.233 The European Roma Rights Centre has reported that
according to official Italian statistics, there are 800 stateless Roma
recorded in the country. However, it too estimates that the true figure
is likely to be “a few tens of thousands”.234 Mapping studies are now
underway to get a better picture of the number of Roma affected by
statelessness in Italy and determine whether this figure is an accurate
representation of the problem.
230
231
232
233
234
98
This is indicated by a footnote to the statistical table of the UNHCR 2013 Global
Trends report in which the data can be found.
The estimate of 40% can be found in: The National Union of Roma and Sinti
in Italy, Report – Roma Communities in Rome, Naples and Milan, 2008. The
estimate of 60% can be found in: N. Sigona and ‘Lo Scandolo dell’allerità, Rom e
sinti in Italia. The estimate of “about half” can be found in: The European Roma
Rights Centre, OsservAzione and Amilipé Romanò, Submission to the Universal
Periodic Review of Italy, 2010.
See, for instance, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, High Commissioner on National
Minorities, Assessment of the Human Rights Situation of Roma and Sinti in Italy
– Report of a fact-finding mission to Milan, Naples and Rome on 20-26 July 2008,
March 2009.
Sant’Edigio, Thousands lead invisible life in Italy, 14 September 2008.
European Roma Rights Centre, Italy: Country Profile, 2011-2012, 2012.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Latvia
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 267,789
The number of persons reported as falling under UNHCR’s
statelessness mandate in Latvia comprises two groups. The vast
majority are the so-called ‘non-citizens of Latvia’ who were left
stateless following the country’s independence from the Soviet
Union. This is due to the approach Latvia took to the distribution of
nationality upon independence, whereby it effectively reinstated the
1919 citizenship law that was in place prior to Latvia’s incorporation
into the Soviet Union. Persons who were nationals under that law and
their descendants, acquired nationality. Soviet citizens who moved to
Latvia during Soviet rule, principally ethnic Russians, did not quality
for nationality but were recognised as ‘non-citizens of Latvia’. They
enjoy a secure legal status and a wide range of rights, including many
on a par with nationals of the state, but do not hold the right to vote
or stand for election. To naturalise, stateless ‘non-citizens’ must pass
language and other integration tests (e.g. a history exam) and to secure
Latvian nationality for their children they must complete a declaration
procedure – a process that has recently been simplified leading to an
increase in the number of children acquiring nationality.235 Although
the numbers are slowly dwindling, this stateless group still accounts
for some 12.5% of the Latvian population today. The remaining
230 persons also reported as stateless in Latvia are those who are
recognised as such in accordance with the law on the status of stateless
persons that the country enacted in 2004.236
235
236
For an analysis see, S. Djackova, “Statelessness among children in Latvia:
current situation, challenges and possible solutions”, European Network on
Statelessness, 29 September 2014, available at: http://www.statelessness.eu/
blog/statelessness-among-children-latvia-current-situation-challenges-andpossible-solutions.
For further details of the situation of these two stateless groups in Latvia
and the legal regimes regulating their status, see, I. Reine, representative of
the Government of the Republic of Latvia, “Protection of stateless persons
in Latvia”, Seminar on prevention of statelessness and protection of stateless
persons within the European Union, June 2007; Refugees International, Latvia:
the perilous state of nationality rights, January 2011.
99
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
Netherlands
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 1,951
As was the case for Italy, UNHCR only reports a relatively small presence
of stateless persons in the Netherlands – the figure in the 2013
General Trends is 1,951 persons. This broadly corresponds with data
on statelessness compiled by the Dutch Central Agency for Statistics
which is based on registration details from the municipal population
registry.237 Generally, only persons with lawful stay in the Netherlands
are able to register in this registry, so any stateless persons who are
in the country irregularly will not be captured in this data. On the
other hand, the data may include some stateless refugees and asylum
seekers, since the registry holds data on persons with all different
types of residence permit.238 A more important reason for drawing
attention to the situation in the Netherlands is that, like in Germany,
there are also a high number of persons registered in the country as
being of ‘unknown nationality’: in fact, almost 89,000 persons were
registered as such in the Netherlands at the end of 2012.239 Unlike
the case for Sweden, these persons are not included within UNHCR’s
statistics at present. Within this population of 89,000 persons of
‘unknown nationality’, statelessness is likely to affect a significant
number, given that the country of birth for many thousands of these
individuals is one where statelessness is known to be a problem – such
as the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Syria.240
The UNHCR statistic is therefore likely to significantly underrepresent
the true scale of statelessness in the Netherlands. Again similarly to
Germany, a further point of interest with respect to statelessness in
the Netherlands is the substantial proportion of stateless persons who
were born in the country. A remarkable 70% of persons registered as
stateless in the Netherlands were born in the country.241
237
238
239
240
241
100
In 2012, the Central Agency for Statistics reported 2,005 stateless persons
living in the Netherlands. See above, note 57.
In Germany, for instance, UNHCR had specifically indicated extracting stateless
refugees and persons with other forms of humanitarian status from the
statistics reported under its statelessness mandate, but that does not appear
to be the case in the Netherlands.
See above, note 57.
Ibid. See for an explanation of the difficulties of registering statelessness
and the procedural reasons behind the large number of persons of unknown
nationality in the Netherlands, K. Swider, Statelessness determination in the
Netherlands, 2014.
See also UNHCR, Mapping statelessness in the Netherlands, 2011.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Russian Federation
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 178,000
The Russian Federation faced a serious problem of statelessness,
as did all successor states, following the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. The numbers have been shrinking due to subsequent measures
adopted by Russia to reduce statelessness in its territory. According
to some reports, approximately 600,000 stateless people acquired
nationality between 2002 and 2009 through a simplified naturalisation
procedure.242 This has not entirely resolved the issue and UNHCR still
reports a figure of 178,000 persons under its statelessness mandate
in Russia – although this number is taken from the country’s 2010
census,243 so may not account for any more recent naturalisations,
particularly as the process of acquiring Russian nationality was again
made easier through further law reform since the 2010 census.
Sweden
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 20,450
Sweden reports just over 20,000 stateless persons which, when off-set
against a total population of some 9.5 million persons,244 means that
one in every 500 or so people in the country is stateless. This number
actually also includes persons who are registered as being of ‘unknown
nationality’ – a group which accounts for over a third of the total figure
reported. Some of these individuals would likely be found to hold a
nationality if a nationality verification or statelessness determination
exercise was undertaken. At the same time, those stateless persons
who do not hold a residence permit are not included in Sweden’s
population register and may be eluding statistical reporting altogether.
UNHCR has been carrying out some further mapping of statelessness
in Sweden which should shed further light on the size and composition
of the country’s stateless population.
242
243
244
See, for instance, UNHCR, Global Appeal 2014-2015; and the report on the
recent Conference on Migration and Statelessness organised by UNHCR and
IOM in Ashgabat in June 2014, available at: http://www.iom.kz/new/116conference-on-migration-ashgabat.
This is indicated by a footnote in the statistical table of the UNHCR, Global
Trends 2013 report in which the data can be found.
See above, note 109, population figure for Sweden.
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3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
Other countries in Europe
The majority of stateless persons in Europe owe their plight to the
break-up of the Soviet Union. In addition to Latvia and the Russian
Federation, already discussed above, Estonia and Ukraine also make a
sizeable contribution to the total tally for stateless persons in Europe:
91,000 and 33,000 persons respectively.245 Other situations of state
succession in Europe have also created lasting statelessness problems,
albeit on a smaller scale. The Czech Republic and Slovakia report
populations of just over 1,500 persons each, while the total tally for the
countries of the Former Yugoslavia stood at just over 12,000 persons
at the end of 2013. Many of those affected in the latter are Roma who
have been unable to establish their ties to any of the successor states,
often due to lack of documentation or civil registration.246 A footnote for
Slovenia (which recorded just four stateless persons) acknowledges
that “the figure is based on an NGO analysis of government registry
data and may not represent the full magnitude of statelessness in
Slovenia”.247
In other parts of Europe, in countries unaffected by political changes in
the 1990s, UNHCR’s statistics show that statelessness generally affects
between a few hundred and a few thousand people. Only a minority
of countries report smaller figure, such as Ireland (73 persons) and
Switzerland (79 persons). Accurately quantifying statelessness
remains a problem, however, because relevant statistical information
is often spread across a number of different data sets that do not
necessarily employ the same approach to the definition of statelessness
or apply it in the same manner. This challenge became apparent in a
mapping study conducted by Asylum Aid and UNHCR in the United
Kingdom and published in 2011. Although there were multiple
sources of data on statelessness, the report concluded that there
245
246
247
102
Note that in Estonia, as in Latvia, a specific legal status has been established
to regulate the situation of ethnic Russians left stateless following the
country’s independence. In Estonia, this group is identified as the persons of
‘undetermined citizenship’, which should not be confused with the situation of
those registered with ‘unknown nationality’ elsewhere in Europe (the latter
being an administrative category to deal with those persons who cannot
establish or meet the burden of proof for the registration of their nationality
or their statelessness).
See, for instance, UNHCR, Report on Statelessness in South Eastern Europe,
September 2011.
See above, note 62.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
was nevertheless “a problem in recording and categorising stateless
persons”, in particular because of a “confused and overlapping” use
of the categories of stateless, unknown and unspecified nationality
across different data sets. Each year, several hundred persons entering
asylum claims or making other applications under the provisions of
the immigration law were identified as stateless by the UK authorities,
but this data is insufficient to ascertain a total tally for the number
of stateless persons currently in the country.248 Similar problems are
in evidence in Poland, where the UNHCR statistic on the number of
stateless persons in Poland of 10,825 is taken from country’s 2011
census.249 This tally likely relies on individuals’ self-identification as
stateless, which may not be entirely accurate.250 Data from the Polish
Central Statistical Office from the same year showed a high number of
persons were recorded as being of ‘undocumented nationality’ (6,780)
and much fewer were considered stateless (2,020)251 – numbers that
do not entirely correspond with the data drawn from the population
census. In Poland as well then, it is very difficult to establish the true
number of stateless persons. In 2013, the Polish Legal Aid Centre,
Halina Niec, undertook a study of statelessness in Poland, looking at
four other government data sources, and confirmed that “there is no
clear and comprehensive statistical data on the number of stateless
persons residing in Poland”.252
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion to draw on the basis of the
above discussion of statelessness situations in Europe is that although
the phenomenon appears, at first sight, to be largely mapped and real
‘holes’ in the statistics are not apparent, a closer look at the numbers
gives reason to question whether this data is truly accurate and
comprehensive. In a number of countries in Europe, there is a problem
of persons being reported as holding an ‘unknown nationality’,
which is obscuring the true number affected by statelessness. It is
apparent that there are still problems with the way stateless persons are
248
249
250
251
252
See above, note 56, pages 58-59.
This is indicated by a footnote to the statistical table of the UNHCR, Global
Trends 2013 report in which the data can be found.
See for the drawbacks of this approach, section 2.I of this report.
Ibid.
Halina Niec, The Invisible. Stateless Persons in Poland, 2013, English language
summary available at: http://www.pomocprawna.org/images/stories/
Pomoc_migrantom/The_Insvisible_Stateless_Persons_in_Poland_2013_
Summary.pdf.
103
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
identified, recorded and reported in different countries in Europe and
it is likely that the absence of statelessness determination procedures
in many places is contributing to this problem. On the other hand, the
existence of statelessness determination procedures in some countries
may also result in underreporting, with an overreliance on statistics
provided by such procedures, to the exclusion of those (including
asylum seekers, refugees, refused asylum seekers and irregular
migrants plus their descendants) who have not presented themselves
for statelessness determination. While it is difficult to estimate how
severely UNHCR’s statistics undercount on statelessness in Europe,
there are a significant number of people across the region who
have not been identified as stateless and are not currently
reported. What a closer look at who is stateless in Europe also made
apparent is that even beyond the state succession context, although it
is also a migratory phenomenon, a great many stateless people were
born in the country they are found in or in another European state.
Thus, just as it is anywhere else in the world, statelessness is in large
part a home-grown problem in Europe.
104
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
VI. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
UNHCR reports a total of 444,237 persons under its statelessness
mandate in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). A review of
how this figure is constituted shows that stateless Palestinians have
not been included due to their particular legal status and position
with reference to UNRWA and they will therefore also be discussed in
a separate section, later in this report. What UNHCR’s statistics also
show is that there are both a number of countries with significant
stateless populations (over 10,000 persons) and several for which
the problem has been indicated as significant but where no figure
has been reported. In combination, the absence of Palestinians from
the data relating to persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate
and the absence of any data for three countries which are known to
have significant statelessness problems, already points to substantial
under-reporting on statelessness in UNHCR’s statistics with respect to
MENA.
Table 10: Countries in the MENA with over 10,000 stateless persons or
marked with *
Syrian Arab Republic
160,000
Iraq
120,000
Kuwait
93,000
Saudi Arabia
70,000
Lebanon
*
Libya
*
United Arab Emirates
*
Many of the modern-day situations of statelessness in the MENA region
have a long history. In some cases, the problem was created when the
country originally adopted and implemented rules on nationality and
when people were recognised – or not recognised – as nationals for
the first time. In Lebanon and across a number of countries in the Arab
Gulf, for instance, the failure to ensure that everyone was included and
documented during early population census and registration exercises
left many to live as stateless persons in their own country. Another key
105
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
cause of statelessness in the region was the pursuit of a strong Arab
national identity, to the exclusion of particular minority groups, which
led to policies resulting in statelessness in Iraq, Libya, Mauritania and
Syria.253 The absence or lack of implementation of legal safeguards to
ensure that children acquire a nationality and prevent the perpetuation
of statelessness has served to ensure that these problems which were
created at a particular time in the various countries’ histories continue
to affect new generations today. Moreover, due to the presence of gender
discrimination in many laws in the region, that prevents women from
passing their nationality to their children, the risk of statelessness
among children is further heightened. Almost half of the countries
worldwide which do not allow mothers to transmit nationality on the
same terms as fathers can be found in this region.254 In the following
paragraphs, the context and magnitude of statelessness in a selection
of countries in the Middle East and North Africa is are discussed in
greater detail.
Iraq
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 120,000
In 1980, Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council passed a decree which
provided for the withdrawal of nationality from anyone ‘of foreign
origin’ who was deemed to be disloyal to the country. This decree was
used to strip as many as 300,000 Faili Kurds of their nationality,255
leaving them stateless.256 A large proportion of those affected were also
forcibly expelled, most seeking refuge in Iran where some were able to
naturalise, but many remained as stateless refugees.257 Their numbers
were estimated to be approximately 130,000 in 2004.258 After Saddam
253
254
255
256
257
258
106
See further in the relevant country sections below.
12 out of the 27 countries whose nationality laws discriminate against women
are found in the MENA. See above, note 22. Since this UNHCR background note
was published, Suriname amended its nationality law to remove discrimination
against women in all aspects of the enjoyment and transmission of nationality.
The Faili Kurds are a Shia, ethnic Kurdish minority group in Iraq who suffered
severe discrimination under the regime of Saddam Hussein who perceived
them as being aligned with Iran.
See A. Shiblak, “The lost tribes of Arabia”, Forced Migration Review, Number
32, 2009; E. Campbell, The Faili Kurds of Iraq: Thirty years without nationality,
Refugees International, 2 April 2010; UNHCR, The situation of stateless persons
in the Middle East and North Africa, October 2010.
See, for instance, Feili Kurds seek way out of identity impasse, UNHCR News
Story, 28 May 2008.
M. Verney, “The Faili Kurds. Expulsion. A forced march. And the loss of
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Hussein’s regime was ousted, a new nationality law passed in 2006
declared void the 1980 decree and paved the way for the return and
reacquisition of nationality by the Faili Kurds. The Iraqi authorities
have since reported that the vast majority of those Faili Kurds who
remained in or returned to Iraq have now had their nationality
reinstated – a finding which has been corroborated by the leadership
of the Faili Kurd community. Nevertheless, the requirements to be met
by Faili Kurds seeking to regain their nationality were described in
one report as “almost crippling”259 and a relatively small but unknown
number of persons concerned have been able to satisfy the evidentiary
requirements such that statelessness remains a problem in Iraq.
The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration has expressed its
commitment to resolving the issue, declaring that “the Faili Kurds file
will not be closed in anticipation of the existence of some of them who
didn’t get their documents so far”.260 UNHCR maintains the figure of
120,000 persons under its statelessness mandate in Iraq, but indicates
that this “is an estimate and currently under review”, acknowledging
that the situation in Iraq is changing but the exact impact of efforts to
resolve statelessness has not been confirmed to date.
Lebanon
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimated size of
stateless population: 80,000 – 200,000
Statelessness is a significant yet poorly understood problem in
Lebanon. While it is common knowledge that the state hosts a large
population of stateless Palestinians,261 other cases of statelessness in
the country receive far less attention. There are a number of causes
which underlie the statelessness of this population: the authorities
overlooked part of the population during the first registration of
inhabitants and subsequent identification of nationals in the 1920s-30s
and this has since been only partially remedied; the legal safeguards
which can be found in the law to prevent statelessness at birth are
259
260
261
nationality”, Refugees Magazine, Volume 1, Number 134, 2004; Norwegian
Refugee Council, Profile of Internal Displacement: Iraq, Global IDP Database,
2004.
F. J. Darah, “Faili Kurds: The curse of compound identity and scars of collective
memory” in S. Salloum, Minorities in Iraq: Memory, Identity and Challenges,
Masarat for Culture and Media Development, 2013, page 120.
“The displacement ministry restores nationality to 97% of Faili Kurds”, Shafaq
News, 4 February 2013.
See section 3.VIII for further information on stateless Palestinians.
107
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
rarely, if ever, implemented in practice; and the law does not allow
Lebanese women to transmit nationality to their children so if they are
unable to acquire a nationality from the father, they are left stateless.
Moreover, if a child’s birth has not been officially registered within the
first year, the authorities do not recognise the person as a national
until the birth registration has been completed. A petition must be
made to the court to effectuate the birth registration and recognition
of nationality and this procedure is inaccessible or ineffective for many.
These different causes mean that different groups are affected by
statelessness in Lebanon, making mapping that much more complex.
There has also been no national census in Lebanon since 1932 due
to political sensitivities surrounding the demographic composition
of the country. Nevertheless, there is consensus that among those
populations which are significantly affected are the Bedouin262 and
Kurdish263 communities. In 1994, the Lebanese authorities passed a
naturalisation decree which granted nationality to 150,000-200,000
people.264 This act partially addressed the situation of statelessness in
the country, but approximately half of those naturalised already held a
foreign nationality so the measure was not solely targeted at remedying
statelessness. It is not known how many people remain stateless in
Lebanon today. Various sources only provide partial data, for instance
estimating that there are still 10,000-15,000 stateless Bedouin,265 or
between 3,000 and 5,000 stateless Kurds.266 One Lebanese NGO which
has been studying the problem has estimated that statelessness affects
a total of 80,000 - 200,000 people in the country,267 although the results
of efforts to more precisely survey the issue are still pending.
262
263
264
265
266
267
108
See D. Chatty and N. Mansour, Bedouin in Lebanon: Statelessness and Marginality,
feature piece, Refugee Studies Centre,C Winter Newsletter, 2011, available at:
http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/about-us/newsletters/RSCWinterNews11.pdf.
See above, note 51. See also, L. Meho and F. Kawtharani, “The Kurdish
community in Lebanon”, International Journal of Kurdish Studies, 19 (1-2),
2005; M. el-Khoury, T. Jaulin, Country Report: Lebanon, EUDO Citizenship
Observatory, 2012.
The official Gazette, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, of 30 June 1994 stated that
39,460 families were admitted to the Lebanese citizenry. Statistics supplied
by the Ministry of the Interior indicate that 157,216 people were granted
naturalisation and a further 45,311 spouses and children also benefited by
extension, yielding a total of 202,527. Statistics cited in “Lebanese Citizenship:
Given arbitrarily”, The Monthly, Information International, Issue 94, May 2010.
See above, note 262.
See above, note 263, L. Meho and F. Kawtharani.
See above, note 51.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Libya
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimated size of
stateless population: 1,085 – up to 50,000 (Tebu community only)
Statelessness has been identified as a problem that affects certain
minority populations in Libya, as a result of policies of ‘Arabisation’
implemented under the former regime of Moammar Gadhafi. Berber
(Amazigh), Tuareg and Tebu are three communities for whom access
to citizenship has been reported as problematic.268 The magnitude
of the problem is not known and UNHCR indicates the country with
an asterisk in its reporting on statelessness. While no published
information is available on statelessness among the Berber and Tuareg
populations, there has been some limited reporting on the Tebu
minority. The Carter Center reported in 2012 that the district court
in Kufra ordered the removal of 1,085 voters (members of minority
groups) from the electoral register because they were deemed
inhabitants of Aouzou and lost their citizenship under a 1998 law.269
How many of this group do not enjoy another nationality is unknown.
In late 2012, a representative of the Tebu community in Libya was
quoted as estimating the size of the Tebu minority to be 50,000, an
unknown number of whom are affected by statelessness due to the
aforementioned 1998 law.270
Saudi Arabia
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 70,000
In Saudi Arabia and across the Arabian Peninsula, one stateless group
has acquired its own term, Bidoon or ‘without’ (short for bidoon jinsiya
or ‘without nationality’). The Bidoon owe their statelessness to the
failure to register when the countries in the Gulf first promulgated their
nationality laws and started to record and issue documentation to their
nationals. They and their descendants remain stateless today because
they have limited access to naturalisation in their state of residence and
because the law does not guarantee that children of stateless parents
are able to acquire a nationality. It has become a deeply entrenched,
inter-generational problem and to be Bidoon today can also mean to
suffer discrimination specifically on account of that status which has
268
269
270
See, for instance, United Nations Inter-Agency Mission to Southern Libya, 1518 November 2011.
The Carter Center, Carter Center Congratulates Libyans for Holding Historic
Elections, 9 July 2012.
As reported in L. van Waas, The Stateless Tebu of Libya?, May 2013.
109
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
become stigmatised in Gulf societies. Saudi Arabia is reportedly home
to the second largest Bidoon population – after Kuwait – and UNHCR
estimates there to be some 70,000 persons under its statelessness
mandate in the country. There have been no detailed studies of the
statelessness situation in Saudi Arabia, nor any government figures
released publically. National media outlets and any other available
documents which touch on the problem of statelessness in Saudi
Arabia repeat the figure of 70,000 which is reported by UNHCR. The
Saudi Bidoon population actually comprises persons from a variety of
different, often traditionally nomadic tribes, living in different parts
of the country, and so is not a homogenous group. In addition to the
Bidoon, it is important to note that there are also a large number of
stateless Rohingya refugees living in Saudi Arabia.271
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimated size of
stateless population: 10,000 – 100,000
As in Saudi Arabia, stateless persons in the UAE are known as Bidoon
and are mostly descendants of nomadic groups in the Arabian Peninsula
who are stateless because they failed to be registered as citizens of
the countries in which they lived at the time of state formation. The
number of stateless persons in the UAE is disputed and UNHCR
currently marks the country with an asterisk in its statistical reporting.
The Government of the UAE asserts that there are around 10,000
Bidoon in the country.272 Independent observers, however, maintain
that this number vastly underestimates the true population size of the
Bidoon in the UAE. The United States State Department acknowledges
that estimates range from 20,000 to 100,000 resident Bidoon in the
UAE.273 The figure of 100,000 has also been acknowledged by the
Emirates Center for Human rights.274 Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE also
has a significant (though smaller) Rohingya population.275
271
272
273
274
275
110
See section 3.VII on stateless refugees for more details.
Please see Katie Cella, The U.A.E’s Brewing Crisis, 3 February 2014.
See above, note 43. See also, The United States Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices 2013: United Arab Emirates.
Please see Emirates Center for Human Rights, The Bidoun of the United Arab
Emirates, July 2012.
See section 3.VII on stateless refugees, for further details on the Rohingya
refugees.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Other countries in the Middle East and North Africa
Elsewhere in the MENA region, statelessness has also been a
substantial problem. In Kuwait, statelessness also affects a sizeable
Bidoon population. They number 93,000 persons according to
UNHCR statistics, or 106,000 persons according to other sources.276
They have now been stateless for over half a century. While at first
this presented few practical problems, the situation of the Bidoon
in Kuwait deteriorated dramatically in the 1980s when their access
to various rights – work, education, healthcare – was significantly
restricted. In recent years, despite some measures to bring about
improvement in their situation, the Bidoon population has remained
severely marginalised and has also seen the imposition of renewed
rights restrictions.277 In Syria, against a backdrop of ‘Arabisation’
measures introduced to assert an Arab national identity, an arbitrary
census exercise conducted in Al-Hasake region in 1962 left some
120,000 Kurds stateless. Part of this population was registered as
ajanib (foreign) and many others were not registered at all and came
to be described as maktoumeen (hidden).278 Because there was nothing
to stop this status being inherited by the next generation, the number
of both ajanib and maktoumeen grew, affecting an estimated 300,000
persons by the time of the onset of the current crisis in Syria in 2011.279
The figure reported by UNHCR for the number of persons under its
statelessness mandate in Syria at the end of 2013 is just over half that –
160,000 people. The drop in numbers is due in part to a naturalisation
decree which was issued in the spring of 2011 and has allowed tens
of thousands of ajanib stateless to acquire Syrian nationality, but it is
also due to the mass population displacement that the Syrian crisis
has prompted, which has caused tens of thousands of stateless Kurds
from Syria to leave the country. They are no longer recorded within
276
277
278
279
Human Rights Watch, Prisoners of the Past. Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of
Statelessness, June 2011.
Most recently, in October 2014, it was reported that Bidoon children who
were unable to present a birth certificate were denied access to schools. See
“600 Bedoon children denied admission to local schools – Kids without birth
certificates crammed in makeshift classrooms”, Kuwait Times, 14 October
2014.
Human Rights Watch, Syria: The Silenced Kurds, 1 October 1996; KurdWatch,
Stateless Kurds in Syria: Illegal invaders or victims of a nationalistic policy?
March 2010.
See also UNHCR, Global Trends 2011, 2012.
111
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
UNHCR’s statelessness statistics because they are stateless refugees.280
There are several other large-scale stateless refugee situations in
the region, including the Black Mauritanians displaced to Mali and
Senegal and the Sahrawi refugees from Western Sahara in Algeria
and Mauritania. These groups are discussed in the section below
which specifically looks at stateless refugees. Finally, there are further
situations of statelessness in the MENA region which remain almost
entirely unreported by states and other actors. Statelessness has been
flagged as an issue with respect to, for instance, the al-Azazma, one
of the largest so-called Negev Bedouin communities, a tribe that lives
in parts of Southern Israel and the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, as well
as Southern Jordan.281 It is not entirely clear how many of this tribe
face statelessness and their situation seems to differ in the various
countries they can be found in. Similarly, the Dom community – a
gypsy group found across much of the MENA region and believed to
be distantly related to the Roma in Europe – have also been reported
to face difficulties accessing nationality, in particular in Lebanon282
and Iraq.283 Again, the scale of the problem is not known and mapping
statelessness within the region is especially complex at present due to
the current political and security context.
The foregoing demonstrates that statelessness is a very real problem
in the Middle East and North Africa, beyond the specific context of the
Palestinian community. There are many minority groups, in different
parts of the region, whose members are reported to experience
nationality problems. Quantifying the problem is a massive challenge
in this region though, because of the diversity of the groups affected
and the underlying causes, as well as the high political sensitivity of
questions of citizenship and demography in many countries. It is a
region in which further mapping of stateless populations is evidently
280
281
282
283
112
See further, section 3.VII on stateless refugees.
D. Chatty, Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the
21st Century, Brill, 2006, at page 904; K. Darmame, S. Nortcliff and R. Potter, “The
role of water and land management policies in contemporary socio-economic
development in Wadi Faynan” in S. Mithen and E. Black (Eds.) Water, Life and
Civilisation: Climate, Environment and Society in the Jordan Valley, Cambridge
University Press, 2011.
Terre des Hommes, The Dom people and their children in Lebanon, 2011.
IRIN, Iraq: Gypsies call for greater rights, 3 March 2005. According to Minority
Rights Group International, there are as many as 60,000 Dom in Iraq. See
Minority Rights Group International, Iraq Overview, 2008, available at: http://
www.minorityrights.org/?lid=5726.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
needed, but also where such activities will be difficult to carry out.
On the basis of what incomplete data there is, it is apparent that
the UNHCR statistics for statelessness in the MENA significantly
underrepresent the problem and (excluding stateless Palestinians
and refugees such as the Rohingya) the lowest estimate for how
many of stateless persons are currently unreported is 100,000
persons.
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3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
VII. STATELESS REFUGEES
Most stateless persons have never crossed an international border, but
continue to live in the country of their birth or ancestry. Nevertheless,
statelessness is recognised as an important root cause of forced
displacement284 and there have been many instances, both historical
and contemporary, in which stateless persons have been compelled
to escape persecution in their country and seek refuge elsewhere.
So, while not all stateless persons are refugees and, indeed, not all
refugees are stateless, there is some overlap between these two groups.
A person can be both stateless285 and a refugee286 for the purposes of
international law. As explained in section 2.II, however, when UNHCR
issues data relating to the number of persons under its statelessness
mandate, these figures generally do not include those individuals
who have already been ‘counted’ elsewhere in UNHCR’s statistical
reporting. As such, the information presented above with regard to
statelessness around the globe concentrates mainly on non-refugee
stateless persons, covering a large proportion of stateless persons
but failing to account for those cases where statelessness and refugee
status overlap. This section will canvas the world’s most significant
stateless refugee populations.287
Bhutanese
During the 1990s, over 100,000 ethnic Nepali Bhutanese – often
referred to as ‘Lhotshampas’ – were displaced across the border into
Nepal. As discussed above, during the 1970s and 80s, the Bhutanese
authorities adopted an ever-more restrictive approach to citizenship
and this ultimately led to the arbitrary deprivation of nationality from
the country’s ethnic Nepali community. Those who were forcibly
expelled have not since been allowed to return and despite repeated
284
285
286
287
114
See above note 36, UNGA Resolution.
Meeting the definition of article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status
of Stateless Persons.
Meeting the definition of Article 1, United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 1951.
Please note that stateless Palestinian refugees are discussed separately in
section 3.VIII.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
attempts to negotiate solutions with both the governments of Bhutan
and Nepal, neither country is willing to offer them a way out of their
plight. More than 83,000 have now been resettled to eight countries
which have agreed to provide a durable solution.288 By the end of 2013,
just over 30,000 remained in refugee camps in Nepal289 – all of whom
are stateless refugees.
Black Mauritanians
In April 1989, against a backdrop of drought, land-grabbing and a
border dispute, inter-communal conflict flared up in Mauritania. Over
the course of the next year, the government arbitrarily denationalised
over 60,000 ‘Black Mauritanians’, leaving them stateless, and
simultaneously expelled them from the country.290 Following the
conclusion of a tripartite agreement between UNHCR and the
governments of Mauritania and Senegal (the host country of the
majority of these stateless refugees), a significant number were able
to return. Restoration of nationality and re-issuance of citizenship
papers formed part of the repatriation agreement, such that those
who returned to Mauritania should now be recognised as nationals.
However, representatives of the expelled report significant problems
in obtaining restoration of Mauritanian identity documents (as well
as land and other property).291 Nevertheless, there remain 13,703
refugees from Mauritania in Senegal and 12,897 in Mali, as well as just
over 5,000 in France.292 It is therefore unlikely that they are currently
recognised as nationals by Mauritania – nor have they yet acquired
288
289
290
291
292
According to the latest information on UNHCR’s country page on Nepal, available
at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487856.html. For an impression of life as
a Bhutanese stateless refugee see, “In Pictures: Nepal’s Bhutanese Refugees”,
Aljazeera, January 2014.
The exact figure given in UNHCR, Global Trends 2013, is 30,977.
See above, note 94, page 105 onwards.
There have been reports of returnees being denied identity cards and still
not being recognised as nationals in Mauritania, such that some cases of
statelessness may remain. See, for instance, E. Dessie, The repatriation and
reintegration of Mauritanian refugees from Senegal: entry-points for conflict
transformation, a case study, 2013. A widely criticised national census and
population registration exercise which Mauritania embarked on in 2011 may
have compounded issues. See also IHRDA, 3 ½ years later, Mauritanian refugees
still await restoration of citizenship, reparation, June 2011. Currently, however,
the scale of this problem is unconfirmed.
See above, note 62.
115
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
a new nationality in their state of refuge.293 This means that the
remaining 30,000 or so Black Mauritanians living in exile are likely to
be stateless refugees.
Faili Kurds
When a Presidential Decree led to the deprivation of nationality from
several hundred thousand Faili Kurds in Iraq in 1980, many were
forced across the border into exile, mostly in Iran. There remains
a sizeable group of refugees from Iraq in Iran: 43,268 at the end of
2013, according to UNHCR’s refugee statistics. This number includes
other, non-Faili refugees from Iraq – in particular those fleeing the
US-led invasion and subsequent violence. It is therefore not clear how
many within this group would be stateless Faili Kurds. One recent
report indicates that estimates inside the country put the number at
approximately 8,000 persons.294
Former Burundian refugees in Tanzania
In 2007, Tanzania offered naturalisation to Burundian refugees
resident in the country since 1972 and their descendants; of those
eligible, 80 percent, or 172,000 people, expressed their desire to remain
in Tanzania, and the remaining 20 percent were to receive assistance
with repatriation from March 2008. Because Tanzania does not
recognise dual nationality, those wishing to naturalise had to renounce
their Burundian citizenship, with no possibility of retaining refugee
status without naturalising. However, the naturalisation procedure
was stalled in 2012, when almost complete, leaving thousands in
limbo: they had renounced Burundian nationality but had not received
Tanzanian certificates of naturalisation, even if named in lists of those
approved for Tanzanian citizenship.295 In late September 2014, the
government of Tanzania announced its intention to follow through
293
294
295
116
The acquisition of nationality in a new country leads to cessation of refugee
status under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, such that
a person would no longer be included in UNHCR’s refugee statistics.
J. Tucker, Exploring statelessness in Iran, May 2014.
See International Refugee Rights Initiative, Going Home or Staying Home?
Ending Displacement for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania, 2008; International
Refugee Rights Initiative, I can’t be a citizen if I am still a refugee’: Former
Burundian Refugees Struggle to Assert their new Tanzanian Citizenship, 2013;
and International Refugee Rights Initiative, From refugee to returnee to asylum
seeker: Burundian refugees struggle to find protection in the Great Lakes region,
2013.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
with the naturalisation of the former Burundi refugees and has since
begun to issue certificates of naturalisation.296 This will put a welcome
end to the uncertain nationality status of this population.
Former Liberia, Rwandan and Sierra Leonean refugees
The cessation clauses under the 1951 Refugee Convention have been
invoked in Africa by UNHCR and the governments of Sierra Leone (at
the end of 2008), Liberia (in 2012) and Rwanda (in 2013). At that time,
the former refugees were given three options, according to agreements
negotiated between UNHCR, host governments and governments
of countries of origin: local integration, voluntary repatriation, or
exemption from the cessation clause on the grounds of a need for
continued international protection. Among the former refugees from
the three countries where the cessation clauses have been invoked,
there is a substantial number who now remain in the country of refuge
with no legal status. In Guinea, for example, there is perhaps a number in
the low thousands of former Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees who
were rejected or did not apply for continuing protection, and now have
no documentation of identity or nationality (whether Guinean identity
documents or a passport from their home country) nor any continuing
refugee status. In the case of the Liberians, around a thousand across
West Africa who were registered as refugees with UNHCR have in fact
been rejected for Liberian passports by the Liberian authorities.297 It
is likely that many thousands of former Rwandan refugees are in the
same situation in the countries neighbouring Rwanda, including DR
Congo, Tanzania and Uganda. How many persons among these groups
are stateless at present is unknown.
Kurds from Syria
As explained earlier in this report, an arbitrary 1962 census exercise
conducted in Al-Hasake region of Syria stripped many Kurds of their
nationality, leaving them stateless.298 The current crisis in Syria has
led to displacement on a massive scale and stateless Kurds are among
those fleeing the country. How many of Syria’s refugees are stateless
cannot be made out from UNHCR’s refugee statistics and there has
not been a comprehensive study of the extent of statelessness among
296
297
298
UNHCR, Tanzania grants citizenship to 162,000 Burundi refugees in historic
decision, 17 October 2014.
See above, note 113.
See above, note 279.
117
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
those in exile. However, UNHCR has updated its statistics for the
number of persons under its statelessness mandate in Syria to factor
in displacement prompted by the current crisis. The fall in numbers
suggests that there are now some 70,000 stateless refugee Kurds from
Syria living in exile.299 Many of these will be found in Iraqi Kurdistan,300
but there could also be some in other countries which host Syrian
refugees.
Rohingya
As already discussed above, the overwhelming majority of Rohingya in
Myanmar are stateless and this has acted as a catalyst or even a conduit
for severe human rights violations and prompting displacement on
a massive scale. Stateless Rohingya refugees can be found in large
groups in several nearby states and further afield, while smaller
numbers have sought asylum in many more countries. In Bangladesh,
forcibly displaced stateless Rohingya account for almost all of the
231,145 persons reported in UNHCR’s statistical data as refugees or
in refugee-like situations.301 According to other sources, the number
of Rohingya in Bangladesh is in excess of 300,000 and perhaps as high
as 500,000.302 Since a new wave of increased and sustained violence
299
300
301
302
118
Compare the end-2012 figure in UNHCR, Global Trends 2012, against the
updated start-2013 and the end-2013 figures in UNHCR, Global Trends 2013.
See, for instance, UNHCR, Lacking a nationality, some refugees from Syria face
acute risks, December 2013.
Country of origin data for refugees in Bangladesh indicates that all but 20
of this number are from Myanmar. See above, note 62. Some 31,000 of these
Rohingya refugees are officially registered and reside in two refugee camps.
The remaining displaced Rohingya population living in Bangladesh is not
registered with either UNHCR or the authorities but is estimated by UNHCR
as 200,000 persons. Note that in media, estimates for the number of Rohingya
in the country varies between 200,000 and 500,000 persons. See, for instance,
IRIN, Bangladesh’s “Rohingya Strategy” stokes concern, 26 November 2013; and
Kaladan National Press Network, Bangladesh bars on marriage with Rohingya
refugees, 12 July 2014.
During the June 2012 violence, Dipu Moni, the Bangladesh foreign minister
(at the time) made a speech in Parliament in which she said that the Rohingya
population in Bangladesh was likely to be as high as 500,000. Since then, more
Rohingya have arrived in Bangladesh fleeing persecution, but others have
also left the country by boat to Thailand, Malaysia and beyond. While her
speech did not receive much international coverage, it was widely reported
by Bangladesh media, in Bengali. For example, see this article of 15 June 2012
in the Daily Janakantha news: http://www.dailyjanakantha.com/news_view.
php?nc=15&dd=2012-06-15&ni=99766.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
against the Rohingya began in 2012, an estimated almost 100,000
have fled Myanmar, but their situation is very fluid and difficult to
map, hence it is difficult to establish where they all are.303 According to
UNHCR, Malaysia currently hosts 40,660 Rohingya refugees registered
with the agency, meaning that the group represents over 40% of the
overall UNHCR registered refugee population residing in Malaysia.304
UNHCR has also registered 12,040 ‘Myanmar Muslims’, a category
that is likely to include within it, Rohingya who are stateless.305 The
Furthermore, UNHCR estimates that approximately 15,000 Rohingya
have been unable to register with the agency, while NGOs and Rohingya
community leaders believe that the number of unregistered Rohingya
is much higher.306 Recent in-depth research on the situation of the
Rohingya in Thailand concluded that the long-term population that
has resided in the country since the 1990’s numbers approximately
3,000.307 There are a few thousand new arrivals as well, many of whom
are in detention.308 At least a few hundred stateless Rohingya can be
found in Indonesia.309 UNHCR reports that 11,122 refugees in India are
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
The Arakan Project estimates that approximately 94,500 Rohingya made the
boat journey between June 2012 and July 2014. The majority of the boats
found their way to Malaysia, either directly or after being ‘helped on’ by
Thai authorities, a few proceeded to Indonesia or Australia while some only
made it to Sri Lanka. As many as 2000 are believed to have gone missing at
sea – presumably drowned (making this one of the most dangerous irregular
migration routes in the world). A few thousand entered Thailand, many of
whom were subsequently smuggled or trafficked into Malaysia (having first
been detained by the state).
UNHCR Malaysia – Figures at a glance (September 2014), available at: http://
www.unhcr.org.my/About_Us-@-Figures_At_A_Glance.aspx.
Ibid.
Equal Rights Trust, Equal only in name: the human rights of stateless Rohingya
in Malaysia, October 2014, page 15.
Equal Rights Trust, The Human Rights of Stateless Rohingya in Thailand, 2014.
Ibid. Some media reports suggest that the number of recent Rohingya arrivals
in Thailand may be as high as 20,000 (see, for instance http://www.irinnews.
org/report/99717/hell-is-real-for-the-rohingyas-in-thailand), but this has
not been confirmed and Rohingya experts do not consider it to be plausible
as Thailand is mainly a country of transit, not of destination, for Rohingya
refugees.
A news report citing UN data indicated that the number of Rohingya refugees
in Indonesia went up from 439 in 2012, to 795 in 2013. See Fox News, Rohingya
kids flee Myanmar by boat alone as exodus surges, scattering families across
region, 26 April 2014. Information from an Indonesian NGO, based on UNHCR
registration data, suggests there were more than 1,300 Rohingya in Indonesia
at the end of 2013.
119
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from Myanmar but does not specify how many of these are Rohingya.310
Recent news reports have cited 5,500 - 6,000 as the number of Rohingya
refugees currently registered with UNHCR in India, but also suggested
that there are likely to be thousands more Rohingya living informally,
without registration, across the country.311 The number of Rohingya in
Pakistan is not known, but according to the records of a Parliamentary
Debate in the United Kingdom in 2006, inquiries made by UK missions
produced an estimate of 80,000 Rohingya living in Karachi alone,312
while for many years unverified reports have put the overall number
of Rohingya in the country at 200,000.313 Outside the Asia and Pacific
Region, a large population of Rohingya can also be found in the Middle
East. Although the numbers there are also uncertain, it would appear
that they run into the hundreds of thousands, thanks to a massive
presence in Saudi Arabia in particular. The same UK Parliamentary
Debate record cited above gave an estimate of 450,000 – 500,000
Rohingya in Saudi Arabia and media reports give a broader range
of estimates of between 300,000 and 600,000.314 In 2013, the Saudi
government announced that a regularisation exercise would be
undertaken315 – if and when it is completed, this may also lead to
firmer figures for the number of stateless Rohingya in the country.
With regard to the Emirates, the 1993 edition of the Asian Yearbook of
International Law estimated that 20,000 Rohingya could be found in
UAE,316 while a Rohingya community leader residing in UAE reportedly
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
120
See above, note 62.
See, for instance, Aljazeera, Rohingya exiles struggle to survive in India, 6
January 2014; South China Morning Post, Three generations of Rohingya living
in India trapped in stateless cycle, 5 May 2014.
No information was uncovered for the rest of the country. See above, note 77.
This number appears in the section on ‘minorities’ in the Asian Yearbook
of International Law in 1993, but it is not sourced. It can later be found, for
instance in BBC News, Refugees smuggled to Pakistan 8 February 2000, citing
NGO Images Asia as the source of this data; and in Press TV, Over 200,000
Rohingyas flee to Pakistan to avoid repression, 3 August 2012.
See, for instance, The National, Rohingyas live in limbo, 9 June 2009; Saudi
Gazette, Protecting the Rohingya, 23 June 2012. According to national media
reports, the Director of the Branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Holy
Mecca, Ambassador Mohamed Bin Ahmed Tayeb, publically announced in
2012 whilst receiving a delegate from the community of Rohingya Muslims
that the Rohingya population in Saudi Arabia numbered 600,000.
The Daily Star, Government to arrange spl documents, 18 July 2013.
‘Minorities’ section in the Asian Yearbook of International Law, 1993. The
same section suggests that 200,000 Rohingya can be found in Saudi Arabia,
1,500-2,000 in Qatar and 3,000-5,000 in Jordan.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
estimated in 2006 that the country hosted some 50,000 Rohingya
refugees.317 Neither estimate is corroborated by other sources and
there is no further data available on the stateless Rohingya living in
UAE. While there are clear gaps in the data, it would appear from the
various estimates provided that, in all, there are upwards of one million
stateless Rohingya living in exile around the world, and that only a
small proportion of this figure, (less than 300,000) that are reflected
in UNHCR’s refugee figures because most have not been recognised by
their host country as refugees. The rest, do not feature in either the
refugee or statelessness statistics of UNHCR.
Sahrawi
Western Sahara is a disputed territory in the Middle East and North
Africa, flanked by Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. The International
Court of Justice passed a ruling in the 1970s that the residents of this
territory be given the opportunity to participate in a referendum on
the question of self-determination.318 Subsequently, Morocco assumed
control of the territory and a referendum was never held. Those
Western Saharans, or Sahrawi, who did not want to be subjected to
Moroccan control were forced to flee the territory.319 Most live in
refugee camps across the border in Tindouf, Algeria. UNHCR reports
that there are 90,000 refugees from Western Sahara in Algeria,320 while
the government of Algeria estimates the number to be far higher, at
approximately 165,000.321 In addition, according to UNHCR, there
are 26,001 refugees from Western Sahara in Mauritania.322 The legal
status of these refugees is complicated by the disagreement regarding
the status of Western Sahara itself. While the so-called Polisario Front,
which has established itself as a government-in-exile, has proclaimed
the independent statehood of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR), this has only been recognised by a few dozen governments and
it is not apparent that a Sahrawi nationality exists at present.323 Morocco
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
A. Rahman, “The Situation of Rohingya in UAE”, Kaladan Press, 2006.
International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara, 16 October
1975.
See above, note 94, chapter 8 on ‘Naturalisation and long-term integration’.
See above, note 62.
UNHCR, 2013 UNHCR Country operations profile – Algeria, 2013, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485e16.html.
See above, note 62.
US State Department, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices –
Algeria, 11 March 2008.
121
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
has meanwhile recognised the residents of the territory of Western
Sahara as Moroccan nationals, but this status may not extend to those
Sahrawi who live in exile. When asked to consider the question of the
Sahrawi’s legal status, Spanish courts (including the Supreme Court)
have determined that Moroccan nationality has not been imposed on
those who fled immediately after Morocco took control of Western
Sahara in the 1970s; nor has Algerian nationality been extended to
Sahrawi refugees in the camps.324 Thus, the Spanish court considered
Sahrawi who have lived as refugees since the 1970s as stateless and
any children born in exile to have also not acquired a nationality.325 This
is only the position of one national jurisdiction, however, and further
research is evidently needed to better understand the situation of the
Sahrawi refugees. It remains difficult to conclude exactly how many
Sahrawi are stateless today, but it is likely that a significant proportion
of the over 115,000 – 190,000 persons living as refugees Algeria and
Mauritania are stateless. This includes new generations born in the
camps despite clear international legal obligations to ensure that all
children enjoy the right to a nationality.
West Papuans
In the mid-1980s, several thousand West Papuans fled from the
Indonesian part of New Guinea Island, across the border into Papua
New Guinea, to escape political turmoil. Many remain there to this
day. Their long-term absence from Indonesia led to loss of Indonesian
citizenship under the operation of the nationality law, but most have
not been able to naturalise as Papuan citizens because they did not
meet the criteria or could not pay the fee. It is likely that all of the
9,378 refugees from West Papua326 reported by UNHCR to be in PNG
are therefore stateless.327
324
325
326
327
122
For a synopsis of Spanish court proceedings relating to the nationality status
of the Sahrawi see, V. Cherednichenko, “A ray of hope for stateless Sahrawis
in Spain?”, European Network on Statelessness, 22 October 2013, available at:
http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/ray-hope-stateless-sahrawis-spain-1.
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Algeria: Whether a Sahrawi who
lived several years in the Sahrawi camps in Algeria, who was born in Algeria
to nomadic parents, themselves born in Western Sahara, can obtain Algerian
citizenship or a permanent resident’s visa in Algeria, DZA35560.E, 18 October
2000; UK Home Office, Immigration and Nationality Directorate Country Report
– Algeria, 1 April 2004.
See above, note 62.
IRIN News, West Papuan Refugees Hope for Citizenship, 17 December 2012.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Other stateless refugee and asylum seeker populations
The refugee populations discussed above account for the majority of
stateless refugees worldwide. There are a number of further refugee
groups among which statelessness features or may arise, but where
it is less clear how prevalent the problem is. For instance, research on
refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia in Egypt has identified statelessness
as a problem for those of mixed Eritrean-Ethiopian origin in Cairo,328
but there is no information as to whether this is indicative of a broader
problem for this group, nor of the scale of the situation in Egypt. Given
the significant scale of statelessness within Côte d’Ivoire, there may
be some stateless persons among the 68,000 Ivorian refugees living
in Ghana, Guinea and Liberia. Similarly, statelessness is a known issue
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and so may also affect a
number of the over 450,000 refugees from DRC. Some refugees from
South Sudan may now be at risk of statelessness, depending on how
the revisions to the Sudanese and the new South Sudanese nationality
laws are implemented in practice for this population. Tibetans living in
exile in India and Nepal since as early as the 1950s, and their children,
may also face statelessness in some cases because the acquisition of
Indian and Nepali nationality is reported to be largely impossible for
this group329 and some may no longer be considered Chinese citizens.
A 2010 High Court ruling in India indicated that the Indian authorities,
at least, view Tibetan refugees in the country as stateless.330
Statelessness can also be found among refugees and asylum seekers
in industrialised countries, including because persons from the above
groups and other stateless populations – such as the Bidoon from
Kuwait – can be found among those who seek refuge in Europe, the
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
This is evidenced by data compiled on asylum applications. Across the
44 industrialised countries for which UNHCR compiles specific data on
asylum trends, a total of 4,377 asylum applicants in 2012 and 11,973
328
329
330
L. Thomas, Refugees and asylum seekers from mixed Eritrean-Ethiopian
families in Cairo, June 2006; E. Pierrot, A responsibility to protect: UNHCR and
statelessness in Egypt, January 2013.
See Tibet Justice Centre, Tibet’s stateless nationals: Tibetan refugees in Nepal,
June 2002; ‘Tibet Justice Centre, Tibet’s stateless nationals II: Tibetan refugees
in India, September 2011; and Human Rights Watch, Under China’s Shadow.
Mistreatment of Tibetans in Nepal, 2014.
Namgyal Dolkar v. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs , W.P.(C)
12179/2009 , India: High Courts, 22 December 2010.
123
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in 2013 were reported to be stateless.331 Data on the total number
of refugees and asylum seekers currently in industrialised countries
who are also stateless is nevertheless not comprehensive because the
persons concerned may not be identified as stateless within a state’s
asylum system. Interestingly, UNHCR’s refugee statistics by country of
origin does include ‘stateless’ as a category of origin. In 2013, there is
one entry, identifying Sweden as the country of asylum and counting a
total of 8,570 stateless refugees residing there at the end of the year.332
The same statistical tables from 2011 and 2012 also have a single entry
for ‘stateless’ as the country of origin, but reported on the number of
stateless refugees in Germany under this entry (just over 5,000).333
According to data on file with UNHCR, a total of just over 20,000
refugees are identified as stateless in some 41 countries of asylum.
Finally, it is important to note that statelessness may also affect
returnee populations, those left behind after a refugee problem
has been largely resolved and resettled refugees. As reported in
Mozambique, for instance, “UNHCR has identified hundreds of
stateless individuals who were mainly returnees from Zimbabwe
and who did not have either their Mozambican or their Zimbabwean
citizenship recognized”.334 Individuals who, in the context of conflict in
the country where they were born and live, have ‘returned’ to a country
of origin of a parent that they have never previously visited, may
often face difficulties obtaining recognition of the nationality of that
country. For example, some of the refugees from the Central African
Republic conflict who were accepted onto evacuation flights provided
by West African countries for their nationals.335 In Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana,
Guinea and Sierra Leone there are some former refugees and stranded
migrants from Liberia who have been unsuccessful in their attempts
to claim Liberian citizenship though many were born in Liberia to
Liberian-born parents. With respect to resettlement, statelessness is
a surprisingly common feature among populations concerned. Indeed,
UNHCR has estimated that a fifth of all refugees resettled in the last
five years were stateless refugees.336 Although, following relocation
331
332
333
334
335
336
124
UNHCR, Asylum Trends 2013, 2014.
See above, note 62, Table 5.
Ibid.
See above, note 120.
See above, note 113.
UNHCR, Statement by Volker Türk, Director of International Protection, 64th session of
the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, October 2013.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
to their resettlement country, these person cease to be refugees, they
remain of concern to UNHCR under its statelessness mandate, as long
as their statelessness endures. It is true that resettled refugees should
be offered a secure legal status, which guarantees access to rights and
services and should be conducive to the possibility of naturalisation at
some point in the future.337 As such, these stateless persons are likely to
enjoy adequate protection in their new home. Yet naturalisation is not
necessarily assured because it is generally subject to the fulfilment of
a range of conditions, which include not just residency, but frequently
also linguistic and cultural testing, and even economic requirements.
In many African countries, naturalisation is only granted to a very few
individuals, most of them working in the formal economy and with
access to resources to provide all the paperwork and legal follow-up
required. Furthermore, especially in those countries with no or only a
partial safeguard to ensure that statelessness is not passed on to the
next generation,338 children born to resettled stateless refugees may
also find themselves affected by statelessness. In the refugee return and
resettlement context then, it is important for the fact of statelessness
to be identified and for these now no longer refugee populations to
be reported as persons falling under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate.
While there are clearly still many gaps in the data on stateless refugees,
the above gives a good impression of the intersection between
statelessness and forced displacement. A conservative tally of the
total number of refugees affected by statelessness across the groups
discussed suggests that there are currently at least 1.5 million
stateless refugees and former refugees around the world. Many
of these persons are counted within UNHCR’s refugee statistics and
337
338
UNHCR, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook. In Chapter One of the Handbook,
‘resettlement’ is defined as involving “the selection and transfer of refugees
from a State in which they have sought protection to a third State which
has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with permanent residence status.
The status provided ensures protection against refoulement and provides
a resettled refugee and his/her family or dependents with access to rights
similar to those enjoyed by nationals. Resettlement also carries with it the
opportunity to eventually become a naturalized citizen of the resettlement
country.”
See above, note 221. Norway, for example, currently has no provision in its
nationality law for the conferral of nationality to a child born on its territory
who would otherwise be stateless. It does accept hundreds of refugees each
year under its resettlement programme, including in recent years some 500
stateless refugees from Bhutan. See also, above, note 142.
125
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
they receive protection as refugees, as appropriate. However, with
some groups as the Rohingya in the Middle East and some Asian
countries, significant numbers are not counted as refugees either.
Regardless of whether they are counted as refugees are not, they are
all also stateless for the purposes of international law and should
be acknowledged within the overall tally for the number of persons
affected by statelessness globally.
126
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
VIII. STATELESS PALESTINIANS
Perhaps the most widely known situation of statelessness in the world is
that of the Palestinians. While, from the point of view of international law,
many are likely to meet the definition of a stateless person in the same way
as any of the other stateless groups described elsewhere in this report,
their situation is nevertheless complex and deserving of a dedicated
discussion. Firstly, the question of the statelessness of Palestinians is
inextricably linked to the larger issue of Palestinian statehood339 and of a
Palestinian nationality policy,340 which are not straightforward. Secondly,
the term Palestinians is a broad descriptor for a group which shares a
common heritage and attachment to Palestine, but is actually diverse in
its composition. Not all Palestinians are similarly situated in terms of their
nationality status or statelessness. Indeed, the large-scale displacement of
Palestinians at various moments in history and the persistence of several
protracted Palestinian refugee situations complicates the question of
enjoyment of nationality, since this is bound up with nationality policy
of the various host countries. Finally, the mandate of the UN Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA), established specifically to provide assistance
to ‘Palestine Refugees’, covers some but not all Palestinians. Therefore,
within the UN system and under international law, Palestinians also enjoy
different statuses and these do not align with the question of nationality
status - i.e. both stateless Palestinians and those who have acquired a
nationality may fall within UNRWA’s mandate if they meet UNRWA’s
eligibility criteria. As explained in section 2.II, this has a critical impact on
how Palestinians feature in UN statistics.
339
340
In 2011, Palestine was admitted to UNESCO and in November 2012, the UN
General Assembly passed a resolution which accorded Palestine the status
of “non-member observer state” of the United Nations. In 2014, Palestine
acceded to numerous multilateral treaties which are open to accession by
States, including treaties relating to diplomatic and consular relations. While
a majority of the world’s governments had recognised Palestine as a state
prior to these latest developments, the denial of Palestinian statehood is now
evidently increasingly untenable.
The recognition of Palestine as a state has not yet translated into the resolution
of issues regarding nationality. There is currently no single authoritative
source on the rules relating to acquisition or loss of Palestinian nationality,
nor is it clear which persons of Palestinian origin are deemed eligible to be
recognised as nationals of the state of Palestine.
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This report does not pretend to offer a comprehensive or definitive
discussion of Palestinian statelessness. Instead, while acknowledging
the complexities noted above, the following paragraphs provide some
insight into the numbers and situation of Palestinians around the
world. The data is presented in three categories: Palestinians who fall
under UNRWA mandate, Palestinians under UNHCR’s refugee mandate
and Palestinians potentially under UNHCR’s statelessness protection
mandate.
Palestinians under UNRWA’s mandate
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, UNRWA was established to
provide assistance and protection to ‘Palestine Refugees’, defined as:
“persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the
period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means
of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict”. UNRWA operates in five
locations: Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Persons who meet the definition of Palestine refugees and are inside
these five areas of operation can register for UNRWA protection or
assistance, as can descendants of Palestine refugee men.341 Palestinians
displaced by the 1967 hostilities are also eligible to receive UNRWA
services, where the agency operates. As of 1 January 2014, UNRWA
gave the following figures for the total number of persons receiving its
protection of assistance:
Table 12: Palestinians registered by UNRWA342
Jordan
2,154,486
Lebanon343
483,375
Syria
569,645
West Bank
914,192
Gaza Strip
1,307,014
TOTAL
5,428,712
343
For more information, see UNRWA, Consolidated Eligibility and Registration
Instructions (CERI).
342
See ‘UNRWA in Figures’, available at: http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/
files/2014_01_uif_-_english.pdf.
343
According to a survey conducted by the Danish Refugee Council in 2004
and re-published in 2007, there were some 3,000 Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon who were not registered with UNRWA and therefore not receiving
341
128
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
The total number of Palestinians registered with UNRWA is thus close
to 5.5 million. How many among them are currently stateless is not
easy to determine. An unknown but relatively small number of this
category of Palestinians have acquired a foreign nationality – e.g.
naturalised elsewhere such as in the United States or Europe – while
remaining registered with UNRWA. For those residing in Lebanon and
Syria: neither naturalisation on the basis of long-term residence nor
access to nationality for otherwise stateless children of Palestinians
are available as options to reduce the incidence of statelessness among
this population.344 Thus, the vast majority of Palestinians registered
by UNRWA in these two countries – over one million persons – are
stateless. In Jordan, the picture is different because most Palestine
refugees acquired Jordanian nationality under the country’s 1954
Nationality Law.345 However, following Jordan’s disengagement from
the West Bank in 1988, not only did Palestinians residing in the West
Bank lose Jordanian nationality but the situation of Jordanians of
Palestinian origin who resided outside Jordan – i.e. in other countries
– also became ambiguous. In particular, some 250,000 Jordanians of
Palestinian origin residing in Kuwait, who subsequently returned to
Jordan during Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990, have reportedly
experienced problems confirming their Jordanian nationality and are
likely to be stateless.346 A few thousand more Jordanians of Palestinian
origin have also seen their nationality withdrawn in recent years,
rendering them stateless as well.347 The nationality status of those who
are registered with UNRWA’s operations in the West Bank and Gaza
344
345
346
347
its assistance. Danish Refugee Council, Survey Report on the Situation of NonID Palestinian Refugees - Lebanon, September 2007, available at: http://www.
refworld.org/docid/47fdfad80.html.
This is a result of the interpretation of the League of Arab States, Protocol for the
Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States (“Casablanca Protocol”), 11 September
1965. The Protocol sets out rights to be enjoyed by Palestinian refugees in host
countries but indicates that this treatment should be provided to Palestinians
‘whilst retaining their Palestinian nationality’. This has contributed to a policy
of non-naturalisation of Palestinians in countries across the Middle East and
North Africa.
UN General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, A/64/13 , 1
January-31 December 2008, para. 51.
Human Rights Watch, Stateless Again. Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of
their Nationality, 2010.
Ibid. More than 2,700 persons of Palestinian origin were reportedly stripped of
their nationality between 2004 and 2008.
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3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
remains ambiguous in the absence of Palestinian nationality law – i.e.
it is uncertain who can now be considered to enjoy nationality of the
state of Palestine.
Palestinians under UNHCR’s refugee mandate
Not all displaced Palestinians fall under UNRWA’s mandate because
some live in a country that is outside UNRWA’s area of operation. Thus,
in Egypt, UNHCR reports that there are 70,026 Palestinian refugees
estimated to fall within its mandate and in Iraq, the latest figure for such
Palestinian refugees is 9,992.348 There could also be as many as several
hundred thousand Palestinian refugees in the Arab Gulf, although
there is not much data available on their exact numbers in individual
states. The Department of Refugee Affairs of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation reportedly provided the following estimates in 1998:
275,000 Palestinian refugees in Saudi Arabia and a further 140,000 in
the other countries in the Gulf.349 A considerable number of Palestinian
refugees also seek asylum or international protection further afield.
For instance, among asylum applicants in Europe in 2013 were 2,758
persons recorded to be of Palestinian origin.350 In Germany alone, one
report estimated that there were about 80,000 refugees of Palestinian
origin residing in the country.351 A large number has also sought refuge
in various countries in the Americas.352
348
349
350
351
352
130
Both figures as at end 2013, See above, note 62.
As reported in T. Chen, “Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries and their
Impacts”, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), Vol. 3, No. 3,
2009. Earlier statistics, from 1980, indicated a larger population of Palestinian
refugees in Kuwait than the rest of the Gulf – almost 300,000 – but it is likely
that these numbers have since dropped as many Palestinians left Kuwait in
the early 1990s due to a change in reception conditions. 1980 Palestinian
Statistical Abstract, as cited in P. A. Smith, “The Palestinian Diaspora, 19481985”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1986.
See above, note 331Note that some of these persons may have come from
UNRWA areas of operation, so this is not necessarily an entirely distinct group.
Abbas Shiblak (ed.), The Palestinian Diaspora in Europe – Challenges of Dual
Identity and Adaptation, Refugee and Diaspora Studies Series, No. 2, Institute of
Jerusalem Studies / Palestinian Refugee and Diaspora Centre, 2005.
One source suggested over 200,000 Palestinian refugees may be found in the
Americas. See Le Monde Diplomatique, The Palestinian Diaspora, undated.
Note that their children will no longer be stateless due to the application of jus
soli in the region.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Significant gaps remain in the data on the total number of Palestinian
refugees in different parts of the world. This is in part due to the
manner in which Palestinians are registered in some countries, where
they are merely registered as stateless persons. In other countries,
data is only reported on the total number of Palestinians, without
specifying how many of these are Palestinian refugees and would
thereby fall within UNHCR’s refugee mandate. For instance, there are
reported to be over 70,000 Palestinians in Iraq and Libya, but how
many of these are refugees is not indicated.353 In terms of the question
of nationality status of Palestinian refugees, it is likely that the vast
majority of persons included in these statistics are stateless. In most
Arab countries, where a large number of Palestinian refugees can be
found, it is also important to recall the policy of non-naturalisation of
Palestinians, which includes lack of access to nationality for children
born of Palestinian parents.354 Elsewhere, acquisition of nationality
in the host country would lead to cessation of refugee status and,
depending on how statistical data is compiled and updated, should
cause the individual to be removed from Palestinian refugee statistics.
The figures included above therefore indicate that there are several
hundred thousand stateless Palestinian refugees under UNHCR’s
refugee mandate dispersed around the globe.
Palestinians under UNHCR’s statelessness protection mandate
Not all Palestinians are also refugees. Some were, in fact, never
displaced by the 1948 conflict or later hostilities. As such, many of these
persons neither qualify for UNRWA assistance nor fall within UNHCR’s
refugee mandate. Estimates place the number of these non-refugee
Palestinians in Gaza at 400,000 and in the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem) at 1.7 million. The question of who is a Palestinian national
has not yet been clarified and the nationality status of this population
is therefore undetermined – i.e. it is not possible, at this time, to clearly
ascertain who is and who is not “considered as a national […] under
the operation of”355 the law of Palestine. This population (or some part
of it) could therefore potentially fall within UNHCR’s statelessness
mandate. Finally, there are also Palestinians who have moved away
353
354
355
Ibid.
See above, note 344.
See above, note 4, Article 1 for the definition of a stateless person under
international law.
131
3 GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
from Gaza or the West Bank but who were not displaced, as refugees.
There are many Palestinians who have taken up residence elsewhere
in the region or other parts of the world, for instance in order to work
or study, who are likely to remain stateless and as non-refugees would
fall under UNHCR’s statelessness protection mandate. Their numbers
are not known.
Based on the data outlined above, there are more than five million
Palestinians worldwide who are stateless or whose nationality
status is currently ambiguous. Upon clarification of Palestinian
nationality law and who falls within its scope, this number would need
to be carefully reviewed.
132
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
4
CONCLUSION &
RECOMMENDATIONS
Statelessness is a problem of global proportions. It affects people all
over the world and can have a harmful impact on them, their families
and the wider community. As set out in the introduction to this report,
there are many lenses through which the phenomenon of statelessness
can be studied, and indeed many links between statelessness and other
issues of international concern. This report looked in particular at the
question of scope and reach of statelessness, which is also the main
focus of these conclusions and recommendations.
The report addressed questions such as how is statelessness
quantified, what are the challenges in measuring statelessness, what
do the statistics show and what remains hidden? While acknowledging
that the primary responsibility to identify stateless persons and
measure the scale of the problem of statelessness within their borders
lies with states, it was seen that UNHCR plays an important role in
tracking and reporting available data on statelessness. This report
explored the UNHCR-reported data and also asked the question: what
more can we learn about the situation of statelessness globally if we
cast the net wider and look to other sources to complement UNHCR’s
statistical reporting? In doing so, the report looked at each region in
turn (exploring the data on selected countries of interest), then also
at what is known about two groups which do not currently feature in
UNHCR’s collated statistics – stateless refugees and the majority of
stateless Palestinians.
On the one hand, the outcome of this exercise was enlightening because
it confirmed what UNHCR itself has repeatedly stated: although 3.5
million stateless persons have been ‘counted’ by UNHCR, the real scale
of the problem is far greater. In Asia and Africa, for instance, it is clear
that the number of stateless persons is – estimated conservatively –
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4 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
more than double the number UNHCR is currently able to report on.
In both regions, there are more countries marked with an asterisk
as having a significant but unquantified stateless population than
there are countries for which UNHCR is able to provide a figure. In
Africa there are three countries marked with an asterisk for every
one which UNHCR has reported a figure on. Several other countries
with significant populations at risk of statelessness are not even
marked with an asterisk. In the Americas, Europe and the Middle East
and North Africa, statelessness is evidently also significantly underreported. Even though in Europe there are no ‘asterisk countries’, a
closer look at what numbers are reported for certain countries and
how they are comprised suggests that what data there is will have
significant gaps in many cases. This is in part due to inherent difficulties
in collecting accurate information on statelessness, but it also reflects
the insufficient level of priority to, attention for and knowledge on
statelessness in many countries and the dearth of good systems for
effectively identifying individuals affected.
On the other hand then, this deeper and broader exploration of
statelessness statistics was unsatisfying because there are so many
gaps in the data. We are forced to admit that there are large and
troubling holes in our collective knowledge of the global statelessness
phenomenon. Where estimates for the number of stateless persons in
a given country range from just a few thousand to a hundred thousand
(as in Madagascar), or from a few tens of thousands to over half a million
(as in Zimbabwe), accurately quantifying statelessness feels a long way
off. For most of these estimates, there is little to no explanation of how
the data was compiled and it is therefore impossible to ascertain the
reliability of the numbers. Some may, in fact, be based on incomplete
mapping or indeed simply amount to an educated guess. In Africa in
particular – but also in other regions - there is also a major challenge in
distinguishing those who are undocumented and thus face a difficulty
in asserting their nationality – and those who are stateless. Add to that
some countries with massive populations and where there is every
indication that large numbers could be affected by statelessness (India
and Pakistan, possibly China) and it becomes difficult to draw any
conclusions with confidence until there is at least a basic insight into
the scale of the problem there. Moreover, it became clear that the lack
of data can, itself, be a protracted and political problem in relation to
statelessness. Many of the countries where statelessness is known to
be an issue but where reliable statistics are unavailable were already
134
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
identified as sites of concern a decade ago. It is perhaps time for a fresh
look at these protracted data gaps and for new, concerted and creative
ways to be found to get a better – even if imperfect – picture of the
magnitude of the statelessness situation in these countries. But it is
also critical to recognise that filling in these gaps and constructing a
comprehensive and accurate picture of statelessness in all countries
is an ambition that may never come to fruition and we should not
put activities aimed at protecting stateless persons and preventing
and reducing statelessness on hold while identification remains
outstanding.
As this report also briefly explores, determining statelessness is not
always a straightforward exercise. Undocumented persons and those
who are of undetermined nationality may be at risk of statelessness and
indeed, some of them are likely to already be stateless. In a migratory
context, a presumption that such persons could be stateless and giving
them the opportunity to be identified as such in line with UNHCR
guidance, is likely to enhance protection.356 When such persons are in
their own countries though, they are likely to receive greater protection
if identified as nationals. Consequently, for persons in their own
countries it is better to begin with a process that scrutinises nationality
law and policy and its implementation against international standards,
and determines nationality. However, even in such situations, where
the lack of documentation is clearly the result of discrimination and
its impact is long-lasting (often inter-generational), there would come
a point when it is better to acknowledge that the person is stateless,
rather than leaving him or her in the limbo of having no legal status.
Such complexities mean that identifying and counting the stateless can
be a very complex exercise, and that ultimately – protection – must be
at the heart of all such actions.
356
Note that the process of statelessness status determination in the migration
context may also lead to the establishment of nationality – i.e. the person
concerned may be found to be a national of country x, resulting in the
prevention of statelessness and enjoyment of national protection.
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4 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations
Recommendations to states
States have the responsibility to identify and count the stateless within
their territories and subject to their jurisdictions. They are the duty
bearers under international law, holding obligations (both under the
international statelessness treaties and under international human
rights law) with respect to the treatment of stateless persons and
the avoidance of statelessness. The identification of statelessness is
a fundamental tool in helping states to ensure that they meet these
obligations.357 Indeed, it is also in a state’s interests to know who is on
its territory and what the composition of this population is, so that it
can plan and develop policy accordingly – including whether there are
stateless persons who may have specific needs or require a specific
policy response. Thus, while UNHCR collates data on statelessness
from different countries into a global overview, arguably the most
important primary data source is government statistics and gaps in
such data sets are contributing significantly to the lack of a complete
picture on statelessness worldwide. At the same time, states hold the
key to better data coverage on statelessness since they already regularly
collect information about their populations in different ways and
existing data collection sets and exercises such as population registries
and national censuses can hold or capture information that enables
the identification of statelessness. With these considerations in mind,
states are urged to consider the following concrete recommendations:
1. States should adopt and/or strengthen measures to count stateless
persons on their territory, including by incorporating census
questions or answer categories to enable the identification of
stateless persons during national population census exercises and
by reviewing how data on nationality or statelessness is collected
within administrative databases such as population registries and
immigration databases to improve the coverage and accuracy of
information on statelessness. Where current data on statelessness
is unreliable or incomplete, states should consider conducting or
cooperating with dedicated statelessness mapping exercises.358
357
358
136
See above, note 39, paragraphs (b) – (g), for the Executive Committee’s
recommendations to UNHCR and to States with regard to the identification of
stateless persons.
Ibid. Paragraph (d).
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
2. States should include a definition of a stateless person in their
domestic law and ensure that this definition is formulated,
interpreted and applied consistently with international law and
relevant doctrinal guidance on statelessness.
3. States with significant statelessness problems on their territory must
revisit the legal and policy framework which created statelessness
with a view to preventing and reducing statelessness. States with
significant populations which are of undetermined nationality or at
risk of statelessness should adopt appropriate measures to address
the situation of these groups, including, in particular, by conducting
nationality determination which allow individuals to confirm their
nationality and receive related documentation (or, where this is not
possible, to be recognised as stateless).
4. States with stateless migrant populations should establish
statelessness determination procedures to identify the stateless,
with a view to providing protection in accordance with international
law.359
5. States which host refugee populations that are also stateless (or
at risk of statelessness), must take their statelessness into account
when providing durable solutions. Ideally, databases should
allow authorities to separately record is someone is a refugee and
stateless. States to which stateless refugees have been resettled
should track their situation until such time as their statelessness
has been resolved (including by collecting and reporting data on
naturalisations).
6. States must fully cooperate with UNHCR to enable it to fulfil its
mandate towards the stateless, including by giving due consideration
to technical advice on how to adopt more robust methodologies
for counting the stateless and by sharing data relating to stateless
populations on their territory, as well as information about persons
of undetermined nationality and individuals or groups at risk of
359
While statelessness status determination also enhances statistical data, it
would be a mistake to consequently only include within national statelessness
statistics those who have been recognised under such procedures.
Statelessness status determination is, by definition, a protection tool and in
terms of the compilation of statistical data should be complemented by other
data collection tools and exercises – such as specialised research and mapping.
137
4 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
statelessness. States should also cooperate and share data with civil
society, including academia, in an effort to further the collective
understanding of the scale and reach of statelessness.
7. States are encouraged to increase financial support towards
enhancing knowledge – both quantitative and qualitative –
on statelessness. Such added funding would be essential to
strengthening efforts to count the stateless and ultimately protect
the stateless, reduce and end statelessness.
Recommendations to UNHCR
It is encouraging that UNHCR has prioritised improving quantitative and
qualitative data on stateless populations, as part of ‘Action 10’ of its Global
Action Plan to end statelessness by 2024. In particular, under this action
point, the Agency has established the target of achieving quantitative
data coverage on statelessness in 150 states by 2024.360 It is hoped
that the findings of this report can contribute to the implementation of
the UNHCR Action Plan. What has undoubtedly been gained from the
analysis of UNHCR and others’ data is far greater clarity of how UNHCR’s
statistical reporting works – who it includes and who it does not. This
is to a certain extent obscured by the present format in which the data
is offered, i.e. a very neat and easy to read statistical table with either a
number or an asterisk beside each country listed and a few short notes,
provides little space for more detailed explanation. By getting to grips
with what the data shows – and what it does not bring to light – it can
be better interpreted and contextualised. It then becomes possible to
also make some recommendations for how the reporting of UNHCR’s
statelessness numbers could be improved. Moreover, the exploration
of what additional data on statelessness is currently available in the
public domain – and what gaps persist – provides an insight into areas
in which UNHCR could help to strengthen the global statistical picture of
statelessness. On the basis of this analysis, UNHCR is urged to consider
the following concrete recommendations:
1. UNHCR is encouraged to increase its engagement with states and
civil society actors in respect to the identification of statelessness,
in particular by continuing efforts to promote a unified approach to
the definition of a stateless person in accordance with international
law and by providing further guidance and technical advice
360
138
See above, note 52.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
on appropriate and effective methodologies for counting the
stateless.361 In particular, UNHCR is invited to consider convening
expert meetings at the international and/or regional level for the
discussion of challenges and sharing of good practices in identifying
and mapping statelessness; and issuing more detailed guidance in
relation to specific identification and mapping contexts.
2. UNHCR should continue to pursue and strengthen dedicated
mapping initiatives on statelessness, in collaboration with relevant
government and civil society partners. While acknowledging a
recent increase in UNHCR publications of statelessness mapping
exercises, wherever possible and with due regard for any protection
concerns, UNHCR is encouraged to make every effort to publicly
disseminate the findings of any studies undertaken and share
other data available to the office that is relevant to researching or
mapping statelessness.362
3. UNHCR should develop a way to reflect the true reach of statelessness
globally by also reporting on, at least, the number of stateless
refugees and asylum seekers – while indicating, as appropriate, that
these persons fall under UNHCR’s refugee protection mandate as
well as its mandate for the identification, reduction and prevention
of statelessness.
4. In its periodic statistical reporting, UNHCR is urged to find a way
to make visible in the main (i.e. compilation) table of persons
of concern to UNHCR any asterisks delineating significant but
unquantified statelessness situations which are found in the table
dedicated specifically to reporting on persons under UNHCR’s
statelessness mandate. While it happens in most instances, UNHCR
should also always include explanatory footnotes for those country
statistics which are known to only reflect a part of the stateless
population, clearly indicating that the figure reflects partial data. It
is acknowledged that the very nature of statistical reporting on fluid
and often hidden human issues such as statelessness means that
the statistical picture will always be incomplete. This suggestion
therefore only relates to countries for which there are some figures,
but also a known significant statistical gap.
361
362
See above, note 39, paragraph (f).
Ibid. Paragraph (c).
139
4 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
5. In carrying out refugee status determination and with due regard
for any protection concerns, UNHCR staff should also identify those
who are stateless or at risk of statelessness.
6. UNHCR should seek every opportunity to strengthen collaboration
with other UN agencies engaged in activities relevant to data
collection on statelessness (e.g. when undertaking population
surveys or advising on national census exercises), including by
conducting joint activities or advocacy and by providing technical
support as appropriate. In this respect, all parts of the UN system
are reminded of the shared responsibility towards stateless
persons and the need to take appropriate action to ensure that the
issue of statelessness receives due attention, as relevant, under
their respective mandates.363 The UN Statistics Division is urged to
review their instruments, in consultation with UNHCR, to request
the reporting of statelessness data by states as part of its regular
compilation of population data. Other UN entities engaged in or
supporting the collection of population data, including the UN
Regional Commissions, are similarly urged to give due attention to
opportunities to strengthen statelessness data through their work.
Recommendations to civil society, including academia
It is evident that there is a long way to go before the global picture
of statelessness that is starting to emerge becomes complete.
More and improved data collection is an important ingredient in
better understanding the phenomenon. So too, however, is a more
comprehensive and thorough analysis of what the data shows and of
how the data might inform more effective measures to tackle the issue.
Civil society actors, including academic scholars, can work alongside or
in partnership with states, UNHCR and other UN bodies to better map
statelessness but also to conduct this much-needed critical analysis of
the data and exploration of its uses. The following recommendations,
formulated in broad terms so as to speak to civil society engagement at
local, national, regional and international levels, are suggested:
1. Civil society should more actively pursue the consolidation and
analysis of data on statelessness, including by asking critical
questions about what it shows and what the significance of this is,
363
140
Ibid. Paragraph (b). Recall also, the UN Secretary General, Guidance Note of the
Secretary General: The United Nations and Statelessness, June 2011.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
as well as what it does not show and what improvements can be
made to the methodologies for counting the stateless.
2. Civil society should work to identify pressing gaps in statelessness
data and conduct research to fill these gaps, where appropriate
in partnership or consultation with states and/or UNHCR, using
methodologies that are suitable to the identification of statelessness
as understood within international law. Wherever possible and with
due regard for any protection concerns, civil society is encouraged
to make every effort to publicly disseminate the findings of any
studies undertaken.
3. Through the collection, compilation and analysis of data, civil
society should contribute to the wider dissemination of information
on statelessness globally, including statelessness statistics. Civil
society should seek to make such data and analysis available in
different formats in order to engage different audiences with the
issue. Civil society organisations and academic scholars who have
engaged in direct data collection should consider making raw data
available, where possible and with due regard to any protection
concerns, to other actors seeking to use the data to inform further
research, analysis or policy development.
4. Civil society should contribute to the strengthening of methodologies
for counting the stateless by sharing not only statelessness data
and analysis, but also methodological approaches and openly
discussing challenges and good practices.
5. Civil society should continue to work to raise awareness of the
phenomenon of statelessness among relevant actors and the general
public to help to pave the way for further and more effective data
collection and mapping of statelessness. Wherever possible, civil
society should also support UNHCR in its identification work and in
advocacy towards states and other UN agencies on the importance
of better mapping statelessness.
Final reflections
The question of how many stateless persons there are in the world
is not an easy one to answer. UNHCR reports at least 10 million
persons under its statelessness mandate, of which it has been able
141
4 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
to collate country-level statistics from different sources that account
for 3.5 million persons. Our research confirms that the 3.5 million
figure significantly underrepresents the scale of the problem. We
found estimates in other sources that would account for an additional
approximately 2.5 million stateless persons. This number is based on
the lowest-end estimates and does not encompass any populations
for which no estimates are available whatsoever (of which there
are still many), and includes, among others, an estimated 81,000
stateless persons in Bhutan, at least 60,000 in India, 80,000 – 200,000
in Lebanon, over 500,000 not included in the present statistics on
Myanmar, 10,000 – 100,000 in the United Arab Emirates, upwards of
86,000 in Uzbekistan and 80,000 – 600,000 in Zimbabwe, There are
also approximately 2.1 million persons of Palestinian origin, who are
not refugees (never having been displaced from the West Bank or Gaza
Strip) and whose nationality status remains ambiguous in the absence
of Palestinian nationality regulations. This brings the tally of stateless
persons who are currently in some way statistically accounted for, or
‘visible’, to over eight million. The true number of stateless persons
is likely to be significantly higher, due to the data gaps which were
identified and could not be filled. There are several large-scale
situations of statelessness that still entirely elude statistical coverage
– such as Pakistan and DRC – and it is likely that some of the low-end
estimates are too conservative and do not represent the true scale of
the problem, it is clear that UNHCR’s estimate of ‘at least 10 million’
persons exclusively under its statelessness protection mandate is well
founded. Furthermore, there are also at least 1.5 million stateless
refugees and in the region of 3.5 million stateless refugees from
Palestine (the majority falling under UNRWA’s mandate but some
under UNHCR’s refugee mandate). When this is all tallied up, there
are therefore likely to be more than 15 million stateless persons
worldwide today. While the majority of these persons fall under
UNHCR’s statelessness protection mandate, they all must be taken into
account when implementing the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness and other obligations towards stateless persons under
international human rights law.
The above calculations lead us to conclude that almost 0.2% of the
population of the globe is currently living without a nationality, or one
in every 500 people. This is a powerful message about how pervasive
the problem of statelessness is. Moreover, these figures, even as
they remain incomplete, also confirm the stark connection between
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THE WORLD’S STATELESS
statelessness and forced displacement. As a factor of the general
population of the world, approximately one in every 400 people have
been forcibly displaced across an international border as an asylum
seeker or refugee. As a factor of the total stateless population, the
number comes to one in three, i.e. of every three stateless persons in
the world, one has been forcibly displaced.364
While the quest for clarity on the magnitude of statelessness is a
fascinating, compelling and useful one, it is important to acknowledge
that it should not be all-consuming. Having comprehensive and
accurate information about who is affected by statelessness and where,
is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Better data will undoubtedly
help in the campaign to end statelessness by 2024, but the priority
needs to rest firmly with addressing – not (just) mapping – the
issue. There are excellent examples of identification and prevention
or reduction of statelessness being pursued in parallel, for instance
through combined registration and legal assistance programmes
which lead to the identification of statelessness cases but also put
people on the path to a nationality. Where a population is currently
of undetermined nationality or believed to be at risk of statelessness,
it is much more important for efforts or procedures to be geared as
much as possible towards the determination of nationality rather than
of statelessness. Such good practices should be shared and promoted.
In the meantime, we must not lose sight of how much can be achieved
to improve people’s lives even in the absence of data about how many
people are affected. For instance, reforming law or policy to introduce
safeguards against statelessness for children, to grant women equal
rights with men to confer their nationality, to strengthen administrative
documentation procedures and make them accessible to all, to prevent
or reduce statelessness in the context of state succession or to reverse
the effects of a previous act of arbitrary deprivation of nationality – all
will help to realise the right to a nationality and none relies on the
availability of statistical data to be introduced. We must strive to strike
a balance between our drive to better understand the issue and its
scale and the need to remain focused on solutions.
364
This calculation is based on the understanding that at a minimum, a total of
five million of the world’s estimated more than 15 million stateless persons
have been forcibly displaced as a result of persecution. This figure +includes
stateless refugees of Palestinian origin.
143
4 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
The message that not ‘just’ 10 million, but more than 15 million people
are affected by statelessness globally certainly helps to add weight
to the argument that this is a widespread international phenomenon
which demands our attention. As already mentioned earlier in this
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matters. Indeed, if all stateless persons were to be counted together
as a single ‘country’ group, it would come in as the 70th largest. But
size is not the only reason that statelessness matters. There are other,
perhaps even more pressing reasons, such as the undeniable reality
that statelessness is an entirely man-made problem, making it both
our collective responsibility but also within our collective power
to resolve. Ultimately though, the most important motivation for
understanding, responding to and ending statelessness continues to
be the devastating impact of statelessness on individuals’ lives and its
destructive effect with respect to other major issues of international
concern such as securing the well-being of children, maintaining peace
and stability, realising equitable development for all and promoting
peace, democracy and the rule of law.
144
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Faili Kurds, 4 February 2013
South China Morning Post, Three generations of Rohingya living in
India trapped in stateless cycle, 5 May 2014
The Daily Star, Government to arrange spl documents, 18 July 2013
The Economist, The land that maps forgot, February 2011
The Express Tribune, Identity crisis: “I was born here, live here and work
here. Why can’t I vote?”, 13 April 2013
The National, Rohingyas live in limbo, 9 June 2009
UNHCR news, Feili Kurds seek way out of identity impasse, 28 May 2008
UZnews.net “Uzbekistan’s stateless people” 15 January 2008
159
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
ANNEX:
UNHCR Statelessness Statistics (2013 Global Trends Report)
Table 7. Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate, 2013
N.B. Stateless refugees are included in Table 3 and stateless asylum-seekers in Table 12.
Data is not complete and includes estimates. Countries for which UNHCR has information about
stateless persons but no reliable data have been included in the table and marked with an asterisk (*).
These statistics cover stateless persons and persons of undetermined nationality.
All data are provisional and subject to change. Country of residence
Albania1
Armenia
Aruba
Austria
Azerbaijan2
Bahamas
Belarus3
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina4
Bhutan
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Burundi
Cambodia
Colombia
Côte d’Ivoire5
Croatia6
Czech Republic7
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Eritrea
Estonia8
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Population start-2013
Total number
of persons
under
UNHCR’s
statelessness
mandate
7,443
35
-
Population end-2013
of whom:
UNHCRassisted
-
542
-
6,969
-
3,585
-
2,640
-
*
-
4,500
4,500
*
1
21,009
1
-
1,302
1,302
700,000
60,000
*
-
*
12
2,886
1,502
3,623
-
177
-
60
60
*
-
*
94,325
2,017
1,210
-
Total number
of persons
under
UNHCR’s
statelessness
mandate
7,443
of whom:
UNHCRassisted
-
180
1
1
3,585
*
-
2,466
792
427
604
-
6,712
-
*
2
20,524
-
1
-
1,302
1,302
12
700,000
60,000
1,502
*
-
*
2,886
4,263
210,000
177
4,837
23
23
*
-
*
91,281
2,122
1,247
-
161
ANNEX: UNHCR Statelessness Statistics (2013 Global Trends Report)
Georgia
Germany9
Greece10
Honduras
Hong Kong SAR, China
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iraq11
Ireland
Israel12
Italy13
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kenya14
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia15
Latvia16
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malaysia17
Mexico
Mongolia
Montenegro18
Myanmar19
Nepal20
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Philippines21
Poland22
Portugal23
Qatar
Rep. of Korea
Rep. of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation24
162
1,156
5,683
154
1
1
103
119
*
1,156
1
1
-
*
-
14
14
6,935
1,234
15,473
1,147
120,000
73
470
1,100
20,000
93,000
175
280,584
*
-
1
1
4,130
-
*
-
5
-
*
-
177
40,000
7
220
3,383
2
42
808,075
250,000
1
1
*
1,951
2,413
*
2
-
*
-
553
-
6,015
10,825
1,200
179
1,998
248
178,000
3
1,750
776
11,709
178
1
1
113
119
*
776
1
1
-
*
-
14
14
120,000
73
470
48
852
6,942
1,128
93,000
11,425
1,544
20,000
230
267,559
-
1
*
1
2
3,892
-
*
177
*
-
40,000
13
3
3,341
810,000
100,000
1,951
1
1
16
*
1,975
*
-
2
*
-
10,825
553
-
6,015
1,200
194
2,029
297
178,000
10
3,295
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
Saudi Arabia
Serbia (and Kosovo:
S/RES/1244 (1999))25
Slovakia
26
Slovenia27
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic28
Tajikistan29
Thailand30
The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia31
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine32
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom33
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam
Zimbabwe
TOTAL
70,000
-
8,500
4,750
4
-
1,523
-
36
-
*
*
-
17,416
-
2,300
-
69
-
506,197
-
190,000
-
905
905
8,947
8,265
205
-
780
-
35,000
61
*
-
*
11,500
*
3,311,467
-
335,373
70,000
4,195
1,523
4
*
270
*
1,014
-
20,450
79
-
1,364
506,197
-
160,000
-
819
819
8,320
8,243
780
-
-
33,271
138
*
-
*
205
11,000
*
3,469,370
183,804
163
ANNEX: UNHCR Statelessness Statistics (2013 Global Trends Report)
NOTES A dash (“-”) indicates that the value is zero or not available. 1
Figure from 2011 census.
3
Figure from 2009 census. 1,640 persons are registered by the Ministry of Interior as
stateless at the end of 2012.
4
The start-year figure was an estimate. During the year, 792 individuals were identified as
falling under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate.
2
5
6
Number of stateless persons registered by the Department of Citizenship and Migration
of the Ministry of Interior of Belarus. (In the 2009 census, 16,116 persons declared that
they do not possess any nationality)
The figure includes: i) 300,000 Children abandoned at birth: Government estimate of
individuals of unknown parentage who were abandoned as children and who are not
considered as nationals under Ivorian law. ii) 400,000 Descendants of Immigrants:
Government estimate of individuals who themselves or whose parents or grandparents
migrated to Côte d’Ivoire before or just after independence and who did not establish
their nationality at independence or before the nationality law changed in 1972. The
estimate is derived in part from the cases denied voter registration in 2010 because
electoral authorities could not determine their nationality at the time.
Figure from the 2011 census. It includes 36 persons registered as stateless as well as 54
persons registered as of undetermined nationality by the Government of Croatia.
Figure from the 2011 census.
7
Almost all people recorded as being stateless have permanent residence and enjoy more
rights than foreseen in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.
8
The figure does not represent the entire number of persons registered as stateless in the
German Central Aliens Register. The number of stateless persons holding a humanitarian
residence title (not all of whom are persons of concern to UNHCR) and the number of
stateless asylum-seekers have been deducted from it.
9
10
11
Includes people deprived of their citizenship under previous nationality legislation,
stateless individuals with permanent residence who are recognized as “stateless
foreigners” and other stateless persons resident in Greece.
The figure is an estimate and currently under review.
12 13 14
15
164
The figure refers to end of 2012; no data available for 2013. The figure does not include
potentially stateless Bedouin nor all stateless former USSR citizens.
Figure refers to the end of 2011; no data available for 2013.
The figure of 20,000 is an estimate by UNHCR and civil society organizations based on
currently available information on several communities in Kenya. This estimate is under
review pending further research and mapping activities.
The Republic of Latvia enacted a Law on Stateless Persons on 17 February 2004, which
replaced the Law on the Status of Stateless Persons in the Republic of Latvia of 18
February 1999, and which determines the legal status of persons who are not considered
as citizens by the legislation of any State and whose status is not determined by the 25th
April 1995 Law (quoted below). The figure is from July 2013 and includes 54 persons
residing in Latvia who have been recognized as stateless by other states.
THE WORLD’S STATELESS
16
17
18
The Republic of Latvia, by the 25th April 1995 Law on the Status of Those Former USSR
Citizens who are not Citizens of Latvia or of Any Other State, granted a transitional legal
status to permanently residing persons (non-citizens) entitling them to a set of rights
and obligations beyond the minimum rights prescribed by the 1954 Convention relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons.
The figure is an estimated number of individuals who are stateless, including people who
are unable to establish their nationality from among the Indian community (Tamils).
Estimate is based on NGO and media reports, some citing official sources.
Figure is based on the 2011 census.
19 20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Muslim residents of northern Rakhine State.
Various studies estimate that a large number of individuals lack citizenship certificates in
Nepal. While these individuals are not all necessarily stateless, UNHCR has been working
closely with the Government of Nepal and partners to address this situation.
Figure from a 2012 survey undertaken by the Government and UNHCR in southern
Mindanao.
Figure from the 2011 census.
Figure from the 2011 census.
Figure from the 2010 census, which likely includes approximately 25,000 stateless
persons registered by the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation.
The great majority are former Yugoslav citizens who have yet to have their Serbian
nationality formally recognized through the issuance of documents proving nationality.
Figure from the 2011 census. It includes 63 stateless persons who held permits to stay
in Slovakia at the end of 2011. No updated data on the number of stateless persons were
available. The figure is based on an NGO analysis of government registry data and may not
represent the full magnitude of statelessness in Slovenia.
The figure is an estimate and takes into account the number of stateless persons who are
belived to have departed the Syrian Arab Republic.
Figure is from 2010 census, likely to include 308 persons registered as stateless by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan.
Figure from the 2000 census.
The great majority are former Yugoslav citizens who have yet to have their nationality of
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia formally recognized through the issuance of
documents proving nationality. The figure is an extrapolation of the 2001 census figure of persons who self-declared as
not having a nationality. It includes 3,217 persons who are registered as stateless by the
Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine.
Figure refers to the end of 2005. 165
The World’s Stateless
To end statelessness worldwide by 2024. That is the ambition of the
#ibelong campaign, spearheaded by UNHCR, which aims to galvanise
governments, civil society, UN agencies and others into action. It is a
bold but appropriate objective. Statelessness has been a cause of human
suffering for too long, and unnecessarily so: it is a man-made phenomenon
and bringing it to an end is – at least in theory – entirely feasible. The
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion is committed to helping to inform
and catalyse solutions for statelessness. In the hope of contributing to
a better sense of the task ahead, this inaugural World’s Stateless report
explores currently available statistical data and discusses the challenges
involved in accurately mapping or quantifying statelessness. From this
analysis, the report distils recommendations to states, UNHCR and civil
society on how to improve data collection and reporting on statelessness.
2014
The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion is an independent, nonprofit organisation dedicated to leading an integrated, inter-disciplinary
response to the injustice of statelessness and exclusion. Established in
August 2014, it is the first global centre of expertise and action committed
to promoting the rights of stateless persons and reducing statelessness
worldwide. We believe in the value of research, education, partnership
and advocacy. We aim to develop and share our skills and expertise with
partners in civil society, academia, the UN and governments, and to serve
as a catalyst for change.
The World’s Stateless
The World’s Stateless
a