2016EmergencyPreparednessAddendumWorkingPaper:
ObservationsonDOE’s2016ClearPathIVExerciseandImplementationofthe
2014NPCEmergencyPreparednessReportRecommendations
NationalPetroleumCouncil
PreparedinFollow-Uptothe2014NPCReport:
EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters
July29,2016
OnDecember17,2014,theNationalPetroleumCouncil(NPC)approvedthe
reportEnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters.Asapartof
approvingthereport,theNPCagreedtoworkwiththeDepartmentofEnergyon
implementingthereportrecommendations.OnJuly29,2016,theNPCapproved
thetransmittalofthisworkingpaperandrelateddocumentstotheSecretary
andthepostingonwww.npc.org.TheNationalPetroleumCouncilhasnot
endorsedorapprovedthisdocument,butapprovedthepublicationofthese
materials.
TheNPCoffersthesesuggestionsinthespiritofcontinuingimprovementas
industryandgovernmentworkjointlytoimprovepreparednessandresponse
programs.
INTRODUCTION
ThisworkingpaperispreparedfortheuseoftheDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)and
othersimplementingtherecommendationsofthe2014NationalPetroleumCouncil(NPC)
emergencypreparednessreportEnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters.
Theintentistoprovideanindependentandconstructivereviewofongoingprogresswith
implementationofthoserecommendations,andthisreviewprovidesobservationsonthe
Department’s2016ClearPathIVexercise.TheNPCparticipantsacknowledgethatonly
anecdotalevidenceisavailableonseveraloftherecommendationsandthatobservationsof
asingleexercisearelimitedinfullyevaluatingtheimplementationoftheother
recommendations.
InaletterdatedOctober25,2013,SecretaryofEnergyErnestMonizrequestedthe
NationalPetroleumCouncil’sadviceaboutnaturalgasandoilinfrastructureresilience(emergencypreparednessfornaturaldisasters).TheNPCassembledadiverseteamofindustryand
governmentexpertsonemergencyresponsethatreviewedpastincidents,collectedanalyses,
anddevelopedaconsensusonrecommendationsforindustryandgovernmenttoimprove
responsetosupplychaindisruptions.InDecember2014,theNPCapprovedandpresented
thereporttotheSecretary(www.npc.org,Reports:EmergencyPlanningandPreparedness:
EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters).
The2014reporthighlightedsevenkeyrecommendations.Theserecommendationsfall
intotwobroadcategories:(1)leveragingoperationalframeworksthatareappropriatelystaffed
and(2)maintainingreadinessthroughsustainingmechanismstoaddressinterdependencies,
enhancecapabilities,andcontinuouslyimprove.
2014ReportRecommendations:
OperationalFramework
v HarmonizeDOE’senergyresponseteamstructurewiththeNationalIncident
ManagementSystem(NIMS)IncidentCommandSystem(ICS).
v LeveragetheEnergyInformationAdministration’s(EIA)subjectmatterexpertisewithin
DOE’senergyresponseteamtoimprovesupplychainsituationassessments.
v EstablishcompanyliaisonsanddirectcommunicationwithDOE’senergyresponseteam
toimprovesituationassessments.
v Streamlineandenhanceprocessesforobtainingtemporaryregulatoryrelieftospeedup
recovery.
SustainingtheProcess
v Statesshouldincreaseengagementwiththeoilandnaturalgasindustryintheirenergy
assuranceplans,andindustrymembersshouldassistthestatesinsuchefforts.
v BothDOEandstatesshouldestablishroutineeducationandtrainingprogramsforkey
governmentemergencyresponsepositions.
v BothDOEandstatesshouldimprovetheircomprehensivedrillandexerciseprograms
andincludeindustryparticipation.Reciprocalinvitationsextendedbycompaniesto
DOEandstatesarerecommended.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
2
AttheDecember2014Councilmeeting,NPCChairCharlesD.Davidsonnotedthatthe
realchallengewasimplementingtherecommendations,notwritingthereport.TheNPC
members,throughapprovingthereport,madeacommitmenttofollowthroughwithDOE
andsupportimplementationofthekeyrecommendations.InaMarch23,2015lettertothe
Council,SecretaryMonizthankedtheCouncilforthereportandnotedseveralareaswhere
implementationofthereport’srecommendationswasunderway.TheSecretaryalsorestated
theDepartment’sinterestinworkingwithindustrypartnerstoenhanceenergysystem
resilience.TheSecretary’sMarch2015letterisavailableforreferenceinAppendixA.
Oneofthesevenkeyrecommendationsaddressesaneffectivedrillandexercise
program.Inlate2015,DOEannouncedthatthefourthannual“ClearPath”energysector
preparednessexercisewouldberevampedandmoveawayfromanacademicsessionformat
ofearlierClearPathexercisesandmoretowardafunctionalexerciseinsupportofthe
QuadrennialEnergyReview(QER),theNPC’sreportrecommendations,andtheDeputy
Secretary’sdesireforcross-sectorcoordination.Consistentwiththecommitmentmadein
approvingthereport,theNPCandindustryassistedDOEwiththeClearPathIVexercisethat
tookplaceinApril2016.ThiseffortbuiltuponpreviousworkcompletedbyDOEandindustry
inworkingtowardimplementingthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.
TheAprilexercisescenariosimulateda9.0CascadiaSubductionZoneearthquakeand
tsunamiinthePacificNorthwest.TheNPCrolewastwo-fold:
1. SupportDOEbyprovidingalinktokeycompaniesintheexerciseregionandproviding
assistanceindesigningandplanningtheoilandgascomponentsoftheexercise
2. Provideindependentobservationsregardingthedemonstrationofreport
recommendationsduringtheexercise.
ManymembersoftheNPCteamparticipatedinthe2014EmergencyPreparedness
studyindividually,orcolleaguesfromtheircompaniesparticipated.Inaddition,somemembers
wereaddedtoensurethatkeyfacilitiesinthePacificNorthwestwererepresented.Afullroster
of2016EmergencyPreparednessAddendumparticipantscanbefoundinAppendixB.
ThisworkingpapercontainsasummaryofNPCsupportforDOE’sClearPathIVexercise
andobservationsofDOE’sexerciseandimplementationofthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.InadditiontoDOE’simplementationofrecommendations,theNPCteamattemptedto
identifyindustryandstateprogressinimplementingtherecommendations.AppendixC
providesalistofreferencesusedinthisreview,AppendixDincludestheoutputfromthe
StateFuelPlanningworkshop,andAppendixEprovidesadetailedsetofcommentsonthe
planningandexecutionofthe2016ClearPathIVexercise.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
3
NPCSUPPORTFORCLEARPATHIV
TheNPCofferedtoassistinexercisedevelopmentwithafocusonincorporatingthe
2014studyrecommendationsintoexerciseplay.DOEwelcomedthisassistanceandthree
NPCworkgroupswereestablishedtoleadtheseefforts.Workgroup1wasestablishedtoassist
withplanningDay1activitiesinPortland.Workgroup2wasestablishedtoassistwithplanning
Day2activitiesandsupportingthefunctionalexercisesimulationcell.Workgroup3was
establishedtoconductareviewoftheClearPathIVactivitiesanddocumentactionsthat
demonstratetheadoptionofthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.
ClearPathIVwasdevelopedtoprovideanopportunityforgovernmentandindustryto
examinethechallengesofrespondingtoacatastrophicCascadiaSubductionZoneearthquake
andtsunamiandtoidentifygapswithinrespectiveresponseplansandpolicies.Day1activities
consistedofatabletopexerciseinthemorningfollowedbysector-specificworkshopsinthe
afternoon.Day2activitieswereplannedasafunctionalexercise,engagingmembersfrom
industryandlocalmunicipalitiesinOregonandWashingtonstatesasControllersinaSimulation
CelltotestmembersofDOE’sEmergency&IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)andEnergy
ResponseOrganization(ERO)inWashington,DC.
Forfurtherdetailsontheexercisescenarioandrelatedmaterialsonemergency
response,pleaserefertoAppendixCforalistofreferences.
Workgroup1–Day1Exercise-TabletopandWorkshop
Workgroup1focusedonsupportingthetabletopexerciseandfuelsworkshop.AWork
PlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup1effortsinassistingDOEwiththeDay1exerciseand
thefacilitationoftheafternoonFuelsBreakoutSessionforoilandnaturalgassectorparticipants.TheWorkgroup1teamfocusedonthefollowingdeliverables:
•
Contactingoilandnaturalgasoperatingcompanies(refineries,terminals,pipelines,etc.)
inthePacificNorthwesttoparticipateintheexerciseandbreakoutsession.
•
ProvidingsupportforDay1exerciseparticipationbydetailingresponseissuesthatoil
andnaturalgascompanieswouldbedealingwithaftertheearthquake.
•
FacilitatingtheFuelsBreakoutSessiontodiscussstatefuelplansandareasfor
improvement.
Inaddition,theworkgroupprovidedexpertiseandeducationontheoilandnaturalgassupply
chainsaspartoftheworkshopdiscussion.
Detailedinformationandoutputfromtheworkshopregardingstatefuelplanscanbefoundin
AppendixD.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
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Workgroup2–ExerciseDevelopment
AWorkPlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup2effortsinassistingDOEwith
developmentofthefunctionalexercise.Workgroup2waschargedwithtwokeyfocuspoints
forassistinginthedevelopmentoftheexercise:1)establishingawaytotestDOEinitial
activationproceduresand2)demonstratingcoordinationbetweengovernment(federal,state,
andlocal)andindustrypartners.WhileprovidingsignificantinputtoDOE’sexercisecontractor,
DOEledtheoverallplanninganddevelopmenteffortfortheexercise.
UsingthekeyNPCEmergencyPreparednessstudyrecommendationsandfollowing
HomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)guidance,Workgroup2developed
anExerciseEvaluationGuide(EEG)focusingonkeyprioritiesandprovidingafoundationfor
exercisedevelopment.TheEEGoutlinedwhattheNPCobserversdesiredtoseedemonstrated
duringtheexerciseplay.Workgroupparticipantsusedtheseexpectedplayeractionsto
developexerciseinjectsthatwouldcreateanenvironmentforexpectedplayeractionstooccur.
Theseinjectswereincorporatedintotheexercisescript,theMasterScenarioEventList(MSEL),
developedbyDOEexerciseplanners.
Thebasicprocesswasasfollows:
Review
DevelopExercise
IdentifyExercise
DevelopExercise
UseMSELand
Develop
IncorporateNPC
NPCEPStudy
Evaluation
Purposeand
Injectsbasedon
EEGduring
Workgroup2
InjectsintoMSEL
RecommenCriteriainthe
Objectives
EEG
ExercisePlay.
dations
formofanEEG
DetailedobservationsandsuggestionsforimprovingfutureDOEfunctionalexercisescanbe
foundinAppendixE.
Workgroup3–ObservationTeam
Workgroup3wasformedtocoordinateateamofobserversforthefunctionalexercise
onDay2oftheDOEClearPathIVexercise.Thisteamwascomposedofemergency
preparednessandresponseprofessionalswithyearsofexperiencebothleadingexercisesand
participatinginexercises,aswellassignificantexperienceleadingresponseteamsduringactual
responseevents.TheroleforWorkgroup3wastoobservetheDOEClearPathIVexerciseand
offerinsightsonDOE’sprogressinimplementingthe2014NPCreportrecommendationsand
thoughtsonareasforcontinuingimprovementinDOE’semergencyresponsesystem.In
additiontoobservingtheexercise,Workgroup3hadtheopportunitytointerviewsomeDOE
employeesandindustryrepresentativesontheprogressoftheNPCstudyrecommendations
thatwerenotexercisedinthescenario.ThedetailsfromWorkgroup3’sobservationsformthe
basisforthedetailedcommentsthatfollow.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
5
OBSERVATIONSOFDOE’SEXERCISEANDIMPLEMENTATIONOF2014RECOMMENDATIONS
TheClearPathIVexerciseallowedtheNPCtoobserveprogresstowardtheseven
recommendationsinthe2014NPCreport,sincetheexercisetouchedonmanyoftheareas
discussedintheNPCstudy.ThissectioncoverstheNPCobservationsrelativetoeach
recommendation.Thereviewwasnotintendedtobeacompleteassessmentoftheprogress
todate,sinceitwasbasedmainlyontheexerciseobservations.Theexercisehadseveral
limitingfactorsforobservations,suchasexercisecontrols,technology,andphysicalconstraints
withinDOE,andsomerecommendationswerenotexercisedduringClearPathIV.
Themostchallengingbuildingblocksofasuccessfulresponseprogramareleadership
commitmentandaprogramownerwhoisgiventheresourcestosustaintheprogram.The
long-termcommitmenttothesetwocomponentswillbefundamentaltoDOE’ssuccessful
emergencypreparednessandresponseeffort.Manyofthe2014NPCrecommendations,such
astheIncidentCommandSystem(ICS),areinstitutionalframeworkstomanageincidents,andit
istheleadershipcommitmentandtheprogramownerthatensurestheireffectiveimplementationanduse.DOEhasclearlybeguntheprocessofsettinganemergencypreparedness
foundation.
Aneffectivepreparednessandresponseprogramisalong-termendeavor.The
organizationswithmatureprogramshavebeenimplementingandcontinuouslyimprovingtheir
programsformanyyears,evendecades.Inordertosustainandbuildonpastprogressover
time,theNPCcannotadequatelyemphasizetheimportanceofaformalmanagement-ofchangeprocess.Amanagement-of-changeprocessisanessentialcomponentinanyprogram,
buttheaddedcomplexityoftheelection-drivenchangeoftheAdministrationandthelarge
turnoverofseniorstaffoveraveryshorttimeheightensthecriticalityofchangemanagement.
TheNPCencouragesDOEtomakemanagementofchangeakeypriorityinplanningforanew
Administrationandanongoingpriorityoftheemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.
Followingisabriefoverviewofhigh-levelobservationsonpreparednessandresponse
programprogressandareasforcontinuingimprovement.Thisoverviewisfollowedbymore
detailedobservations.TheNPCoffersthesesuggestionsinthespiritofcontinuingimprovementandlooksforwardtocontinuingtoworkwiththeDepartmentoverthenextyearsand
decadesasindustryandgovernmentworkjointlytoimprovepreparednessandresponse
programs.
Overview–OperationalFramework
TheexercisedemonstratedtheDOEleadership’scommitmenttoestablishinga
preparednessandresponseprogram,whichisthefirststepinfurtherprogramdevelopment.
OneoftheclearimprovementareaswastheinclusionofEIAintheEROresponseteam,andit
appearedthatEIAparticipantsunderstoodtheirroles.Todevelopintoaseamlessteaminthe
SituationUnit,EIAwillrequiredocumentationofclearlydefinedrolesandresponsibilitiesand
additionalpractice.EIA’sinclusionseemedtohelpothersoutsidetheindustrytounderstand
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
6
theantitrustissuesthatrequireEIA’sconfidentialinformationhandling.Basedoninteractions
withindustrythroughtheOilandNaturalGasSectorCoordinatingCouncil(ONGSCC),EIAhas
alsocompiledafoundationallistofcompanyliaisoncontactstouseduringsuchincidents.
Akeyeffortinimprovingandmaintainingapreparednessandresponseprogramisthe
processofcontinuousimprovement.DOEshouldcontinuetobuildtheircapabilityandunderstandingoftheICStoensureitsconsistentuseacrosstheentirepreparednessandresponse
team.TheobservationteamhasnotedthatareviewofDOEresponseplans,staffing,and
facilityspacemayofferareastoadvanceeffectiveness.Inthestaffcategory,theremaybe
opportunitiestoincreasetheleverageofEIAstaffaspartoftheresponseteam.Inaddition,the
ONGSCCandtheEIAshouldworktogethertoensurethattheliaisoncontactlistmaintenance
processisinstitutionalizedandsustainable,andworkwithDOE’sEnergyResponseOrganization
tosynchronizeplanning.
Overview–SustainingtheProcess
TheClearPathIVexercisewasasignificantstepforwardinimprovingindustryandDOE
energyemergencypreparednesscooperation.ThroughtheONGSCCanditsmembertrade
associationsandcompanies,theindustryhasalsobeenreachingouttoDOEforgovernment
attendanceorparticipationinindividualcompanyexercises.AsDOEpersonnelcontinueto
participateinindustryexercises,movingfromobservationtoactualparticipantroleswill
advancethevalueofthatinput.ThefuelsworkshoponDay1oftheexercisewasanimportant
opportunityforstatestoimproveunderstandingofindustrysupplychainsandusethat
knowledgeinthedevelopmentoftheirstatefuelpreparednessplans.Italsowasan
opportunityforindustryparticipantstoimproveunderstandingofstateandfederalrolesduring
emergencies.Themovetoafunctionalexercisecreatedtheopportunityforindustryand
governmenttoworktogethernotjustduringtheexercise,butduringtheplanningandreview
processes.Thiscreatedanongoingdialogueandfacilitatedthedevelopmentofworking
relationshipsthatarelikelytocontinueforyears.
ThisDOEandindustrycollaborationhighlightedopportunitiesforcontinuingimprovement.Thefuelsworkshopandthediscussionsonfundamentalsupplychainissuesemphasize
theneedforongoingtrainingandeducationbetweengovernmentandindustryatalllevelsso
thatthefuelproductionanddistributionnetworkismoreclearlyunderstoodinadvanceofan
emergencybythosethatwillbeworkingtowardrestoration.Suchcollaborationwillalsohelp
toinformmoreindustrypersonnelongovernmentroles,includingsituationassessmentsand
areasinwhichgovernmentassistsinrestoration.FutureexercisescanbuilduponClearPathIV
andprovideevengreatervalueinsupportingtheindustryandgovernmentemergency
preparednessandresponsesystems.
Followingisadetailedrevieworganizedaroundtheoriginal2014NPCemergency
preparednessrecommendationsthatincludesmanysuggestionsforimprovementdirectedat
industry,states,andtheDepartmentofEnergy.Afewkeyissueshavebeenidentifiedasthe
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
7
mostcriticaltoadvancetheDOEemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram,aswellas
industryandstateprograms.
KeyActionItemsforDOE
•
ConformtoICSorganizationalstructure,roles,nomenclature,andprocesses(avoid
customization).TheICSapproachprovidesstandardizationthroughconsistent
terminologyandestablishedorganizationalstructure.1
•
Developacontinuityandmanagement-of-changestrategy.Thisshouldincludea
staffingplanforkeyemergencypreparednessandresponsepositions,whichaddresses
employeeturnoverandretainssubjectmatterexpertise,historicalknowledge,andan
understandingofworkprocessestoensurealong-termorganizationalcoreteam.In
addition,aprocessownerforemergencypreparednessandresponseleadership,who
hasalong-termcommitmenttotheprogram,isakeycomponentofcontinuity.
•
Engageexperienced,operationalrespondersandpractitionersascoachestoassistwith
emergencypreparednessandresponsedesign,documentation,knowledge,tools,and
training(e.g.,U.S.CoastGuard,subjectmatterexpertsfromindustryoperators,etc.).
• Expandtrainingandexercises.Continuecollaborationwithindustry,states,andothers.
KeyActionItemsforIndustry
•
CollaboratewithEIAonthedesignofasustainmentprocessforthecompanyliaison
contactsystemwiththeONGSCC.
•
FormalizeaprocesstoshareindustryexerciseschedulesandengagebothDOEandstate
governments’participationthroughtheEnergyGovernmentCoordinatingCouncil(GCC).
KeyActionItemsforStates
•
Establishroutinereviewandupdateofstateenergyassuranceplans.
•
Expandunderstandingofenergysysteminterdependencies.
•
Improveunderstandingofoilandnaturalgassupplychains,includingregionaland
nationalimplicationsofdisruptions.
DETAILEDREVIEWOF2014NPCREPORTRECOMMENDATIONS
Thefollowingsectionincorporatesobservationdetailstoreviewprogresstowardmeetingthe
original2014NPCrecommendations.Eachrecommendationbeginswiththe2014report
languageanddescriptivebulletsinbluetext.Thecommentsareorganizedintotwo
subsectionsnotedas“ProgressObserved”and“OpportunitiesforImprovement.”
1
NationalIncidentManagementSystem,HomelandSecurity,December2008.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
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Recommendation1
HarmonizeDOE’senergyresponseteamstructurewiththeNationalIncidentManagement
System(NIMS)IncidentCommandSystem(ICS).
v Adoptscalablemodelfromlocaltoregionaltonational–StaffordActenactedornot
§ Usecommonnomenclature,structure,tools,training
§ Ensureconnectivityatlocallevelandhigherlevels
§ MaintainclearcontactpointsbetweengovernmentandindustryICSstructures
v DevelopDOEcultureandknowledgeofICS
§ Ensurestaffingandtrainingtosustainbothcapabilitiesandcompetenciesbetween
incidents
§ Identifymechanism(e.g.,U.S.CoastGuard)fortrainingDOEstaffonICS.
ProgressObserved
ObservershadasenseofDOEleadershipcommitment,whichiscriticaltodevelopingand
maintainingapreparednessandresponseprogramforDOEtouseinperformingitsrole
underESF-12.DOEleadershiphasexpressedonvariousoccasionstheirdesiretoimplement
theNPCstudyrecommendations,includingadoptionofICSastheresponseorganizationand
communicationtool.
•
TheDeputySecretary’sparticipationintheexercisedebriefandintheEmergency&
IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)meetingsindicatedherinterestandcommitment
toimprovingtheDOEpreparednessprogram.Shewasfocusedonlessonslearnedfrom
theexerciseandunderstoodtheimportanceofparticipatinginexerciseswiththe
industry.
•
TheDeputyAssistantSecretary’sleadershipwasresponsibleforsupportingand
providingresourcesfortheexercise,includingparticipatingintheNPCactivity
associatedwiththiseventandallowingNPCobserverstoattend.
TheDOEOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityhasprogressedinharmonizingits
responsestructureunderNIMSICS.
•
Sincethe2014NPCstudy,DOEhasdevelopedanEnergyResponsePlandocument,
whichcontainsthebasicconceptsoftheICS.
•
Thefunctions(legal,safety,publicaffairs)wereorganizedunderwhatappearstobethe
CommandStaff.
•
TheEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)wasorganizedunderthebasicstructureofICS
andcontainedthefollowingsections:Operations,Planning,Finance,andLogistics.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
9
OpportunitiesforImprovement
DOE’sresponseorganizationdesignneedstobefullyconsistentwithNIMSICSandavoid
terminologythatcreatesconfusion,particularlywithstaffgroupdesignations.Strict
conformitytoICSstructure,nomenclature,anddocumentationofDOEEnergyResponsePlan
organizationstructurewillimprovetheeffectivenessofDOEresponseandinteractionwith
otherpublicandprivateresponsestakeholders.
•
ImplementationoftheICS,underNIMS,isnotconsistentacrossorganizationsandfirst
respondersatalllevelsofgovernment.Althoughmanyagenciesatlocal,state,and
federallevelsuseICS,thevariabilityinapplicationunderminestheefficienciessought
throughstandardization.Aconsistent,disciplinedprocessforcommunicationbetween
federalagenciesandwithindustrycanleadtomoretimelyandqualityinformationto
supportsituationalawarenessanddecision-makingduringnaturaldisasters.
•
Theuseofstaffingpositionterminologyandsomedocumentsprovidedduringthe
exercisecreatedconfusionastowhowasperformingcertainroles.Itwasparticularly
uncleartotheobserverswhowasperformingtheroleofIncidentCommanderduring
theClearPathIVexercise.DOEneedstoclearlydefinetheterminologyforpositions
andtheassociatedroleswiththem.
–
AtvarioustimetheERODirectorseemedtobeperformingthefunctionofIncident
Commanderandatothertimesitappearedthatthisfunctionwashousedinthe
SeniorEnergyResponseOfficial(SERO)position.
–
Variousversionsoftheorganizationchartsindicatedthreedifferentreporting
structuresfortheSERO,CommandStaff,andERODirector.
o TheEnergyResponsePlanindicatesthatthePublicAffairsOfficerwould
reporttotheSEROandtheLegalOfficerwouldreporttotheERODirector.
InaNIMScompliantICS,theCommandStaffwouldreporttotheIncident
Commander.
o Duringtheexercise,theCommandStaff(legalandpublicaffairs)reportedto
theSERO.InNIMSICSthatwouldindicatethattheSEROwastheIncident
Commander.
o TheExercisePlayerLayoutdocument,providedtotheobservers,usedthe
termChiefofStaffinplaceoftheERODirectoranddidnotindicateany
positiontermedtheSERO.
o AnotherdocumentprovidedtotheobserversindicatedthatboththeCommandStafffunctions(legalandpublicaffairs)reportedtotheERODirector.
–
Alltheorganizationalchartsprovidedtotheobservers,andintheEnergyResponse
Plan,indicatedFinance,Logistics,andAdministrativefunctionsarebeingsupplied
bythesameperson.InaNIMSICScompliantstructure,ratherthancombining
functionsunderoneSection,ifanyfunctionsidentifiedinICSasbeneaththelevel
ofIncidentCommanderarenotbeingperformedbythatICSSection,theyarethe
responsibilityoftheIncidentCommander.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
10
•
EIMCisnotastandardICSelement,rolesandresponsibilitiesarenotclear,andchainof
commandwasnotconsistentnorclearrelativetotheICSstructure.TheERO(onDay2)
waitedfortheEIMCtoestablishpriorities,whichwerecommunicatedtotheUnified
CommandGroup(UCG)andthentheERO.WithinatypicalICS,theEROwouldbe
recommendingobjectivestotheUCGasinputtoEIMC.
Rolesandresponsibilitiesofresponseteampositionsneedtobeclearlyunderstoodbyall;
documentationofrolesandresponsibilitiesmustbedescribedsufficientlyintheEnergy
ResponsePlan.(Note:TheEnergyResponsePlanreferencesothersupportingdocumentation
–e.g.,The“EnergyResponseOrganizationTacticalProceduresManual”andthe“ESF#12
ProgramPlan”–thatmayhavemoredetailanddescription,butwerenotavailabletothe
assessmentteamforreview.)
•
TherewasconfusionbetweenUCGrolesofcommandandcoordination.Thereisasignificantdifferencebetween“command”and“coordination”andthecorrectterminology
shouldbedecideduponbasedontheroleofthatgroup.Typically,aUCGiscreated
whenleadershipisjointwithmembersfromdifferentorganizations.TheexerciseUCG
wasmadeupofplayersfromtheDOE(i.e.,anOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergy
ReliabilityandNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration[NNSA]LeadershipTeam).The
significantlydifferentmissionsbetweentheseDOEresponseteamsshouldbeconsidered
intheuseofany“unifiedcommand/coordination”group.Itmaybeappropriatefor
someresponses,butthatshouldbeclearlyarticulatedinDOE’senergyresponseplanand
terminologychangedtoavoidconfusionwithICSdefinitions.
•
TheEnergyResponsePlanhadveryshortroleandresponsibilitydescriptionsforeach
position,whichlackedsufficientclarity.Clarityofroleforeachresponsesectionmust
beclearlyunderstoodbyallresponseteammemberstoensureacohesiveresponse
teamandavoidduplicationofeffort.
•
ThefunctionsoftheEIMC,UCG,andEROdidnotappeartobecompletelyunderstood
byallthemembersofeachgroup.Thisaddedconfusionbetweenrolesforeachgroup
andinturncleardirectionongoals,objectives,andsituationalstatuswerenotfollowed
withtherigorthatwewouldnormallyexpectunderanICSorganizationalstructure.
StandardICSworkprocessesandtoolsshouldbefullyusedtoimprovetheeffectivenessof
DOE’sresponseteam;adherencetotheseprocessesandtools,throughouttheevent,will
enableDOEtoquicklyalignwithandworkeffectivelyinarealresponsewithotherpublicand
privateorganizations.
•
TherewasnoevidenceofthedevelopmentofaDOEIncidentActionPlan(IAP)forthe
response.WithouttheinitialdevelopmentofanIAPandarepeatableprocesstoupdate
theIAPwiththechangingscenario,thereisnowayfortheresponseteamtokeepup
withallthechangingsituation.DOEusedwhattheyreferredtoas“BattleRhythm”as
theirplanningtool.BattleRhythmisnotatermroutinelyusedorunderstoodbyother
organizationsandagenciesoperatingunderICS.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
11
–
•
TheICSstandardPlanning“P”processwasnotleveragedtodeveloptheIAP.
–
•
TheBattleRhythmwasobservedtobealistofpre-definedmeetingsorconference
callsandtimes.TheuseofthisBattleRhythmalonecouldnotproduceanICS
qualityIAP.TheIAPisadocumentthatcontainstheresponseobjectives,communicationoftheobjectives,strategicdirection,tacticalplanstoaccomplishthe
objectives,identificationandallocationofresources,thedevelopmentofa
situationalstatusboard(display),andtheoperationalperiodforactivity.TheIAP
isreviewedandsignedoffonbytheIncidentCommander.Itisusedtoensure
cohesionofmissionbytheresponseteamandistheplanforaccomplishingthe
objectives.
TheuseoftheICSstandardPlanning“P”processwasabsentfromtheresponse
planningprocess.DOEindicatedinlaterinterviewsthattheBattleRhythmwas
intendedtobetheprocesstodeveloptheirprimaryproduct–theSituationReport.
TheBattleRhythm,asobserved,couldnotreplacethePlanning“P”processand
lackstheabilitytoadequatelydeveloptheIAP.WithouttheuseofanIAP,
developedbytheuseofthePlanning“P”,acoordinatedandefficientresponse
effortwillbeextremelydifficulttomaintain.Trainedresponders,operatingunder
ICSandthePlanning“P”processcanprogressivelyhandleandaccomplishcomplex
scenarios.OurobservationisthattheBattleRhythm,ascurrentlyused,cannotbe
reliedupontheuseinalong-termorcomplexscenario.
TherewasnosituationalstatusboardavailableintheDOEEmergencyOperations
Center(EOC)toinformtheentireresponseteamofthestatusoftheresponse.This
wouldincluderesourcesidentifiedandallocated;responseobjectives;asituational
display(map)oftheoperationsarea;responseorganizationchartwithspecificnames
assignedtoeachsection;etc.ItwastheobserversopinionthatWebEOCwasintended
tobeused,butitdidnotworkandtherewasnoattempttodisplaywallcharts.
DOE’sEnergyResponsePlanshouldincludesufficientlytrainedstafftocoverIncident
CommandrolesandEOCoperationsforascenariothatextends24/7operationsoveran
extendedperiod(weeksormonths).TheEOCstaffingduringtheexerciseappearedtobe
inadequatetohandlethisspecificexercisescenario.
•
Theobserverssaworheardnorecognitionconcerningthisissue.
•
DOEindicatedthatitisinvestigatingtrainingotherDOEemployeesoutsideofthe
InfrastructureSecurityandEnergyRestorationDivisiontofillthoseroles.
•
DOEindicatedthatitsrationalefor“doublingup”ontheICSSectionChiefpositionswas
toprovideanopportunityforcross-training.
Guidelinesshouldbedevelopedformanagingresponsetosimultaneousevents.Establishing
aUnifiedCommandapproachacrosstheeventswouldbevaluablewhentheeventsimpact
thesameregionand/orsectorandresponserequirescoordinationandallocationofsimilar
resources.Whentherearefewornointerdependenciesbetweenresponseresources,it
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
12
maybemoreeffectivetomanageeacheventunderadiscreetresponsestructure(ERO)with
communicationsintegratedattheEIMClevel.Thecomplexities,diversities,anddynamicsof
managingaresponsetosimultaneousevents,acrosssectors,regions,andagenciesisdifficult.
ThedecisionforanintegratedresponseteamunderUnifiedCommandissituationandevent
dependent.However,oncedecided,fullyutilizingtheICSprocessandtoolstoclearly
communicateresponsescope,responsibilities,andactionplansisacriticalenablertoensure
responseteamsarealignedandeffective.
•
Respondingasa“unifiedresponseorganization”betweentheCascadiascenarioandthe
nuclearthreatscenariowasconfusing.Eventhoughthesescenarioswereintroducedas
havingoneresponseteam,thepartiesaddressingthesescenariosroutinelyworkedin
separatespaces.
•
Itappearedthattheintegratedfunctionshadlimitedbenefitandaddedtotherole
confusion.
•
Integrationatthehigherlevels,perhapstheEIMC,ismoreappropriate.
EmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC)logisticsshouldaccommodateawidevarietyofinternal
andexternalparticipantssupportingunifiedcommand,includingreliablecommunications,
sufficientspace,redundantsystems,andotherEOCdesignbestpractices.TheEOCusedfor
thisexerciseappearedhavesignificantlimitationsandperhapshinderedamorecohesive
response.
•
Usingrestricted(classified)spacefornon-classifiedemergencyresponseoperations
addsunnecessaryconstraintstocommunicationsandinteractions.Fortheexercise,
DOEprovidedescortswhowerehelpful,informative,andprofessional;theyaccommodatedrequestsquicklyandpleasantly,butinarealevent,ifthereareun-cleared
participants,theselimitationsmaybedifficulttocoordinateeffectively.
•
TheDOEEmergencyOperationsCenterhadlimitedspacetohandlealargeexercise;
theUnifiedCommandGroupwasisolatedfromtherestoftheteam.
•
CommunicationsystemissuesrequiredtheEIAsituationunitrepresentativeintheEOC
toleavetheexerciseroomforextendedperiodsduringtheafternoontocommunicate
withtheEIAteam.
Summary–Recommendation1Input
ThedisciplineofICS,usingthesystematic,standardizedapproach,providesaneffective
mechanismforDOEtoactasthecoordinating,primaryagencyforenergyinfrastructure
assessment,repair,andrestorationwithinthefederalgovernmentaspartoftheNational
ResponseFrameworkandtheNationalIncidentManagementSystem.Thebenefitsof
implementingICSasdesignedincludes:standardizedorganizationstructurewithclearlydefined
rolesandresponsibilities,integratedcommunicationsthatfacilitateescalationofissues,
situationassessment,commonoperatingpicture,andcoordinationofresponseacrossagendas
andsectors.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
13
Recommendation2
LeveragetheEnergyInformationAdministration’s(EIA)subjectmatterexpertisewithinDOE’s
energyresponseteamtoimprovesupplychainsituationassessments.
v StaffsituationunitleaderandsupportpersonnelfromEIA(mostknowledgeableon
industrysupplies)
v Developsituationassessmentviatwocommunicationpaths
§ BottomupthroughgovernmentICSstructure(ESF-12contact,PSAs,JFO,etc.)
§ Directone-on-onecommunicationsandcoordinationwithIndustrySupplyChain
Liaisons
v Summarizeoverallfuelsupplysituationandcascadingeventsandtimelines
v Aggregateindustrysupportrequirements
v SupportDOEcontinuingtoassessandimplementsocialmediainformationgathering.
ProgressObserved
EIAparticipatedinthePlanningSectionoftheEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO),witha
staffpersonintheEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC).EIAstaffsupportingtheEROwere
locatedoutsideoftheEOCinanEIAdata-secureareainordertocollectandprocessindividual
companydatafortheSituationReport.EIAhaspreparedalistofquestionstopre-identifythe
typesofinformationthatwillberequiredduringarealdisruptionevent.EIAusedsimulated
contactsforindustryrepresentativestogetaninitialassessmentofthesupplychainprocedures
forpurposesoftheexercise.
ASituationReportwasproducedthatcoveredmajorenergyfacilitiesstatusandinformation
onrecovery.TheEnergyResponsePlanindicatesthattheSituationReportistheprimary
productoftheEROduringamajorevent.WhiletheexercisebeganDay2withaprepared
SituationReport,thePlanninggroupproducedasecondreporttowardtheendoftheday,
usinginputfromEIA.
OpportunitiesforImprovement
UseofEIA’ssubjectmatterexpertisewithinDOE’senergyresponseteamdidnotappeartobe
fullyexercised.Incorporatingthisroleasalearningobjectiveintofutureexercisedesignmay
assistinincreasingEIA’seffectivenesstotheprocess.Thisisanotherexampleofwherethe
EnergyResponsePlanneedstobeupdatedtoclarifyandcodifyEIA’srolesandresponsibilities.
EIA’sroleintheEROasobservedduringtheexerciseshouldenhanceitsabilitytointeract
moreeffectivelywithsituationassessment.EIA’ssupporttotheSituationUnit,undertheICS
structure,shouldbeformalized,andtrainingonemergencyresponseprotocolsandtools
shouldbeprovidedtoEIApersonnel.EIAhasmanystatisticalanalyticalskillsandabilitiesthat
canaidDOE’sassessmentofimpactstotheenergysectorduringasupplydisruption.EIA
individualsassignedtotheEROSituationUnitrolesshouldhaveabroadknowledgeoftheoil
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
14
andgassupplychains,sensitivitytobusinessproprietaryandcompanyconfidentialdata,and
understandingofthesupplymarkets.MorefullyleveragingEIA’ssubjectmatterexpertiseon
theEROteamwillimprovethequalityofanalyticalandsituationassessmentsproducedbyDOE
andusedfordecision-makingmorebroadly.
Recommendation3
EstablishcompanyliaisonsanddirectcommunicationwithDOE’senergyresponseteamto
improvesituationassessments.
v DOEICSLiaisontogatherone-on-oneinformationpriortoorduringsupplychain
disruptions
§ Developbestandfastestsourceforinformationandclarityonsupply,delivery
issues,andsupportneeds
§ AdviseDOEonsituationassessment(status,potentialcascadingevents,response
activity)
§ Highlightantitrustandconfidentialitylimitationsthatprecludejointindustry/trade
associationsupport
v OilandNaturalGasSectorCoordinatingCouncil(ONGSCC)tosupportDOEin
maintainingtwo-waycontactroster(regional/national)
v DOEandindustrytoestablishcontactsinadvanceofemergencyevent.
ProgressObserved
In2015,theNPC,ONGSCC,andEIAcompiledcompanyliaisoncontactinformation.As
recommended,theinformationrepresentsthesinglepointofcontactforDOEtocontact
companiesinsupportofsituationassessment,andanavenuetocontactseniorcompany
officials,asintendedintheNPCstudyrecommendations.
•
AnNPCrequestforcontactinformationwasdistributedtoallNPCmembercompanies
andtradeassociations.Theletter,supportedwithFAQ,outlinedthekeyinformation
requestedandprotocoltobefollowedbyEIAtomaintainconfidentialityofthe
information.
•
TheONGSCCsupportedthecompilationofthecurrentcompanycatalogue.Since
companyparticipationisvoluntary,theONGSCCandtradegroupsworkedona
prioritizedlistofcompaniestoensureeffectiveindustrycoverageindifferentsegments
oftheindustry.Thelistincludes:
− Refiningcompanies–approx.96%ofalltherefiningcompaniesthatoperatean
individualrefinerycapacityof>150,000bpd;thisrepresentsapprox.86%ofallU.S.basedrefiningcapacity
− Midstreamcompanies(liquidpipelines&terminals)–approx.65%ofallmidstream
companiesthatwerelistedinthetoptierbycapacityorthroughput.Thisincludes
forliquidpipelines–top25bybbl.deliveredormilesofpipe;forterminals–top10
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
15
bybbl.ofcapacityornumberofterminals;andforFERC-regulatedcompanies–
28companies.
− Naturalgasandoilproductioncompanies–14companies.
EIAhasstateditsintentiontovalidateandupdatethelistannuallythroughanexercisecalloutprocedure,butthiswasnotpracticedduringtheexercise.
TheONGSCChasupdatedthesectorplanappendixonemergencymanagementduring
supplychaindisruptions.Thisincludes:ONGSCCRolesandLimitations,keyreferencematerial
(APIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook,2014NPCreport),descriptionof
howtheoilandnaturalgassectorcompaniesprepareandrespondtoincidents,andcompany
organizationalstructureandoperationsundertheNationalResponseFramework.The
appendixwasapprovedandtheAPIhandbookadoptedbytheONGSCC.
EIAvalidatedkeyoilandgascompaniesinPADD5inpreparationfortheClearPathIV
exercise.
OpportunitiesforImprovement
EIAmayneedtoassessthecompletenessofthecontactlistforallPADDsandcoordinatewith
theONGSCCtofillanyidentifiedgaps.
EIAhasnottestedtheLiaisonContactSystem.DuringClearPathIV,asimulationcontactlist
wasused,sotheactualliaisoncall-outprotocolwasnotused.
TheONGSCCandEIAneedtoworktogethertoinstitutionalizeasustainmentprocessforthe
liaisoncontactlist.WithinDOE,aformalprotocolbetweentheEnergyInformation
AdministrationandtheOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityshouldbeestablished
toclarifytheinformationsharingandstaffroles.
Recommendation4
Streamlineandenhanceprocessesforobtainingtemporaryregulatoryrelieftospeedup
recovery.
v Developbestpracticelanguageandstandardizedtemplatesforkeytemporary
regulatoryrelief
v Keyimprovements:
§ ImproveexistingEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)processforfederalfuel
waiverstoreducedelaysanddecreaseuncertainty
§ IdentifyCleanAirActprovisions/restrictionsonEPAwaiverauthoritythatmay
createuncertaintiesthathinderresponseactivities
§ Improvestatefuelwaiverprocesses
§ ImproveJonesActwaiverprocess.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
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ProgressObserved
TheDOEEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)processedarequestforregulatoryreliefaspart
oftheClearPathIVexercise.
OpportunitiesforImprovement
TheexerciseresponsetoaninjectforaJonesActwaiverrequestindicatesadditionalwork
maybeneededinthisarea.
•
TheUnifiedCommandGroup(UCG)spenttimeworkingaJonesActwaiver
(transportationofgoodsandfuelonnon-U.S.flaggedvesselsbetweenU.S.ports),which
shouldbeaclearlydefinedanddocumentedprocess.Regulatoryreliefinvolvingother
agencieswasnotpartoftheexercise.
•
AnyregulatoryreliefcommunicationwiththesimulatedfederalinteragencyNational
ResponseCoordinationCenterwasnotobserved.
Inordertorespondeffectivelytothemanydifferentwaiversandassociatedauthorities,DOE
maywanttodocumentthespecificrolesofDOEandspecificallytheOfficeofElectricity
DeliveryandEnergyReliabilityinthevariouswaiverprocesses.Thisdocumentationcouldbe
includedintheenergyresponseplantoidentifytheappropriateDOEdepartmentandICS
peopletooverseewaiverprocessrequestsandtoprovideinteragencysupport.TheAPIOiland
NaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbookprovidesanoverviewofthemanypossible
waiversthathaveoccurredduringemergencyevents.
Recommendation5
Statesshouldincreaseengagementwiththeoilandnaturalgasindustryintheirenergy
assuranceplans,andindustrymembersshouldassistthestatesinsuchefforts.
v DOEandstatestoassesscomprehensivenessofstateenergyassuranceplans
§ Statestoincreaseindustryinvolvementwithplandevelopment(roleforONGSCC,
trades)
§ Includeassessmentofvulnerabilitiesandriskassessmentsofsupplychains
§ Ensureresiliencyconsideredinpermittingprocess(i.e.,gasvs.electricfornaturalgas
compression)
§ Addressinterdependencies(cross-regionalandcross-industry)
§ Verifyplansforensuredfuelsupplyanddistributionpointsforfirstresponders
v IndustrytoensurethatinterdependenciesareaddressedinBusinessContinuityPlans.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
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ProgressObserved
ClearPathIVDay1agendaprovidedanopportunityforstatestoengagewiththeoilandgas
industrytoshareunderstandingandenhancestate(Washington,Oregon)energyassurance
plans.OregonidentifiedadditionalareasforimprovingitsplanandWashingtonusedthe
exercisetoinformthedraftingofaplanunderdevelopment.
•
State-industrydiscussiontopicsincludedindustryassessmentprocesses;overflightsor
damageassessment;andalternativesourcesofproducts,supplies,andpersonnel.
•
Authoritytoallocatefuelwasdiscussed,recognizingthecomplexityofdifferent
authoritiesandhowthisissueisaregionalissuethatwouldneeddetailedanalysisin
eachstateplan.
TheONGSCCandNationalAssociationofStateEnergyOfficials(NASEO)hostedajoint
meetingofstateenergyofficialsandindustryinOctober2015todiscussfurther
implementationoftheNPCrecommendations.
DOEandNASEOareworkingtogetheronaprocesswiththestatestoimproveandupdate
stateenergyassuranceplans,training,andexercises,pendingavailableresources.
•
Thisisafollow-uptoamajorjointprogramthatconcludedin2014andwasfundedby
DOEtoestablishenergyassuranceplansinthestates.
•
InFebruary2016,theSecretaryofEnergyenteredintoaMemorandumof
Understandingtostrengthenandexpandcommunicationsandinformationsharing
throughtheEnergyEmergencyAssuranceCoordinatorprogramwithNASEO,the
NationalAssociationofRegulatoryUtilityCommissioners,theNationalGovernors
Association,andtheNationalEmergencyManagementAssociation.
DOE’sOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityhassupportedaStateEnergyRisk
AssessmentInitiativetohelpstateenergyagenciesbetterunderstandriskstotheirenergy
infrastructuresotheycanbebetterpreparedtomakeinformeddecisionsabouttheir
investments,resilience,response,andhardeningstrategies.2,3
ClearPathIVdemonstratedaneffectivewayforstatesnotonlytotesttheirplans,but
exploremoreopportunitiesforindustryinvolvement.
2
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability.“StateEnergyRiskAssessment
Initiative.”http://energy.gov/oe/mission/energy-infrastructure-modeling-analysis/state-and-regional-energy-riskassessment-initiative.
3
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability,EnergyModelingandAnalysis
Division.“EnergyRiskResourceLibrary.”December31,2015.
http://energyoe.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=ece7b1c390b24177b4361784104cab7d.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
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OpportunitiesforImprovement
Allstakeholdersneedtomakeagreaterefforttocommunicateduringsteadystate
operations,andnotjustimmediatelybeforeorduringanevent.Thepathwaysfor
communicationbetweenstatesandindustryareidentifiedintheAPIOilandNaturalGas
IndustryPreparednessHandbookandthe2014NPCreport.
DiscussionsduringClearPathIVDay1oftheexercisehighlightedthatfederal,state,local,
andindustrystakeholdershavenotsufficientlydiscussedthecauseandeffectof
interdependentenergysystemsastheyrelatetoplanning,allocationofresources,and
potentialsupplyanddemandconcernsduringanenergydisruptionevent.
Federal,state,local,andindustrypreparednessplansshouldbeenhancedtoaddress
allocationofresourcesandcascadingsupplyanddemandimplicationsduringadisruption
event.
Stateenergyplansrequireroutinereviewandupdating.
Recommendation6
BothDOEandstatesshouldestablishroutineeducationandtrainingprogramsforkey
governmentemergencyresponsepositions.
v UseandmaintaintheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbookasakey
reference
§ Overviews:supplychains,pre-eventpreparations,operationalmodels,regulatory
reliefinventory
§ EnhanceAPIhandbookandappendices
v DOEandstatestoholdregulareducationsessions
§ Conductannualrefreshereducationonsupplychainsinadvanceofhurricaneseason
§ Leverageexistingfederal,state,local,andindustryforumsforeducation
§ Engagethecorrectlevelofdecision-makersandstakeholders(e.g.,localdecisionmakers)
v DOEandstatestoestablishmanagement-of-changeprocessesforkeypositions.
ProgressObserved
TheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryHandbookhasbeenupdated(consistentwiththeNPC
studyrecommendations).Theupdatedversion,publishedApril2016,isavailableontheAPI
website;hardcopiescanbeobtainedbycontactingtheAPIoffice.APIhasofferedoutreach
educationtovariousgovernmentagencies;therehasbeenselectinterestandinquiriesbutno
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
19
sessionshavebeenscheduled.TheAPIhandbookhasbeenadoptedbytheONGSCCasakey
reference.4
EnergyInformationAdministration(EIA)petroleumsupplyreportsareavailableforPADD5
(ClearPathIVregion),aswellasPADDs1and3.5,6ThesereportsenhanceDOEEnergy
ResponseOrganization(ERO)andstategovernmentsupplychainawarenessforregionsmost
likelyimpactedbynaturaldisasters.Accesstothesereportsenablesmoreeffectiveanalysis
andimprovedsituationassessment.
ONGSCCmembershavecontinuedtoreachoutthroughtheNPCreportprocess,theEnergy
GovernmentCoordinatingCouncil(EnergyGCC),andparticipationineventssuchasClear
PathIVtoprovideindustryexpertiseandexperience.
OpportunitiesforImprovement
Governmentpersonnelturnoverandmanagement-of-changeprocessremainacontinuing
concern.Lossofpersonnelmeanslossofknowledge.Amanagement-of-changeprocessisan
essentialcomponentofanyemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.TheNPC
encouragesDOEtomakemanagementofchangeakeypriorityinplanningforanew
Administrationandanongoingpriorityoftheemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.
DiscussionsonDay1oftheexerciseindicatedthat,asDOEmoreclearlyadherestoitsrole
andresponsestructureunderESF-12,itshouldworkwithstatestoeducatethemonDOE’s
roleandhowtheyinteractwiththestates.Thisisespeciallyimportantforthesituation
assessmentactivity.Theexercisedidnothaveavisiblepathforstatesituationassessment
needstoflowtothefederallevelandforafeedbackloopoffederalsituationreportsbackto
thestates.UndertheNationalResponseFramework,thiswouldbethroughtheinteragency
jointfieldoffice(JFO).
ContinuingeducationandtrainingofDOEandstatestaffshouldbeanongoingpriorityinthe
faceofexpectedstaffturnover.Theeducationalprogramobjectivesneedtoincludeboth
emergencyresponsecapabilities,suchasICS,andenergy-specificexpertise,suchasoiland
naturalgassupplychainbasics.
4
AmericanPetroleumInstitute,OilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook,April2016.
http://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/hurricane-information/oil-and-natural-gas-industry-preparednes.
5
U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.“PADD5TransportationFuelsMarkets.”September30,2015.
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/transportationfuels/padd5/.
6
U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.“PADD1andPADD3TransportationFuelsMarkets.”February3,2016.
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/transportationfuels/padd1n3/.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
20
Recommendation7
BothDOEandstatesshouldimprovetheircomprehensivedrillandexerciseprogramsand
includeindustryparticipation.ReciprocalinvitationsextendedbycompaniestoDOEand
statesarerecommended.
v DOEemergencypreparednessprogramneedsanassignedprocessowner
v DOEwithstatestoestablishfrequencyandscope(local,state,andfederal)
v DOEtodevelopandimplementacomprehensivedrillandexerciseprogramthatfully
teststheirresponseplantosupplychaindisruptions
§ Engagewithotherfederalagenciesandinterdependentprivatesectors
§ Ensurerightlevelparticipation(seniordecision-makers,firstresponders,etc.)
§ Testunderstandingofroles,communications,priorities,interdependent
infrastructure
v IndustrytoinviteDOEparticipationintheirdrillsandexercises
v DOEandstatestoadjustplansbasedonlessonslearnedfrompastdrills/exercisesand
incidents.
ProgressObserved
DOEadvanceditsexerciseprogrambyimplementingafunctionalexercise(ClearPathIV)with
boththeoil&naturalgasandtheelectricindustries.
DOEhasanassignedprocessownerintheDeputyAssistantSecretary.Thiswasnotedasa
criticalelementinthebeginningofthereviewsectionofthispaper.Continuingtoproperly
resourcethepreparednessandresponseeffortisequallyimportant.
AteachEnergyGCCmeeting,bothDOEandtheindustryshareavailableinformationon
upcomingexercisesordrillsforawarenessandtoencourageparticipationbetweenindustry
andgovernment.
DOEhasattendedexercisesordrillshostedbyseveraloilandnaturalgascompanies,
includingExxonMobil,MarathonPetroleumCo.,andShell.
ManycompaniesparticipatedinthedesignandroleplayatClearPathIVin2016.Foralistof
NPCparticipants,pleaserefertoAppendixB.
DOEadvancedtheirexerciseprogrambyimplementingafunctionalexercise(ClearPathIV)
withboththeoil&naturalgasandtheelectricindustriesparticipating.TheClearPathIV
exerciseservedasanimportantopportunityforgovernment(federalandstate)andindustry
toworktogetherandadvanceemergencypreparednesscapability.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
21
OpportunitiesforImprovement
UsingHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)guidance,DOEshould
includeindustrypartnersinthemulti-yeartrainingandexerciseplanningprocess.
ContinuedcollaborationbetweenDOEandindustrywillenableevengreaterbenefitfor
futureexercises.Improvedexercisepreparationandaddedtrainingofexercisecontrollersfor
thefunctionalexercisecomponentwillenhancetheexercisebenefits.
DOEshouldconsiderusingICScoaches(suchasCoastGuardstriketeamsorindustrysubject
matterexperts)withtheresponseteamduringexercisesinordertoprovidemoredirectionin
theirrolesandresponsibilities.Moreadvancedtechniqueswillaligntrainingandexercise
programswiththecapabilitiesandplanningasthematurityoftheincidentmanagement
organizationgrows.
ONGSCC(industry)shouldformalizeaprocesswithintheONGSCCandtheEnergyGCCfor
gatheringandsharinginformationonupcomingindustryexercisestofacilitateDOEandother
governmentagencyparticipation.
Governmentrepresentativesshouldexpandparticipationandconsiderservingasparticipants
inindustryexercises,ratherthanobservers,togainthemostbenefitfromtheexperience.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
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Appendices
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
23
AppendixA–SecretaryMonizLettertotheCouncil,March23,2015
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
24
AppendixB–NPCEmergencyPreparednessAddendumParticipants
EmergencyPreparednessAddendumWorkgroup
Lead
PhilipB.Smith
Manager,EmergencyManagement
andRegulatoryPolicy&Advocacy
ShellEnergy
ResourcesCompany
SeniorStudyCoordinator
NationalPetroleumCouncil
DavidK.Barrett
SeniorCorporateStrategicAdvisor
CorporateStrategicPlanning
ExxonMobilCorporation
MatthewD.Duncan
ProgramManagerforState,Local,
Tribal,TerritorialEnergyAssurance
InfrastructureSecurity&Energy
Restoration
OfficeofElectricityDelivery&
EnergyReliability
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
SeanM.Griffin
ProgramManagerforExercises
InfrastructureSecurity&Energy
Restoration
OfficeofElectricityDelivery&
EnergyReliability
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
JeffreyT.Gunnulfsen
Director
SecurityandRiskManagement
AmericanFuel&
PetrochemicalManufacturers
EricA.Haugstad
Director,ContingencyPlanning
&EmergencyResponse
Environmental,Health,Safety&
Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning
TesoroCompanies,Inc.
NancyL.Johnson
SeniorAdvisor,Environmental
Science&PolicyAnalysis
OfficeofOilandNaturalGas
OfficeofFossilEnergy
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
SuzanneM.Lemieux
Manager,Midstream&
IndustryOperations
MarineandSecurity
AmericanPetroleumInstitute
JayS.Montgomery
VicePresidentand
ChiefSecurityOfficer
KinderMorganEnergy
Partners,L.P.
FabioA.Naranjo
OperationalExcellence/Health,
Environment&SafetyProcess/
TechnicalTeamLead
Chevron
Secretary
JamesA.Slutz
Members
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
25
JillianRobles
EmergencyManagementSupervisor
DevonEnergyCorporation
KeithC.Robson
Manager
CorporateSafety,Security
andEmergencyPreparedness
MarathonPetroleum
CompanyLP
RobinR.Rorick
Director
MarineandSecurityIssues
AmericanPetroleumInstitute
JoanneM.Shore
ChiefIndustryAnalyst
GovernmentRelations/Outreach
AmericanFueland
PetrochemicalManufacturers
GerardTaylor
EmergencyManagementSpecialist
Chevron
Workgroup1–TabletopandWorkshop(Day1)
Lead
BillyJ.Powell
Manager,AmericasEmergency
Response
ShellExploration&
ProductionCompany
PaulD.Andersen
OperationsManager
WilliamsNorthwestPipeline
MarkL.Anderson
SeniorEnergyPolicySpecialist
StateEnergyOffice
WashingtonState
DepartmentofCommerce
StephanieArnold
Safety&SecurityManager
U.S.Oil&RefiningCo
HannahP.Breul
TeamLead,PetroleumMarketAnalysis
EnergyInformationAdministration
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
TracyL.Cowan
Manager,BusinessContinuity
TesoroCompanies,Inc.
RickDuncan
Director,BordersWestRegion
TransCanadaPipelinesLimited
ToddFelix
EmergencyManager
NWNatural
JeffreyT.Gunnulfsen
Director
SecurityandRiskManagement
AmericanFuel&
PetrochemicalManufacturers
KelliGustaf
Crisis&Continuity
ManagementAdvisor
BPUSPipelines&Logistics
EricA.Haugstad
Director,ContingencyPlanning
&EmergencyResponse
Environmental,Health,Safety&
Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning
TesoroCompanies,Inc.
TerryW.Hardman
Manager,PipelineControl
WilliamsNorthwestPipeline
JimHart
SeniorManager–GasOperations
NWNatural
DeannaHenry
EmergencyPreparednessManager
NuclearSafety&Energy
EmergencyPreparednessDivision
OregonDepartmentofEnergy
AndrewHolbrook
Manager–Operations,
PacificNorthwest
KinderMorganInc.
Members
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
26
SuzanneM.Lemieux
Manager,Midstream&
IndustryOperations
MarineandSecurity
AmericanPetroleumInstitute
ScottL.McCreery
Crisis&ContinuityManager
BPFuelsNorthAmerica
DeanA.Meier
HeadTerminalOperator/
OperationsPlanner
ChevronWillbridge
LightProducts
XavierMiller
SupplyLogisticsCoordinator–
Rockies/PacificNorthwest
ExxonMobil
LauraK.Ritter
LeadAnalyst–Security
GovernanceandRisk
CorporateInformationSecurity
Services
Exelon
JillianRobles
EmergencyManagementSupervisor
DevonEnergyCorporation
LoriRussell
VicePresident–UtilityServices
NWNatural
YvonneSisler
ContractortoOfficeofEnergy/
InfrastructureSecurityand
EnergyRestoration
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
RickSlaugh
Director–Environmental,Health
&Safety
KinderMorganEnergy
Partners,L.P.
JamesA.Slutz
SeniorStudyCoordinator
NationalPetroleumCouncil
PhilipB.Smith
Manager,EmergencyManagement
andRegulatoryPolicy&Advocacy
ShellEnergyResources
Company
GerardTaylor
EmergencyManagementSpecialist
Chevron
LarryWest
CoordinatorofMaintenance
Williams
Workgroup2–ExerciseDevelopment(Day2)
Lead
JillianRobles
EmergencyManagementSupervisor
DevonEnergyCorporation
RobertJ.Fick
GlobalEmergencyPreparednessand
ResponseAdvisor
ExxonMobilCorporation
SeanM.Griffin
ProgramManagerforExercises
InfrastructureSecurity&Energy
Restoration
OfficeofElectricityDelivery&
EnergyReliability
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
EricA.Haugstad
Director,ContingencyPlanning
&EmergencyResponse
Environmental,Health,Safety&
Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning
TesoroCompanies,Inc.
Members
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
27
SuzanneM.Lemieux
Manager,Midstream&
IndustryOperations
MarineandSecurity
AmericanPetroleumInstitute
KevinP.O’Prey
SeniorVicePresident/
ContractortoInfrastructure
SecurityandEnergyRestoration
Obsidian,ACadmusCompany/
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
BarbaraT.Parker
OilSpillResponseand
AdvocacyManager
ShellExploration&
ProductionCompany
BillyJ.Powell
Manager,AmericasEmergency
Response
ShellExploration&
ProductionCompany
RickSlaugh
Director–Environmental,
Health&Safety
KinderMorganEnergy
Partners,L.P.
GerardTaylor
EmergencyManagementSpecialist
Chevron
Workgroup3–ObservationTeam
Lead
JayS.Montgomery
VicePresidentand
ChiefSecurityOfficer
KinderMorganEnergy
Partners,L.P.
DavidK.Barrett
SeniorCorporateStrategicAdvisor
CorporateStrategicPlanning
ExxonMobilCorporation
RobertJ.Fick
GlobalEmergencyPreparednessand
ResponseAdvisor
ExxonMobilCorporation
MarshallW.Nichols
ExecutiveDirector
NationalPetroleumCouncil
BarbaraT.Parker
OilSpillResponseand
AdvocacyManager
ShellExploration&
ProductionCompany
KeithC.Robson
Manager
CorporateSafety,Securityand
EmergencyPreparedness
MarathonPetroleum
CompanyLP
RobinR.Rorick
Director
MarineandSecurityIssues
AmericanPetroleumInstitute
JoanneM.Shore
ChiefIndustryAnalyst
GovernmentRelations/Outreach
AmericanFueland
PetrochemicalManufacturers
MichaelSmith
SeniorAdvisor
OfficeofElectricityDelivery&
EnergyReliability
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
Members
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
28
AppendixC–References
AmericanPetroleumInstitute.OilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook.April2016.
http://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/hurricane-information/oil-and-natural-gasindustry-preparednes.
CascadiaRegionEarthquakeWorkgroup(CREW).CascadiaSubductionZoneEarthquakes:A
Magnitude9.0EarthquakeScenario.2013.
http://crew.org/sites/default/files/cascadia_subduction_scenario_2013.pdf.
FederalPowerAct,16U.S.C.§824a(c).
http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Federal%20Power%20Act.pdf.
NationalPetroleumCouncil.EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters:
GovernmentandOil&NaturalGasIndustryActionstoPrepare,Respond,andRecover.2014.
http://www.npc.org/reports/2014-Emergency_Preparedness-lr.pdf.
RobertT.StaffordDisasterReliefandEmergencyAssistanceAct,Pub.L.93-288.§42-5121
(2013).https://www.fema.gov/robert-t-stafford-disaster-relief-and-emergency-assistance-actpublic-law-93-288-amended.
U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.EmergencySupportFunction#12–EnergyAnnex.January2008.
http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/emergency-support-function-12-energy-annex.
U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.NationalResponseFramework,SecondEdition.May
2013.https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32230.
WhiteHouse.PresidentialPolicyDirective8:NationalPreparedness.March30,2011.
http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
29
AppendixD–ClearPathIVExerciseWorkshop(Day1)–StateFuelPlans
TheFuelsBreakoutSessionreviewedtheplenaryanddiscussedhowincidentmanagement
appliestotheoilandnaturalgassector:responseintheinitialphaseofadisasterandthen
followedbyashiftinapproachduringthelong-termresponsethatrequiresactivitiesbeyond
emergencyresponse.
Thesessionclarifiedthefollowing:
•
ThestatesofWashingtonandOregonbothhavefuelplanswithsomeareasstillin
development.Oregon’splanwasfairlywelldefined(stagingareas,storage
requirements,somepredesignated,etc.)
•
Therearetwotypesoffuelissues(refertoNationalResponseFrameworkflowchartat
theendofthisappendix):
o IncidentManagement(EmergencyResponsePhase–LifeSafety)
§
StateandcountyEmergencyOperationsCenters(EOCs)
§
FuelneededtosupportESF-10andearlyESF-12activities
§
EOCshavedirectcommunicationstoterminalsandrefineriesforESF-10
fuelneeds
•
Strictlyneedsforemergencyresponse–notforecastingsupplyfor
recoveryorconditionoffacility
§
Communicationsareconductedprivatelywithterminal/facilityandnot
providedingroupsettingwithotherindustrymembers.Discussionsmust
beconfidentialtoensurecompliancewithantitrustregulations.This
shouldbeacknowledgedinStateFuelPlans.
§
Lackofelectricpowermayrequiremanagement-of-changereviewsfor
othermethodsoffuelingsuchasgravity-fedoptions.
§
Immediateneedwillbeforgeneratorsforemergencyresponsefuelonly,
notrecovery
o IssueManagement(RecoveryPhase–Long-TermFuelSupply)
§
DOEEmergencyResponseTeamESF-12
§
Antitrustpreventsdiscussionoffuelprovidersinagroupsetting,as
notedabove;thisissueshouldbeclearlyacknowledgedinstateplans
(earlyidentificationofprocessforlong-termfueldiscussions)
•
IndustrytohavedirectcontactwithEnergyInformation
Administration(EIA)–Individualcompaniesdiscusssupplyand
recoveryneedsbasedonassessment,timing,etc.(EIAprovides
thepointofcontactforDOE.)
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
30
§
§
•
EIAtoaggregateinformationandcoordinatewithDOEemergency
responseteam(incidentcommander)tosharetotalswithstates
impacted,etc.
•
Includeconditionoffacilityandneedsforrecoveringfacility
•
Electricneeds–generators,heavylifthelicopters,etc.
Otherfuelsupplytopics
•
Howtomanageregionalsupply?
•
Howtoconsultwithoilcompaniesforadditionalsupplyfromout
ofregiontomeetrecoveryneeds?
•
Prioritizingrecoveryofassetsinregionbasedonimpact
•
Whocanrecoverthequickest–whichrefinery,terminal,etc.?
NationalResponseFrameworkflowchart(seegraphic)needstobe
includedinstateplans
•
§
Communicationprocessto/fromstateandfederal
Needforearlyidentificationofwaiversinstateplans
•
FuelWaivers
•
JonesActWaivers
•
U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersWaivers
•
EPAAirQualityWaivers
•
StateEnvironmentalWaivers
•
FederalEnvironmentalWaivers(OilPollutionActof1990andthe
CleanWaterAct)–EstimatedDailyRecoveryCapacity
•
U.S.NavySingle-PointMooringSystems
•
StateplansneedtoaddressengagementandcoordinationwithEIAinregardto
informationaboutfuelsuppliesinaregion.
•
Discussionsfocusedonresponsecoordination14daysaftertheincident.Whilesome
powerwillberestoredinlessimpactedareas,itwillbeamajorefforttorestoreareasin
thePacificNorthwestthatreceivedsevereinfrastructuredamage.
•
Foramajorearthquake,theregion’sfuelsupplywouldbedifficulttoaccessand
distributeduetodamagedpipelines,roads,andports.Stateplansshouldaddressthe
following:
o Fuelsupplieswouldhavetocomefromoutsidetheregioneitherbytruck,rail,or
ship.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
31
o Withthehighway,bridges,rail,andwaterwayinfrastructuredestroyed,there
wouldbearelianceontruckingfuelintoaffectedareas.Truckingfuelwould
havelimiteddistributiontoaffectedareasinwhichtherearenoaccessibleroads
orbridgesduetodamagefromtsunamiwatersandearthquake.
o Deliveringfuelbyshipwouldrequiremooringareasidentifiedfortankshipsthat
couldtransferproducttobarges,etc.Inaddition,atemporarydockandstorage
facilitywouldneedtobeconstructedforreceivingthefuel.
•
TherewasdiscussionofaddinginformationtotheStateFuelPlanstoaddress
streamliningtheprocessandearlyrequestofobtainingkeywaivers(JonesAct,SinglePointMooringSystems,etc.)foraffectedareas.Eachplanwouldneedtohaveaclause
orstatementaboutantitrustrulesastheyrelatetoEIAinformation.Byaddressing
theseandotherkeyissueswillassistinresponseintheregion.
•
Forindustryandfederalgovernment,earlyresponseeffortswillbefocusedonsearch
andrescue(safetyandhumanlife)followingbyenvironmentalemergencyresponse
efforts.
Insummary,bothWashingtonandOregonhavefuelplansbutadditionaldetailisrequiredto
addresstheissuesidentifiedabove.Theworkshopparticipantssuggestedthatanexpanded
workshopwithallstakeholdersandindustrywouldbeausefulprocesstoensuretheplans
coverkeyissuesandlinesofcommunications.Thelevelsofengagementandcoordinationneed
tobeclearlydefinedatlocal,state,andfederallevels.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
32
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
33
AppendixE–ClearPathIVExerciseCritiqueDetails
TheNPCofferedtoassistinexercisedevelopmenttosupportDOEintheincorporationofthe
2014NPCstudyrecommendationsintoexerciseplay.DOEwelcomedthisassistance,andNPC
workgroupswereestablishedtoleadtheseefforts.Workgroup1wasestablishedtoassistwith
Day1activitiesinPortland.Workgroup2wasestablishedtoassistwithDay2activities.And
Workgroup3wasestablishedtoobservetheClearPathIVactivitiesandserveinthe“exercise
evaluators”roleintermsoftheHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)
guidance.
ClearPathIVwasdevelopedtoprovideanopportunityforgovernmentandindustrytoexamine
thechallengesofrespondingtoacatastrophicCascadiaSubductionZone(CSZ)earthquakeand
tsunamiandtoidentifygapswithinrespectiveresponseplansandpolicies.
ObjectivesfortheClearPathIVeventweredevelopedtocoverbothDay1andDay2activities:
1. Examineenergysectorrolesandresponsibilitieswithinresponseplansutilizedfora
CSZ9.0earthquakeandtsunami,suchastheDOEEnergyResponsePlan,Federal
EmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)RegionalPlans,StateEmergencyManagement
Plans,StateEnergyAssurancePlans,andindustryresponseplans.
2. Highlightstrategiestoaddressfueldisruptionsandshortagesduringamulti-state
regionaldisasterwithimpactstooilandnaturalgassupplychainsandmethodsof
transportation.
3. Identifyessentialelementsofinformationanddeterminemethodsandprocessesof
informationsharingbetweenstate,federal,andindustrypartnerstobestprovide
situationalawarenessandtodevelopacommonoperatingpicturetosupportexecutive
andoperationaldecision-makingandresourcerequirements,adjudication,allocation,
anddisposition.
4. Determineeffectiveidentificationofcriticalresourcesandcapabilities,eliminate
duplicationofrequestsordelivery,anddeterminelogisticalrequirementswith
commercialandgovernmentalmethodswithinmultiplemutualassistancenetworksand
systems.
5. Prioritizetherestorationofenergysystemswithstate,federal,andindustrypartners
withconsiderationtocascadingimpactstointerdependentsectors.
6. EvaluatetheDOEUnifiedCommandStructureConceptofOperationswithfederal,state,
andindustrypartnersinrespondingtotheCSZdisaster.
Day1activitiesconsistedofatabletopexerciseinthemorningfollowedbysector-specific
workshopsintheafternoon.
Day2activitieswereplannedasafunctionalexerciseengagingmembersfromindustryand
localmunicipalitiesinOregonandWashingtonstatesascontrollersinaSimulationCelltotest
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
34
membersofDOE’sEmergency&IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)andEnergyResponse
Organization.
Thepurposeofthisappendixistoprovidefeedbackaboutthefunctionalexercisedesign,
development,andexecutionratherthanobservationsonresponseeffectiveness.
Workgroup2ExerciseDevelopment
AWorkPlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup2effortsinassistingDOEwithdevelopmentof
thefunctionalexercise.Workgroup2waschargedwithtwokeyfocuspointsforassistinginthe
developmentoftheexercise:1)establishingawaytotestDOEinitialactivationproceduresand
2)demonstratingcoordinationwithfederal,state,andindustrypartners.
UtilizingthekeyNPCEmergencyPreparednessreportrecommendationsandfollowingHSEEP
guidance,Workgroup2developedanExerciseEvaluationGuide(EEG)toaddressthefocus
pointsandprovideafoundationforexercisedevelopment.TheEEGoutlinedtheanticipated
playeractionsbasedonthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.
Workgroupparticipantsusedtheseexpectedplayeractionstodevelopexerciseinjectsthat
wouldcreateanenvironmentforexpectedplayeractionstooccur.Theseinjectswere
incorporatedintotheexercisescript,theMasterScenarioEventList(MSEL),developedby
DOE’sexerciseleaders.NPCexerciseevaluatorsusedtheEEGtodeterminewhetherornot
playeractionsduringtheexerciseoccurredcorrectlyasaresultofissuedinjects.
Workgroup2metnumeroustimesviaconferencecallandtheninpersonwithDOE’sexercise
leaderstodevelopMSELinjects.TheMSELwasusedduringtheClearPathIVexerciseasthe
mainscripttoguideexerciseplayandensurethatexerciseactivitiestestedNPCstudy
recommendationsappropriatelyandinawaythatwouldallowforevaluatorobservation,as
indicatedintheEEG.
Thebasicprocesswasasfollows:
Develop
Workgroup2
Identify
Exercise
Purposeand
Objectives
Review
NPCEPStudy
Recommendations
Develop
Exercise
Evaluation
Criteriainthe
formofanEEG
Develop
ExerciseInjects
basedonEEG
Incorporate
NPCInjects
intoMSEL
UseMSELand
EEGduring
ExercisePlay.
InjectdevelopmentbyNPCWorkgroup2wassuccessfulandwellreceivedbyexerciseleaders
responsibleforMSELdevelopment.AllelementsintheNPC-developedEEGwereaddressed
andmadeobservablethroughexerciseinjects.Itisimportanttonotethatinjectsdevelopedby
Workgroup2werespecifictoNPCstudyrecommendationsandoilandnaturalgasactivities
only.TheseinjectswereincorporatedintothelargerMSELusedforexerciseplay.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
35
Asmentioned,afunctionalexercisewasdevelopedtotestobjectivesonDay2.Accordingto
theHSEEP,afunctionalexerciseisbestusedfortestinganoperationscenterenvironment.
AMSELisinitiatedbycontrollersinaSimulationCell(SimCell)andguidestheplayeractionsand
behaviors.Injectsareredirectedtoplayersuntiltheobjectiveismetandvalidated
successfully.
AtypicalfunctionalexercisehasoneSimCellandisfocusedtowardaparticularplayergroup.
InthecaseofClearPathIV,themake-upofthecontrollerversusplayergroupswasnotwell
definedandledtoconfusionleadinguptotheexercise,aswellasonthedayoftheexercise.
Onetrueplayergroupwasidentified–theDOEgroupinWashington,DC.However,multiple
SimCellsalsoservingasExercisePlayerswerecreated.Thisresultedinplayerstestingplayers
andSimCellcontrollerstestingSimCellcontrollersratherthantheSimCellcontrollerstesting
theplayers.
Successofafunctionalexercisereliesonawell-scriptedMSELandawell-organizedSimCell.
Initially,itwasunderstoodbytheNPCworkgroupsthattheSimCellinPortlandwouldbemade
upofindustrypartnersfrombothenergysectorsaswellaskeymunicipalpartnersandthatthe
playerswouldbethegroupsrepresentingorworkingwithDOEinWashington,DC.Itwasnot
untilgroupsarrivedinPortlandthatworkgroupmembersbecameawarethatcontrollersin
PortlandwouldalsobeexpectedtoserveasplayersandthattheMSELwasnotfullyscripted
butwouldbedevelopedadhocduringexerciseplay.
Inaddition,duringexerciseplay,facilitatorswereinjectedintosector-specificroomstobegin
leadingsector-specificdiscussionsrelatedtothescenarioandsectorpriorities.Thisalsocaused
confusionbecauseitwasnotdirectlytiedtoexerciseplay.Thefacilitatorplacedintheoiland
naturalgasroomwasfromtheelectricsectoranddidnotunderstandtheuniquedynamicsof
theoilandnaturalgassector.Thediscussionfocusedmoreonindustryeducatingthefacilitatoraboutthesector,ratherthanonanexchangeamongsectorparticipants.
ExerciseCritique
ThefollowingexercisecritiqueisbasedontheHSEEPguidanceforexercisedesignand
executionandtheprofessionaljudgementsofindustrysubjectmatterexpertswithdecadesof
experienceleading,designing,andevaluatingemergencypreparednessexercises.These
individualsarealsothekeyplayersincorporateemergencyresponseprograms,withyearsof
practicalexperienceinmanagingincidentresponseoperations.Thepurposeofthiscritiqueis
toprovideinputtofutureDOEexerciseleadersandplannersforimprovingtheeffectivenessof
futureexercises.
Exercisesaremeanttobelearningopportunitiesforparticipants.Exerciseobjectivesand
correspondingscenariosaredevelopedtoallowparticipantsasafeenvironmenttotesttheir
knowledgeandskillswhileguidingkeylearningprinciples.Exercisesmaybeorganizedinaway
thatallowsparticipantstolearnandsuccessfullyworkthroughproblems.Basedonearly
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
36
discussionwithexerciseleaders,thereappearedtobeconfusiononwhethertheexercisegoal
wasalearningenvironmentorwhethertheaggressivedesignwasintendedtohighlight
deficiencies.Thisexerciseforcedplayerstoengagewithlittleguidanceanddidnotappearto
embedappropriateoperationalexerciseplanningprocessintotheexercisedesign.An
effectivelydesignedexercisecanprovidebothalearningenvironmentandidentifyareasfor
improvement.
Functionalexercisesmustbewellplanned,organized,andexecuted.Thesetypesofexercises
arethemostdifficulttoorganizeandmustbecontrolledbyaLeadwithexperiencein
developing,executing,andparticipatinginsuchevents.TheMSELmustbevery“tight”and
heavilycontrolled.“FreePlay”mustbekepttoaminimumandcommunicationsmustbea
tightlyclosedloopwithawell-developedcommunicationsdirectory.
Theexercisedidengageagreatnumberofplayersfromvariousindustries,disciplines,and
levelsofgovernment.Itisalwaysbeneficialhavingpartnersfromvariousjurisdictionsand
companiescometogetherinacommonenvironmentandtalkthroughacommonscenario.
Thiswasapositiveelementoftheexercise.
AnotherpositiveelementwastheopportunityforDOEtointeractwiththevariouspartners
whileworkingthroughtheirvariousplans.Thisprovidedanopportunityforpartnerstointeract
withDOEandforDOEtointeractwithpartnerspre-emergencyinasafeenvironment.
ThenetworkinginthePortlandvenuewasalsoapositiveelementoftheexercise.Partners
representingmanydifferententitieswereabletodiscussresponseactivitiesandsharebest
practices.
TheexercisedesignprocessforClearPathIVlooselyfollowedHSEEPguidance.SomeHSEEP
terminology,documentation,andplanningconferenceswereheld;however,theexercise
executionlackedcommandandcontrol.Coreelementsthatcouldhaveledtoamore
successfulexerciseweremissing.
• ExerciseobjectiveswerewrittentocoverbothDay1andDay2activities.Thiscreated
confusionaboutwhatthefocuswouldbeforDay1versusDay2.Theassumptionwas
thattheDay2activitieswereprimarilymeanttoengageDOEHQoperationcenters.
• Amorecohesivefunctionalexercisewouldhaveallowedforenhancedtestingofthe
DOEHQoperationcenters.However,SimCelloperationswerenotwellplanned,
requiredcontrollerstoalsoparticipateasplayers,andinsomecases,testedtheplayers
asmuchormorethanDOE.
• Rolesforexerciseparticipantswereassignedlastminuteandnotexplained.Players
wereleftconfusedabouttheirroleandunsureofwhattheirexpectationswerefor
participation.Exerciseparticipantswerenotwellbriefedfromearlyintheplanning
processontheirrolesduringtheexercise.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
37
• TheMSELwaswrittenasalistofeventswithoutconnectinglogicallywithinputfrom
variouspartners.Thisdidnotleadtoacohesivescriptforexerciseplay.AwelldevelopedMSELwillcreateaconversationbetweencontrollersandplayers.Upon
readingthroughaMSEL,someoneunfamiliarwiththeexercisewillbeableto
understandtheexercisescenarioandseewhatisbeingaskedoftheplayers.Thiswas
notthecasewiththeClearPathIVMSEL.
• Inaddition,theprocessforexecutingtheSimCellandinjectswasnotclearly
communicatedorcontrolled.PlayersshowedupattheexercisewiththeirownMSEL
anduponStartExbeganimplementingexerciseinjectspertheirownindividualMSEL.
ThesehadnotbeencoordinatedinadvancewiththeLeadController,werenot
incorporatedintotheexerciseMSEL,andthisactivitywasnotrecognizeduntila
designatedcontrollerwasapproachedwithaquestionaboutwhotosendinjectsto.
• Inaddition,aMSELtypicallysimulatespartnersthatarenotactuallyrepresentedas
playersanddesignatesanappropriatecontrollerforsuch.Thisalsowasnotorganized
wellandledtoconfusionduringexerciseplay.
• TheMSELandexercisedocumentationtobeutilizedbycontrollersduringthefunctional
exercisewereprovidedtocontrollersanhourpriortoStartEx,notallowingforadequate
reviewandpreparationtime.Ideally,thiswouldbeprovidedatthecontrollersand
evaluatorsbriefing.
• Aninvitationtothecontrollersandevaluatorsbriefingwassentthedaypriortothe
meetingbeingheld.Thisshouldbeplannedaspartoftheinitialexerciseschedule.
• Theplayerlistwasfinalizedthemorningoftheexerciseandwasalsopieced
together.Controllersshouldhavebeenidentifiedinadvancetoallowforsuccessful
exerciseplay.AnyadditionalparticipantsshouldhavebeenassignedasObservers.
Theexercisecouldhavebeenevenmoresuccessfulwithbetterplanningandpreparationfor
Day2events.Keyitemsthatshouldreceiveadditionalattentioninthefuture:
• Designatealeadexercisecontrollerwithextensiveknowledgeoffunctionalexerciseand
MSELdesigntoleadthefunctionalexerciseefforts.
• Identifytruedesiredoutcomesforthefunctionalexerciseandchooseplayersand
controllersfortheSimCellthatwillallowthatobjectivestobeaccomplished.
• CreateasingleSimCellthatisonlyservingascontroller.The“hybrid”modelwasnot
successfulandisnotconsideredabestpracticeforexercisedesign.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
38
•
•
•
Ensurethatexerciseparticipantsareidentifiedearlyintheplanningprocessandclearly
understandtheirroles.
PublishtheMSELandotherpertinentcontrollerdocumentsinadvanceoftheexercise
andensureallcontrollersandevaluatorsunderstandthescriptanditemstobe
accomplished.
AllEEGsshouldbetiedtoMSELinjects.
Conclusion
TheClearPathIVexercisewasvaluableandadvancedgovernmentandindustryengagementon
emergencypreparednessandresponse.Theexerciseprovidedanexcellentopportunityfor
stateandindustrypartnersfromthePacificNorthwesttointeract.Theworkplanningthe
exerciseandthenworkingtogetherduringtheexercisecreatedavenueforDOEtointeract
withindustryatlocal,regional,andnationallevels.
Disorganization,confusion,andlackoftruefunctionalexerciseplayinhibitedsomeofthe
benefitsthatmayhavebeenachieved.Betterpreparationforexerciseexecutionand
developmentofexercisecontrollersandclarifyingrolesandresponsibilitiesduringexerciseplay
willheightenthebenefitoffuturefunctionalexercises.Forfutureexercises,DOEmaywantto
expanditsengagementofindustrysubjectmatterexpertsorotherswithexperienceworking
withindustryonfunctionalexercisessignificantlyinadvanceofanexercisetoimprovethe
exerciseoutcome.Planningformajorindustryexercisesmaybeayearorlongerfrominitial
schedulingthroughexecutingtheexercise.ADOEexercisesuchasClearPathIVhasthissame
levelofcomplexityandrequiresthesameplanningtimeframe.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum
39