Many archaeologists call on the use of uniformitarianism in order to invoke a 'scientific basis' for their use
of ethnographic analogies to help explain the archaeological record This paper argues that analogies, as used
by most archaeologists, cannot be subsumed into an
overall principle of uniformitarianism. 'Thi S i S because
the principles within uniformitarianism, as used in geology and physics, are quitedistinct from analogies as used
by most archaeologists. While substantivism is testable
and methodological principles are necessary if we are to
make any meaningful statements about our data, associativeuniformities are often not testable and may hinder
our ability to make meaningful statements about the past.
In order to identify and present testable hypotheses for
the archaeological record, archaeologists need to distinguish between methodological, substantiveand associative uniforrnities. Most archaeological interpretations
that are based on ethnographic analogies are based on
associative uniformities which may not be refutable. In
order to test the archaeological record we must invoke
refutation and not confirnationism, as confirmationism
is incapable of identifying behavioural anomalies within
the archaeological record
a
The development of uniformitarianisn within
IPh3'
In order to avoid explaining the geological history
of the earth in terms other than through divine
intervention or supernatural processes Jarnes Hutton
(1795) and Charles Lyell (1830-33) set out to identify
observable processes that could be used to explain
geological phenomena. Lyell proposed that existing
processes such as glaciation events and volcanic activity
could not only explain existing geological formations as
well as the earth's geological history, but that such
theories could be tested. Thus, there was no need to turn
to biblical catastrophist theory in order to explain
geological processes. It was the proposal that extant
geological processes could be used to explain past and
present conditions due to the fad that geological forces
have been uniform in process and result, that ultimately
placed geology within the hard sciences.
1
42
The recent identification of two distinct principles
within uniformitarianism by Hooykaas (1963), Gould
(1965), Simpson (1970) and Shea (1982) has removed
much of the pseudo-debate within geology regarding the
use of uniformitarianism. The dual concepts of
substantive and methodological uniforrnitarianism have
been defined by Gould (1965:226) as:
The present is a key either because we can
extrapolate observed rates or conditions to
past times (leading to substanti ve uniformitarianism) or because we establish our natural
laws by observing present processes and then
extrapolate the laws (leading to methodological uniformitarianism). Both postulate uniformity, but according to whether this be a
uniformity of rates of the material processes
themselves or of the abstract laws by which
they operate, two distinct concepts arise.
Substantivism leads to the empirical record as the
working framework for geological explanation.
Substantivism leads to statements or hypotheses about
the real world which are then empirically testable (Gould
1965).For example, we may state that continental plate
subduction has operated at the same rate in the past as it
does today. Hence, given that geologists explain past
geological events only in the 'terms of reference' of
present day phenomena, substantivism is testable
through invoking empiricism. Gould defines it as 'a
testable theory of geologic change postulating
uniformity of rates or material conditions' (1965:223).
In other words, substantivism is based on correlating
past and present material conditions and arguing that a
constant rate has produced that result, that is, the amount
of cl4in the atmosphere.
Methodological uniforrnitarianism is concerned
with using extant processes and results to explain the
past. That is, the substantive principle of a constant rate
of continental plate subduction and thus movement of
the continental plates, has enabled geologists to propose
the methodological principle of continental drift. This
means that during the past the position of the continents
have not always been in their present locations. Thus,
Dtpartrnent of Archaeology aod Anthropology. The Faculties, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia.
Ausr ralian A rchaeology, Number 36, 1993
methodological uniforrnitarianism connects material
conditions to processes by arguing that the processes
have never changed. In other words one particular
process will result in one particular material condition.
Methodological uniformitarianism does not make
dogmatic statements about the real world, but is
concerned with the 'investigators approach to nature',
or how we organise our knowledge of the real world
(Ryrner 1978:248). The idea that only one process is
possible is uncertain, but one can concentrate on the
implications of that process and try to refute it. Thus
while substantivism leads to a testable statement
regarding a uniformity between past and present
material conditions, methodological uniformitarianism
examines the correlations between processes and
material conditions in order to explain past processes
and their subsequent historical result.
Uniformitarianism and prehistoric archaeology
Archaeology currently invokes a general principle
of unifonnitarianism, but does not widely differentiate
between the distinct principles which underline its
importance for the historical sciences. The most
important methodological principle currently used in
archaeology is perhaps radiocarbon dating. The basic
substantive premise of radiocarbon dating was that cl4
production was constant and that by measuring the
amount of decay in an object we could ascertain an
absolute date. We know now however, that this
substantive principle was wrong. With the refutation of
this substantive principle it has been necessary to
calibrate cl4production against an external marker (e.g.
dendrochronology) in order that cl4can be used to help
date archaeologicaldeposits absolutely (Renfrew 1979).
The very refutation of this principle has however,
improved the ability of cl4 to help absolutely date
archaeological material. A major component of any
substantive proposition must be that the suggested
constancy of rate can be tested. The rehtation of the
originally argued constant rate of
production, and
the later determination of the degree of variability within
this rate, has resulted in one of the most important
methodological principles currently used by
archaw1ogists.
The current problem within archaeological discussions concerning analogies and uni fonnitariani sm is that
most archaeologists do not identify three distinct principles within the general term uniformitarianism (Bailey
1983, 1986; Davidson 1988; Gamble 1986; Dunnell
1983; Gould 1980; Murray 1988; Murray and Walker
1988; Walker 1984a, 1984b). While Gould (1980;
Gould, in Gould and Watson 1982) has succinctly defined the differences between substantive and methodological uniforrnitarianism, as they relate to archaeology,
Australian Archaeology. Number 36, 1993
he did not define however, a third principle within uniforrnitarianism which is based on associative evidence
(but see Fletcher in press). A uniformity of association
is most ofteninvoked when archaeologists try to explain
past human behavioural activities by an association between artefacts and social phenomena which are archaeologically invisible. Uniformitarian statements that are
based on associative uniformities are often untestable
because the premise of artefact association and the resulting material condition cannot be refuted. A number
of distinct hominid, non-hominid and environmental
phenomena may result in similar material conditions.
Hence, associativeuniformity principles, like methodological proposals, attempt to connect processes with
material conditions, and like substantivism attempts to
connect past and present material conditions. The correlation however, between past and present material conditions and the explanation of the condition as defined
by the corresponding empirical process is not testable.
Fletcher (in press) would classify associative uniformities as unoperational. A number of contemporary processes can explain the contemporary and prehistoric
condition. Such statements about the past must be considered scientifically meaningless because the very associative premise of the interpretation cannot be tested.
Bailey (1983: 175, 1986:13) and Murray and
Walker (1988:277) both argue that the correlation
between fossil and contemporary foraminifera,and past
and present climates is a substantiveprinciple which can
be used to propose a methodological uniformity
principle of prehistoric climatic interpretation. Murray
and Walker (1988:277) suggest that Bailey's (1983)
example of substantive and methodological principles
cannot be bettered:
The difference between temperature-re1ated
morphological adaptations in foraminifera
and their biogeographical correlates ('substantivism'), and the extrapolation f?om them
to beliefs in Quaternary climatic oscillations
('methodological').
It is clear, however, that this correlation is not
substantive, but based on a uniformity of untestable
association between palaeobiology and palaeoclimatology. Evolution, which is largely induced by climatic and
environmental change, tends to negate this argument
(see Ryrner 1978), as a number of extinct foraminifera
species may not have shared the same narrow climatic
range of contemporary foraminifera species, due to
cladogenesis (which is frequently the result of changing
climates and environments!). Also, the fact that this
'substantive' principle is based on the presencdabsence
of data, makes it extremely tenuous, as the absence of
foraminifera species, may not be the result of unsuitable
climatic conditions, but may be due to some other
43
Unifonnitarianismand Prehistoric Archaeology
external factor. It is much better to base palaeoclimatic
interpretations on the substantive principle of oxygen
isotopes 16 and 18 absorption within fossil foraminifera.
This is not only because the rate of isotopic absorption
can be tested, but also because it is not potentially biased
by the presencdabsence of fossil foraminifera within
deep sea cores.
As previously mentioned, much of the current
debate concerning the use of uniformitarianism within
archaeology is due to the general use of the term
'uniformitarianism' without defining the distinct
principles within this general term.Binford (1981:26)
has suggested that because the archaeological record is
a 'structure of relationships between the distribution and
form of matter as caused by energy sources acting on
matter in the past', archaeologists need to identify the
source and type of energy that shapes the pattern in the
archaeologicalrecord in order to interpret the past. In his
discussion Binford invokes a general principle of
uniformitarianisrn and argues that we must use
empiricism to make a distinction between animal and
hominid activities in order that we can then 'factor out'
animal activities in our interpretation of past human
behaviour. Binford suggests that this will enable
archaeologists to explain the remaining 'pauerns ' seen
within the archaedogical record & the result of hominid
activities (l98 1:26-9, 1983:61-76).
Binford (1981) makes a distinction between
'middle range research' which focuses on identifying a
correlation between certain actions and the resulting
material condition (e.g. the distinction between animal
gnawing marks on bone, and hominid induced marks
due to the cutting of bone using stonetools), and 'general
archaeological theory', which largely attempts to
explain the archaeological record using methodological
uniformitarianism. Binford, however, does not make a
clear distinction within his middle range research
between substantive and associativeuniformitarianism.
Therefore, while Binford argues that unifarmitarianism
is vital for archaeological interpretation he is still forced
to plead a special case for its use in archaeology. We
must:
assume that knowledge gained from
actualistic studies is relevant and applicable to
the living systems of the past. This basic
proposition must be true if inferences
employing principles gained through the study
of contemporary dynamics are to be used in
inferring the past from patterned statistics.
This means that the assumption is always
conditional and may be false; that is, we could
be wrong in our judgement regarding the
condition shared by systems or entities of the
past and the present (Binford 1981:27).
44
It is clear in this discussion that Binford is refemng to
associative uniformities, rather than substantivism. In
using substantivism we can empirically refute our
statements concerning material conditions. Hypotheses
based on associative uniformities may be the result of
any number of processes and thus the resulting material
condition in many cases cannot be refuted, only
confiied.
The discriminationbetween animal gnawing marks
and early hominid stone tool cutting marks on fossilised
bone has enabled important methodological propositions to be examined relating to early horninid activities
(Binford l98 1, 1983, 1984; Potts 1988). These propositions are however, based on the substantive (in the
identification that differential rates and types of markings are present on the fossilised bone) and methodological principles that animal puncturing marks and tool
cutting marks will result in a constant correlation between process and material condition that can be identified and repeated through empirical experimentation.
The resulting material condition would have occurred in
the same way in the past as they occur today and will
occur in the future. The major problem is when Binford
invokes contemporary dynamics in the sense of ethnographically documented spatial ,relationships between
people, carcasses and tools at butchering sites. There can
be no testing of the uniformity of the resulting material
condition. It is because of this that Binford argues that
uniformitarianism must be considered conditional when
applied to the archaeological record.
While methodological uniformitarianism leads to
propositions about processes which are invariable, they
acknowledge different rates and varying products over
times - for example the evolutionary process results in
new species (Fletcher in press). Archaeology and other
behavioural sciences, however, have to deal not only
with differing behavioural processes that may result in
a similar material condition but such processes need not
only vary through time, but may be extremely variable
today. For example, the butchering patterns of the
Eskimo and Australian Aboriginals are extremely
variable given the different cultural influences and the
vast difference in the food resources utilised. This
problem becomes even more pronounced when we
compare early hominid debris patterns to contemporary
hunter and gatherer debris patterns. The behaviour of
Australopithecus afarensis or Paranthroplss boisei will
not result in a similar material condition within the
archaeological record to that of contemporary hunters
and gatherers. While early hominids may have left
'butchering' debris patterns within the archaeological
record, the composition or pattem of such sites need not
be analogous to present day hunter and gatherer
butchering sites. Indeed,the behaviour of early hominids
Ausrmlian Archaeology, Number 36,1993
Cameron
may have been more analogous to chimpanzee 'hunting'
and scavenging debris patterns, rather than
contemporary hunters and gatherers (Potts 1988).
Archaeology is concerned with examining a past that is
different from the present and because of this the
extrapolation of ethnographic archaeological studies (in
terms of the documentation of artefact spatial
distributions and specifichuman tasks or activities) must
be considered a hindrance to archaeological
interpretations (see Binford l98 1; Fletcher in press;
Gould, in Gould and Watson 1982; Isaac 1986; Murray
and Walker l98 8). This is largely because the prehistoric
material condition cannot be tested against the proposed
extant process that is used to explain the prehistoric
archaeological result.
Gould (1965, 1987) suggests that we should no
longer invoke substantivism because the premise of a
uniformity of rates and material conditions through time
can no longer be maintained. He also argues that while
methodological uniformitarianism is vital to geological
enquiry, it is not unique to geology but is the basis of all
scientific research. Gould states that by accepting that
geology is a science, we are by definition invoking
methodological uniformitarianism. Hence there is no
longer any reason to use this term as it is a definition of
science (1965:227). However, if we reject testable
substantivism we are in danger of proposing
methodological statements about the past which are
based on untestable associative propositions. Testable
substantivismis vital to any methodological proposition.
It was not only the substantive statement regarding the
constant rate of cl4production which helped develop
the methodological principle of radiocarbon dating, but
the refutation of this constant rate improved the ability
of this technique to date archaeological deposits
absolutely. Substantivism is important & it gives us a
refutable hypothesis. Also the fact that methodological
statements can be based on either substantive or
associative uniformities means that we must distinguish
between these principles. We need to identify those
methodological principles which are based on
substantivism against those which are based on
untestable associative arguments. Thus, it is for this
reason that we must continue to make clear distinctions
between the three uniformity principles within the
general term uniformitarianism.
It is very often the poor resolution of the archaeological record which makes some archaeologists interpret the archaeological record by invoking associative
uniformities. How do archaeologists measure an acceptable degree of variation within the material condition in
order to ascertain the contemporary process which
formed the archaeological pattern? In some cases archaeology cannot successfully deal with archaeological
Australian A rchaeolugy, Number 36, 1993
material conditions. For example, while we may be able
to propose methodological propositions which identify
the difference between environmentally-induced, nonhominid-induced and hominid-induced material conditions, it is very difficult (at the lower scale of
interpretation) to determine whether this same site (if
determined to be the result of hominid activity) was the
result of either H o r n habilis andlor Paranthropus
boisei. It is very often at this level of investigation that
archaeologists use associative uniformities to make conclusions. For example, because only Horn habilis is
associated with stone tools, it could be concluded that
Homo habilis only, made stone tools (Leakey 1971).
This need not necessarily be the case, however it is
impossible to rehte. Even if Paranthropus fossils were
to be found associated with stone tools, it need not refbte
the previous interpretation (even though it could be well
argued that it should). It is the relatively poor resolution
of the archaeological record (in terms of the 'microscale' of the analysis being invoked) that may result in
some archaeologists presenting propositions which are
based on untestable associative evidence. Archaeologists must be careful not only to make a clear distinction
between-statementsthat are based on substantivism and
associative uniformities, but also ask appropriate questions in terms of the resolution available.
Ngarulurutja: married or unmarried men's camp?
Hayden (198l)in his archaeologicalinterpretations
of Ngarulurutja (an Aboriginal site abandoned in the late
1940s), based much of his conclusions on general
ethnographic analogies which were compared to events
known to have occurred from oral history. Hayden's
analysi S however, could be argued to be biased fiom the
outset. For example, Hayden considers the excavated
hearths to be contemporary episodes, without giving any
reasons for this interpretation (except that tools
associated with one individual from the 1940s
occupation, were found associated with a number of
different hearths). The archaeological interpretationthat
these hearths represent contemporary occupations is
problematic, especially given that some of the known
contemporary archaeological debris is dispersed
between differing stratigraphic lenses. It is thus feasible
that these hearths could be interpreted as representing at
least two separate occupation events, rather than one.
Even given this bias, the conclusions drawn are
acknowledged by Hayden to be at odds with the known
events. This is largely because the observed material
conditions do not necessarily display a substantive
uniformity with contemporary processes and conditions.
Archaeological behavioural residues can be the result of
a number of extant processes, humanly and
environmentally induced. We have no sure way of
Uniformitananism and Prehistoric Archaeology
calibrating the archaeological material condition to
contemporary material conditions, in order to identify
the process responsible.
The currentemphasis on associative uniformities to
help explain past human behavioural activities, as identified in the archaeological record, are largely untestable.
Hayden's associative principles relating to the identification of unmarried and married men's camp sites,
within the archaeological record are based on a uniformity between contemporary material conditions (extant
debris patterns as reflectedby the spatial distribution of
tools and faunal remains associated between these two
'distinct' camping sites) and prehistoric material conditions (spatial distribution within the archaeological
record of stone tools and faunal remains), which cannot
be tested. There is no way of verifying through empiricism that the archaeological pattern was caused by a
correlation between contemporary behavioural process
and material conditions and prehistoric processes and
material conditions. No meaningful methodological
proposition can be proposed to explain the archaeological record because there is no testable uniformity between extant and prehistoric conditions. Any number of
contemporary processes can be used to explain the
archaeological result, which need not invoke a married
men's camp scenario. The prehistoric scenario is based
on a suggested similarity between the extant pattern, and
the prehistoric pattern. Indeed, the differential increase
and decrease in depositional rates (thus refuting the
substantive proposition) may incorporate distinct
archaeological events so that when excavated they may
seem contemporary or temporally distinct (see Cameron
et al. 1990; Isaac 1977; Mathews 1965; Potts 1988;
Schick 1986;Wood and Johnson 1978). Hayden's conclusion that the archaeological record in this circumstance represents a prehistoric married men's camp
cannot be proved or disproved because his conclusion is
based on an untestable association between a contemporary married men's camp and a 'similar' pattern identified in the archaeological record.
While Hayden presents some archaeological
evidence which does indicate that in some cases
prehistoric and contemporary material conditions have
some correlations, there is a problem in that we will
never know when such correlations are valid. For
example, at Walukaritji Hayden (198 1)was able to make
correlations between archaeological interpretation and
the activities known to have occurred at the site. Without
the oral history however, it would have been impossible
to measure the degree of success or failurein interpreting
past behavioural events using ethnographic associations
against the archaeological record Also, while in this
particular circumstance there appears to be a correlation
between contemporary and prehistoric material
conditions it need not, and in most cases, will not, be
universal as already discussed above.
FLK NORTH-6: an early hominid butchering site?
The site of FLK North-6 located in the main gorge
at Olduvai, in the upper part of Bed I, is well known for
its interpretation as an early hominid butchering site
dating to around 1.7 million years ago (Leakey
1971:258). The excavations in trenches IV and V
revealed the remains of an almost complete elephant
skeleton, which has been described by Leakey as a
butchering site:
where an elephant was cut up by early man,
who may have come across it accidentally, or
deliberately driven it into a swamp to be
slaughtered. The tools found nearby would
seem to represent those used for cutting the
meat off the carcass (Leakey 1971:64).
Based solely on the association of numerous stone tools
and the elephant remains, Leakey argues that they are
contemporary and thus concludes that they are part of a
prehistoric residue of activity. While Leakey
(197 1:235-47) discusses bone modification on
mammalian remains, no mention is made of 'hominid
induced' modification to the elephant remains. Thus the
'butchery' site is based purely on the association
between tools and elephant remains, which must be
viewed with some caution.
This type of associative analysis of early hominid
behaviour can also be seen in Binford' S ( 1981) 'residual '
analysis of early 'hominid' debris fiom Olduvai. Binford
concentrates on distinguishing between carnivore and
hominid behavioural debris patterns. In his examination,
any archaeological pattern that cannot be contributed to
carnivores (as defined by extant carnivore residual
patterns), is assigned to hominid activity. The major
problem with this approach is the factoring out of
'carnivore debris patterns'. It does not allow for any
overlap between the mu1tiple use of animal carcasses by
both carnivore and hominids. Also, because Binford can
only explain such patterns using extant carnivores, he
fails to appreciate possible extinct and other extant
carnivore patterns that may have contributed to the
archaeological bone accumulation. For example, what
about the felids Dinofelis and Megantereon and also the
hyaenid Euryboas (Groves 1989:77)? In his multivariate
analysis of the assemblage composition present at FLK
North-6, Binford, argues that this site, like FLKNN-2,
represents a carnivore den assemblage. This is based on
the similarity of high Q-mode factor loadings between
these sites to those of extant carnivore den assemblages.
Potts (198 8) questions Binford's carnivore versus
horninid bone pattern assemblage analysis. He believes
that the large degree of variability between
contemporary carnivore debris patterns (not to mention
extinct patterns), would make it very difficult to identify
the phenomenon responsible for the debris observed in
the archaeological record:
... our current knowledge of carnivore bone
accumulations and damage includes
significant variation in the species observed
(e.g. spotted hyenas versus wolves) and in
observation conditions (e.g. bones fed to zoo
animals versus bones recovered from natural
dens and kill sites). Even within species, bone
damage and selection of parts for transport
may vary with environmental factors.
Although there may be features in common to
all carnivore bone accumulations, it is still
unclear how well these features distinguish
carnivore collectionsfiom bones collected and
modified by hunter-gatherers (1988: 135).
Potts' (1986,1988),Potts and Shipman's (l98l), Bunn's
(1981) and Bunn and Kroll's (1986) microscopic
analyses of fossilised bone have been able to identify
hominid stone tool cutting marks and also carnivore
tooth marks on the bone fragments recovered from a
number of excavations at Olduvai. It has been these
examinations that have refuted Binford's claim that FLK
North-6 is solely representative of a prehistoric
carnivore den. Potts' analysis has clearly shown that
hominids and other carnivore species were both
involved in utilising the remains at FLK North-6. The
refutation of Binford' S analysis has been possible
because of substantivism (the identification of
differential rates and types of markings on bone
fragments) and the methodological principles that is
invoked regarding the distinction between stone tool and
animal gnawing marks identifiable through microscopic
analysis. In making a distinction between hominid
cuttinglslicing marks on bone fragments and animal
gnawing and canine puncture marks, Potts has
concluded that hominids and other animals were both
present and contributed to the archaeological debris at
FLK North-6.
Binford (1981, 1985, 1988) in his multivariate
analyses of the Olduvai sites further argues that the early
hominids were not involved in Central Place Foraging
(Isaac 1986, 1989), but were rather optimal scavengers
with no central place for food distribution. Binford
argues that the early hominids scavenged other carnivore
kills (and thus only obtained low food utility items) and
then, like most other scavengers, moved off to the
nearest protected location, to finish off the scavenged
items. Thus, the Olduvai sites if they can be contributed
to horninid activity are argued to represent optimal
scavenging activities. Potts (1986) however, has refuted
Binford's argument in that he invokes a substantive
Australian Archaeology, Number 36, 1993
principle in accepting a reasonably constant rate in bone
weathering. Using thi S principle Potts has established
that these bone formations have accumulatedover a five
to ten year period. This is an important methodological
proposal which indicates that some form of central p1ace
foraging was indeed being used by the early hominids.
It is clear that during this period hominids contributed to
these concentrated scatters because tool cutting marks
can be identified on many pieces of bone which are
temporally distinct as indicated by the differential
degree of weathering patterns seen on the bone. The
substantive principle of bone weathering can be tested
empirically. Thus specific locations were being used by
the early hominids over a period of at least five to ten
years. Thus, Isaac's central place foraging model has not
yet been refuted.
Testing archaeological uniformities
The above discussion has demonstrated that archaeologists using associative uniforrnitarianism by invoking ethnography alone may be able to identify
similar pattems in the archaeological record to those
observed in the present. However, similar patterns need
not be a result of similar behavioural events.
Ethnoarchaeology is unable in many cases to identify
what is a testable correlation between prehistoric and
contemporary material conditions. As such it cannot
define meaningful methodological propositions which
explain the processes involved in the formation of the
prehistoric material condition. It can only correlate particul ar or parochial, archaeologicaWcontemporary patterns through the use of interpretation through
association. Archaeologists who invoke untestable associative uniformities to interpret the archaeological record, are in danger of invoking confiiationism rather
than refutation to test assumed cause or constancy of
archaeological patterns. As Tangri (1988, 1989a, 1989b,
1990)correctly points out, an emphasis on confiationism, rather than refutation in archaeological research
will hinder archaeological interpretations.
When archaeologists rely on particular
ethnographic examples to help interpret the
archaeological record (e.g. the Nunamiut Eskimo or the
Walbiri), there is a real danger that their conclusions are
reached through searching the ethnographic record for a
'best fit' explanation. Indeed the contemporary models
that have been traditionally used to interpret the
archaeological record at Olduvai are a good example of
this. It would be agreed by most that early horninid
behaviour was quite distinct from modern day hunters
and gatherers. Thus, home base andor scavenging
debris interpretations for the archaeological record of
Olduvai, if they are based on modern day hunter and
gatherer analogies alone, would have to be considered
47
Unifonnirananism and Prehistoric Archaeology
with some skepticism. If we do not acknowledge the
numerous anomalies within the archaeological record,
but instead settle for a 'best-fit' scenario, we are doomed
to interpret the past in terms of the present. This is not
acceptable for a historical profession, especially since as
archaeologists we are in most cases trying to explain the
changing nature (physical and behavioural) of past
hominid grades and clines.
When archaeologists use a 'best-fit' model to
interpret their data, there is a real danger that the very
data that can help identify behavioural changes through
time (the anomalies within the archaeological record)
will either be ignored, explained away or not even
identified (Gould 1980, Gould in Gould and Watson
1982). In using a 'best-fit model' or a 'high probability
of identification' between extant and extinct
archaeological patterns (Watson, in Gould and Watson
1982)~archaeologists invoke mflmationism, as they
search the ethnographic record for a 'best-fit'
in confiing that the past was the same as the present.
As Gould (1980; Gould, in Gould and Watson 1982)has
explained, it is only when archaeologists identify
anomalies within their data (which are identified
because they conflict with our hypotheses), can they
analvse a ~ a s that
t
is different mtentiallv from the
Ili;s identification can onl; be estabished when
using refutation (Tangri 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990). It is
refutation that will identify and highlight the data that
does not allow a hypothesis to be ~ n f m e dand it is this
data that can inform US of a past that may be very
different from the present.
Conclusion
It is the 'IJrrent
lack of understanding of
substantive, methodological and associative
uniformitarian principles that has resulted in much of the
current confusion regarding the use, or misuse, of
analogies within arc-lo&.
While both substantive
and methodological uniformitarian principles will
enable a uniformity of behavioural processes and
material conditions to be proposed, most associative
uniformities are not governed by such uniformities, but
rather must invoke a number of differing parochial
extant processes to account for the prehistoric material
condition which in most cases cannot be refuted.
It is the use of substantiveuniforrnitarian principles
which are empirically testable, and methodological
uniformitarian principles which are necessary to make
meaningful statements about the past that must be used
by archaeologists. In testing our hypotheses, it is
important that we use rehtation because it will allow
archaeologists to identify archaeologicalanomalies. The
fact that anomalies are present within our data should
make us question our initial hypothesis, thus they should
not be ignored in order that a 'best-fit' model can be
adopted. The dismissal of anomalies in order to present
a 'best-fit' model will only hinder archaeologists in their
ability to identify a past that is different from the present.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank John Clegg, Roland Fletchex,
Colin Groves, Sheridan Pritchard, Daniel Tangri and
Greg Wyncoll for general discussions concerning
uniforrnitarianism. I would especially like to thank
Roland and Daniel for reading an earlier draft of this
paper. Needless to say none of the above necessarily
agree with my conclusions.
References
Bailey, G.N. 1983 Conceptc of
in
prehistory.
Annual Review of Anthropology 12:165-92.
Bailey, G.N. 1986 Breaking the time bamer. Archueolog ical
Review From Cambridge 65-20.
York: Academic Press.
Binford, L.R. 1983 In Pursuit of the Past: Decoding the
Archaeological Record. London: Thames and Hudson.
from Klaries River ,uourh.
~ i n f ~ L.R.
~ d , 1984 f-1
New York: Academic Press.
Binford, L.R. 1985 Human ancestors: Changing views of their
behaviour. Journal of Atlthropological Archaeology
4:292-327.
Binford, L.R. l988 Fact and fiction about the Zinjanthropus floor
data, arguments, and interpretations. Current Anthropology
29: 123-35.
Bunn, H.T. 1981 Archaeological evidence for meat-eating by
Plio-Pleistocene hominids from Koobi Fora and 0lduvai
Gorge. Nature 291 574-7.
Bunn, H.T. and EM. Kroll 1986 Systematic butchery by
Plio-Pleistocene hominids at Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania
Current Anthropology 27:43 1-52.
Cameron, Dew., P.J. Whie, R. Lambe* and S. n o d 1990
Blowing in the wind. Site destruction and site creation at
Hawker Lagoon, South Australia Australian Archaeology
3058-69.
Davidson, I. 1988 The naming of p m : Ethnology and the
interpretation of Australian prehistory. In B. Meehan and
R. Jones (eds) Archaeology with Ethnography: An Australian
Perspective, pp. 17-32. Canberra: Department of Prehistory,
~ e s & h school of Pacific Studies, "he Australian National
University. Occasional Papers in Prehistory, No. 15.
Dumeu, R.C. 1983 European Economic Prehistory: A New
Approach. New York: Academic Press.
Fletcher, R. in press Time perspectivism, annales and tbe potential
of archaeology. In B. Knapp (ed.) Erne Perspectivisttl,
Annales, and the Potential of Archaeology, pp.38-51.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gamble, C. 1986 'Ihe Palaeolithic Settlement of Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gould, R.A. 1980 Living Archaeology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Gould, R.A. and P.J. Watson 1982 A dialogue on the meaning and
use of analogy in ethoarchatological reasoning. Journal of
Anthropological Archaeology 1:355-8 1.
GouM, S.J. 1965 Is uniformitarianism necessary? Ammimn
Journal of Science 263:223-8.
Gould, S.J. 1987 Times A m , Times Cycle. London: Penguin
Books.
Groves, C.P. 1989 Natural selection and intelligent ancestors.
Mankind 19:76-82.
Hayden, B. 1981 Palaeolithic Reflections: Lithic Technology and
Ethnographic Excavations Among Australian Aborigines.
Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.
Hooykaas, R 1963 Zke Principle of Clniformiry. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Hutton, J. 1795 Theory of the Earth, 2 Vols. Edinburgh: William
Creech.
Isaac, G.L. 1977 Olorgesaile:Archaeological Studies of a Middle
Pleistocene Lake Basin in Kenya. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Isaac, G.L. 1986 Foundation stones: Early artifacts as indicators of
activities and abilities. In GN. Bailey, and P. Callow (eds)
Stone Age Prehistory, pp.221-41. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Isaac, G.L. 1989 Cutting and carrying: Archaeology and the
emergence of the genus Homo. In J.R. Durant ( d . ) Human
Origins, pp.106-22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leakey, M.D. 1971 Olduvai Gorge: Excavations in Beds I and 111,
1960-1963, Volume 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Lyell, C. 1830-33 Principles of Geology, 3 Vols. London:
J. Murray.
Matbews, J.M. 1965 Stratigraphic disturbance: The human
element. Antiquity 39:295-8.
Murray, T. 1988 Ethnoarchaeology and palaeoethnology? In
B. Meehan. and R. Jones (eds) Archaeology with
Elhnography: An Australian Perspective, pp.1-16. Canberra:
Department of Prehistory, Research School of Pacific Studies,
The Australian National University. Occasional Papers in
Prehistory, No. IS.
Murray, T. and M.J. Walker 1988 Like WHAT? A practical
question of analogical inference and archaeological
meaningfulness. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology
7:248-87.
Potts, R. 1986 Temporal span of bone accumulations at Olduvai
Gorge and imptications for early hominid foraging behaviour.
Palaeobwlogy 1225-31.
Potts, R. 1988 Early Hominid Activities at Olduvai. New York:
Aldine de Gmyter.
Potts, R. and P. Shipman 1981 Cutmarks made by stone tools on
bones from Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania Nature 291577-80.
Renfrew, C. 1979 Bdore Civilisation: The Radiocarbon
Revolution and Prehistoric Europe. London: Penguin Books.
Rymer, L. 1978 The use of uniformitarianism and analogy in
palaeoecology, particularly pollen analysis. In D. Walker and
J. Guppy (eds) Biology and Quarternary Environments,
pp.245-57. Canberra: Australian Academy of Science.
Schick, K.D. 1986 Stone Age Sites in the Making: Experiments in
the Formation and Tmn&ormation of Archaeological
Occurrences. BAR Intemional Series 319.
Shea, J.H. 1982 Twelve fallacies of uniformitarianism. Geology
10:455-60.
Simpson, G.G. 1970 Uniformitarianism. An inquiry into principle,
theory, and method in geohistory and biohistory. In
M.K. Hecht and W.C. Streve (eds) Essays in Evolution and
Genetics in Honour of lheodosius Dobzhansky, pp.43-96.
New York: Appleton.
Tangri, D. 1988 Politics and cultural evolution in archaeology.B.A.
Hons. thesis, University of Sydney.
Tangri, D. 1989a Science, hypothesis testing and prehistoric
pictures. Rock Art Research (with comments) 6:83-95.
Tangri, D. 1989b Early physical anthropology, confirmation, and
Australian Aboriginal brains. Australian Archaeology
28:26-34.
Tangri, D. 1990 Popular fiction and the Zimbabwe controversy.
History in Africa 17:293-304.
Walker, M.J. 1984a Analogy, theory and practice in prehistoric
archaeology: Part One. Trasus 2(1):6-18.
Walker, M.J. 1984b Analogy, theory and practice in prehistoric
archaeology: Part Two. Tmsus 2(2):22-33.
Wood,W.R and D.L Johnson 1978 Disturbance processes in site
formation. Advances in Archaeological Method and Theory
1:315-81.
Wylie, A. 1985 The reaction against analogy. Advances in
Archaeological Method and Theory 8:63-109.
-
p
p
The Weekend Australian. 16-17 January 1993. (Supplied by CS.)
Australian Archaeology, Number 36,1593