1
TECTONIC PLATES SHIFTING? The Visits of Lien Chan and James Soong to China in
April-May 2005
NACS Conference 2005, Helsinki, Finland
Juha Tähkämaa
University of Turku
This is an article that I came up with rather rapidly after the visits of Lien Chan and
James Soong to China. It is basically meant as a commentary on the significance and
meaning of the visits, and rather chronological as such. For the seminar purposes I
wish to present it as a conversation piece as the paper in itself is still somewhat
sketchy and not very polished (many of the footnotes are missing). Argumentation is
not yet very through, but I ask the reader to bear with me and perhaps receive some
comments on how to improve it .I also hope that we can have an interesting
discussion on the current state of cross-straits policies between China and Taiwan.
The visits of Lien Chan and James Soong to mainland China were perhaps the most
significant events in the history of mainland-China – Taiwan relations during the past 50
years. The sudden visits of these two prominent opposition leaders from Taiwan increased
pressure on the DPP government and opened new channels of cross-straits
communication. The real impact of these visits is unclear at the time of writing this, but
nevertheless they signalled a new level of interchanges and communication, which in itself
is a vital and promising sign in the complex and very hostile relationship between the two.
However, multiple problems still remain, and the real willingness of the ROC government
to negotiate with the mainland Chinese government remains weak.
This paper discusses the recent visits in three parts. The first part briefly describes Hu
Jintao´s current Taiwan policy, the second analyses the visits themselves, and the last part
tries to outline possible impacts of the visits to Taiwan´s China and domestic policies.
HU JINTAO AND CHINA`S OLD NEW TAIWAN POLICY
The real impetus behind the visits has been Hu Jintao´s new Taiwan policy and president
Chen Shui-bians pro-Taiwan policies within the ROC political framework. These two
dimensions of cross-straits political discourse are vital in understanding the context of the
visits.
President Hu Jintao secured his position as the supreme leader in the PRC and CCP
political leadership by occupying the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission of
the CCP in September 2004. His ascendancy to presidency and party chairmanship has
been rather smooth and swift. It has coincided with President Chen Shui-bians reign in
Taiwan. President Chen has been the most pro-Taiwan independence president of the
ROC so far and his policies have caused considerable worry in mainland China and
abroad. His policies have also forced the mainland Chinese government to adjust their
policies towards Taiwan.
Starting from the turn of the century, China has gradually adopted a new approach to
dealing with the Taiwan issue. It has basically adopted a two-pronged strategy, which
consists of softening the tone towards Taiwan to win over the hearts of the Taiwanese
moderates and those not supporting independence, while at the same time increasing
2
military build-up to put pressure on the Taiwanese independence supporters.1
An indication of the softening tone towards Taiwan has been the gradual remodelling of
the One China –policy, which is the cornerstone of China´s approach to the Taiwan issue.
Starting from 2000, the one China has been defined as something that both China and
Taiwan belong to, but perhaps on a more equal level. The previous emphasis of stating
Taiwan´s provincial status and emphasising the PRC government’s status as the only
legitimate government of China have been erased and instead the new definition leaves
open the definition of China (it is not explicitly the PRC) and the relationship between
China and Taiwan (Taiwan no longer province). This definition of China comes very close
to the so-called 1992 consensus which is the key to cross-straits dialogue currently.2
On the other hand the military threat has been escalated and words have become harsher
especially after President Lee formulated his special state-to-state relations statement in
1999 and Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in May 2000. In the 2000 Defence
White Paper of the Chinese Government Taiwanese secessionist activities were devoted a
paragraph and Taiwan situation was depicted as very grim.3 Starting from 1999, more
missiles have been deployed to Fujian province opposite of Taiwan, and the military has
become more aggressive in its stance towards Taiwan.
Within this strategic framework Hu Jintao´s tactical contribution in Taiwan politics so far
has been the idea of separating the fight against Taiwan independence from the
immediate reunification goals. The politics of Deng and Jiang emphasised reunification as
the first and foremost goal and Taiwan independence was not even considered a real
possibility in the cross-straits framework.4 The statement of President Lee Teng-hui in
1999 of special state-to-state relations and the subsequent victory of Chen Shui-bian in
the 2000 Taiwanese presidential elections have suddenly increased the push for
independence and forced the Chinese to change their priorities. Currently the most
important task facing the Chinese leadership is curbing independence activities in Taiwan
and eliminating international (mainly US and Japan) support to it. The ultimate goal of
reunification has not been abandoned, and ultimately the Chinese leadership will not give
in on it, but at the moment reunification is not priority number one.
The new prioritisation was first published in the joint statement of the Office of the Taiwan
Affairs of Central Committee of the CCP and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council
in May 2004.5 The statement was issued three days before President Chen gave his
inaugural speech in 20.5.2004, and its target was clear. Chen Shui-bian was mentioned
several times as the main culprit in the independence activities, and his policies were
strongly condemned. The statement begins by emphasising that “To put a resolute check
on the “Taiwan independence” activities…is the most pressing task before the compatriots
on both sides of the straits”. It ends with a firm warning to independence activists; if the
Taiwanese leaders provoke recklessly major incidents of Taiwan independence, the
1 Yasuhiro Matsuda: PRC-Taiwan Relations Under Chen-Shui-bians´Government: Continuity and Change Between the
First and Second Terms. Paper presented at the Brookings-FICS conference, Taipei, May 23, 2004., p.2-10 passim.
2 However, the latest government policy paper, The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China defines one China
as “There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat of China's central
government is in Beijing.”. Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office of the State Council, 1993
3 Chinas National Defence in 2000, Chapter I The Security Situation, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/20-2.htm,
October 2000. The 2004 National Defence White Paper is even more stern in the analysis of the situation.
4 Lecture of You Ji in CPAS, Stockholm, 9.5.2005
5 “Curbing “Taiwan independence” most urgent task”, People´s Daily Online, 17.5.2004
3
Chinese people“ will crush their schemes firmly and thoroughly at any cost”.6
Otherwise the statement calls for the resumption of cross-straits talks with any party that
recognises the One China principle. Again the One China was defined rather ambiguously;
“…there is only one China in the world and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to that
one and same China”. The talks should aim at formal ending of the state of hostility
through equal-footed consultations, establishing a mechanism of mutual trust in military
field, and jointly building a framework for peaceful and stable cross-straits relations. Other
goals were maintaining close in an appropriate manner for problem solving, realising the
“three links”, establishing closer economic cooperation, and Taiwan agricultural products
were offered wider access to the mainland Chinese market if the Taiwanese agreed to
negotiate under the One China principle.
The hard-line approach was further strengthened with the promulgation of the AntiSeparation law in February 2005. The law is explicitly aimed at Taiwan, and legitimises
Chinese military intervention in the case of Taiwanese independence or when all peaceful
options for reunification are exhausted.7 At the same time Hu Jintao released his four-point
strategy towards Taiwan emphasising a more moderate approach. According to it China
has four principles guiding their Taiwan policy: the official conclusion of the state of
hostility between the two sides, the establishment of mutual military trust, enhancing
Taiwan’s international and political status, and establishing a framework for peaceful and
stable development of cross-straits relations. The basis for all contacts and negotiations
was the acknowledgement of the 1992 consensus.
In regard to Chinese foreign policy and the Taiwan issue, the Chinese government has
criticised the Japanese “involvement” in the Taiwan issue especially after Japan and the
US signed the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in
February 2005. In this agreement Taiwan was mentioned for the first time during their 50
years of alliance and both parties stated that “common strategic objectives [of both parties
in region] include”…” Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan
Strait through dialogue”.8 On the Chinese side this was interpreted as an intervention in
the Taiwan issues, and aroused strong opposition.9 When one considers the Bush
administrations fluctuating policy towards Taiwan and his 2001 statement that the US
government is willing to do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan, the Chinese feel that
there is growing support to Taiwan independence from Japan and the US. Additionally the
US decision to sell more high-tech weaponry to Taiwan in 2004 increased criticism from
China.
Basically Hu Jintao is not softer towards Taiwan and not willing to give on reunification, but
he is willing to experiment with a new tactical approach to the issue. So far the hard-line
approach has been prevailing, and the military has had more say in Taiwan politics than
before, as can be seen from the events of the past year. Hu has also increased the
number of active military personnel in the highest policy making bodies concerning Taiwan
straits.10 The results of the soft-talk elements of the strategy had not produced any
significant results until the visits of Lien Chan and James Soong to mainland. They were a
6 ibid. Hu Jintao became the chairman of the Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs of the CCP in March 2003.
7 See
8 Text of the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. US department of State,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm
9 Zan Jifang: The Taiwan Card. Beijing Review http://www.bjreview.com.cn/En-2005/05-09-e/09-world-2.htm
10 See Lam XX for an analysis on the composition of the CCP LGTA.
4
major victory to Hu Jintao and the PRC, and a serious setback to President Chen and his
party the DPP.
THE VISITS OF LIEN CHAN AND JAMES SOONG TO CHINA
Rumours of the visits circulated in the Taiwanese media already months before the visits
took place. Two major preceding events signalled that something was underway in the
cross-straits relations; the meeting of PFP chairman James Soong and President Chen
Shui-bian, and the trip of KMT vice-chairman Chiang Pin-kun to China in March.
The Soong-Chen meeting took place 24.2.2005, three weeks before the Anti-secession
Law was promulgated in the National People´s Congress. These two politicians
represented opposite opinions of China policy in Taiwan, and their meeting was a major
event in Taiwanese politics. The meeting resulted in a 10-point joint declaration, which
stated that both signing parties promised to uphold the ROC name and constitution, and
restrain from declaring Taiwan independence. The declaration also stated that president
Chen would keep his “five no´s” policy promises.
Most of the promises in the declaration were consistent with James Soong´s policies, and
apparently only served as an assurance of Chen´s political credibility towards China. At
the time it was already widely discussed in the media that Soong will visit China in the
spring, and by signing the agreement with him President Chen was able to convey his
message to mainland Chinese leadership. The unholy alliance was thus a way of
communicating to mainland China. At the same time the statement created an outcry in
the pro-independence groups in Taiwan, who widely criticised president Chen for joining
forces with James Soong and promising to uphold the ROC name, flag, territory and
constitution. In their opinion President Chen was backing from his independence
position.11
Another mini-earthquake in Taiwanese politics took place with the five-day visit of KMT´s
vice-chairman Chiang Ping-kun and a 34 member delegation to China in March 28 to
discuss cooperation and a possible visit of the KMT chairman to China. During the visit
KMT and CCP reached agreement on a number of issues. According to the agreement
both parties promised to push for direct charter flights between China and Taiwan on
special holidays, to advance media interaction between the two sides, and to push for
greater interaction between regional governments12 of China and Taiwan. The CCP also
extended an invitation to Lien Chan to visit China.13
The actual nature of the agreement was and still is somewhat clouded, but apparently
Chiang signed a document with the CCP on the above-mentioned issues. Initially he
11 Many charterised Soong as the real winner in the meeting, while Chen had to do a lot of explaining for his
supporters. Taipei Times “Pledges a betrayal for some, boring for others” Feb. 25, 2005
12 County and town governments
13 TT “Beijing signs 10-point plan with KMT”, April 01, 2005; Peoples´Daily Online “Twelve results achieved in CPC
and KMT dialogue” March 31, 2005. It is unclear whether the parties signed any documents or treaties on the issues, or
whether is was just a mutual accors or statement by the two. The agreement also stated that mainland was willing to
sign an agreement to insure the rights of Taiwanese investing in China, is prepared to allow Chinese tourists to visit
Taiwan, and is willing to consider allowing Taiwanese businesses from the financial, insurance, transportation, medical
and other industries to set up and expand in China.
5
declined to comment on the matter, but later said that he signed a document, but not with
China.14 The trip was characterised as “ice-breaking” from the KMT side, but it infuriated
president Chen, who strongly condemned it and accused the parties of back-pedalling to
the 1920´s, 30´s and 40´s, referring to the united front periods of the two parties.15 He also
called the trip treason and accused the KMT of selling out to the CCP.16 The results of the
trip nevertheless paved the way for a historic visit of the KMT chairman to China after
almost 60 years of separation.
Lien Chan´s visit
The visit arrangements in Taipei took place in a hostile environment. The government,
president and the DPP were heavily criticising the KMT for the visit preparations. More fuel
to the flames was added when KMT´s secretary-general Lin Feng-cheng slipped for a twoday visit to Beijing to discuss arrangements for Lien´s trip. In the flurry of criticism from the
DPP and Taiwan independence supporters, Lien agreed to talk with President Chen
before departure to mainland. They discussed the trip over the phone, and President Chen
reminded Lien that he could not sign agreements enroaching the ROC state, and Lien
promised to respect this position.17 More interesting contact, however, was Lien´s visit to
Douglas Paal, director of the AIT in Taiwan, two days before his departure to China. Again
Lien refused to comment about his talks with Paal, but it was widely perceived that Paal
was briefing Lien about the US position on the visit.18
Lien Chan´s visit took place between April 26 and May 3. The two most important events
during Lien´s trip to China were his speech in Beijing University and his meeting with the
CCP chairman and PRC president Hu Jintao. These events were truly historic in the
China-Taiwan framework, since it was the first time that a KMT chairman set foot to
mainland China since 1949. More than 50 years of antagonism was thrown to the dustbin
with this event. The twists and turns of Taiwan’s domestic political development had
relegated the KMT to opposition, but did not substantially diminish the importance of the
event when one considers the role of the KMT as the founding party of the ROC and its
role in the conception of the Taiwan problem. Moreover, until the past 10 years, the KMT
and the CCP have been the main protagonists in the Taiwan-China dispute, and any
formal meeting between these two former arch-enemies would be historic.
Lien´s talks with Hu Jintao resulted in a CCP-KMT communiqué issued by the parties right
after the meeting. The emphasis of the communiqué was on peace promotion and
increasing communication. It contained what was later dubbed as the “three agreements”
and “five promotions”.19 The three agreements were recognition of the 1992 consensus,
opposition to Taiwan independence and seeking of peace and stability across the Taiwan
straits. The five promotions were promotion of cross-straits talks and consultations on the
14 TT “KMT's Chiang defends his recent Beijing visit”, April 9, 2005; TT “Chiang explains his China trip to premier”,
April 8, 2005
15 TT ” Chen blasts KMT's trip”, March 30, 2005
16 See for example SCMP 7.4.2005 “President’s treason threat absurd, says KMT”; Taipei Times 8.4.2005 “KMT´s trip
violated the law”.
17 TT “Chen, Lien chat briefly by phone”, April 26, 2005
18 Immediately after Lien´s return form China Paal paid a visit to Lien Chan in the KMT headquarters. The visit took
place one day after President Bush had made a phone call to Hu Jintao. SCMP 7.5.2005 “US envoy to Taipei in talks
with Lien Chan.” According to the article rumours indicated that Paal gave a message from President Bush to Lien. The
KMT had given documents about Lien´s trip to senior White House officials to be passed on to President Bush before
he made his phone call to Hu Jintao.
19 Beijing Review 19.5.2005, p.24
6
basis of the 1992 consensus; promotions of a formal end to the state of hostility across the
Taiwan straits and taking steps towards a peace accord; promoting economic cooperation
and the “three links”; discussing Taiwan´s participation in international activities after the
resumption of cross-straits talks; and establishing a regular platform for exchanges
between the two parties.20
The actual outcomes of the talks were of course limited by the nature of the meeting. The
two political parties could not sign or make agreements on behalf of their governments.
Nevertheless the public and high-profile denouncement of the Taiwan independence
activism and constitution proposals created an atmosphere of a “united front” to the visit,
which was reported in the media around the world. As such Lien´s visit did not result in any
substantial policy openings in regards to One China policy, but produced some practical
results which the PRC government undoubtedly gave to boost the image of KMT in
Taiwan. The most important of these were the lifting of travel restrictions of mainland
Chinese tourists to Taiwan and the promise to help Taiwan acquire a position in the WHO.
The latter promise included the condition that the ROC side acknowledge the 1992
consensus. Additionally the Lien-Hu talks resulted in wider access for the Taiwanese
agricultural products to the mainland Chinese market.21 In fact the products that gained
wider access to China were from southern Taiwan where President Chen has more
support than the KMT. 22
Otherwise Lien and Hu gave reconciliatory statements about cross-straits affairs and
hoped to work together for a prosperous China. Lien spoke highly of Hu´s four-point
guidelines proposed is March saying it was a call for peace and positive in guiding the
cross-straits affairs. Hu urged both parties to jointly work for peace and stability in order to
revitalize the great Chinese nation.23 Lien touched upon the Chinese nationalistic
sentiment by stating that a prosperous, strong and well-being Chinese nation was no
longer an unreachable dream, and that the KMT and the CCP both aimed at creating a
prosperous and strong China.24 To the pleasure of his hosts, he also strongly condemned
the desinification policies of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan.25
To sum up, the atmosphere of the visit was one of reconciliation and peace. In many
instances the historical significance of the event was publicised, and the importance of
having contact after almost 60 years of separation was emphasised especially by the
mainlander media. Lien´s speeches and the final communiqué of the meeting referred to
the long history of separation and different paths of the two parties, and mentioned how it
was time to work together again for the happiness and wealth of the Chinese people.26 As
the actual policy outcomes of the meeting were rather limited, there was an atmosphere of
ceremonialism about the visit. Nevertheless, the concessions from the Chinese side
20 Ibid. China daily overseas edition, April 30, 2005, front page. The KMT has accepted the current changes to the
constitution redifining electoral system and number of seats to the parliament, but these changes all take place under the
ROC constitutional umbrella. During Lee Teng-hui era the constituion was amended four times.
For a detailed list se XXX
21 Lien negotiated about the agricultural products access, while Soong negotiated about opening the three links.
22 This political dimension of the agricultural package was not accidental. See “Bejing offers aid package as KMT ends
visit”, China Daily, May 3, 2005
23 Historic moment: Hu, Lien meet in Beijing, China Daily, April 29, 2005
24 People´s Daily Online ” Lien: Strong Chinese nation no longer reachless dream”, April 29, 2005
25 ”De-sinification unacceptable - Lien Chan”. China Daily online, April 29, 2005
26 The international edition of People´s Daily dedicated the whole front page to the meeting between Lien ad Hu on
April 30, 2005.
7
indicated that the party-to-party talks could be used for gaining practical result also.
James Soong´s visit to mainland
Soong´s visit took place a few days after Lien Chan had concluded his visit. Soong left for
China on the 7th of May and toured Hunan, Beijing and Shanghai. Again, the most
important events were his speech in Qinghua University on the 12th and subsequent onehour meeting with Hu Jintao. The tone of the meeting as well as speeches and statements
emanating from it were different from the Lien meeting, and were concerned with the
actual situation in the cross-straits affairs and aimed more at the Taiwanese domestic
market, so to speak.
The Soong-Hu meeting results were published in a communiqué similar to the Lien-Hu
communiqué. The communiqué did not dwell upon history as much as the CCP-KMT
communiqué, but instead concentrated on the cross-straits affairs right from the beginning.
It started with an assurance that if Taiwan does not seek independence, there will be no
war. It also urged the Taiwan authorities to respect the four no´s policy of Chen Shui-bian
and not to seek independence through constitutional changes. Emphasis was again on the
adherence to the 1992 consensus and both parties voiced their strong opposition to
Taiwan independence and the rectification of Taiwan´s name as well as constitutional
changes through referendum. After these assurances the communiqué listed areas of
cooperation between the parties, which were rather similar to the KMT communiqué. A
notable difference was that the parties promised to promote the realisation of two-way
direct flights in 2006.27
The most highly anticipated message in the communiqué was not the promotions or
opposition to Taiwan independence, but whether it would contain any new positive policy
signals towards Taiwan. This meant especially adjustments in the 1992 consensus debate
or one China policy. The results, however, were disappointing. A new definition of the
1992 consensus was included in the communiqué and it was defined as “two shores, One
China” (liangan yizhong).28 It did not markedly differ from previous Chinese conceptions of
one China, and “two shores” is something that the Chinese media, for example, uses
commonly to refer to Taiwan and China. Thus it did not contain any substantial political
signal to Taiwan. Essentially it was similar to the previous one China definition, with
perhaps a slight semantic change.29 According to Soong the definition matched the 10point consensus he had reached with President Chen prior to his trip, and it was up to the
president to decide how to react to it. Soong stated that the purpose of the new definition
was to bring the parties back to negotiation table.30
The visit of James Soong also contained strong national elements, and in fact more so
than Lien Chan´s. When arriving to China Soong´s visit as televised live as was Lien Chan
´s visit, but already in his first speech Soong referred to the Republic of China so many
times, that he was cut-off from the air. From that on, all his speeches were broadcast with
a three-minute delay to give officials time to remove any unwanted references.31 When
27 “CPC, PFP Jointly Issue Communique”, Beijing Review, May 19, 2005, p.21
28 People´s Daily overseas edition, May 13, 2005, fp
29 “Hu, Soong join hands for Straits peace, China Daily, May 13, 2005; SCMP ”Chens´next move will determine his
legacy”, May 14, 2005
30 SCMP ”I did not go too far, says Soong”, May 14, 2005. President Chen rejected the new formulation immediately.
31 SCMP
8
leaving to China Soong made a promise to uphold the name of the ROC and defend it in
China. This he did with such vigour, that his hosts were dismayed.
Soong also appealed to broader Chinese nationalism in his speech in Qinghua University.
He strongly condemned Taiwan independence claiming it was a “dead alley”, and stated
that “there is nobody in the world who can hold back the Chinese people from resolving
their own problems peacefully”. He added that resolving the Taiwan question is a
complicated matter and constitutes a challenge to the wisdom of all Chinese for “handling
our problems ourselves”32 Taken literally these statements denounce foreign intervention
in the Taiwan question and take the stand that the Taiwan issue is a domestic one. In fact
these statements are similar to mainland Chinese policy line on the Taiwan issue. In an
interesting reference to Japan, Soong slashed at the efforts of a small group of
secessionists who see themselves as Japanese rather than Taiwanese.33 This was
apparently a reference to Lee Teng-hui and the TSU. Lee publicly associates with Japan
and Japanese right-wing political ideas.34
Soong also gave statements resonating with Chinese nationalism by stating that “No one
can block the trend of the Chinese nation´s rejuvenization…. The rejuvenization of the
Chinese nation is the is the common aspiration of all the people across the Taiwan
straits.”35 However, in the field of Chinese nationalism Soong positioned the PFP and
Taiwan differently than Lien and the KMT. According to Soong, the PFP is an indigenous
political force passionate for Taiwan consciousness, but not for Taiwan independence.
Taiwan consciousness is different and these two should not be confused. Taiwan
consciousness is the result of a long separation form China, and basically indicates that
the Taiwanese fear that they have something to lose if the status quo in the Taiwan straits
is changed. This has nothing to do with independence aspirations, and there are different
forces behind the independence movement.36
In general the Soong-Hu meeting was much more concerned with concrete cross-straits
politics than the Lien meeting, and clearly aimed at Chen Shui-bian, whereas the Lien visit
was concerned with nationalistic and historical issues. Soong´s role as a go-between was
obvious, and most of the messages of the communiqué were aimed at President Chen.
Soong also conveyed a message from president Chen to Hu Jintao, though Chen himself
gave confusing signals, to say the least, of whether or not Soong had a message to take to
Hu. The message according to Soong was, that President Chen will not push Taiwan
independence through referendum.37
During the visit Soong tried to portray himself as being in the middle in the Taiwan China
dispute. He highlighted the Taiwanese consciousness, but at the same time also
emphasised the ROC state. During his speech in Qinghua University, he mentioned
Taiwan more than 50 times, but in the final communiqué of the visit strongly opposed
Taiwan independence. He also made constant remarks of the coming Chinese era and the
rejuvenation of China during his visit and made clear that the Taiwan question should be
32 People´s Daily Online 11.5.2005. Similar statements were quoted in the mainland media by Soong after his talks
with Hu Jintao.
33 ibid.
34 His most controversial proposition was the division of China into seven federal states, which is something proposed
by the Japanese right-wing military in the 1930´s. Alexander Lu Ya-li XXXXX
35 “Soong visits millennial academy in hometown”, China Daily, Myay 10, 2005
36 “Soong; Taiwan consciousness not Taiwan independence”, China Daily, May 11, 2005
37 XXXX
9
solved by the Chinese only.38 These statements well summarise his balancing act between
China and Taiwan, and the DPP and the KMT.
Conclusion
Of the practical results most significant were the establishment of direct channels of
communication across the straits for problem solving between the parties. How these
channels will be used and for what purpose is another matter, but as such their
establishment is an important step towards lowering the tensions across the Taiwan
straits. If the parties will truly establish regular discussion mechanisms across the straits,
substantial changes in the cross-straits policies are possible.
The significant similarities of the visits were that both Lien and Soong publicly announced
their recognition of the 1992 consensus and sided with the CCP in opposing Taiwan
independence. Both parties also spoke highly of the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation,
which perhaps indicates sympathies towards mainland Chinese nationalism and nationbuilding as opposed to Taiwan independence. Moreover, the political results were very
close the joint-statement of the OTA and TAO in May 2004. Many of the goals mentioned
in the statement are confirmed in the communiqués resulting from the visits, including
even “building military trust” , and as such indicate closer cooperation between CCP, KMT
and the PFP than before.
On the foreign policy front it might be tempting to interpret Lien-Soong visits also as a
statement directed at Japan and the US as much as to the domestic audience. Especially
Soong´s emphasis on solving the Taiwan question only by Chinese and linking Taiwan
independence movement with Japan give support to this line of thought. The PFP has
been more radical in its pro-unification policies than the KMT previously, and perhaps it
was only stating what the KMT does not want to state explicitly. The KMT for obvious
reasons has not been positive towards Japan, either, but has not so openly lumped
together Japan and Taiwan independence.
Even if the practical results as such were rather meagre, the political implications of the
visits are much more far reaching. After all the most important political aspect of the visits
is that they took place at all. In themselves they represent a remarkable step in the
improvement of cross-straits communications.
AFTERMATH IN TAIWAN
The most obvious loser of these visits was president Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. The
opposition visits relegated him to the sidelines in mainland communications, and this had a
negative impact on his image in Taiwan. His apparent confusion over the visits was
reflected in the numerous about faces in commenting the KMT-PFP trips. To make things
worse he gave two long interviews in television condemning all other parties and their
policies in handling the visits. He even managed to anger Lee Teng-hui, who he criticised
during his interviews.39 Internally the DPP was in chaos during the visits and many proindependence members of the party left for the TSU, while two prominent business
38 According to newspaper reports his speech was rewritten many tiems on the preceding night by his assistants. SCMP
XX
39 SCMP 7.5.2005 “Chen tries to prevent a party backlash over mainland visits”
10
leaders previously connected to Chen announced their resignation from the party in a
high-profile manner.40
Critique against Chen in the party increased rapidly, and his approval and support ratings
among voters dropped markedly. 41 Chen´s contradictory statements and constantly
changing opinions about the opposition’s visits confused his supporters and the DPP, and
what is more significant, were closely following US statements of the visits. In many
instances Chen first denounced an event or statement by the opposition and the CCP, but
as the US usually gave moderately positive comments on the developments, Chen´s
comments also followed suit. According to many analysts, the US influence behind Chen´s
about faces was obvious.42
Domestically the DPP now faces a difficult task. If the KMT and PFP do as they promised
to do in their joint-statements with CCP, the DPP will have a mountain to climb in the
elections. The KMT and PFP will continue to maintain dialogue with the CCP, whereas the
DPP will be excluded from this dialogue. If the two negotiating parties bring home concrete
concessions from the mainland side, i.e. like the broader expansion of agricultural
products and liberating the tourist traffic from mainland to Taiwan, the DPP government
has nothing to counter these with. According to Lien Chan, the KMT and CCP already
agreed to hold forums on peaceful development and cross-straits economic and trade ties
under a party-to-party mechanism.43 What’s more, James Soong promised to work for the
fulfilment of the CCP-PFP communiqué proposals together with the KMT in Taiwan. “The
PFP will not hesitate in working together with the KMT to supervise the authorities [in
Taiwan] and to defend the fundamental interest of the Taiwanese” Soong said in Beijing.44
Of course the KMT or the PFP can not sign any agreements concerning the state or
violate the legitimacy of the ROC government in Taiwan, but these party-to-party forums
can produce results conducive to cross-straits stability or concessions from the mainland
side which do not require any actions or sanctioning from the ROC government. These are
results that neither the government nor the DPP can do anything about, but will still have a
direct impact on the cross-straits exchanges. These concessions will be credited to the
KMT/PFP axis, where as the only development credited to the DPP in this kind of crossstraits dialogue would perhaps be the continued military build-up on the Chinese side of
the Taiwan straits.
KMT and PFP also take part in the highest legislation in Taiwan and KMT is a former
government party. If these parties continue negotiations with the CPP, Taiwanese
domestic politics are severely undermined. If the pan-blue camp would have regular
channels of communication with the CCP, the Chinese side would be able to acquire first
hand information of Taiwanese legislative politics and perhaps even influence the
Taiwanese side legislation. If we take this train of thought even further, the pan-blue camp
could perhaps be in closer co-operation with the mainland Chinese side than with the
40 SCMP 2.4.2005 “Second tycoon distance´s himself from island´s leader”
41 Opinion polls conducted immediately after the visits indicated a loss of support for Chen Shui-bian from 43% to
38%. China Times XXX
42 See for example See SCMP 7.5.2005 “US envoy to Taipei in talks with Lien Chan.”; SCMP 7.5.2005 “Wary leaders
cosy up over Taiwan gambit”, SCMP 7.5.2005 “Chen tries to prevent a party backlash over mainland visits”; See for
example SCMP 7.4.2005 “President’s treason threat absurd, says KMT”; Taipei Times 8.4.2005 “KMT´s trip violated
the law”; ”Chen backs KMT chief´s Beijing trip” 25.4.2005.
43 SCMP 3.5.2005 ”Taipei must prepare for peace talks, says Lien”
44 No independence, no military: CPC-PFP Communque, China Daily May 12, 2005
11
DPP. This is perhaps a bit far fetched, but nevertheless a possibility. If the parties continue
to maintain contact with CPP, what can the government do? Party-to-party contacts are
normal and even encouraged in international politics, but in this case the situation is
perhaps somewhat more complicated.45
Moreover, as the Chinese side has at the orders of Hu Jintao abandoned the isolation
policy of the DPP officials and welcomes any mid-ranking party members to China for
talks, what happens if the DPP rank-and-file start visiting China against the wishes of the
party leadership?46 In the long run the DPP has to come up with substantial policy
initiatives towards mainland China that are really aimed at improving the situation and not
only aimed at promoting independence. If the KMT/PFP continue their productive contacts
with mainland China and DPP can not produce any concrete results in improving the
situation, the party will most likely start to lose ground to the current opposition parties.
If the DPP continues to push independence, the loyalty of the Taiwanese supporters will
be put to test as the Chinese pressure mounts. The most obvious risk then would be
further polarization of the situation in Taiwan and the radicalization of the independence
movement. These developments might cause politically inflammable situations, but their
development also depends on the foreign policy positions of the US. Given the current US
statements on the opposition’s visits and the indirect pressure towards Chen, perhaps not
even the US side would look favourably on independence leaning policy initiatives from
President Chen.
The politics of Chen Shui-bian have indeed produced remarkable results. Never before
have none of the parties on the island so prominently sided with the CCP and mainland
Chinese political opinion. The former enemies CCP and KMT are now friends. The ROC
state, the other China, the competitor and arch-rival, once the main enemy of the PRC, is
now the key to cross-straits stability and political status quo. The sudden friendship of the
pan-blue camp and the CPP will have a major impact on the cross-straits policies. Perhaps
Taiwan will be more divided than ever politically, but the Taiwanese voters will have a
bigger say in the cross-straits policies than ever through the 2007 parliamentary elections
and the 2008 presidential elections. If the pan blue camp is the winner in the elections,
China and Taiwan might approach each other rather fast, if not, the DPP has to adapt its
China policy to the changing cross-straits political environment. The ball is now definitely
on the court of the Taiwanese voters and the DPP.
45 In fact the pan-blue camp is already taking a stand according to joint communiqués in the arms procurement bill,
which has been blocked by the KM T and PFP for a number of times now in Taiwan Legislative Yuan.
46 LamXXX, SCMP 6.5.2005 “Chen tries to soothe unhappy party faithful”