NIDS Commentary No. 48
The “Pakistan Factor” in China-Indian Relations
Asia and Africa Division, Regional Studies Department
Masahiro Kurita
No. 48
Preface
July 29, 2015
Indian relations. Against a backdrop of the rapid
Since the 1990s, the China-India relationship has
deterioration of India-Pakistan relations and the
been characterized by two underlying and contradictory
increasing closeness between China and Pakistan, China
trends. On the cooperative side, they have deepened
has increasingly been entangled in the core issues
economic cooperation and formed a united front in
between India and Pakistan ― namely Kashmir and
asserting their rights as “developing nations” on global
terrorism.
issues. On the other hand, there has also been the non-
This means that there is a growing need to
cooperative aspect of their relationship stemming from
understand the “Pakistan factor” in order to predict the
some controversial issues. Nonetheless, since late
future trajectory of the Sino-Indian relationship. In this
2000s, the latter aspect has become more visible,
commentary I will explain the recent development of
mainly due to the re-emergence of the territorial
this issue, up to July 2015.
dispute.
Among several thorny issues in their relationship, the
1. The deterioration of India-Pakistan relations
territorial dispute is attracting attention most, followed
Understandably, the worse India-Pakistan relations
by trade deficit and maritime competition over the
get and the closer China and Pakistan become, the more
Indian Ocean SLOC. However, the “Pakistan factor”
serious the implication of the “Pakistan factor” in the
―Chinese various supports to Pakistan― is sometimes
China-India relationship. From this standpoint, I would
considered the most serious point of controversy
like to take a look at the status of India-Pakistan
between India and China. India and Pakistan have been
embroiled in an intractable conflict since there
independence mainly over the territorial sovereignty on
Kashmir. China and Pakistan, on the other hand, have
forged
a
close
relationship
sometimes
even
characterized as a “de-facto alliance,” mainly based on
relations and China-Pakistan relations over the past
year.
After the relatively stable period from 2003 to 2007,
the Mumbai terror attack in November 2008, committed
by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a terrorist outfit allegedly
supported by the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), rocked India-Pakistan relations and stalled the
the fact that both countries have territorial disputes with
peace process. But after the attack no other incident that
India. India has expressed serious concerns about this
could seriously deteriorate the relationship occurred,
relationship.
and Indian Prime Minister Modi who took office in
There have recently been signs that merit serious
May 2014 showed willingness toward rapprochement
attention with regards to the “Pakistan factor” in Sino-
with Pakistan, which was reciprocated by Pakistani
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NIDS Commentary No.49
Prime Minister Sharif. It raised expectations that the
soured their relationship further. But what made the
relationship would improve.
matter worse was the cross-border raid conducted by
However, when the Pakistan High Commissioner in
Indian Special Forces against camps of armed insurgent
New Delhi met the leaders of the pro-Pakistan separatist
groups based in the India-Myanmar border area. This
group of Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) in August
raid was retaliation for the ambush carried out by those
2014, India cancelled the scheduled meeting between
militants against Indian troops in the north-eastern part
the foreign secretaries in protest, and their relationship
of India in early June.
began to deteriorate again. Even up to this event, both
In the wake of the raid, an Indian senior official
sides had continuously engaged in sporadic cross-
implicated that they might conduct a similar raid on
border shelling along the Line of Control in Kashmir,
another border, including the Line of Control in
showing that the foundation of deterioration did exist.
Kashmir. Since it was the very option that had been
At the United Nations General Assembly in September,
contemplated within the Indian strategic community for
Modi stated that he was ready to engage in a dialogue
quite a long time as a possible retaliatory option against
with the country in a terror-free environment and
terror attacks by Pakistan-based militant groups, this
implicitly accuse Pakistan of its support for terrorist
remark evoked harsh criticism from the Pakistan
groups. Meanwhile, Pakistan criticized India for calling
government. Its interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan issued
off the scheduled foreign secretary-level talks.
a warning, “Pakistan is not like Myanmar.”
In the early 2015, some efforts were made to revive
In an attempt to de-escalate the situation, Modi and
the dialogue between their foreign offices. In April,
Sharif met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation
however, Lahore High Court suspended the detention
Organization (SCO) Summit on July 10th. Although
order against Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, who was the
this meeting attracted attention as it was agreed that PM
leader of the LeT and the alleged mastermind of the
Modi would visit Pakistan to attend the South Asia
Mumbai Terror Attacks, and set him free. India
Association
vehemently protested this move. On the other hand, in
Summit in 2016, it is not clear whether this move will
May, Pakistan strongly accused India when its Defence
actually lead to rapprochement. Pakistan’s provision of
Minister Manohar Parrikar suggested, as a possible
voice samples of Lakhvi, which was included in the
countermeasure against Pakistan’s proxy war strategy,
Joint Declaration, seems improbable. Furthermore,
to “neutralize terrorists through terrorists.” Although the
National Security Advisor of Pakistan Sartaj Aziz
truth is not clear, there are prevailing beliefs in Pakistan
stirred some controversies when he stated after the talks
that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Indian
that unless the Kashmir issue, which was not clearly
external intelligence agency, is supporting the anti-
indicated in the Joint Statement, would be on the
government militancy in Balochistan and the Federally
agenda, Pakistan would not start a formal dialogue
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and thereby
process with India. On 15th, the Pakistan Army
Parrikar’s remark was interpreted as an official
announced that they had shot down an Indian
recognition by the Indian government of such an
surveillance drone in Pakistan Administered Kashmir
involvement. Against this backdrop, one of the major
(PAK). India denied this. Given these development,
opposition parties in Pakistan, the Muttahida Qaumi
significant improvement of India-Pakistan relations is
Movement (MQM), was embroiled in controversy over
not so easy.
the party’s alleged fomentation of violence in Karachi
with funding received from RAW.
for
Regional
Cooperation
(SAARC)
2. China and Pakistan getting closer
PM Modi’s speech at Dhaka University in June,
In contrast to India-Pakistan relations, the intimate
which referred to Pakistan promoting terrorism in India,
relationship between China and Pakistan has become
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NIDS Commentary No. 49
much closer in recent years. The most prevalent
largest-ever bilateral arms deal to purchase several
example is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
conventional submarines. Given the country’s technical
(CPEC) which was officially announced during the
and financial limitation, it is deemed highly likely that
Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Pakistan in April
Pakistan will convert some of these latest conventional
2015. Under the CPEC, China and Pakistan plan to
submarines to operational platforms for nuclear-tipped
build transportation infrastructure between Kashgar,
cruise missiles. In addition, Khushab nuclear complex,
Xinjiang and the Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the coast of
Pakistan’s main plutonium production site, was
the Arabian Sea, which was constructed and now
constructed with Chinese support. The plutonium is
operated by China, along with large scale power
necessary for making small warheads suitable for cruise
stations and optical fibre networks in the surrounding
missiles.
area. It is expected in Pakistan that Chinese $46 billion
Intelligence sources observed that Pakistan had been
investment on this project will transform Pakistan into a
developing new types of conventional submarines
regional economic hub.
capable of launching 1,500 km nuclear-tipped cruise
Moreover, military cooperation between China and
According
to
a
media
report,
Indian
missiles with Chinese assistance.
Pakistan has also been progressing steadily, especially
On the civil nuclear side, China is an indispensable
in the field of defense equipment and technology, which
partner for Pakistan because the US is not inclined to
has a much longer history than the economic
sign a nuclear deal equivalent to the one with India. In
cooperation between the two countries. According to
addition to the construction of Chashma 3 and Chashma
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
4 nuclear reactors since 2011, China has been helping
(SIPRI), China stands as the largest arms supplier to
Pakistan to build two other reactors in Karachi.
Pakistan between 2010 and 2014, accounting for 51%
Although China’s assistance is criticized as a blatant
of the total weapons imported. Most recently, in the
violation of the guidelines of the Nuclear Supplier
wake of President Xi’s visit in April, it was announced
Group (NSG), of which China is a member, China
that China would provide 50 joint JF-17 Thunder
insists that the cooperation with Pakistan is not
fighters to Pakistan over the next three years, and then
inconsistent with the guidelines since it can be
additional 60 fighters would be supplied though the date
grandfathered
of delivery was not clear.
agreement preceding to China’s joining NSG in 2004.
through
the
2003
China-Pakistan
However, the most symbolic aspect of their
Despite these developments, it is sometimes pointed
relationship is nuclear cooperation, including both civil
out that Sino-Pakistan rapprochement would be
and
to
constrained by the issue of Uyghur terrorism, which has
Pakistan’s nuclear program dates back to 1980s. Such
been deemed as a potential cause of friction between
assistance may have included provision of blueprints for
China and Pakistan. However, it seems improbable that
nuclear weapon designs. What is currently attracting
this issue makes serious trouble under present
attention is the possibility of China assisting Pakistan in
circumstances. Although Chinese concern on anti-
introducing sea-based nuclear deterrent, responding to
government Uyghur militant groups having training
India’s progress on development of its indigenous
camps in Pakistani tribal areas may still remain,
SSBN.
Pakistan’s political and military leaders are determined
military
dimensions.
Chinese
assistance
With regard to Pakistan’s effort to acquire sea-based
to eradicate at all cost the Tehrik-I Taliban Pakistan
nuclear deterrent, the role of Chinese assistance is much
(TTP), the largest anti-government militant outfits in
more significant compared to the cases of Pakistan’s
the country, and some other foreign militant groups
land-based and aircraft-based nuclear forces. Pakistan
aligned with it, including Uyghur militants.
has reportedly been negotiating with China over a
While some terrorist groups the US and India have
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NIDS Commentary No.49
asked Pakistan to crack down on are “strategic assets”
organization of the LeT, into the UN Security Council’s
for its Army and ISI against India, there is no incentive
terror list.
for them to protect militant outfits attacking Pakistan
state, like TTP or affiliated foreign groups.
Nonetheless, China’s involvement in these IndiaPakistani core issues has been remarkably deepening
It may be still inevitable for China to feel a certain
recently. First, the CPEC entails some large-scale
degree of dissatisfaction with Pakistan on this issue
construction projects in PAK, which India views as part
because complete eradication of Uyghur militants from
of its sovereign territory. Hence, India has repeatedly
Pakistan’s territory may be beyond their capacity. But,
conveyed its concern to China over this issue. The
as long as Pakistan commits to crackdown on them, it
CPEC project includes a large-scale expansion of the
would be reasonable for China to continue its
Karakoram Highway, and construction of special
collaboration with Pakistan on counterterror efforts,
economic zones and industrial parks, hydroelectric
rather than threaten and pressurize the country.
power stations, roads and railways in PAK. Although
3. China’s entanglement in the India-Pakistan
core issues
Chinese has invested in this region before the CPEC,
the sheer scale of the project has evoked India’s strong
sense of concern, which is shown by the fact that PM
Such situations in India-Pakistan and China Pakistan
Modi strongly raised this issue and termed the project
relations have profound implication on the “Pakistan
“unacceptable” during the summit meeting with
factor” in Sino-Indian relations. In broad terms the
President Xi in May.
“Pakistan factor” would encompass China’s various
What makes them more complicated is the fact that in
kinds of supports for Pakistan related to the India-
Pakistan,
including
statements
from
government
Pakistan conflict, but what can have a serious
authorities, there are prevailing discourses that India is
ramification is the fact that China has been increasingly
trying to obstruct the CPEC and RAW is at frontline of
entangled in Kashmir and terrorism issues, which are
the attempt: a new division being set up within the
central to the recent India-Pakistan dispute.
RAW to interfere with the CPEC, and Chinese authority
Currently, the Chinese declared position on the issue
issuing a warning on possible interference against the
of territorial sovereignty of Kashmir is that it is a
project by the agency. Some reports even said that the
bilateral matter to be solved by India and Pakistan
authorities suspected involvement of RAW in Karachi-
through peaceful means, and Chinese government
bus attack in May. The Ismaili community targeted in
doesn’t officially side with either country. However, it
this attack belongs to Gilgit-Baltistan region in PAK,
does not mean that the government has never been
the main artery of the CPEC.
involved in these core issues of India and Pakistan.
Since the major part of transport infrastructure under
When China and Pakistan demarcated their border in
the CPEC is supposed to pass through the restive
1963, India raised an objection because this border
Balochistan province where armed insurgents are
demarcation entailed provisionally transferring a part of
active, China concerns the safety and security of
PAK to China. Moreover, around 2010, India began to
Chinese workers operating there. Authenticity of these
show concern on Chinese PLA’s increasingly noticeable
discourses is not clear, and, even though they contain a
activities in PAK. Besides, possibly as an indirect
modicum of truth, some elements of propaganda cannot
support for Pakistan, China has issued stapled visas,
be ruled out. However, regardless of the truth, if a
instead of stamped visas, to the residents of IAK. With
terrorist attack targeting Chinese nationals was to occur
regard to terrorism, prior to the Mumbai terror attacks
in Pakistan, it can easily be imagined that the Pakistan
in 2008, on multiple occasions China blocked India’s
government will publicize Indian involvement, which
bid to include the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), a front
will inevitable drag China into the ensuing blame game
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NIDS Commentary No. 49
between India and Pakistan.
Secondly, Chinese attempts to frustrate India’s efforts
considered as the one potentially having
significant
implication in future.
to question Pakistan’s position on terrorism in
Since the 1990s there has been a growing belief
multilateral fora have become remarkable recently.
within the Indian strategic community that Pakistan’s
Since December 2014, there have been at least three
alleged use of its “proxy” against India is a typical case
such instances, including Chinese placing technical hold
of the “stability-instability paradox”: under its nuclear
on an India’s request to add the head of the Hizb-ul-
deterrent, Pakistan has been supporting anti-Indian
Mujahideen, a PAK-based militant organization, to the
militants in not only IAK but also mainland India,
UN sanction list in May 2015. In addition, at the end of
without fearing India’s retaliation with its superior
June, China blocked an Indian motion to question
conventional forces. From this perspective, assisting the
Pakistan on the release of Lakhvi at the UN Sanctions
Pakistan’s development of its nuclear deterrent is
Committee based on the UN Security Council
directly linked to encouraging the country’s support for
Resolution 1267, due to lack of evidence.
terrorism.
Though, as mentioned above, it is not unprecedented
Of course, it is unlikely that China has supported
for China to block such Indian efforts, the issue of the
Pakistan’s nuclear development with the intent of
release of Lakhvi was somewhat different in its
facilitating its proxy war against India. Nonetheless,
graveness because he was an alleged mastermind of
regardless of Chinese intention, taking into account the
Mumbai. Besides, this case made a stark contrast to the
visibility of its involvement in the development of
one in the wake of the Mumbai terror in 2008, where
Pakistani naval nuclear capabilities, and
China acquiesced to designating the JuD and Lakhvi as
policymakers’ belief in the stability-instability paradox,
terrorist under the resolution 1267. Moreover, this
it would be inevitable for India to consider that China is
occurred within only a month and a half after Xi and
partly to blame if the security situation of IAK
Modi had discussed enhancing their counterterror
deteriorates or a spectacular terror attack occurs.
Indian
cooperation. PM Modi indeed voiced India’s strong
In recent years, partly due to Pakistan’s own war
concern to Chinese President when he met Xi ahead of
against terrorism, the law and order situation in IAK has
the BRICS and SCO summit in July.
greatly improved compared to the beginning of the
In response, India successfully blocked China’s
2000s, and since the Mumbai terror, there have been no
attempt to insulate its ally Pakistan from a terror-related
terror attacks on a similar scale to Mumbai or the 2001
charge at the end of June. At a meeting of the Financial
attack against Indian Parliament. However, unless the
Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental
Kashmir dispute is resolved, it is inconceivable that the
organization tasked to combat money laundering and
Pakistan Army will completely abandon its proxy war
terror financing, China tried to save Pakistan from
strategy against India, and if the Army and ISI were to
scrutiny on its compliance with UN financial sanctions
intensify their support for militancy, Sino-Indian
against terrorism through an associated body of the
relations would be severely damaged.
FATF, but India, with the support of the US, managed to
In summary, the triangular structure in which China’s
ensure that Pakistan would be monitored by the
deepening involvement with the core issues of the
organization.
India-Pakistan conflict has adverse effects on Sino-
If these are considered as issues already and
Indian
relations
is
increasingly
and
undeniably
gradually having adverse effects on Sino-Indian
reinforced. Therefore, although the pace and extent of
relations, Chinese assistance for Pakistan’s sea-based
“damage accumulation” is not certain, it seems that
nuclear deterrent and the supposed linkage between the
deterioration of Sino-Indian relations originated from
assistance and India-Pakistan terror issues could be
the “Pakistan factor” is inevitable.
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NIDS Commentary No.49
At the same time, however, the fact should be taken
bargaining. Pakistan can provide various “values” for
into consideration that China has strong incentive to
China even apart from checking India, like serving as
control this triangular setting. In addition to its
one of the main arteries of the “One Belt, One Road
emphasis on stable and mutually beneficial relationship
(OBOR)” initiative, and facilitating China’s role in the
with India, China does not share the Pakistan’s goal to
Afghan reconciliation process. The extent that the
make IAK incorporated into Pakistan state.
negative impact of the “Pakistan factor” will have on
What is strategically desirable for China is the
existence of the “controlled” conflict situation between
Sino-India relations will partly depend on this alliance
bargaining between China and Pakistan.
the two countries, which means the conflict not only
keeps Indian attention diverted to the Pakistan threat,
but also is restrained from turning into a military
Conclusion
As for the non-cooperative aspect of Sino-Indian
be
relations, the territorial dispute tends to attract much
emboldened by its deepening relationship with China
wider attention. However, the “Pakistan factor” is more
and resort to some reckless and aggressive behaviors,
complex due to the involvement of an independent third
i.e. excessively intensifying its proxy war against India,
party actor pursuing its own objective, and its potential
China would feel compelled to restrain its ally.
impact
confrontation.
Hence,
if
Pakistan
were
to
On the other hand, such a “China putting the brakes
on”
scenario
is
not
preferable
for
Pakistani
decisionmakers who want to leverage Chinese backup
on
China-Indian
relations
is
gradually
increasing. Given these points, the “Pakistan factor”
deserves much more attention in the debates on the
China-Indian relationship.
as much as possible, and this means a bargaining
situation exists between China and Pakistan. While
(Submitted on July 21, 2015)
there is no doubt that Pakistan is in a relatively
vulnerable position, it does not necessarily mean that
China holds a dictatorial position in this alliance
The views expressed in this column are solely those of authors, and do
not represent the official views of NIDS, the MOD or the Japanese
Government. Please contact us at the following regarding any
Masahiro Kurita
questions, comments or requests you may have.
Asia and Africa Division,
Planning and Coordination Office, The National Institute for Defense
Regional
Studies
Department
Field of study: Nuclear deterrence theory,
India-Pakistan relations
Studies
Telephone (direct): 03-3713-5912
Telephone (general) 03-5721-7005
Fax: 03-3713-6149
E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.nids.go.jp
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