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The Uneven Spread of Democracy:
An Assessment of Global Trends
Thomas Sherlock
Although democracy as an idea has achieved public approbation in most regions of the
world, it has clearly suffered in implementation in recent decades. While the number of fully
authoritarian regimes has declined significantly since the “Third Wave of Democracy” began in
1974,1 many of the seeming transitions to democracy since then, if not still-born, have stalled or
come to exist as hybrid regimes – political systems that share both democratic and authoritarian
traits. Important factors that have strengthened this negative trend is the declining commitment
of Western democracies to democracy promotion as well as the devaluation of Western
democracy in many countries as an ideological “brand.”
The purpose of this short paper is to provide a basic analytical framework to support
assessments of the prospects for democratization in nondemocratic countries, as well as enable
sound analysis of the political health of fledgling or established democracies. Hopefully, these
tools will also provide some guidance as to the type and utility of U.S. policies designed to
advance democracy globally.
Whether an authoritarian regime is replaced by a stable democratic system or whether it
de-democratizes or perhaps remains authoritarian, depends on the distribution and strength of
democracy-supportive and democracy-inhibiting factors. Five broad variables, which can either
1
According to Samuel Huntington, the First Wave began with Jacksonian Democracy in 1828 and the
abolition of property qualification for voting. Spreading to Latin America and Europe, the First Wave
encompassed perhaps thirty countries before ending in the 1920s. The Second Wave began in 1943,
receiving its impetus, first from World War II and the then from the era of decolonization. Both the first
and second waves were followed by respective “reverse” waves which saw the installation or restoration of
autocratic rule in countries which had established at least minimally democratic institutions. Huntington,
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20 th Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
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support or undermine democracy, are of particular importance in determining the prospects for
democratization.
They are:
1.
Socio-economic development
2.
Political institutions
3.
Political culture
4.
Social structure
5.
External environment
It is doubtful that a country undergoing democratization – a process that can ultimately
fail or perhaps last for years before a stage of “consolidated” democracy is achieved – will enjoy
significant supports in each of these variables. Yet a polity that is less endowed across most or
all of these categories is unlikely to develop or sustain democratic values and institutions.
Let us consider each in turn.
Socio-economic Development
Theories of modernization have gained significant currency over the past two decades for
their identification of some of the foundational causes of democratization. As two scholars noted
succinctly, “Beyond a certain point, economic development makes it difficult to avoid
democratization.”2 This is so because industrialization sets in motion other aspects of social
development which taken together support democratization. These changes, which include
urbanization, higher education, more complex employment patterns that demand independent
2
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know About
Modernization.” Foreign Affairs, March-April 2009.
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thinking, and the rise of affluent middle classes – gradually but inevitably cause shifts in the
prevailing system of values. Society slowly moves from traditional to secular-rational values
which emphasize inter-personal trust, autonomy from political authority, and the ability to
participate in decision-making that affects society.
Although the level of per capita GDP in a country is a useful shorthand method in
estimating the dominant value structure of a society – i.e., whether the regime is authoritarian or
democratic – modernization theory is not deterministic. It recognizes that prevailing religious or
ethnic cultures of a country may either complement or work against the values generated by
modernization. Yet over time economic development transforms even resistant traditional
cultures by generating norms that privilege democracy and self-expression. At the same time,
modernization is not a linear process – it can be thrown back to earlier stages as a result of war or
other causes of social dislocation. War, including civil war, in the Middle East has clearly
undermined the prospects for modernization in countries like Iraq and Syria, leading not only to
economic distress but to a re-emphasis on values of survival – and away from self-expression,
tolerance, and inter-personal trust. The same logic holds true for polities controlled by effective
and ruthless dictators who can suppress mass demands for greater freedoms for a very long time.
What are the practical, policy implications of modernization theory? Modernization
theory suggests the appearance of more peaceful inter-state relations and more tolerant domestic
polities if development continues to advance. As economic development drives the emergence of
democratic values and eventually democratization, it is possible to expect, at some point,
important changes for the better in countries such as China, the educated middle class of which is
burgeoning. Barrington Moore’s dictum “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” still seems to hold
true. Modernization theory also suggests that Washington’s current policies towards Iran and
Cuba, which seek to enable economic development within certain external constraints, are sound.
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But modernization theory also suggests that policies that seek to export democracy must
be grounded in an awareness of conditions conducive to democratization. The heady theories of
“transitology” – the study of democratization, particularly in the last two decades of the
twentieth century -- were influenced by the unexpected, rapid collapse of communism in the late
1980s to diminish the importance of “preconditions” to democratization, such as levels of socioeconomic development. Modernization theory suggests that transitions to democracy can be
exceedingly difficult in underdeveloped countries even if they are under the benevolent
occupation of the military forces of advanced liberal democracies.
Political Institutions
Even in a society which increasingly embraces liberal values, democratization can
be derailed if elites do not craft appropriate political institutions. Such political
institutions cover a broad range of organizations, from legislatures and political parties, to
executives and courts. Effective political institutions are like shock absorbers,
particularly in a new democracy: they enable the new system to weather the turbulence
created by diverse and often contending political groups flooding into long-empty civic
and political arenas. Ineffective political institutions, unable to mediate the often
conflicting demands of society in newly established democratic conditions, inadvertently
increase the level of societal frustration and vulnerability, often to the point that politics
takes the form of violent protest.
Despite the dangers attending poor institutional choices, new democracies are
often tempted to take the wrong road. In the assessment of many scholars, one poor
choice is the selection of a presidential system of government. The attractions of a
presidential system from a systemic perspective are obvious: the centralization of power
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theoretically enables the executive to claim to represent all citizens in a polity that may
be divided by regional antagonisms and have only a weak sense of national identity. The
difficult business of creating a new political system and fostering economic growth
would also seem easier under a presidential system than under a parliamentary one,
which may be prone to deadlock.
Even if chosen with the national interest in mind, a presidential system, due to its
winner-take-all logic, excludes a significant fraction of elites and mass publics from
exercising any measure of political power, with no possibility of reversing this condition
until several years into the future. By their very nature, presidential systems undermine
representative government in other ways. Existing alongside powerful presidencies,
weak legislatures are made even more ineffectual because the minimal power afforded
the institution dissuades talented individuals from seeking public office with low payoffs
in political prestige and influence. Executive bureaucracies tend to flourish while a
political class, so necessary for effective democratic governance, suffers decline.
Presidential systems are also not good for clean government. From the perspective of
self-regarding elites, a presidential system enables corrupt incumbents to extract high
rents from the state while more easily concealing their behavior.
While parliamentary systems lower the stakes of political combat, enabling a
degree of power-sharing, or at least proximity to power and the surveillance of the
leading party, scholars argue that more institutional reform is necessary if a new
democracy is to survive. Checks and balances against the abuse of power, whether in a
presidential or parliamentary system, must be established in both the civil and political
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arenas (including independent courts, strong parties, freedom of the press, robust unions,
and human rights organizations, etc).3
Ethnic fragmentation has long represented a significant threat not only to new
democracies but to established ones as well. Spain, the United Kingdom, and Iraq are
just a few of the countries where the existence of the state itself is threatened to different
degrees, a condition that places new and established democratic processes under
significant strain. Although political institutions in the form of power-sharing
arrangements are often invoked as effective means to counter this danger, the attentive
observer must notice not only previous successes and failures of such reforms but also
calculate the conditions under which they might succeed in new cases. The lessons of the
recent past are ambiguous. Power-sharing seems to have reduced the threat of separatism
in Quebec, while devolution in the UK may have actually empowered and emboldened
the Scottish National Party. In the classic example of Belgium, power-sharing
arrangements seem to be fraying, as they are within the UK in Northern Ireland. In the
end, the central question is whether a state, under the threat of ethnic fragmentation, can
summon sufficient legitimacy and intelligence to craft institutions that foster
democratization or keep an established democratic system in business.
Social Structure
Social structure is an omnibus variable that includes class, race and ethnicity, and
religion. The categories of social structure often overlap, if imperfectly, with the other
variables under review. For example, the category of social class is related to the variable
of socio-economic development in that the development of the middle class is often
3
Ethan Kapstein and Nathan Converse, Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, no. 4 (October 2008), pp. 57-68.
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viewed as the primary force driving democratization. Yet it is also true that middle
classes throughout the world have often supported authoritarian rule because it was
viewed as in their self interest. In this regard, China comes to mind as does Russia. How
long the middle class in whole or part will support nondemocratic rule in a particular
country requires some informed speculation grounded in historical comparison.
Similarly, the working class has not always played the historical role ascribed to it by
Karl Marx and other socialist thinkers, often propping up the very dictatorships they were
expected to topple through revolution.
Whether race and ethnicity are serious impediments to democratization depends
in part on the spatial configuration of contending groups as well as their relative size and
economic, social, and political strengths. Long-standing inter-ethnic grievances or
traditions of cooperation are also important is trying to make sense of the prospects for
inter-ethnic cooperation or discord in new democracies. Even if racial and ethnic
grievances are deep, power-sharing may alleviate tensions and allow democratization to
proceed. Yet as Horowitz points out, consociational agreements are by nature fragile –
over time dominant ethnic groups tire of accommodating minorities, particularly if the
crisis which prompted compromise and institutional reform has passed.
Religion is the last major component of the category of social structure. Whether
religion supports or impedes democratization requires careful examination of individual
cases, usually over time. Scholars had long considered Catholicism and countries with
largely Catholic populations to be unlikely platforms for democratization. The
institutional and cultural attributes of traditional Catholicism, including hierarchy and
regimentation, were said to comprise important, almost insuperable barriers to liberalism.
Yet the Carnation Revolution in Catholic Portugal in 1974 set off the Third Wave of
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democratization, which is still underway, even if it has recently suffered stagnation.
Catholicism also provided the institutional and normative opposition to communism in
Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland. Equally important, Catholicism helped topple the
military dictatorships of Latin American after local religious leaders abandoned the
Church’s long-standing support for authoritarian rule on the continent.
To what extent does Islam contain the doctrinal and normative capacity to support
democratization as has Catholicism? If doctrine is sufficiently flexible, under what
conditions could Islam support democratic political reform? In which countries?
Political Culture
The variable of political culture encompasses a society’s understanding of politics
and political participation, including its conceptualization of a legitimate political system.
A political culture supportive of democratization will incline citizens both to privilege
peaceful participation in the political life of society and to believe that democracy should
be “the only game in town.” Some of the defining traits of a democratic political culture
are high levels of interpersonal trust, involvement in community and civic organizations,
peaceful political activism, tolerance of different, even heterodox, political views, and an
associated willingness to engage in political debate, compromise, and power-sharing.
Although democratic political cultures emerge through a number of socioeconomic, cultural, and political processes that are often intertwined, scholars are divided
over exactly how such values emerge. While most observers believe that modernization
is vital to the emergence of democratic cultures, other avenues are usually important and
often complementary, including democratic historical experiences as well as the
demonstration effects of democratic politics in other countries -- or in sub-cultures within
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one’s own country. Equally important, democratic elites and leaders can play a
significant role in shaping mass attitudes and values. We may note that the anticommunist, pro-democratic revolutions that swept aside the communist regimes of
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s were driven by insurgent counter-elites committed to the
peaceful installation of western forms of democracy.
This regional process of political change tended to be most successful in those
countries which were not only more modern at the time of the revolt but also had the
advantage of socialization into a liberal political culture in the period before communism.
The exposure of much of the Polish population to the relatively open political culture of
the Hapsburg regime in the 19th and early 20th century comes immediately to mind. These
three factors – effective pro-western leaders, liberal societal memories, and urbanized
middle classes who chafed under repressive communist regimes – generated the
remarkable societal upsurge that toppled the Soviet outer empire. These same factors,
powerfully reinforced by the magnetic attraction of membership in the European Union
and also NATO to some extent, enabled several of the countries of East Central Europe to
establish consolidated democracies in the following years.
Unlike the post-communist countries of eastern Europe (such as Poland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia), the states that emerged from under the rubble of the Soviet Union,
fifteen post-Soviet states in all, did not fare well, in large part because the elites and mass
publics of these new states – from Russia and Belarus to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan –
for the most part did not have significant pre-communist experience of liberal or
democratic politics to guide post-collapse democratization (the exceptions were the Baltic
states). Instead, political values were shaped by authoritarian models derived from
communism and pre-communist traditional and communal systems which privileged
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political hierarchy and societal subordination. External models, such as the democracies
of the EU, were too distant and too alien to have a significant impact. In short, location
matters, even in the era of globalization.
The burst of political activity known as the Arab Spring suffered from a similar
absence of historical experience with democracy or legitimate regional models to guide
democratization. The values of democracy – political equality, institutionalized
limitations on political power, compromise, debate, organization around common
political interests, and power-sharing – were not sufficiently part of the region’s political
culture among both elites and mass publics to sustain peaceful political change after the
eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011. Illiberal interpretations of Islam in the region
weakened the prospects for success, but so too did decades of authoritarian rule during
which society was denied exposure to liberal thought and democratic practice.
Temporarily rocked by public protest, deeply entrenched authoritarian institutions such as
the military in Egypt and the monarchical systems throughout the region either staged
successful comebacks or suppressed dissent while remaining in power.
Offsetting to some extent this antidemocratic backlash is the fact that public
opinion surveys before and after the Arab Spring reveal that the population of the region
remains supportive of democracy as a form of government, often more so than many of
the citizens in the consolidated democracies in western Europe.4 Developments in
Tunisia seem to validate the argument that democratic political culture in the region,
when joined by other supportive factors, can buoy positive change. In 2015 the Noble
Peace Prize recognized four organizations in Tunisian civil society – the National
4
Mark Tessler, et al., “New Findings on Arabs and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 23, no. 4,
(October 2012), pp. 89-103
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Dialogue Quartet -- which united to promote political processes informed by dialogue
and compromise.
A final point brings the discussion back to the United States. It is important to
consider whether the United States should develop policies designed to promote
democratic political culture abroad. But one should also take the pulse of America’s own
political culture. Is American democratic culture in decline? What is the state of the
United States’ culture of political dialogue and compromise, particularly as this culture
appears in our national political institutions and media? What can be done to improve the
quality of American democracy?
External Variables: A Tale of Different Occupations
Throughout history external factors have played a crucial role in determining the
character and quality of political regimes. For example, international trade or membership in
liberal regional organizations can help the growth of democratic values and institutions. The rise
of powerful, seemingly successful authoritarian regimes can also induce the elites in neighboring
countries to adopt antidemocratic models. The positive demonstration effects of Nazi Germany
on its smaller neighbors in the 1930s, for instance, pulled much of the region into
authoritarianism.
Preparation for war, as well as defeat or victory in conflict, powerfully shapes
democracy’s prospects. Post-WWII Germany is a quintessential example of variable effects of
defeat in war followed by regimes of occupation. Germany, particularly West Germany,
deserves extended examination because it was used by American officials and scholars as a
model of successful democratization that could be reproduced in the Middle East in the early
2000s. Instead, the case serves as an example of the complexities and pitfalls of democratization
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even in a country endowed with strong socio-cultural, ethnic, and economic conditions that
provided support for American efforts.
With Germany’s de facto territorial division in 1945, the eastern sector fell under the
harsh regime of Stalinist communism. Although conditions in the western sector were far more
supportive of democracy-building, significant obstacles were present. Trends in West German
political and civic culture during the first two post-war decades were also cause for concern,
leading respected Western scholars to doubt the viability of democracy in West Germany. In The
Civic Culture, a study based on extensive survey data and published in 1963, Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba expressed pessimism about the future of German democratization. Most
tellingly, Almond and Verba found that only 7 percent of their German respondents were proud
of Germany’s post-war “governmental and political system.”5 The authors argued that “norms
favoring active political participation are not well developed. Many Germans assume that the act
of voting is all that is required of a citizen….”6
Despite these concerns, democracy eventually struck deep roots in West Germany.
Among the most significant heralds of successful democratization was the gradual increase in
German pride in German democratic political institutions. What accounts for the gradual
deepening of German democratization? Earlier exposure to democratic politics and
institutions—in the late Imperial period and during the Weimar Republic—was obviously
important. So too was the fact that Germany suffered total defeat in World War II, and that the
occupying powers in West Germany were dedicated to transforming German political
institutions and political culture.
5
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1963, 1965), p. 199.
6
Almond and Verba, p. 312.
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These efforts were flawed in many ways and often made slow progress – many Germans
remained unconvinced that Germany’s future was with the democratic West. In a survey
conducted in 1953 over a third of the respondents said that they would support or remain
indifferent to an attempt by a new Nazi Party to seize power.
Nevertheless, such negative trends were decisively countered by the continued American
military presence in Germany which worked to devalue alternatives to the new democratic
system, thereby undermining over time the appeal of earlier German regimes, including the
Imperial and National Socialist variants.7 External factors were important in other ways in
reducing German support for political alternatives to democracy. Post-war West Germany was
increasingly embedded in a supportive trans-Atlantic community dominated by institutionalized
democracies and united by strong, overlapping political, military, and economic ties. The norms
and values of this community helped to gradually reshape German political culture, particularly
German perceptions of the external environment. The even-handed treatment of post-war West
Germany by the occupying democracies undoubtedly supported this process of positive change.
By its very success, German and also Japanese democratization helps us understand the
limits of “liberal” occupations. Other cases such as Afghanistan and Iraq did not enjoy the
significant domestic advantages present in Germany and Japan, such as a polity knit-together in
ethnic terms, as well as a civic society and industrialized economy that could be restored in
relatively short order. Most important, the American occupations in the Middle East never
enjoyed the same open-ended, determined commitment by Washington, as did Germany and
Japan, to democratize the political system and suppress antidemocratic movements.
What Is To Be Done?
7
For the polling data on German attitudes in 1953, see D.P. Conradt, “Changing German Political Culture,” in G.
Almond & S. Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), pp. 212-272, at p. 259.
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Taking stock of democracy as an institution and as a global idea seems
particularly appropriate as we approach the twenty-five anniversary of the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991. The celebration of the momentous implosion of the primary
ideological and strategic competitor to the West was imbued with triumphalism. At that
time, the global spread of democracy seemed ineluctable and the prestige of Western
liberal democracy, as expressed by American principles and institutions, unchallenged.
Yet over the coming decades it became increasingly clear that creating the foundation for
successful democratization – from well-crafted political institutions and inclusive
political cultures to vibrant socio-economic development and effective power-sharing
policies that united diverse ethnic groups – was much more difficult than at first thought.
Not only has the spread of global democratization stagnated over the past decade;
important cases of backsliding have also occurred, including Iraq, Russia, Hungary,
Afghanistan, Mali, El Salvador, and Thailand. For several of these countries, the failure
of democratization is particularly significant because they had been the focus of years of
Western public and private attention to support durable reform.
Growing doubts in the West about whether democracy aid can produce robust
results are joined by increasing questions in most regions of the world as to the value of
western democracy as a political model. To many, the political institutions of the United
States and the EU seem increasingly frayed and less viable than those of China, Russia,
or Turkey. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, alternative models to
liberal democracy seem to be emerging. Given their domestic political vulnerabilities,
many authoritarian regimes still push back against western democracy efforts. But they
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do so now with greater confidence, restricting the ambit of the programs of western
governments and NGOs.8
Democracy assistance by western states and non-profits now faces difficult
decisions as to the intensity and scope of future efforts. Not surprisingly, the challenges
of the existing environment often lead western politicians to reevaluate democracy
assistance as too costly in fiscal and political terms. After bruising experiences in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine, and Syria, many politicians now favor retrenchment and
political stability over the seemingly uncertain results of promoting full-throated
democratization.
One fundamental choice is whether efforts to promote democratization should
focus primarily on long-term socio-economic development in target countries (whether
nondemocratic or democratizing), with the expectation that modernization will gradually
generate domestic civic forces committed to lasting political change. Other programs
might carefully develop the values and organizational skills of a liberal political culture
while avoiding confrontation with incumbent elites. Overall this approach emphasizes
caution and accommodation with the regime in power, whether it is nondemocratic,
democratizing, or hybrid. Proponents might add that the United States should put its own
democratic house in order for the sake of the Republic and to provide a restored political
model for other countries.
Some proponents of democracy promotion disagree, maintaining that the costs
and risks of retrenchment may be even higher than those associated with a robust (but
sensible) promotion of democracy. They recognize that promoting democracy in Iraq
(and other countries which do not have the requisite institutions, culture, or social
8
For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Aid at 25: Time to
Choose,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 2015), pp. 59-73.
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structure to support democracy) was a fool’s errand given the scale of the problem and
the incommensurable resources and planning that the United States devoted to its
solution. Yet successful democratization in countries like Ukraine, which also requires
vast resources and skills to establish effective institutions, still seems within reach despite
Europe’s constrained political and fiscal climate.
For the proponents of placing democracy promotion higher on the policy agenda,
the example of Ukraine may be viewed as a litmus test of the health of western
democracy and the civic virtue of its elites. Failing to help Ukraine stabilize and
democratize will perpetuate a new sick man of Europe, which in turn will likely
embolden Russia and other authoritarian countries, such as China.
The failure to provide decisive assistance to Ukraine, which lies near the heart of
democratic Europe, would further tarnish the global credentials of the democratic model.
But so, too, would the persistence of political conflict and deadlock in the United States
and the rise of multiple forms of discord and stress within the EU. And if the lure of the
model further weakens, the unequal global distribution of political freedom is likely to
persist and perhaps expand in coming decades.
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Recommended Readings
Carothers, Thomas. “Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose.” Journal of Democracy,
vol. 26, no. 1 (January 2015), pp. 59-73.
Diamond, Larry. “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession.” Journal of Democracy, vol.
26, no. 1 (January 2015), pp. 141-154.
Diamond, Larry. The Spirit of Democracy. The Struggle to Build Free Societies
Throughout the World. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2008.
Fukuyama, Francis. Why is Democracy Performing So Poorly?” Journal of Democracy,
vol. 26, no. 1 (January 2015), pp. 11-20.
Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy. New York: Cambridge, 2005.
Kagan, Robert. “The Weight of Geopolitics.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1
(January 2015), pp. 21-30.
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Plattner, Marc. “Is Democracy in Decline?” Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1
(January 2015), pp. 5-10, http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Plattner26-1.pdf.
Puddington, Arch. “A Return to the Iron Fist.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 2
(April 2015), pp. 122-138,
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v026/26.2.puddington.pdf
Welzel, Christian. Freedom Rising. Human Empowerment and the Quest for
Emancipation. New York: Cambridge, 2013.
In addition to the readings recommended here, see various articles in 2014 and 2015 in
Journal of Democracy that evaluate democracy in separate regions or countries.