EscapingtheHierarchyTrap:CopticMobilizationandDemocratizationinEgypt
YosraElGendi
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
AmericanUniversityinCairo
[email protected]
MarcoPinfari
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
AmericanUniversityinCairo
[email protected]
**Firstdraft–commentswelcome,citationsnotyet**
Drafttobepresentedatthe24thIPSAWorldCongressofPoliticalScience–Poznan,23-28July2016
Theresearchonwhichthispaperisbasedisfundedbytheproject“Media,ConflictandDemocratisation”
(Principal Investigator: Katrin Voltmer, University of Leeds, UK). The project has received funding from
the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and
demonstration under grant agreement no. 613370. The authors are grateful to Rachel Naguib, Aseel
Osman,KarimaSeyamandLamaTawakkolfortheirresearchassistance.
1
TheCopticcommunityisanintegralpartofthesocialandculturalfabricofEgypt.
However,theemergenceofsectarianconflictsincethe1980shasheightenedthetensions
betweendifferentreligiouscommunitiesinthecountry.Thesetensionshaveled,ontheone
hand,tothedevelopmentofinformalbutstructuredlinksbetweentheofficialrepresentatives
oftheCopticcommunityandtheEgyptianstateand,amongtheCoptsthemselves,tothe
tighteningoftop-down,hierarchiccontroloverthemembersofthecommunitywhoare
politicallyactive.
Theeffectivenessoftheseformsofsocialandpoliticalcontrolgraduallyerodedinthe
2000s,aspartofthebroaderprocessesthroughwhichtheEgyptiansocietyopenedspacesfor
contestationthateventuallyledtothe25thJanuary2011Revolution.However,westillknow
littleaboutthewayinwhichthesedynamicsunfolded,andabouttheexactroleplayedby
specificactorsbothwithinandoutsidetheChurchhierarchy.
Thispaperaimstofillthisgapbylookingintothedevelopmentofnewformsofpolitical
mobilizationsincethemid-2000s,focusingalsoonthecontributiontotheseprocessesby
mediaoutletsandformalandinformalnewspapersrunbyCopticgroups(suchastheTheban
Legionmagazine).Byextendingtheanalysistothepost-revolutionaryperiod,itseeksto
understandtheoriginandnatureofthemainsocialmovementsthatdevelopedin2011to
promotetherightsofChristiansandreligiousminorities.
2
Egypt’sCopts
Egypt’sCoptsarethelargestnon-MuslimcommunityintheMiddleEast(Pew,2011).
TheytracetheiroriginstothepreachingofStMarktheEvangelistandcontributedsubstantially
tothedevelopmentofChristianity,boththeologicallyanddevotionally,throughoutitsearly
history.
Theinstitutiontowhichtheyowetheirallegiance,whichisformallynamedtheCoptic
OrthodoxChurchofAlexandria(fromnowonsimply“CopticChurch”or“Church”),today
representsapproximately95%ofEgypt’sChristians–theremaining5%beingdistributedacross
otherChristiandenominations,mostnotablyCatholicandEvangelical.Despitereferringtoitself
asan“orthodox”church,theCoptsarenotpartofwhatinChristianityiscommonlyreferredto
asEasternOrthodoxy,whichincludesthecommunitiesthatsplitfromRomein1053-4CEand
thatisnoworganizedinaseriesofautocephalouspatriarchiesrepresentingmostEastern
EuropeancountriesfromGreecetoRussia.TheEgyptianCoptsinsteadsetapartfromtherest
ofChristianityattheCouncilofChalcedonin451CE,whentheysupportedadoctrineaboutthe
natureofJesusknownas“monophysism”thatwouldbeconsideredhereticalbyotherChristian
authorities.Monophysitechurches,which(somewhatconfusingly)arealsoreferredtoas
OrientalOrthodoxy,alsoincludetheEthiopianTewahedoChurch,theSyriacOrthodoxChurch
andthreeotherdenominations.
ConsideredasasplintermovementwithinChristianityitself,theCopticChurchhasa
longhistoryofconflictwiththepoliticalauthoritiesthatruledoverEgypt.AfterChalcedonit
sufferedatthehandsoftheMelkitegovernorsofAlexandriaappointedbytheByzantines,to
3
thepointthattheArabconquestin641BCEwaswelcomedbymostmembersofthe
community(Pennington,1982).MigrationandmassconversionledtotheCoptsbecominga
minoritywithinEgyptbythe9thcentury,afterwhichtheyweretargetedbyoccasionalpogroms
(especiallyatthehandsoftheMamluks)beforebeingorganizedasamillet–aseparate
confessionalcommunitysubjecttoitsownlegalcourts–underOttomanrule.Inexchangefor
thepaymentofextrataxation,themilletsystemgavetheleadershipoftheCopticChurch
“substantialfreedomtogovernitsfollowers”(Tadros,2013:27).Themilletsystemwas
graduallydismantledinthe19thcenturyandtheCoptsbecameactivepartsofthepoliticallife
ofEgyptespeciallyintheearly20thcentury,whentwoCoptswereevennamedasprime
ministers.Afterthemilitaryrevolutionin1952,theCoptsbecameincreasinglyestrangedfrom
politics(Scott,2010:41),eveniftheyplaytothisdayanimportantroleinEgypt’ssociety.
ThenumericalweightoftheCopticcommunityremainsamatterofdebate.Since1986,
whenChristiansamountedto5.7%ofapopulationof48.2million,censusesdonotask
respondentsabouttheirreligiousaffiliation–andeventhe1986figurehasbeensometimes
consideredasunreliable.Currentestimatesrangefrom5.3%toupto23%ofEgypt’snow91
millioninhabitants.
Researchpuzzles
MostofthecontemporaryresearchonCoptsfocusesontheirrelationwiththeMuslim
majorityinEgyptandthe(re-)emergenceofsectarianconflictinthecountrysincetheearly
1980s.
4
Atleastsincethemassacreofal-Zawyaal-Hamrain1981,thisconflicthaspeakedin
variousepisodesofopenconfrontationbetweenChristiansandMuslims,especiallyinUpper
Egypt,thatwidelyaffectedinter-communalrelationsinthecountryandcontributedtocreating
anenduringatmosphereoftensionandmistrust.Inter-religiousconflicthasalsobeen
instrumentalinreinforcingtheself-identificationoftheCopticcommunity;theCopticChurch
tracesitsorigininthepersecutionsufferedbyitsmembersinthefirstcenturiesofChristianity
atthehandsofRomanemperors,andthecyclicalrepetitionofthis“historicalprocessof
eternalmartyrdom”iskeytohowtheChurchseesitsroleintheEgyptiansociety.
Variousaspectsofthisconflicthavebeenanalyzedindepth,includingitssocioeconomicroots(Farah,1986)andtheroleofmediainfomentinginter-communaltensions
(Iskander,2012).Somescholars,especiallyMarizTadros(2009;2013),alsolookedintothe
attemptsmadebytheEgyptianstatetomanageit.IncontrasttocountrieslikeLebanon,that
resortedtoconsociationalsystemstoguaranteeadegreeofpoliticalrepresentationtovarious
religiouscommunities,inEgyptthepresenceofCoptsinpoliticalbodies(orevenincivilservice)
isnotregulatedbylaw,partlybecauseCoptsthemselveshavehistoricallyrejectedanysystem
thatformalizestheirstatusasa“minority”(Al-Gawhary1986).Yetopenconflictoftenarises
outofpettydisputes(forinstancerelatedtotheconstructionofchurches,orindividualcasesof
divorceandconversion)thatcanescalateintobloodyurbanriots;forthemanagementofthese
issues,theCopticChurchandtheEgyptianstatedevelopedaseriesofadhoc,informal
consultationmechanismswhoseultimateguarantorsaretheindividualstowholieatthetopof
thesetwopyramids–theCopticPopeandtheEgyptianPresident.
5
Thesearrangements,describedbyTadros(2009)as“ententes”,firstcameintobeing
withthefriendshipbetweenGamalAbdelNasserandCyrilVI.Asimilarsystemwasputinplace,
notwithoutdifficulties,byHosniMubarakandShenoudaIIIinthe1980s,andconsolidatedin
the1990sandearly2000s.Athirdversionofthis“entente”isarguablyinplacesince2013
betweenAbdelFattahel-SisiandShenouda’ssuccessor,TawadrosII.Theoveralllogicofthe
ententesremainedthesamesincethe1960s;theEgyptianPresidentguaranteesthatthebasic
grievancesoftheCopticcommunityarelistenedtoand,ifpossible,actedupon,whilethe
CopticPopekeepshiscommunityundercontrol,avoidingwheneverpossibletheescalationof
religioustensionsandensuringpoliticalsupportfortheregime.
Structurally,theseententesarebasedonwhatPaulRowe(2009:114)describedasa
“neo-milletsystem”–are-editionof“thepatternlaiddownsinceOttomantimesofengaging
withtheChristianpopulationthroughtheirowncommunalorganizations”.Somewhat
paradoxically,theirappearanceshortlyfollowedAbdelNasser’sambitiousplanstoerasethe
lastremainingsoftheOttomanmilletsystemandunifythecountrybothideologicallyand
legallyunderthenewregime,forinstancebyplacingmattersrelatedtocivilstatusundera
unifiedsystemofcivilcourts.Yettheissuesthattrickledthroughthecracksofthisnewsystem
–forinstancethepresenceofconflictingadministrativeregulationsfortheconstructionof
religiousbuildings(cf.FastenrathandKazanjian,2008)–andthereinforcementofEgypt’s
Islamicidentityinsocietyafter1967,insocietyevenbeforethaninlaw,ledtotheneedforsuch
managementsystem.
TheCopticChurch,fromitsend,certainlybenefitedfromthisarrangement,whichgave
itsleaders“theexclusiverighttorepresentCopticclaimsbeforethestate”(Hasan,2003:264).
6
Moreover,theseententesgavetheChurchachancetodefendinformalcommunitarian
prerogatives,suchasthosepertainingtoitsinvolvementincasesofreligiousconversion(the
so-called“guidancesessions”)thatcanbeatoddswiththeindividualrightentitlementsof
Egyptiancitizens.
However,theexistingresearchoftheseententesstillleavessomeimportantquestions
unanswered.Inparticular,theroleoftheCopticChurchinactingasrepresentativeofthe
Copticcommunityisoftentakenforgranted,andweknowlittleabouthowtheCopticChurch
exertsitscontroloverthecommunity.Infact,theCopticChurchhasasubstantialhistoryof
bottom-upactivism,whichsurfacedprominentlyinthe19thcenturyduringthereformofthe
milletsystemwiththecreationofthecounciloflaymenknownasmajlisel-milli(Tadros,2009:
270).
TheanalysisofthearticulationoftheententesystemwithintheCopticcommunityhas
atleasttwosides.Ontheonehand,atanorganizationallevel,isunclearwherethelineshould
bedrawnbetween“thechurchhierarchs”(Rowe2009:115)andtherestofthecommunity.In
particular,whiletheformerlogicallyincludesthePopeandhisentourageandthelatterthevast
majorityoflaypeople,therearereasonstoexpectthepositionoftheclergytobemore
nuanced,notleastbecauseindividualprieststendtobemoredirectlyexposedtosectarian
incidentsthanupperechelonsoftheclergy.Inthissense,considering“thePopeandhisclergy”
(ibid.)tobeonthesamesideisnotnecessarilywarranted.
Ontheotherhand,wealsoknowlittleaboutthemeansthroughwhichtheChurch
ensuresthecohesionoftheCopticcommunity.AsexpectedinaChristiancommunity,
7
especiallyacomparativelysmallonethathasalonghistoryunderthemilletsystem,notonlyis
theChurchtoppedbyahierarchyofclergymenbutthecommunityitselfhasarelationof
deferenceandobediencewithitspastors.Yetthecapillarycontrolofthecommunitythatis
neededtoensurethatnoepisodeofsectarianviolenceescalatesoutofcontrol,orthatnoopen
criticismoftheregimeisvoiced,cannotbeachievedthroughhierarchicdisciplinealone.In
particular,theroleoflessmaterialdynamicssuchasnorm-basedconvergence–withreference
notjusttopoliticalandsocialideologies,butalsotheologicaldebates–hasnotbeenfully
accountedforintheseprocesses.
Thispaperwilllookintotheroleplayedbybothorganizationalandideationalfactorsin
thesecondentente,betweenMubarakandShenouda,sincetheearly2000s.Particular
attentionwillbepaidtothegradualweakeningofstate-churchrelationssince2005andthe
openconflictthatemergedsince2010.
Duringthelate2000sarangeofsectarianincidentstookplacethatshookalongheld
church-stateentente.Asthestatewasseenasunableorunwillingtomanagethedisputes
betweenthechurchandothersocialactors,suchasIslamists,theententewasseverelyputto
thetest(Tadros,2013:83-96;Iskandar,2012:153-169).Theseeventsalsogaveanopportunity
foranemergingCopticactivistmovementtopressurethestateaswellasthechurchto
respondtoCopticcommunaldemands,thuschallengingtheroleoftheChurchassole
representativeoftheCopticcommunity.
Nevertheless,theCopticactorsthatchallengedtheententepositionedthemselves
differentlyvis-a-vistheseinstitutions.Awidearrayofmovementsappeared,someofwhich
8
reflectedtheradicalizationofsectorsoftheCopticcommunity,usingprotestasakeytool,and
differentiatedthemselvesfromchurchhierarchyinordertobefreetopoliticallymaneuver.
Others,however,maintainedbettertieswiththeChurchestablishmentandorthesecurity
establishmentinordertonegotiatetheirdemandswiththem.
Thedevelopmentofthesemovementshasbeenpresentedbysomeactivistsasan
integralpartoftheriseofEgyptiancivilsocietysincethemid2000s(Tamry,2014:52).While
indeedboththenationalpoliticalsphereandtheCopticspherebothsharedthesurgeof
protestactivity,aidedbytheriseofsocialmediaandanexpansionofacultureofdissentinthe
laterMubarakyears,theCopticmovementsshowsomedistinctivefeatures.
Onepeculiarityhastodowiththewaytheyframedtheirmaingoal–thatofcitizenship
(al-muwatana).FormanyoftheemergingCopticthatconstitutethecoreofCopticmovements,
citizenshipasaconcepthadtwoparadoxicalsides.Thefirstaspectwasseekingequalrightsof
allcitizens,regardlessofcreed,asanindispensableaspectofcitizenship.Yet,inorderto
achievethattheyseea“secularstate”aspertinenttoestablishequalcitizenshipinthissense.
Thesecondaspectofcitizenshipwasintermsofassertingtheirculturalidentityinpublicspace
asaremedyforthemarginalizationoftheircommunalidentity(Lukasik,2016:107-125).Thus
theycalledforfurtheringaparticularformofcommunalidentity,namelyCopticidentitythat
wouldcompetewithexpandingIslamistsymbolsinpublicspace.Yet,despitetheirclaimthat
“Copticidentity”isnotareligiouscategory,itgivesparticularsaliencetotheCopticChurchas
foritshistoricalrootsandclaimedtopreservetheCopticculturaltraditionsandlanguage
(Iskandar,2012:92).Inthissense,thecallforequalityofcommunalidentityinpublicspacehas
beenasecondaspectoftheircallstoequalcitizenship(Lukasik,2016:107-125).
9
Withintheseculturalmarkerstheroleofnon-Christianshasbeenmarginalizedina
numberofthesenewlyemergingmovements.AreasonpositedforthtothelackofnonChristianmembershipinmanyofthesemovementswastoavoidalienatingtheCopticyouth
thatwouldwanttojoin,andwhoarethemaintargetgroupofthesemovements1.While
groupssuchastheMYUdidnetworkwithotherrevolutionaryyouthmovementsandpolitical
partiesduringtheireventsthatwouldcontainnon-ChristiansaswellasChristians,MYUsaw
themselvesassocializingtheChristianyouthtoengageinpoliticalparticipationandthuswere
keentoensuretheirloyalty2.
AsecondthemerevolvesaroundtheCopticmovements’adoptionofsecularism.Atan
ideologicalordoctrinallevel,thesemovementsmostlycallfortheestablishmentofacivicor
secularstate,oneinwhichreligionissolemnlyseparatefromthestate3.Accordingly,theyare
notinterestedinpromotinginternalchurchreformorincriticizingthechurchondoctrinalor
strictlyecclesiasticalmatters4.Yet,intermsoftheircompositions,theclergyhasbeenplayeda
substantialroleinthem;individualpriestsareoftendescribedasgodfathersofspecific
movements,assistedintheirframing,gavetheirpoliticalguidanceandspiritualblessings,as
wellasactingaslinkswiththechurchestablishmentshouldtheneedarise.
1
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionFounder,13August2015
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionActivist,21July2015
2
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionActivist,21July2015
3
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionActivist,21July2015
4
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionActivist,20August2015
10
Copticactivismsince2004:adiscussion
Stage1:ThePoliticalFramingoftheMovement
WhilemanyoftheCopticactivistshavestartedtheiractivismandsocialworkwithinthe
Church’sgates,andmaintainastrongaffinitytothechurch,theyaimedtoengageinpolitical
participationthatwoulddifferentiatetheirpoliticalstancesfromthatoftheChurch
establishmentandgiveavoicetotheCopticyouth.
Asitwillbeshown,thisprocessofdifferentiationtookplaceinstages.Intheearly
2000s,varioushumanrightandlegalcentersoperatednationally suchastheEgyptianHuman
RightsCenterformedbyLawyerMauriceSadeqin1994andal-KalimahCenterforHuman
RightsformedbyLawyerMamduhNakhlahin1996(Tamry,2014:50),yetitwasnotpossibleto
talkofastructured,articulatedmovement.ProtestshavebeenheldinfrontoftheCathedral
sincetheearly2000s,inresponsetowhatwereseenasmediaoffencesagainsttheCoptic
community(Tamry,2014:53),butthesewereissue-basedandlargelyimprovised.
Themomentinwhichbottom-upCopticactivismwouldbeginitsdevelopmentintoafullfledgedsocialmovementwaswiththefoundingofthe“ThebanLegion”magazinein20045.The
mainreasonsfortheestablishmentofthe“ThebanLegion”bytwolocalpriestsandanumber
5
ThenameofthemagazinehasaparticularhistoricalconnotationasitreferstoalegionofEgyptiansoldierswhen
EgyptwasunderRomanEmperorDiocletian.In286ADthelegionwasorderedtotraveltoprotecttheempire’s
northernborders.Overseas,theywereorderedtopaytributetotheRomanGodstowhichtheyrefused,andthus
wereexecuted.Inthatsense,thenamesuggestedagroupofCoptswhoremainloyaltotheemperorbutthey
wouldnotgiveupontheirfaithintheprocess.ByresortingtothesymbolismofmartyrdomandCoptic
persecutionthathashadaparticularsalienceintheCopticOrthodoxchurch,itsharedthesamediscourseofthe
church,yetgaveitanactiveelement.
11
ofyoungCopticactivistsweretwofold.ThefirstgoalwastohighlighttheattacksagainstCopts
thatwereignoredbythemainstreammediaandtorespondtopolemicsthatwerespreadin
themediaagainstChristians.Engaginginthisresponseprocesswasbelievedtodiscourage
thosewhoengageinhatespeechorpolemicsagainstCoptsaswellasbringawarenessof
Copticgrievances6.Thesecond,relatedgoalwastopromoteandreinforcea“Copticidentity”7,
basedonexposingtheimpactofthe“Islamicoccupation”thatledtotheimpositionofArabian
traditionsandcultureonindigenousCoptsandanextendedperiodof“persecution”(Hulsman
etal,2006:47-51).
Bothgoals–butespeciallytheformer–wouldleadtoskirmisheswiththeupper
echelonsoftheChurchhierarchyandwithsecurityestablishments.Asthe“ThebanLegion”was
notalicensednewpaper,itneededtheblessingofthePope–withoutwhichitwasnotpossible
todistributethemagazineinchurches.However,itsfounderswantedthemagazinetobe
independentfromthechurchcontrolinordertoavoidpressuresandtomaintainitsfreedomof
expression.11Indeed,thestatesecurityestablishmenthadmadevariousattemptstorestrict
thepaper.Atfirst,throughbringingtheattentionofthePopetoitand,whenthoseattempts
failed,theywerereportedbytheEditorinChieftohavetoattackedtheprinthouse,
headquartersofthemagazineandhisownhouse.12
Moreover,duringthatperiod,thesecondententewasatitsheightandtheChurchdid
nottolerateanysubstantialpoliticalcriticismtoMubarak’sregime,whichmadeconflictwith
6
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionAdvisor,5September2015
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
7
12
theeditorsofthe“ThebanLegion”inevitable.InJuly2005apriest,writingunderthe
pseudonymofFinhasal-Nusrani,publishedapiecethatportrayedsecurityinstitutionsas
complicitinattacksagainstseveralchurches,andthusarguedagainstthemainstreamideathat
thestatewastheprotectoroftheCopts.(Seephoto1.1below).Thiswasadirectcritiqueofa
premiseofthechurch-stateentente.Asaresult,thispriestwassuspendedbytheClerical
CounciloftheGizaDioceseforamonthandahalf(Sanad,2011).
Photo1.1:ThebanLegionarticle“CoptsbetweentheNDPhammerandtheanviloftheMuslim
Brotherhood
(ThebanLegion,July2005).
13
Themagazinestartedaprocessofpoliticalsocializationofmanyyoungmembersofthe
communitywhohadpreviouslybeenwaryofpoliticalactivism,andwasthevenueinwhich
manyoftheleadersoftheyouthgroupsthatemergedafterthe2011Revolutionfirstmet.
Furthermore,itencouragedthecreationofnewCopticwebsites,suchasCoptsUnited,which
ledtofurtherincreasethereportingofCopticissuesandfocusingongrievancesofCopts.This
increasedthecirculationofnewsrelatedtodiscriminationandsectarianconflict(ShamsEl-Din,
2016).Together,thesemediawereinstrumentalin(re)framingofCopticidentityinadversarial
terms,bothagainstIslamistsandagainststateactorsthatwereseenascollusive,andinthe
processchallengedtheroleofthechurchasthesolearticulatorof“Copticness”.Thiswasafirst
embryooftheevolvingCopticmovement,beforeasetofattacksstartinthelate2000swould
bringoutfullyfledgedmovementstopublicspace.
Stage2:FromChurchtoStreet:ExitingtheChurch’sGate
Politicalmovementsdevelopedwhentheopportunityarose.Suchopportunityemerged
inthelate2000sastheMubarakregimegraduallylostitsgriponthecountry.Thisledtothe
riseofattacksagainstCoptsandconsequentlyledthestate’simageastheprotectorofCoptsto
wane.
Inthisphase,amovementnamed“CoptsforEgypt”emergedwiththepurposeof
interceptingthegrievancesoftheCopticcommunitythatwerenotadequatelyaddressed
throughtheentente.CreatedinJuly2009,thismovementfocusedprimarilyonrequestingthe
revisionsoflawsandregulationsthatwereseenasdiscriminatorytoCopts(CoptsforEgypt
Brochure).Thisstrategyallowedittocooperatewithstateentitiesandengagewiththeformal
14
politicalsystemandactors.Inthisway,CoptsforEgyptnotonlybypassedsomeofthefunctions
traditionallytakenbyChurchauthoritiesbutalsocontributedtomarginalizingtheroleofthe
priestsandyoungactivistswhohadchallengedbothstateandChurchauthoritiesmoreopenly.
However,theoccasionsforconfrontationdidnotdisappear,particularlyastheTheban
Legionsupportedtheprotestmovementwithitsmediacapacities15.ACopticstrikewasheld
onSeptember11,2009,theCopticNewYeartoprotesttherecurrenceofthesectarian
incidentsandtopressurethegovernmenttotakeactiontostopthem.Theprotestshowever
pickedupinanescalatoryfashionwiththerecurrenceofincidents.OnCopticChristmasEve
2010,anincidentintheUpperEgyptiancityofNag’Hamaditookplacewhendeliberate
shootingsjustoutsideachurchledtothedeathofsixChristians16.Asaresult,onFebruary14,
2010,animportantescalationtookplacebyCoptsforEgyptwhentheyorganizedaprotestwas
heldinTahrirsquaretoprotestthe“Nag’HamadiMassacre”.Withthisdemonstration,the
protestsforthefirsttimemovedoutsideoftheChurchandintopublicspace.
However,asthemovementwasgainingvigor,itsoonbecameapparentthataleading
figureoftheNationalDemocraticParty(NDP–Mubarak’spoliticalarm)mayhavebeen
involvedinincitingfortheNag’Hamadishootings.Disagreementsbetweentheoldgeneration
activistswhohavehadimportantsecurityconnectionsandtheyouthofthemovement
emergedonwhethertoprotestfurther17.Theoldergenerationactivistscoordinatingwith
securitypersonnelseemtohavebeenpressuredbythesecuritynottoescalateandthus
15
InterviewwithCoptsforEgyptActivist,24August2015
Ibid.
17
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionFounder,13August2015
16
15
rejectedthecallsofmanyyouthforanotherprotest18.Meanwhile,thePopemadestatements
ofsupporttotheNDP(Tamry,2014:54),whichensuredtheententewasintact.Seeingthatthe
movementleadershipwasnotwelcomingtheviewscallingformoreprotests,agroupof
activistsfromthemovementthusdecidedtoactalone.Aprotestlaunchedbyagroupofyoung
activistswasbooedbythemovementfornothavingbeendiscusseditbeforehand19.Thisledto
aneventualsplintertoemergefromthe“CoptsforEgyptmovement”,whichmaterializedwhen
thechurch-statepactthatremainedstrongintheNag’Hamadicasereceivedanewjolt.
Thepactbetweenthechurchandthestatereceivedashudderwhenthestateand
Churchwereunabletomanageyetanothersectarianincidentthathadescalatedintostreet
clashes.InNovember2010,intheUmraniyahareainGiza,achurchpermitrevokedbythelocal
governorledtoclashesbetweenpoliceandprotesters,asthelatterattemptedtoresumethe
constructionofthereligiousbuilding.SinceboththeChurchandthestatewereseenas
incapableofprotectingtheCopticcommunityanditsinterests(Iskandar,2012:158),asplinter
groupemergedfromCoptsforEgypt.Thenewgroup,namelytheCopticYouthFront,wasmore
explicitlyinfavourofconfrontativetacticsandsoonstagedasit-ininUmraniyah20.
The25thJanuary2011Revolutionwouldseeonceagainyouthgroupstakingtheleadin
challengingthecollusiverelationbetweenthestateandtheChurch,allthemorebecausethe
Revolutionhappenedfewweeksafteranothermajorsectarianincident–thebombingofthe
TwoSaintChurchinAlexandriaonNewYear’sEve,where23worshipperslosttheirlives.
18
Ibid.
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
19
16
InitiallytheChurchforbadetheCoptsfromjoiningtheprotests–areconciliatoryattemptwith
theMubarakregimeinstruggletomaintainitscontrolovertheCopts.WhiletheCopticYouth
Frontjoinedtheprotestsnevertheless(Tamry,2014:54),theCoptsforEgyptrejectedthecalls
foranuprisinganditsleadersignedajoinedstatementagainsttheprotests(Besheer,2011).Yet,
withthesuccessoftheJanuaryuprisinginremovingMubarak.TheCopticYouthFrontwas
dissolvedaftertheuprising,astheyouthconsideredtheirintegrationinthepoliticalpartiesin
whatwasexpectedtobeaflourishingnationalpoliticallifeafterthedeposalofMubarak
(Tamry,2014:54).Meanwhile,astheChurchrecognizedtheuprisingcallingita“White
Revolution,”(HolySynod,2012:8)therelationswiththechurchseemedtobepromising.This
wasmostlikelyamiscalculationonthesideoftheyouth,aspoliticalpartiesyetrefusedto
adopttheirgoals(Tamry,2014:54)andtherelationswiththeChurchwouldundergoastrain
afteraninitialperiodofcalm.AresurgenceofCopticactivismwouldensue,whentheyouth
thatonceconstitutedtheCopticYouthFrontwouldconstitutenewmovements21,assoonasa
crisisoccurredintheuprisingsaftermath.
Stage3:AHybridFormula
Itdidnottakelongforanewcrisistodevelop.On11February,uponhisresignation,
Mubarak’spowerswereassumedbytheSupremeCounciloftheArmedForces(SCAF),chaired
byFieldMarshalMohammedHusseinTantawi.Yet,eveniftherevolutionhadnotresultedina
prolongedpowervacuuminthecountry,initsimmediateaftermathanumberofsectarian
attacks(mainlyagainstChurches,monasteriesandafewagainstcitizens)tookplace.Theseput
21
TheseincludetheMasperoYouthUnionandtheMasperoYouthMovement,bothofwhichwereformedby
formermembersoftheCopticYouthFront(seebelow).
17
furtherobstaclestothereinstatementofthechurchstate-pact,particularlybecausenotjust
individualpriestsbutalsofewmembersoftheupperclergystartedmobilizingindependently.
InMarch2011,asaresultoftheattackonachurchinAtfih,BishopTheodosiusofGizacalled
forthepriestsinhisdiocesetostartprotestinginfrontoftheMasperoBuilding–the
headquartersoftheEgyptianRadioandTelevisionUnionand,toCopts,along-lastingsymbolof
themisrepresentationofCopticissuesinofficialmedia.Manypriestsansweredthecall22.Thus
theclergywasfromthebeginningattheheartofaprotestmovementthatwouldlead,six
monthlater,tothemostviolentconfrontationbetweenCopticdemonstratorsandthearmyin
themodernhistoryofEgypt.
IntheabsenceofthePope,whowasintheUnitedStatesonavisit,thepriestsmobilized
theyouthwithintheircircles,whogatheredinfrontofthebuildingside-by-sidewiththeir
priests.WhilethepriestswereaskedbytheChurchleadershiptoleaveendtheprotest,afew
ofthemrefusedtodoso,thereforeopposingdirectordersofmembersofthehigherclergy.23
Theseincludedthesame“activist”priestswhohadfoundedtheThebanLegion.Aftermore
tensionbetweenthedemonstratorsandthemilitaryofficersthatsecuredtheMaspero
Building,negotiationsledtoatemporaryeaseofthestandoff,whichwashelpedbythe
promisebythemilitarytorebuildthedamagedchurch(Tamry,2014:55).
Afterthesetensions,itwasapparentthattheChurchsoughtareturntotheentente.
ThefirstarticlepennedbyPopeShenoudaaftertheRevolutionappearedintheofficial
magazineoftheChurch,named“Keraza”,inApril2011.Initheportrayedtheseattacksasa
22
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionAdvisor,5September2015
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionAdvisor,5September2015
23
18
resultofthegenerallackofsecurityintheaftermathoftheRevolution,carefullyavoiding
puttingtheblameonspecificpartiesandthereforeshowingacleardesireformendingrelations
withthesecurityinstitutions(PopeShenouda,2011a).
Yettheseattemptswereunderminedbytheemergenceofnewmovementsthatwould
onceagainchallengethepoliticalroleoftheChurch.OnthesiteoftheMasperosit-inthat
lasted9daysbetween6-15March2011,severalpost-revolutionaryCopticyouthmovements
cametolightnamelytheMasperoYouthUnionandtheMasperoYouthMovement.The
MasperoYouthUnionemerged“fromtheground”asprotesters,someofwhichwere
experiencedmembersoftheCopticYouthFrontstartedtoorganizethesitin.Theorganization
ofthesititledtothedevelopmentofseveralcommitteesonthegroundasaformofdivisionof
labourfortheprotesters.Agroupwouldberesponsibletotalktothemedia,suchastheMedia
Committee.Anothercommitteethatemergedandwasvitalforthesit-inwastheorganization
committeewhichwasresponsibleforensuringtheorderintheprotestsandsit-inandto
preventanyrulebreakingbytheindividualprotesters25.Thepoliticaloffice,whichwould
becomethemostimportantdecisionmakingbodyinthemovement,waselectedafterthefirst
sitin(Tamry,2014:55).
IntheMasperoYouthUnion(MYU),the“activist”priestshadanactive(yetformally
advisory)roleespeciallyinassistingitsleadersindevelopingthemovementandintakingkey
decisions.Oneofthesepriestssawhisroleasa“balance”,toallowthemovement:
25
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionActivist,20August2015
19
“tomovefreelywithoutconflictwiththestate,evenifitwasinevitable,andwithout
conflictwiththeChurch,becausetherewouldbeangryandfrustratedyouth...Myrole,
specifically,wastoencouragethemtokeepthemovementsecular...[thepriests]wereonly
toadviseandguidethemovement,butnotleadit,sothatitremainssecularandpure”26.
Inthissense,hedidnotseehisinvolvementinthemovementasaffectingitssecular
nature;rather,hesawitasaimedatprotectingitfromtheinfiltrationsoftheChurch
establishment,aswellastokeeptheyouthundercontrol.
However,somememberssawthattheroleoftheclergywasmorethanjustadvisory.
Indeed,thelackofinstitutionalizationledtoahybridpositionofthepriestsintheunionasthey
hadmuchinformalpowerdespitethelackofanyformalpowerintheirpositionas“advisors”.
Thepositionofthepriestswasnamedasmembersintheadvisorycouncilthusholding
honorarymemberships.Whiletheadvisorycouncilwithwasdissolvedintheaftermathofthe
secondMasperosit-ininMay2011,thepriests’roleremainedasadvisorstotheunion27.Many
membersstatedthattheylikedtorefertohiminapersonalmannerontheirdecisions.
Howevertheydeniedthathecontrolledit28.Moreover,manymembersoftheMYUargued
thatthecontroloftheclergyoverthemovementledtothemovementbeingmanaged
autocraticallyandwithlittletransparency,asdecisionsweretakenbehindcloseddoorsbythe
activistswhowereclosetothepriests29.Thisledtoorganizationaladjustmentswithinthe
26
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionAdvisor,5September2015
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionFounder,13August2015
28
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionActivist,21July2015
29
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionActivist,27October2015
27
20
Union;anexecutivebureauwasestablishedtocounterbalancethepoliticalbureau,perceived
asstronglycontrolledbythepriests30.
Othersmallergroupswerecreatedbyactivistswhowereunhappywiththeleadingrole
playedbythe“activist”priestsintheprotestmovement.Thesecondgroupthatemergedin
March2011outoftheMasperoprotests,namedMasperoYouthMovement(whichlater
becameCoptswithoutRestrictions),haddifferedovertheideasofmembersoftheclergy
presentedwithrespecttotheappointmentsandpoliticalposts.Whilethemembersofthe
clergyhadpositiveviewsofinvolvingmembersoftheCopticDiaspora,asMichaelMunir,as
theywerericher,morefamousandmorepowerful,thiswasrejectedbyagroupofMaspero
activistswhoinsistedthattheDiasporaCoptsshouldnotbegivenprivilegeoverthenational
onesandeventuallyformedtheMasperoYouthMovement32.Thisisalsoinrelationtodifferent
viewsofthepoliticalmanagementoftheorganizationwhichtheyfeltwasheavilycontrolledby
thepriestsathand33.
Anew,decisiveescalationofthetensionsbetweentheprotestersandtheregimetook
placeinOctober2011.Onthe4th,variousmarcheswereorganizedtoprotesttheattackagainst
achurchinMarinab,Aswan34.WhileanMYUgroup,ledbythe“activist”priests,wantedtohold
asit-in,theothermovementsincludingCoptswithoutRestrictionandtheCoptsforEgypt
rejectedthat,havingagreedbeforehandonendingtheprotestearlierandnotholdingasit-in.36
TheprotestersmarchedtotheJudiciaryHouseafterwhichtheothercooperatingmovements
30
Ibid.
thatofincludingCopticDiasporamembersinthemovement
33
InterviewwithCoptsWithoutRestrictionsActivist,31August2015
34
th
ThreeprotestswereorganizedOctober1,4and9 .
36
InterviewwithCoptsWithoutRestrictionsActivist,31August2015
Interviewee18,InterviewwithCoptsforEgyptActivist,24August2015
32
21
suchastheMasperoYouthMovementandtheCoptsforEgyptMovementrefusedtotakepart
inthefurtheractivitiesthatday.TheMasperoYouthUnionwiththeremainingallied
movementsmarchedontoMasperowheretheyattemptedasitinandwereattackedbythe
militarypolice37.TheattackswhichthemilitarypolicecommittedonOctober4,caughtonvideo
andspreadthroughsocialandCopticmediaweretheprecursortotheprotestsonOctober9th.
TheattacksonOctober4thledtothemobilizationoftheCopticstreet.Furtherprotests
wereplannedonOctober9th,andyettheactivistsdisagreedonwhatprotesttacticsshould
havebeenusedonthatday38.Aclearsplitexistedbetweenthosewhowantedtoadoptmore
openlyconfrontationaltactics,whichwouldhaveinvolvedtheorganizationofatwo-hour
marchfromthedistrictofShoubratotheMasperobuilding,andthosethatwantedtoavoid
provokingthemilitaryandpreferredtostandinprotest,ratherthanmarch.Theproteststand
aimedatavoidingadirectchallengetothearmedforcesprotectingthebuilding39.Amarchwas
eventuallyorganized;whenitarrivedatMaspero,itwasbrutallyattacked.23activistsdiedon
thatdayinwhatwouldbeknownasthe“MasperoMassacre”.
TheChurchhadtorespondtotheangryyouthandtheCopticcommunityatlargewho
witnessedthebloodshedandwhowereeagertoseetheassailantsheldaccountablefortheir
actions.IndeedthemagnitudeoftheMasperoIncidentwassuchthatitgaveastrongblowto
theCopticcommunityandthuspushedthePopetomakesupportivestatementstothe
community.InhisWednesdaysermon,thePopehimselfrejectedallegationsthattheCoptic
demonstratorswerearmedandcalledthosekilledmartyredandthattheirblood“willnotbe
37
InterviewwithCoptsforEgyptActivist,24August2015
ThedatewasselectedtoavoidArmyNationalDayonOctober6
39
Interviewee18,InterviewwithCoptsforEgyptActivist,24August2015
38
22
spiltinvain”(El-Gergawi,2011:1).Thus,whilethechurchglorifiedthemartyrs,itmadesureto
dosoinamannerthatwouldhighlightthechurchrole.AsBishopMusaputsit“thesemartyrs
haveservedthechurchfaithfullyuntiltheyshedtheirblood.Theirbloodisthatnourishedthe
treeoftheCopticChurch.Historically,thischurchistheonlyonethathasaMartyrs’Calendar
andwearetheChurchthatgavethemostmartyrs.”(BishopMusa,2012:62).Theywerethus
themartyrsoftheChurch,ratherthantheCopticcommunity.
Thus,asperententepolitics,theChurchneededtoreassertitscontroloverthe
communityanddissociatethemselvesfromthepositionsoftheyouth,allthemoreastheir
protestwasdirectlysupportedbypriests.Thus,therewerecallsbyBishopBishoy,Secretaryof
theHolySynod,thatthepriestsundergoaChurch’strial(Samir,2013:124).Thiswaspossiblya
punishmenttothemfortheirroleinmobilizingtheyouthaswellastryingtomendrelations
withthestatebyremovingfromtheactivepriestsanyformofchurchcover.40Inaddition,
anotherprominentbishopattemptedtoconvincethefamiliesnottoconductforensicautopsy
onthebodiesofthedeceasedandtodropthelegalcaseagainsttheirassailants(Tamry,2014:
58).Fromitsend,theSCAFmovedtomendrelationswiththeChurch,asthePopereceived
membersoftheSCAFinaclosedmeetingaweekaftertheincidentwhichtheKerazamagazine
framedasgiving“condolences”(PopeShenouda,2011a:2).ThiswasfollowedbyChurch
positionsthatweremoreconciliatorytowardstheSCAFincludingreceivingtheminafriendly
mannerinCopticChristmasmassonJanuary6,2011.
40InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionAdvisor,5September2015
23
Thustheepisodesofstateviolenceandrepressionhadbeenrespondedtodifferentlyby
thechurchandtheyouthmovements.StatecrackdownclearlyledtoweakeningtheCoptic
movementasawholeandareenactmentofthechurch-stateententeonthepremiseofthe
needstomaintaincalmandregainingcontroloverthecommunity.
Conclusion
Copticsocialmovementshaveshownvariousformsofrelationshipswiththestateand
Churchhierarchy.Thispapershedlightonthecomplexarticulationoftheserelationshipsand
onthenatureoftheententesbetweentheCopticChurchandtheEgyptianstate.
Somekeyfindingsemergedfromouranalysis.First,thinkingaboutChurch-state
relationsthroughtheconceptofententeshouldnotmakeusforgetthatthesearrangements
areinformal,fluidandsubjecttocontestationfrombothsides.Especiallysince2009,
contentiousmovementshavebothbenefitedfromaswellaswidenedthecracksinthe
entente;moremoderatemovements,ontheotherhand,haveattemptedtofindcommon
groundsonwhichtonegotiatetheirdemandswiththeChurchandstate,whilenotremoving
streetprotestfromtheirrepertoire.
Secondly,thisanalysisquestionedthevalidityofjuxtaposing“theChurchandthe
clergy”withCopticcivilsociety(cf.Rowe2009).Notonlyhaveindividualpriestsbeenleadersof
variousinitiatives–andevensocialmovements–thatchallengedtheofficialroleoftheChurch
intheententeanditsnarratives,butinsomeoccasionsevenbishopshavecalledopenlyfor
proteststhatwidenedtheriftbetweentheChurchandstateauthorities.
24
However,theattemptstoarticulateaCopticvoicewhichwouldbeautonomousfrom
boththeChurchandthestatehavenotbeenfullysuccessful.Ontheonehand,theactors
involvedinthiscontestationprocesscouldnotagreeonwhatconstitutes“autonomy”fromthe
Church.Thiscanbeintermsofmembership,identityorpoliticalstrategies.Otherssimplyposit
autonomyaslackofinstitutionalaffiliationwiththeChurch.Inparallel,therehavebeen
debatesontheextenttowhichthemovementsshouldcooperatewithsecurityinstitutions46.
Thesevariousmodelswereinturnaffectedbythewayinwhichdifferentgroupsreactedtothe
eventsandchallengesofthepost-revolutionaryperiodthatfurtherexacerbatedthedivisions
withintheCopticcommunity.Asaconsequence,attemptsatbringingtogethertheCoptic
movementsunderacollectivebodysuchastheCopticConsultativeCouncilfailedprimarily
becauseofthelackofanagreementoverthesebasicissues47.WhiletheCopticChurchhas
reaffirmeditsententewiththestateafterthedeposalofMohammadMorsi,somemovements
havedissolved48andotherspersistinthebackground49,albeitwithlittleinstitutionalcapacity.
46
InterviewwithMasperoYouthUnionFounder,13August2015
Interviewee18,InterviewwithCoptsforEgyptActivist,24August2015
48
CoptsforEgyptandtheCoptswithoutRestrictions
49
MasperoYouthUnionandCoalitionofCopticEgypt
47
25
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