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The Impact of Wars on Russia’s Development
and Its Role in the World
Capt. 1st Rank V.V. KIRILLOV
Doctor of Political Sciences
Capt. 2nd Rank Yu.N. KRYUCHKOV
In their essence, all wars, regardless of their historical conditions or causes,
goals, methods and means of conduct or their results, have been and will continue to be merely an extension of policies pursued by the states’ ruling classes and
political elites. “The war of a community—of whole nations and particularly of
civilized nations—always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by
a political motive. It is therefore a political act.1 War is a socio-political phenomenon, an extension of politics by violent means. From the viewpoint of
general theory, this definition has a certain meaning, but during the 5,000 years of
its existence mankind has developed a more complex concept of “war.” Without
a doubt, underlying any military, armed confrontation is some idea, goal or ideology. The evolution of this idea in general form proceeded as follows: the interests
of tribal survival—tribal development—acquisition of territory in the interest of
tribal survival—the emergence of first state formations and politics. Is survival
still a relevant issue? Yes, it is, and the 20th century proved that. The Great Patriotic War [1941-1945] is a classic example of big politics—class related, international, national, ethnic, racial, etc., but to millions of Slavic peoples, it was a war
of survival. “The greater and more powerful the motives of a war, the more it
affects the whole existence of a people, the more violent the excitement which
precedes the war, by so much the nearer will the war approach to its abstract form,
so much the more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy, so much the
nearer will the military and political ends coincide, so much the more purely military and less political the war appears to be.”2 This classic definition shows that
politics and war can both influence each other and at the same time be mutually exclusive. This is precisely how Russia’s wars and military conflicts with
external enemies can be described in the historical perspective.
With the start of the 21st century, the Russian Federation witnessed a gradual revival of its economic and social spheres. The liberation from financial
dependence and the growth of political independence enable it to take firmer
positions on international problems, as well as the requirements and goals of its
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own development. Will these trends prevail over a certain period, during which
it will be able to take, if not leading, at the very least, stable positions in domestic and foreign polices? That is the main question of the country’s modern
development.
However, history shows that in the 18th-20th centuries, Russia was on the
whole unable to attend to its domestic problems in a quiet environment. On the
contrary, it had to deal with domestic and external problems amid ongoing wars,
which were often started by an adversary with the aim of hindering Russia’s stable development. Here is a noteworthy fact: From the 17th century, every new
century for the country started with some catastrophic military events: the Time
of Troubles and the disintegration of the country in the early 17th century; the
Northern War in the early 18th century; a series of the so called Napoleonic wars
in the 19th century; the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, the [October 1917]
Revolution and the Civil War at the start of the 20th century. Furthermore, even
during the apparently peaceful period of the second half of the 20th century, we
had to go through a series of upheavals. Despite Russia’s relatively peaceful existence after 1945, it still had to wage a number of heavy and protracted wars
(Afghanistan, Chechnya). What is in store for us at the start of the 21st century?
Throughout its centuries old history, Russia had made a strenuous
effort to create a great country and defend it, and starting with the 19th century, it desperately needed peace. In the 20th century, it seemed that it had, at
tremendous cost, finally taken a path to peace. But it was prevented from calmly moving along that path. It is the view of the present authors that today, it is
once again faced with the threat of large and small wars and conflicts, which
will affect the country’s internal and external development.
Now a few historical facts. From 862 (the legendary date of the establishment of the ancient Russian state) until now, the country has fought or been
involved in over 700 wars and armed conflicts. On average, our predecessors and
contemporaries have fought once every two years. From Rurik to Peter the Great,
war was a “normal” condition for Russia.
Four main stages can be conveniently singled out in the military history of
many modern states, including Russia:
„
First, the formation of the state and the expansion of state borders,
involving open aggression against neighboring tribes and peoples.
„
Second, feudal division and the fight for sovereignty, marked by brutal
internecine wars and the fight against external invasions.
„
Third, the restoration of independence and strengthen of state borders.
„
Fourth, further expansion of borders and a country’s assertion on the
international arena.
At three of the four stages, the central core of policies is aggression with a
variety of goals, means and motives (“to repulse a long standing enemy,” “to
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recover historical lands,” “economic necessity,” “assistance to fraternal Slavic
nations,” and finally, “protection of the interests of Russian citizens”). Therefore,
the aggressiveness of states at the early stages of their existence is a norm (in
the 20th century, Israel, Somalia, Iraq, etc.), and Russia is not an exception here,
but quite the contrary, a typical example. Lake Chudskoye or the Battle of
Kulikovo—these are truly brilliant episodes in Russia’s history, but in addition
to that, there were incursions into Constantinople, the plundering of Bulgarians
in the Balkans and the Bulgars on the Volga, the seizure and destruction of Khazaria, the pogroms in Tavria, the Livonian War, and the list is endless. From the
9th until the 17th century, Russia attacked and repulsed attacks, gained and lost
[tracts of land], won victories and suffered defeats in more than 350 wars and
incursions, not counting the perennial internecine wars.
Russia has occupied a special place in international politics since Peter the
Great’s era to date. From 1700 until 1917, Russia fought in over 70 wars and military campaigns, with only four of them on its own soil: the Northern War (17001721), the Civil War (1812), the Crimean War (1853-1856), and World War I
(1914-1918). The number of wars is distributed by the centuries as follows (taking into account only major wars): the 10th century, 18; the 11th century, 11; the
12th century, 13; the 13th century, 19; the 14th century, 17; the 15th century, 18;
the 16th century, 26; the 17th century, 21; the 18th century, 20; the 19th century,
32; and the 20th century, 21.3
Thus, there has been a marked trend toward an increase in the number of
wars from century to century. Although the 20th century is in third or fourth
place, after the 16th and the 19th century, it was by far the most “bellicose.” It
includes two world wars and a civil war with armed intervention by a number of
countries. That century includes such wars fought by Russia as the armed conflicts on the Chinese Eastern Railroad (July 1929), on the Damansky Peninsula
(March 1969), and in the Dnestr Region, in the 1990s.
It is essential to note that major wars without a doubt impact on countries’
development, but the contemporaries of such events often suffer more as a result
of “minor” wars, and it is such conflicts that have largely formed the state’s
image and its policies. For example, the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)
changed little if anything in the structure and organization of the state or its politics, but the Soviet Union’s involvement in a local armed conflict in Afghanistan
(1979-1988), to a certain extent, initiated the disintegration of the state’s economic and political system. From the viewpoint of the time that Russia spent
fighting, it is definitely not the first among other states. In their fundamental
study of the dynamics of wars, P.A. Sorokin, N.N. Golovin, and A.M. Zaytsev
systematized the data about the wars of some European states over nine to ten
centuries with a breakdown by the centuries and quarter centuries. They studied
a total of 967 major wars fought by Ancient Greece, Rome, Austria (the Holy
Roman Empire of the German nation until 1806 and from then on, the Austrian
Empire), Germany (Prussia before 1870 and then the German Empire), Great
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Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Russia, Poland, and Lithuania (from the
16th century, Rzeczpospolita), in specific periods of their history.4 These data, as
well as other studies, offer a correlation of periods of war and peace in the history of a number of states, which shows that Russia did not fight more than other
countries (see Table 1).5
Table 1
A Correlation of Periods of War and Peace in the History of States
Total
duration of
wars
Proportion
of
wartime
Wartime
quarter
centuries
Peaceful
quarter
centuries
From 1051 until
1925—875 years
630 years
72%
34
1
From 976 until
1925—900 years
674 years
80%
33
1
From 901 until
1925—1025 years
592 years
57%
40
1
Ancient Greece
375 years
235 years
63%
—
—
Rome
876 years
411 years
47%
32
3
Countries
England
France
Russia
Periods of History
Judging from Table 1, West European countries “indulged” in wars to a comparatively larger extent, but as far as Russia is concerned, the aforementioned
authors took into account only “major” wars, whereas with respect to other countries, they studied all wars that were more or less known. This approach is rather
reminiscent of the time of ideological confrontation during the “Cold War” era,
where in their recriminations, the parties tried to count literally all military
actions by an adversary, while “forgetting” their own actions. For example, it has
been asserted that during the 200 years of its history, the United States fought in
over 200 wars, taking into account “minor” ones.6 One may, therefore, think that
wars have played a lesser role in Russia’s history than they have in the history of
other countries. It should be noted that in terms of the aggregate time spent on
fighting wars, Russia little differs from other countries – that is, if we take into
account only large, “major” wars. However, first, minor wars, for example, wars
between principalities in the 11th-15th centuries, were often very cruel and devastating, and second, a number of major wars involved extremely serious consequences and implications, which was not the case with respect to other countries:
e.g. the Mongol Tatar invasion (the destruction of statehood), the PolishSwedish intervention in the early 17th century (disintegration of statehood),
World War I (the downfall of the ruling regime and as a result of that, a revolution and civil war), and the Great Patriotic War (an economic and demographic
catastrophe).
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Oftentimes, wars wreaked destruction and waste with fire and sword on the
entire or substantial part of the country’s territory, reducing everything to rubble
and ashes. For example, Mongol-Tatar hordes spread across Ancient Russia,
burning down towns and settlements, destroying culture, turning fields into
deserts, and forcing people to flee in panic. That had a long term and deeply negative impact on the nation’s life and its mentality.
It should be noted that internecine wars of the 11th-15th centuries caused far
greater damage than did wars with external enemies. The pattern was repeated in
the early 17th century, during the Time of Troubles, when “the war of all against
all” brought far greater damage and destruction than had the Polish and Swedish
intervention, and only the unification of the people helped drive away the external aggressor. This is a good example showing that any intervention is based on
the weakness of the victim of aggression (the aggression by Nazi Germany in
1941 with its erroneous assessment of the Soviet Union’s military capability was
not an exception here). The pattern was also repeated in 1918-1922, when Russia’s entire Eurasian part was a field of a large scale civil war and military intervention, which took a toll of 15 million lives. In 1941-1945, the largest battles
of World War II, as well as of mankind’s entire history, unfolded on Russian soil. The country lost around 27 million people—an unheard of human loss
in the history of wars. Were there wars comparable in scale in Western Europe,
starting from the Middle Centuries?
Not in Great Britain, not in the Scandinavian countries; in Spain, the Moor
invasion and the subsequent Reconquista of the 8th-15th centuries (the loss and
subsequent restoration of statehood); in France, the Hundred Years War, 13371453 (the relative loss and restoration of statehood); in Germany (the territory of
German states), the Thirty Years War of 1618-1648 (catastrophic demographic
losses: the war claimed two-thirds of the population of Central Europe), and then
something similar happened in World War II (the loss of the country and the
colossal human losses—9 mln out of 70 mln); in Poland, three divisions of the
country in the late 18th century (true, with a minimum loss of human life) and
the cruel ordeal of World War II (the loss of 600,000 human lives out of the country’s 6 mln population before the war). There is no getting away from the fact
that Russia (the USSR) suffered the heaviest losses in the 20th century (in
absolute figures).
The question arises: Is there a criterion to provide a general assessment of
the role that wars have played in the history of this country? A concrete gauge, a
yardstick here could be: the real scale, depth and vector of the changes that wars
brought to the life of the Russian people; the amount of material and intellectual resources spent on waging them; and the significance of the aggregate results
of wars for the life of the current and succeeding generations.7 Based on these
criteria, it is possible to give a generalized assessment of the historical role of the
military activity of our people and the state on a whole, as well as in separate
wars.
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However, war is not only about military action, but it is also an extremely
strenuous effort in the economic sphere to provide the warring masses with all
that is needed: weapons, food, gear, equipment, transport, and so on, and so forth.
From the 16th-18th centuries, the military economy—i.e., a specific part of the
national economy serving the state’s military needs, which for its part, facilitated the development of both the economy per se and the development of entire
regions and the creation of new populated centers—was developing at an intensive pace. Initially, the purely “military” areas were the southern fortified line
(against the Crimean Tatars: Line 1, Kaluga—Tula—Ryazan; Line 2, Belgorod—Voronezh—Volga; Line 3, Little Russian Cossack lands) and the Urals.
Tula, Izhevsk, Yekaterinburg, Kovrov, and many other cities emerged as military
production centers and remained such.
The proportion of the military sectors of industry and military spending was
constantly growing, reflecting a general trend in the world as a whole. If in the 19th
century, an average of 8-14% of the national income of warring states was spent on
wars, in World War I, the proportion rose to 15.5-37%, and in World War II it was
as follows: in the United States, 43%; Great Britain, 55.7%, and Germany, 67.8%.8
In the Soviet Union, 65-68% of all products manufactured in 1941-1945 were
designed for military purposes.9 The USSR, which had a smaller technological and
production capacity, produced almost double the amount of weapons and military
equipment, also of superior quality, than Nazi Germany with all of the resources of
the West European states that it had occupied. How? In the USSR, literally all
spheres of life were under the control of the state and the [Communist] party, and
therefore, its mobilization resources were incomparably higher. The people’s living conditions and their personal interests came not even second, but last on the list
of priorities. Here is a well known example: Industrial plants that were evacuated
[from central Russia to the east of the country] started operating literally without a
roof over the workers heads, without any adequate housing or household infrastructure. That was only natural: Such were the tough conditions and circumstances
of the war time: “Everything for the front, everything for victory!”
Wars demanded the maximum possible contribution from the sciences, culture, arts, literature, and the people’s intellectual and spiritual resources. Even the
oldest known Russian chronicles are devoted to the fight against external enemies: Zadonshchina [region beyond the Don River], The Tale of Mamay Slaughter, and, needless to say, The Lay of Igor’s Campaign—the first ideological
poem. It contains not only an appeal for unity but also a veiled political appeal
to the rulers of the Russian state, identifying the concrete target of a general, all
out war—the Golden Horde.10 A colossal role was also played by official ideology, which, within the framework of the historical era and the contemporary
political system, prioritized the goal of maintaining the regime, giving second
priority to the support and justification of wars. Orthodoxy served as a base for
the fight against “infidels,” at certain historical periods playing an exceptional
role (for example, the activity of Sergei of Radonezh in the fight against the
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Golden Horde). The “Moscow is the third Rome” political and ideological postulate played its role in strengthening statehood in the numerous wars of the 15th17th centuries. A series of wars of the 19th-20th centuries were fought under the
slogan “For Faith, Tsar, and Motherland.” Class ideology “covered” around 60
wars and military operations from 1917 till 1991.
In order to understand the price of wars that Russia fought, it is important to
know the level of human losses. More or less complete data are only available
on military [personnel] losses, but even they provide a horrifying picture. Russia lost on the battlefields: in the 17th century, 150,000 people; in the 18th century, 550,000 (killed or injured); in the Napoleonic wars (1805-1814), 90,000
(killed); from 1815 until 1914, 192,000 were killed or died of their wounds;11 in
World War I (1914-1918), 2,254,369;12 in wars and armed conflicts from 1922
until 1940, 140,336; in the Great Patriotic War, 11,944,100; from 1946 until
1991, 17,453; in conflicts outside the Russian Federation, from 1991 until 2000,
496 people. It is important to note that these include only “external” conflicts,
and therefore, do not include losses as a result of internal wars and conflicts: the
Civil War, armed revolts, nationalist movements, and finally, wars in the North
Caucasus: in the first war in Chechnya alone (1994-96), the RF Armed Forces,
Interior Ministry [internal] troops, and the Federal Security Service lost 5,552
personnel.13
These figures only reflect military, combat losses. As for civilian losses, it is
almost impossible to count them. For example, it is known that in the 16th-early
18th century, up to 10,000 Russian slaves captured during the numerous incursions into Russia were sold in Crimean markets a month. The Northern War,
waged by Peter the Great (1700-1721), reduced Russia’s population by one-third.
Napoleon’s invasion in 1812 claimed around 140,000 civilian lives in the
Smolensk region alone.14 Wars of the 20th century took a heavy toll of the civilian population. Nevertheless, it is wrong to regard wars only from a moralistic
perspective, as an absolute evil. Many of them were inevitable, necessary and
played a positive role in the history of our state. Without the bloody and “barbarous” work of many preceding generations, our people would simply not
have survived, and there would have been no Russia as an independent
state. In the fire of endless wars, ancient Slavic tribes were coalescing into a
great nation. Princes, tsars and emperors created a great power with a superior material and intellectual culture, which more than just once saved other
nations and mankind as a whole from military catastrophes.
External wars, at first, helped to seize and develop vast tracts of land and to
create a great state with a powerful military force, and then, on numerous occasions, they helped to eliminate threats to Europe and the world as a whole from
Mongol and Tatar hordes, the Napoleonic empire, and the Nazi “Ubermensch.” From the viewpoint of the development of civilization, the wars of annexation waged by Ancient Rome facilitated the spread of culture and law. The
appearance and expansion of Islam through aggression was conducive to the dis-
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semination of medicine, astronomy, and poetry. The wars waged by Charles the
Great brought about the concept of “a single Europe.” If it was not for the
USSR, which was capable of standing up to Hitler’s monstrous war
machine, mankind would have been thrown back an entire century, and possibly even more.
After World War II, our citizens were involved in probably all armed conflicts around the world, oftentimes very far away from their state borders. The
Soviet state supported all those who declared their fight against imperialism with
the provision of large scale supplies of arms, ammunition, military advisors and
specialists, as well as by sending troops to take part in combat operations (e.g.,
Egypt, 1970-1972). Military supplies to socialist states and “Third World” countries at the time cost the USSR 3.5 billion rubles. That further militarized the
country’s already over-militarized economy, straining and undermining its financial system, and worsening the people’s living standards. At the cost of their deteriorating situation, our state and our people helped to advance the social and
national liberation as well as revitalization of many previously enslaved nations.
The military efforts of our state along those lines not only were not in vain but
are to date revered by some peoples in the world as a great and selfless contribution to expanding their socio-political struggles. In hindsight, one can make
an absolutely objective assessment of such efforts. By the late 1970s, around 40
countries in the world had declared their socialist orientation. By the late 1990s,
only four countries had preserved their course (Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and
China), but during that time this country had itself changed greatly.
It is indicative that of the aforementioned four countries, China, having
armed itself with Soviet made weapons and military equipment, declared the
USSR to be its No. 1 enemy, and it was not until after it embarked on the path of
capitalism that it returned to peaceful coexistence with its northern neighbor. A
number of countries shifted to the enemy camp when the USSR was still around
(Somalia, Indonesia). Many countries, having used our selfless aid, built their
economies and started pursuing an independent policy, which was often hostile
toward the USSR (Egypt, Algeria, Laos). Following the breakup of the Soviet
Union, many countries, in the absence of military and economic assistance, succumbed to civil war with the ensuing troubles (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique).
Huge economic, financial and human resources went down the drain. What
remained of those efforts were only the images of the Kalashikov assault rifle on
the state emblems of certain states (Mozambique). The most interesting thing is
that such an approach to foreign policy and military “assistance” had also been
typical previously, when international activities were based on some preposterous “redemptive” ideas. History repeats itself with a remarkable similarity.
Emperors Alexander I (1801-1925) and Nikolay [Nicholas] I (1825-1855)
adhered to the policy of the so called Holy Alliance, based on the idea of saving
Europe from revolution, and preserving monarchies, even to the detriment of
own [national] interests. However, those were not political or economic interests,
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but abstract, ideal interests. It is noteworthy that history repeated itself even in
“trivia.” After routing Napoleon and freeing Europe from his domination,
Russia achieved unprecedented military might and international prestige. But
instead of using that for the benefit of the country (after all, the main foreign policy goal has always been and will always be the creation of favorable conditions
for domestic development), Russia embarked on the path of wasting its resources
for the sake of Europe within the so called Holy Alliance. A similar situation
occurred after the victory in the Great Patriotic War, following the establishment
of a socialist system in Europe.
In the 19th century, Europe’s leading countries were almost immediately
faced with the goal of eliminating Russia’s influence: The Vienna Congress
(1815), where a postwar order in Europe was discussed, saw the establishment
of a military alliance of Great Britain, Austria and France directed against Russia and Prussia. Likewise, the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences (1945) finalized
not only the dissolution of Nazi Germany and establishment of a postwar order
in Europe, but also became the first steps toward the Cold War. In 1829, Russia
chose not to finish off Turkey only because that was at variance with the principles of monarchism, but when Nicholas I thought better of it in 1853, it was
already too late. In 1849, Russia helped to put down a revolution in Hungary,
thus saving the Austrian empire, which, “in gratitude for that,” already in 1853,
became Russia’s bitter enemy, until the time when both empires crashed (in 1917
and 1918). As mentioned earlier, the USSR spent significant resources on supporting the idea of the triumph of “the world revolution” and proving the superiority of the socialist idea over the capitalism idea.15
Needless to say, the extensive military activity conducted by many generations, like in no other sphere, was accompanied by a good deal of actions that
could be described as ill considered, unbalanced, unnecessary and irrational.
Some wars were not inevitable and could have been prevented. Oftentimes, Russia was not sufficiently prepared to repulse aggressive attacks or, quite the contrary, to conduct successful offensive operations. True, the criteria for assessing
its preparedness for war are rather complex. The principal indicators of preparedness (on unpreparedness) are as follows: the military-economic capability;
the military budget; the availability of a powerful army and navy armed with
modern weapons; well trained and prepared military personnel, primarily command personnel; sufficient supplies of weapons, strategic reserves, infrastructure
and other reserves; and a well thought through foreign policy. Paradoxically,
even in wars for which Russia was well prepared, initially, the enemy managed
to achieve the maximum possible result (1812 and 1941-1945). Although [Russia’s] readiness was to a very large degree predetermined by a high level of danger, nevertheless, at the initial stages of war, the enemy turned out to be stronger,
better trained and more experienced.
In the 1812 Patriotic War, for which Russia had started making preparations
in 1810, the enemy advanced as far as Moscow, while the Russian army sus-
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tained huge losses in manpower and materiel. After the fall of Moscow and in the
course of a forced undeclared truce, a virtually new army was formed, which
drove out Napoleon’s hordes.16 The pattern was repeated during the Great Patriotic War. A colossal military economy had been created, as had been armed
forces and strategic reserves, which were effectively wiped out by September
1941. Starting with 1942, the war effort was picked up and carried on by what
was essentially a new Red Army.17
Another example of the country’s preparedness (unpreparedness) are the
Russo-Turkish wars waged by Catherine the Great (the so-called 1st and 2nd
Wars). The first (1768-1774) broke out unexpectedly to Russia, on the initiative
of the Ottoman Empire; Russia had bogged down fast [on the battlefields] in
Poland (intervention in support of “dissidents”—i.e., Poland’s Orthodox nationals, which subsequently led the country to ruin and destruction), and no one
expected a strike from the south. But after rallying, Russia delivered a series of
powerful strikes on land and at sea, advancing to the Danube and the Aegean Sea,
while the Russian Navy (squadrons under the command of A.G. Orlov and G.A.
Spiridonov) all those years dominated the central and eastern parts of the
Mediterranean.
As for the second war (1787-1791), Russia started making preparations for
it almost immediately after the first one ended, and its results proved to be brilliant: A.V. Suvorov’s strikes on land (Kliburn, Fokshany, Rymnik, and Izmail)
and F.F. Ushakov’s at sea (Kerch, Tendra, and Kaliakria) routed the Turkish
Army and Navy. Turkey abandoned its claims to the Crimea (it was annexed to
Russia in 1783 without a war). Russia’s newly created Black Sea Fleet became a
dominant force in the Black Sea. Russia’s new border was established along the
Dnestr River (southwest) and the Kuban (southeast).18
What is also very important in this context is the assessment of the preparedness of the country and its armed forces for war in the eyes of its ruling circles, not as seen by future historians. For example, Nicholas I was convinced of
his strength and was not afraid of war in 1853;19 Nicholas II entered the war in
1914, honestly believing in victory (he even issued orders that special uniforms
be designed for a victory parade in Berlin, including the subsequently famous
Budyonny broadcloth helmets, styled to look like those of ancient Russian warriors).20 The results of such mistakes by the country’s rulers about its preparedness for war: the defeat in the Crimea in 1855 and the downfall of the Russian
empire in 1917. It also has to be acknowledged that Russia has on numerous
occasions used military force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. The people of the USSR and the Russian Federation regard themselves as quite peaceful
and do not wish anyone to experience the horrors of war, but facts—especially
as seen by the “West”—speak otherwise.
If we look at Russia’s history starting from 1700, every quarter century “we”
invaded Europe, which in the eyes of the country and its rulers, was well justified. In the course of the Northern War (1700-1721), Russian troops repeatedly
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interfered in the affairs of small German states: From Peter the Great’s perspective, we were helping our possible allies, whereas from “Europe’s” perspective,
Russia was demonstrating its Great Powerism.21 In 1735, the Russian expedition
to the Rhine in support of Austria in its war with France, was appreciated neither
by the French nor by the Austrians themselves (in their opinion, Russia should
not have dictated its terms in Europe). In 1748, there was another expedition to
the Rhine with the same goals and the same results. Then there was the Seven
Years War (1756-1763) (for Russia, 1757-1761), in which the Austrians tried
hard to force Russia to follow their interests, while “Europe as a whole” understood very well that Russia in that war was serving Austria’s interests. In 17681794, Russia became actively involved in Polish affairs, contributing to the
demise of that state (three divisions of Poland—in 1772, 1774 and 1795). In
1799, the Russian army, in Germany and Italy, routed the French (A.V. Suvorov’s
brilliant campaign), while the Russian navy established its supremacy in the
Mediterranean (the expedition and victories by F.F. Ushakov): Austria and England made tremendous efforts to get rid of such an ally.22 In 1805, 1806-1807 and
1813-1814, Russia moved into Europe in its deadly war with Napoleon. The outcome: France, Austria and England forged a military alliance against Russia in
1815. In 1827, the Russian navy acquired supremacy in the Aegean Sea and the
eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea in support of an uprising in Greece. As
soon as the Russian, English, and French squadrons routed the Turkish fleet in
the Navarino Sea Battle (08.10.1827), England and France sent their fleets to the
Mediterranean Sea, just in case, to neutralize the Russians.23 In 1830 and 1831,
Russia put down an uprising in Poland. In 1849, the Russian army, at Austria’s
request, invaded revolutionary Hungary: in “gratitude” for that, in 1853, Austria
presented Russia with an extremely hostile ultimatum (in the course of the
Crimean War). In 1863 and 1864, Polish troops were routed once again, and once
again France and England undertook military demarches.
How much did those wars benefit Russia economically, politically or socially? In the opinion of the present authors, not very much. The outcome of those
wars was sometimes territorial expansion (the main territorial enlargement
occurred in a number of other wars than those mentioned above) and some short
term political gains. Just as often, the ruling authorities made fatal mistakes and
errors in military affairs. All of that resulted in further manpower and financial
losses. Very often, even the state’s successes eventually turned into bitter defeats:
And that is one of the principal factors in the impact of wars on a country’s development.
What is the logic of historical events here? “The art of war has to deal with
living and with moral forces; the consequence of which is that it can never attain
the absolute and positive.”24 This means that some achievements in the military
sphere can never be final and absolute. If, in addition to that, we take into
account economic development, political relations and social factors, we can
come to the conclusion that the military is the most unstable and constantly
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changing sphere. The main contradiction in the evolution of the military sphere
is the fact that, in the opinion of some historians, the military is by far the most
conservative element. Not surprisingly, as the saying goes, the military always
makes preparations for past wars. Why? Any victory is not only about the activity of military leaders, commanders, and generals, but also about the strategic,
tactical and organizational decisions that contribute to success. They become a
guarantee of future victories and the confidence that they should be followed also
in the future. If victories that have been attained lead to the impressive successes of the armed forces and the state itself, we believe that leads to the automatic
ossification of a country’s military theory.
On the other hand, those who have suffered a defeat start actively searching
for means and methods of taking revenge, which facilitates the development not
only of the armed forces but very often also the development of the state per se
(a case in point is Japan after 1945), whereas the “victor” starts lagging behind
in military organization, blindly believing in the immutability of his absolute
principles. Here are a few examples. The victories attained by the Spanish army
(the late 16th-early 17th century) led to the “mothballing” of both the army itself
and the state as a whole; the result: a complete lack of military capability by the
late 17th century amid the rapid advancement of the military sphere [elsewhere]
in Europe.25 Frederick II, the king of Prussia (1740-1786), created the best army
in Europe and achieved very spectacular results in a number of wars that he
waged; the outcome: the army remained as it was, unchanged, until the
Napoleonic wars, when the principles of warfare of the mid-17th century had
become archaic. Prussia was routed within a space of just two weeks, in 1806.26
England won a number of victories in wars of the 18th century, as well as in
the war with Napoleon, and its military organization, based on principles and
methods of the mid-18th century, remained unchanged until the mid- 19th century, subsequently becoming the most anachronistic army in Europe. It took the
Crimean campaign for it to start reforming its military. True, England was lucky:
it was separated from Europe by the Channel and had the largest and best navy
in the world, which prevented it from falling prey to its hostile neighbors. France,
after winning a victory in World War I, stayed at the level of positional fighting
concepts; the outcome: its compete routing by Nazi Germany within a space of
two weeks in 1940. Meanwhile, the French army had been considered to be the
most powerful in Europe.
Nor did Russia escape such a pattern. Its truly spectacular victory in the
Northern War (1700 through 1721) from the development of the ground forces
until the Russians started sustaining huge losses in a number of wars with the
Ottoman Empire (1735-1739 and 1768-1774), and it was only G.A. Potyomkin’s
reforms that were able to effectively rectify the situation.27 Emperor Pavel’s
army attained a number of brilliant victories in 1799. But then that army (the
same in its organization) encountered Napoleon’s army in 1805, the most
advanced army at the time. However, A.V. Suvorov was no more, while the army
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had become hopelessly obsolete. The result: the defeat in the Battle of Austerlitz.28 In the course of the subsequent Napoleonic wars (1806-1807, 1809, 1812,
and 1813-1814), the Russian army gained extensive experience, acquired new
organization, weapons and a brilliant constellation of generals. But time went on,
while Russia entered into the Crimean war in 1853 with the same army, despite
the progress that had been made [elsewhere] during that time (it had lived
according to the traditions of past wars for almost 40 years). The outcome: a devastating defeat, but on the other hand, the country’s entire state structure was
reformed in order to enhance its defense capability—Alexander II’s reforms.
True, it is also essential in this context to point to yet another impact of [military] victories – specifically, on the development of a country’s political system.
In contemporary perception, any victory proved the superiority, as it were, not
only of the armed forces that had won that victory, but also the superiority of
state organization, and that, in the view of the present authors, was one of the
most important factors in the ossification of the military and society. Prussia after
Frederick II, in its socio-political structure and organization, remained
unchanged until the mid-19th century, while Russia’s numerous and glorious victories froze its development until the 1860s. As a matter of fact, except for some
insignificant changes, by 1861, Russia was the same as it had been in 1725 (the
year Peter the Great died). On the other hand, Sweden, which had been defeated
by Peter the Great, started developing more intensively economically as well as
politically.
This pattern came through on a larger scale after the Great Patriotic War, in
which the Soviet Union had lost almost 27 million people and one-third of its
national wealth. That was probably the worst loss that has ever befallen our
people, and to date, there is no greater holiday than May 9, Victory Day.
Therefore, the development of a country and its armed forces, its foreign
policy and the wars that it has waged should be considered in their dialectic
unity, in close interconnection with its domestic problems and foreign political factors. History at different periods poses its own goals, and they were
addressed the way they were perceived and understood by the ruling authorities.
It is quite evident that defeats also make a significant impact on a country’s
development. As far as Russia is concerned, a classic example of the impact of
war on the country’s development was its defeat in the Crimean War (18531856). When entering into that war, the Russian political elite were absolutely
convinced of Russia’s military and political superiority over its enemies.
Reality turned out to be different. Instead of a triumphant entry into Constantinople, there was the shameful Paris Peace Treaty. Most importantly, the ruling circles became aware of Russia’s backwardness, and as a result of that, the
reforms of the 1860s and the 1870s in all spheres of life, and victory in the
Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) (incidentally, due to the “timid” foreign policy
of Alexander II and his much praised chancellor, A.M. Gorchakov, as well as
tough counteraction on the part of England and France, Russia failed to derive
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significant dividends from that victory). At the same time, Turkey was on the
verge of surrender (the corps under the command of Gen. M.D. Skobelev was
ready to stake Istanbul). The resolution of Russia’s perennial problem of Black
Sea straits was quite possible, but that did not happen.
Military history shows that even defeat in one separate battle can bring
about drastic reforms in a country—for example, the crushing defeat in the battle of Narva, on November 19, 1700. It is well known that happened after that—
the Petrine reforms, which in effect created a new, European-type army and a
new state.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that on the whole, wars have helped
resolve the fundamental problems of survival, creation of historical space for the
creative activity of our people, and opening great prospects for the future. It is
the duty of the current generation, as well as of succeeding generations, to
remember about the past wars so as to be able to use their experience to achieve
victories in future wars for the glory of Russia and for the sake of strengthening its might and authority in the world.
NOTES:
1. K. Klauzevits, O voyne, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1941, p. 42.
2. K. Klauzevits, O voyne, p. 43.
3. S. Modestov, “Uroki geopoliticheskoy istorii Rossii,” Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye,
No. 4, 1997, p. 4.
4. Antologiya otechestvennoy voyennoy mysli. M., 1998.
5. V.V. Serebryakov, Voyny Rossii: sotsialno-politicheskiy analiz, Nauchnyy mir Publishers,
1998, p. 10.
6. T.K. Belashchenko, SShA: 200 let—200 voyn, Voyenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1982. p. 32.
7. V.V. Serebryannikov, Voyny Rossii: sotsialno-politicheskiy analiz, Nauchnyy mir Publishers,
Moscow, 1998, p. 11.
8. Sovetskaya voennaia entsiklopediya, vol. 8, Voyenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 568.
9. Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945 gg. Entsiklopediya, Sov. Entsiklopediya,
Moscow, 1985, p. 815.
10. L.N. Gumilev, V poiskakh vymyshlennogo tsarstva, St. Petersburg, 1994, pp. 262-297.
11. B.Ts. Urlanis, Istoriya voennykh poter’, Poligon Publishers, Moscow, 1994.
12. Rossiya i SSSR v voynakh 20 veka. Poteri vooruzhennykh sil, Olma press Publishers,
Moscow, 2001, p. 100.
13. Op cit., pp., 213, 246, 541, 594, 583.
14. Rodina, No.6-7, 1992, p. 176.
15. Rossiya (SSSR) v lokalnykh voynakh i voyennykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny 20 veka,
Kuchkovo pole Publishers, Moscow, 2000.
16. E.V. Tarle, Nashestviye Napoleona na Rossiyu. 1812, Feniks Publishers, Moscow, 1994;
L.P. Bogdanov, Russkaya armiya v 1812 g. Voyenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1979; N.A. Troitskiy, 1812—Velikiy god Rossii, Moscow, 1988.
17. Istoriya Vtoroy mirovony voiny, in 12 vlms, Moscow, 1973-1978.
18. Voennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar. Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1983, p. 847.
19. A.M. Zayonchkovskiy, Vostochnaya voyna 1853-1856, Poligon Publishers, St. Petersburg
2002.
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20. M.K. Kasvinov, Dvadtsat tri stupeni vniz, Alma Ata, 1989; A.A. Kersnovskiy, Istoriya
russkoy armii, Golos Publishers, Moscow, 1992, vol. 4.
21. N.N. Molchanov, Diplomatiya Petra Pervogo, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya Publishers,
Moscow, 1986.
22. E.V. Tarle, Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom more, Feniks Publishers, Moscow, 1994.
23. Istoriya flota gosudarstva rossiyskogo, Terra Publishers, Moscow, 1996. vol. 1, p. 99.
24. K.O. Klauzevits, O voyne, p. 41.
25. G. Delbruk, Istoriya voennogo iskusstva v ramkakh politicheskoy istorii, in 4 vlms, Voenizdat Publishers, 1938, vol. 4.
26. K. Klauzevits, 1806 god, Voyenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1937; Yu.N. Kryuchkov, “Prusskaya voyennaya sistema i eye vliyaniye na organizatsiyu russkoy armii 18-seredina 19 vv.,” In:
Voyennaya organizatsiya i voyennoye delo Rossii i stran Zapadnoy Yevropy 18-nachala 20 vv.,
VU MO RF, Moscow, 1998.
27. A.A. Kersnovskiy, Istoriya russkoy armii, in 4 vlms, Golos Publishers, Moscow, 1992, vol. 1,
p. 116.
28. Ibid., p. 194.