From Symmetrical Bicameralism to Which Model?
The Constitutional Reform and the Second Chamber in Comparative Perspective
Michelangelo Vercesi*
[email protected]
Paper prepared for the panel ‘Il Parlamento italiano al bivio della riforma costituzionale: un’occasione per riflettere
sull’evolversi degli studi parlamentari in Italia’, chaired by Andrea Pedrazzani and Luca Pinto, XXX Annual Meeting of
the Italian Political Science Association, Milan, 15-17 September 2016.
1. Introduction
This paper deals with the relationship between the lower and upper chamber in the Italian
parliament. Moreover, it aims to provide insights on how the role of the upper house in the
executive-legislative arena should change, according to the Renzi-Boschi constitutional reform.1
This constitutional law was approved by the parliament in April 2016 and will be subjected to a
binding popular referendum before 2017.
The crucial role that parliaments play in modern liberal-democracies makes the topic
particularly relevant for the legislative studies with a focus on Italy. The well-known model of
parliamentary democracy as a system of delegation and accountability (Strøm 2003) places
parliaments at the core of the chain of delegation, between voters (parliament’s principal) and
prime ministers (parliament’s agent) and cabinets. Battegazzorre (2011: 467) stresses the role
of democratic parliaments as sources of systemic stabilization. With regard to the Italian political
system, scholars have underlined the centrality of the legislature in the political process during
the republican period, especially before the breakdown of the former party system in the early
1990s (e.g., Cotta 1994).
The origins of the Italian parliament date back to the proclamation of the Reign of Italy
in 1861. The new unitary State was born by virtue of the unification of some Italian territories
under the rule of the former Reign of Sardinia. From this reign, Italy inherited the octroyée
*
Center for the Study of Democracy, Leuphana University Lüneburg.
The current Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and the Minister for Constitutional Reforms and Relationships with the
Parliament Maria Elena Boschi are the two main official proponents of the reform.
1
1
Constitution (the Statuto Albertino) of 1848 and its the bicameral parliament (De Micheli and
Verzichelli 2004). The Statuto remained the Italian formal constitutional reference even during
the Fascist period. However, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the monarchy was
replaced by a republican State through a popular referendum (1946). A Constituent Assembly
was elected and its members decided to preserve bicameralism: the 1948 Constitution (still in
effect) provides that the legislature be made up of directly elected lower (Chamber of Deputies)
and upper (Senate) houses with equal powers and functions, making Italy ‘the last of the
identical [paritari] bicameral parliamentary systems’ (Pasquino 1992: 18).
Since the very beginning of the republican period, the parity between the chambers has
been being highly disputed in the public debate: the Italian bicameralism is still ‘one of the
unsolved cruxes of the Constitution’ (Barbera 2004: 37). According to Russell (2001b: 454),
Italian politicians ‘are supportive of bicameralism in principle, but want a second chamber with
a more distinct composition and functions’. Parliamentary bicameral committees attempted to
revise the institutional setting of the Republic in 1983-85, 1993-94, and 1997-98. However, none
of these attempts were successful (Pasquino 2002: 74-75; Bull 2015. See also Russell and
Sandford [2002]). The parliament could instead approve the replacement of the Senate with a
‘federal chamber’ in 2005, but the reform was rejected by the electorate via a popular
referendum in 20062 (Bull and Pasquino 2007). In 2013, the then Prime Minister Letta asked a
group of experts (ten ‘wise men’) to propose a broad institutional reform, but the reforming
process was blocked by inter-party disagreements (Bull 2016).
When in February 2014 the current Prime Minister Renzi sworn in, he presented the
abolition of the symmetrical bicameralism as one the distinctive goals of the new cabinet’s
program (Marangoni and Verzichelli 2014). Finally, on 12 April 2016 the Italian legislature
approved the constitutional reform,3 which redefines the relations between the central State
and regions and introduces a Senate hollowed out of some legislative prerogatives and
representative of sub-national institutions.
What type of bicameralism does this reform introduce? Will the Italian Senate become
more similar or dissimilar to other upper chambers in parliamentary democracies? How does
2
Article 138 of the Italian Constitution states that constitutional changes must be approved twice by both houses,
with an interval of time of at least three months between the approvals. Should the change not be approved the
second time by a two-third majority, but only by an absolute majority, a referendum can be requested by one-fifth of
one of the two houses, 500.000 voters, or five regional councils. In that case, the approval of the majority of valid
votes is necessary for the entry into force.
3 ‘Via libera definitivo alla riforma costituzionale. Ora l’ultima parola ai cittadini con il referendum.’ In La Stampa, 12
April
2016,
http://www.lastampa.it/2016/04/12/italia/politica/rush-finale-per-la-riforma-costituzionale-leopposizioni-non-voteranno-BpWSbGzC3NRab0wJGo49GO/pagina.html.
2
this reform affect the distribution of power between parliament and executive? Where is the
Italian parliamentarism going? This paper seeks to answer these questions. In the following
section, I present a theoretical framework for the comparative study of bicameral legislatures in
parliamentary democracies. Subsequently, I analyze the structural and functional features of the
Italian Senate as it is and as it should be according to the reform. The fourth section deals with
methodological issues, whereas the fifth compares Italy and other parliamentary democracies
based on the theoretical framework and points out the direction of the prospective changes.
The implications for the relationship between the executive and legislature are discussed in the
conclusions.
2. A Framework for the Study of Upper Chambers
2.1 Bicameral Parliaments and the Functions of Upper Chambers
Only a minority of countries in the world rely on bicameral parliaments. According to the
information gathered by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, their number is 77 out 193 (39.9%) in
2016. In Europe, the ratio decreases to 35.4 percent.4 Historically, modern European
bicameralism emerged as a tool to moderate the democratic element of the elected chambers
(lower houses) by means of an aristocratic chamber (upper house), made up of hereditary or
appointed members (Shell 2001; Barbera 2004). Nowadays, the presence of second chambers5
seems especially likely in large and decentralized States, where senators represent territorial
interests (Patterson and Mughan 1999; Russell 2001a; Taagepera 2003). However, the range of
interests represented in contemporary upper houses varies to a great extent: from those of
linguistic minorities in Belgium to the interests of the Church in the United Kingdom and those
of vocational categories in Ireland (Borthwick 2001: 22-23). Second chambers are veto players
in the policy-making process and they can be sources of consensus and scrutiny of the
government (Russell 2001b).
Comparative legislative studies have dealt with bicameral parliaments from two main
viewpoints: functional and structural (Blondel 1973; Polsby 1975; Mezey 1979; Mattson and
Strøm 1995; Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2006; Pasquino and Pelizzo 2006). On the one hand, it
4
Data are available online: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/ParliamentsStructure.asp?REGION=All&LANG=ENG. Latest
access on 30 August 2016.
5 For comparison’s sake, I use first as synonym of lower and second as synonym of upper to distinguish between
parliamentary branches. Democratic lower houses are the main branches and are always directly elected.
Terminological confusion can be provoked by the Dutch case, where the lower house is called Second Chamber
(Tweede Kamer), whereas the upper chamber is called First Chamber (Eerste Kamer).
3
is argued that second chambers fulfill (or should fulfill) a couple of basic functions; on the other
hand, the extent to which these functions are fulfilled would depend on the structure and the
formal prerogatives of the upper houses. As Norton (1998: 205) has pointed out, the internal
arrangement of legislatures has – albeit along with external variables – an independent effect
on the outcomes of the political cycle. However, it is worth noting that focusing only on the
upper house is not sufficient to understand its added impact. First, second chambers should be
studied in relation to their lower counterparts; second, as Scully (2001: 96) has stated, ‘the most
important point that must be understood with regard to relations between the first and second
chamber in any parliamentary system of government is that they cannot be understood as
separate from executive-legislative relations. […] And in turn, executive-legislative relations are
impossible to understand in practice without recourse to the concept of party.’ Parties organize
MPs’ behaviors and define the lines of political division within the chambers.
Scholars generally agree that second chambers share with their institutional siblings
three broad functions. The first is the representative function. Representation can be conceived
of as morphological (representation of groups or communities), sociological (reflection of voters’
socio-demographic characteristics), and political (reflection of voters’ ideological and party
orientations). The other two functions concern the legislative activity and the control of the
government (Cotta et al. 2001: 318-326; Battegazzorre 2011). Following Sartori (1995: 250),
however, we can group these two functions under the same heading of control, either legislative
or political (i.e., of the government).
The assessment of the effective fulfillment of these functions ultimately results in the
observation of the chamber’s activities, even with regard to the representative function. As
Battegazzorre (2011: 447-448) has pointed out, the concept of representation implies the idea
of active promotion of interests. In empirical research, thus, ‘the representative function loses
distinctiveness, fading into the […] control function, and eventually turning out to be absorbed’
(see also Andeweg and Thomassen 2005).
In so far as the parliamentary branch is able to perform its functions against external
resistances, one can depict the chamber, and thus bicameralism, as strong.
2.2. The Dimensions of Upper Chambers’ Strength
Lijphart (2012) has suggested determining the strength of bicameralism mainly based on two
structural dimensions. The first dimension is connected to the formal powers the second
chamber is bestowed on. Similar or even equal constitutional powers make bicameralism
4
stronger. In addition, the author has mentioned, all else being equal, the compositional
incongruence between the two parliamentary branches as a further dimension (see also
Swenden 2004). In particular, the prime source of incongruence would be the
overrepresentation of small territorial unities or minorities. However, Tsebelis (2002) has
pointed out that in modern democratic parliaments, when it comes to shape MPs’ behaviors,
divisions along party lines are likely to overcome territorial differences.
Some scholars have argued that a complete measurement of veto players’ strength
cannot avoid considering the perceived legitimacy among the population, since a lack of
legitimacy can undermine the chance to use the institutional powers (Russell 2013; Heeß 2016).
If, on the contrary, ‘there are no serious legitimacy concerns about the second chamber, the
first two dimensions will in practice determine de facto bicameral strength’ (Russell 2013: 386).
There are two approaches for the study of second chambers’ legitimacy, which can be associated
to inputs, procedures, or outputs. On the one hand, one can follow an empirical way and survey
the perceived legitimacy of institutions. With regard to this, Russell (2013: 375) has proposed to
operationalize the concept as ‘social support.’ However, as Heeß (2016) has stressed, this could
result in measuring the support towards the use of an institution, rather than the perceived
legitimacy. In democracies, a legitimate institutional veto player would be an institution aimed
to fulfill democratic goals, even if not directly elected. Secondly, the equation between
legitimacy and social support can lead to measurement pitfalls, due to the difficulty of measuring
social support over time in comparative analyses. The second approach, instead, posits
normative criteria as proxies of (supposed) perceived legitimacy; this allows relying on a range
of more clear-cut indicators.
I argue that formal powers and membership incongruence are dimensions for the
measurement of the organizational strength of second chambers, whereas legitimacy can be
associated to the notion of authoritative strength. Organizational strength is internal to veto
players; authoritative strength comes from outside the institution. An upper house can have
prerogatives and institutional resources, but, at the same time, be not enough legitimate within
the political system to pursue its prerogatives effectively, and vice versa (cf. Heeß 2016). It is
worth noting that neither the organizational strength nor the authoritative strength per se are
necessary conditions for affecting the political cycle. However, the combined absence of both is
very likely to be a sufficient (but not necessary) condition (Schneider and Wagemann 2012) for
an ineffective role. Based on this argumentation, second chambers can be of four types (Table
1).
5
Table 1. Types of parliamentary second chambers
Low organizational strength
High organizational strength
High authoritative strength
Type 1
Type 2
Low authoritative strength
Type 3
Type 4
Conceptually, these types encompass the scope of both the resources and the
contextual conditions to fulfill the aforementioned parliamentary functions (representation and
control) and the three main dimensions of second chambers’ strength suggested by the
comparative literature (formal power, incongruence, legitimacy). Overall, the four types account
for the power – and thus the influence in the policy-making process – of second chambers. For
empirical purposes, we have to list a set of indicators in order to place lower houses within each
cell.
2.3. The Indicators of Upper Chambers’ Strength
Based on the literature, I construe multiple indicators (Pennings et al. 2006: 69-70) for each
dimension of analysis.
First, formal power originates from both constitutional and other statutory prerogatives.
In parliamentary systems, the characteristic prerogative of the legislature is the power to
confirm and dismiss the government. As a rule, only lower chambers are responsible for (explicit
or tacit) investitures and for no-confidence motions (Patterson and Mughan 2001; Bergman et
al. 2003: 119). Therefore, if a second chamber shared such prerogative, it would be, all else
equal, stronger. Secondly, upper houses can affect the policy-making by means of their
legislative prerogatives. In particular, they can benefit from the power to introduce bills and the
final veto on decisions (Money and Tsebelis 1992; Tsebelis and Rasch 1995). I consider the
possibility to propose amendments that cannot be rejected by the lower house and the absence
of time limits for delaying the legislation as forms of final vetoes. The larger the scope of these
powers in terms of policy fields, the higher the influence.
The second dimension is the membership incongruence between the first and second
chamber. Following Tsebelis and Rasch (1995: 368), I argue that dissimilar partisan compositions
are likely when the two chambers are not selected simultaneously and the respective selection
systems diverge. Moreover, a proxy of (likely) incongruence is the difference between the two
chambers’ representational principle (Heeß 2016).
6
Finally, legitimacy can be observed (presumed) through three indicators. The first is the
direct election of the members of the chamber, that is, their democratic legitimation (Lijphart
2012). Secondly, second chambers can be perceived legitimate in connection with their outputs.
With regard to this, a particular role is that of the morphological representation of territorial
entities or marginalized groups within the society (Krook and O’Brien 2010; Heeß 2016). This
kind of representation can be perceived as complementary to the representation of the polity
as whole, which is typical of first chambers.
In the following section, I present the Italian bicameralism, based on this discussion.
3. The Italian Senate and the Constitutional Reform6
3.1. The Italian Senate as It Is: Structure, Powers, Selection
In line with the general pattern, the Italian second chamber is smaller than the lower house.
However, comparatively, its size is one of the largest (Borthwick 2001: 20): the elected senators
are 315 (while the first chamber is made up of 630 deputies). The Head of State can also appoint
up to five life senators, ‘who have given honor to the Nation with their outstanding
achievements in social, scientific, artistic, and literary fields’ (Article 59 of the Constitution,
translated in Pasquino [2002: 68]). Moreover, former Presidents of the Republic become de jure
life senators. Life senators’ votes on confidence or bills are especially important when the
government enjoys unstable majorities in the chamber, as it has been the case in recent
legislatures (see below). The minimum age to become senator is 40 years, whereas 25 years is
the minimum age to get the right to vote for the Senate (the ages for the Chamber of Deputies
are 21 and 18 years, respectively). Formally, the speaker of the upper house is the second
highest office of the Italian State following the President the Republic (the speaker of the
Chamber of Deputies is instead the third), for whom s/he stands in when the Head of State is
abroad. The legislative term of both the Senate and the Chamber lasts five years, and the
elections for the two houses are held on the same days.7
With regard to the formal powers of the Senate, cabinets need the confidence of both
chambers and must resign even if only one of them withdraws the support. The Senate and the
6
This section is taken, with substantial and stylistic changes, from a part I wrote for the paper ‘The Reform of the
Italian Senate: A Step Back for Women’s Representation?’, coauthored with Pamela Pansardi and presented at the
24th IPSA World Congress of Political Science in Poznań (23-28 July 2016).
7 According to the first version of the Constitution, the legislative term for the Senate was six years. However, after
three simultaneous dissolutions to avoid incongruent majorities between the chambers, the parliament shortened
the duration to five years, as of the 1963 election.
7
Chamber are also co-equal in the legislative process. The power to initiate legislation is shared
and bills must be approved with the same text by the two parliamentary branches. Moreover,
there are no time limits for the approval, and each chamber can delay the process indefinitely.
Disputes between chambers are settled by means of the navette (shuttle) system (Money and
Tsebelis 1992; Zucchini 2008). Finally, the parliamentary committee system of the Senate is as
strong as that of the Chamber (Curini and Zucchini 2014; Pansardi and Vercesi 2016).
Despite formal parity, party politics has been conducive to some differences in terms of
membership. Indeed, party leaders and prime ministers have usually sat in the Chamber of
Deputies. According to Pasquino (2002: 72), two reasons account for this.
‘The first one is very simple. If most party leaders sit in the House of Deputies, then it is likely,
indeed almost assured, that all important debates and confrontations will take place in that
chamber. […] The second reason […] is purely electoral. Up to 1992 the Italian electoral
proportional system was complemented by a number of preference votes the voter could cast.
Hence, famous and powerful candidates could prove their voting-getting ability (being candidates
in up to three, multi-member constituencies) and at the same time could channel votes towards
their party that otherwise would go elsewhere.’
Being candidate for the lower has been the rule for party leaders. However, the two
chambers have recently become similar even in this respect. After five legislative terms in the
lower house, People of Freedom’s leader Silvio Berlusconi entered the Senate in 2013.
Moreover, the current leaders of the largest parties (the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi of the
Democratic Party, Beppe Grillo of the Five Star Movement, and Matteo Salvini of the Northern
League) are not MPs, neither in the Senate nor in the Chamber.8
The selection of senators and deputies is based on the same electoral system9 (Pasquino
2015). From 1948 to the early 1990s, the system was proportional, while in 1994 and 2001 the
general elections were held under a mixed system. In 2005, the parliament approved a new
proportional system with a majority bonus, used for the 2006, 2008 and 2013 elections. It is
worth noting that, with regard to the Senate, the system distributed the seats separately for
each region, whereas the allocation of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies occurred at the
national level. The majority premium thus applied to each region (Chiaramonte 2015). For most
8
The same holds for Silvio Berlusconi, after his expulsion from the Senate in November 2013 resulting from a
conviction for tax fraud. See ‘Silvio Berlusconi non è più senatore. Via libera del Senato alla decadenza. Il Cavaliere:
“Lutto
per
la
democrazia”.’
In
La
Stampa,
27
November
2013,
http://www.lastampa.it/2013/11/27/italia/politica/decadenza-stasera-il-voto-su-berlusconi-cominciata-ladiscussione-in-senato-UZnd9UDRvn1gKXBUKTuNeO/pagina.html.
9 According to Article 57 of the Constitution, senators are to be elected on a regional basis.
8
of the republican period, the two chambers have been congruent in terms of partisan
composition. However, since 1994 higher incongruence has emerged (Table 2).
Table 2. Cabinet support in the two Italian parliamentary chambers, 12th-17th legislative terms
Legislative term
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
Seats controlled by cabinet parties (%)
Chamber of Deputies
Senate
58.1
49.5
0.0
0.0
44.0
48.2
50.3
51.7
48.6
50.8
49.5
51.4
56.1
55.9
55.4
54.6
53.5
47.8
53.3
54.4
0.0
0.0
70.3
69.0
59.2
45.0
Cabinet
Berlusconi I (1994-1995)
Dini (1995-1996)
Prodi I (1996-1998)
D’Alema I (1998-1999)
D’Alema II (1999-2000)
Amato II (2000-2001)
Berlusconi II (2001-2005)
Berlusconi III (2005-2006)
Prodi II (2006-2008)
Berlusconi IV (2008-2011)
Monti (2011-2013)
Letta (2013-2014)
Renzi (2014-)*
* In office at time of writing.
Note: data refer to the date of inauguration.
Sources: Zucchini (2008: 15) and own elaboration of data from Döring and Manow (2016); Senato della Repubblica
(www.senato.it)
The 2005 electoral law was overruled for the most part by the Constitutional Court,
whose decision led to a fully-fledged proportional system. Eventually, on 4 May 2015, the
parliament voted for a new electoral law, which came into force on 1 July 2016. The new system
assures an absolute majority for the most voted list and proportionally allocates the remaining
seats to the other lists (D’Alimonte 2015). However, the provision applies only to the selection
of the first chamber, since the Senate and its role are modified by the constitutional reform.
3.2. The Reform of the Senate: Introducing Asymmetrical Bicameralism
As touched upon, the constitutional reform approved by the parliament in April 2016 has been
conceived and advocated by the executive. The law will enter into force if voters approve it with
the referendum to be held before 2017.
The main changes introduced by the reform concern the centralization of some
competences from sub-national institutions to the central State. Secondly, it revises the Italian
bicameralism deeply.10 The Chamber of Deputies will be the only branch with the power to
10
The full text of the constitutional law ‘Disposizioni per il superamento del bicameralismo paritario, la riduzione del
numero dei parlamentari, il contenimento dei costi di funzionamento delle istituzioni, la soppressione del CNEL e la
revisione del titolo V della parte II della Costituzione’ (GU Serie Generale No. 88, 15-4-2016) is available on the
website
of
the
Italian
Gazzetta
Ufficiale
(official
journal)
of
Italian
laws:
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/stampa/serie_generale/originario. See also ‘Addio province, nuovo Senato e
Federalismo:
ecco
cosa
cambia
con
la
riforma
costituzionale’,
12
April
2016,
http://www.lastampa.it/2016/04/12/italia/politica/addio-bicameralismo-nuovo-senato-e-federalismo-ecco-cosacambia-con-la-riforma-costituzionale-hTL8gvle7Bw6F5aii2aq2I/pagina.html.
9
provide and withdraw the confidence to the cabinet. As for the legislative prerogatives, the
Senate will have full powers only in the field of constitutional laws and other laws with
institutional and European scopes, whereas in ordinary fields it will be able only to solicit
discussions and amendments of bills from the Chamber. The upper house will be able to do it
within 30 days if the decision is taken by one third of the members. However, the lower house
will have the power to refuse any change, although by only the absolute majority of its members
if the bill regards the relations between the central State and the regions.
The new Senate will be made up of 95 senators (74 regional MPs and 21 mayors)
proportionally selected by 19 regional councils and two autonomous provinces (Trento and
Bolzano), based on their partisan composition. Moreover, the Head of State will be able to
appoint up to five senators for seven years, in accordance to the criteria already in effect.
Voters will select the members of the Senate indirectly, when, during regional elections,
they will indicate preferences among the candidates to the regional councils. Regional
assemblies should make their choices in line with these voters’ indications. Each region and the
provinces of Trento and Bolzano will select one representative mayor. Except those appointed
by the President of the Republic, at least two senators will be allocated for each region, based
on the population size. Senators will forfeit their seat when they forfeit their post at the subnational level.
4. Method of Analysis
For the comparative analysis of the Italian second chamber, I cluster the indicators listed above
in two indices defining, respectively, the organizational strength and the authoritative strength
of second chambers. I ascribe an equal theoretical weight to the indicators. I measure the
variables, by assigning the value 1 to the full presence, 0.5 to a partial presence (where
applicable), and 0 to total absence (cf. Ragin 2008). The only exception regards the legislative
prerogatives. The literature has stressed the crucial role of the control of budget bills as a source
of parliamentary influence (Heller 1997; De Giorgi and Verzichelli 2008). Especially with regard
to this policy field, second chambers’ prerogatives can differ from the rest (Money and Tsebelis
1992). For these reasons, I distinguish between prerogatives about budget policies and
prerogatives about other policies, assigning for each sub-indicator a value of only 0.5 for the full
presence and – for non-budget policies – 0.25 for the partial presence. For each dimension, the
relevant values are added and the result is divided by the hypothetically highest total score. The
10
index of organizational strength is the mean of the comprehensive scores of formal power (F)
and membership incongruence (M).
In formal terms, 𝐹 =
∑𝑖 𝑓𝑖
𝑛𝑓
, where f is the value assigned to the ith indicator or sub-
indicator of formal power and nf the total number of variables related to the formal power
dimension. Similarly, 𝑀 =
∑𝑖 𝑚𝑖
𝑛𝑚
, where m is the value assigned to the ith indicator of membership
incongruence and nm the total number of variables related to the relevant dimension. Hence,
the index of organizational strength O is the result of (𝐹 + 𝑀)/2. The index of authoritative
strength (A) is instead the result of
∑𝑖 𝑙𝑖
𝑛𝑙
, where l is the value of the ith indicator of legitimacy and
nl the total number of variables related to legitimacy. The two indices range from 0 (weak) to 1
(strong).
Table 3 summarizes the possible scores for the quantification of each variable.
Table 3. Dimensions of analysis and quantification
DIMENSION
Formal power
VARIABLE
Confidence
Non-budget legislation
Introduction
Final veto
Budget legislation
Introduction
Final veto
Yes
QUANTIFICATION
Partial
No
1
-
0
0.5
0.5
0.25
0.25
0
0
0.5
0.5
-
0
0
Membership incongruence
Different timing of selection
Different procedure of selection
Different representational principle
1
1
1
0.5
0.5
0.5
0
0
0
Legitimacy
Direct election
Territorial representation
Minorities’ representation
1
1
1
0.5
-
0
0
0
5. The Italian Bicameralism in Comparative Perspective
In this section, I compare bicameralisms in Italy and in other parliamentary countries. With
regard to the Italian case, both the current legislature and the parliament provided for by the
constitutional reform are considered. Based on the framework for the analysis, I focus on the
organizational and authoritative strength of second chambers. This comparison is the starting
point for the discussion of the prospective consequences of the reform for the executivelegislative relationships. Indeed, mapping parliamentary systems based on systematic criteria
allows making inferences about the direction of the constitutional changes and the possible
approach to alternative models.
11
With regard to the selection of countries, I deal with the largest parliamentary
democracies listed in Samuels and Shugart (2010: 32-33), including those systems with a score
of five or higher on the Polity IV scale of democracy (Marshall et al. 2014) in the year 2015. The
literature has highlighted some kind of relation between population size and institutional
settings (Veenendaal 2015: 27-34). In his picture of 36 democracies, Lijphart (2012: ch. 14) has
distinguished between countries above ten million inhabitants and other democracies, and I use
this threshold to select the largest polities. The total number of cases is thus 13 (Table 4).
Table 4. The 13 largest parliamentary democracies in terms of population, 2015
Country
Population
India
Japan
Germany
United Kingdom
Italy
South Africa
Spain
Canada
Australia
Netherlands
Belgium
Greece
Czech Republic
1,311,050,527.0
126,958,472.0
81,413,145.0
65,138,232.0
60,802,085.0
54,956,920.4
46,418,269.0
35,851,774.0
23,781,169.0
16,936,520.0
11,285,721.0
10,823,732.0
10,551,219.0
Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.org)
Greece is the only parliamentary democracy with more than ten million inhabitants and
a unicameral parliament. All other countries in the list rely on a bicameral structure.
As for the criteria for assigning numbers to the indicators of the analysis, a cabinet is
defined as dependent on the confidence of the second chamber when the house can vote a
binding motion of no confidence. Procedures of selection are considered different even when
direct elections are held with different electoral systems. Direct election is conceived of as the
prime source of democratic legitimacy, whereas the indirect election is meant to be a partial
form of input legitimation.11 The representation of minorities is revealed only when quotas for
ethnic/religious/linguistic minorities or other particular groups exist. With regard to ‘different
timing of selection’, ‘different procedure of selection’, ‘different representational principle’, and
‘direct election’, the full score (1) applies when two thirds or more of the chamber’s members
are involved. When instead the number ranges between one third (included) and two thirds, I
assign the partial score. A partial ‘different procedure of selection’ applies also when the
electoral system is similar, but the territories on which votes are distributed differ.
11
I include as indirectly elected both representatives in assemblies (such as regional legislatures) and members of
executives stemming from elected assemblies (such as regional ministers in German Länder).
12
Table 5. Second chambers in 12 parliamentary democracies
Country
Name of the chamber
Confidence
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Germany
India
Italy
Italy (reform)
Japan
Netherlands
South Africa
Spain
United Kingdom
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Federal Council
Council of States
Senate
Senate
House of Councilors
Senate
National Council of Provinces
Senate
House of Lords
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Non-budget legislation
Introduction
Final veto
Yes
Yes
Partial
Partial
Yes
Yes
Yes
Partial
Yes
Partial
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Partial
Partial
Yes
No
No
Yes
Partial
Partial
Partial
No
Yes
No
Budget legislation
Introduction
Final veto
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Cont.
Country
Different timing
of selection
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Germany
India
Italy
Italy (reform)
Japan
Netherlands
South Africa
Spain
United Kingdom
Partial
No
Yes
Partial
Yes
Partial
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No***
No
Yes
Different
procedure of
selection
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Partial*
Yes
Partial
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Different
representational
principle
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Direct election
Territorial
representation
Minorities’
representation
Yes
Partial
No
Yes
Partial
Partial
Yes
Partial
Yes
Partial
Partial
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes**
No
No
No
No
No
No
* I have considered the electoral law into force for the 2006, 2008, and 2013 general elections.
** Quota for expatriates as indicated by Krook and O’Brien (2010: 257).
*** Members of the second chambers are indirectly selected by provincial territories. Although the Constitution does not require
simultaneity, general and provincial elections are usually held at the same time.
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org); Krook and O’Brien (2010: 257-258); Money and Tsebelis (1992: 36-39); O’Brien
(1997); Patterson and Mughan (2001); Russell (2001a); Senate-Parliament of the Czech Republic (www.senat.cz).
The comparative picture in table 5 presents significant cross-country variations with
respect to the legislative powers. Eight out of 13 second chambers can introduce non-budgetary
bills, but only two are allowed when it comes to legislate on budgets. Moreover, most upper
houses wield final vetoes on some legislation, but only three can definitely block budgetary
decisions. Countries vary to a great extent also with regard to the direct election: in only two
cases, the chambers’ members are appointed, while in six polities a sort of indirect democratic
legitimation exists. Usually, no quotas for minorities are introduced, except for Belgium and
Italy. In Belgium, this results from the fact the linguistic divides coincide with the territorial
distinctions. Territorial representation is a feature of almost all second chambers. The data show
also that only four democracies make the time of the selection of the two parliamentary
13
branches correspond fully. In three cases, the coincidence is only partial, whereas six polities
adopt fully-fledged differentiations. The indicators of the confidence to the cabinet and
procedure of selection provide the lowest cross-country variation. Italy (with the current
Constitution) is the only country where the second chamber can dismiss a government and,
together with Japan, where the MPs in the lower and upper house are only partially selected
through different procedures.
The collected information is quantified and shown graphically in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Types of second chambers in 13 institutional settings
1
BEL
Authoritative strength
SP
AUS
ITA1
SAF
ITA2
IND
JPN
GE
NTL
CZE
CAN
UK
0
0
Organizational strength
1
Note: ITA1 refers to the Italian second chamber as it is; ITA2 refers to the prospective upper house according to the
constitutional reform.
The upper left quadrant corresponds to the type 1 (see above) of second chambers, that
is, those upper houses with an high authoritative strength (legitimate), but only a few resources
of organizational power. In the lower right quadrant, the situation is overturned. The weakest
second chambers can be found in the lower left quadrant, whereas the strongest are placed in
the upper right space of the graph.
The placement of the 13 houses confirms the validity of the proposed indices as an
illustrative tool for the comparative study of second chambers (and bicameralism). For example,
all the chambers of the type 2 – those of Australia and Italy – or however close to (Germany,
India, and the Netherlands) are considered powerful for example also by Lijphart (2012). Among
the strong chambers mentioned in his analysis, the Japanese House of Councilors is, on the
14
contrary, a deviant case. This is probably due to the fact the Lijphart has referred to the
democratic legitimation as a source of organizational strength instead of the authoritative
strength, thus increasing the score on the dimension of formal power. A further point of
divergence is that he has focused only on the territorial differentiation to ‘measure’ the interchamber incongruence.
Contrary to what one could expect at a first glance, the Italian Senate introduced by the
reform appears not much weaker than its current version, even if substantially impoverished
with regard to its powers over legislation. Indeed, it could have the resources to counterbalance
the loss of formal power with a more pronounced differentiation in terms of membership. This
means that the Senate could still function as an effective institutional check. Moreover, the
chamber will lose the direct democratic legitimation, but, according to the theoretical
framework, it will be able to rely on a new source of legitimation: the representation of
territories. The impact of this resource, however, would depend on the voters’ support towards
the sub-national entities affected by the recentralization process, which is provided for by the
constitutional reform.
6. Conclusions: What Implications for the Executive-Legislative Arena?
The constitutional reform introduces a system where most of the legislative powers are situated
in the lower house, to which the cabinet is exclusively accountable. This implies that, even when
the two chambers are not congruent, the government could have a greater room for maneuver
– compared to the past – to limit the coalitional borders and, nonetheless, to have the support
to stay in office and promote bills. As a consequence, the governmental Pareto Set (Tsebelis
2002) is likely to be narrower and, thus, the modification of the status quo should be easier, all
else equal. However, in as much as the second chamber has legislative prerogatives, the Senate
will be still a veto player in the policy-making process if there is an inter-chamber incongruence
in terms of membership (Druckman et al. 2005; Zucchini 2013: 110). According to our
argumentation, this situation is likely to occur. Moreover, I have focused on a further variable
that can enhance the strength of the second chamber, that is, its (perceived) legitimacy. The
new Senate will be legitimate by both an indirect democratic legitimation and the
representation of different interests (Russell 2001b). Experiences in other countries prove that
this factor can make even weaker upper houses able to make governing parties more sensitive
to the upper house’s positions (Russell 2013).
15
Overall, the new Italian Senate could remain a relevant institutional player in the Italian
political system vis-à-vis the government, although downsized in its scope of action. Our
comparative analysis has shown that other ‘minor’ chambers can be strong for a series of
reasons in spite of their subordinated role. Tsebelis and Money (1997: 211) have stated that
‘second chambers always exercise an influence on final outcomes of legislation.’ This holds in
particular when other factors counterbalance the lack of formal power in all fields of legislation.
The German Bundesrat, ‘the single most important institution’ of German federalism (Patzelt
1999: 60), is a case in point.
As a conclusion, a caveat about the preliminary indicators proposed must be addressed.
The rough distinction between non-budget and budget legislation that I have proposed cannot
capture the degree of variance within the former category. A second chamber can wield power
in relation to a great bulk of non-budgetary bills or only to a few issues, such as constitutional
laws and relationships between the central State and sub-national territories. Our scores can
tell if the competence is on all topics or only on some of them, irrespective to their number and
their significance. Future research can point to comprehensive comparative analyses of the
features of bicameralism I have dealt with, by intertwining them with electoral and party factors;
on the other hand, a refinement of the indicators and their quantification could be the first step
towards more fine-grained comparisons.
16
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