Supreme Court Cases That Changed America—DUE 9/23/13
4= Evaluate the effects of the Court's interpretations of the
Constitution in Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. Maryland,
and United States v. Nixon, with emphasis on the arguments
espoused by each side in these cases.
2= Summarize some parts of the Court's interpretations of the
Constitution in Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. Maryland,
and United States v. Nixon, with emphasis on the arguments
espoused by each side in these cases.
3= Explain the effects of the Court's interpretations of the
Constitution in Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. Maryland,
and United States v. Nixon, with emphasis on the arguments
espoused by each side in these cases.
1= Vague or missing discussion of the Court's
interpretations of the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison,
McCulloch v. Maryland, and United States v. Nixon, with
emphasis on the arguments espoused by each side in these
cases.
4= Analyze the changing interpretations of the Bill of Rights
over time, including interpretations of the basic freedoms
articulated in the First Amendment and the due process and
equal-protection-of-the-law clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2= Identify how the interpretations of the Bill of Rights
changes over time, including interpretations of the basic
freedoms articulated in the First Amendment and the due
process and equal-protection-of-the-law clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
3= Explain the changing interpretations of the Bill of Rights
over time, including interpretations of the basic freedoms
articulated in the First Amendment and the due process and
equal-protection-of-the-law clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1= Vague or missing interpretations of the Bill of Rights over
time, including interpretations of the basic freedoms articulated
in the First Amendment and the due process and equalprotection-of-the-law clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4= Sophisticated explanation of the controversies that have
resulted over changing interpretations of civil rights, including
those in Brown v. Board of Education, Miranda v. Arizona,
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
2= Explain the controversies that have resulted over changing
interpretations of civil rights, including those in Brown v.
Board of Education, Miranda v. Arizona, Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.
3= Explain the controversies that have resulted over changing
interpretations of civil rights, including those in Brown v.
Board of Education, Miranda v. Arizona, Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.
1= Explain the controversies that have resulted over changing
interpretations of civil rights, including those in Brown v.
Board of Education, Miranda v. Arizona, Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.
Directions:
1) Read and annotate the Supreme Court cases in this packet. If you
need other resources, check out the class page on esathigh.org…I
put some helpful links on our class page & Edmodo, including the
power point from class lecture, videos, and more. Here is a great link
to start you off: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/index.html
On a separate sheet of paper, evaluate & analyze EACH CASE by answering the questions below.
Each answer should be minimum 3 sentences.
1) Title of Case. Ex: Marbury v Madison
2) What was the legal question or issue that was being addressed? Who were the litigants?
3) What was the court’s opinion in this case? Who was the Chief Justice who delivered the
opinion?
4) What precedent(s) were established or overturned? What Constitutional ideals were used to
support this ruling? Why is this significant?
5) If you were a Justice who had ruled on the case, would you have dissented? Why or why not?
If any part of this is unclear a) email me! [email protected] b) be prepared to go over this in class Monday! Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Judicial Review, Federalism
The landmark 1803 case Marbury v. Madison
marked the first time the Court asserted its role
in reviewing federal legislation to determine its
compatibility with the Constitution -- the function
of judicial review. Above, a portrait of plaintiff
William Marbury.
Reproduction courtesy of the Office of the
Supreme Court Curator
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Marbury v. Madison, arguably the most
important case in Supreme Court history, was
the first U.S. Supreme Court case to apply the principle of "judicial review" -- the
power of federal courts to void acts of Congress in conflict with the Constitution.
Written in 1803 by Chief Justice John Marshall, the decision played a key role in
making the Supreme Court a separate branch of government on par with
Congress and the executive.
The facts surrounding Marbury were complicated. In the election of 1800, the
newly organized Democratic-Republican party of Thomas Jefferson defeated the
Federalist party of John Adams, creating an atmosphere of political panic for the
lame duck Federalists. In the final days of his presidency, Adams appointed a
large number of justices of peace for the District of Columbia whose commissions
were approved by the Senate, signed by the president, and affixed with the
official seal of the government. The commissions were not delivered, however,
and when President Jefferson assumed office March 5, 1801, he ordered James
Madison, his Secretary of State, not to deliver them. William Marbury, one of the
appointees, then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, or legal
order, compelling Madison to show cause why he should not receive his
commission.
In resolving the case, Chief Justice Marshall answered three questions. First, did
Marbury have a right to the writ for which he petitioned? Second, did the laws of
the United States allow the courts to grant Marbury such a writ? Third, if they
did, could the Supreme Court issue such a writ? With regard to the first question,
Marshall ruled that Marbury had been properly appointed in accordance with
procedures established by law, and that he therefore had a right to the writ.
Secondly, because Marbury had a legal right to his commission, the law must
afford him a remedy. The Chief Justice went on to say that it was the particular
responsibility of the courts to protect the rights of individuals -- even against the
president of the United States. At the time, Marshall's thinly disguised lecture to
President Jefferson about the rule of law was much more controversial than his
statement about judicial review (which doctrine was widely accepted).
It was in answering the third question -- whether a writ of mandamus issuing
from the Supreme Court was the proper remedy -- that Marshall addressed the
question of judicial review. The Chief Justice ruled that the Court could not grant
the writ because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted it the
right to do so, was unconstitutional insofar as it extended to cases of original
jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction -- the power to bring cases directly to the
Supreme Court -- was the only jurisdictional matter dealt with by the Constitution
itself. According to Article III, it applied only to cases "affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls" and to cases "in which the state shall be
party." By extending the Court's original jurisdiction to include cases like
Marbury's, Congress had exceeded it authority. And when an act of Congress is in
conflict with the Constitution, it is, Marshall said, the obligation of the Court to
uphold the Constitution because, by Article VI, it is the "supreme law of the
land."
As a result of Marshall's decision Marbury was denied his commission -- which
presumably pleased President Jefferson. Jefferson was not pleased with the
lecture given him by the Chief Justice, however, nor with Marshall's affirmation of
the Court's power to review acts of Congress. For practical strategic reasons,
Marshall did not say that the Court was the only interpreter of the Constitution
(though he hoped it would be) and he did not say how the Court would enforce
its decisions if Congress or the Executive opposed them. But, by his timely
assertion of judicial review, the Court began its ascent as an equal branch of
government -- an equal in power to the Congress and the president. Throughout
its long history, when the Court needed to affirm its legitimacy, it has cited
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison.
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)
In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress had implied powers
under theNecessary and Proper Clause of Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution to create the
Second Bank of the United States and that the
state of Maryland lacked the power to tax the
Bank. Arguably Chief Justice John
Marshall's finest opinion, McCulloch not only gave
Congress broad discretionary power to
implement the enumerated powers, but also
repudiated, in ringing language, the radical
states' rights arguments presented by counsel for
Maryland.
A pro-Andrew Jackson
political cartoon applauds the
president's September 1833
order for the removal of
federal deposits from the
Bank of the United States. On
the right, Jackson, cheered on
by Major Jack Downing, holds
aloft a scroll with the words
"Order for the Removal of
Public Money." To the left, the
combined opposition to the
president's move -represented by Bank
President Nicholas Biddle,
Whig Senators Daniel
Webster and Henry Clay, and
the pro-Bank press -- are
ridiculed.
At issue in the case was the constitutionality of
the act of Congress chartering the Second Bank of
the United States (BUS) in 1816. Although the
Bank was controlled by private stockholders, it
was the depository of federal funds. In addition, it
had the authority to issue notes that, along with
the notes of states' banks, circulated as legal
tender. In return for its privileged position, the
Bank agreed to loan the federal government
money in lieu of taxes. State banks looked on the
BUS as a competitor and resented its privileged
position. When state banks began to fail in the
depression of 1818, they blamed their troubles on
the Bank. One such state was Maryland, which
imposed a hefty tax on "any bank not chartered
within the state." The Bank of the United States
was the only bank not chartered within the state.
When the Bank's Baltimore branch refused to pay
the tax, Maryland sued James McCulloch, cashier of the branch, for collection of
the debt. McCulloch responded that the tax was unconstitutional. A state court
ruled for Maryland, and the court of appeals affirmed. McCulloch appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which reviewed the case in 1819.
In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court ruled that the
Bank of the United States was constitutional and that the Maryland tax was
unconstitutional. Concerning the power of Congress to charter a bank, the Court
turned to the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, which expressly
grants Congress the power to pass laws "necessary and proper" for the execution
of its "enumerated powers." The enumerated powers of Congress include the
power to regulate interstate commerce, collect taxes, and borrow money. Said
the Court famously, "let the ends be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." In other words, because the creation of the Bank
was appropriately related to Congress's legitimate power to tax, borrow, and
regulateinterstate commerce, the Bank was constitutional under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
Second, the Court ruled that Maryland lacked the power to tax the Bank because,
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, the laws of
the United States trump conflicting state laws. As Marshall put it, "the
government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its
sphere of action, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form
the supreme law of the land." Because "the power to tax is the power to destroy,"
Maryland was unconstitutionally undermining the superior laws and institutions of
the United States.
Finally, the Court held that the "sovereignty" (political authority) of the Union lies
with the people of the United States, not with the individual states that comprise
it. The United States, not a simple alliance of states, is a nation of "constitutional
sovereignty" with its authority resting exclusively with "the people" who created
and are governed by the Constitution. To the Court, "the government of the
Union is a government of the people; it emanates from them; its powers are
granted by them; and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."
Maryland's tax, however, violated constitutional sovereignty because it acted as a
levy against all the people in the United States by a state accountable to only
some of the people.
If Marbury v. Madison (1803) "promised" that the Supreme Court would exercise
great authority in shaping the laws of the land, McCulloch v. Maryland fulfilled
that promise for the first time. Arguably no other decision has so profoundly
defined national power. In one case, the Court expanded Congress' powers to
include those implied by the Constitution, established the inferior status of the
states in relation to the Union, and set the constitutional sovereignty of the
federal government. McCulloch remains today a fundamental and binding bedrock
of American constitutional law.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that detained criminal
suspects, prior to police questioning, must be informed of
their constitutional right to an attorney and against selfincrimination. The case began with the 1963 arrest of
Phoenix resident Ernesto Miranda, who was charged with
rape, kidnapping, and robbery. Miranda was not informed
of his rights prior to the police interrogation. During the
two-hour interrogation, Miranda allegedly confessed to
committing the crimes, which the police apparently
recorded. Miranda, who had not finished ninth grade and
had a history of mental instability, had no counsel
present. At trial, the prosecution's case consisted
A mug shot of Ernesto
solely of his confession. Miranda was convicted of both
Miranda, whose
rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years in
wrongful conviction led
prison. He appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court,
to the landmark case
claiming that the police had unconstitutionally obtained
Miranda v. Arizona, in
his confession. The court disagreed, however, and
which the Court held
upheld the conviction. Miranda appealed to the U.S.
that detained criminal
Supreme Court, which reviewed the case in 1966.
suspects must be
informed of their rights
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Chief
prior to police
Justice Earl Warren, ruled that the prosecution could not
questioning.
introduce Miranda's confession as evidence in a criminal
trial because the police had failed to first inform Miranda
of his right to an attorney and against self-incrimination.
The police duty to give these warnings is compelled by the Constitution's Fifth
Amendment, which gives a criminal suspect the right to refuse "to be a witness
against himself," and Sixth Amendment, which guarantees criminal defendants
the right to an attorney.
The Court maintained that the defendant's right against self-incrimination has
long been part of Anglo-American law as a means to equalize the vulnerability
inherent in being detained. Such a position, unchecked, can often lead to
government abuse. For example, the Court cited the continued high incidence of
police violence designed to compel confessions from a suspect. This and other
forms of intimidation, maintained the Court, deprive criminal suspects of their
basic liberties and can lead to false confessions. The defendant's right to an
attorney is an equally fundamental right, because the presence of an attorney in
interrogations, according to Chief Justice Warren, enables "the defendant under
otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and
in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogations process."
Without these two fundamental rights, both of which, the Court ruled, "dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings," "no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice."
Thus, to protect these rights in the face of widespread ignorance of the law, the
Court devised statements that the police are required to tell a defendant who is
being detained and interrogated. These mandatory "Miranda Rights" begin with
"the right to remain silent," and continue with the statement that "anything said
can and will be used against [the defendant] in a court of law." The police are
further compelled to inform the suspect of his or her right to an attorney and
allow for (or, if necessary, provide for) a defendant's attorney who can
accompany him during interrogations. Because none of these rights was afforded
to Ernesto Miranda and his "confession" was thus unconstitutionally admitted at
trial, his conviction was reversed. Miranda was later retried and convicted without
the admission of his confession.
Miranda v. Arizona, in creating the "Miranda Rights" we take for granted today,
reconciled the increasing police powers of the state with the basic rights of
individuals. Miranda remains good law today.
United States v. Nixon (1974)
Watergate, Checks and Balances
Background In 1972, five burglars broke into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters. This is the national office of the Democratic Party. There, party members make decisions relating to political campaigns. They also decide how they will raise money to help the candidates. The burglars were caught. Later, investigators discovered that President Nixon and his aides were involved in the burglary. They had hired people to break into the offices. They wanted to get information that would help Nixon get re-­‐elected. Investigators discovered that the president and his aides had committed other illegal acts, too. In the United States, the president has to follow the rule of law. If he breaks the law, he can be put on trial. Since President Nixon broke the law, the federal government decided to prosecute him. The government gathered evidence against him. They discovered that President Nixon had a tape recorder in the Oval Office. He taped most of what happened in his office. The tapes included conversations he had with his aides. The prosecutor in the case believed that the tapes probably had information about the illegal things President Nixon and his aides had done. He asked President Nixon to turn over the tapes. Nixon said no. A federal judge told him he had to give the tapes to the prosecutor and eventually the case ended up in the Supreme Court. The Case President Nixon's lawyers argued that the president's tapes were protected by executive privilege. This is the belief that the conversations between the president and his aides are confidential. Sometimes, these discussions need to be private to protect the country. Other times, privacy is needed to protect the advisors. They need to be able to give the president advice without worrying about being criticized by other people. That way, they can be honest with the president. Their honest opinions help the president to make decisions. The lawyers for the United States said that the tapes were necessary to prove that the president had committed a crime. They argued that justice in this criminal case was more important than protecting the privacy of the president and his aides. Therefore, President Nixon should turn over the tapes. The Ruling In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled in favor of the United States and against President Nixon. Chief Justice Burger, wrote the opinion for the Court, which concluded that presidents do enjoy a constitutionally protected executive privilege, but that the privilege was not absolute. The Court decided that in this case, the President’s interest in keeping his communications secret was outweighed by the interests of the judiciary in providing a fair trial with full factual disclosure. The justices reasoned that the judiciary’s interest in the “fair administration of criminal justice” outweighed President Nixon’s interest in keeping the content of his tapes secret. One reason for this was that the only issue before the Court was whether the trial judge could privately inspect the tapes to determine whether they were essential to a fair trial. The justices further stated that there would be cases in which the president’s need for confidentiality would outweigh the interests of the judicial branch, such as when the secret communication involved “military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets.” However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III. Regents of University of California v. Bakke
(1978)
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke
(1978), the Supreme Court ruled that a
university's use of racial "quotas" in its
admissions process was unconstitutional, but a
school's use of "affirmative action" to accept
more minority applicants was constitutional in
some circumstances. The case involved the
admissions practices of the Medical School of the
University of California at Davis. The medical
school reserved 16 out of 100 seats in its
entering class for minorities, including "Blacks,"
"Chicanos," "Asians," and "American Indians."
The rigid admissions quota was administered
Regents of University of California v. Bakke
by a special school committee. Allan Bakke, a
(1978), the Court ruled unconstitutional a
white applicant, was twice denied admission to
university's use of racial "quotas" in its
admissions process, but held that affirmative
the medical school even though his MCAT
action programs could be constitutional in
scores, GPA, and benchmark scores were
some circumstances. "significantly higher" than those of some
minority applicants recently admitted.
Bakke sued the University of California in a state court, alleging that the medical
school's admission policy violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The California Supreme
Court agreed, finding that the quota system explicitly discriminated against racial
groups and holding that "no In
applicant may be rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less
qualified, as measured by standards applied without regard to race." The medical
school, ordered to shut down its quota system, appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which reviewed the case in 1978.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Lewis Franklin Powell,
ruled that a state may constitutionally consider race as a factor in its university
admissions to promote educational diversity, but only if considered alongside
other factors and on a case-by-case basis. California's use of racial quotas in this
case, however, did not meet those requirements and violated the Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause, which forbids a state from denying "to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Court held that the medical
school racially discriminated against whites because it excluded them from 16 out
of 100 spots solely by virtue of their race. The fact that blacks have historically
had been discriminated against more than whites was irrelevant to this case,
because racial quota systems, whether applied against whites or blacks, are
always "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality." Indeed, because the school's quota was designed to redress past
discrimination against racial minorities, the Court stated, it was intended to prefer
"one group for no other reason other than race or ethnic origin." Thus, the Court
ruled that the school's quota system "must be rejected ... as racially invalid"
under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court also ruled, however, that the state "has a legitimate and substantial
interest in ... eliminating ... the disabling effects of identified discrimination." Yet
to prosecute those rights within the Constitution's limits, a state must first make
judicial, administrative, or legislative findings that document illegal and specific
discrimination against racial groups. An admissions department may then attempt
to "redress" these findings of past discrimination by considering an applicant's
race as a "plus" factor among many in its admissions decisions. Such a raceconscious consideration, however, may only be one of many factors used in
assessing each applicant, and the race of each applicant may never be a
preclusive factor in granting admission.
Regents of University of California v. Bakke established a pragmatic means of
reconciling well-intentioned quota and affirmative action programs with the
Constitution's zealous protection of equality. In sum, racial quotas are always
unconstitutional, but affirmative action programs may be constitutional if race is
considered as one of many admission factors and used to remedy past findings of
discrimination and to promote diversity. In the 30 years since this ruling, public
and private universities have crafted affirmative action programs consistent with
Bakke's requirements. In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), for example, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed Bakke's basic approach and ruled that University of Michigan
Law School's policy of giving significant but non-determinative weight to its
applicants' race was "neutral" enough, and Michigan's interest in a diverse
student body was "compelling" enough, to meet constitutionally standards of
equality. In a related but separate decision -- Gratz v. Bollinger -- issued on the
same day, however, the Court struck Michigan's undergraduate affirmative action
program, which employed a points system to rate applicants and which awarded
automatic points to minority applicants.