Philosophy of Science
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Heikki J. Koskinen
Philosophy / School of Social Sciences and Humanities
University of Tampere
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Scientific Explanation
• The fundamental task of scientific research is to acquire new
and truthful information about the world.
• This task is carried out by proposing and testing hypotheses,
and by formulating the achieved results into the form of
laws and theories.
• The different stages in scientific reasoning are together
thought to provide an answer to some question often
including the word ’why’.
• We may discern different types of explanatory models in
science. In the following, we are going to look at three of
them: the deductive-nomological, the functional and the
intentional one.
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1. THE DEDUCTIVE-NOMOLOGICAL MODEL
deduction
L1, …, Lk
C1, …, Cm
E
laws (k 1)
p.conditions
explanans
explanandum
(induction: inductive-statistical model of explanation; E
follows only with some probability from general laws and
preliminary conditions)
Covering-law model, or so-called ”subsumption theory”
• Causal explanations tell us why some event occurred, and
teleological explanations tell us what for some event
occurred, or some object exists. (Gr. telos = goal, aim, end)
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2. THE FUNCTIONAL MODEL
• Has to do with self-regulation and functions
• We have a case of functional explanation when we e.g.
answer the question ’Why do human beings have lungs?’
by referring to their function or role in the human
organism.
• Cf. also:
Why is Pete sweating?
-So that his body temperature would decrease
Why are there chairs?
-So that we could sit on them
• Not just any effect is properly called a function (cf. sound
created by heartbeat – not the function of the heartbeat).
The question of the objective existence of functions
(cf. living organisms vs. human artefacts…
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3. THE INTENTIONAL MODEL
• Has to do with conscious action directed towards a goal.
• We are using this model when referring to the goals of action of
individual human beings or groups of them, and explaining their
actions with them
applicability to animals, computers,…?
• E.g. ’Why did the Scottish Parliament pass the Alcohol Minimum
Pricing Bill?’
• Intentionality means (goal-)directedness (cf. the raising of an arm).
• According to Franz Brentano (1838-1917), intentionality is a feature
that characterizes psychological phenomena.
• Practical syllogism in the explanation of intentional action, instead
of the covering-law model (G. H. von Wright).
The Aristotelian and the Galileian tradition of science
The relations between intentional/teleological and causal explanations
The problem of free will, the mind-body problem
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Practical Inference
• In theoretical inference, both premises and conclusions are
propositions, whereas in practical inference, the conclusion is an act.
• The practical syllogism originating with Aristotle can be considered a
special case of a more general type of ends-means-actions scenario:
X desires that E
X believes that A is an efficient means of bringing about E
So X proceeds to do A.
The conclusion is an action, i.e. a performance of A.
• Understanding behaviour as action presupposes its interpretation as
an expression of an intended goal. Only after such an interpretative
step does the object of study constitute and action which can then
be in principle explained teleologically.
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Daniel C. Dennett on Intentional Systems
(1) The physical stance: our explanations and predictions are
based on physical states and laws or regularities.
(2) The design stance: the actual physical structure is ignored
while focusing on the designed (functional) mechanisms of
a system.
(3) The intentional stance: the object is interpreted as a
rational agent, and we aim to find out which beliefs and
desires the agent has.
Cf. the deductive-nomological, functional and intentional
models of explanation above.
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FORMS OF TELEOLOGY
ACTION
goal-oriented
conscious unconsc.
goal-directed
functional
selfregulation
develop.
processes
intentional
genuine teleology
quasi-teleology
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Causality
• A plurality of causes: Situations where an event has
multiple possible sufficient conditions.
C1
C2
E
Cn
• Cf. e.g. a fire or a murder mystery…
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• Common cause: e.g. ’Every time the barometer drops, a
storm follows.’
d
c
e
The barometer’s dropping does not cause the storm, but
they have a common cause.
• A causal chain
d
c
e
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• A plurality of effects
E1
C
p1
p2
E2
pm
Em
• p1 + … + p m = 1
• C causes Ei with the probability of pi
• Causal process vs. a ”pseudoprocess” (cf. post hoc, propter hoc)
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The Problem of Scientific Realism
• How is the language of theory related with reality (cf. e.g.
’electron’, ’the subconscious’,…)?
empiricists & positivists: ”the given”
• Observations:
vs. more recent philosophy of science:
• The theory-ladenness of observations (cf. also concepts)!
• Interpretations of relations between theory and reality:
(a) empiricism
(b) phenomenalism
(c) instrumentalism
(d) fictionalism
(e) constructivism
(f) realism
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