E UR OPE A N G O V ERNA NC E A ND D E C ISI O N M A K I N G Roberto Castaldi [email protected] $VVLVWDQW3URIHVVRU6DQW¶$QQD6FKRRORI Advanced Studies - Pisa Director Centro Studi, documentazione e formazione VXOO¶8QLRQH Europea (CESUE) Vice-editor Perspectives on Federalism (www.onfederalism.eu) and Bibliographical Bulletin on Federalism (www.federalism-bulletin.eu) Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Our aims today A look at the evolution of the European governance analysed from the main integration theories. Grasping their insights and weaknesses. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Methodological premise on academic disciplines 6HYHUDOGLVFLSOLQHZLWKLQ³(XURSHDQVWXGLHV´LQWHUQDWLRQDO constitutional and comparative law; IR and comparative politics; history, economics, sociology, philosophy. Each one with its own agenda. Philosophy: European integration final goal, European people and citizenship, democratic deficit, Charter of Rights, normative debate. Law: what is the EU, the role of law and of the ECJ. Political science: EU institutions and political system, IR: EU compared with other forms of cooperation, actors and dynamics of European integration. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Grand theories Grand theories revolved around 3 issues: What is the EEC-EC-EU? How does European integration proceed? What is its dynamics? What are the main actors? Where does European integration lead? What is its possible, probable, desirable final destinatation? Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Three main grand theories 1) 2) 3) Realism, confederalism or intergovernmentalism Federalism Neo-functionalism All start as normative theories They evolve analytically along the process Need to look at them from a theoretical and historical perspective Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Realism,, confederalism, (then intergovernmentalism) 1. Integration is a sophisticated form of international cooperation. 2. EEC-EC-EU is a sophisticated international organization. 3. Within integration power remains in member states: they are the owners of the treaties. The dynamics, goals and speed of the process are decided by member states. 4. Integration cannot bring the overcoming of national sovereignty. Initially successful: UK, The Hague Congress and the Council of Europe Critique: so why bother inventing the concept of ³integration´ if ³cooperation´is enough? At least monetary sovereignty is now European. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Federalism (costitutionalism) at the beginning (Spinelli) 1. Nation states are the past, and can be overcomed. 2. International systems change from the European to the world state system implies the need for a federated Europe. 3. The Communities are confederal, because they do not imply a real transfer of power and sovereignty. 4. Need for the European people to decide through a European constituent procedure (assembly). 5. The ultimate goal of integration is a political union through a federation. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Neo-functionalism (Haas, Monnet) 1. The Communitier are pre-federal supranational organizations: more than international organization but less then a federal state (Schuman Declatation). 2. Impossible a federation now. Sectorial integration will produce shifts of interests and loyalties. 3. Integration efficiency will bring extension of sectors involved through the spill-over effect, up to political union. 4. Crucial role of Communities supranational institutions, especially the Commission, as drivers and engine of integration. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa 6LQWHVLGHOOHSULQFLSDOLWHRULHGHOO¶LQWHJUD]LRQHULIHULWHDO livello super-sistemico Teoria Realismo Inter-governmentalism /¶8(q Oganizzazione internazionale Modello decisionale rafforzare intergovernativo A ttori principali governi nazionali /¶8(GHYH essere Come ar rivarci Organizzazione internazionale con De Gaulle (neutralizzare elementi federali dei Trattati) Neofunzionalismo Organizzazione sovranazionale tecnocratico (prima) comunitario (poi) Alta Autorità (sovranaz.) Commissione e governi Federazione europea (origine) Polity sui generis o Federazione di Stati sovrani (ora) spill-over w la Commissione F ederalismo Organizzazione sovranazionale pre-federale comunitario rafforzare PE democratico) (sfruttare deficit democratico) Popolo europeo (prima) Crisi-iniziativaleadership* (poi) Stato federale Federazione europea o costituente europea (inizio) gradualismo costituzionale + processo costituente (poi)(elezione, moneta, governo) Unification, integration, construction 50s-60s debate over supranationality and integration. Integration z cooperation. End of 60s Albertini distinguishes 3 concepts: - unification: historical process of uniting Europe - integration: transfer of sectors or competences - construction: transfer of powers through the creation of institutions and decision-making procedures Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Historical development and theoretical evolution 1950-1958 SchumanDeclaration ĺ(&6& Monnet designs pre-federal institutions: High Authority (then Commissione), ParliamentaryAssembly, Council of ministers, Court of Justice. Same model for EDC and EPC. In 1954 they collapsed. Relaunch through EEC and Euratom. Federalists lost their chance. Realists happy: high politics vs low politics. Neo-functionalist very happy: spill-over, polical union not ripe (Haas 1958). Some intergovernmentalist start from 1957 to avoid the issue (Milward and Moravcsik). Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Historical development and theoretical evolution 1958-1966 Smooth EEC transitory period. At the end introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council. Empty chair crisis ĺ Luxemburg Compromise. First wave of theoretical revision. Realists very happy: impossible to give out national veto and sovereignty. Neo-functionalist retreat: not just spill-over but also rollback; and recognition of role of national governments (Haas, Lindberg, Schmitter). Federalists out of the game. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Federalist theoretical revision - Negative integration vs positive integration (Pinder); -crisis-initiative-leadership -3URFHVVDVDQ³DFFRUGLRQ´ILVDUPRQLFDVHYHUDO times it can produce the conditions when federation is possible, but not necessarily they are exploited -costitutional gradualism (Albertini = Monnet + Spinelli): European election, European currency, European government - Exploit democratic deficit Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa The ECJ role ECJ jurispudence establishes fundamental principles RU³(XURSHDQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´0DQFLQL -Implied powers - Prevalence of EU law -Autonomy of Eu legal order Member states agree because of unanimity (Weiler) Main grand theories did not pay enough attention. Still Hamilton had foreseen it for the USA. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa T he 70s: a controversial period 1971 Dollar inconvertibility: Bretton Woods collapse. 1972 Monetary Union project 1973 Oil Shock What governance for Europe? The European Council as the transitory government The direct election of the European Parliament The European Monetary System Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Realists Nothing is happening for realists: JCMS XXI, 1982, 12special issue 1982: Hoffmann Stanley, Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today; Weiler Joseph, Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?,pp. 39-56. Wallace William, Europe as a Confederation: the Community and the Nation-State; Tsoukalis Loukas, Looking into the Crystal Ball , pp. 229-244. and the book The limits of European integration, Taylor 1983, Little for neo-functionalists too. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa For federalists Very important period Direct election of E.P Monetary union on the agenda, even if only EMS achieved. EP approves WKH³6SLQHOOLdraft Treaty´ national governments reject it but compelled to relaunch ± IGC majority rule, then Single European Act; single market in 1992. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Second wave of theoretical revision Neo-IXQFWLRQDOLVWVLW¶VWKHVSLOO-over comeback, long live the Commission (Delors). )HGHUDOLVWVLW¶VWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKH³SROLWLFDOSKDVH´ $OEHUWLQL¶DQGWKH³LQFOLQHGSODQH´QH[WVWHSWKH single currency. Realists: ok, but governments are leading anyway (not the EP), ICG results explained by converging SUHIHUHQFHVRIPDLQ0HPEHUVWDWHVHOLWHV0RUDYFVLN¶V Liberal Intergovernmentalism = not simply realism, a refined and more effective version of classical realism). Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa 3. A ndrew 0RUDYFVLN¶V L iberal Intergovernmentalism Vedi tavole I.1, I.2, I.3, e I.4, tratte da M oravcsik 1998: 24, 28, 54, 69 T able I.1 International cooperation: A rationalist framewor k ( M oravcsik 1998, 24) Stages of negotiations National Preference Formation Interstate Bargaining Institutional C hoice A lternative independent variables underlying each stage What is the source of underlying national preferences? Given national preferences, what explains the efficiency and istributional outcomes of interstate bargaining? Given substantive agreement, what explains the transfer of sovereignty to international institutions? Economic interests or Geopolitical interests? Asymmetrical interdependence or Supranational entrepreneurship? Federalist ideology or Centralised echnocratic management or More credible commitment? Underlying national Preferences Agreements on substance Choice to delegate or pool decision-making in international institutions O bserved outcomes at each state Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa T able I.2 National preference formation: T heories and H ypoteses (Moravcsik 1998, 28) Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa T able I.3 Interstate bargaining: T heories and hypoteses (Moravcsik 1998, 54) Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa T able I.4 Institutional choice: T heories and H ypoteses (Moravcsik 1998, 69) Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Integration vs contruction A relevant theoretical issue: substantive bargains priority , that is to say distributive choices prevailing over institutional ones: in other words, the integration-construction relationship in the XQLILFDWLRQSURFHVV$OEHUWLQL¶VLQVLJKWRQWKHLULQWHUDFWLRQ subtler. Reason why Moravcsik gives little importance to federalists, except for institutional choices (crucial ones for federalists). Validation of the federalist hypothesis implied by Moravcsik on the Single Act and QMV, and implied by Thatcher in her book. Pattern 2: summary of the theories Focus on players and on ability to explain change and development. Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Focus on players and differences among theories Process increasing complexity fosters more limited theories and debates: Comitology Susbidiarity, + the Europe of the Regions, the Committee of the Regions. European political system, European Parliament Constitution. + Constant topics: deepening-enlargement. Democratic deficit and European demos. In the meantime, after the Single Act, 80% is Community legislation: democratic deficit Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Democratic deficit of EU governance Realists: nonexistent, if anything more unanimity. Functionalists: output legitimacy. Federalists: more E.P and QMV Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa 4. Sintesi delle visioni del deficit democratico (liberamente tratta da W eiler 1995). Roberto Castaldi Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
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