海外競争法アップデイト (2012 年 7-12 月)

海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
1
2013 年 2 月
海外競争法アップデイト
海外競争法アップデイト
(2012 年 7-12 月)
Antitrust Review | July-December 2012
この海外競争法アップデイトは、主としてクリフォードチャンスが発行している Antitrust Review の概要
を日本語でお届けするものです。詳細については、添付の Antitrust Review をご覧ください。
This is the Japanese summary of Antitrust Review (published by Clifford Chance and attached hereto).
今号のインデックス
EU
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欧州委員会、TV およびコンピューター用モニターのブラウン管製造業者に対して 14 億 7000 万
ユーロの課徴金
欧州委員会は、ブラウン管を製造する 7 つの国際的なグループ企業に対して、合計で約 14 億 7000 万
ユーロの課徴金の支払いを命じた。
•
•
マイクロソフト、誓約事項違反を理由とする異議告知書を受領
欧州委員会は、マイクロソフトに対し、ユーザーが
ウェブブラウザーを簡単に選べるようにする選択
画面を設定するという誓約事項に違反したとして、
異議告知書を送付した。
お問い合わせ先
ユニバーサルによるEMI買収案件に対して欧州委員会
が条件付きクリアランス
弁護士
欧州委員会は、フェーズ II の審査を経て、ユニ
バ ー サ ル ミ ュ ー ジ ッ ク グ ル ー プ に よ る EMI の
レコード部門の買収提案を、多数の資産譲渡を条件
として承認した。
•
普通裁判所、欧州委員会のビチューメン案件の判断
を支持
EU の普通裁判所は、ビチューメン[注:アスファ
ルト原材料]製造業者および建設業者がオランダに
おける道路用ビチューメンの価格協定カルテルに
参加していたとする欧州委員会の判断を支持した。
掲載記事やこの配布物についてのご意見・ご質問
は以下までご連絡ください。
水口美穂
クリフォードチャンス法律事務所
パートナー
E: [email protected]
弁護士
鹿倉将史
クリフォードチャンス法律事務所
アソシエイト(ブリュッセルオフィス出向中)
E: [email protected]
弁護士
平岡留奈
クリフォードチャンス法律事務所
アソシエイト
E: [email protected]
海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
•
2
欧州委員会、ワイヤーハーネスに関する調査を開始
欧州委員会は、ワイヤーハーネス(自動車の電気回路に用いられる電線)の供給に関し、欧州経済
地域におけるカルテルの疑いがあるとして、調査を開始した。
•
欧州委員会、コンピューター用CD/DVDドライブの供給業者に対し、異議告知書を送付
欧州委員会は、欧州経済地域内の 13 の光ディスクドライブ供給業者に対し、国際的なカルテルに
参加したことにより EU 競争法に違反した可能性があるとの仮定的見解を通知した。
中国
•
商務部、ウォルマートによるオンライン通販事業会社の買収を条件付きクリアランス
中国商務部は、ウォルマート・ストアーズ社に対し、Newheight Holdings Limited の支配的な株式の
取得につき、問題解消措置を課した。
•
ARM / Giesecke & Devrient / Gemaltoの合弁会社、条件付きクリアランスを取得
中国商務部は、半導体の知的財産を提供する ARM 社(イギリス)と、セキュリティ・ソリューション
を提供する Giesecke & Devrient 社(ドイツ)および Gemalto 社(オランダ)の 3 社による合弁会社
の設立につき、問題解消措置を課した。
•
中古車ディーラーがカルテル行為により課徴金
国家工商行政管理総局の地方支部である河南省工商行政管理局は、11 の中古車ディーラーに対し、
価格協定をしたとして 173 万元の課徴金を課した。
チェコ共和国
•
チェコ競争法の改正
チェコ競争法の改正法案が 2012 年 12 月 1 日付で発効した。
ドイツ
•
連邦カルテル庁、Haribo に対し情報交換を理由に課徴金
連邦カルテル庁は、2012 年 8 月 1 日、製菓会社である Haribo 社に対し、違法に情報交換を行ったと
して、240 万ユーロの課徴金を課した。
海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
3
ルーマニア
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競争評議会、携帯電話のプリペイカードに関する調査を終了
ルーマニア競争評議会は、携帯電話事業者である Orange 社、Vodafone 社および Cosmote 社と、それ
らのプリペイド SIM カードの販売業者らに対する協調的行為の疑いにつき、いくつかの誓約を条件と
して、3 年間に及んだ調査を終了した。
スロバキア共和国
•
スロバキア反独占局評議会、ZSE-D 社に対する課徴金を承認
スロバキア反独占局評議会は、地方配電システムオペレーターである ZSE Distribúcia 社が支配的
地位を濫用したとの 2011 年 12 月の反独占局の決定に対する同社の異議を認めなかった。
イギリス
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公正取引庁、海峡横断運送に関する企業結合につき競争委員会に回付
公正取引庁は、倒産したフェリー会社であるSeaFrance社の一定の資産をGroupe Eurotunnel社が買収
した件につき、更なる調査のため、競争委員会に回付した。
•
公正取引庁、イエローページ事業に関する解除を勧告
公正取引庁は、競争委員会に対し、hibu社(前Yell Group社)がイエローページ事業に関して2007年
に競争委員会から課せられていた義務の解除を検討するよう勧告した。
•
公正取引庁、競争法手続ガイダンス改正版を公表
公正取引庁は、改正された1998年競争法手続ガイダンスを公表した。
•
公正取引庁、個人の当座預金市場の調査を公表
公正取引庁は、個人の当座預金市場につき、2008年の公正取引庁による市場調査以来市場がどのよう
に変化したかについての調査につき公表した。
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NHS ホスピタル・トラストが公正取引庁に対し任意の保証
8つのNHSホスピタル・トラストが、公正取引庁に対し、競争法の遵守を確実にし、それにより公正
取引庁による正式調査を避けるため、自己負担患者部門(PPU)での価格についての営業機密情報を
今後一切交換しないことを任意で保証するとの申し出を行った。
海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
4
アメリカ
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連邦取引委員会、企業結合審査において標準必須特許に関する行為に対する措置
米国連邦取引委員会は、Robert Bosh 社による SPX Service Solutions US 社の買収案件につき、
SPX 社の買収取引前の標準必須特許に関する行為についての問題解消措置を条件として、承認した。
•
Biglari 社、企業結合の事前届出義務違反の主張につき和解
Biglari Holdings 社は、レストラン運営会社である Cracker Barrel Old Country Store 社の株式
取得の届出を怠ったことにより企業結合の事前届出規制に違反したとの連邦取引委員会の主張につき、
85 万ドルを支払うことで和解した。
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製薬協同組合と連邦取引委員会、共同交渉につき同意命令
連邦取引委員会は、製薬協同組合である Cooperativa de Farmacias Puertorriqueñas から提示され
た、支払者に対し共同で交渉することを自ら禁止するとの同意命令案を受け入れた。
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連邦取引委員会、製薬業界における排他的特許ライセンスについてハート・スコット・ロディノ法が
定める届出義務を変更する改正案についてパブリックコメントを募集
連邦取引委員会は、製薬業界の会社が排他的特許ライセンスを取得しようとする場合に適用される
1976 年ハート・スコット・ロディノ反トラスト改正法において定められている企業結合に関する
事前届出規制について、改正案を発表しパブリックコメントの募集を開始した。
海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
5
今号のピックアップ
EU:欧州委員会、TV およびコンピューター用モニターのブラウン管製造業者に対して 14 億 7000 万
ユーロの課徴金
要約:欧州委員会(以下「委員会」といいます。)は、ブラウン管を製造する 7 つの国際的なグループ
企業(以下「本件ブラウン管製造業者」といいます。)に対して、合計で約 14 億 7000 万ユーロの課徴金
の支払いを命じました。
背景:欧州連合の機能に関する条約(TFEU)第 101 条は、カルテルおよびその他の合意または協調的行為
であって、競争を制限するものを禁止しています。企業は、課徴金の全額免除または減額を受けるために、
委員会に対し、定められた条件に従ってリニエンシー申請をすることができます(2006/C 298/11)。
委員会は、2007 年 11 月に非公表の調査を行った後、2009 年 11 月に異議告知書を送付していました。
また、2 社については、2012 年 6 月に、共同責任に関する追加の異議告知書を送付していました。
事案:委員会は、本件ブラウン管製造業者に対し、(1)コンピューターのモニターに使用されるカラー
表示管および(2)カラーテレビに使用されるカラー受像管についてのカルテルに参加していたとして
(以下「本件カルテル」といいます。)、合計で約 14 億 7000 万ユーロの課徴金の支払いを命じました。
委員会は、本件ブラウン管製造業者は、価格協定、市場割当、顧客割当、生産能力および生産量の調整、
ならびに営業機密情報の交換を、1996 年から 2006 年までおよそ 10 年間行っていたとしています。また、
委員会は、本件ブラウン管製造業者は、コンピューターのモニターのブラウン管に関して行われていたと
されるカルテルにおいては、工場を訪問して生産能力の制限を守っているか確認するなどして、本件カル
テルの合意が実行されていることをモニターしていたとしています。
委員会によれば、本件カルテルは世界規模で行われ、本件ブラウン管製造業者のミーティングはアジアや
ヨーロッパの複数の場所で行われました。また、本件ブラウン管製造業者は、法に違反していることを
理解した上で、反競争的な書類を所持することを避けるよう予防措置をとっていたとされています。
課徴金のレベルを決めるに際し、委員会は、欧州経済地域(EEA)における当該製品の売上高、非常に
重大な違反であるという性質、地理的範囲、実施方法および実施期間を考慮しました。本件ブラウン管
製造業者のひとつである Chungwa 社は、本件カルテルの存在を 1 番目に明らかにしたとして、課徴金の
全額免除を受けました。その他にも、委員会のリニエンシー制度で定める協力をしたことにより、10%
から 40%の減額を受けた会社があります。
コメント:この案件で課された課徴金の合計額は、委員会の単一の決定により課された課徴金額として
史上最高額です。対象会社のうちのひとつは、支払能力がないことを理由に課徴金を減額されています。
ブラウン管業界に対しては、近年調査が集中して行われており、2011 年には、テレビやコンピューターの
スクリーンに使用されるブラウン管のガラスの製造業者が価格調整を行ったとされた調査に関し、委員会
は和解手続を行いました。
ソース:2012 年 12 月 5 日付委員会によるプレスリリース
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1317_en.htm
海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
6
EU:ユニバーサルによる EMI 買収案件が条件付きクリアランス
要約:欧州委員会(以下「委員会」といいます。)は、フェーズ II の審査を経て、ユニバーサル ミュー
ジック グループ(以下「ユニバーサル」といいます。)による EMI のレコード部門の買収提案(以下
「本提案」といいます。)を、多数の資産譲渡を条件として承認しました。
背景:EU 企業結合規則(139/2004/EC)(以下「EUMR」といいます。)において、委員会は、その買収が
関連市場における有効な競争を著しく阻害する場合を除き、フェーズ I の審査の終了時に当該買収に対す
るクリアランスを付与しなければならないとされています。深刻な疑念を生じる場合は、適切な問題解消
措置(EUMR 第 6 条第 1 項)の提案を受けない限り、委員会は詳細なフェーズ II の審査を開始しなければ
なりません。委員会は、買収当事者が履行を誓約する問題解消措置を、フェーズ I のクリアランスの条件
として受け入れることができます(EUMR 第 6 条第 2 項)。委員会の調査の最終決定は、詳細な調査の開始
を決定したことには左右されません。
ユニバーサルは、2012 年 2 月 17 日に、委員会に対し EMI のレコード部門の買収計画を通知し、委員会は、
2012 年 3 月 23 日に、詳細な調査の開始を決定しました。2012 年 6 月 19 日には、委員会の懸念する競争
法に関する問題点を示した異議告知書が出ていました。
事案:本提案は、世界的に「メジャー」と呼ばれるレコード会社 4 つのうち 2 つが一緒になるもので、
メジャーが 3 つしか残らないことになります。委員会は、今回の買収後に、小売レベルで[CD などの]
物理的音楽媒体またはデジタル音楽媒体を販売する顧客に対し、ユニバーサルが過度の市場支配力を持つ
ことにならないかを懸念していました。委員会は、Apple や Spotify などのデジタル音楽販売業者に対し
てレコード会社が音楽をライセンスするデジタル音楽市場を集中して審査しました。本提案の通知当初は、
ユニバーサルが、デジタル音楽販売業者に対して、買収後により高い価格やより重い負担のあるライ
センス条件を課すことにならないかが懸念されていました。委員会は、本提案が、欧州経済地域(EEA)
において、革新的な業者が新しい音楽を始めたり拡げていこうとする可能性に悪影響を与えないかという
点、また究極的にはデジタル音楽に関する消費者の選択肢を減らし、文化的多様性も失われないかという
点を考慮しました。
ユニバーサルは、EMI Recording Limited (Parlophone レーベル)、EMI フランス、EMI のクラシック音楽
のレーベルおよびその他の様々なレーベルに加え、様々な地域の EMI の事業体など、重要な資産を分割
することを誓約しました。分割された資産の中には、レーベルのライセンス事業を行う Coop も含まれ
ます。加えて、ユニバーサルは、人気のある「Now! That's What I Call Music」の編集を行う合弁会社
に対する EMI の 50%の持分を売却し、今後 10 年間に渡り当該編集のレパートリーをライセンスし続ける
ことを誓約しました。
さらに、ユニバーサルは、欧州経済地域において、今後 10 年間、デジタル音楽の顧客との新たなまたは
再交渉する契約の中で、自身に有利な最恵国待遇条項(デジタル音楽の顧客がユニバーサルの競争相手に
有利な条件で契約した場合、その条件をユニバーサルにも適用することを義務付けるもの)を入れない
ことも誓約しました。今回分割される権利は全世界で適用され、デジタル音楽と物理的音楽の両方に適用
されます。
海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
7
コメント:現在、委員会のフェーズ II の審査としては、他に、UPS による TNT の買収提案1、ライアン
エアーによるエア・リンガスの買収提案、製紙会社である Munksjö と Ahlstrom のヨーロッパにおける
ラベルの製造および加工事業の統合提案、および Synivers による技術サービス業者である Mach の買収
提案の 4 つが継続しています。
ソース:2012 年 9 月 21 日付委員会によるプレスリリース
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/999&format=HTML&aged=0&language=E
N&guiLanguage=en.
中国:商務部、ウォルマートによるオンライン通販事業会社の買収を条件付きクリアランス
要約:中国商務部(MOFCOM)は、ウォルマート・ストアーズ社(以下「ウォルマート社」といいます。)
に対し、Newheight Holdings Limited(以下「Newheight 社」といいます。)の支配的な株式の取得に
つき、問題解消措置を課しました。
背景:一定の売上基準を満たした取引は、商務部に対して通知し、取引完了前にクリアランスを得る必要
があります(独占禁止法(AML)第 21 条)。独占禁止法第 27 条は、商務部が取引を審査する際に考慮
する事項のリストを定めています。リストには、取引当事者のマーケットシェア、市場集中レベルや、
市場参入者、第三者および国の経済成長に与える影響が挙げられています。
事案:ウォルマート社は、中国および世界のスーパーマーケット業界において、主要な競争者のひとつで
す。Newheight 社は、現在中国において最も大きなオンラインスーパーマーケットである「1 号店」
(Yihaodian)を保有しています。1 号店の事業は、オンラインの直接販売事業と、付加価値電信事業
(以下「VATS 事業」といいます。)に分けられます。買収が完了すると、ウォルマート社は Newheight 社
の持分割合を 17.7%から 51.3%へ増加させることになり、Newheight 社の(そして間接的に 1 号店の)
支配株主となります。
商務部は、企業結合後の会社が[従来型の店舗での販売という意味での]物理的な小売販売とオンライン
での小売販売の競争における強みを一体化させて「てこ」のように使う力を持ってしまい、VATS 市場に
おいて急速に拡大し、交渉力を強化させるのではないかと考えました。商務部は、これにより VATS 市場
における競争が制限または除去されてしまうことを懸念しました。そこで商務部は、主として、1 号店が
ウォルマートの関与なしに VATS 事業を独立して運営することを目的とした問題解消措置を課しました。
コメント:これは独占禁止法施行後、商務部による 15 件目の条件付きクリアランスです。小売業は中国
政府が詳しく検査している分野です。本件においては、商務部は物理的な(すなわち電子取引外の)小売
業と、オンラインの小売業を区別しました。商務部は、今回の取引の調査のため、調査期間である 180 日
間をすべて使いました。
ソース:2012 年 8 月 14 日付中国商務部によるプレスリリース(中国語)
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201208/20120808284410.html
1
UPS による TNT の買収提案については、2013 年 1 月 30 日に欧州委員会が買収を承認しないことを発表しました。EU 加盟国のうち 15 か
国で市場における競争者が 2-3 社になってしまうことが理由として挙げられています。当該案件の欧州委員会のプレスリリースは以下の
リンクからご覧頂けます。
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-68_en.htm
海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
8
アメリカ:製薬協同組合と連邦取引委員会、共同交渉につき同意命令
要 約 : 連邦取 引委 員会は 、製 薬協同 組合 である Cooperativa de Farmacias Puertorriqueñas( 以下
「Coopharma」といいます。)から提示された、支払者に対し共同で交渉することを自ら禁止するとの
同意命令案を受け入れました。
背景:連邦取引委員会法第 5 条は、不公正な競争方法および不公正または欺瞞的な行為・慣行を禁止して
います。これには、シャーマン法に違反する行為その他の競争を害する行為が含まれますが、シャーマン
法で正式に禁止されている行為のカテゴリーにきれいに当てはまらないものもあります。
事案:審判開始決定書において、連邦取引委員会は、Coopharma への加入を通じて、競争者である薬局間
において価格協定が行われているのではないかと主張していました。薬局は、Coopharma を通じて、支払
者と共同で交渉し、薬局が共同で提示した条件に従わない支払者に対しては、ボイコットを行っていま
した。Coopharma は、所属するメンバーに、協同組合を通じないで第三者である支払者と取引をすること
を拒絶させ、また要求する条件で Coopharma と取引をすることを拒絶した支払者に対しては契約を解除
すると脅し、実際に解除していました。薬局は、指摘された行為を正当化できるような、効率性を強化
する統合であるということができませんでした。連邦取引委員会によると、当該行為は、Coopharma の
メンバー間での薬局サービスの価格その他の競争を不合理に制限し、結果として薬局サービスの価格を
上昇させました。
コメント:このケースは、競争者間における協同組合の合意が、とりわけ当該合意が競争促進的な正当化
事由に欠けるときは、反トラスト法における問題をはらむものであることを注意喚起するものとなりま
した。
ソース:2012 年 8 月 21 日付け審判開始決定書
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1010079/120821coopharmacmpt.pdf
パブリックコメントへの補助を目的とした同意命令を含んだ合意の分析
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1010079/120821coopharmaanal.pdf
海外競争法アップデイト(2012 年 7-12 月)
9
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
クリフォードチャンスの独禁法グループについて
クリフォードチャンスの競争法グループは、経済学と規制法の知見を併せた競争法・独禁法の専門的知識と経験をもって、
以下のようなことについて、幅広い分野のクライアントの皆様にアドバイスしています。
•
合併、買収、合弁事業、事業提携
•
カルテル調査
•
独占的地位又はマーケットパワーの濫用
•
反競争的な合意、取引
•
独禁法違反訴訟
•
コンプライアンスプログラム
独禁法・競争法はますます複雑化し、重要なものになっています。クリフォードチャンスの競争法グループは、ヨーロッパ、
アメリカ、アジアをカバーする約 150 名の弁護士から構成され、各国のクライアントの皆様に「ワンストップサービス」を
提供しています。
より詳しい情報をお知りになりたい方は、表記のお問い合わせ先にご連絡いただくか、
http://www.cliffordchance.com/antitrust をご覧ください。
本稿 は テー マと な る題 材 に関 し て一 般的 な 解説 を行 う こと を 目的 と して
おり、全ての側面を網羅するものではありません。又、本稿は、法律その他
のアドバイスを行うものではありません。
クリフォードチャンス法律事務所
外国法共同事業
〒107-0052 東京都港区赤坂 2 丁目 17 番 7 号赤坂溜池タワー7 階
© Clifford Chance 2013
Clifford Chance Law Office (Gaikokuho Kyodo Jigyo)
www.cliffordchance.com
Abu Dhabi ■ Amsterdam ■ Bangkok ■ Barcelona ■ Beijing ■ Brussels ■ Bucharest ■ Casablanca ■ Doha ■ Dubai ■ Düsseldorf ■ Frankfurt ■ Hong Kong ■ Istanbul ■ Kyiv ■ London ■
Luxembourg ■ Madrid ■ Milan ■ Moscow ■ Munich ■ New York ■ Paris ■ Perth ■ Prague ■ Riyadh* ■ Rome ■ São Paulo ■ Shanghai ■ Singapore ■ Sydney ■ Tokyo ■ Warsaw ■
Washington, D.C
*Clifford Chance has a co-operation agreement with Al-Jadaan & Partners Law Firm in Riyadh.
TOKYO-1-273369
1
Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
Antitrust Review
July - December 2012
Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
European Union

Commission fines producers of TV and computer monitor tubes €1.47 billion. The European Commission has
imposed total fines of approximately €1.47 billion on seven international groups of companies producing cathode ray
tubes.

Microsoft receives SO for non-compliance with commitments. The European Commission has issued a statement
of objections to Microsoft on non-compliance with commitments to offer users a choice screen enabling them to easily
choose their preferred web browser.

Universal/EMI receives conditional clearance. The European Commission has, subject to a number of divestments,
conditionally approved the proposed acquisition of EMI's recorded music business by Universal Music Group after its
Phase II investigation.

General Court upholds Commission's bitumen decision. The General Court of the EU has ruled on appeals brought
by bitumen producers and construction companies against a decision of the European Commission, which found that
the undertakings had participated in an illegal price-fixing cartel in the road bitumen sector in the Netherlands.

Commission opens wire harnesses investigation. The European Commission has opened an investigation into
suspected cartels for the supply of automotive electrical distribution systems, also known as wire harnesses, in the EEA.

Commission sends SO to computer CD and DVD drives suppliers. The European Commission has informed
thirteen suppliers of optical disk drives in the EEA of its preliminary view that they may have infringed EU antitrust rules
by participating in a worldwide cartel.
China

Wal-Mart's acquisition of Chinese online retail platform receives conditional clearance. China's Ministry of
Commerce has imposed behavioural conditions on Wal-Mart Stores Inc.'s acquisition of a controlling stake in Newheight
Holdings Limited.

ARM / Giesecke & Devrient / Gemalto JV receives conditional clearance. China's Ministry of Commerce has
imposed behavioural conditions in connection with the proposed creation of a joint venture between semiconductor
intellectual property supplier ARM, and two providers of security solutions – Giesecke & Devrient of Germany and
Gemalto of the Netherlands.

Second hand car dealers fined for cartel conduct. The Henan Administration of Industry & Commerce, a local
branch of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, has fined 11 used car dealers RMB 1.73 million for price
fixing.
Czech Republic

Amendments to the CCA. A bill amending the Czech Competition Act came into effect on 1 December 2012.
Germany

FCO fines Haribo for information exchange. On 1 August 2012, the German Federal Cartel Office fined confectionery
manufacturer Haribo €2.4 million for unlawful information exchange.
Japan

FTC warns alcohol wholesalers against suspected beer sales below cost. The Fair Trade Commission issued a
warning to three alcohol wholesalers regarding the sale of beer to Aeon, a large chain store operator, at an excessively
low price which could result in sales below cost.
© Clifford Chance LLP July – December 2012
2
Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
Romania

RCC closes mobile telecommunication prepay cards investigation. The Romanian Competition Council has closed
a 3-year investigation into possible concerted practices between mobile telecommunication operators Orange, Vodafone
and Cosmote, and distributors of their prepaid SIM cards subject to certain commitments.
Slovak Republic

Council of the Antimonopoly Office confirms fine against ZSE-D. The Council of the Slovak Antimonopoly Office
has dismissed the appeal of ZSE Distribúcia, a.s., a regional electricity distribution system operator, against the AMO's
decision of December 2011 which found that ZSE-D had abused a dominant position.
United Kingdom

Cross channel transport merger referred to CC. The Office of Fair Trading has referred the completed acquisition by
Groupe Eurotunnel S.A. of certain assets of former ferry operator, SeaFrance S.A. to the Competition Commission for
further investigation.

OFT recommends release from Yellow Pages undertakings. The Office of Fair Trading has recommended that the
Competition Commission consider releasing hibu plc (formerly Yell Group plc) from the undertakings given to the
Competition Commission in 2007 relating to its Yellow Pages business.

OFT launches revised Competition Act procedures guidance. The Office of Fair Trading has issued its revised
guidance on Competition Act 1998 procedures.

OFT launches review of personal current account market. The Office of Fair Trading has launched a review of the
personal current account market to establish how the market has evolved since the OFT's market study in 2008.

Voluntary assurances to the OFT by NHS hospital trusts. Eight NHS Hospital Trusts have given voluntary
assurances to the Office of Fair Trading that they will no longer exchange commercially sensitive information about their
private patient unit prices, to ensure their compliance with competition law and thereby avoid a formal investigation by
the OFT.
United States

FTC addresses standard essential patent conduct in merger review. The US Federal Trade Commission has
approved the acquisition by Robert Bosch GmbH of SPX Service Solutions US LLC subject to certain behavioural
commitments relating to SPX's pre-transaction standard essential patent conduct.

Biglari settles alleged violation of US premerger notification requirements. Biglari Holdings, Inc. has agreed to pay
$850,000 to settle an allegation by the US Federal Trade Commission that Biglari violated premerger notification laws
when it failed to report an acquisition of shares in restaurant operator Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.

Pharmaceutical cooperative and FTC reach consent order on collective bargaining. The US Federal Trade
Commission has accepted a proposed consent order from the pharmaceutical cooperative Cooperativa de Farmacias
Puertorriqueñas prohibiting itself from collectively negotiating with payers (such as pharmacy services providers).

FTC seeks comments on proposed changes to reporting requirements under the HSR Act for exclusive patent
licenses in the pharmaceutical industry. The US Federal Trade Commission has requested public comments on
proposed amendments to the premerger notification rules promulgated under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 that will apply to proposed acquisitions of exclusive patent rights by companies in the
pharmaceutical industry.
© Clifford Chance LLP July - December 2012
3
Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
European Union: Commission fines producers of TV and computer monitor tubes
€1.47 billion
Summary. The European Commission (the Commission) has imposed total fines of approximately €1.47 billion on seven
international groups of companies producing cathode ray tubes (CRT) (the CRT manufacturers).
Background. Article 101(1) (Article 101) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits cartels
and other agreements or concerted practices that restrict competition. Companies can apply to the Commission under the
terms of its leniency notice to obtain total immunity or leniency from fines (2006/C 298/11).
Following unannounced inspections in November 2007, the Commission issued a statement of objections (SO) in November
2009. A supplementary SO concerning corporate liability was issued in June 2012 against two companies.
Facts. The Commission has imposed total fines of approximately €1.47 billion on the CRT manufacturers for alleged
participation in cartels relating to (i) colour display tubes used in computer monitors and (ii) colour picture tubes used for
colour televisions. The Commission considered that the CRT manufacturers participated in anti-competitive practices
including price fixing, market sharing, customer allocation, capacity and output coordination and exchanges of commercial
sensitive information for almost ten years between 1996 and 2006. The Commission also considered that the CRT
manufacturers monitored the implementation, including auditing compliance with the capacity restrictions by plant visits in
the case of the alleged computer monitor tubes cartel.
According to the Commission, the alleged cartels operated worldwide and meetings between the CRT manufacturers took
place in various locations in Asia and Europe. It also considered that the CRT manufacturers were aware that they were
breaking the law and were taking precautions to avoid being in possession of anti-competitive documents.
In setting the level of fines, the Commission took into account the companies' sales of the products concerned in the EEA,
the very serious nature of the alleged infringement, its geographic scope, its implementation and its duration. Chungwa, one
of the CRT manufacturers, received full immunity from fines as it was the first to reveal the existence of the alleged cartels.
Others received reductions ranging from 10% to 40% for their cooperation under the Commission's leniency programme.
Comment. The combined total fine is the largest fine imposed by the Commission to date in a single decision. One of the
companies was granted a reduction of the fine due to its inability to pay. The CRT sector has been a focus of investigation in
recent years and, in 2011, the Commission settled an investigation into alleged price coordination between producers of
CRT glass used in television and computer screens.
Source: Commission press release, 5 December 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1317_en.htm.
European Union: Microsoft receives SO for non-compliance with commitments
Summary. The European Commission (the Commission) has issued a statement of objections (SO) to Microsoft on noncompliance with commitments to offer users a choice screen enabling them to easily choose their preferred web browser
(the browser commitments).
Background. Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits the abuse of a dominant position
by companies of their market position in the EU, or a substantial part of the EU (Article 102).
The Commission may terminate Article 102 proceedings by adopting a commitments decision where the companies under
investigation are willing to offer commitments which remove the Commission's initial competition concerns (Article 9,
Modernisation Regulation (1/2003/EC)) (Article 9). The commitments can be behavioural or structural and may be limited in
time.
The issuing of an SO is a formal step in competition investigations by the Commission and provides notice of a proposed
infringement decision to the parties involved. The parties can make written submissions in response and may request an
oral hearing. The Commission considers any submissions made before it makes its decision (Article 10, Conduct of
© Clifford Chance LLP July – December 2012
4
Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
Commission Proceedings Regulation (773/2004/EC)).
In 2009 to address the Commission's concern that it may have tied its web browser Internet Explorer to Windows, in breach
of Article 102, Microsoft offered commitments to the Commission. These included the browser commitments whereby
Microsoft would make available for five years (i.e. until 2014) a "choice screen" in Windows from which EU consumers could
choose which web browser(s) they wanted to install in addition to, or instead of, Microsoft's Internet Explorer. The
Commission approved the browser commitments and made them legally binding on Microsoft in December 2009.
On 16 July 2012 the Commission opened proceedings to investigate concerns that Microsoft may have failed to incorporate
the choice screen in its Windows 7 Service Pack 1, issued in February 2011.
Facts. The Commission has issued an SO to Microsoft informing it of the Commission's preliminary view that Microsoft has
failed to comply with the browser commitments. The Commission has taken the preliminary view that Microsoft has failed to
roll out the browser choice screen with its Windows 7 Service Pack 1 and that from February 2011 until July 2012, millions of
Windows users in the EU may not have seen the choice screen.
Comment. The sending of an SO does not prejudge the final outcome of the investigation. Microsoft has acknowledged that
the choice screen was not displayed during the relevant period and has stated that it had moved quickly to address the
problem as soon as it became aware of it. In June 2012, the General Court of the EU upheld a fine imposed on Microsoft by
the Commission in 2008 for failure to comply with a 2004 Commission decision.
Source: Commission press release, 24 October 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1149_en.htm..
European Union: Universal/EMI receives conditional clearance
Summary. The European Commission (the Commission) has, subject to a number of divestments, conditionally approved
the proposed acquisition of EMI's recorded music business (EMI Recording) by Universal Music Group (Universal) (the
proposed transaction) after its Phase II investigation.
Background. Under the EU Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) (EUMR), the Commission must clear a transaction at the end
of its Phase I investigation unless it finds that the merger would significantly impede effective competition in the relevant
markets. If serious doubts are raised, then it must open an in-depth Phase II investigation if it has not received an offer of
appropriate remedies (Article 6(1), EUMR). The Commission can accept binding commitments from the merging parties as
a condition of the Phase I clearance (Article 6(2), EUMR). The decision to open an in-depth investigation does not prejudge
the final results of the Commission's investigation.
Universal notified its proposed acquisition of EMI's recorded music business to the Commission on 17 February 2012 and
the Commission then opened an in-depth investigation on 23 March 2012. A statement of objections setting out the
Commission's competition concerns was adopted on 19 June 2012.
Facts. The proposed transaction would bring together two of the four so-called global "major" record companies, leaving
only three majors. The Commission had concerns that following the merger, Universal would enjoy excessive market power
vis-à-vis its direct customers, who sell physical and digital recorded music at retail level. The Commission focused its
investigation on the markets for digital music where record companies license their music to digital retailers such as Apple
and Spotify. It had concerns that the proposed transaction, as initially notified, might have allowed Universal to impose
higher prices and more onerous licensing terms on digital music providers. The Commission considered that this could have
negatively impacted on the possibilities for innovative providers to expand or launch new music offerings and would
ultimately have reduced consumers' choice for digital music, as well as cultural diversity, in the European Economic Area
(EEA).
Universal committed to divest significant assets including EMI Recording Limited (Parlophone label), EMI France, EMI's
classical music labels and various other labels and a number of local EMI entities. The divestment package also includes
Coop, a label licensing business. In addition, Universal committed to selling EMI's 50% stake in the popular Now! That's
What I Call Music compilation joint venture and to continue licensing its repertoire for that compilation in the next ten years.
© Clifford Chance LLP July - December 2012
5
Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
Universal also committed not to include most favoured nation clauses in its favour (which oblige digital customers to extend
any favourable term granted to Universal's competitors to Universal) in any new or renegotiated contract with digital
customers in the EEA for ten years. The rights to be divested are worldwide and cover both digital and physical music
Comment. There are currently four other on-going Commission phase II investigations: the proposed acquisition of TNT
Express by UPS; the proposed acquisition of Aer Lingus by Ryanair; the proposed merger between the paper products
manufacturer Munksjö and the European label and processing business of Ahlstrom; and the proposed acquisition of
technology services provider Mach by Syniverse.
Source: Commission press release, 21 September 2012,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/999&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=
en.
European Union: General Court upholds Commission's bitumen decision
Summary. The General Court of the EU has ruled on appeals brought by bitumen producers and construction companies
(the appeals) against a decision of the European Commission (the Commission), which found that the undertakings had
participated in an illegal price-fixing cartel in the road bitumen sector in the Netherlands.
Background. Article 101(1) (Article 101) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits cartels
and other agreements or concerted practices that restrict competition.
Those found to have infringed Article 101 can appeal to the General Court (Article 256, TFEU). Appellants can also apply to
the General Court for a reduction of the fines imposed by the Commission (Article 256, TFEU).
Facts. In September 2006, the Commission imposed total fines €266.7 million on eight bitumen suppliers and six
construction company purchasers for infringing Article 101(1). The Commission found that between, at least, 1994 and 2002
the undertakings had allegedly participated in a single and continuous infringement by fixing collectively the gross price of
road pavement bitumen in the Netherlands, a uniform rebate on the gross price for participating road builders and a smaller
maximum rebate on the gross price for other road builders.
Decision. The General Court has handed down 16 separate judgments in the appeals. Fourteen of the appeals were
rejected in their entirety, whilst Shell and Ballast Nedam were granted a reduction in their fines. The General Court reduced
the fine imposed on Shell from €108 million to €81 million; concluding that the Commission failed to establish to the requisite
legal standard that Shell played the role of instigator and leader in the infringement. The General Court also reduced the fine
imposed on Ballast Nedam Infra BV to €3.45 million from €4.65 million as the Commission had failed to indicate the capacity
in which the appellant was held responsible for the alleged involvement in the cartel between June 1996 and September
2000 (i.e. for its own conduct or for that of a wholly-owned subsidiary). However, the fine against its parent company Ballast
Nedam was upheld.
Comment. A number of the undertakings, including both Shell and Ballast Nedam, challenged the Commission's decision to
attribute liability to parent companies for the alleged anti-competitive behaviour of their subsidiaries. In rejecting the appeals
against parental liability, the court followed the principle of the 2009 decision in Akzo Nobel NV v Commission that there is a
rebuttable presumption that a parent company is liable for the antitrust infringements of a subsidiary if the parent exerts
"decisive influence" over it.
Source: Case T‑343/06 – Shell Petroleum NV v Commission; Case T-344/06 – Total SA v Commission; Case T-347/06 –
Nynas Petroleum and Nynas Belgium; Case T-348/06 – Total Nederland v Commission; Case T-351/06 – Dura Vermeer
Groep v Commission; Case T-352/06 – Dura Vermeer Infra v Commission; Case T-353/06 – Vermeer Infrastructuur v
Commission; Case T-354/06 – BAM NBM Wegenbouw and HBG Civiel v Commission; Case T-355/06 – Koninkliijke BAM
Groep v Commission; Case T-356/06 – Koninkliijke Volker Wessels Stevin (KVWS) v Commission; Case T-357/06 –
Koninkliijke Wegenbouw Stevin (KWS) v Commission; Case T-359/06 – Heijmans Infrastructuur (HI) v Commission; Case T360/06 – Heijmans NV v Commission; Case T-361/06 – Ballast Nedam v Commission; Case T-362/06 – Ballast Nedam Infra
v Commission; and Case T-370/06 – Kuwait Petroleum v Commission.
© Clifford Chance LLP July – December 2012
6
Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
European Union: Commission opens wire harnesses investigation
Summary. The European Commission (the Commission) has opened an investigation into suspected cartels for the supply
of automotive electrical distribution systems, also known as wire harnesses, in the EEA.
Background. Article 101 (Article 101) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits cartels and
other agreements or concerted practices that restrict competition.
In February 2010, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of a number of wire harness
producers.
Facts. The Commission has concerns that certain suppliers of automotive distribution systems (used to link a car's computer
systems to its various functions) may have been involved in bid-rigging.
Investigations have been ongoing, including unannounced inspections at companies suspected of being involved. However,
the opening of proceedings means the Commission will treat this case as a matter of priority, without prejudging the outcome
of the investigation. The Commission has informed the companies involved and the competition authorities of the Member
States that it has opened formal proceedings in this case.
Comment. The Commission's investigation is part of a wider effort to investigate possible cartels in the automotive sector.
The Commission has recently carried out unannounced inspections in other areas of the car parts sector, including in the
occupant safety systems sector in June 2011, bearings sector in November 2011 and in the thermal systems sector in May
2012. In October 2011, the UK's Office of Fair Trading (OFT) closed its criminal investigation into the alleged cartel conduct
involving suppliers in the automotive sector.
Source: Commission press release, 9 August 2010,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/894&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=
en.
European Commission: Commission sends SO to computer CD and DVD drives
suppliers
Summary. The European Commission (the Commission) has informed thirteen suppliers of optical disk drives in the EEA of
its preliminary view that they may have infringed EU antitrust rules by participating in a worldwide cartel.
Background. Article 101(1) (Article 101) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits cartels
and other agreements or concerted practices that restrict competition.
A statement of objections (SO) is a formal step in competition investigations by the European Commission and provides
notice of a proposed infringement decision to the parties involved. The parties can make written submissions in response
and may request an oral hearing. The Commission considers any submissions made before it makes its decision (Article 10,
Conduct of Commission Proceedings Regulation (773/2004/EC)).
Facts. The Commission has concerns that certain suppliers of optical disk drives (used to read or write data on CDs and
DVDs) may have co-ordinated their behaviour in bidding events organised by two major original equipment manufacturers
for optical disk drives used in personal computers (desktops and notebooks) and in servers.
The Commission's preliminary view is that the companies concerned were involved for at least five years in bid rigging. The
Commission considers bid rigging to be one of the most serious breaches of EU antitrust rules which, if established in this
case, may have ultimately affected customers that bought optical disk drives manufactured by the companies concerned.
Comment. The Commission has stated that the sending of an SO does not prejudge the final outcome of the investigation.
The Commission has recently opened proceedings in several other cases, demonstrating its commitment to anti-cartel
enforcement. For example, earlier in July, the Commission sent an SO to four traders of North Sea shrimps following
concerns that they may have colluded to fix prices, and allocate markets and customers in at least the Netherlands,
Germany, France and Belgium; and in September, it sent an SO to suspected participants of a retail food packaging cartel.
© Clifford Chance LLP July - December 2012
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Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
Source: Commission press release, 24 July 2012,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/830&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=
en.
China: Wal-Mart's acquisition of Chinese online retail platform receives conditional
clearance
Summary. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has imposed behavioural conditions on Wal-Mart Stores Inc.'s (WalMart) acquisition of a controlling stake in Newheight Holdings Limited (Newheight).
Background. Transactions which meet specified turnover thresholds must be notified to MOFCOM and clearance obtained
before the transaction can be completed (Article 21, Anti-Monopoly Law (AML)). Article 27 of the AML sets out a list of
factors that MOFCOM will consider when reviewing a transaction. These include market shares of the transaction parties,
market concentration levels and the impact of the transaction on market entry, third parties and national economic
development.
Facts. Wal-Mart is a major competitor in the supermarkets sector in China and globally. Newheight owns Yihaodian,
currently the largest online supermarket in China. Yihaodian's business can be split into its online direct sales business and
its value-added telecoms services (VATS) business. Post-acquisition, Wal-Mart would increase its stake in Newheight from
17.7% to 51.3% and would become the controlling shareholder in Newheight and, indirectly, in Yihaodian.
MOFCOM considered that the merged entity would have the ability to “leverage” its combined competitive strength in both
physical and online retail segments to expand rapidly and enhance its bargaining power in the VATS market. MOFCOM had
concerns that this could eliminate or restrict competition in the VATS market. MOFCOM therefore imposed behavioural
conditions largely aimed to ensure that Yihaodian operates and manages its VATS business on an independent basis
without Wal-Mart's involvement.
th
Comments. This is MOFCOM's 15 conditional clearance since the enactment of the AML. Retail is a sector closely
scrutinized by the Chinese government. In its decision, MOFCOM made a distinction between the physical retail sector (i.e.
brick and mortar retail outlets) and the online retail sector. MOFCOM used the entire review period of 180 calendar days to
review this transaction.
Source: MOFCOM press release, 14 August 2012, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201208/20120808284410.html (in
Chinese).
China: ARM / Giesecke & Devrient / Gemalto JV receives conditional clearance
Summary. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has imposed behavioural conditions in connection with the proposed
creation of a joint venture (JV) between semiconductor intellectual property supplier ARM, and two providers of security
solutions – Giesecke & Devrient (G&D) of Germany and Gemalto of the Netherlands.
Background. Transactions which meet specified turnover thresholds must be notified to MOFCOM and clearance obtained
before the transaction can be completed (Article 21, Anti-Monopoly Law (AML)). Article 27 of the AML sets out a list of
factors that MOFCOM will consider when reviewing a transaction. These include market shares of the transaction parties,
market concentration levels and the impact of the transaction on market entry, third parties and national economic
development.
Facts. The purpose of the proposed JV was to research, develop and market trusted execution environments (TEE), a
security product, for consumer electronics devices. Given that ARM licenses intellectual property rights (IPRs) to consumer
electronics devices, MOFCOM considered that the JV's TEE products would rely on ARM's technology and are vertically
related. MOFCOM considered that ARM had a substantial market position in the licensing of the relevant IPRs, as a result of
which the proposed transaction could enable ARM to exclude competitors of the JV from the TEE market.
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To address MOFCOM's concerns, ARM committed to release the security monitoring code and other information necessary
for the development of alternative TEE products based on ARM's technology on a non-discriminatory basis. ARM further
committed not to degrade the performance of any third party's TEE products through any special design of its own
intellectual property. Both commitments will be valid for 8 years.
Comments. This is MOFCOM's 16th conditional clearance since the enactment of the AML and the 6th conditional
clearance in 2012 which appears to have been MOFCOM's most active year to date. The duration of the commitments
offered in this case is also the longest in MOFCOM's conditional clearances to date.
Source: MOFCOM press release, 6 December 2012, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201212/20121208469841.html
(in Chinese).
China: Second hand car dealers fined for cartel conduct
Summary. The Henan Administration of Industry & Commerce (Henan AIC), a local branch of the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (SAIC), has fined 11 used car dealers (the dealers) RMB 1.73 million for price fixing.
Background. Article 13 of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) prohibits competitors from entering into anti-competitive
agreements, including price fixing agreements. The SAIC is one of two authorities responsible for enforcing the conduct
provisions under the AML – the other authority being the National Development Reform Commission.
Facts. The Henan AIC commenced its investigation in August 2011. According to the Henan AIC, the dealers fixed servicing
charges for four years from October 2007, resulting in illegal gains of approximately RMB 7 million. The dealers allegedly
fixed standard servicing charges and agreed that deviators would be penalised by up to RMB 15,000. The dealers also
allegedly agreed not to reduce servicing charges except in special circumstances, and even then not by more than 10% of
the agreed rate. The Henan AIC proceeded to fine the dealers after authorisation from the SAIC.
Comment. This is the second published enforcement decision by a local branch of the SAIC since the enactment of the
AML in 2008. The first enforcement decision was published in February 2011 by the Jiangsu Administration for Industry and
Commerce in relation to alleged cartel conduct by concrete manufacturers. The SAIC has stated that cartels such as this,
and a number of other similar investigations, are amongst its enforcement priorities. The increase in enforcement activity
coincides with the fourth anniversary of the AML's entry into force in August 2008.
Source: Anyang City Government press release, 3 August 2012,
http://www.anyang.gov.cn/sitegroup/root/html/00000000361142360136385855fe2882/20120803105191585.html (in
Chinese).
Czech Republic: Amendments to the CCA
Summary. A bill amending the Czech Competition Act (CCA) (the Bill) came into effect on 1 December 2012.
Background. According to Section 21 of the CCA, proceedings regarding cartel cases and abuse of dominant positions are
initiated by the Czech Competition Office (CCO). Sections 22 and 22a of the CCA provide sanctions for breaches of
competition law. The CCO already uses leniency and settlement procedures as part of its investigative and decision-making
powers, and has issued a notice on its leniency procedure. However, there has been no express statutory basis for leniency
and settlement procedures in the CCA.
On 29 February 2012, the Czech Government proposed the Bill to the Czech Chamber of Representatives (the Chamber of
Representatives). Following the approval by the Chamber of Representatives, the Bill was submitted to the Czech Senate
(the Senate) on 23 July 2012. On 21 August 2012, the Senate returned the Bill to the Chamber of Representatives.
Facts. The Chamber of Representatives overruled the Senate by approving the Bill with an absolute majority on 19
September 2012. On 9 October 2012, the Czech President signed the Bill, which then came into effect on 1 December 2012.
The Bill includes provisions introducing (i) a legal basis for leniency, (ii) a settlement procedure, (iii) the possibility of
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excluding companies guilty of bid rigging from participating in public tenders for three years, and (iv) the discretion of the
CCO not to pursue cases if there is no public interest in initiating such proceedings in view of the low negative impact of the
anti-competitive behaviour in question.
Comment. The Bill is expected to enhance legal certainty for companies as well as the enforcement of competition law.
While the proposed discretion of the CCO not to commence proceedings in certain cases might not result in legal certainty
for companies on the Czech market, the reasons given by the Senate for returning the Bill were primarily related to technical
and drafting issues.
Source: Transcript of Senate proceedings, http://www.senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/pssenat/historie?O=8&action=detail&value=3180
(available in Czech only); Act amending the CCA, 19 September 2012, http://aplikace.mvcr.cz/sbirkazakonu/ViewFile.aspx?type=z&id=24921 (in Czech).
Germany: FCO fines Haribo for information exchange
Summary. The German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has fined confectionery manufacturer Haribo €2.4 million for unlawful
information exchange.
Background. According to Section 1 para 1 of the German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC), agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices, which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, shall be prohibited. Information exchange can lead to a
concerted practice under section 1 para 1 ARC if it reduces strategic uncertainty in the market.
Facts. According to the FCO, senior sales representatives of four confectionery manufacturing undertakings (the
manufacturers) met regularly in the years 2006 and 2007 in so-called "four party talks". During these meetings competitively
sensitive information on the state of negotiations with various major retailers was exchanged. The manufacturers informed
each other about retailers' demands regarding rebates and discounts, and discussed how they had dealt or intended to deal
with such demands. The FCO considered that this type of information is usually treated as strictly confidential, and its
availability had allegedly influenced the manufacturers' market conduct in negotiations with the retailers.
The FCO's investigation began following a leniency application filed by Mars, one of the manufacturers. As a consequence,
Mars received full immunity from fines. Proceedings against the two other manufacturers are still ongoing.
The FCO noted that it reduced the fine imposed on Haribo due to its cooperation during the investigation proceedings.
Furthermore, it took into account termination of the proceedings by way of settlement and the alleged infringement not
constituting a hard core infringement.
Comment. The FCO's investigation is the latest in a number of investigations relating to the broader food retail sector. In
2010, coffee roasters were fined €159.5m for price fixing, which is one of the largest fines ever imposed by the FCO. Given
the pending sector inquiry by the FCO into the food retail sector, it can be assumed that the food industry will continue to be
under intensive scrutiny of the FCO.
Source: German FCO press release, 1 August 2012,
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/aktuelles/presse/2012_08_01.php.
Japan: FTC warns alcohol wholesalers against suspected beer sales below cost
Summary. The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) issued a warning to three alcohol wholesalers (the wholesalers) regarding the
sale of beer to Aeon, a large chain store operator, at an excessively low price which could result in sales below cost.
Background. The Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade (AML) prohibits the
continuous supply of goods or services for a price which is excessively below cost without a justifiable reason.
Facts. According to the FTC's press release, the wholesalers had been selling beer to Aeon at a price excessively below
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cost since at least January 2009. The FTC believes that the alleged illegal practice may be a result of the National Tax
Agency's 2006 guidelines which led beer manufacturers to reduce their rebates while the wholesale price was not increased
to reflect the reduction of rebates. The FTC suspects that the wholesalers were unable to raise the wholesale price as Aeon
refused to agree to price increase due to a superior bargaining position. In addition, the FTC could not prove that the sales
below cost had in fact an adverse effect on competition from the retailers in Aeon's neighbourhoods. The FTC therefore
issued a warning to the wholesalers, rather than a prohibition order, but added a note requesting that Aeon and the
wholesalers hold discussions to ascertain when wholesalers propose to increase wholesale prices.
Comment. In the current economic climate, consumers are increasingly price sensitive and competition amongst retailers is
intense. Aeon, in its press release, admitted that it had been investigated by the FTC but stressed that the FTC could not
find any anti-competitive conduct and that it has always been willing to discuss prices with the wholesalers.
Source: FTC warning to the liquor wholesalers, 1 August 2012, http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/12.august/120801.pdf (in
Japanese).
Romania: RCC closes mobile telecommunication prepay cards investigation
Summary. The Romanian Competition Council (RCC) has closed a 3-year investigation into possible concerted practices
between mobile telecommunication operators Orange, Vodafone and Cosmote (the operators), and distributors of their
prepaid SIM cards (the distributors) subject to certain commitments.
Background. Article 5(1) of Law no. 21/1996 (Competition Law) (Article 5) and Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Article 101) prohibit agreements between undertakings and decisions by
associations of undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the Romanian market and the common market, respectively. The prohibition contained in Article 5 and Article 101 may be
declared inapplicable in respect of certain agreements (Article 5(2) Competition Law and Article 101(3) TFEU).
Article 46 of the Competition Law provides the possibility for entities investigated by the RCC to submit proposed
commitments designed to remedy the alleged breach of antitrust law. If the RCC considers the commitments to be sufficient,
the investigation may be closed without imposing sanctions on the company being investigated. The RCC can decide to
reject such proposed commitments.
In November 2009, the RCC opened an investigation on its own initiative into the mobile telecommunication prepaid cards
market, in connection with the possible existence of contractual clauses in breach of antitrust law regarding (i) imposition of
a resale price, (ii) territorial restrictions and customer sharing and (iii) non-competition in distribution agreements.
Horizontal relations between the operators were not the object of the investigation. In November 2010, Orange and
Vodafone approached the RCC with proposed commitments and the RCC requested that all three operators submit
proposed commitments to address the potential competition issues.
Facts. The operators and the distributors committed to sign addendums to the distribution agreements with the distributors
to amend or eliminate certain clauses. The RCC accepted the proposed commitments and ruled in three separate decisions
(one for each operator and its distributors) to close the investigation. The RCC imposed time limits for the implementation of
the commitments - three months in respect of the agreements with the direct distributors and nine months time in respect of
the rest of the distribution arrangement. The implementation of the commitments will be monitored for a three year period.
The RCC can shorten the term by one year if it is satisfied that the commitments have been sufficient to remedy the alleged
infringement of competition law.
Comment. The RCC also closed another investigation in relation to prepaid cards on the same day subject to commitments.
This investigation concerned Orange and six of its direct distributors and had also been opened in November 2009.
Source: RCC decisions no.21, 22, 23 and 24, 6 June 2012,
http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/items/id7631/decizie_21_2012_prepay_public.pdf,
http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/items/id7632/decizie_22_2012_vodafone_prepay.pdf,
http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/items/id7633/decizie_cosmote_23_2012_prepay_publicare.pdf,
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http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/items/id7634/decizie_24_2012_publicare.pdf (in Romanian).
Slovak Republic: Council of the Antimonopoly Office confirms fine against ZSE-D.
Summary. The Council of the Slovak Antimonopoly Office (AMO) (AMO Council) has dismissed the appeal of ZSE
Distribúcia, a.s. (ZSE-D), a regional electricity distribution system operator, against the AMO's decision of December 2011
which found that ZSE-D had abused a dominant position (the infringement decision).
Background. According to Section 8(2)(a) of the Slovak Competition Act (Act), the direct or indirect enforcement of
excessive prices or other unfair trade conditions may amount to the abuse of a dominant position in the relevant market. Any
abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited under Section 8(6) of the Act.
Facts. The AMO Council's decision has confirmed a fine of €150,000 imposed on ZSE-D by the AMO. ZSE-D charged
alternative suppliers of electricity a fee of around €27 (excl. VAT) whenever consumers wanted to change supplier on the
newly liberalised market. The fees were levied for taking readings of electricity consumption meters on dates outside of
regular meter reading dates. The AMO compared the fees charged by ZSE-D with those charged by other regional
distribution system operators and considered that ZSE-D had exploited a dominant position on the market between 1 April
2008 and 31 March 2010. The AMO believed that the fees charged by ZSE-D were excessive and would not be possible in a
competitive environment. The AMO also noted that, following legislative changes which prohibited excessive charges for
changing suppliers, the fee for an additional reading of electricity meters dropped to around €10 which, according to the
AMO, corresponded to the actual costs incurred by ZSE-D in this regard.
Comment. The fine is equivalent to 0.032% of ZSE-D's total 2010 turnover and actually equals the total excessive amount
of fees charged for the extra readings. Despite the relatively low fine, the threat of private damages claims from alternative
electricity suppliers may serve to deter any future anti-competitive conduct in such cases.
Source: AMO press release, 31 July 2012 http://www.antimon.gov.sk/135/4748/the-council-of-the-office-confirmed-the-finefor-zse-d.axd (in Slovak).
United Kingdom: Cross channel transport merger referred to CC
Summary. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has referred the completed acquisition by Groupe Eurotunnel S.A. (Eurotunnel)
of certain assets of former ferry operator, SeaFrance S.A. (SeaFrance) to the Competition Commission (CC) for further
investigation.
Background. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) must refer completed mergers to the CC if the OFT believes that a relevant
merger situation has been created and this has resulted, or may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of
competition (SLC) within any market or markets for goods or services in the United Kingdom (section 22(1), Enterprise Act
2002) (2002 Act).
Eurotunnel provides rail transport services to passengers and freight customers across the English Channel via the Channel
Tunnel. SeaFrance previously provided ferry services from Dover to Calais (the route) to passengers and freight customers
across the same section of the English Channel. After SeaFrance went into liquidation in January 2012 (the liquidation),
Eurotunnel acquired some of its assets (the acquisition) and, in August 2012, recommenced operations of some former
SeaFrance vessels, operated primarily by ex-employees of SeaFrance, on the route under a new brand called 'MyFerryLink'.
Facts. The OFT recognised that the new service benefits passengers by replacing the capacity on the route that was lost
due to the liquidation. However, the OFT considered that there is some evidence that an alternative buyer would have
acquired the business had Eurotunnel not done so. The OFT was concerned about the loss of competition as compared with
the alternative buyer scenario.
The OFT considered that SeaFrance was a close competitor to Eurotunnel prior to the liquidation and that, although some
competitors remain after the acquisition, only P&O will provide a strong competitive constraint to Eurotunnel for some
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customers. The OFT was concerned that, for both passenger and freight customers, competition in the provision of cross
channel transport services may reduce and prices may increase as a result of the acquisition. According to the OFT, the
acquisition has a realistic prospect of resulting in a SLC and has therefore been referred to the CC for an in-depth review.
Comment. OFT Chief Economist and Decision Maker, Amelia Fletcher commented that efficient and cost-effective
transport links between the UK and Continental Europe for passengers and business customers are important and it is
appropriate for the CC to review the merger in detail to ensure that the interests of consumers and industry are protected.
However, the French competition authority approved the merger on 8 November 2012. The CC published its issues
statement on 17 December 2012 and is expected to publish its final report is 14 April 2013.
Source: OFT press release, 29 October 2012, http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/100-12.
United Kingdom: OFT recommends release from Yellow Pages undertakings
Summary. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has recommended that the Competition Commission (CC) consider releasing
hibu plc (formerly Yell Group plc) (hibu) from the undertakings given to the CC in 2007 relating to its Yellow Pages business
(the Yell undertakings).
Background. The OFT has the power to make a market investigation reference to the CC if it has reasonable grounds for
suspecting that any feature, or combination of features, of a market in the UK prevents, restricts or distorts competition in
connection with the supply or acquisition of any goods or services (section 131, Enterprise Act 2002) (2002 Act). The CC
has two years from the date of a market investigation reference to conduct inquiries and publish its report (sections 136 and
137, 2002 Act). If the CC concludes adverse effects on competition or detrimental effects on customers are occurring, it can
take action or recommend action to remedy, mitigate or prevent such effects, including by accepting undertakings from
appropriate persons (sections 138 and 159, 2002 Act).
The OFT has a duty to keep undertakings given under the 2002 Act under review and to consider whether, by reason of any
change of circumstances, an undertaking is no longer appropriate and needs to be varied or to be superseded, or the party
to the undertaking needs to be released from it (section 162, 2002 Act).
In April 2007, the Yell undertakings were provided following the CC's 2006 market investigation and report into the supply of
classified directory advertising services in the UK. The Yell undertakings include (i) a price cap on Yellow Pages'
advertisement rates; (ii) restrictions on hibu's ability to publish second tier directories and guides on particular topics (themed
guides); and (iii) requirements for hibu to provide the OFT with a comprehensive advertising rate card, as well as accounts
relating to its printed regulated directory business.
Facts. Following a review of the Yell undertakings and a consultation on its provisional findings between August and
September 2012, the OFT has advised the CC that the Yell undertakings may no longer be appropriate and that the CC
should consider releasing hibu from all elements of the Yell undertakings. The OFT considered that the growth in internet
access and usage by both consumers and advertisers was a relevant change of circumstances that justified a review of the
Yell undertakings, as it had led to a likely broader range of competitive constraints on suppliers of printed classified
directories. The OFT also noted that the size of the printed classified directory business has decreased significantly since
2006, and as such it appeared to be a declining business.
Comment. In its final report of 2006, the CC had recommended that the Yell undertakings should be reviewed by the OFT
after three years. The CC will now consider the OFT's advice and decide whether to take any action, based on the OFT's
advice as well as any additional analysis that the CC considers necessary to inform its decision. The CC is expected to
publish its final report in April 2013.
Source: OFT press release, 26 October 2012, http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/98-12; CC press release,
27 November 2012, http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/media-centre/latest-news/2012/Nov/issues-statement-yellhibu-review-of-undertakings.
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United Kingdom: OFT launches revised Competition Act procedures guidance
Summary. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has issued its revised guidance on Competition Act 1998 (1998 Act) procedures
(the revised guidance).
Background. The 1998 Act gives the OFT a number of powers to investigate and fine companies suspected of taking part in
anti-competitive agreements or concerted practices or abusing their dominant position in a market, as well as the power to
conduct studies of markets as a whole and refer them for more detailed investigation by the Competition Commission if the
OFT has reasonable grounds to suspect that the markets may contain anti-competitive features.
In March 2011, the OFT published guidance on its investigation procedures and announced a one-year trial of a procedural
adjudicator who would resolve disputes between parties and OFT case teams in investigations under the 1998 Act. In
March 2012, the OFT published a revised draft of the guidance for consultation (the consultation).
Facts. Many of the main procedural changes considered during the consultation have been incorporated into the revised
guidance, including:

final decisions on infringement and penalty are to be taken by a three person "case decision group" (rather than a
single senior responsible officer (SRO), as is current practice);

in order to reflect the views received during the consultation, the SRO will continue to take decisions relating to the
imposition of interim measures, acceptance of commitments and possible settlement (consulting with other senior
officials as appropriate);

the procedural adjudicator role has been extended until the OFT's enforcement powers under the 1998 Act are
transferred to the Competition and Markets Authority in April 2014;

parties in relation to whom the OFT is considering finding an infringement and imposing a financial penalty will be able
to make representations on key elements of the OFT's proposed penalty calculation ahead of the final decision;

more interactive oral hearings, additional 'state of play' meetings have been introduced to provide greater opportunity
for direct dialogue between the parties and the decision makers; and

case opening notices and case-specific administrative timetables are to be published on the OFT's website to increase
the transparency of the investigations.
Comment. The OFT has recently faced criticism in relation to its investigation and fining procedures following successful
appeals against OFT decisions before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (for example, the construction and construction
recruitment cases, and the tobacco case). The OFT believes the changes introduced in the revised guidance will enhance
the robustness and efficiency of its 1998 Act cases, as well as resulting in better interaction with parties to investigations and
improving the transparency of its work.
Source: OFT press release, 16 October 2012, http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/91-12.
United Kingdom: OFT launches review of personal current account market
Summary. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has launched a review of the personal current account (PCA) market (the
review) to establish how the market has evolved since the OFT's market study in 2008 (the 2008 study).
Background. The OFT keeps markets under review as part of its general function (section 5, Enterprise Act 2002) (2002
Act). The OFT has the power to make a reference (MIR) to the Competition Commission (CC) if it has reasonable grounds
for suspecting that any feature, or combination of features, of a market in the UK prevents, restricts or distorts competition in
connection with the supply or acquisition of any goods or services (section 131, 2002 Act).
Facts. The review will consider whether previous initiatives agreed by the OFT with banks have been successful at
improving the process of switching PCAs, increasing the transparency of PCA charges and allowing people to manage their
accounts more effectively.
The review will also inform the OFT's wider programme of work aimed at achieving a more competitive and customer
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focused retail banking sector. As part of the wider programme, the OFT will also consider the operation of payments
systems and the banking market for small and medium-sized enterprises, and examine the way in which consumers make
decisions and engage with retail banking services, including through applying behavioural economics.
The OFT aimed to publish the outcome of the review by the end of 2012.
Comment. The 2008 study identified the key problems in the PCA market to be low switching levels and real and perceived
difficulties in switching between PCA providers, low levels of transparency of PCA charges and other costs, and complexity
combined with a lack of control over the use of unarranged overdrafts. In September 2011, the Independent Commission on
Banking recommended that the OFT consider making an MIR to the CC by 2015 if it had not already done so and if sufficient
improvements in the market have not been made by that time. The OFT has stated that its PCA review and wider
programme of work are aimed at informing its response to this recommendation.
Source: OFT press release, 13 July 2012, http://oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/62-12.
United Kingdom: Voluntary assurances to the OFT by NHS hospital trusts
Summary. Eight NHS Hospital Trusts (the trusts) have given voluntary assurances to the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) that
they will no longer exchange commercially sensitive information about their private patient unit (PPU) prices, to ensure their
compliance with competition law and thereby avoid a formal investigation by the OFT.
Background. Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 prohibits agreements or concerted practices which have the object or
effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition in the UK (Chapter I prohibition). The maximum penalty the OFT
can impose is 10% of worldwide turnover of the relevant undertaking in its last business year (Competition Act 1998
(Determination of Turnover for Penalties) (Amendment) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1259)).
All public bodies, including NHS Hospital Trusts, are subject to the Competition Act 1998 when engaged in the commercial
supply of goods or services, such as paid treatments for private patients. The OFT published revised guidance in December
2011 on how competition law applies to public bodies engaged in economic activity.
Facts. Following information received from a whistleblower earlier in the year, the OFT approached members of the
Southern Region Private Healthcare Association (SPHA) regarding possible competition concerns about the exchange of
pricing data. To address the OFT's concerns, the trusts, who are members of SPHA, have provided voluntary assurances
that they will not exchange confidential pricing information and will provide further training to their staff on the importance of
complying with competition law where applicable.
The OFT has welcomed the voluntary assurances, which have enabled the OFT to close its preliminary investigation.
However, the OFT has noted that this does not preclude the OFT from investigating any aspect of NHS Hospital Trusts'
economic activities if it receives further evidence of potential infringements of competition law.
Comment. The OFT's work in healthcare is part of its wider public markets work and forms part of the priorities identified in
its Annual Plan 2012-13. In April 2012, the OFT referred the market for privately funded healthcare services in the UK to the
CC for further investigation and in October 2012, it commenced its review of a proposed merger between two NHS
Foundation Trust hospitals. Recent changes to the regulation of the health sector, where Monitor will become the
concurrent regulator for health services in England from April 2013, have resulted in the OFT working closely with the
Department of Health and Monitor to provide advice on competition and consumer issues. The OFT has also written to NHS
Hospital Trusts and Foundation Trusts which operate PPUs, enclosing guidance on competition law compliance.
Source: OFT press release, 16 August 2012, http://oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/71-12.
United States: FTC addresses standard essential patent conduct in merger review
Summary: The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) approved the acquisition by Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch) of SPX
Service Solutions US LLC (SPX) subject to certain behavioural commitments relating to SPX's pre-transaction standard
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essential patent conduct.
Background: Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18) prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act) (15 U.S.C. §45) prohibits „„unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.‟‟
Facts: In 2010, Bosch acquired RTI Technologies, a business providing air conditioning recycling, recovery and recharge
("ACRRR") services for the repair of motor vehicle air conditioning systems. On 23 January 2012, Bosch entered into an
agreement to acquire SPX. According to the FTC, the market for ACRRR services is highly concentrated, with Bosch (via
RTI) and SPX being the two most significant participants with 10% and 80% market share respectively. The FTC alleged
that the acquisition of SPX would give Bosch essentially a monopoly in the market for ACRRR services.
The FTC further alleged that, prior to Bosch's acquisition, SPX reneged on a commitment to license key, standard-essential
patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms by seeking injunctions against willing licensees of
those patents in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. As part of its review of the merger, the FTC incorporated into the
proposed settlement behavioural commitments to address SPX's conduct regarding SEPs.
The proposed settlement requires Bosch to (1) sell its RTI business; (2) grant manufacturers licenses to key patents that
they need in order to compete in the market for this equipment, and (3) end agreements that restrict third parties from
advertising, servicing, distributing, or selling competitive products in the United States. The proposed settlement is open to
comment until December 26, 2012.
Comment: This is an example where the US antitrust authorities examined anti-competitive conduct in the context of a
merger review, and emphasises the importance due diligence for companies engaging in transactions as conduct, such as a
target's patent licensing practices, could be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
Source: FTC press release, 26 November 2012, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/11/bosch.shtm.
United States: Biglari settles alleged violation of US premerger notification
requirements
Summary. Biglari Holdings, Inc. (Biglari) has agreed to pay $850,000 to settle an allegation by the US Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) that Biglari violated premerger notification laws when it failed to report an acquisition of shares in
restaurant operator Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (Cracker Barrel).
Background. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (HSR Act) requires companies
proposing to acquire voting securities, non-corporate interests or assets above certain thresholds to notify the US
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC and wait a specified period of time before closing. The HSR Act permits the FTC
and DOJ to review such transactions to determine whether they may violate the antitrust laws if consummated. Parties
failing to make required notifications are subject to fines of $16,000 per day and other penalties.
The passive investor exemption permits the acquisition of up to 10 percent of a company's voting securities provided that the
investor has no intention to participate in management of the company. The US antitrust authorities have historically
interpreted this exemption strictly, and any attempt to influence the company's business decisions has been viewed as
inconsistent with the exemption.
Facts. Between May and June 2011, Biglari acquired approximately 8.7 percent of Cracker Barrel's voting securities valued
in excess of the then-applicable monetary threshold of $66 million without making a premerger filing. At the request of the
FTC, the DOJ filed a complaint in the US District Court seeking civil penalties for the violation.
According to the complaint, Sardar Biglari, the Chairman and CEO of Biglari, met with Cracker Barrel officers to discuss
ideas for the company and to request that he and another Biglari officer be appointed to the board of directors. The FTC
alleged that such actions were inconsistent with the passive investor exemption from filing requirements. In September 2011,
Biglari agreed to pay $850,000 to settle the charges.
Comment. While the FTC claims that Biglari improperly relied on the passive investor exemption, Biglari's own press
© Clifford Chance LLP July – December 2012
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Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
release states that it did not rely on the passive investor exemption but inadvertently failed to make the required filing.
Despite Biglari's assertion, the enforcement action is a reminder that FTC and DOJ interpret the passive investor exemption
strictly, and will seek penalties for an improperly broad interpretation of this exemption. In addition, intent to influence
business decisions can be inferred from actions taken by the investor after the acquisition has occurred.
Source: FTC press release, 25 September 2012, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/09/biglari.shtm.
United States: Pharmaceutical cooperative and FTC reach consent order on collective
bargaining
Summary. The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has accepted a proposed consent order from the pharmaceutical
cooperative Cooperativa de Farmacias Puertorriqueñas (Coopharma) prohibiting itself from collectively negotiating with
payers (such as pharmacy services providers).
Background. Section 5 of the FTC Act bans unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. This
includes conduct that violates the Sherman Act as well as other practices that harm competition, but that may not fit neatly
into categories of conduct formally prohibited by the Sherman Act.
Facts. In its complaint, the FTC alleged that competing pharmacies, through their participation in Coopharma, agreed to fix
prices. The pharmacies, through Coopharma, collectively negotiated contracts with payers and organised boycotts against
payers that would not abide by their collective terms. Coopharma encouraged its members to refuse to deal with third-party
payers except through the cooperative and threatened to terminate and terminated contracts with payers who refused to
deal with Coopharma on the terms it demanded. The pharmacies lacked any efficiency-enhancing integration that would
otherwise justify the challenged conduct. According to the FTC, the conduct unreasonably restrained prices for pharmacy
services and other competition among Coopharma members and, as a result, prices for pharmacy services increased.
Comment. This case serves as a reminder that cooperative agreements among competitors can be problematic under the
antitrust laws, especially where such agreements lack any pro-competitive justification.
Source: Complaint, 21 August 2012, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1010079/ 120821coopharmacmpt.pdf; Analysis Of
Agreement Containing Consent Order To Aid Public Comment,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1010079/120821coopharmaanal.pdf.
United States: FTC seeks comments on proposed changes to reporting requirements
under the HSR Act for exclusive patent licenses in the pharmaceutical industry
Summary. The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has requested public comments on proposed amendments to the
premerger notification rules (Rules) promulgated under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act)
that will apply to proposed acquisitions of exclusive patent rights by companies in the pharmaceutical industry.
Background. The HSR Act and Rules require companies proposing to acquire voting securities, non-corporate interests or
assets above certain thresholds to notify the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC and wait a specified period of
time before closing. The HSR Act permits the FTC and DOJ to review such transactions to determine whether they may
violate the antitrust laws if consummated.
Facts. The FTC and DOJ jointly developed the proposed changes to the Rules which apply to the transfer of patent rights in
the pharmaceutical and biologics industries. Under current regulations, the acquisition of a patent license is potentially
reportable only if the license is exclusive in some respect even as against the grantor – for a specified geographic area, field
of use, or period of time. Under the proposed Rules, whether the acquisition of a patent license is potentially reportable
would no longer be based on exclusivity but on a newly-defined concept of "all commercially significant rights."
A grantor will have been deemed to have transferred "all commercially significant rights" to a licensee in the pharmaceutical
or biologics industry even where the patent holder retains the right to manufacture the product for the licensee, provided that
© Clifford Chance LLP July - December 2012
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Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
other exclusive rights to the patent within a specific therapeutic area or indication have been transferred to the licensee. All
commercially significant rights will also be deemed to be transferred where the grantor retains "co-rights" to assist the
licensee in developing and commercializing the product covered by the patent. Previously, where the grantor retained rights
to manufacture the product, the license was not deemed to be "exclusive" and no potentially reportable transfer of an asset
occurred.
The FTC deadline for comments on the proposed amendments was 25 October 2012.
Comment. While certain classes of assets benefit from specific exemptions, this is the first time that a specific class of
assets has been singled out for special inclusion under the HSR Act and regulations. The FTC believes the proposed
changes will enhance the effectiveness of the premerger notification program.
Source: FTC press release, 13 August
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/08/120813hsr-ipnprm.pdf.
© Clifford Chance LLP July – December 2012
2012,
http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/08/hsr.shtm;
Federal
Register
Notice,
18
Antitrust Review | July - December 2012
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