Berlusconi`s constitutional reform proposals within a historical context

Berlusconi’s Attempt to Reform the Italian Constitution.
Rehearsal of New (Post-modern) Authoritarian Politics or Same Old Habit?
Dr. Elisabetta Cassina Wolff
University of Oslo
Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History
Oslo, Norway
[email protected]
Paper prepared for the One-day conference
Silvio Berlusconi and Post-modern Politics
University of Birmingham, 14 December 2012
Work in progress
Please do not quote from this paper without permission from the author.
1
Berlusconi’s Attempt to Reform the Italian Constitution.
Rehearsal of New (Post-modern) Authoritarian Politics or Same Old Habit?
Introduction
In 2003 a very narrow group of Italian politicians from the governing centre-right coalition
led by Silvio Berlusconi drafted the so-called ‘Great Reform’ of the Italian Constitution. This
proposed amending 53 of the 139 Articles of the Second Part, the section that deals with the
Republic’s organisation; both central institutions (Parliament, Government, the Presidency,
the Judiciary and the Constitutional Court, referenda) and local ones (regions, provinces and
municipalities). 1
There were a number of major changes recommended by these few ‘wise men’. Firstly,
Parliament should have scrutiny over regional laws that were deemed to conflict with the
‘national interest’. Secondly, there was the introduction of the ‘Federal Senate’, with the
consequent abolition of symmetric bicameralism. Thirdly, there was the possibility of giving
the regions legislative power on crucial areas such as health, education and security. Fourthly,
there was to be a strengthening of the Prime Minister’s role, with relevant changes to the
parliamentary system. Fifthly, the role of the President of the Republic was modified. Finally,
a revision was to be made to the composition of the Constitutional Court.2
Was the ‘Great Reform’ of Berlusconi a unique and dangerous attempt by the Prime Minister
to amend the Italian Constitution in order to realise his ambition to become a dictatorial leader
(‘absolute premier’)? Was Italy on the way to becoming an ‘illiberal democracy’ 3 of an
1
The First Part of the Italian Constitution, in force since January 1, 1948, deals with overall principles. It
recognizes citizens’ fundamental rights, liberty and equality as well as civil, political, social and economic rights.
Social and political pluralism is a basic principle ensuring the rights of individuals within communities such as
schools, unions, churches and parties.
2
Bull, Martin & Gianfranco Pasquino (2007). ‘A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in Italy’, West
European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 670-691; Bull, Martin (2007). ‘La “grande riforma” del centro-destra alla
prova del referendum’, in J. L. Briquet & A. Mastropaolo (eds.). Politica in Italia. I fatti dell’anno e le
interpretazioni, Bologna: il Mulino; Pinelli, Cesare (2006). ‘The 1948 Italian Constitution and the 2006
Referendum: Food for Thought’, European Constitutional Law Review, 2, 329-340; Sartori, Giovanni (2006).
Mala costituzione e altri malanni, Rome-Bari: Laterza; Vassallo, Salvatore (2005). ‘The Constitutional Reforms
of the Centre-Right’, in C. Guarnieri & J. Newell (eds.). Italian Politics: Quo Vadis? London: Berghahn, 153175.
3
Zakaria, Fareed (2003). The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, New York: Norton.
2
‘authoritarian populist’ 4 nature? Were the Berlusconi proposals an unusual attack on the
Italian centralized state?
The intention of my paper is to answer to these questions by analysing the process around the
Berlusconi’s constitutional reform and the functioning of core institutions in Italy during the
last twenty years in a comparative historical perspective. The Berlusconi’s governments’ style
and politics with regard to constitutional changes will be confronted with past attempts to
amend the Constitutional charter since 1948. Such a comparative study will allow us to state
whether Berlusconi’s political approach represents a unique phenomenon, or whether it is
collocated in a set of constant patterns that characterizes Italian politics. In case we found a
constant political attitude which emerges in the long run from the analysis of several historical
periods and different political actors, we might be compelled to re-define the significance of
‘the Berlusconi experience’.
Berlusconi’s ‘Great Reform’
The first point on Parliament’s scrutiny over regional laws was the least controversial because
such scrutiny had been established by the 1948 Constitution, although it had been repealed by
Constitutional Law 3/2001. The proposal was to reintroduce it.
The second and the third points were far more controversial. It was proposed that the Italian
‘regional’ State should be modified into a ‘federal’ one by strongly limiting the central
government’s power to legislate. Moreover, the meaning given to the ‘federal’ nature of the
Senate consisted in the fact that the reform intended to reverse the symmetric bicameralism of
the Italian Parliament by not only reducing the number of Deputies from 630 to 518 and of
Senators from 315 to 252, but also by differentiating the roles of the Chamber of Deputies and
the Senate. The latter (‘Federal Senate’) was to legislate on a number of issues concerning
regional competences while the former was to deal with national issues (the budget, energy,
foreign policy, etc.). Critics wondered whether such a division would create conflicts between
the two chambers rather than making Parliament more effective, as was the intention. It was
also felt that there would be less control of the legislative process and more conflict between
regional powers and the national authority. Questions were also raised about the new regional
4
Tranfaglia, Nicola (2010). Populismo autoritario. Autobiografia di una nazione, Milan: Baldini Castoldi Dalai.
3
tax-collecting powers to pay for services such as school and health, and the possibility that
this might widen north-south inequalities.
However, it was the fourth point, proposing a new role for the Prime Minister, that attracted
most criticism. Berlusconi’s reform conferred on the Prime Minister the power to appoint and
dismiss ministers and to dissolve Parliament. In the 1948 Constitution such power lies
formally in the hands of the President of the Republic. Berlusconi’s reform, unlike the
German model with konstruktives Misstrauensvotum, did not allow the opposition to gain
governmental power in the case of a vote of no-confidence. It permitted a constructive noconfidence vote, but only when the existing parliamentary majority was not at risk of being
overruled. 5 According to the reform, Parliament could replace the Prime Minister, but the
ruling coalition would be unaffected, thus undermining one essential feature of parliamentary
systems such as the one created by Italy’s 1948 Constitution. Constitutional scholars noted
that the reform would have made way for a sort of ‘absolute premiership’ or ‘Prime
Ministerial dictatorship’ as opposed to the system of ‘checks and balances’ (bilancia di
poteri). Such an innovation would provide an exception to the constitutional arrangements in
all other contemporary European democracies. 6 In the meantime, the majority led by
Berlusconi voted for a statute giving the Prime Minister and a number of other institutional
heads judicial immunity. 7
The fifth point was interpreted as an unacceptable weakening of the Presidency. The President
was still supposed to appoint the Prime Minister, but without the unconditional freedom stated
in article 92 of the Constitution, since he would have to choose a member of the winning
coalition. The President could still dissolve Parliament in the case of the Government being
unable to command majority support, but only under specific conditions.
The final point concerned changes to the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court. A
greater number were to be appointed by Parliament, and critics interpreted this reform as an
attack on the independence of the Court.
5
Pinelli, Cesare (2006). ‘The 1948 Italian Constitution and the 2006 Referendum: Food for Thought’, European
Constitutional Law Review, 2, 338.
6
Sartori, Giovanni (2006). Mala costituzione e altri malanni, Rome-Bari: Laterza; Elia, Leopoldo (2004). ‘Una
forma di governo unica al mondo’, in ASTRID, Bassanini, Franco (ed.). Costituzione, una riforma sbagliata. Il
parere di sessantatre costituzionalisti, Firenze: Passigli, 363, reported in Pinelli, Cesare (2006), cit., 338.
7
The immunity law was, however, declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (decision no. 24/2004).
4
In November 2005, Berlusconi’s reforms were approved by both chambers of the Italian
Parliament by absolute majorities, rather than by two/thirds of the vote. As a consequence,
according to Article 138 of the Constitution, the way was open for a referendum. 8 The
popular consultation took place on June 25-26, 2006. 61,7% of the voters rejected it, in spite
of misleading information from both the state-owned and private media, and government
propaganda that described the reform as a unique occasion to modernize and simplify Italian
institutions. 25 million people voted in the referendum, 53,7% of the electorate. Opposition
was especially high in the South, demonstrating that federalism was perceived as the main
core of the reform. 9 The ‘No’ Committee was chaired by the former President of the Republic
Oscar Luigi Scalfaro. He was assisted by 14 former Constitutional Court Presidents and VicePresidents, and by two other former Presidents of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga and Carlo
Azeglio Ciampi. 10
The 1948 Constitution
Let us go back in time and remind ourselves of the atmosphere in which the Italian
Constitution came into force, on January 1, 1948. The document, undoubtedly a remarkable
example of constitutional law because of its attention to guarantees on several fields and to
the realization of a ‘perfect’ balance of powers between institutions, was in fact the result of
several compromises among a wide range of parties that had fought together against Fascism.
The anti-Fascist parties that had gained an overwhelming majority after elections to the
Constituent Assembly on June 2, 1946, had very different opinions on both political and
institutional issues. The different models of the structure of Parliament that were advanced by
the major parties are of particular interest. The Communist Party (PCI) and the Socialist Party
(PSI), together holding some 40% of seats in the Assembly, envisaged power and sovereignty
for a single assembly representing the people. The Christian Democratic Party (DC),
8
Article 138 of the Italian Constitution states that ‘Laws amending the Constitution and other constitutional laws
shall be adopted by each House after two successive debates at intervals of not less than three months, and shall
be approved by an absolute majority of the members of each House in the second voting. The said laws are
submitted to a popular referendum when, within three months of their publication, such request is made by one
fifth of the members of a House or five hundred thousand electors or five region councils. The law submitted to
referendum shall not be promulgated if not approved by a majority of valid votes. A referendum shall not be held
if the law has been approved in the second voting by each of the Houses by a majority of two-thirds of the
members.’
9
Bull, Martin (2007). ‘La “grande riforma” del centro-destra alla prova del referendum’, in J. L. Briquet & A.
Mastropaolo (eds.). Politica in Italia. I fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni, Bologna: il Mulino.
10
Bassanini, Franco (ed.) (2004). Costituzione, una riforma sbagliata. Il parere di sessantatre costituzionalisti,
Firenze: Passigli Editore.
5
numerically as strong as the two parties on the left, favoured communitarian theories (inspired
by Jacques Maritain and the Fascists, although the latter of course were not openly
mentioned) and the establishment of a Parliament where both parties and professions could be
represented. A Chamber of Deputies would be elected by the people, while the Senate would
be composed of representatives of social categories. The compromise solution was a
Parliament with two chambers (630 + 315) elected by the people and perfectly equal in their
functions (bicameralismo perfetto): legislative power, a vote of confidence regarding the
Government, scrutiny of governmental activities. 11 As for the relationship between Parliament
and Government, the Assembly chose the parliamentary model where the Government had to
depend on a vote of confidence from both chambers in order to remain in office. The
President of the Italian Republic was given a representative role but at the same time he (the
possibility of a woman in this office has never been on the agenda in Italy) was given the
power to appoint the Prime Minister, to dissolve one or both chambers in case of the lack of a
majority and to veto legislation.
As far as the relationship between local and central authorities was concerned, the Italian
Constitution, through Article 5 12, opened for the creation of a ‘regional’ State. This would be
distinct from both the strongly centralized Napoleonic state, where regions were invested with
administrative but not legislative functions, and the federal state, which was a fusion of
former sovereign states. 13 At the same time, Title V of the Second Part of the Constitution
limited the power of the regions provided with ordinary autonomy. 14 It listed in detail the
areas in which the regions were entitled to legislate and stated that the central government had
the power to check whether such legislation was in accordance with state prerogatives,
constitutional principles or national interests. The restrictions on the regions’ powers adopted
by the Constituent Assembly can be explained by the concern of governing parties for the
possibility that regions could have different political majorities than the central government. 15
11
In the Senate, life-tenure seats are occupied by former Presidents of the Republic and by five citizens
appointed by the President for special merit in social, scientific, artistic or literary fields.
12
‘The Republic is one and indivisible. It recognises and promotes local autonomies, and implements the fullest
measure of administrative decentralisation in those services that depend on the State. The Republic adapts the
principles and methods of its legislation to the requirements of autonomy and decentralisation’.
13
Pinelli, Cesare (2006). Cit., 333.
14
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste have
special forms and conditions of autonomy.
15
Pinelli, Cesare (2006). Cit., 333.
6
Compared to the Statuto Albertino, the 1948 Constitution paved the way not only for
regionalism but also for other three important institutional innovations: the Constitutional
Court, the Supreme Judicial Court and the abrogative referendum as a provision for direct
democracy. However, during the ‘Golden Age’ of Alcide de Gasperi’s centre-right coalition,
the Constitution was actually ‘frozen’ inasmuch as the parties in power (DC, the Liberal
Party-PLI, the Social Democratic Party-PSDI and the Republican Party-PRI) prevented the
implementation of important constitutional rules (‘obstructionism of the majority’). The
Constitutional Court was not set up before 1955 and the Supreme Judicial Court as late as
1958. In Parliament, the necessary support for laws directly referring to the 1948 Constitution
came not only, and not always, from the centre-right coalition parties, but also from the
parties of the left; the Socialist Party, which entered Government in 1963, and the Communist
Party, which remained excluded from the cabinet until the end of the Cold War, even though
it represented a third of the electorate. When regions were eventually established in 1970, at
the same time as the institution of the abrogative referendum, it soon became evident – as
foreseen – that the Communist Party would be able to win majorities in both municipalities
and regional governments. Thereafter, the ‘regional’ spirit of the Constitution was restricted
by the central government, which was still dominated by the Christian Democrats, who
referred to the limitations expressed in Title V of the Constitution’s Second Part.
‘Democracy Italian Style’ (1948-1992) / Consensual Democracy in a Polarized Pluralistic
Party System
In the meantime, the Italian political system had developed chronic weaknesses and some
original features that many commentators considered (and still consider) direct consequences
of the 1948 Constitution. To begin with, it must be said that the Constitution did not have
rules able to prevent single parties from being constantly excluded from Government
(conventio ad excludendum). Between 1948 and 1992 the Christian Democrats sat in power
while the second-biggest party, the Communist Party on the left, and the fourth-biggest party,
the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) on the right, were excluded from Government
(‘blocked democracy’). The reason for this was that these two parties were both deemed antisystem, due to their ideological stances. However, this did not hinder the PCI and the MSI
from exercising a degree of political power. The anti-system parties’ votes in Parliament (or
their abstentions in votes of confidence) were often indispensable for the survival of
Governments. This happened several times during the 1950s, when the MSI backed the
7
Christian Democrats, or in the 1970s, with the ‘historic compromise’ between the DC and the
PCI in order to fight terrorism. These parties had the opportunity to participate in the policymaking process. 16 Between 1948 and 1992, the disadvantages in Italy of a blocked democracy
were counterbalanced by the ability of political elites to avoid direct conflict and find
solutions in order to maintain the system and meet demands from opposing political spheres.
One way in which this was done was through cooperation in Parliament, where consensual
law-making became possible within the parliamentary committees which were granted
legislative powers after a revision of parliamentary procedures in 1971. In fact Italy, during
the Cold-War period, worked quite well as a semi-consociational (consensual) democracy
where ideological (not linguistic, religious or ethnic ones in her case) cleavages were
overcome thanks to ‘overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of
counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system’ 17. Further rules introduced by
Parliament during the 1970s (public financing of parties and elections; television time for
parties; financing of party newspapers; a system of automatic candidatures in elections for
persons selected by parties represented in Parliament) contributed to consolidating the party
system. 18
During the Cold War period the Italian political system was characterized by ideological
polarization and no real alternation in office – it was described either as a ‘polarized
pluralistic party system’ 19 or an ‘imperfect two-party system’ 20. Consociational procedures
16
Pappalardo, Adriano (1980). ‘La politica consociativa nella democrazia italiana’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza
Politica, vol. 10, no.1, 73-123; Di Palma, Giuseppe (1977). Surviving without Governing. The Italian Parties in
Parliament, Berkeley: University of California Press; La Palombara, Joseph (1987), Democracy Italian Style,
New Haven and London: Yale University Press; Cotta, Maurizio (1995). ‘Il Parlamento nella Prima Repubblica’,
in Pasquino, Gianfranco (ed.). La politica italiana. Dizionario critico 1945-1995, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 79-91;
Hine, David (1993). Governing Italy. The Politics of Bargained Pluralism, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Vassallo,
Salvatore (1994). Il governo di partito in Italia (1943–93), Bologna: Il Mulino; Scoppola, Pietro (1997). La
Repubblica dei partiti. Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema político. 1945-1996, Bologna: Il Mulino.
17
Lijphardt, Arend (1968). ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 1, no. 1,
21. Lijphardt argued that the multi-party democracies in Western Europe were based on the principle of
inclusion, while competitive Anglo-Saxon democracies such as USA and England worked according to a ‘the
winner takes all’ principle. Italy found itself something in between given that the country’s division was mainly
ideological (Communism/anti-Communism). See also Lijphart, Arend (1984). Democracies. Patterns of
Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, London and New Haven: Yale University
Press.
18
Fusaro, Carlo (1998). ‘The politics of Constitutional Reform in Italy: A Framework for Analysis’, South
European Society & Politics, 2/98, 47.
19
Sartori, Giovanni (1966). ‘European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism’, in LaPalombara
Joseph & Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, New Jork: Princeton
University Press, 137–176. See also Sartori, Giovanni (1976). Parties and party systems. A framework for
analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131-145.
8
had five important consequences. Firstly, they allowed the integration of an anti-system
opposition into the very system such parties opposed (we should however bear in mind that
ideologically radical parties such as the PCI and MSI exhibited political moderation).
Secondly, consociational procedures strengthened the power of Parliament vis-à-vis the
executive (‘centrality of Parliament’), enabling the opposition to exert influence on
Government policy without assuming responsibility. Thirdly, given the lack of alternation in
office, they favoured the formation of a political oligarchy and this could often degenerate
into endless bargaining between parties in the corrupt ‘sharing out’ (lottizzazione) of both
ministerial and non-ministerial posts according to parties’ electoral strengths. It must be said
that a great number of institutions – public administration, social security offices, statecontrolled companies and local government agencies – were ‘colonized’ by both government
and opposition parties. Fourthly, consociational procedures opened the way for many actors
(both parliamentary committees and individual deputies) to exercise powers of veto, with a
consequent slowing-down of public policy or incoherent policy-making. Finally,
consociational procedures increased the distance between the political class and the electorate
citizens insofar as while the visible political discourse appeared polarised between
Communist and anti-Communist ideological stances, actual cooperation and consensual lawmaking in Parliament was kept hidden from voters. The ‘degenerated consociationalism
(consociativismo)’ 21 of Italy during the period 1970-1992 was characterized by inefficiency,
intransparency, elitism, and immobilism.
Moreover, the secret ballot in Parliament (abolished in 1988), the symmetrical bicameral
system and the need for a vote of confidence in both chambers (Article 94 of the Constitution)
made it very difficult to obtain or maintain a parliamentary majority. As a result, the executive
was condemned instability and weakness; it could be overthrown by a vote of no-confidence
in either chamber. Until 1992, the Italian political system was characterized by ‘stable
instability’ 22; this means that coalitions, policies and ministerial personnel always showed a
high degree of stability while, at the same time, Government was affected by a great number
20
Galli, Giorgio & Alfonso Prandi (1970). Patterns of Political Participation in Italy, New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 299.
21
Bogaards, Matthijs (2005), ‘The Italian First Republic: Degenerated consociationalism in a polarized party
system’, West European Politics, vol. 28, no. 3, 503-520. Needless to say that the Italian consociational model is
an up-to date version of the old trasformismo. See Sabbatucci, Giovanni (2003). Il trasformismo come sistema.
Saggio sulla storia politica dell’Italia unita, Rome: Laterza and Rogari, Sandro (1998). Alle origini del
trasformismo: partiti e sistema política nell’Italia liberale (1961-1914), Rome: Laterza.
22
Bull, Martin & James Newell (1993), ‘Italian Politics and the 1992 elections: From stable instability to
instability and change’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 203-227.
9
of cabinet crises and bargaining among parties. There was no adherence to pre-election
manifestos; on the contrary, negotiations started among parties within the majority after
elections had taken place, reducing the role to Prime Minister to a mediator rather than
authoritative leader. 23 The latter would be by the way allowed by the Constitution. 24 Due to a
comprehensible aversion to any solution based on a strong executive, the Italian system
designed by the Constituent Assembly did not adopt the German model of the ‘constructive
no-confidence vote’ (konstruktive Misstrauensvotum). However, this did not make life any
easier.
Finally, the electoral system, based on proportional representation without a threshold (until
1993), guaranteed an extensive and democratic representation of socio-political preferences.
However, this also contributed to the fragility of the very same party coalitions and favoured a
permanent fragmentation of the party system. Moreover, the aspect of the Italian electoral
system (until 1991) that allowed for the multiple preference vote caused internal party
conflicts and encouraged both factionalism and political patronage (clientelismo) on the part
of strong leaders interested in keeping their seats (and privileges) in Parliament. Legislation
affecting the electoral system is independent of the Constitution, but the Italian case shows
very clearly how it can influence the political arena insofar as even the smallest parties,
indispensable in holding majority coalitions together, can at any time blackmail the
Government.
Criticism of the 1948 Constitution from a neo-Fascist Minority
We know that from the very start of the republican era, there was a lively debate on the need
to amend the Constitution, in order to overcome the weaknesses of the political system. What
is less well-known is the contribution to this debate that came from a minority of protagonists
who, in spite of military defeat, had remained loyal to the ideas and principles of the past. The
neo-Fascists had not participated in the drafting of the charter in the Constitutional Assembly,
but this did not stop them from having an opinion. On the contrary, they expressed a high
23
Bull, Martin & Gianfranco Pasquino (2007), ‘A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in Italy’, West
European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 677.
24
Article 95 of the Constitution states that ‘The President of the Council conducts and holds responsibility for
the general policy of the Government. The President of the Council ensures the coherence of political and
administrative policies, by promoting and co-ordinating the activity of the Ministers.’
10
degree of criticism towards the constitutional text in the free Italian press. 25 Generally
speaking, the neo-Fascists were most critical of the new republican and democratic system in
post-war Italy and of the new ruling class, and they were convinced that the pluralistic
political system would soon collapse. First of all, the neo-Fascists regretted that a referendum
was not held on the approved text of the Constitution. In an article written in 1946,
immediately after the election for the Constituent Assembly, the former Fascist jurist and
ideologue Carlo Costamagna 26 questioned whether the drafting of the Constitution really
fulfilled popular demands, or whether it rather was the result of intimidation from the foreign
victors or of demagogic subjection from anti-Fascist parties. 27 The Italian Constitution of
1948 had given the country a liberal democracy based on universal suffrage and the
quantitative vote of all citizens. The neo-Fascists dismissed this, using well-known arguments
borrowed from Fascist discourse. The neo-Fascists also opposed the system of proportional
representation that had been re-introduced. They preferred the system of majority
representation, based on single-member constituencies and argued that proportional
representation placed candidates under the control of the party from whose list they had been
elected. They were very clear on this point. The proportional electoral system, in their view,
not only allowed an uncontrolled number of parties to enter parliament, but also generated a
dependency between the members of Parliament and their parties, limiting the deputies’
freedom to work in the best interests of the nation. The consequence was – in their opinion –
that instead of democracy and parliamentarianism, a ‘partyocracy’ (partitocrazia) 28 was
established, in which the authority of the state was undermined by the power of parties and
party secretariats. This left Italian democracy extremely vulnerable to dominant sectarian
interests. In 1947, in la Rivolta Ideale, an anonymous writer argued that instead of
25
Wolff, Elisabetta Cassina (2012). L’inchiostro dei vinti. Stampa e ideologia neofascista (1945-1953), Milano:
Mursia, 97-117; Id. (2011). ‘The meaning and role of the concepts of democracy and corporatism in Italian neofascist ideology (1945-1953)’, Modern Italy, vol. 16, no. 3, 295-313.
26
Carlo Costamagna (1881-1965) can be considered one of the most important theorists of Fascism in Italy
between the wars. His works as a jurist and political analyst had a great impact, especially during the 1930s. In
1930, he set up the review Lo Stato (The State) and he was its editor until 1943. Lo Stato soon became the most
influential periodical covering political, judicial and economic issues during the regime. Costamagna also wrote
several essays on the theory of the state and on public law. He worked jointly with Alfredo Rocco and Giuseppe
Bottai to codify Fascist law, particularly the legislation on the corporative structure of the state and the Charter
of Labour. After the war, he was among the founders of the MSI.
27
The article is signed ‘Arce’ (pseudonym of Costamagna): ‘Repubblica: presidenziale o parlamentare?’ in la
Rivolta Ideale, no. I/26, October 3, 1946.
28
The term was used then and is still used today in the Italian political discourse to refer to political parties’
dominance over civil society and public institutions. There is not made any clear-cut distinction between
governing or non-governing parties.
11
parliamentarianism, there were in Italy ‘stages on the way towards a dictatorship of parties’ 29.
The neo-Fascists preferred a presidential democracy, rather than a parliamentary democracy.
Furthermore, they were convinced that the system of coalition governments created a state
without authority, law or order. Though they did not express it openly, it is quite evident that
they preferred a political system with a single unitary party. Another objection to the
Constitution concerned the issue of regional autonomy (articles 5 and 114-133 of the
Constitution). The neo-Fascists totally rejected regionalism because they considered it far
worse than the excessively centralized bureaucracy it was supposed to replace. 30 Finally, it
was Costamagna’s opinion that the Constitution forced Italians apart since it not only
introduced regional autonomy, but also welcomed and endorsed class struggle through the
articles that gave freedom to organize trade unions (article 39) and the right to strike (article
40). 31
In short, the neo-Fascists saw the Constitution as the result of petty bargaining between the
parties that had taken part in the drafting of the document, above all the Christian Democrats,
the Socialists and the Communists. To Costamagna, the document was the end-result of a tacit
agreement among parties to avoid conflict over matters of principle. 32 He deplored the lack of
a steady, comprehensive and clear policy. The provisions of the Constitution were, in his
opinion, illusory in that they claimed to safeguard the unity and identity of Italy and to
provide for the best interest of the Nation. In fact, by drawing up the document, the parties
had signed an agreement of mutual recognition with the sole intent of keeping their share of
influence and securing their share of voters’ support.
As early as the end of the 1940s, the Italian neo-Fascists demanded a broad revision of the
Italian Constitution. They wanted a presidential system and a ‘corporative’ parliament with
29
The article is signed ‘X’ and was published in 1947 on la Rivolta Ideale, June 26, II/26, with the following
title: ‘Parlamentarismo’. The term partitocrazia was then coined much earlier than 1958 as reported in
LaPalombara, who attributed it to Giuseppe Maranini. See LaPalombara, Joseph (1987). Democracy Italian
Style, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 215-218 and Maranini, Giuseppe (1958). Miti e realtà
della democrazia, Milan: Edizioni di Comunità.
30
See for instance Giorgio Pini ‘Attenti alla Costituzione’ in Meridiano d’Italia, no. II/9, March 2, 1947;
Concetto Pettinato ‘I quattro anni dell’umiliazione’ in Meridiano d’Italia, no. III/42, December 26, 1948; Id. ‘E
adesso, che fare?’ in Meridiano d’Italia, no. IV/4, January 30, 1949; Arce ‘Abbiamo la “carta”!’ in la Rivolta
Ideale, no. III/2, January 8, 1948; Carlo Costamagna ‘La forza di un popolo si celebra nell’unità’ in la Rivolta
Ideale, no. VI/37, September 20, 1951.
31
Arce ‘Aberrazioni costituzionali’ in la Rivolta Ideale, no. II/20, May 15, 1947; Id. ‘Abbiamo la “carta”!’ in la
Rivolta Ideale, no. III/2, January 8, 1948; Carlo Costamagna ‘L’ordinamento costituzionale del Lavoro’ in
Nazionalismo Sociale, no. I/7 September-October 1951.
32
Arce ‘Abbiamo la “carta”!’ in la Rivolta Ideale, no. III/2, January 8, 1948.
12
political representation for workers’ groups or at least the institution of one corporative
chamber of Parliament (the Senate). If at least one chamber were to maintain the traditional
system of representation, the proportional electoral system would have to be replaced by a
system of majority representation. The Corporative State that was advocated had a number of
essential features. It rejected the multi-party system and universal suffrage. It was organic,
hierarchically structured, centralized and authoritarian.
The Bozzi Commission (1983) for a Revision of the 1948 Constitution
The first serious attempt at revising the Italian Constitution came, however, much later, in
1983. This was when the Bozzi Parliamentary Commission, named after the constitutionalist
and liberal Aldo Bozzi, was set up. 33 The initiative actually came from Socialist leader
Bettino Craxi who shortly after the appointment of the Commission became Prime Minister of
a coalition government with the DC and her usual allies (PRI, PSDI, PLI). Twenty deputies
and twenty senators from twelve parties gathered to develop proposals for institutional
reform. As its members were either experts or influential MPs, this first bicameral committee
(Bicamerale) was highly respected. The following issues were at the top of the agenda: 1. The
electoral system, 2. The structure and role of Parliament, 3. The legitimacy, structure and role
of the Government, 4. Local and regional autonomy. The first two items immediately caused
much conflict. As I have already pointed out, electoral law should not formally be included in
constitutional reform, since it is not part of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it was clear that
changes to the system of Government could not be implemented without revisions being made
to the electoral system. However, the small parties (PLI, PSDI, PRI) rejected any changes to
electoral law that would go in the direction of a majority vote or a threshold within the
proportional system. They obviously feared for their own survival. The Christian Democrats
favoured a system based on proportional representation with a bonus for the most successful
parties, while the Communists favoured a system based on proportional representation on the
German model, but without a 5% threshold. As for the structure of Parliament, there were
divisions between the majority parties and the opposition. Both Communists and neo-Fascists
favoured the abolition of the bicameral system. But as far as the number of deputies and
33
Köppl, Stefan (2006). ‘Italy’s Constitutional Odyssey. Failed Attempts at Constitutional Reform in the 1980s
and 1990s’, in Risso, Linda & Monica Boria (eds.), Politics and Culture in Post-War Italy, Newcastle:
Cambridge Scholars Press, 223-239.
13
senators was concerned, the small parties again opposed the proposals from the big governing
parties (DC, PSI) or the opposition (PCI, MSI).
It is worth mentioning the initiative in 1983 that came from MSI deputy Franco Franchi. He
presented a proposal in Parliament for a constitutional reform which envisioned a new
presidential and corporative Republic, with greater powers to the President, abolition of the
Senate, and the establishment of a single ‘Chamber of deputies and of workers’ groups’
(Camera dei deputati e delle categorie). 34 The same year saw the Prime Minister Bettino
Craxi, for the first time, inviting MSI leaders to public meetings, together with other antiFascist leaders, when he formed his Government (1983-1987).
However, the Bozzi Commission’s work came to nothing. The only concrete recommendation
regarded the structure of Parliament where the existing bicameralism was to be replaced by
the so-called bicameralismo differenziato, i.e. different functions for the two Chambers. Only
16 members of the Commission approved the draft document, with the Communists
abstaining. 35 The whole project was put aside and until the end of the 1980s the debate on
constitutional reform was shelved.
‘Democracy Italian Style’ (1992-2012) / Competitive Democracy from a Moderate
Pluralistic Party System to Polarised Bipolarism.
The 1990s have been described as representing a transition from an old political system to a
new one. 36 Though labels such as ‘first’ and ‘second Republic’ are incorrect since the period
saw no relevant changes in constitutional rules, there is no doubt that important political and
institutional developments took place as a consequence of the fall of Communism in Eastern
and Central Europe, the acceleration of the process of European unification, the rise of new
protest movements and revelations of political corruption.
34
Revelli, Marco (1996), La destra nazionale, Milano: Il Saggiatore.
Köppl, Stefan (2006). ‘Italy’s Constitutional Odyssey. Failed Attempts at Constitutional Reform in the 1980s
and 1990s’, in Risso, Linda & Monica Boria (eds.), Politics and Culture in Post-War Italy, Newcastle:
Cambridge Scholars Press, 223-239.
36
Gundle Stephen & Simon Parker (1996). The New Italian Republic: from the Fall of the Berlin Wall to
Berlusconi, London: Routledge; Newell, James & Martin Bull (1997). ‘Party organizations and alliances in Italy
in the 1990s: A revolution of sorts’, West European Politics, vol. 20, no. 1, 81-109; Bull, Martin & James
Newell (2009), ‘Italian Politics and the 1992 elections: From stable instability to instability and change’,
Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 203-227.
35
14
The new phase was opened in 1991 with the June 9 referendum, proposed by the Christian
Democrat Mario Segni, for the abolition of the multiple preference vote in Chamber
elections. 37 Segni’s battle against political corruption, patronage and the role of correnti
(fractions) within the parties coincided with the success of a new protest party, the Northern
League. This party based its program not only on federalism but also on a fierce attack on the
partitocrazia, and its rhetoric and arguments were reminiscent of those expressed by post-war
neo-Fascists. The initiative for a change to the Italian political system moved thus from
political elites to civil society. No wonder, since the former were in big trouble.
In 1992, almost the entire political elite was swept from power out as a result of the
investigations into corruption and other crimes against public administration that were led by
Milan prosecutors – the so called Tangentopoli or ‘Clean Hands’ operation. The traditional
parties barely survived the April 5 elections. The Communist Party managed to avoid collapse
after having undergoing a radical internal reform process, which resulted in it being rebranded
as the Left Democratic Party (PDS/DS, today’s Democratic Party - PD). The MSI also entered
an internal reform process, abandoning its neo-Fascist identity and embracing a new
conservative and moderate stance (later on the party changed its name to the National
Alliance-AN, today’s Future and Freedom-FLI). Italy was excluded from the European
Monetary System and a ‘technical’ Government led by the Socialist Giuliano Amato and
supported by the moribund DC, PSI, PLI and PSDI struggled to save Italian financial and
political credibility, and the country’s position in the European Union. The legitimacy of the
established parties had already been lost.
In such a dramatic political situation, the initiative for change fell once again into the hands of
civil society. On April 18, 1993, a second referendum promoted by Mario Segni was held.
77% of the electorate participated and 82,7% voters expressed a clear wish to modify the
electoral rules, thus forcing Parliament to modify the electoral system. This resulted in a
mixed solution, combining a majority system inspired by the Westminster model for 75% of
seats in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Proportional representation for the
remaining 25%, was introduced by law a few months after the referendum. It was an
important change – though not a constitutional one. There had been a widespread belief that
proportional representation had contributed to the malfunctioning of the Italian political
37
Donovan, Mark (1995). ‘The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy’, International Political Science Review,
vol. 16, no. 1, 47-64.
15
system: political fragmentation, instable and short-lived governments, a lack of alternation of
parties in power, inefficiency, corruption, electoral fraud, clientelism and links between
politics and organized crime. 38 A reform of the electoral system in order to reform the partysystem and facilitate governmental stability was thought to be the solution to Italy’s political
problems. This has been noted by Paul Furlong, who also comments on how wrong this
diagnosis was. 39
The electoral reform promoted by Segni had a clear ‘anti-hegemonic’ 40 or ‘antiestablishment’ 41 character and was meant to take the country from a consociational model (in
the Italian case, a degenerated consociationalism: consociativismo) without alternation to a
competitive one, opening for honest competition between two parties/alliances with no
excuses for under-the-table bargaining. To a certain extent, it succeeded. The DC rapidly
disintegrated. Small parties and former allies of the DC, such as PSDI, PLI and PRI,
disappeared overnight. Silvio Berlusconi founded a new party (Forza Italia-FI, later People of
Freedom-PDL), which entered the political arena and made a controversial alliance with the
Northern League and the post-Fascists. The new electoral law brought about, in fact, the
formation of two opposing coalitions; a centre-right one under the leadership of Berlusconi
and a centre-left one led by the PDS under the leadership of Romano Prodi.
The Italian political scientist Adriano Pappalardo has described the 1990s as a transition from
polarized pluralism, according to Giovanni Sartori’s model, to moderate pluralism. 42 There is
much to support such an analysis: two large, stable coalitions on the centre-right and on the
centre-left have since 1994 sat in power with quite regular alternations (1994 centre-right
coalition; 1996-2001 centre-left coalition; 2001-2006 centre-right coalition; 2006-2008
centre-left coalition; 2008-2011 centre-right coalition); the ideological polarization between
Communism and neo-Fascism disappeared after the internal reform processes within the PCIDS and MSI-AN; all parties (including former neo-Fascists and Communists) have gained
38
Donovan, Mark (1995). ‘The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy’, International Political Science Review,
vol. 16, no. 1, 48.
39
Furlong, Paul (1991). ‘Government Stability and Electoral System: The Italian Example’, Parliamentary
Affairs, vol. 44, no. 1, 50-59.
40
Donovan, Mark (1995). ‘The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy’, International Political Science Review,
vol. 16, no. 1, 54-55.
41
Sakamoto, Takayuti (1999). ‘Explaining Electoral Reform. Japan versus Italy and New Zealand’, Party
Politics, vol. 4, no. 4, 423.
42
Pappalardo, Adriano (1996). ‘Dal pluralismo polarizzato al pluralismo moderato. Il modello di Sartori e la
transizione italiana’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, vol. 26, no. 1, 103-45.
16
equal legitimacy to participate in Government; the electorate has become more mobile when
we compare its behaviour to the preferences given to only three parties (DC, PCI, PSI) until
1994. All this points to a reinforcement of Italian democracy. The question remains whether
the political developments during the 1990s have been accompanied by a lessening of party
power, decreased party fragmentation and more governmental stability and efficiency.
The De Mita-Jotti Parliamentary Commission (1993) on Institutional Reform
It was immediately after the electoral defeat in 1992 that the parties in Government (DC, PSI,
PLI, PSI, PRI) took the initiative of a second attempt at constitutional reform. 43 The second
bicamerale consisted of thirty deputies and thirty senators from all fourteen parties in
Parliament (De Mita-Jotti Parliamentary Commission). The Northern League and
representatives of orthodox Communism were new political actors. Experts also took part in
the commission’s deliberations. This time the issues at stake were 1. Electoral law 2. The
form of Government 3. Constitutional guarantees (the Judiciary and justice in general;
independent authorities; composition and role of the Constitutional Court) and 4. Federalism
(as requested by the Northern League). Soon attention focused on the first issue and, again,
the larger parties (DC, PDS, PSI and Northern League) proposed a majority voting system.
Again, the proposal was rejected by the small parties (MSI and orthodox Communists) who
feared they would lose in the political competition. It was only the pressure from civil society,
through the referendum promoted by Segni in 1993, that made electoral reform possible. But
it must be noted that the new law approved in Parliament did not correspond totally to public
expectations. The percentage of proportionality that was included was a compromise and, in
fact, guaranteed the survival of small parties and their influence in Parliament. The number of
parties did not go down after 1993, on the contrary.
Within the De Mita-Jotti Parliamentary Commission, one could witness unusual alliances –
unusual at least for that period. The neo-Fascists convinced Bettino Craxi’s Socialist Party
and the Northern League to support the idea of a presidential system with increased powers
for the President of the Republic. Nothing concrete came out of it but this dialogue can surely
43
For a detailed account of the attempted constitutional reform process during the 1990s I refer to Gilbert, Mark
(1998). ‘Transforming Italy’s institutions? The bicameral committee on institutional reform’, Modern Italy, vol.
3, no. 1, 49-66; Fusaro, Carlo (1998). ‘The politics of Constitutional Reform in Italy: A Framework for
Analysis’, South European Society & Politics, 2/98, 45-7; Pasquino, Gianfranco (1998). ‘Reforming the Italian
Constitution’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 42-54; Teresi, Francesco (1998). La strategia
delle riforme. La tormentata revisione della Costituzione repubblicana, Turin: Giappichelli.
17
be viewed as a rehearsal for future political alliances. In fact, when, after the disappearance of
both DC and PSI as a consequence of Tangentopoli, Bettino Craxi’s best friend Silvio
Berlusconi, the successful and ‘creative entrepreneur’ 44, decided to found a new party, he
sought a coalition with the Northern League and the post-Fascist National Alliance (AN).
Together, they won the elections in 1994, bringing to power, for the first time in post-war
Italy, the heirs of Fascism.
What attitudes did the new parties (Northern League and Forza Italia) and the reformed ones
(MSI/AN, but also the PCI/DS) have towards the Constitution? The centre-right coalition won
the elections in 1994 with a political program to which the Northern League had added
federalism and the heirs of Fascism had added proposals for the direct election of the Prime
Minister and/or of the President. However, it is also worth noting that when he came to
power, Berlusconi, the leader of Forza Italia, was quite indifferent towards the constitutional
wishes of his political allies.
The D’Alema-Berlusconi Parliamentary Commission (1997) on Constitutional Reform.
In truth, the third attempt to reform the Italian Constitution came from the parties on the left
that traditionally had been the proud defenders of the spirit of wartime armed resistance and
the spirit of the Constitution. After the fall of the first Berlusconi Government, which lasted
only a few months in 1994, and after a year of so-called ‘technicians in power’ (DiniGovernment 1995-96), Romano Prodi formed in 1996 a new cabinet supported by a centreleft coalition – indeed the first Government in post-war Italy that saw the successors of the
PCI in power. Concurrently, the former Communist Massimo D’Alema took the initiative –
once again – to gather all parties in Parliament with the aim of reforming the Republic’s
institutions. The D’Alema-Berlusconi parliamentary Commission – the third Bicamerale –
was set up in January 1997. 45 It consisted of thirty-five deputies and senators, assigned
according to parties’ proportional representation. The Northern League decided to boycott the
commission, at least formally, by not participating. Fourteen parties were represented but it is
important to notice that many of them were new to the Italian political scene, or deeply
44
Poli, Emanuela (1998), ‘Silvio Berlusconi and the Myth of the Creative entrepreneur’, Modern Italy, 3:2, 271279.
45
Again I refer to Gilbert, Mark (1998), ‘Transforming Italy’s institutions? The bicameral committee on
institutional reform’, Modern Italy, vol. 3, no. 1, 49-66; Fusaro, Carlo (1998), ‘The politics of Constitutional
Reform in Italy: A Framework for Analysis’, South European Society & Politics, 2/98, 45-7; Pasquino,
Gianfranco (1998), ‘Reforming the Italian Constitution’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 42-54.
18
changed after the end of the Cold War. Again, many very significant political actors were
involved. 46
The main issues to be discussed – apart from the electoral law that had just been reformed –
were similar to those explored by the previous commission: 1. The functions of Parliament, 2.
The form of Government, 3. The form of the state (increased regionalism) and 4. The
Judiciary. On the question of Parliament, all parties, except the orthodox Communists, now
supported the bicameral model but with a reduction of MPs. The former Communists (now
Left Democrats) and the former neo-Fascists (now right-wing conservatives) had therefore
changed their positions since the first Bicamerale. Moreover, the biggest parties from both
coalitions (DS and FI) supported different functions for the two chambers, while their smaller
allies (former Christian Democrats on both right and left side) did not.
The two main coalitions disagreed on the form the Government should take. The governing
centre-left coalition favoured the German model, with a strong Prime Minister (Chancellor)
elected by Parliament, who can be replaced by a new parliamentary majority. This model
leaves the possibility of bargaining and mediation in the hands of the parties, both before and
after the formation of any Government that needs the support of Parliament; this solution was
therefore also liked by the small parties. The centre-right coalition preferred the French model
of semi-presidentialism, in which a strong President, chosen through direct popular election,
shares executive powers with a Prime Minister who commands a parliamentary majority. It is
worth noting that the neo-Fascists had as early as in the 1940s advocated a presidential
Republic with direct popular election of the President. This presidential model enhances the
power of the voters, who have an influence in the formation of the executive; this model was
therefore opposed by the small parties. When finally the two leading parties from the two
coalitions (DS and FI) agreed on a ‘strong premiership’ system, according to the German
model, the Northern League, who actually did not participate in the debate within the
Commission, voted in Parliament for a semi-presidential system, putting the whole reform
process at risk. On the question of regionalism, it is worth noting that the Left Democrats
were now pushing for a strengthening of territorial autonomy, including the possibility of
regions legislating in fields not explicitly reserved for the state.
46
Political leaders such as Silvio Berlusconi for Forza Italia, Massimo D’Alema for the Left Democrats,
Gianfranco Fini for National Alliance, Franco Marini for former Christian Democrats on the left, Pierferdinando
Casini and Rocco Buttiglione for former Christian Democrats on the right, and Fausto Bertinotti for orthodox
Communists were members of the Commission.
19
The Commission finally drafted a constitutional reform inspired by the French Fifth Republic
model: popular election of the President of the Republic; more powers to the regions;
abolition of Title V of the Constitution’s Second Part, which restricted regional legislation
and administration. The draft was quite radical, especially the parts that dealt with the
movement from regionalism to federalism, and it seemed that it would especially please the
opposition parties on the right. However, Berlusconi suddenly withdrew from the
Commission. The draft went to Parliament, where a host of amendments were made by
orthodox Communists and representatives of the Northern League. It proved impossible to
reach a parliamentary majority for a draft on institutional reform that parties from both
coalitions could support. So, in June 1997, the debate was once again abandoned.
In the same year, the centre-left majority approved a bill in Parliament concerning the regions.
This was more or less a copy of the draft elaborated by the Bicamerale, including the reform
of Title V. 47 Since the bill was only passed with an absolute majority in both Chambers and
not with two-thirds of votes, a referendum was requested. 48 On October 7, 2001, the
electorate approved the law (Constitutional law 3/2001) with 64,2% in favour of the
constitutional changes. However, only 34,1 % of the electorate participated in this popular
consultation. 49 What happened is most significant. For the first time since 1948, not only was
the Constitution modified on relevant questions, such as regionalism, but it was also modified
by simple parliamentary majority50, creating the precedent that a 2/3 majority involving
members of the opposition was no longer necessary for constitutional reforms. 51 As a matter
of fact, as soon as the centre-right coalition returned to power after a general election in 2001,
they re-launched a project of constitutional reforms that included federalism, marginalizing
the centre-left coalition (the ‘Great Reform’).
A new electoral law
47
The history of ‘devolution’ in Italy has taken the following steps: 1993 - legislation on direct election of
mayors; 1994 - introduction of a local property tax giving financial autonomy to local governments; 1997 –
Bassanini laws, transferring administrative responsibilities from central to regional government.
48
See footnote 7.
49
Being a referendum on constitutional matters, an electoral majority is not required. At the time of the
referendum, governmental power was no longer with the centre-left coalition, but had moved to the centre-right
coalition.
50
The Italian Constitution from 1948 has been amended on minor issues 13 times, each time with a majority of
two/thirds.
51
Pinelli, Cesare (2006). Cit., 337.
20
Although his attempts at constitutional reform did not succeed, Berlusconi did manage to
reinforce the power of the parties, as a sort of revenge for not having strengthened his own
power. On December 21, 2005, almost simultaneously with the approval of the constitutional
law that was later rejected in the 2006 referendum, Parliament approved a new electoral
reform. This only had the votes of the governmental parties (law 270). 52 The new electoral
law, still in force, replaced the one that was the result out of the referendum of April 18, 1993.
From a mixed system, 25% proportional and 75% majoritarian, one moved back to a
proportional system, but ‘correct’ inasmuch as the winning coalition is entitled to a majority
premium for the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, provided it is over 25 per cent, and there is
a low electoral threshold. However, because today’s electoral law does not permit the vote of
preference, the parties’ secretaries have control over the selection of the candidates who are
entitled to enter Parliament. 53
The functioning of core institutions
The electoral law of 1993 did not have the effect of reducing the number of parties and
lessening party fragmentation. On the contrary, it was elaborated by the party secretaries in
such a way that it permitted the survival of a high number of parties. The electoral law of
2005, however, which marked a return to a proportional system, with a threshold and bonus to
the majority coalition, has managed to reduce party fragmentation. For the first time in the
Republic’s history, only five parties have significant representation in Parliament (2008
election). However, although there has been a positive development towards political
alternation between two coalitions, the Italian political system has remained in a state of
‘stable instability’, the condition it was in before 1993. Moreover, the long bicameral
approval process and the secret negotiating among parties within the parliamentary legislative
committees continue to be a brake on the executive. Some analysts have also noticed that the
level of ideological polarization, which had been reduced during the 1990s, has increased
again since the beginning of the new century, so that it is no longer appropriate to employ
Pappalardo’s model of ‘moderate pluralism’. A greater ideological distance between the two
major parties has been identified, as well as a radicalisation of small parties both on the right
and on the left and even a radicalisation of the Northern League in terms of increased
52
Pasquino, Gianfranco (2007). ‘Tricks and Treats: the 2005 Italian Electoral Law and its Consequences’, South
European Politics and Society, vol. 12, nr. 1, 79-93.
53
In 2009 three referenda with the intention to modify the law in several points took place, but they did not reach
the necessary quorum and were therefore declared invalid.
21
xenophobia. Giuseppe Ieraci describes the Italian party system today as ‘polarised
bipolarism’ 54 while Emanuele Massetti talks of a ‘(non-fragmented) polarised bipolarism’ 55.
In this context, the most interesting developments in Italian politics during the last twenty
years concern the roles of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic. 56 Silvio
Berlusconi, at least in the period 2001-2006, showed a remarkable ability to strengthen the
authority of the Prime Minister, albeit independent of constitutional rules. He simply adopted
the Westminster model when he appointed ministers – and there were much fewer of them
than had previously been the case – according to his own criteria rather than following the
wishes of his allies. He also appointed party leaders as ministers, with the declared intention
of making them more responsible for governmental policies. Nevertheless, he did not manage
to stop all conflicts among coalition partners. Without the power to dissolve Parliament, even
such a strong and ambitious Prime Minister as Il Cavaliere remained a mediator totally
dependent on his political allies, and his attempts to create a more authoritative chief
executive role came to nothing. 57
The executive has in fact become more efficient, but again this has been independent of
constitutional rules. This is due to three essential facts, as noted by Salvatore Vassallo. 58
Firstly, parliamentary rules have changed so that the Government has a greater influence in
setting up the working agenda for legislation in front of both parliamentary groups and
individual deputies or senators. However, the final approval of the agenda remains in the
hands of the leaders of parliamentary groups.
Secondly, over the last twenty years, the use of decree laws (decreti-legge) has increased
dramatically. Both left-wing and left-right coalitions have resorted to them in order to pass
legislation in a number of areas: tax, health and welfare reform, education, pensions,
privatization, measures against organized crime, corruption and tax evasion, immigration,
administrative decentralisation, national broadcasting. It is a fact that all Italian Governments
54
Ieraci, Giuseppe (2007). ‘From polarised pluralism to polarised bipolarism. Parties, governments and policy
space in Italy after the 2006 elections’, Polena, vol. 3, no. 1, 9-24.
55
Massetti, Emanuele (2009). ‘The sunrise of the Third Republic? The evolution of the Italian party-system after
the 2008 general election and the prospects for constitutional reform’, Modern Italy, vol. 14, no. 4, 495.
56
Bull, Martin (2004). ‘Parliamentary Democracy in Italy’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 57, no. 3, 550-567;
Vassallo, Salvatore (2007). ‘Government under Berlusconi: The Functioning of the Core Institutions in Italy’,
West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 692-710.
57
Bull, Martin (2004). ‘Parliamentary Democracy in Italy’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 57, no. 3, 556-557.
58
Vassallo, Salvatore (2007). ‘Government under Berlusconi: The Functioning of the Core Institutions in Italy’,
West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 692-710.
22
since the 1970s have resorted to decree laws. However, there has been a striking increase in
the adoption of this measure. Between 1948 and 1963, 128 decrees were issued; between
1963 and 1972, there were 163; between 1972 and 1980, there were 350. 59 There has been a
growing tendency to use such a surrogate for legislation in recent decades. In the period of the
1996-2001 centre-left Government, 174 decrees were promulgated and converted into laws
(19% of all legislative acts); during the 2001-2006 centre-right Government there were 200
(29% of all legislative acts). 60
Thirdly, and especially during the last two Berlusconi Governments, the executive has called
for votes of confidence in order to accelerate the passage of governmental bills and in order to
bring members of the majority coalition into line (e.g. in 2005, in reforming the Judiciary).
Equally and concurrently, the executive has used the so-called maxi-amendments in order to
drastically change bills originating in Parliament (e.g. budget bills). 61
At the same time, the Italian presidency has gained a more significant political role. Several
times since the beginning of the 1990s the President has exerted his influence by using the
powers he is entitled to: nominating the premier, dissolving Parliament and calling new
elections. Italians have been ruled by four ‘technocratic’ Governments (Amato in 1992-93;
Ciampi in 1993-94; Dini in 1995-96; Monti since 2011) in which the chief of the executive
has a non-political background. This has been a consequence of Parliament’s inability to
establish a stable majority behind a political leader. In the cases of Prime Ministers Lamberto
Dini and Mario Monti, their cabinets were committees of non-elected academics, jurists and
economists. However, such ad hoc solutions, which actually have been very positive for the
country in moments of political and/or financial crisis, hardly conform to democratic
principles. This peculiar pattern of Italian politics demonstrates the extensive power that the
President has; one can even theorize a sort of presidential Republic de facto for Italy when
Presidents Oscar Luigi Scalfaro and Giorgio Napolitano take affairs in their own hands and
appoint former bankers as Prime Ministers. This political procedure is fully allowed by the
Italian Constitution within the rules of a parliamentary Republic (Article 92 of the Italian
Constitution). However, caution should be urged. Even technocratic Governments are
59
Hine, David (1981), ‘Thirty Years of the Italian Republic: Governability and Constitutional Reform’,
Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 34, no. 1, 72.
60
Vassallo, Salvatore (2007). ‘Government under Berlusconi: The Functioning of the Core Institutions in Italy’,
West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 699.
61
Vassallo, Salvatore (2007). ‘Government under Berlusconi: The Functioning of the Core Institutions in Italy’,
West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 702.
23
dependent on confidence votes in Parliament and are therefore condemned to be short-lived;
political parties who no longer fear an early election can soon reassert their alliances.
Conclusion
Let me now summarise and draw a few conclusions about what has been labelled a
‘constitutional odyssey’ 62. After sixty years, the only concrete changes that have occurred
concern electoral law, which, however, is not a Constitutional matter. The basic formal rules
of the Italian Republic, i.e. the Constitution, have remained unchanged, except for the
important introduction, by a centre-left government, of decentralisation of the Italian state by
Constitutional Law 3/2001.
There have been four attempts to reform the constitutional document, but all of them have
been unsuccessful. The first and the second Commissions for constitutional reform had certain
continuity with the past, in that many of their members had participated in the 1946
Constitutional Assembly in 1946. In the third Commission and the group of ‘wise men’, new
political actors came to the fore. However, it is possible to identify certain constant patterns in
all four attempts.
The main reason for the failure of the reform processes is that the parties – all of them, i.e. the
political class or elite as a whole – have given priority to short-term interests such as staying
in power instead of long-term national interests such as the need for more stable Government
and more effective rules of decision-making. Whenever it has discussed constitutional reform,
the political class has used the debate for politically contingent reasons rather then showing a
genuine will to improve the system. During the Bozzi Parliamentary Commission’s work, the
De Mita-Jotti Parliamentary Commission’s work and th4e D’Alema-Berlusconi bicamerale, it
was only disagreements between parties, internal rivalries and blackmail on part of the small
parties in Government towards the bigger ally (DC first, DS and FI later) that prevented a
successful outcome. The small parties in any occasion acted as ‘veto players’ 63. As far as the
‘Great Reform’ of Silvio Berlusconi is concerned, it has been described as ‘a cattle market in
62
Köppl, Stefan (2006). ‘Italy’s Constitutional Odyssey. Failed Attempts at Constitutional Reform in the 1980s
and 1990s’, in Risso, Linda & Monica Boria (eds.), Politics and Culture in Post-War Italy, Newcastle:
Cambridge Scholars Press, 223-239; Fabbrini, Sergio (2012). ‘The institutional odyssey of the Italian
Parliamentary Republic’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol.17, no. 1, 10-24.
63
Pasquino, Gianfranco (1998). ‘Reforming the Italian Constitution’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 3,
no. 1, 49.
24
which each party obtained a cow’ 64: the Northern League could have put the centre-right
coalition at risk if devolution was not achieved; Berlusconi was interested in strengthening his
position as Prime Minister; the National Alliance was concerned with a stronger executive
and ‘national interests’ vis à vis federalism; the Union of the Democratic Centre wanted a
guarantee to return to a proportional electoral system.
Another pattern is the lack of consistency on the part of many parties with regard to
institutional solutions. For example, both the Communists and neo-Fascists changed from
supporting the abolition of the bicameral system in the first Commission to supporting a
system with two chambers in the third Commission, where they participated as Left
Democrats and Conservatives. In this respect, only the Northern League has consistently
pushed for devolution and federalism, and in fact succeeded in achieving its own political
goals through constitutional reform, a process that has paradoxically been promoted by rival
parties.
A third pattern is the lack of interest in constitutional reform on the part of significant political
leaders as soon as they gain executive power. The initiator of the reform process in the 1980s,
Bettino Craxi, soon lost interest in it after taking office as Prime Minister, probably because
he found it more convenient to strengthen the Government by using decree laws instead of
changing the Constitution. Romano Prodi, at the head of the cabinet during the third
bicamerale, invested his credibility in fulfilling the Maastricht criteria and paid little attention
to the constitutional debate. As Craxi did before him, he used decree laws to strengthen his
powers. Decree laws have also been a good option for Berlusconi to guarantee governmental
stability.
Italy is no longer a blocked degenerated consensual democracy of the same kind as in the
Cold War, but it has not become a fully competitive majoritarian democracy. The political
and institutional decision-making system has become more efficient, but it is hard to say that
it also has become more modern in terms of transparency and democracy.
In this ambiguous situation, we can provide a tentative answer to our original questions: Was
the ‘Great Reform’ of Berlusconi a unique and dangerous attempt by the Prime Minister to
64
Sartori, Giovanni (2006). Mala costituzione e altri malanni, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 54-55, as reported in Bull,
Martin & Gianfranco Pasquino (2007), ‘A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in Italy’, West European
Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 674.
25
amend the Italian Constitution in order to realise his ambition to become a dictatorial leader?
Were the Berlusconi proposals an unusual attack on the Italian centralized state? It is fair to
say that the Berlusconi proposal was a long way from both the German (a ‘strong
premiership’ combined with guarantees for the parties in Parliament) and the French (semipresidentialism) models. It was based, as its critics pointed out, on an idea of ‘absolute
premiership’ that was hardly consonant with the models of consensual or competitive
democracy. Nevertheless, compared to the three previous attempts, it must be noted that the
Berlusconi proposal in 2003 was not so original either.
Bibliography
Bassanini, Franco (ed.) (2004). Costituzione, una riforma sbagliata. Il parere di sessantatre
costituzionalisti, Firenze: Passigli Editore.
Bogaards, Matthijs (2005). ‘The Italian First Republic: Degenerated consociationalism in a
polarized party system’, West European Politics, vol. 28, no. 3, 503-520.
Bull, Martin (2004). ‘Parliamentary Democracy in Italy’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 57, no.
3, 550-567.
Bull, Martin & Gianfranco Pasquino (2007). ‘A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in
Italy’, West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 670-691.
Bull, Martin (2007). ‘La “grande riforma” del centro-destra alla prova del referendum’, in J.
L. Briquet & A. Mastropaolo (eds.) (2007). Politica in Italia. I fatti dell’anno e le
interpretazioni, Bologna: il Mulino.
Bull, Martin & James Newell (1993). ‘Italian Politics and the 1992 elections: From stable
instability to instability and change’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 203-227.
Donovan, Mark (1995). ‘The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy’, International Political
Science Review, vol. 16, no. 1, 47-64.
26
Donovan, Mark (2003). ‘Berlusconi, Strong Government and the Italian State’, Journal of
Modern Italian Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 231-248.
Furlong, Paul (1991). ‘Government Stability and Electoral System: The Italian Example’,
Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 44, no. 1, 50-59.
Fabbrini, Sergio (2012). ‘The institutional odyssey of the Italian Parliamentary Republic’,
Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol.17, no. 1, 10-24.
Farneti, Paolo (1985). The Italian Party System (1945-1980), London: Frances Pinter.
Fusaro, Carlo (1998). ‘The politics of Constitutional Reform in Italy: A Framework for
Analysis’, South European Society & Politics, 2/98, 45-74.
Di Palma, Giuseppe (1977). Surviving without Governing. The Italian Parties in Parliament,
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Galli, Giorgio & Alfonso Prandi (1970). Patterns of Political Participation in Italy, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press. Italian original: Galli, Giorgio (1967) [1966]. Il
bipartitismo imperfetto: comunisti e democristiani in Italia, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Gilbert, Mark (1998). ‘Transforming Italy’s institutions? The bicameral committee on
institutional reform’, Modern Italy, vol. 3, no. 1, 49-66.
Gilbert, Mark & Gianfranco Pasquino (eds.) (2000). Italian Politics. The Faltering Transition,
New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Gundle Stephen & Simon Parker (1996). The New Italian Republic: from the Fall of the
Berlin Wall to Berlusconi, London: Routledge.
Hine, David (1981). ‘Thirty Years of the Italian Republic: Governability and Constitutional
Reform’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 34, no. 1, 63-80.
Hine, David (1993). Governing Italy. The Politics of Bargained Pluralism, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
27
Ieraci, Giuseppe (2007). ‘From polarised pluralism to polarised bipolarism. Parties,
governments and policy space in Italy after the 2006 elections’, Polena, vol. 3, no. 1, 9-24.
LaPalombara, Joseph (1987). Democracy Italian Style, New Haven and London: Yale
University Press.
Lijphardt, Arend (1968). ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, Comparative Political Studies,
vol. 1, no. 1, 3-44.
Köppl, Stefan (2006). ‘Italy’s Constitutional Odyssey. Failed Attempts at Constitutional
Reform in the 1980s and 1990s’, in Risso, Linda & Monica Boria (eds.), Politics and Culture
in Post-War Italy, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 223-239.
Maranini, Giuseppe (1958). Miti e realtà della democrazia, Milan: Edizioni di Comunità.
Massetti, Emanuele (2009). ‘The sunrise of the Third Republic? The evolution of the Italian
party-system after the 2008 general election and the prospects for constitutional reform’,
Modern Italy, vol. 14, no. 4, 495.
Negri, Guglielmo & Silvano Simoni (eds) (1990). Le costituzioni inattuate, Roma: Colombo.
Newell, James & Martin Bull (1997). ‘Party organizations and alliances in Italy in the 1990s:
A revolution of sorts’, West European Politics, vol. 20, no. 1, 81-109.
Newell, James (2010). The Politics of Italy. Governance in a Normal Country, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Pappalardo, Adriano (1980). ‘La politica consociativa nella democrazia italiana’, Rivista
Italiana di Scienza Politica, vol. 10, no.1, 73-123.
Pappalardo, Adriano (1996). ‘Dal pluralismo polarizzato al pluralismo moderato. Il modello
di Sartori e la transizione italiana’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, vol. 26, no. 1, 103-45.
Pasquino, Gianfranco (1998). ‘Reforming the Italian Constitution’, Journal of Modern Italian
Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 42-54.
28
Pasquino, Gianfranco (2007). ‘The Five Faces of Silvio Berlusconi: The Knight of Antipolitics’, Modern Italy, vol. 12, no. 1, 39-54.
Pasquino, Gianfranco (2007). ‘Tricks and Treats: the 2005 Italian Electoral Law and its
Consequences’, South European Politics and Society, vol. 12, no. 1, 79-93.
Pasquino, Gianfranco (2011). La rivoluzione promessa. Lettura della Costituzione italiana,
Milano: Bruno Mondadori.
Pasquino, Gianfranco (ed.). La politica italiana. Dizionario critico 1945-1995, Rome-Bari:
Laterza.
Pinelli, Cesare (2006). ‘The 1948 Italian Constitution and the 2006 Referendum: Food for
Thought’, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 2, 329-340.
Poli, Emanuela (1998). ‘Silvio Berlusconi and the Myth of the Creative entrepreneur’,
Modern Italy, vol. 3, no. 2, 271-279.
Putnam, Robert (1976). The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
Revelli, Marco (1996). La destra nazionale, Milan: Il Saggiatore.
Rogari, Sandro (1998). Alle origini del trasformismo: partiti e sistema politico nell’Italia
liberale (1961-1914), Rome: Laterza.
Sabbatucci, Giovanni (2003). Il trasformismo come sistema. Saggio sulla storia politica
dell’Italia unita, Rome: Laterza.
Sakamoto, Takayuti (1999). ‘Explaining Electoral Reform. Japan versus Italy and New
Zealand’, Party Politics, vol. 4, no. 4, 419-438.
Sartori, Giovanni (1966). ‘European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism’, in
LaPalombara Joseph & Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development,
Princeton, New Jork: Princeton University Press.
29
Sartori, Giovanni (1976). Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Sartori, Giovanni (2006). Mala costituzione e altri malanni, Rome-Bari: Laterza.
Scoppola, Pietro (1997). La Repubblica dei partiti. Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema político.
1945-1996, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Teresi, Francesco (1998). La strategia delle riforme. La tormentata revisione della
Costituzione repubblicana, Turin: Giappichelli.
Vassallo, Salvatore (1994). Il governo di partito in Italia (1943–93), Bologna: Il Mulino.
Vassallo, Salvatore (2005). ‘The Constitutional Reforms of the Centre-Right’, in C. Guarnieri
& J. Newell (eds.). Italian Politics: Quo Vadis? London: Berghahn, 153-175.
Vassallo, Salvatore (2007). ‘Government under Berlusconi: The Functioning of the Core
Institutions in Italy’, West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 692-710.
Wolff, Elisabetta Cassina (2012). L’inchiostro dei vinti. Stampa e ideologia neofascista
(1945-1953), Milano: Mursia.
Wolff, Elisabetta Cassina (2011). ‘The meaning and role of the concepts of democracy and
corporatism in Italian neo-fascist ideology (1945-1953)’, Modern Italy, vol. 16, no. 3, 295313.
30

Download Report