Review no. 71
Press Review
16-30 June 2014
Table of Contents
Pages
African Union
- Top Commander of the LRA surrenders with five fighters to the AU-Regional Task Force in the CAR
- 442ème réunion CPS sur la situation à l’Est de (RDC) et l’état de mise en œuvre de l’Accordcadre pour la paix, la sécurité et la coopération pour la RDC et la région
- 442nd PSC meeting on the situation in the East of the (DRC) and the implementation status
of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and the Region
- The PSC of the (AU), at its 442nd meeting, held on the situation in Guinea-Bissau
- Le CPS de l’UA) en sa 442ème réunion tenue sur la situation en Guinée-Bissau
- Le CPS de l'UA en sa 440ème réunion tenue le 12 juin 2014, a adopté une décision sur
la situation au Soudan du Sud
- The PSC of the AU, at its 440th meeting held in Addis Ababa, on 12 June 2014,
adopted a decision on the situation in South Sudan
- L'Union Africaine condamne fermement le massacre perpétré par Al-shabaab au Kenya
- The African Union strongly condemns the massacre carried out by Al-shabaab in Kenya
- L'UA se félicite de la libération du dirigeant politique Soudanais Sadiq Al-Mahdi:
L'UA réitère son soutien à l'Initiative du Dialogue National
- The AU welcomes the release of the Sudanese political leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi:
The AU reiterates its support to the National Dialogue Initiative
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Terrorism in Africa
- Terrorist plague' tops agenda at AU summit
- A MISTAKEN IDENTITY: MUSLIM RADICALISM AS A COMPLEX PHENOMENON
- LifeView: 2014 Global Peace Index
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DRC
- Dossier spécial: Sur les traces du Djihad islamique en RDC?
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Egypt
- Sisi's African tour to normalize ties, urge anti- terrorism cooperation
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Kenya
- Kenya's dilemma in Somalia: to withdraw or not to withdraw?
- Kenya’s security crisis worsens after Mpeketoni attacks
- Attacks in Lamu County widens political division
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Libya
- Libya Coming Full Circle. When A Deemed “Conspiracy Theory” Becomes Reality
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Mali
- Mali: Fear and Loathing In The Desert
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- Les dessous de Serval au Mali : « En réalité les terroristes ne sont pas l’objectif de cette guerre.
Ils sont seulement le prétexte »
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Nigeria
- International Analysis: Nigerian Security in the Face of Boko Haram
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Somalia
- Al-shabaab still poses serious threat to the region
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Tunisia
- Le terrorisme en Tunisie : entre réalité et manipulations
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Terrorism in the World
- Russia, Iraq, China and Europe - The Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse
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Iraq
- How ISIS is winning the online war for Iraq
- Raqa, l’inquiétante capitale du « Djihadistan »
- Map redrawn in blood
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Pakistan
- PAKISTAN’S WAZIRISTAN: TERROR DESTINATION
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SYRIA
- America’s “Nonconventional War” against Syria: Western Media Narrative Enters into
Comedy Act
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USA
- Jihadist Threat Calls For New US Strategy to Combat Terrorism, RAND Study Says
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Yemen
- Fighting Al Qaida in Yemen and the ulterior motive
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African Union
Top Commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army surrenders with five
fighters to the African Union-Regional Task Force in the Central African Republic
Addis Ababa, 26 June 2014: Six (6) fighters of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) reported, on 25 June 2014, to the African Union-led Regional Task Force (RTF) in
Bakouma, Mbomou Prefecture in the South-eastern part of the Central African Republic (CAR). The fighters are "Lt Col" Opio Sam, Okello Civilian, Walube (all Ugandan nationals), Rafai from the CAR, and two (2) pregnant Congolese women who
had been abducted by the LRA from the Democratic Republic of Congo and were
being used as wives by "Lt Col" Onen UNITA, a senior LRA commander who is still in
the bush.
The LRA fighters reported with three (3) Sub-Machine Guns and five (5) magazines
with 106 rounds of ammunition. “Lt Col” Opio Sam had been in a group of LRA under Okello Punu that the RTF squads attacked on 21 April 2014, in the CAR.
The Commission of the African Union wishes to commend the RTF for the continued success of its “Operation Monsoon”, and encourages it to sustain the current
momentum against the LRA in order to dislodge them from their various hide-outs
and induce further defection of their remaining fighters as well as commanders
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442ème réunion CPS sur la situation à l’Est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et l’état de mise en œuvre de l’Accord-cadre
pour la paix, la sécurité et la coopération pour la RDC et la région
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA), en sa 442 ème réunion tenue le 17 juin 2014, a suivi une communication sur la situation à l’Est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et l’état de mise en œuvre de l’Accord-cadre
pour la paix, la sécurité et la coopération pour la RDC et la région. Le Conseil a également suivi les déclarations faites par les représentants de la RDC, de l’Angola, en
sa qualité de pays assurant la présidence en exercice de la Conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL), et du Rwanda.
Le Conseil, se référant aux conclusions de Dialogue entre le Gouvernement de la
RDC et le M23, telles qu’adoptées à Nairobi le 12 décembre 2013, a noté avec satisfaction l’adoption et la promulgation par le Gouvernement de la loi d’amnistie pour
les faits insurrectionnels, faits de guerre et infractions politiques commis sur le territoire national, entre le 18 février 2006 et le 20 décembre 2013. Le Conseil s’est
félicité des mesures prises en vue de faire bénéficier les ex-miliciens du M23 et excombattants des autres groupes armés des dispositions de cette loi, et a encouragé
le Gouvernement congolais à poursuivre les efforts engagés, notamment en favorisant le retour des ex-miliciens du M23 dans leur pays.
Le Conseil a réitéré son appréciation au Président Yoweri Museveni de l’Ouganda
pour ses efforts qui ont permis de mener son terme le Dialogue, ainsi que pour son
engagement continu en faveur de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité dans la région des Grands Lacs.
Le Conseil a encouragé le Gouvernement à redoubler d’efforts en vue de la mise en
œuvre des autres aspects des conclusions de Nairobi, y compris ceux relatifs aux
processus de désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration (DDR) et de désarmement, démobilisation, rapatriement, réintégration et réinstallation (DDRRR). À cet
égard, le Conseil a lancé un appel à la communauté internationale pour la mobilisation des ressources financières nécessaires.
Le Conseil a exhorté les Forces armées de la RDC (FARDC) et la Brigade d’intervention de la MONUSCO à poursuivre et à intensifier les efforts en cours visant à neutraliser les Forces démocratiques alliées (ADF). Le Conseil a rappelé ses décisions
antérieures sur l’urgence que revêt la neutralisation des Forces démocratiques
pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR), et a exigé des FDLR, qu’elles mettent en
œuvre sans délai le processus de désarmement volontaire qu’elles ont annoncé. Le
Conseil s’est félicité des recommandations du Comité des Ministres de la Défense
et des chefs d’État-major des pays membres de la CIRGL, tenue à Luanda, en Angola, le 13 juin 2014.
Le Conseil a noté avec satisfaction les efforts que déploie le Gouvernement congolais pour mettre en œuvre les engagements auxquels il a souscrit au titre de l’Accord-cadre, notamment en ce qui concerne la décentralisation, les réformes en
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cours au sein de l’armée, des services de sécurité et de la justice, ainsi que le redéploiement de l’administration dans les localités précédemment occupées par les
groupes armés, y compris le M23.
Le Conseil s’est félicité des avancées significatives enregistrées dans la mise en
œuvre de l’Accord-cadre. Rappelant le Plan d’action par la 3ème réunion du Mécanisme régional de suivi, tenue à Addis Abéba, le 31 janvier 2014, sous les auspices
de l’UA et des Nations unies, le Conseil a exhorté tous les acteurs internationaux
concernés à apporter le concours financier nécessaire à la mise en œuvre des activités prioritaires convenues par les pays de la région. Le Conseil s’est également
félicité des conclusions de la 7ème réunion du Comité d’appui technique (CAT) tenue
à Goma, en RDC, du 20 au 23 mai 2014, et attend avec intérêt les résultats de la
4ème réunion du Mécanisme régional de suivi prévue à New York, en septembre
2014. Le Conseil a encouragé les pays de la région à continuer à mettre en œuvre
leurs engagements au titre de l'Accord-cadre.
Le Conseil s’est félicité par ailleurs des efforts visant à renforcer la coopération économique régionale et a appelé les partenaires bilatéraux et multilatéraux à appuyer
les actions en cours dans ce domaine, et attend avec intérêt les résultats de la Conférence de suivi ministérielle prévue à Bruxelles, du 1er au 2 juillet 2014, sous les
auspices des Nations unies, de l’UA et de la Banque mondiale.
Le Conseil a noté avec satisfaction la coordination étroite entre les Envoyés/
Représentants spéciaux de l’UA, des Nations unies, de l’Union européenne (UE) et
des États-Unis en vue de la mise en œuvre de l’Accord-cadre, et les a encouragés à
poursuivre leurs efforts.
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442nd PSC meeting on the situation in the East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the implementation status of the
Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and the
Region
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 442 nd meeting, held
on 17 June 2014, received a briefing on the situation in the East of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the implementation status of the Peace, Security
and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and the Region. Council also received the statements made by the representatives of the DRC, Angola, in its capacity as the country chairing currently the International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Rwanda.
Council, referring to the Conclusions of the Dialogue between the Government of
the DRC and the M23, as adopted in Nairobi, on 12 December 2013, noted with
satisfaction the adoption and promulgation, by the Government, of the amnesty
law for the acts of insurrection and war, as well as political offences, committed on
the national territory between 18 February 2006 to 20 December 2013. Council
welcomed the measures taken for the ex-militia of the M23 and the ex-combatants
of other armed groups to benefit from the provisions of this law, and encouraged
the Government of the DRC to pursue the efforts initiated, particularly by facilitating the return of the ex-militias of the M23 to their country.
Council reiterated its appreciation to President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, for
having successfully facilitated the Dialogue and for his commitment to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes Region.
Council also encouraged the Government to redouble its efforts with a view to implementing the other aspects of the Nairobi Conclusions, including those relating to
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) processes. In this
regard, Council made an appeal to the international community for the mobilization of the necessary financial resources.
Council encouraged the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade to continue and intensify their efforts to neutralize the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF). Council recalled its earlier decisions on the urgency of
neutralizing the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and demanded that the FDLR implement without delay the voluntary disarmament process they have announced. Council welcomed the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of Defense Staff of the member countries
of the ICGLR, held in Luanda, Angola, on 13 June 2014.
Council noted with satisfaction the efforts being made by the Congolese Government to honor its commitments under the PSC Framework, particularly the
measures related to decentralization, the reforms under way within the army, the
security services and the judiciary, as well as the redeployment of the administra-
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tion in the areas previously occupied by the armed groups, including the M23.
Council welcomed the significant progress made in the implementation of the PSC
Framework. Recalling the adoption of a Plan of Action by the 3rd meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, held in Addis Ababa, on 31 January 2014, under the
auspices of the AU and the United Nations, Council urged all the relevant international actors to provide the required financial assistance for the implementation of
the priority activities agreed upon by the countries of the region. Council also welcomed the Conclusions of the 7th meeting of the Technical Support Committee
(TSC), held in Goma, DRC, from 20 to 23 May 2014, and looks forward to the outcome of the 4th meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism scheduled, in New
York, in September 2014. Council encouraged the countries of the region to continue to implement their commitments under the PSC Framework.
Council furthermore welcomed the efforts to enhance regional economic cooperation, urged the bilateral and multilateral partners to support the ongoing actions in
this field, and looks forward to the outcome of the Follow-up Ministerial Conference scheduled to take place in Brussels, from 1 to 2 July 2014, under the auspices
of the United Nations, the AU and the World Bank.
Council noted with satisfaction the close coordination between the Special Envoys/
Representatives of the AU, the UN, the European Union (EU) and the United States,
with a view to implementing the PSC Framework and encouraged them to pursue
their efforts.
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The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 442nd
meeting, held on the situation in Guinea-Bissau
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 442nd meeting,
held on 17 June 2014, adopted the following decision on the situation in GuineaBissau
Council,
1. Takes note of the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation
in Guinea-Bissau [PSC/PR/2. (CDXLII)] and the statements made by the representative of the Republic of Ghana, the current Chair of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS);
2. Recalls its previous communiqués and press statements on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, particularly communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXVIII) adopted at its 318th
meeting, held on 17 April 2012, communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM/1. (CCCXIX), adopted at its 319th meeting, held on 24 April 2012, press statement PSC/PR/BR.2
(CCCXL), adopted at its 340th meeting, held on 2 November 2012, as well as communiqués PSC/PR/COMM (CCCLXI), PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXII) and PSC/PR/COMM
(CCCLXXII), adopted at its 351st, 361st and 372nd meetings, held respectively on 16
January, 22 March and 26 April 2013;
3. Reiterates its deep appreciation to ECOWAS for the crucial role it played in support of the process of ending the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. In this regard, Council pays
tribute to Presidents Alassane Dramane Ouattara, Goodluck Jonathan and John
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Dramani Mahama, as well as to the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Kadré
Désiré Ouedraogo, for their personal involvement in the efforts to successfully implement the transition process;
4. Also expresses its appreciation to the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the European Union (EU), the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF), the United Nations and the concerned bilateral partners for their
sustained support to the process of ending the crisis. Council congratulates the
Commission and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission
on their active contribution to the successful completion of the transition;
5. Welcomes the positive developments in the situation in Guinea-Bissau, in particular the successful holding, on 13 April and 18 May 2014, of the two rounds of the
presidential election, as well as the organization of the legislative elections;
6. Notes with satisfaction that the electoral process was recognized to have been
inclusive, free and fair and credible by the various election observation missions,
including that of the AU, led by former President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique. In this regard, Council expresses its appreciation to the people, as well as to
all the political institutions and actors of Guinea-Bissau, for the smooth and peaceful conduct of the elections and for the completion of the transition process. Council also commends former President Joachim Chissano for the critical role he played
during the elections, in particular in the aftermath of the second round of the presidential election;
7. Takes note of the proclamation by the National Electoral Commission (CNE) of
Guinea-Bissau, on 19 May 2014, of the final results of the 2nd round of the presidential election, congratulates Mr. Jose Mario Vaz on his election as the new President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and expresses its appreciation to Mr. Nunu
Gomes Nabian for having recognized the victory of his opponent;
8. Decides, in the light of the completion of the transition process and the restoration of the constitutional order, and in conformity with the relevant AU instruments, particularly the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,
to lift the suspension measure against the participation of Guinea-Bissau in the activities of the AU, as contained in paragraph 6 of its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM
(CCCXVIII), and invites Guinea-Bissau to immediately resume its participation in the
activities of the AU. Council also appeals to other concerned members of the international community to lift any sanction imposed on Guinea-Bissau;
9. Encourages the new President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and all the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders to work closely together, within the framework of the
democratic institutions of the country, to consolidate the important achievements
made. In this regard, Council stresses the urgency of sustained action to address
the many challenges facing Guinea-Bissau, especially the promotion of national reconciliation and good governance, including the management of the natural re-
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sources of the country, observance of human rights, the fight against impunity and
drug trafficking, security sector reform and socio-economic development;
10. Urges the armed forces to break definitively with the past practices of interference in the management of the country, and stresses the duty of loyalty, which is
incumbent upon them, to the civilian authorities democratically-elected and their
subordination to the political authorities;
11. Appeals urgently to the international community to continue and enhance its
support to Guinea-Bissau, including through the early resumption of development
cooperation and assistance to Guinea-Bissau. In this regard, Council urges the
Member States in a position to do so and the international bilateral and multilateral partners to seize the opportunity of the Donors’ Round Table, scheduled for
the end of 2014, to provide to Guinea-Bissau the necessary financial and economic
support;
12. Requests the Commission to take all necessary steps to mobilize, from within
the continent, adequate support for Guinea-Bissau, including through the inclusion
of this country on the list of States to benefit from the African Solidarity Initiative
and continued facilitation of coordination among the relevant international organizations, particularly through regular joint assessment missions as a follow-up to
those undertaken in December 2012 and July 2013;
13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA), en sa
442ème réunion tenue sur la situation en Guinée-Bissau
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA), en sa 442ème réunion
tenue le 17 juin 2014, a adopté la décision qui suit sur la situation en GuinéeBissau:
Le Conseil,
1. Prend note du rapport de la Présidente de la Commission sur la situation en Guinée-Bissau [PSC/PR/2(CDXLII)], ainsi que de la communication faite par le représentant du Ghana, pays assurant la présidence en exercice de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO);
2. Rappelle ses communiqués et communiqués de presse antérieurs sur la situation
en Guinée-Bissau, à savoir le communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(CCCXVIII) adopté lors de
sa 318ème réunion tenue le 17 avril 2012, le communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM/1.
(CCCXIX) adopté lors de sa 319ème réunion tenue le 24 avril 2012, le communiqué
de presse PSC/PR/BR.2(CCCXL) adopté lors de sa 340ème réunion tenue le 2 novembre 2012, ainsi que les communiqués PSC/PR/COMM (CCCLI), PSC/PR/COMM.
(CCCLXI) et PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLXXII) adoptés lors de ses 351ème, 361ème et
372ème réunions tenues respectivement les 16 janvier, 22 mars et 26 avril 2013;
3. Réitère sa profonde appréciation à la Communauté économique des États de
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l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) pour le rôle crucial qu’elle a joué dans l’accompagnement du processus de sortie de crise en Guinée-Bissau. À cet égard, le Conseil rend
hommage aux Présidents Alassane Dramane Ouattara, Goodluck Jonathan et John
Dramani Mahama, ainsi qu’au Président de la Commission de la CEDEAO, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, pour leur implication personnelle dans les efforts visant à mener à
son terme le processus de transition;
4. Exprime également son appréciation à la Communauté des pays de Langue portugaise (CPLP), à l’Union européenne (UE), à l’Organisation internationale de la
Francophonie (OIF), aux Nations unies et aux partenaires bilatéraux concernés pour
leur accompagnement soutenu du processus de sortie de crise. Le Conseil félicite la
Commission, ainsi que le Représentant spécial de la Présidente de la Commission
pour leur contribution active à l’aboutissement de la transition;
5. Se réjouit de l’évolution positive de la situation en Guinée-Bissau, en particulier
la tenue réussie, les 13 avril et 18 mai 2014, des deux tours de l’élection présidentielle,
ainsi
que
de
l’organisation
des
élections
législatives;
6. Note avec satisfaction que le processus électoral a été reconnu comme ayant été
inclusif, transparent et crédible par les différentes missions d’observation électorale, y compris celle de l’UA, sous la conduite de l’ancien Président Joaquim Chissano du Mozambique. À cet égard, le Conseil exprime son appréciation au peuple,
ainsi qu’à l’ensemble des institutions et acteurs politiques bissau-guinéens, pour le
déroulement harmonieux et paisible des élections et pour le parachèvement du
processus de transition. Le Conseil félicite également l’ancien Président Joaquim
Chissano pour le rôle crucial qu’il a joué durant les élections, en particulier au lendemain du second tour de l’élection présidentielle;
7. Prend note de la proclamation, le 19 mai 2014, par la Commission nationale des
élections (CNE) de la Guinée-Bissau, des résultats définitifs du 2ème tour des élections présidentielles, félicite M. José Mario Vaz pour son élection comme nouveau
Président de la République de Guinée-Bissau, et exprime son appréciation à M. Nunu Gomes Nabiam pour avoir reconnu la victoire de son adversaire;
8. Décide, au regard de la conclusion du processus de transition et de la restauration de l’ordre constitutionnel, et conformément aux instruments pertinents de
l’UA, notamment la Charte africaine de la Démocratie, des Élections et de la Gouvernance, de lever la mesure de suspension de la participation de la Guinée-Bissau
aux activités de l’UA, tel que contenue au paragraphe 6 de son communiqué PSC/
PR/COMM(CCCXVIII), et invite la Guinée-Bissau à reprendre immédiatement sa participation aux activités de l’UA. Le Conseil appelle également les autres membres
concernés de la communauté internationale à lever toute sanction imposée à la
Guinée-Bissau;
9. Encourage le nouveau Président de la République de Guinée-Bissau et toutes les
parties prenantes bissau-guinéennes à travailler étroitement ensemble dans le
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cadre des institutions démocratiques du pays pour consolider les acquis importants
enregistrés. À cet égard, le Conseil souligne l’urgence que revêt une action soutenue pour relever les nombreux défis auxquels la Guinée-Bissau est confrontée, notamment la promotion de la réconciliation nationale et de la bonne gouvernance, y
compris la gestion des ressources naturelles du pays, le respect des droits de
l’homme, la lutte contre l’impunité et le trafic de drogue, la réforme du secteur de
la sécurité et le développement socio-économique;
10. Exhorte les forces armées à rompre définitivement avec les pratiques passées
d’ingérence dans la gestion du pays, et souligne avec force le devoir de loyauté qui
leur incombe vis-à-vis des autorités civiles démocratiquement élues et leur subordination aux autorités politiques;
11. Lance un appel pressant à la communauté internationale pour qu’elle poursuive
et renforce son appui à la Guinée-Bissau, y compris à travers la reprise rapide, le
cas échéant, de la coopération au développement et de l’assistance à la Guinée Bissau. À cet égard, le Conseil exhorte les États membres en mesure de le faire et les
partenaires internationaux tant bilatéraux que multilatéraux à saisir l’occasion de la
table ronde des donateurs prévue en fin 2014 pour apporter à la Guinée-Bissau le
soutien financier et économique dont elle a besoin;
12. Demande à la Commission de prendre toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour
mobiliser, au niveau du continent, un appui adéquat en faveur de la Guinée-Bissau,
y compris en inscrivant ce pays sur la liste des États bénéficiaires de l’Initiative de
solidarité africaine et en continuant à faciliter la coordination entre les organisations internationales concernées, notamment à travers des missions régulières
d’évaluation conjointes dans le prolongement de celles entreprises en décembre
2012 et juillet 2013;
13. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.
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Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa
440ème réunion tenue le 12 juin 2014, a adopté une décision sur la
situation au Soudan du Sud
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa
440ème réunion tenue le 12 juin 2014, a adopté la décision qui suit sur la situation
au Soudan du Sud:
Le Conseil:
1. Prend note de la déclaration faite le Commissaire de l'UA à la paix et à la sécurité et de la communication du Président de l’Equipe des Envoyés spéciaux de
l'Autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement (IGAD, Ambassadeur
Seyoum Mesfin. Le Conseil prend également note de la déclaration faite par le
représentant du Gouvernement de la République du Soudan du Sud, ainsi que
celles par les Nations unies, de l’Union européenne (UE) et des pays membres du
Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies : le Nigeria et le Rwanda, en leur capacité
de membres africains (A3) du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations unies, la France, le
Royaume Uni et les Etats Unis d’Amérique;
2. Rappelle ses communiqués et communiqués de presse antérieurs sur la situation au Soudan du Sud;
3. Félicite le Président de l'IGAD, le Premier Ministre Hailemariam Dessalegn, et
les autres dirigeants de la région pour leur engagement et leur détermination
soutenus à trouver une solution durable au conflit au Soudan du Sud. Le Conseil exprime également sa reconnaissance à l'Equipe de médiation de
l'IGAD, dirigée par l'Ambassadeur Seyoum Mesfin, et comprenant le Général Lazaro Sumbeiywo et le Général Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi, pour ses
efforts inlassables;
4. Note avec satisfaction les progrès réalisés dans l’opérationnalisation du Mécanisme de suivi et de vérification (MSV) de l'IGAD, y compris le déploiement des
équipes de suivi et de vérification (ESV) à Bentiu, Bor, Malakal et Nasser,
et attend avec intérêt le déploiement prévu des équipes du MSV sur vingt autres
sites. Le Conseil exhorte la Commission d’apporter le soutien nécessaire à cet
effet;
5. Note en outre avec satisfaction l'adoption par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, le 27 mai 2014, de la résolution 2155 (2014), prorogeant et renforçant le mandat et l’effectif de la Mission des Nations unies au Soudan du Sud
(MINUSS), y compris le déploiement de trois bataillons avec la responsabilité additionnelle d’assurer la protection du MSV de l'IGAD et de mettre en œuvre le
mandat global de la Mission. Le Conseil appelle les pays contributeurs de troupes
à la Force de protection prévue dans la résolution 2155(2014) à prendre toutes
les dispositions nécessaires en vue de faciliter le déploiement rapide des troupes
requises. Le Conseil exhorte également les Nations unies à prendre les mesures
nécessaires pour faciliter le déploiement de la Force de Protection. Le Con-
15
seil exige des Parties qu’elles facilitent immédiatement la mise en œuvre de, la
coopération avec, la MINUSS et sa Force de protection, ainsi que le MSV, dans l’accomplissement de leurs mandats respectifs;
6. Se félicite de la signature, à Addis Abéba, le 9 mai 2014, entre le Président Salva
Kiir Mayardit et le chef du SPLM/A (opposition), l’ancien Vice-Président Riek Machar, sous les auspices du Président de l'IGAD, le Premier Ministre Hailemariam
Dessalegn de l'Éthiopie, de l'Accord pour la résolution de la crise au Soudan du
Sud, y compris l’engagement à accélérer et à parachever le dialogue sur la formation d’un Gouvernement d’unité nationale de transition dans les soixante (60) jours
et à assurer le l’accès humanitaire sans entrave aux populations affectées. Le Conseil se félicite également de l’organisation, à Addis Abéba, les 6 et 7 juin 2014, du
symposium multi-parties prenantes pour lancer la phase inclusive du processus de
paix. Le Conseil note en outre avec satisfaction la libération de tous les détenus
politiques et leur participation au processus politique;
7. Exprime sa profonde préoccupation devant le fait qu’en dépit des engagements
pris par les Parties, aussi bien le Gouvernement que le SPLM/A (opposition) n'ont
pas réussi à faire avancer de manière significative le processus de paix et à mettre
fin aux massacres de civils innocents. À cet égard, le Conseil condamne fermement les violations persistantes et flagrantes des Accords de cessation des hostilités, tel que documenté par le MSV de l'IGAD, ainsi que les atrocités et les exactions
perpétrées par toutes les parties contre des civils innocents. Le Conseil réitère la
préoccupation de l’UA face à la terrible situation humanitaire et des droits de
l'homme qui prévaut au Soudan du Sud, du fait de l'incapacité des Parties à respecter leurs engagements;
8. Exige des Parties belligérantes qu’elles mettent fin immédiatement aux affrontements, d’honorer pleinement leurs engagements et de faire preuve de la volonté
politique nécessaire pour faire avancer le processus politique. À cet égard, le Conseil se félicite du communiqué adopté par la 26ème session extraordinaire de la Conférence des chefs d'État et de Gouvernement de l’IGAD sur la situation au Soudan
du Sud, tenue à Addis Abéba, le 10 juin 2014. Le Conseil réitère sa disposition, sur
recommandation de l’IGAD, à prendre immédiatement des sanctions ciblées et
autres mesures contre toute partie qui continue à agir contre la quête d’une solution au conflit et n’honore pas ses engagements;
9. Réaffirme la nécessité d’un processus de paix inclusif, afin de faciliter une solution durable à la crise, et souligne la nécessité pour toutes les Parties de s'abstenir
de toute action qui pourrait compromettre la recherche de l'inclusivité;
10. Se félicite des mesures déjà prises par la Commission d'enquête de l’UA sur les
violations des droits de l'homme et autres exactions perpétrées au cours du conflit
armé au Soudan du Sud. Le Conseil réitère son appel à toutes les Parties, afin
qu’elles apportent leur entière coopération à la Commission, et attend avec intérêt la soumission, en temps utile, de son rapport et de ses recommandations sur les
meilleurs moyens d'assurer l’obligation de rendre compte, la réconciliation et
16
l’apaisement entre tous les communautés sud-soudanaises;
11. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.
17
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 440th
meeting held in Addis Ababa, on 12 June 2014, adopted a decision
on the situation in South Sudan
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 440 th meeting held in
Addis Ababa, on 12 June 2014, adopted the following decision on the situation in
South Sudan:
Council:
1. Takes note of the statement made by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and the briefing provided by Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, the Chair of the
Team of Special Envoys of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD). Council also takes note of the statement made by the representative of
the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, as well as by those of the United
Nations (UN), the European Union (EU)and Nigeria and Rwanda in their capacity
as African members of the UN Security Council, France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States of America, in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council;
2. Recalls its earlier communiqués and press statements on the situation in
South Sudan;
3. Commends the IGAD Chairperson, Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn, and
the other leaders of the region for their continued commitment and determination in finding a lasting solution to the conflict in South Sudan. Council also expresses appreciation to the IGAD Mediation Team led by Ambassador Seyoum
Mesfin and comprising General Lazaro Sumbeiywo and General Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi, for its relentless efforts;
4. Notes with satisfaction the progress made in the operationalization of the
IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM), including the deployment
of the Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) to Bentiu, Bor, Malakal and Nasser, and looks forward to the planned deployment of MVTs in twenty other sites.
Council urges the Commission to provide the necessary support to this effect;
5. Further notes with satisfaction the adoption by the UN Security Council, on 27
May 2014, of resolution 2155 (2014) that extended and enhanced both the mandate and strength of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), including the deployment of three battalions with additional responsibility for protecting IGAD’s
MVM, as well as implementing the Mission’s overall mandate. Council calls
on the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to the protection force provided for in
resolution 2155 (2014) to take all necessary steps towards the expeditious deployment of the required troops. Council further urges the UN to take all necessary steps to facilitate the deployment of the protection force. Council demands that the Parties immediately facilitate the full implementation of,
and cooperation with, UNMISS and its protection force, as well as the MVM, in
18
the discharge of their respective mandates;
6. Welcomes the signing on 9 May 2014, in Addis Ababa, under the auspices of the
Chair of IGAD, Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia, of the Agreement
to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and the
leader of the SPLM/A (in opposition), former Vice President Riek Machar, including
the commitment to expedite and complete dialogue on the formation of a transitional Government of National Unity within sixty (60) days, as well as to ensure unhindered humanitarian access to the affected population. Council also welcomes the convening in Addis Ababa, on 6 and 7 June 2014, of the multistakeholders symposium to initiate the inclusive phase of the peace process. Council further notes with satisfaction the release of all the political detainees and their
participation in the political process;
7. Expresses its deep concern that, in spite of the commitments made by the Parties, both the Government and the SPLM/A in opposition have failed to meaningfully move forward the peace process and bring an end to the senseless killing of innocent civilians. In this respect, Council strongly condemns the continued and flagrant violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements, as documented by the
IGAD MVM, as well as the widespread atrocities and abuses committed by all sides
against innocent civilians. Council reiterates AU’s concern at the dire humanitarian
situation prevailing in South Sudan, as a result of the failure of the parties to live up
to their commitments;
8. Demands that the warring Parties immediately stop fighting, fully implement
their commitments and display the required political will to advance the political
process. In this respect, Council welcomes the communiqué adopted by the
26th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government
on the situation in South Sudan, held in Addis Ababa on 10 June 2014. Council reiterates its readiness, upon recommendation by IGAD, to immediately take
targeted sanctions and other measures against any party that continues to undermine the search for a solution to the conflict and fails to honor its commitments;
9. Reaffirms the need for the peace process to be inclusive in order to facilitate a
lasting solution to the crisis and stresses the need for all Parties to refrain from any
action that may undermine the search for inclusivity;
10. Welcomes the steps already taken by the AU Commission of Inquiry on South
Sudan in investigating human rights violations and other abuses committed during
the armed conflict. Council reiterates its call to all the Parties to extend full cooperation to the Commission, and looked forward to the submission, in due course, of
its report and recommendations on the best ways and means to ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities;
11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
19
L'Union Africaine condamne fermement le massacre perpétré par Alshabaab au Kenya
Addis Abéba, le 17 juin 2014 : La Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine
(UA), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, condamne fermement le massacre, par AlShabaab, de plus de 50 personnes dans la localité de Mpeketoni, près de la ville
côtière de Lamu, dans la nuit du 15 juin 2014.
La Présidente de la Commission exprime les sincères condoléances de l’UA aux familles endeuillées et souhaite un prompt rétablissement aux blessés. Elle réitère la
solidarité de l’UA avec le Gouvernement et le peuple du Kenya, ainsi que son soutien aux efforts que déploie le Gouvernement kenyan dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.
La Présidente de la Commission souligne que cette attaque horrible est une manifestation supplémentaire de la menace qu’Al-Shabaab et d'autres groupes terroristes font peser sur la paix, la sécurité et le développement sur le continent. Elle
met en exergue le fait qu’Al-Shabaab est non seulement l'ennemi des peuples somalien et kenyan, mais également un ennemi de l'Humanité et de tous les principes de paix et de tolérance auxquels l'Afrique est attachée.
La Présidente de la Commission félicite le Gouvernement et le peuple kenyans, ainsi que tous les autres pays contributeurs de troupes et de personnels de police à la
Mission de l’UA en Somalie (AMISOM), pour leur engagement indéfectible en appui
aux efforts de leurs frères et sœurs de la Somalie visant à lutter contre le terrorisme, à rétablir l’état de droit et à reconstruire leurs institutions étatiques.
20
La Présidente de la Commission réitère le rejet total par l'UA de toutes les formes
de terrorisme et d'extrémisme, et souligne que seule une action collective, concrète et coordonnée des États membres permettra de venir à bout de cette menace. À cet égard, elle rappelle que les instruments de l'UA de lutte contre le terrorisme constituent un cadre approprié de coopération pour la prévention et la lutte
contre le terrorisme. Elle exhorte les États membres à mettre pleinement en œuvre
les dispositions qui y sont contenues.
21
The African Union strongly condemns the massacre carried out by Alshabaab in Kenya
Addis Ababa, 17 June 2014: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, strongly condemns the massacre of over 50
people, by Al-Shabaab, in the town of Mpeketoni, near the Kenyan coastal city of
Lamu, on the night of 15 June 2014.
The Chairperson of the Commission expresses AU’s heartfelt condolences to the
bereaved families and wishes strength and speedy recovery to the wounded. She
reiterates AU’s solidarity with the Government and people of Kenya, and its support to the efforts of the Kenyan Government to combat the scourge of terrorism.
The Chairperson of the Commission emphasizes that this horrendous attack is yet
another testimony to the menace posed by Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups
to peace, security and development on the continent. She stresses that Al-Shabaab
is not only the enemy of the Somali and Kenyan peoples, but also an enemy of humanity and all principles of peace and tolerance that Africa is striving for.
The Chairperson commends the Government and people of Kenya, as well as all
other troops and police contributing countries to the AU Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) for their unwavering commitment to support their Somali brethren in
combating terrorism, restoring the rule of law and rebuilding their state institutions.
The Chairperson reiterates AU’s strong rejection of all forms of terrorism and extremism, and emphasizes that the only way to eliminate this menace is through
collective, concrete and coordinated action by all Member States. In this regard,
she recalls that the AU counter-terrorism instruments provide an ideal cooperative
22
framework for the prevention and combating of terrorism. She appeals to Member
States to fully implement the provisions contained therein.
23
L'Union Africaine se félicite de la libération du dirigeant politique Soudanais Sadiq Al-Mahdi: L'UA réitère son soutien à l'Initiative du Dialogue National
Addis Abéba, le 17 juin 2014: La Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine
(UA), Dr. Nkosozana Dlamini-Zuma, se félicite de la libération, le 15 juin 2014, de
l'ancien Premier ministre soudanais et Président du Parti national Umma, l’Imam
Sadiq Al-Mahdi. M. Al Mahdi avait été arrêté le 17 mai 2014, à la suite des déclarations publiques qu'il a faites au sujet du rôle de la Force de soutien rapide dans
la région du Darfour.
La Présidente de la Commission souligne que cette décision est un pas dans la
bonne direction qui contribuera à la création de conditions propices au bon déroulement de l'Initiative du dialogue national annoncée par le Président Omar
Hassan Al Bashir, en janvier 2014. Elle réitère l’appui de l’UA à cette Initiative, et
exhorte le Gouvernement de veiller à ce que les libertés et les droits fondamentaux des Soudanais soient protégés. Elle demande à tous les acteurs concernés de
s'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait compromettre le dialogue national envisagé
et de s'engager dans un processus transparent, inclusif et holistique qui permette
de promouvoir la stabilité, la démocratie et le développement dans la République
du Soudan.
La Présidente de la Commission réitère l'engagement continu de l'UA, à travers le
Groupe de haut niveau de l’UA, à appuyer le Gouvernement et le peuple du Soudan dans leurs efforts visant à relever, par le dialogue, les défis auxquels leur pays
est confronté.
24
The African Union welcomes the release of the Sudanese political
leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi: The AU reiterates its support to the National
Dialogue Initiative
Addis Ababa, 17 June 2014: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African
Union (AU), Dr. Nkosozana Dlamini-Zuma, welcomes the release of former Prime
Minister of Sudan and President of the National UMMA Party, Imam Sadiq AlMahdi, on 15 June 2014. Mr. Al Mahdi was arrested on 17 May 2014, following
public statements he made regarding the role of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in
the Darfur region.
The Chairperson of the Commission stresses that this decision is a step in the right
direction that will contribute to the creation of conditions conducive to the successful conduct of the National Dialogue Initiative announced by President Omar Hassan
Al Bashir in January 2014. She reiterates AU’s support to this Initiative, and appeals
to the Government to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people
of Sudan are protected. She calls on all concerned to desist from actions that would
threaten the proposed National Dialogue and to recommit to a transparent, inclusive
and holistic process that will ensure stability, democracy and development in the Republic of Sudan.
The Chairperson of the Commission reiterates the AU’s continued commitment,
through the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), to assist the Government and people of Sudan, in their efforts to address the challenges facing their
country through dialogue.
25
Terrorism in Africa
Terrorist plague' tops agenda at AU summit
June 27, 2014
Heads of State and officials attending AU summit. PHOTO/PPU
newvision
African leaders gathered Thursday for a summit dominated by fears over a rise in
extremist groups sowing terror across the continent.
From the Sahel to Nigeria, central and east Africa, armed Islamist groups carry out
attacks, kidnappings and chilling massacres on a near-daily basis on the continent.
This threat is increasingly drifting across porous borders, heard the summit in Malabo, also attended by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon who called for a "rapidly
operational peace and security structure".
"Africa is threatened by cross-border terrorism," said Egyptian President Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi, who took to the podium to thunderous applause as he marked his
country's comeback to continental politics in his first foreign trip.
26
"This common threat demands that we reinforce our cooperation," said Sisi, calling
on his peers to "firmly face up to this plague to preserve the dignity of our people
and economies."
Egypt was suspended from the AU bloc after Sisi toppled Islamist president Mohamed Morsi while he was army chief last July.
The two-day summit in Equatorial Guinea, sub-Saharan Africa's third largest oil producer, has as its official theme "Agriculture and Food Security."
However it has been hard to ignore the barrage of extremist attacks, which threaten to overshadow civil wars in Sudan and the Central African Republic.
In Nigeria's capital at least 21 people died in a bombing blamed on Islamist group
Boko Haram on Wednesday, adding to over 2,000 killed this year in an insurgency
which the government has been unable to curb.
Boko Haram's five-year terror campaign shot to worldwide attention after they kidnapped more than 200 schoolgirls in April.
The militants have also raised alarm in neighbouring Cameroon where they kidnapped 10 Chinese road workers in May, prompting the government to dispatch
3,000 troops to its porous border with Nigeria.
In the horn of Africa Somalia's Shebab rebels have launched attacks in Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti to punish them for sending troops to an AU force fighting its militants.
In September last year the group carried out its most high-profile attack to date -- a
suicide commando assault on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall that left at least 67
dead.
And in the Sahel, Mali is still recovering from the Islamist takeover of half the country and Ban called on armed groups there to "negotiate a lasting peace."
Africa facing 'new threats'
"These are new threats," a French diplomat told AFP on the sidelines of the summit.
"Before African crises were linked to coups d'etat, rebellions which could be fought
with conventional armies. The security apparatus is not complex enough to deal
with terrorism."
Leaders appear powerless in the face of the extremist juggernaut.
An African diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said despite these
threats, security cooperation between states was still in its infancy.
27
"Co-ordination between states is slow because they aren't all on the same wavelength. Some countries don't realise that the security question affects them too, or
prefer to avoid turning their back to jihadists."
The 54-nation AU's current chief, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, has urged his peers to put in place "effective mechanisms" to ensure peace.
The bloc's peace and security council has long floated plans to create an African
rapid response force to step in on erupting crises which more often than not in recent years have been stamped out by western nations intervening on the continent.
But implementation of this force remains chaotic, mostly for financial reasons, and
it is now expected to be in place by 2015.
France has sent thousands of troops to curb violence in former colonies Mali and
Central African Republic.
AFP
http://www.newvision.co.ug/
28
A MISTAKEN IDENTITY: MUSLIM RADICALISM AS A COMPLEX PHENOMENON –
ANALYSIS
JUNE 27, 2014
If the above premise holds true, the coming years promise a new and potentially
fruitful approach to mitigating the threat of ever-growing violent Muslim radicalism.
Muslims praying
First, some background
About a decade ago, the Afghanistan-Pakistan region was the main theatre of violent transnational Islamic radicalism. The phenomenon has spread far and wide,
despite the immense efforts of the United States and its allies. First, the AfPak region appears to be all set to revert to its pre-9/11 days; second, militant groups are
now operating in vast swaths of territory from the Middle East to North Africa.
Moreover, even the Western counties themselves are hardly free from terrorism
conducted by resident jihadists. Countries such as India, Israel, China, the Philippines and Thailand that border Muslim nations and have significant Muslim minorities are reeling under increasing attacks by home-grown Muslim radicals.
If these results are any indication, both the experts in the intelligence world who
drive policies and in the academia have failed to delineate the dominant causes
that drive Muslim radicalism. For instance, terrorism scholar Marc Sageman pointed out in 2013 that “overall, the same stale arguments about ‘how can
this [a terrorist incident] happen?’ are debated over and over again—with very
little new insight.” This could mean two possibilities: one, that the learned experts
have yet to comprehend this phenomenon and two, that the phenomenon itself
may be so complex that it is hardly driven by one or two dominant causes.
29
It appears that most experts in Western intelligence world are being made to focus
on short-term projects that put them at a disadvantage in taking a long-view of the
phenomenon. Moreover, as Sageman notes, they usually lack a high-end analytical
background. However, the experts in academia, typically PhDs in political science,
may have a different shortcoming. Recently, questions have been raised about the
quality and relevance of academic scholarship, with a well-respected political scientist noting that “[p]olitical science Ph.D.’s often aren’t prepared to do real-world
analysis.”
The Underlying Simplicity
While the conventional wisdom holds that the radicalization process is “complex,” I
am positing that such a characterization is unwarranted for the following reasons:
Violence conduced in the name of Islam is preponderant compared to other religions; almost always, this radicalism invokes sharia and armed jihad; this violence
transcends, ethno-cultural, linguistic, geographic and income fault-lines.
The above universality suggests that specific religion based causes or processes are
behind the modern phenomenon called Muslim radicalism. The extent of its spread
suggests that these processes could not be complex and that they are likely to be
simple to the extent that, many Muslims understand and identify with them.
One might wonder why this phenomenon has taken off only recently, rather than,
say, four decades ago. There are two main reasons. First, only since the late 1970s,
the birth place of Islam, Saudi Arabia, has apparently spent well over 100 billion
dollars to spreadsharia and armed jihad emphasizing Wahhabism around the
world. Second, the worldwide training of Muslim activists in armed conflicts
stemmed from some of their participation in the following event: the Afghan jihad
of the 1980s, directed at countering the Soviet occupation of Muslim-majority Afghanistan.
Toward Developing Science of Muslim Radicalism
What could be the basis of such “simple” processes?
A starting point could be the realization that almost all of the Muslim militant
groups around the world are purportedly fighting to institute sharia as the governing law of Muslims. Sharia, the Islamic legal system or, more broadly, a religiously
sanctioned “code of conduct” is a prominent feature of Islam. The Muslim holy
book, the Quran, does not directly mention sharia; rather, it is a legal system based
upon an interpretation of Islam. Hence, in a community where sharia is popular, an
outlook can take hold that views sharia-based governance as an appealing and
plausible ideological alternative to modernity in many walks of life.
Naturally, due to their perceived command of religious knowledge, clerical interpretations of sharia hold sway. Moreover, a recent study conducted in India shows
that the Muslim minorities have been more personally influenced by their clerics
than the Hindu majority by its religious leaders. Thus, it is in the self-serving inter-
30
est of clerics to promote sharia as all-embracing divine law. For instance, the 2008
All India Anti-Terrorism Conference, attended by thousands of Sunni clerics in India, called upon Muslims “to spend their lives in the country following Islamic sharia and [Islam’s] teachings with full confidence.”
However, flip side of a broad definition of what constitutes sharia law is that it has
materialized in the form of rampant, contradictory and confusing (sharia-derived)
injunctions called fatwas, usually delivered by clerics. Along these lines, some of
the most authentic and influential calls that invoked armed jihad, too, have emanated from clerics. A disturbing trend is that in communities where sharia is popular, the so-called jihadist clerics (the subset of clerics who espouse armed jihad) are
sought out for their expertise on sharia. Besides, jihadist clerics such as Saeed Mohammed, chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba, has cleverly placed himself at the forefront of
the call for implementing more sharia laws in sharia-popular Pakistan and this
platform has helped him to publicly advocate for armed jihad. Moreover, militants
are able to extract fatwas from jihadist clerics to suit their violent causes.
The heart of developing science of a phenomenon lies in outlining a testable hypothesis followed by its validation. With that in mind I have proposed the following
hypothesis:Sharia’s popularity forms a platform for jihadist clerics and militant
groups to advance a violent agenda. While I invite the interested readers to read
the forthcoming article, I provide below the essence of this scholarship.
Data from Pakistan show that the growing clerical influence there correlated with
sharia’s popularity. This is also true of the subset of jihadist clerics and militant
groups vis-à-vis sharia. This hypothesis also consistently explains the radicalization
process underway in Muslim minority communities in the United Kingdom and India. Moreover, much reduced extent of radicalization found in Turkey is correlated
with the reduced popularity of clerics and sharia there. This study also suggests
that sharia-empowered clerics stifle socioeconomic development by overemphasizing religion at the expense of modern education.
The Need for a Paradigm Shift
This analysis has policy implications. Instead of ad hoc policies such as countering
the extremist narratives that emphasize interpretations of jihad in an armed context, efforts should mainly focus on countering the self-serving clerical narratives of
sharia as all-embracing divine law, thereby, clearing the way for Muslim communities to govern themselves and develop their societies by embracing modernity.
In a broad sense, this calls for a strategy similar to the one used to counter—as part
of the Cold War—the ideological basis of the former Soviet Communism, with an
understanding that undercutting the influence of sharia also helps promote religious freedom and human rights of those under its spell.
(The views expressed are author’s own)
31
(The author is a U.S.-based nuclear physicist. Dr. Muthuswamy is the author
of Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War; email: [email protected])
http://www.eurasiareview.com/
32
LifeView: 2014 Global Peace Index
Contributed by admin on Jun 18, 2014 - 04:03 PM
Seven year trend in violence overturns 60 years of increasing peacefulness
New model identifies countries at risk of descending into violence and unrest
The ten countries most likely to deteriorate in peace in the next two years
are
Zambia,
Haiti,Argentina,
Chad,
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina,Nepal, Burundi, Georgia, Liberia and Qatar
Global violence impacted the global economy by US$9.8 trillion or 11.3% of GDP
in the last year, an increase of US$179 billion YOY, through upward revisions
of China's military expenditure and the number and intensity of internal conflicts
Syria displaces Afghanistan as the world's least peaceful nation
while Icelandmaintains its status as the most peaceful country in the world
Georgia showed the largest improvement in peace levels, while South Sudanexperienced the largest drop and now ranks as the third least peaceful country
LONDON, June 18, 2014 /CNW/ - Terrorist activity, the number of conflicts
fought, and the number of refugees and displaced persons were the key contributors to the continuing deterioration in global peacefulness last year. This confirms
a seven year gradual, but significant downward slide, which overturns a 60-year
trend of increasing global peacefulness dating back to the end of the Second
World War.
The economic impact of containing and dealing with the consequences of global
33
violence last year was estimated to be US$9.8 trillion, according to the latest Global Peace Index (GPI) released today. This is equivalent to 11.3% of global
GDP - equal to twice the size of the 54 countries in the African economy.
Steve Killelea, founder and Executive Chairman of the IEP, observed, "Many macro factors have driven the deterioration in peace over the last seven years including
the continued economic repercussions of the Global Financial Crisis, the reverberations of the Arab Spring, and the continued spread of terrorism. As these effects
are likely to continue into the near future; a strong rebound in peace is unlikely.
"This is resulting in very real costs to the world economy; increases in the global
economic impact of violence and its containment are equivalent to 19% of global
economic growth from 2012 to 2013. To put this in perspective, this is
around $1,350 per person. The danger is that we fall into a negative cycle: low economic growth leads to higher levels of violence, the containment of which produces lower economic growth."
The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), which produces the report, has also
developed new statistical modelling techniques to identify the 10 countries most
threatened by increased levels of unrest and violence in the next two years. These
models have a 90% historical accuracy. Countries with higher levels of risk include
Zambia,
Haiti,
Argentina,
Chad,
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina, Nepal, Burundi, Georgia, Liberia and World Cup 2022 host Qatar.
The new methodology analyses a data set stretching back to 1996, and compares
countries with the performance of states with similar institutional characteristics.
"What is transformational in this analysis is our ability to compare a country's current level of peace with the potential for it to increase or decrease in violence in
the future. A country's potential for peace is shaped by many positive factors including sound institutions, well-functioning government, low levels of corruption
and a pro-business environment which we call the Pillars of Peace. These models
are revolutionary for assessing country risk; positive peace factors tend to align
over longer periods of time with actual levels of violence thereby allowing real predictive accuracy," said Steve Killelea.
"Given the deteriorating global situation we cannot be complacent about the institutional bedrocks for peace: our research shows that peace is unlikely to flourish
without deep foundations. This is a wakeup call to governments, development
agencies, investors and the wider international community that building peace is
the prerequisite for economic and social development."
In the IEP's current assessment, Cote d'Ivoire recorded the second biggest improvement in the GPI 2014 with reductions in the likelihood of violent demonstrations and in the number of displaced persons, while the largest improvement occurred in Georgia, as it gradually returns to normality following its 2011 conflict
with Russia.
34
The most peaceful region of the world continues to be Europe while the least
peaceful region is South Asia. Afghanistan has been displaced at the bottom of the
index by Syria due to a slight improvement in its peace while Syria continued to deteriorate. South Sudan experienced the largest drop in the index this year falling to
160th and now ranking as the third least peaceful country. Major deteriorations also
occurred in Egypt, Ukraine and Central African Republic.
OTHER REGIONAL HIGHLIGHTS
Europe once again leads the world in terms of its overall levels of peace, with the
Scandinavian countries performing particularly well. The top five positions remain
unchanged from 2013. Most of the improvements in peace are in the Balkans, an
area that has traditionally been the most turbulent in the region.
North America's score deteriorates slightly, mostly on account of a rise in terrorist
activity in the US, related to the Boston-marathon attack in April 2013. The region
retains its position as the second-most peaceful in the world, largely on account
of Canada's score.
The Asia-Pacific region remains among the most peaceful in the world: it ranks
third, behind Europe and North America, and suffers only a very modest deterioration from its 2013 score. The Philippines saw a deterioration in its 'relations with
neighbouring countries' score on the back of tensions with China relative to the
South China Sea dispute. Countries in the Indochina sub-region, as well as North
Korea, continue to be at the bottom of the region. In contrast, New Zealand, Japan, Australia, Singapore and Taiwan all rank in the top 30.
South America scores slightly above the global average, with the strongest improvements coming from Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay. In contrast Uruguay,
which retains its position as the region's most peaceful country, sees its score deteriorate as a result of a rise in the number of police and security forces. Internal tensions underline the trends in the two lowest-scoring countries in the region, Colombia and Venezuela.
Peace in Central America and the Caribbean remains challenging, but the region
manages to improve slightly compared to its 2013 score and ranks only slightly below the global average. Jamaica and Nicaragua are the biggest improvers through
improvements in their domestic safety and security scores. Mexico, which continues to be mired in a vicious drug war, falls slightly due to an increase in the number
of internal security officers.
Sub-Saharan Africa sees the second largest deterioration in the regional scores but
still fares better than Russia and Eurasia, Middle-East and North Africa as well
as South Asia. Four out of the ten countries with the largest negative score changes
come from this region, topped by South Sudan and the Central African Republic.
Russia and Eurasia shows a modest improvement in the rankings, and benefits
from positive score changes from all but four of the twelve states in the region. Un-
35
doubtedly, the key event in the region is the crisis between Russia and Ukraine.
This caused both Ukraineand Russia's performance in domestic and international
conflict to tumble. Russia remains the least peaceful country in the region and one
of the poorest performers globally, ranking 152nd.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains in the headlines as numerous
conflicts stemming from the Arab Spring continue to escalate. Egypt and Syria are,
unsurprisingly, the two countries that see their overall scores deteriorate most,
with Egyptsuffering the second-steepest decline globally.
South Asia remains at the bottom of the overall regional rankings; however its
score did improve more substantially than any other region. All countries in South
Asia improved their overall scores, especially their domestic peace. The recent elections in Afghanistan proceeded without major incident in early April, with its political terror score improving, however being partly offset by increased terrorist activity and military expenditure. Other improvements are in the levels of political terror, as well as in the number of refugees and displaced people inSri
Lanka and Bhutan.
NOTES TO EDITORS
GPI report, video, and
www.visionofhumanity.org
interactive
maps
are
available
at
http://
Twitter: https://twitter.com/GlobPeaceIndex (#peaceindex)
Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/globalpeaceindex
About the Global Peace Index
The GPI is the world's leading measure of global peacefulness produced by
the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). It gauges on-going domestic and international conflict, safety and security in society, and militarisation in 162 countries
by taking into account 22 indicators.
About the Institute for Economics and Peace
IEP is an international and independent think tank dedicated to shifting the world's
focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being
and progress.
About the Risk Assessment Models
A number of country risk models have been developed by IEP based on its unique
data sets. These models measure peace and violence in order to assess the relative
probability of countries deteriorating or improving in peace. The output of these
models proved to have good predictive capabilities when compared against history.
Using a combination of two models Ukraine, Syria and Egypt were all identified as
being in the top 20 countries at risk in 2008. IEP's model has, on average, a 90%
predictive validity in identifying the ten countries most likely to deteriorate in
36
peace in the ensuing two years. The validation was run for five two-year periods
from 2006 to 2010.
http://www.northumberlandview.ca/
37
DRC
Dossier spécial: Sur les traces du Djihad islamique en RDC?
17 juin 2014
Depuis quelques jours, l’information faisant état de la présence des combattants
islamistes Al-Shabaab aux côtés des rebelles ougandais de l’ADF/Nalu au NordKivu font les choux gras des médias et ne cessent d’alimenter, avec son lot
d’émotions et fantasmes de tout genre, les échanges dans les différents fora et
arènes sociaux et politiques congolais. Cette analyse revue est une mise à jour
d’une analyse publiée en juillet 2012 où j’alertais l’opinion sur les menaces islamiques en RDC. Elle faisait suite à une publication de 2011 d’une autre analyse
intitulée : « La RDC, otage des enjeux géostratégiques », reprise en janvier 2013
par lepotentielonline.com. Plusieurs lecteurs m’ont interpellé en privé pour la republier à la suite des récentes informations faisant état de la présence des milices
fondamentalistes musulmans d’Al-Shabaab aux côtés des rebelles ougandais de
l’ADF/Nalu installés dans le nord-est de la RD Congo.
1. Introduction
Les relations internationales présentent actuellement quatre axes stratégiques :
la crise économique mondiale et la recherche de nouveaux pôles d’expansion économique;
les rivalités grandissantes entre les Grandes puissances occidentales et les puis-
38
sances émergentes : BRICS (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine, Afrique du Sud) ;
les guerres civiles qui deviennent régionales comme au Pakistan, dans le Sahel,
dans la corne de l’Afrique et dans la région des Grands-Lacs africains ;
les menaces terroristes, en ce compris les menaces nucléaires.
Par son immensité, par sa situation géographique comme carrefour des différentes
régions d’Afrique subsaharienne, et en l’absence de tout contrôle étatique efficace,
la RDC est à la fois une passerelle et un sanctuaire pouvant offrir aux groupes mafieux et terroristes des facilités logistiques étendues : Commerce illicite des matières premières, carrefour d’intérêts économiques et énergétiques des pays de
tous bords Afrique-Europe-Amérique-Asie, trafic de drogue; la traite des humains,
zone potentielle de ravitaillement pour les organisations maffieuses et terroristes,
espace d’acheminement de combattants, de fonds et d’armes vers différents
théâtres de conflits, etc. Le constat qui s’est dégagé c’est que la RDC reste encore
le foyer de nombreux conflits qui fragilisent sérieusement la région d’Afrique Centrale et dont les conséquences pourraient engendrer l’insécurité sur le plan international.
Un état des lieux sociopolitique qui rend possible l’extension des connexions d’AlQaeda (Al-Shabaab), du Hezbollah libano-iranien et qui présenterait le danger de
voir la RDC se transformer rapidement en sanctuaire d’approvisionnement rêvé des
groupes terroristes. D’autant plus que la RDC est actuellement marquée par un
cocktail de facteurs qui alimentent une conflictualité « à fleur de peau »:
La fragilité du système politique et démocratique accentuée par des élections présidentielle et législatives ratées de 2011;
la faiblesse et/ou effondrement des institutions étatiques (Armée, Justice, Police,
administration publique;
la pauvreté accrue et endémique, criminalité transfrontalière par l’inflation des
groupes armés économiques ; convoitises des ressources naturelles par les pays
voisins de la sous-région et par certaines puissances émergentes, mouvements rebelles ou autres mouvements terroristes…
l’instrumentalisation des différends ethniques et fonciers qui engendrent les conflits armés à l’Est de la RDC ; mauvaise répartition des richesses malgré les performances de la croissance économique, disparités sociales : sources d’antagonismes
et tensions ethniques, lutte pour le contrôle des ressources naturelles et énergétiques, ainsi que la criminalisation des circuits économiques et financiers couplée
de la paupérisation accrue des populations.
Bref, la RDC, apparaît aujourd’hui comme le berceau de l’insécurité et risque de
devenir l’îlot de beaucoup de fléaux du monde et le terreau de beaucoup de problèmes. En d’autres termes, le monde entier cherche à accéder aux richesses et
ressources naturelles congolaises, cela ne semble pas étonnant que les pays émer-
39
gents comme la Chine et des mouvements tels qu’Al-Qaeda ou Hezbollah trouvent
également en RDC, un terreau fertile pouvant leur servir d’un fond de commerce
rentable, car exploitable à moindre coût du fait :
de l’accès facile à ses ressources naturelles facilement exploitables ;
des nouveaux gisements de pétrole découverts au nord-est, dans une zone comprise entre la RDC, l’Ouganda et le Soudan ;
de la porosité de ses frontières ; notamment dans sa partie nord orientale où ces
derniers temps l’on signale une certaine alliance entre la rébellion ougandaise ADF/
Nalu et les miliciens islamiques de Al Sabaab. Ce qui conforte notre crainte avancée
il y a deux ans.
de la déficience de l’Etat (et surtout de l’autorité de l’Etat) en tant que principal
acteur régulateur de l’ordre social, politique, économique et sécuritaire.
2. La RD Congo, zone géostratégique névralgique mais chaotique
La RDC est une « zone névralgique » qui se trouve au centre des enjeux géostratégiques et géopolitiques considérables, grâce à ses innombrables ressources naturelles et énergétiques susceptibles de soutenir à la fois les économies des «
Grandes puissances et des puissances émergentes» et celles du « terrorisme international ». En effet, la RDC est un pays de la taille de l’ensemble des pays de l’Europe occidentale réunis et a une population estimée à 65 millions d’habitants. C’est
un pays qui est scandaleusement riche en matières premières essentielles pour la
production mondiale d’une très large gamme de produits. Son sous-sol, ses ressources, sont depuis plus de trois siècles enviés, convoités, spoliés et récupérés. Le
pays possède environ 33% des gisements mondiaux de cobalt, 10% de cuivre, le
tiers de la réserve mondiale du diamant, de grands gisements d’uranium, étain,
zinc, manganèse, or ainsi que d’autres matières premières dont au moins trois
quarts des ressources mondiales de coltan (colombo-tantalite), une composante
primaire essentielle à la fabrication des téléphones mobiles, laptops et autres équipements électroniques. La RDC participe comme le Brésil à l’équilibre écosystémique du monde. On y trouve également des nouveaux gisements de pétrole découverts au Nord-Est, dans une zone (Le Graben Albertine situé dans la chaîne des
volcans du Parc national de Virunga) comprise entre la RDC, l’Ouganda et le SudSoudan. En effet, les provinces des Kasai, des Kivu, Orientale et du Katanga sont les
réservoirs de stockage géologique de certains les minéraux stratégiques, d’importance mondiale. La frontière orientale située à cheval sur le Rwanda et l’Ouganda,
dans une zone qui s’étend des plateaux des Grands-Lacs à la vallée du Rift, est estimée par les géologues comme l’un des plus riches dépôts de minéraux sur la surface de la terre.
Malgré toute cette richesse, le PIB par habitant est aujourd’hui de 136 $ soit environ 1/25 de ce qu’elle était au moment de l’indépendance en 1960. Non seulement
40
ces ressources n’ont à ce jour bénéficié au peuple congolais ; mais aussi, c’est la
présence de ces ressources très convoitées qui ont transformé le pays en un champ
de batailles depuis son indépendance en 1960 à nos jours.
« Chaque jour, dans l’est du Congo, sept à dix avions, chargés chacun de deux
tonnes de cassitérite, vont de Mubi a Goma, d’où le minerai est passé illégalement
par-delà la frontière rwandaise. Le trafic d’or, de diamant, de cuivre et de cobalt ne
connait pas non plus de ralentissement. » Telles sont les conclusions rapport du
groupe d’experts des Nations-Unies publié en automne 2010. « L’état congolais ne
touche presque rien des profits générés par cette contrebande. Mais il semble que
très peu de choses aient été entreprises pour combattre le pillage prolongé des ressources minières congolaises. Les mineurs – il y en a plusieurs dizaines de milliers –
en restent les principales victimes. »
3. Analyse factuelle et conjonturelle des menaces terroristes au départ de la RDC
Il m’ paru une fois de plus important de rappeler la théorie de Buzan, politologue et
polémologue britannique, qui dans un ouvrage intitulé : « People, State and Fear :
An agenda for international security studies in de Post-Cold War Era », évoquera la
nécessité d’appliquer le concept de sécurité à d’autres domaines tels que le politique, l’économique, le sociétal et l’environnement. En effet, selon Buzan, on ne
peut parler de la sécurité sans lui associer trois réalités que sont : l’Etat, l’individu
et le système international. Le lien entre les trois, selon lui, est que la sécurité de
l’individu et du système international dépend de celle des Etats. De même, la sécurité des Etats et celle du système international dépendent aussi des individus (dont
les autorités politiques), puisque ce sont eux, qui peuvent le déstabiliser à travers
l’organisation des mouvements de contestations, des rébellions et autres actes
subversifs ou terroristes. De l’analyse de cette théorie ressort l’idée de l’existence
des liens d’interdépendance entre l’individu (responsable politique ou citoyen),
l’Etat et le système international. D’où sa thèse : « la création d’Etats plus forts
(stables) est une condition nécessaire, à la fois pour la sécurité nationale, pour
la sécurité individuelleet pour la sécurité internationale ».
La faillite des institutions publiques, les conflits armés, la mal gouvernance comme
facteurs de la montée de l’intégrisme islamique et de l’implantation du terrorisme
La conjugaison des éléments susmentionnés rendent difficiles la surveillance et la
sécurisation des frontières nationales congolaises. Ces manquements les rendent
particulièrement perméables, et de ce fait, vulnérables. C’est ainsi que sont facilitées toutes formes de trafics et d’activités illicites ouvrant la porte aux développements des activités criminelles aux frontières et à l’intérieur de la RDC.
Dans une étude originale sur la « criminalisation de l’Etat en Afrique », JeanFrançois Bayart, Stephen Ellis et Béatrice Hibou soutiennent que les autorités politiques africaines sont de plus en plus interconnectées avec les milieux de la criminalité sur le continent africain, de blanchiment des capitaux sales. Ce qui prédit un
41
avenir sombre pour l’Afrique du fait du terrorisme international latent. (Gérard
Prunier, Une poudrière au cœur du Congo-Kinshasa – Le Monde Diplomatique, juillet 1998, Page 14). Selon ces auteurs, l’Afrique, singulièrement, la RDC pourrait
éventuellement avoir un rôle central dans le développement du terrorisme international. Le pays présente à la fois un environnement favorable et un vaste champ
d’action pour tous ceux qui voudraient s’attaquer à l’ordre hégémonique occidental du système mondial.
Les craintes de cette menace se situent également au niveau du ralliement par les «
Mollahs » des populations vulnérables, à la doctrine chiite. Certes la RDC est en
majorité constituée des populations chrétiennes, mais la pauvreté grandissante, la
crise économique, le chômage qui touche près de 80% des jeunes, sont des facteurs à faciliter l’endoctrinement. En effet, depuis quelques années, les Mollahs
iraniens et les sympathisants du Hezbollah libanais écument les quartiers pauvres
des villes africaines afin de recruter des « futurs kamikazes ». Et la faillite de l’autorité de l’Etat, incapable de contrôler les 9.000 km de frontières avec les pays voisins, laisse dubitatif et ne rassure surtout pas quant à la capacité de ce pays de contrer cette menace qui se fait de plus en plus pressante. (Martin Lutter MBitta, Radio
Kan-Kan.com Guinée, 25/02/2010).
A titre d’illustration, d’où cette mise à jour de la présente analyse qui nous donne
raison, aujourd’hui dans la partie septentrionale de la RDC, à la frontière avec le
Soudan et le long de la frontière ougandaise, des maquis originaires de ces pays se
sont implantés, profitant de l’absence presque totale de contrôle du régime de
Kinshasa sur la région pour opérer en toute impunité contre le pouvoir ougandais.
C’est le cas de l’Alliance des forces démocratiques (Alliance of Democratic Forces,
ADF), une guérilla multiethnique à dominante fondamentaliste musulmane, mal
enracinée dans la région frontalière où elle opère, qui préfère donc s’appuyer sur
ses bases arrière au Congo en formant (ADF/Nalu). Elle y survit en bonne partie
grâce à l’appui du régime islamiste soudanais d’Omar Al-Bashir accusé le président
ougandais, Yoweri Museveni, de soutenir les mouvements de guérilla ougandais
écumant au Nord-Est du Congo.
C’est ainsi, à titre préventif et afin de prendre le taureau par les cornes en vue de
renforcer les capacités de défense et la sécurité dans la partie nord-est de la RDC,
les Etats-Unis ont décidé de déployer leurs soldats dans cette zone. Le président
Barack Obama y a expédié une centaine des soldats très bien équipés pour être déployés en RCA, en RDC, en Ouganda et au Sud-Soudan. Officiellement pour appuyer
ces pays à mieux combattre la LRA et de traquer son chef Joseph Kony. Ce groupe
armé ougandais qui sème l’insécurité dans ces pays. Ces militaires, selon la lettre
du président américain au Congrès serviront de conseillers près les Etats susmentionnés afin de fournir des informations de première nécessité en vue de neutraliser les éléments de la LRA, et n’interviendront qu’en cas de légitime défense. Pour
une mission similaire, des forces spéciales guatémaltèques avaient essuyé un re-
42
vers. Officiellement, cette prise de position américaine serait une réponse à une
recommandation du sommet de Libreville d’octobre 2011 sur la paix et la sécurité
en Afrique centrale, visant à renforcer par un appui militaire la MONUSCO en vue
d’en finir avec la LRA. En réalité, les observateurs avisés estiment que cette implication américaine n’est pas étrangère à la volonté affichée de ce pays d’intensifier la
lutte contre le terrorisme international dont l’Afrique des Grands-Lacs, singulièrement la RDC, constitue le talon d’Achille, suite à la porosité de ses frontières et la
mobilité dense des matières premières illégalement exploitées, des armes et de la
drogue. Cette présence militaire est entre autre consécutive aux menaces islamiques qui pèsent sur le Sud-Soudan, à majorité chrétienne et animiste, dernier
Etat d’accéder à son indépendance et admis à l’ONU.
L’inquiétant rapprochement entre la RDC et la République Islamique d’Iran
Téhéran a toujours maintenu secrètement des relations avec les mouvements terroristes étrangers de manière à pouvoir les utiliser à son profit. Cependant, les
preuves formelles restent rares. En 1995, une conférence secrète aurait eu lieu en
Iran sous l’égide des Gardiens de la Révolution (Pasdaran). Elle a rassemblé des représentants des mouvements terroristes suivants : l’Armée rouge japonaise, l’Armée secrète arménienne, le PKK, le parti irakien Dawah, le Font islamique de libération du Bahrain et le Hezbollah libanais. Le but poursuivi à l’époque était la déstabilisation des Etats du Golfe persique. Téhéran aurait alors proposé son aide à ces
différents mouvements, notamment en matière d’entraînement. Aujourd’hui, Téhéran utilise surtout le Hezbollah libanais, mais aurait également des contacts avec
des nouveaux groupes islamiques qui pullulent en Afrique de l’Ouest.
Bien qu’il s’en défende, l’Iran peut également fournir un appui logistique à des activistes à l’étranger, grâce à ses nombreuses représentations diplomatiques, culturelles ou même des ONG. On constate avec curiosité que partout où des changements politiques ont amené au pouvoir des responsables hostiles aux Etats-Unis –
tout particulièrement en Amérique latine – les représentations diplomatiques iraniennes ont été considérablement renforcées sans que les échanges politiques,
économiques ou culturels avec ces Etats ne le justifie. Washington soupçonne Téhéran de mettre en fait en place un réseau logistique destiné à nuire aux EtatsUnis, peut-être en utilisant l’arme du terrorisme.
Le terrorisme est un moyen de combat au même titre que la guérilla. Téhéran a
montré dans le passé qu’à défaut d’armes de destruction massive, il ne répugnait
pas à recourir au terrorisme d’Etat car c’est en quelque sorte « l’arme du faible
contre le fort» dans la guerre dite asymétrique. L’Iran en a les moyens humains,
techniques et pratiques grâce à ses réseaux qui couvrent une grande partie de la
planète. Si un bras de fer sévère s’engage vraiment entre les Occidentaux et la république théocratique, il est très probable que des opérations terroristes seront
déclenchées comme moyen de rétorsion. L’identification formelle du commanditaire sera difficile à faire car les services iraniens sont passés maîtres dans le do-
43
maine du brouillage de pistes en utilisant des mouvements qui servent d’écrans de
dissimulation. La dernière affaire de tentative d’assassinat d’ambassadeur saoudien
aux Etats-Unis en 2012 en est une illustration.
Pour ce qui est des rapports diplomatiques de l’Iran avec la RDC, les analystes sont
impressionnés par le nombre des ballets diplomatiques déployés ces derniers
temps entre la RDC et la République islamique d’Iran. Déjà en début 2010, une importante délégation de parlementaires iraniens a séjourné en RDC. Conduits alors
par le député Hamid Reza Haji Babaei, les membres de la délégation, ont été chaleureusement accueillis par les autorités congolaises. Officiellement il s’agissait
d’une visite amicale sur invitation des députés de la RDC. Mais selon certaines indiscrétions, au-delà du caractère amical mentionné par les autorités locales, cette
visite serait une mission de reconnaissance, d’autant plus que le pays des Ayatollahs s’entête à s’enrichir de l’uranium dont le Congo dispose à profusion, à même
le sol.
Les dessous de la visite : L’ambassadeur plénipotentiaire d’Iran, Hamib Reza Ghomi
qui accompagnait la délégation des parlementaires iraniens rencontrer les
membres du gouvernement congolais a déclaré à cette occasion que Téhéran était
disposé à «accompagner la RDC dans sa phase de redressement ». L’Iran utiliserait
le canal de la coopération pour assurer son entrée dans le pays et profiter de cette
importante richesse minière. En effet le « réchauffement des relations » entre les
deux pays intervient au moment où Téhéran malgré les menaces de sanctions de
l’Onu multiplie des recherches de partenariats pour l’enrichissement de l’uranium
afin de se doter du nucléaire. Il faut relever que le programme nucléaire iranien,
dont des installations clandestines avaient été découvertes en 2002, est soupçonné
par la communauté internationale de comporter un volet militaire visant à doter la
République islamique d’une bombe atomique. Arguments dont ne cessent de réfuter les autorités iraniennes qui assurent que ce programme d’enrichissement est
exclusivement réservé à l’usage civil. Téhéran précise que son objectif est de développer la capacité de production de l’énergie nucléaire de 6.000 MW d’électricité
dans le pays.
De plus, cette présence des parlementaires iraniens en RDC qui dispose d’uranium
naturellement enrichi, était loin de rassurer la communauté internationale. Une
visite qui pour certains analystes permettait de « baliser le chemin » au pouvoir de
Téhéran qui par le biais de la coopération pourrait profiter des faiblesses structurelles du pays pour se doter de cet uranium. L’inquiétude est grandissante dans la
mesure où la seule mine d’uranium de la RDC, située à Shinkolobwe dans la province du Katanga et officiellement fermée depuis 1960, est régulièrement investie
par des groupes mafieux. Et l’Iran ne serait pas à sa première tentative d’extorsion
de l’uranium congolais. En août 2006, le célèbre journal britannique le Sunday
Times avait révélé qu’une importante cargaison d’uranium 238 en provenance de la
RDC à destination de l’Iran avait été saisie en Tanzanie. L’information avait été dé-
44
mentie par les autorités iraniennes et congolaises. L’Agence Internationale de
l’Energie Atomique (AIEA) a ouvert une enquête à ce sujet. Selon certains experts,
l’uranium 238 sorti en contrebande à destination de l’Iran aurait bénéficié de l’implication de l’Iran, de la Corée du nord dans le secteur de l’uranium du Congo et
des cellules terroristes et dormantes iraniennes au Congo.
En retour de l’ascenseur, l’ancien président de l’Assemblée Nationale congolaise
sous la législature écoulée, Evariste Boshab, s’est rendu à son tour en visite officielle en Iran le 22 février 2010. Une visite qui selon les analystes spécialisés, dont
le quotidien congolais proche du pouvoir, mettent en rapport avec la vente d’uranium dont est accusée la RDC. (L’Avenir Quotidien 20/04/2010). Le dialogue entre
pays, a fait savoir Evariste Boshab est plus important que tout dans la vie des nations. Le quotidien iranien, Tehra Times, rapportait les déclarations suivantes du
président iranien Mahmoud Ahmadinejad : « l’Iran et la RDC devraient conjuguer
leurs efforts à contrer les puissances hégémoniques à imposer leur volonté aux nations. (…) L’Iran et le Congo ont le potentiel de devenir des pays avancés et pays
puissants dans le monde (…) Les puissances occidentales fournissent de grands
efforts pour empêcher l’avancement des pays indépendants et recourent aux pressions politiques et économiques pour atteindre leur but(…) Le développement de la
coopération entre les pays ‘indépendants’ est la seule façon de contrer les efforts
des puissances dominantes et les pays devraient se préparer pour leur développement et indépendance intégrale ». Boshab a quant à lui déclaré que « la RDC est
intéressé par le renforcement des relations avec l’Iran. Les deux pays entretiennent
des relations historiques et l’Iran a toujours manifesté une opinion positive sur la
RDC ».
Cette audacieuse déclaration de Boshab ne constitue-t-elle pas aujourd’hui, avec
un peu de recul, sa « condamnation (à mort) politique ? Lui qui, malgré son militantisme kabilien actuel effréné et débordant, se voit de plus en plus mis à l’écart de l
’« inner circle », du régime. Un éloignement accentué depuis la tragique disparition,
dans un mystérieux accident d’avion, de son grand protecteur, le Tout-Puissant
AKM : Augustin Katumba Mwanke . AKM qui, de son vivant, ne cachait son penchant en faveur des relations privilégiées avec les pays du sud (Chine, Afrique du
Sud, Corée du Nord, Iran…) au détriment de l’Occident.
Selon le spécialiste des questions iraniennes, Ariel Farrar-Wellman, la RDC est un
pays membre du mouvement non-aligné, qui a publié un communiqué en juillet
2008, déclarant que les Etats Non-Alignés « ont salué la coopération continue et
prolongée de la République islamique de l’’Iran à l’AIEA » et « ont réaffirmé que les
choix et les décisions des Etats, y compris ceux de la République islamique de l’Iran,
dans le domaine de l’ utilisation de la technologie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques et
des politiques de cycle du combustible doivent être respectés. ». Selon cet analyste,
les relations bilatérales entre la RDC et l’Iran sont principalement centrées sur le
développement du commerce et d’autres intérêts économiques, particulièrement
45
dans le domaine de l’énergie. Or l’intérêt iranien pour l’énergie congolaise renvoie
naturellement au nucléaire, c’est-à-dire l’uranium.
La Menace Hezbollah via les investissements libanais (banques, immobilier…) en
RDC
Le Hezbollah : une épine dans la stratégie américaine en Afrique. Né en 1982, ce
mouvement islamiste radical est considéré comme un rejeton de la révolution islamique iranienne. Ce mouvement politico-militaire prône la revendication de la lutte
armée, y compris le recours au terrorisme, et l’existence de puissantes milices. Il
dispose d’un soutien des libanais expatriés et des analystes pensent que ceux établis en Afrique subsaharienne -particulièrement en RDC où ils contrôlent des secteurs entiers de commerce, des mines et de l’immobilier- apportent une contribution financière considérable pour soutenir les actions des milices islamiques et
autres terroristes. En effet, Le Hezbollah profite de l’importante communauté libanaise expatriée pour tisser ses réseaux à l’étranger. Très présent sur le continent
africain, sud-américain, ce mouvement est capable d’apporter une aide logistique,
financière via des réseaux bancaires voire opérationnelle, à des actions terroristes
qui pourraient viser les intérêts occidentaux sur ces continents ou au départ des
Etats faibles comme la RDC.
Il semble que les Libanais ont créé la Solidaire Banque qui engrange toutes les opérations financières portant sur les matières précieuses – cette banque ayant été
notamment créée par le réseau de Libanais œuvrant dans le commerce de diamant. Dans le giron de la communauté libanaise, il faut compter également avec le
groupe Soficom. S’étant au départ spécialisé dans les opérations de transfert des
fonds, le groupe Soficom s’est diversifié par la création notamment de sa branche
bancaire,Sofibanque. Le foisonnement des banques constaté ces derniers temps
en RDC cache bien quelque chose. D’autant que la plupart de ces banques sont plutôt des banques de transactions que des banques d’investissement. Dès lors, la
prudence dans la prolifération de ces banques doit rester de mise afin de décourager toute forme d’imposture dans le secteur bancaire congolais étant donné qu’il y
a bien des zones d’ombre dans la forte expansion de l’activité bancaire en RDC
dans la mesure où la prolifération de ces banques pourrait dissimuler la présence
des Hezbollah en RDC déguisés en hommes d’affaires.
Certains opérateurs économiques douteux, proches des milices terroristes, qui travaillent en étroite connexion avec les autorités congolaises. Mais pour des raisons
de notre sécurité, nous ne pourrions fournir ici leurs noms. Certains d’entre eux
sont réputés très dangereux et se trouvent dans l’œil du cyclone occidental.
D’autres sont en train d’investir, et d’étendre leurs tentacules dans les pays
comme : Congo Brazzaville, Ouganda, Rwanda et Tanzanie. Ils diversifient également leurs investissements notamment dans les stations services de carburant
(près de 200 stations services à travers le pays), dans le secteur hôtelier ou encore
dans l’exploitation des hydrocarbures. Il y en a un particulièrement qui est réputé
46
très puissant, proche de la RAW BANK et capable d’allumer le feu à la moindre menace car disposant d’une puissance financière colossale nous affirmait un contact
congolais. Il semble que l’intéressé est réputé très dangereux et ferait l’objet d’une
surveillance par certains éléments de la CIA.
Dans une déclaration, le sénateur Florentin Mokonda Bonza n’a pas hésité de fustiger des « réseaux mafieux » qui disposeraient d’une masse d’argent liquide qui leur
permet de construire des immeubles à plusieurs étages. Pour lui, cette masse d’argent proviendraient des opérations illicites dont le trafic de drogue. La RD Congo en
général et les villes de Kinshasa et de Lubumbashi en particulier sont envahies par
des « hommes d’affaires » indo-pakistanais et libanais opérant dans les secteurs de
l’alimentation, le « commerce général » et la banque. C’est le cas notamment du
staff dirigeant de la toute-puissante société « Congo-Futur » installé dans la tour
TOUR POWER, propriété d’un sujet libanais dont l’oncle serait décédé dans un
crash d’avion d’Ethiopian Airlines au large de Beyrouth le 25 janvier 2011. Une société dont on dit que la famille Kabila y disposerait des parts importantes.
Un communiqué, rendu public le 9 décembre 2010 depuis Washington D.C. (EtatsUnis) et portant le sceau officiel de ‘US Department of Treasury’ (Trésor américain)
sous le titre : «Treasury targets Hizballah financial network» (Le Trésor cible le réseau financier du Hezbollah), indexe la RDC comme l’une des plates-formes de financement des groupes terroristes comme le Hezbollah libanais. Le document accuse nommément les propriétaires du géant congolais de commerce général « Congo Futur » d’implication avérée dans le blanchiment des capitaux et le financement
du terrorisme. Pour le Trésor américain, la RDC serait devenue une plaque tournante du blanchiment des capitaux en vue de financement de certains groupes terroristes, notamment ceux indexés comme tels par le département d’Etat américain. Et ce, en dépit des efforts internes entrepris, notamment sous la houlette de
la Banque centrale du Congo pour mettre fin à ces deux fléaux. La Cellule des renseignements financiers (Cenaref), une structure répressive qui a été créée pour
cette fin, sombre encore dans l’immobilisme, alors que pour le Trésor américain, la
RDC serait devenue un dépotoir des capitaux sales. Dans les milieux des affaires de
la RDC, tout comme dans différents cercles politiques, le sujet était sur toutes les
lèvres. (Lire aussi Le Potentiel – 17-12-2010
Blanchiment des capitaux et financement du terrorisme. -Congo Futur dans le collimateur des Etats-Unis
Dans un article signé Baudouin Amba Wetshi du quotidien en ligne Congoindependant.com, le journaliste se pose la question si « l’homme d’affaire Kashim, dont on
pense faire partie des victimes du crash du vol 409 d’Ethiopian Airlines du 25 janvier à Beyrouth et qui serait présenté, à tort ou à raison, comme étant le patron de
la société « Congo Futur » aurait-il été un des financiers du Hezbollah? Et que ses
avoirs, au niveau international, avaient été gelés. » La C.I.A le tenait à l’oeil. D’aucuns vont plus loin en imputant, à tort ou à raison, au Mossad israélien la destruc-
47
tion en vol de l’avion éthiopien. D’autant que deux semaines après le crash du
Boeing 737-800 d’Ethiopian Airlines, les dirigeants de cette compagnie aérienne –
une des meilleures du continent -, ont fait savoir qu’ils n’excluaient «aucune piste,
y compris celle du sabotage, jusqu’à ce que l’on connaisse les résultats de l’enquête». Les responsables de cette entreprise balaient par ailleurs d’un revers de la
main les allégations selon lesquelles l’accident aurait été provoqué par une «erreur
de pilotage». Cette annonce tranche avec la déclaration – précipitée ? – faite par le
président libanais quelques heures après la catastrophe écartant l’hypothèse d’un
acte terroriste. Cinquante-quatre Libanais établis au Congo-Kinshasa se trouvaient
à bord de cet avion dont un certain Kashim qui serait un des principaux actionnaires voire le « véritable patron » du Groupe «Congo-Futur». Spéculation, intox ou
vérité ? Cette désignation vise également deux de hauts financiers du Hezbollah en
Afrique : Les frères Ali et Hussein Tajideen qui génèrent des millions de dollars dans
le financement du réseau multinational et régional africain du Hezbollah, selon le
sous-secrétaire pour le terrorisme et le renseignement financier, Stuart Levey.
Sous le titre « Treasury targets Hezbollah financial network », le Trésor américain
désigne les frères Ali et Hussein Tajideen, opérant également en Gambie, au Liban,
au Sierra Leone, en Angola, et aux îles Vierges britanniques ; propriétaires en RDC
du groupe « Congo Futur » comme pions majeurs de réseau financier du Hezbollah.
Pour Washington, les deux frères, d’origine libanaise, travailleraient dans la collecte
des fonds en vue de fournir le soutien financier au Hezbollah. Tous deux, toujours
selon le document du Trésor américain, sont les frères et partenaires commerciaux
de Kassim Tajideen, un important contributeur financier au Hezbollah, qui a été
désigné depuis mai 2009 par le Trésor comme un «Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) » en vertu de l’Executive Order (EO) 13224. Dans son communiqué,
sans en dévoiler le contenu, le Trésor américain avait annoncé des sanctions à
l’égard des personnes et entreprises citées. Il a fait mention notamment de la possibilité de les isoler à partir des États-Unis des systèmes financiers et commerciaux
internationaux. Il n’est pas exclus que certains congolais fassent partie de la liste
des personnes mises en quarantaine. D’où leur rapprochement avec les pays de
l’Orient !
Fin de la Première Partie
4. La Menace de la forte présence des opérateurs Indo-Pakistanais
Beaucoup d’opérateurs indo-pakistanais opèrent librement en RDC sous la protection des certaines autorités de Kinshasa. Cette liberté d’action leur laissée par les
autorités congolaises, devient inquiétante lorsque cela implique le secteur hautement stratégique minier, notamment dans l’exploitation artisanale et illégale dont
l’Uranium ; ou lorsque cela concerne le secteur bancaire : blanchiment d’argent.
L’information reprise ci-dessous est assez éloquente sur les implications douteuses
des entreprises indo-pakistanaises dans les pillages des ressources de la RDC. En
effet, la Radio onusienne Okapi rapportait le 05/05/2010 qu’une entreprise indopa-
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kistanaise, La société minière de diamant du Sankuru, née du partenariat entre une
firme indopakistanaise de droit chinois (Ndlr : quel melting-pot ?) du nom d’Indo
Afrique Mining et la Minière de Bakwanga (Miba), se serait volatilisée avec plus
d’un milliard huit cent millions de Francs congolais (environ 88 millions d’euros) des
droits de redevances qui dataient de 2006. Ces révélations faites par la Direction
provinciale des recettes du Kasaï Oriental qui a accusé la Miba d’avoir encouragé
cette fraude. Le rapport des travaux de la commission de révision des contrats miniers indique qu’il s’agissait d’une joint-venture en vue de l’exploration et l’exploitation des gisements diamantifères sur la rivière Sankuru. Une association où la Miba était minoritaire avec 49% des parts, alors qu’Indo Afrique Mining en possède
51%.
La forte présence des opérateurs indo-pakistanais s’accompagne en même temps
de la floraison des institutions bancaires dans un pays post-conflit caractérisé par
une structure économique fragile et désarticulée. Et pourtant, les banques, en tant
qu’opérateurs générateurs des capitaux, constituent le moteur du décollage économique et de la création d’emplois via les investissements et crédits octroyés. De ce
fait, elles sont donc des canaux incontournables devant stimuler la croissance économique. Pour cela, elles doivent orienter leurs actions sur les opérations encourageant l’épargne, le financement des entrepreneurs, des PME et des coopératives
via des crédits et micro-crédits devant leur permettre de lancer ou d’étendre leurs
activités en touchant une part importante de la population, censée constituer la
classe moyenne, capable de soutenir l’économie nationale. Seulement, dans le cas
de la RDC, la prudence doit être de mise dans la mesure où, bon nombre de
banques y installées dernièrement se livrent très peu dans les activités d’investissements et de financements des projets à vocation socioéconomique. Elles préfèrent,
par contre, s’orienter vers les activités de transactions en tant qu’intermédiaires.
Cela, afin d’éviter le piège de voir ces banques privilégier des opérations de nature
à fragiliser davantage ce secteur déjà défaillant à sa base. Surtout que le secteur
bancaire des pays dits fragiles ou instables est un des secteurs ayant plus d’interconnexions avec des circuits mafieux, notamment par la mise en place d’un système insidieux de blanchiment des capitaux en créant des zones d’ombre de sorte
à détourner les banques de leur mission première.
Parmi les opérateurs et les banques islamiques actifs en RDC, on peut citer :
La Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), fondée avec le soutien du
souverain d’Abou Dhabi, Cheikh Zayed, en 1972 par un financier pakistanais aussi
véreux que charismatique, Agha Hasan Abedi, s’est spécialisée dans l’escroquerie
financière au détriment de ses déposants, a aidé des chefs d’État à siphonner les
ressources de leur pays, a travaillé de pair avec Saddam Hussein et Manuel Noriega
et s’est livrée au trafic d’influence à Washington ou à Londres en bénéficiant de la
cécité, de la complaisance, si ce n’est de la complicité de la Réserve fédérale américaine, de la Banque d’Angleterre, de la CIA et de la City à Londres.
49
La Raw Bank, branche commerciale du groupe indien Rawji, créée en 2002, active
en RD Congo depuis près d’un siècle et très diversifié. C’est un des grands conglomérats de l’économie congolaise actuelle, dans lequel l’on compte également
Beltexco, Marsavco,…
La banque d’affaires « Millénium finance corporation » fondée en 2005 et a pour
actionnaire de référence la « Dubaï Islamic Bank-DIB » associée à d’autres banques
du Moyen-Orient.
5. Une dangereuse mafia du trafic illicite de l’Uranium au cœur du pouvoir congolais
A titre d’illustration, nous faisons part des informations recueillies des sources
dignes de foi sur les activités auxquelles se livrent certains membres du cercle du
pouvoir. Ces sources sont parvenues à tracer l’itinéraire d’un dangereux trafic de
l’uranium.
Patrick Bologna : sujet italien marié à la sœur de l’épouse de Kabila et député récemment validé aux législatives de 2011 etDany Banza, député provincial du Katanga seraient impliqués dans le trafic illicite d’uranium via Kigali par Gisenyi. Ils bénéficieraient de l’escorte du lieutenant rwando-congolais Hubert Kahozi, travaillant
également sous couvert des services de renseignement rwando-congolais. Il
semble que lors des traversées Goma-Gisenyi, Hubert Kahozi troquerait son uniforme FARDC pour celui de RDF (Rwanda Defence Forces). Il semble que Bologna,
Banza (Tous deux membres d’un parti nouveau alimentaire dénommé ACO : Avenir
du Congo) et Zoé Kabila, le frère du Président congolais utilisent deux corridors
pour sortir l’uranium et le cuivre du Katanga via la Zambie vers l’Afrique du Sud et
via la Tanzanie vers Rwanda. L’Uranium est vendu à Dubaï. Les transactions et la
livraison des marchandises se font dans un Hôtel dénommé BUDDHA-BAR DUBAÏ.
Un hôtel de luxe où Bologna et Zoé Kabila possèdent des parts, selon des sources
dignes de foi. C’est au nom de la société de Patrick BOLOGNA, BOLPAT CORPORATION « BOLOGNA PATRICK CORPORATION » que les transactions relatives à la
vente de l’uranium sont effectuées auprès de clients arabes via des intermédiaires
ukrainiens à Dubaï. Notons que Patrick Bologna est un sujet italien, possédant le
passeport n° YA 002135, délivré le 11 janvier 2010 devant expirer le 13 août 2013,
repêché et proclamé député national par la CSJ alors qu’il avait admis sa défaite. De
plus, compte tenu de sa proximité avec le milieu de la musique congolaise, friande
de l’Occident, il a longtemps travaillé comme agent de l’ANR extérieur, dont il percevait un salaire mensuel, en vue d’infiltrer certains milieux de la diaspora congolaise en occident.
D’ailleurs, une partie des dividendes engrangés dans ce traffic illicite ont permis à
Zoé Kabila de s’offrir une résidence immobilière aux Etas-Unis en novembre 2010.
Un autre contact anonyme dans ce dossier très sensible nous a fait savoir queles
dividendes du marché illicite de l’uranium, qui rapporterait au minimum 300.000$
50
US par voyage. Nous en avons eu la confirmation via une source protagoniste à ces
transactions et négociations.
D’autres sources anonymes ayant eu accès à l’entourage du feu, le « Tout-Puissant
» Augustin Katumba Mwanke, mais furieux du démantèlement de leur réseau
d’influence auprès de Joseph Kabila après la mort de ce dernier, m’ont affirmé la
possibilité d’une présence des libanais proches d’Al-Qaida au Congo, qui travailleraient dans le secteur de blanchiment d’argent avec Zoe Kabila. Ils ont en outre indiqué des interconnexions avec le Groupe « Millenium Finance Corporation », dirigé par Mr. Keba Keinde. Un groupe financier qui a réalisé d’importants investissements suspects depuis 2010 dans plusieurs secteurs d’activités en RDC, notamment
les domaines agricole, minier et immobilier. S’agissant du spectaculaire « boom
immobilier » constaté ces dernières années à Kinshasa et dans les grandes villes du
pays, pour des criminologues avertis, deux indices peuvent expliquer le boom immobilier dans un pays post-conflit : soit une véritable émergence économique
comme l’ont connu les pays du Sud-est asiatique (ASEAN) ; soit une réinjection de
l’argent sale issu des bénéfices tirés des activités mafieuses dans le circuit immobilier. Il est impressionnant de constater avec effroi que la situation d’explosion immobilière anarchique que connait actuellement la RDC ressemble à s’y méprendre
à celle du Liban au sortir des années 1980. A chacun de tirer sa propre conclusion.
Enfin, pour son implantation en RDC, notons que le Groupe Millenium Finance Corporation aurait bénéficié des largesses, via le versement des commissions illicites,
de la part du premier ministre sortant, Adolphe Muzito, dernièrement mise en
cause par l’ex-député de sa propre mouvance politique, Gérard Mulumba dit
GECOCO, qui a démissionné de son propre gré depuis en quittant sa famille politique. Rappelons que ce groupe a pour actionnaire de référence la « Dubaï Islamic
Bank-DIB », mentionnée plus haut. Ainsi la toile d’araignée détricote ses ramifications.
6. L’infiltration d’Al-Qaïda en Afrique et en RDC
Depuis 2002, la présence de djihadistes internationaux s’est accrue au Sahel. AlQaïda cherchant à y créer une zone refuge pour ses cadres et ses militants forcés
de s’expatrier suite à la guerre au terrorisme déclenchée par les Américains. En
effet, Al-Qaïda, chassé des montagnes d’Afghanistan, n’étant plus parfaitement en
sécurité au Pakistan et en Iran, cherche des havres sûrs pour y installer des facilités
logistiques permettant d’abriter et d’entraîner ses activistes afin de les renvoyer au
combat contre les « apostats et les mécréants », vers de nouvelles zones de bataille
au nombre desquelles figurent la corne de l’Afrique, le Sahel, la partie orientale et
de l’Afrique (Kenya, Ouganda et Tanzanie), les confins de la partie nord-est congolaise; avec le risque de contamination sur l’ensemble de ce pays instable et postconflit.
Les réseaux terroristes trouvent en Afrique une zone de repli idéale, d’autant
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qu’aucune politique organisée visant à a démanteler le terrorisme n’a véritablement été mise en place. Ce laxisme se double d’une corruption endémique qui facilite la liberté de manœuvre des terroristes. C’est pourquoi les Etats-Unis insistent
désormais sur l’importance primordiale que revêt le continent noir dans le cadre de
la lutte antiterroriste1. Avant d’entamer sa tournée africaine qui l’a mené successivement au Sénégal, en Afrique du Sud, au Bostwana, en Ouganda et au Nigéria, le
président Bush a annoncé que son administration allait débloquer une enveloppe
de 100 millions de dollars pour soutenir les pays africains dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Cette aide sera surtout employée à améliorer la sécurité des ports et des
aéroports, qui assurent le commerce international avec les Etats-Unis. Mais cela
concerne aussi l’assistance militaire. Discrètement, les Américains installent au Mali d’importants moyens de lutte antiterroriste. Une nouvelle ambassade est en
cours de construction. Le bureau local de la CIA est en train de devenir l’un des plus
importants de la région sahélienne. Depuis le Mali, les Américains surveillent tous
les mouvements caravaniers de la région liés au trafic d’armes et à l’intégrisme islamique, ainsi que les réserves pétrolières du sud de l’Algérie ou opèrent des sociétés pétrolières américaines (La lettre du continent, n° 432, 9 octobre 2003, p.6.)
Au Maghreb, Al-Qaïda (AQMI: Al-Qaïda au Maghreb) s’appuie essentiellement sur
le Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC) algérien d’Hassan
Hattab. De 1999 à 2000, des écoutes téléphoniques ont révélé que des liens personnels existaient entre le chef historique du GSPC et Ousama Ben Laden. Ce serait
d’ailleurs ce dernier qui aurait poussé Hassan Hattab à fonder le GSPC en septembre 1998 après qu’une fatwa condamnant les dérives meurtrières des GIA ait
été lancée par le Jordano-palestinien Abou Koutada, le représentant d’Al-Qaïda en
Europe. Depuis, ce mouvement algérien a mis ses réseaux européens à la disposition de la nébuleuse Al-Qaïda. En échange, le GSPC reçoit des financements pour
poursuivre la lutte en Algérie.
Au Sahel, l’inflation des mouvements terroristes et groupuscules armés très mouvants et dynamiques, spécialisés dans les guerres de type asymétrique, difficiles à
éradiquer. Depuis la guerre de Libye, des pans de territoires s’étendant de la région
du Sahel jusqu’au nord Cameroun sont devenus des non man’s land qui pourraient
à terme devenir des viviers propices et des zones fertiles de propagation de l’islamisme fondamentaliste. Des sanctuaire de l’AQMI et des groupuscules islamistes
contestant les pouvoirs locaux. Un terreau d’expérimentation de nouvelles stratégies d’action fondamentaliste musulmane qui se délocalise du Proche-Orient et de
l’Asie centrale pour trouver un nouveau souffle en Afrique. Ainsi, la faiblesse des
structures étatiques des Etats africains marqués par l’absence de l’autorité de l’Etat
sont des catalyseurs qui facilitent cette expansion
Dans la corne d’Afrique, le « Jammat e-Djihad Eritre » actif en Erythrée et en Somalie est considéré comme un mouvement associé à Al-Qaeda depuis que son chef
politique, le Cheikh Arara, a connu Ben Laden lors de son séjour dans le pays de
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1992 à 1996. Leur officier de liaison serait Mohammed al-Kheir. Au Soudan, le vieux
leader islamique, Hassan Al-Tourabi, encore président du « congrès populaire »,
avait été libéré après presque trois ans de maintien en résidence surveillée. Il a été
réincarcéré à la fin mars 2004, soupçonné par le régime du président Omar Hasan
al Bachir, d’avoir voulu participer à un putsch. Etant donné sa position très surveillée, il est peu probable qu’il ait maintenu des contacts avec Ben Laden. Cependant,
il est vrai que la menace fondamentaliste musulman, qui est déjà active à la corne
de l’Afrique et au Sahel, et signalée en Afrique Orientale, est bien réelle et que
cette menace est déjà aux portes de la RDC. Elle risque d’atteindre les zones sensibles de ce pays fragile, dont les Kivu et l’Ituri constituent le ventre mou et poreux.
En ce qui concerne la RDC, un officier ougandais aurait témoigné qu’il était possible
de transporter des explosifs ou armes à partir de la Libye ou du Tchad pour les
acheminer en RDC. Les analystes estiment que les frontières poreuses de la RDC
constituent un couloir ou une porte d’entrée pouvant faire des intérêts occidentaux en RDC ou dans le monde une cible potentielle des terroristes ou une plaque
tournante à partir de laquelle peuvent être menées des actions terroristes. Dans la
partie frontalière entre la RDC, l’Ouganda et le Soudan, les contrôles frontaliers formels étant inexistants, la corruption et l’absence des structures étatiques viables
rendent théoriquement cette région d’Afrique des grands-Lacs susceptible de devenir une plaque tournante de trafic illicite d’uranium. La corruption endémique en
RDC est d’ailleurs considérée par les services de renseignement américains, pire
que l’épidémie de VIH/AIDS.
Le chef d’état-major général ougandais James KAZINI, a déclaré qu’il est possible de
tout transporter à partir de cette partie de la RDC vers le Tchad ou via le Lac Albert
ou le Lac Tanganyika du fait de l’absence de l’autorité de l’Etat (Terrorists’ Would
Love Eastern Congo, Matekopoko in BBC, 17 Dec 2002”). Il déclarait posséder des
documents prouvant la tentative échouée d’Oussama Ben Laden d’exploiter l’axe
montagneux de la Ruwenzori pour infiltrer la zone frontalière entre l’Ouganda et
la RDC, en alliance avec un groupe rébelle ADF (Allied Democratic Forces). On se
demande si avec la pfrte présence libano-indo-pakistanais et le chèque en blanc
leur concédé dans presque tous les domaines d’activités économiques, cela n’est
déjà pas fait.
7. Le Groupe Al-Shabaab : une menace qui se répand en Afrique
Les shabaab, dont la création remonterait à 2006, étaient à l’origine le mouvement
de la jeunesse des Tribunaux islamiques, qui ont contrôlé brièvement la Somalie au
deuxième semestre 2006 avant d’être mis en déroute par l’armée éthiopienne.
Tandis que la majeure partie des dirigeants des Tribunaux partaient en exil, les
combattants restés en Somalie pour combattre les troupes éthiopiennes s’unissaient sous la bannière shebab, (ou Al-Shabaab) qui devint de fait le bras armé du
mouvement islamiste somalien. Ce groupe veut mettre en application une forme
très stricte de la Charia (loi islamique). Le chef des shabaab, Mohamed Abdi Go-
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dane, alias Abou Zubaïr, est un religieux natif du Somaliland qui compense ses très
rares apparitions publiques par la diffusion de messages enregistrés via des médias
locaux ou internet. Les shebab, qui contrôlent environ 80% de la Somalie, seraient
en mesure de mobiliser 7.000 hommes, dont 3.000 réellement aguerris. Le mouvement comprend une branche armée, « Jeish al-Usrah » (« L’armée de la
souffrance »), et une police religieuse, principal organe de propagande connu sous
le nom de Jeish al-Hisbah (« L’armée de la moralité »).
En octobre 2008, les shabaab franchissaient un cap en organisant des attaques suicide simultanées dans les deux régions autonomes du nord de la Somalie, le Puntland et le Somaliland. Courant 2009, un afflux sans précédent de combattants
étrangers renforçait les craintes des Etats-Unis et de leurs alliés de voir la Somalie
devenir un nouveau sanctuaire d’Al-Qaïda.
Jusque récemment, le groupe poursuivait des objectifs strictement internes à la
Somalie et des discussions avec les dirigeants du mouvement permettaient aux
agences humanitaires d’acheminer et de distribuer leur aide. En effet, ce groupe
somalien, qui a officiellement prêté allégeance à Oussama Ben Laden en septembre
2009, n’hésite pas à menacer l’étranger. Il s’en est pris d’abord au Kenya, accusé de
former les militaires des forces du gouvernement de transition4. Ensuite AlShabaab a menacé de frapper au coeur des capitales de l’Ouganda et du Burundi,
pays frontaliers à la RDC, en représailles à la participation des militaires de ces pays
à l’AMISOM, considérée par les islamistes comme une force d’occupation5. Des
menaces à prendre très au sérieux compte tenu de l’allégeance faite par les shabaab à Al-Qaïda qui a déjà durement frappé le Kenya et la Tanzanie, en août 1998,
lors des attaques contre les ambassades américaines à Nairobi et Dar Es-Salam.
D’ailleurs ces attentats avaient été préparés en Somalie. Selon des responsables de
l’AMISOM certains des combattants d’Al Shabaab seraient ougandais, provenant du
mouvement rebelle ougandais ADF opérant dans les montagnes du Ruwenzori à la
frontière ouest de l’Ouganda avec la RDC. (Nicolas Gros-Verheyde – Afrique Est –
Somalie Ouganda, 8 janvier 2010)
S’agissant du double attentat suicide qui a visé un restaurant éthiopien et le bar
d’un club de rugby qui retransmettaient la finale de la Coupe du monde de football
tuant 76 personnes le 11 juillet 2010 à Kampala, dans la capitale ougandaise, les
insurgés somaliens shabaab ont été désignés comme étant les principaux suspects
de ces actes terroristes. Depuis, ils ont gagné en envergure et en notoriété pour se
présenter comme étant les représentants attitrés d’Al-Qaïda en Afrique de l’Est. Ce
mouvement islamiste radical, à la tête d’une insurrection contre le fragile gouvernement de transition somalien, n’a certes pas revendiqué la paternité de ces
attaques. Mais des sites internet proches du mouvement se sont félicités de ces
attentats perpétrés dans un pays pourvoyeur de la moitié des troupes de la force
de l’Union africaine en Somalie (Amisom) tandis que des dirigeants shabaab
avaient menacé de telles attaques au début du mois.
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Si leur implication dans les explosions de Kampala se confirmait, ces attentats marqueraient leur première action d’envergure à l’extérieur de la Somalie, ultime
étape d’un processus visant apparemment à acquérir la franchise Al-Qaïda pour
l’Afrique de l’Est et Centrale. Les explosions de Kampala sont les plus meurtrières
dans la sous-région depuis les attentats d’août 1998 contre les ambassades américaines de Nairobi et Dar es-Salaam qui avaient fait plus de 200 morts et avaient été
revendiquées par Al-Qaïda. Plusieurs suspects recherchés pour ces attentats ont
été repérés ces dernières années en Somalie, parmi eux le Comorien Fazul Abdullah
Muhammad, qui occuperait un poste important dans la hiérarchie. Il n’est pas exclus que ce groupe ou d’autres mouvements radicaux islamistes, profitent du grand
rendez-vous international de la Francophonie prévue en octobre à Kinshasa, pour
faire parler à nouveau la poudre. Car en quête d’une nouvelle identité, existence et
territorialité depuis la mort de Ben Laden et l’affaiblissement et l’expulsion des activistes wahhabites et salafistes d’Al-Qaïda des zones tribales pachtounes turbulentes et irrédentistes pakistano-Afghanistanes. Leurs confrères d’AQMI occupent
de plus en plus le terrain dans le Sahel.
Concernant la liquidation de Ben Laden, chose étrange, la RDC, par la voix de son
ministre des Médias et porte-parole du gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), Lambert Mende Omalanga, a été le seul pays d’Afrique Centrale à avoir condamné l’exécution d’Oussama Ben Laden, dans une interview à la
radio privée Top Congo : « Nous ne soutenons pas le terrorisme, mais il aurait fallu
l’arrêter, l’entendre et le juger », a-t-il souligné. Pour Mende, ce que les Etats-Unis
ont fait c’est combattre le mal par le mal. Ben Laden, chef d’Al-Qaïda, considéré
comme le symbole du terrorisme, a été tué le 1er mai dans sa villa d’Abbottabad, à
80 km de la capitale pakistanaise, Islamabad, au cours d’une opération menée par
un commando américain. Qu’est ce qui a poussé le griot de Mr Kabila à faire une
pareille déclaration qui cacherait sans doute une anguille sous roche ?
8. Pour un nouveau réinvestissement des partenaires traditionnels en RDC pour
contrer la menace terroriste ?
Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les USA se sont installés en Afrique centrale,
particulièrement en RDC, pour s’opposer à l’expansionnisme communiste de
l’URSS. Après l’effondrement de l’URSS, les USA se sont désengagés peu à peu de
cette zone d’Afrique et n’y ont maintenu qu’une présence économique, par l’entremise des firmes minières et pétrolières, de sorte que les USA n’ont même pas répondu à empêcher le génocide au Rwanda en 1994. Le président Clinton est allé
présenter des excuses plus tard à Kigali (capitale du Rwanda), à partir de l’aéroport.
Les interminables conflits qui secouent ce pays riche en minéraux depuis environ
15 ans commencent à inquiéter l’Administration américaine. Et depuis peu, on
constate que les Etats-Unis commencent peu à peu à (re)consacrer un intérêt particulier à la situation sécuritaire de la RDC.
Les Américains tentent actuellement de parer cette menace. Toutefois, leurs inté-
55
rêts en Afrique ne sont pas uniquement sécuritaires, mais également politicoéconomiques. Constance Newman, l’ex- secrétaire d’Etat adjointe aux affaires africaines soulignait en mai 2004 que « l’Afrique est un continent au potentiel illimité,
et nous continuerons à faire tout ce qui est en notre pouvoir pour aider les Américains à réaliser ce potentiel, à aider les Africains à réaliser ce potentiel et à créer,
ensemble, un avenir plus prometteur ». C’est ainsi que les experts estiment qu’au
cours des prochaines années, l’Afrique va couvrir 30 % des besoins en pétrole des
Etats-Unis. C’est ainsi que l’on peut remarquer une impressionnante présence américaine en Angola où l’ambassade américaine à Luanda est transformée en une forteresse abritant des centaines de marines US prêts à intervenir pour assurer la protection de leurs intérêts pétroliers dans ce pays.
Parlant de l’aspect sécuritaire, nous observons que Washington met progressivement en œuvre un programme majeur pour conserver la main haute sur la RDC qui
doit lui servir de « zone avancée » en Afrique. Ce programme a pour ambition
d’intensifier la présence des USA sur le plan des opérations militaires et autres en
RDC. En effet, la RDC fait progressivement l’objet d’une nouvelle stratégie géopolitique « hot spot » des USA, notamment dans le cadre du renforcement de l’AFRICOM. Au Rwanda, en Ouganda comme au Burundi, l’argument ethnique fait de
moins en moins recette. Voici les dirigeants de ces pays changer de stratégie en
mettant en avant les menaces terroristes qui pourraient toucher leurs pays respectifs au départ de la RDC. Cela, pour justifier entre autres les interventions de leurs
armées respectives en RDC et ainsi faire les yeux doux aux USA, très sensibles à
cette question. Rappelons que le Burundi a notamment envoyé en Somalie un contingent militaire de plusieurs milliers d’hommes dans le cadre de l’Afrisom
(l’opération militaire de l’ONU). Cet engagement lui vaut, à l’instar de l’Ouganda,
d’être menacé par une action punitive des chebab, les islamistes somaliens liés à Al
-Qaïda. Quant au Rwanda, il a déployé trois mille trois cents casques bleus au Darfour, dont un contingent féminin. Alors que l’Ouganda est engagé depuis des années dans la lutte contre la rébellion LRA de Kony que Kampala accuse d’accointance avec le régime de Khartoum au Soudan. Toutes les raisons pertinentes pour
pousser Al Qaïda ou les milices shebab ou leurs autres alliés financées par les filières islamistes contrôlant l’économie grise congolaise, à mener des actions de représailles comme à Kampala en 2010 contre ces pays au départ de l’Est instable et
poreux de la RDC.
Conclusion
Face aux menaces ci-haut décrites, la RDC a besoin d’un soutien appuyé des pays
alliés traditionnels pour l’accompagner dans la réalisation d’une vision politique
visant à faire de la RDC un « containment » contre le terrorisme et le fondamentalisme musulman. Mais cela doit d’abord passer par l’instauration de la paix, la sécurité et la restauration de l’autorité de l’Etat sur l’ensemble du pays. Cela permettrait d’éviter de voir la RDC, du fait du caractère transnational des menaces terroristes induites par la poussée de l’intégrisme en Afrique, devenir une partie inté-
56
grante d’un champ de confrontation plus extensive. Sur le plan international, cela
nécessite de définir d’abord un cadre global et multilatéral de coopération internationale. La coopération multilatérale et non les diverses coopérations bilatérales
aux contours flous privilégiés actuellement par Kinshasa, serait le cadre le plus adéquat pour apporter une réponse holistique, proportionnée et maîtrisée sur le caractère transnational et géopolitique de l’insécurité, de la criminalité transnationale, en ce comprise la menace terroriste et les pillages des ressources congolaises
via des circuits mafieux. Cette coopération multilatérale avec les pays traditionnellement alliés du Congo, premières cibles potentielles de la menace terroriste, tout
en répondant à leurs préoccupations sécuritaires, doit également aboutir au renforcement de capacités de l’Etat congolais dans les domaines de la réforme des services de sécurité, de la recherche et l’analyse du renseignement, des opérations
militaires, des investigations judiciaires, de la détection des transactions financières
suspectes et des trafics illicites des matières premières pour lutter efficacement
contre la pénétration d’Al-Qaïda en Afrique centrale dont la RDC constitue un terreau idéal de germination.
Comme on le sait, la realpolitik n’a pas pitié des faibles, les difficultés de la RDC pèsent sur les transformations de l’Afrique centrale et menacent la sécurité internationale si rien n’est fait. En effet, ces difficultés sont alourdies par la régression démocratique qui s’enracine à la suite de la crise de légitimité qui couve dans le pays
depuis bientôt deux ans. Une crise qui n’est pas prête de trouver une solution politique dans l’immédiat avec le rejet en bloc par l’opposition et une bonne partie de
la société civile influente en RDC de la convocation des concertations nationales
par le président Kabila. D’autant que des bouffées de violence dans plusieurs parties du pays commencent à s’accentuer en convergence avec la déliquescence des
services de sécurité faisant de ce pays un sanctuaire du commerce illégal des ressources naturelles, une plaque tournante des différents trafics illicites (drogue,
êtres humains, blanchiment d’argent, crime organisé de tout genre…) et pourquoi
pas une base arrière et un réservoir fécond des groupes terroristes au point de menacer les intérêt géostratégiques des pays alliés traditionnels de la RDC.
Les engagements contenus dans l’accord-cadre d’Addis-Abeba, en tant que réquisitoire sévère contre le Gouvernement Congolais, montrent que le régime congolais
fait preuve d’un déficit de vision géopolitique sur les grands enjeux stratégiques
nationaux et internationaux de notre siècle et de la région. La gouvernance sécuritaire chaotique dénoncée récemment par Obama depuis Dar-es-Salam qui a demandé à Kabila de « faire plus » pour la sécurité en RDC est un signal fort adressé
aux autorités congolaises de s’activer à prendre le taureau par les cornes. En voulant rester indifférent face cette exigence américaine, en laissant l’insécurité et
l’impunité persister dans cette partie orientale du Congo et en menant une politique qui paupérisent les populations, risquent d’accentuer les menaces d’instabilité non seulement sur le Congo mais également sur toute la région des Grands Lacs,
faciliter l’implantation et la consolidation des mouvements islamistes qui
mettraient en danger les intérêts sécuritaires des pays traditionnellement alliés à la
57
RDC au départ du Congo. Le déficit de gouvernance en RDC – générateur d’injustices, d’insécurité et de frustrations tant à l’intérieur du pays que dans le chef de
nos voisins – finira tôt ou tard par exacerber la communauté internationale, si ce
n’est déjà pas fait. La patience de la communauté internationale risque d’avoir des
limites car elle ne supportera plus longtemps la persistance d’une situation d’instabilité géopolitique intenable du fait de la fragilité du Congo et de ses institutions
républicaines, susceptible d’imploser à tout moment, et aux conséquences régionales et internationales incommensurables.
http://www.ingeta.com/sur-les-traces-du-djihad-rdc/
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Egypt
News Analysis: Sisi's African tour to normalize ties, urge anti- terrorism cooperation
Xinhua News Agency June 27, 2014 9:45pm
CAIRO, June 27 (Xinhua) -- The recently-concluded African tour of Egypt's newlyelected President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi has aimed to normalize ties with the African
Union (AU) after a year-long tension and to urge for Egyptian-African cooperation
on fighting terrorism, Egyptian experts said.
Sisi started his tour with a visit to Algeria on Wednesday, before heading to Equatorial Guinea for a two-day African summit after the AU resumed Egypt's membership in the African body. Before coming back to Cairo on Friday, Sisi stopped in
Khartoum to hold talks with his Sudanese counterpart Omar al-Bashir.
NORMALIZING TIES WITH AFRICA
In his statement at the AU summit on Thursday, Sisi said that " although Egypt
was absent for a while from participation in the AU activities, it has not stopped
being busy with the issues and worries of Africa ... Egypt cannot be separated
from Africa."
"Sisi's tour in Africa represents a new line in the chapter of Egyptian-African ties
and a new beginning for Egypt's diplomatic representation in Africa," said Hani
Raslan, head of Sudan and Nile Basin studies department at Cairo-based AlAhram Center for Political and Strategic.
The AU suspended Egypt's membership after the Egyptian military, led by thenDefense Minister Sisi, overthrow the Muslim Brotherhood-oriented former President Mohamed Morsi in early July last year. The Peace and Security Council of the
African body has recently resumed Egypt's membership by an overwhelming
vote.
"Freezing Egypt's AU membership was shocking but the union realized that
Egypt's absence would negatively affect the collective African work," Raslan told
Xinhua, noting that Egypt is a founding member of the AU and provides about 15
percent of the body's budget.
RESOLVING ETHIOPIA'S DAM ISSUE
With regards to the Renaissance Dam, which is now under construction in Ethiopia and expected to affect Egypt's share of Nile River water, Sisi held talks with
Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn on the sidelines of the summit
on Thursday.
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A following joint statement later reaffirmed the two countries' mutual respect, their
commitment to the international law and their future cooperation for common interests.
"The talks and the statement represent a qualitative shift to the course of the dam
crisis towards negotiations rather than conflict," Raslan said.
Refaat Sayed Ahmed, founder and head of Cairo-based Yafa Center for Studies and
Researches, said that Sisi's two predecessors, Morsi and Hosni Mubarak, had dealt
with the Egyptian-Ethiopian relations carelessly and randomly.
"Sisi attempts to return the ties with Ethiopia to warmth and serenity on the basis
of mutual respect and common interests," the political expert told Xinhua, adding
that Mubarak's policy with Ethiopia was "arrogant," while Morsi's was characterized
by " political randomness."
URGING ANTI-TERRORISM COOPERATION
Sisi has warned the African summit of "cross-border terrorism." He conveyed the
same message during his visits to Algeria and Sudan before returning to Cairo.
"The chaos in Libya threatens the national security of bordering states like Egypt
and Algeria, which explains Sisi's warning and his desire to coordinate with Algeria,"
Ahmed explained.
However, the expert expressed belief that there are unannounced, indirect goals
behind the tour, including "preservation of Egypt's water security and confrontation
of the Israeli growing role in Africa at the expense of that of Egypt."
At a joint press conference with the Sudanese president on Friday, Sisi said that the
southern neighbor represents "strategic depth" for Egypt, and that the near future
would witness a greater cooperation between the two bordering states.
A few months following Morsi's removal, Egypt's interim leadership blacklisted the
Brotherhood as "a terrorist organization" and launched a security crackdown on
Morsi's supporters, which has left more than 1,000 people killed and thousands
others arrested.
In response, extremist Islamist groups launched dozens of anti- government bombings in the Sinai Peninsula, the capital Cairo and other provinces across the turmoilstricken country.
"Sisi's visit to Sudan shows his interest in securing Egypt's southern strategic depth
in case some Islamist extremists fled to the adjacent state and formed terrorist
groups there," Ahmed told Xinhua.
Strategic expert, Gen. Sayed al-Gabri, echoed Ahmed's view and lamented the stagnant relations between Cairo and Khartoum over the past few years.
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He explained that there have been attempts to convert Sudan to a terrorismhosting nation to besiege Egypt from the south through Sudan, from the west
through Libya and from the east through Gaza and Sinai extremists.
"Through Sisi's tour and coordination with African states, Egypt is successfully foiling such a terrorist plot," Gabri told Xinhua.
Copyright 2014 Xinhua News Agency.
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Kenya
Kenya's dilemma in Somalia: to withdraw or not to withdraw?
23 June 2014
It has been almost three years since Kenyan troops were deployed neighbouring
Somalia to create a security buffer zone on the Somali side of the border. The main
aim at the time was to reduce growing insecurity in Kenya, which affected the
country’s economy and the tourism industry especially. Since the deployment and
the subsequent integration of Kenyan troops into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), however, the goal of reducing insecurity is yet to be realised. Instead, insecurity that is attributed to the very presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia
has continued to rise.
The recent attacks on 16 June in Mpeketoni, Lamu County, in which more than 60
people died is yet another reminder of the increasing number of terrorist incidents
that have taken place since Kenya’s deployment in Somalia. Despite the ongoing
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debate between government and opposition groups about the cause and perpetrators of the Mpeketoni attacks, Kenya’s presence in Somalia remains an important
variable.
Prior to the Mpeketoni attacks, the dilemma of dealing with Kenya’s presence in
Somalia was firmly under discussion in many policy circles. One school of thought
holds that Kenya should withdraw, while another argues otherwise. Some opposition groups, including the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) and its
leader, Raila Odinga, reason that Kenya’s presence in Somalia has brought insecurity. Kenya should therefore withdraw. According to this argument, radical Somali
Islamists will have no reason to keep targeting Kenya once the country’s troops
cease operations in Somalia.
Supporters of Kenya’s continued presence in Somalia, including Deputy President
William Ruto, maintain that withdrawing would mean succumbing to the demands
of Islamist militant group, al-Shabaab, and expressly conceding defeat to terrorists.
If Kenya’s presence in Somalia were as irrelevant as al-Shabaab would have the
world believe, the group would have ignored their presence rather than insisting
that the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) withdraw.
This second school of thought therefore believes that KDF’s presence in Somalia
has contributed to the strides made in the stabilisation of Somalia and the successes of AMISOM; hence the pressure for them to withdraw. The country therefore
finds itself in a catch-22 situation: to withdraw or not to withdraw, each of which
poses enormous implications for the security of Kenyans, as well as the future and
stability of the country.
The position of the government of Kenya is unequivocally not to withdraw, at least
for the foreseeable future. Apart from the combat fatalities that will come with the
prolonged exposure of Kenyan troops to battlefield conditions, a non-withdrawal
policy implies that the insecurity trends might continue to rise – unless drastic
measures are instituted to mitigate the threat of radical elements in the country.
Rising insecurity would, in turn, have disastrous repercussions on foreign direct investment, investor confidence, Kenya’s vibrant tourism sector and the associated
political costs and pressure from citizens. Already the Mpeketoni attacks, for instance, created political damage following blame shifting between the government
and opposition groups regarding who is responsible for the incidents.
While opposition groups are trying to harvest political capital from these events,
the government has also been quick in blaming political rivals for fomenting trouble
to make the country ungovernable, and paint the Kenyatta administration as a failure in the eyes of citizens. At the heart of the blame shifting is the crumbling of unity of purpose and the politicisation of efforts, with dire implications on domestic
attempts to address insecurity.
Citizens are increasingly fed up with the rising insecurity without clear hopes or in-
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dications of improvements in the near future. While President Uhuru Kenyatta's
administration grapples with the International Criminal Court question, the government’s worse nightmare will be to have a hugely disgruntled domestic constituency.
On the other hand, if Kenya were to succumb to the pressure to withdraw, this
would also come with costs. Apart from adding itself to the list of countries that
have burnt their fingers in Somalia, a knee-jerk withdrawal from Somalia without a
proper exit strategy would be problematic in a number of ways.
First, it would reinforce the belief among some Somalis that Kenya’s incursion was
fuelled by selfish interests, rather than wanting to assist in creating peace and stability for Somalia and the region at large. Secondly, it would imply conceding defeat
to al-Shabaab, and would thereby give the al-Qaeda-affiliated group a reason to
cause greater havoc in other countries that are currently at the frontline in the
search for peace in Somalia.
Thirdly, the suspicion that Kenya’s response was more of a rash response than a
planned, strategic move will be confirmed for the many who warned against the
incursion. Additionally, Kenya’s withdrawal from Somalia would have negative implications for the country’s strategic interests in the region and its efforts to position itself as an indispensable partner in the region’s security matrix.
The country cannot afford to be absent in a context where Burundi and Uganda are
clearly playing important roles in the quest for peace. Such an absence would directly erode its influence, soft power and political clout in the keen contest for regional leadership.
If Kenya were to withdraw, it would not be the first to have done so. American
troops withdrew in 1993 after casualties; and Ethiopian troops withdrew in 2009.
The aftermath of the 2009 Ethiopian withdrawal, however, created a security vacuum, which was readily exploited by al-Shabaab. A KDF withdrawal, unless immediately replaced with another capable actor in AMISOM’s sector II, would therefore
similarly be an invitation for the return of al-Shabaab and the loss of liberated areas
currently controlled by Kenya.
Moreover, Kenya seems to have crossed the Rubicon with its deployment into Somalia and certain choices in Kismayo – and so, even if the KDF were to withdraw,
there is no proof that al-Shabaab would cease its fire against Kenya. There is every
indication that the radicalisation resulting from Kenya’s presence in Somalia will
persist until contained.
The option of withdrawal is therefore not as easy as opposition groups make it appear, neither is non-withdrawal as cost-free and simple as pro-government communicators present it. Either way, Kenya's best options for addressing rising insecurity depends on unity of purpose among its political leadership and citizens in their
commitment to the national course, rather than parochial political and ethnic inter-
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ests.
Politicising security issues, as had happened after the Mpeketoni attacks, is counter
-productive to collective action and building political consensus for addressing insecurity. It is also important that Kenya does not blame all that happens on its territory on Somalia. Despite al-Shabaab’s influence, it is debatable whether al-Shabaab
directly planned and executed all the attacks perpetrated in Kenya in their name.
There is a case to be made about the challenge within Kenya itself.
Kenya’s greatest vulnerability to the rising insecurity is as much a problem with internal weaknesses, fault lines at the heart of the capacity of the state, social tension and citizens’ disengagement from the state. The threat of al-Shabaab, in most
cases, is mostly in its exploitation of these vulnerabilities that require urgent attention domestically.
Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis
Division, ISS Pretoria
http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-dilemma-in-somalia-to-withdraw-or-not
-to-withdraw
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Kenya’s security crisis worsens after Mpeketoni attacks
Wednesday, 25 June 2014
The Mpeketoni attacks that took place on the 15th and 16th of June have led to a
renewal of political divisions in Kenya and concerns over state responses to terrorism. While Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks as retaliation for “the
[Kenyan] government’s brutal oppression of Muslims in Kenya,”President Uhuru
Kenyatta blamed “local political networks”, insinuating that opposition figures were
behind efforts to foment violence.
Wherever the truth may lie, Kenya has been affected by a spate of attacks in recent
years. According to analysis by the Nairobi-based Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, the Mpeketoni attacks were the 61st to take place since Kenya’s military
incursion into Somalia (Operation Linda Nchi) began in October 2011. Over half of
these attacks have occurred in the country’s northeast, in Mandera, Garissa and
Wajir. Police stations and vehicles, nightclubs and bars, churches, and mosques
have all been targeted. The frequency of attacks has varied over time, with sharp
spikes (such as in April 2012 when seven attacks were reported) punctuating longer
periods when there were few attacks, such as in 2013 when only eleven attacks
were reported. However, there has been an uptick in attacks in 2014, with five
attacks in May alone.
Al Shabaab only claimed responsibility for six attacks
These attacks would advance its strategy to destabilise Kenya by instilling fear and
contributing to a sense of insecurity. However, Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for only six attacks since October 2011, with no one coming forward to claim
responsibility for the other attacks. One theory is that Al Shabaab sympathisers are
carrying out attacks independently of its command structures. Al Shabaab has
many supporters in Kenya and a strong presence in places like Eastleigh, the centre
for Nairobi’s Somali community. [1] Further, Al Shabaab has adapted its recruitment strategy, and increasingly draws in young Kenyans who are not Somali. This
has become an achilles heal for the Kenyan government, raising counterradicalisation of the youth to the top of the its security agenda.
Yet, in spite of the trend of worsening insecurity, there have been few arrests,
feeding an impression that the state has lost control over the situation. In April
2014, the government launched Operation Usalama Watch, a crackdown on illegal
immigrants. The operation was concentrated in neighbourhoods of Nairobi with
large Somali populations, including Eastleigh and South C. The police conducted
house to house searches, arresting anyone who did not have a form of Kenyan
identification or valid travel document. Those arrested were taken to the city’s
Kasarani Gymnasium and some were deported to Somalia, raising the ire of Somali
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leaders, other Kenyan opposition politicians, human rights advocates, and legal
experts.
Draconian measures being adopted are counter-productive and breed resentment
The Kenyan government’s response to worsening security fits a wider pattern of
draconian counter-terrorism measures adopted by governments in the Horn of
Africa and elsewhere. Governments curtail human rights and basic freedoms in
the name of strengthening security and safeguarding poorly defined ‘national interests’. Yet, trampling on human rights and civil liberties is dangerously counterproductive. The smouldering resentment it breeds risks generating terrorist recruits, alienates potential anti-terrorism allies, and weakens efforts to curb terrorist atrocities. In order to guarantee national security, protecting human rights
and continued vigilance are paramount.
Ultimately, Kenya’s faltering responses to recent attacks only serve to feed a dynamic that further destabilises the country. They are also no substitute for serious security sector reforms. The Kenyan police forces are still largely reviled by a
public that has long been accustomed to its corrupt, abusive and otherwise unprofessional practices. Other security agencies have been complicit in political
repression, eroding public confidence in the state’s abilities to provide secure for
all citizens without bias. A lack of adequate resources, poor training, weak leadership and an institutionalized culture of unaccountability in policing and security
institutions have grievously undermined public faith and trust. Thus, security sector reforms – and not swoops by security departments that disproportionately
target certain communities – will be critical for strengthening security and winning wider public support for the fight against terrorism in all its forms.
[1]
Kenya’s Assistant Minister for Internal Security and Provincial Administration, Orwa Ojode likened the Al Shabaab to a snake whose head was in
Eastleigh, Nairobi and tail in Somalia. Tom Odula, “War Fears: Somalis in
Kenya Afraid of Xenophobia”, Associated Press, 11 November 2011.
[2]
[2] Roth Kenneth, ‘Human Rights, the Bush Administration, and the Fight
Against Terrorism: The Need for a Positive Vision’ in www.hrw.org.
http://vulnerabilityandpoverty.blogspot.com
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Kenya: Attacks in Lamu County widens political division
A
raging debate over the perpetrators of two deadly terrorist attacks in the coast this
week, is threatening to push the country down the brink of stability.
Following the attacks, which left about 70 people dead, the Somalia-based Islamic
extremist group, al Shabab, were accused of complicity. The group later claimed
responsibility for the attacks.
However, on Tuesday, President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed local political groups, for
what he described as ethic violence.
While reports that a majority of the casualties are Kikuyu people seems to support
the President’s claim, many critics have condemned the comment saying it will create undue tension in the deeply divided nation and possibly compromise the investigations into the incident.
The president’s analysis of the situation is also consistent with al Shabab’s recent
comments that Mpeketoni was originally populated by Kenyan-Somali Muslims before it was invaded and occupied by predominantly Kikuyu Christians.
Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, whose Coalition for Reform and Democracy
(CORD) has been identified as the most likely suspects, has described the president’s statement as “unfortunate and unjustified.”
He noted that “CORD condemns the massacres in Mpeketoni and states categorically that violence is not a means of achieving legitimate political aims or objectives.”
He also urged President Kenyatta to desist from blaming other political groups and
tackle the lapses in the country’s security.
Mr. Odinga, whose allegations of electoral manipulation during the 2007/08 presi-
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dential polls led to ethnic clashes during which hundreds of Kikuyu people were
killed, has threatened the government with mass protests next month if his party’s
concerns about the country’s security and the general performance of the Jubilee
administration are not addressed.
Critics say the President’s dismissal of al Shabab’s statement claiming responsibility
for the attack as well as intelligence reports linking Somali suspects to the killings
reeks of a sinister motive to politicize the incident in order to win popular support.
The Financial Times quotes a western diplomat explaining that “this government is
only making things worse by sowing the seeds of national division and raising ethnic tension to the roof at a time it should be talking about national unity.”
Local sources say there have been protests in Nairobi and Mombasa this week over
the president’s contentious statement.
Several top officials and members of opposition groups have accused the country’s
security agencies of failing their mandate and reiterated calls for the withdrawal of
Kenya Defence Force (KDF) from Somalia.
al Shabab spokesman, Abdulaziz Abu Musab, who disclosed that the terrorists were
behind the attack, has urged ” Muslims in Kenya to fight for their dignity as there is
no neutral middle ground now.”
“Your religious leaders were killed, your daughters were raped, your property was
looted,” he said, in reference to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
where Kenyan forces have been stationed since 2011.
But on Wednesday, Deputy President William Ruto noted that “Kenya is not going
to walk away from its duty as a responsible neighbour, we are going to stay engaged under the AMISOM arrangement until stability is realised in Somalia.”
Mr. Ruto, who made this revelation during a joint press conference with Prime
Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed of Somalia, further disclosed that investigations
into the attacks in Lamu County have been opened and several top officers – who
have been accused of failing to act on intelligence reports of the attacks – have
been interdicted and will be arraigned in court.
Local sources say the authorities have also arrested several people in connection
with the attacks. Reports indicate that among the suspects is the owner of one of
the Nissan minibuses used in the raid, as well as the driver of one of the vehicles.
Many people are reported to have fled the county due to fears of a repeat attack –
despite heavy security presence. However, officials say efforts are underway to distribute emergency relief items among locals.
Meanwhile, on Wednesday, Kenya and Israel vowed to share intelligence and technology to improve the efficiency of the security agencies in both nations and curb
the possibly of successful terrorist attacks.
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The Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Liberman, who is currently in Kenya on a rare ten-day Africa tour, underscored the fact
that both countries are facing similar challenges of radicalism and religious extremism.
“We need to reduce bureaucracy on issues of sharing security information, the
same terror groups like Hamas, ISIS in Iraq, Boko Haram in West Africa and AlShabaab share information and network to cause evil; we therefore don’t need too
much formal systems which sometimes hinder those involved in responding to security threats,” he said.
On his part, President Kenyatta highlighted the fact that the key to defeating terrorism is through co-operation.
“That is what I have been telling our friends especially from the West. That they
don’t need to issue any travel advisories to their citizens but rather to encourage
them to not only travel but also invest in Kenya,” he said.
Reports indicate that both countries are also set to sign co-operation agreements in
other areas, including medicine, agriculture and technology.
Photo: 24Tanzania
http://www.zegabi.com/articles/?p=8810
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Libya
Libya Coming Full Circle. When A Deemed “Conspiracy Theory” Becomes Reality
Libya as a Functioning, Cohesive State has virtually Ceased to Exist
Global Research, June 18, 2014
In the duration of the
“revolutionary frenzy” that
categorized western media
coverage of the Libyan Civil
War in 2011, public audiences
were captivated with both tales of rebels aspiring for
“democracy” and with complimenting stories of unabated
brutality by Gaddafi forces.
Without any serious mainstream criticism, an imperialist mythology centered on the
interventionist doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect” was cemented in public
consciousness with even usually non-mainstream and “anti-imperialist” figures such
as Juan Cole deliberately misrepresenting the situation in Libya. In Cole’s perspective, no reference to armed militants from the start of the conflict or the role of extremism and western premeditation found its way into the narrative and he predicted a simplistic narrative where the overthrow of Gaddafi would lead the region into
an era of unity, prosperity and freedom.
Libya Today
How is Libya today? If one denied the existence of hell, they need not look further
than Libya to observe a case of hell on Earth. Libya as a functioning, cohesive state
has virtually ceased to exist, having been replaced by a myriad of conflicting factions divided on tribal and religious lines. While mainstream media tends to obscure the identity of these factions and their connection to western imperialists,
Eric Draitser in his analysis, “Benghazi, the CIA, and the War in Libya” shows the
beyond the fractious infighting, both primary factions engaging in direct combat
have been beneficiaries of the NATO imperialist powers in their systematic aggression against the Libyan state.
Battling over the strategic commercial area around Benghazi is the Islamist Ansar al
-Sharia led by Ahmed Abu Khattala fighting against the former leader of the CIAbacked Libyan National Salvation Front and current renegade Libyan Army General
Khalifa Hifter. The conflict is more complex than merely conflagration between
these two main parties and is interspersed with competing militias and gangs. As
noted by Draitser, the February 17th Marytrs Brigade, seen as one of the most capa-
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ble militias in the region, has received training by western forces and is seen as a
reliable security force, but is recognized by its own members as having antiAmerican sentiments.
The Islamist Ansar al-Sharia has been implicated in the September 11, 2012 attack
on the American consulate in Benghazi with its leader Khattala admitting being
present but denying leading the attack. With no end in sight for the war, it appears
that the primary gainers in the conflict are the westerncorporate-financier interests who orchestrated the overthrow of Gaddafi because he was seen an impediment to accomplishing their geopolitical aims.
Now they Admit the Truth.
On April 24th, 2014, Washington’s Blog published a priceless and concise piece titled “Confirmed: U.S. Armed Al Qaeda to Topple Libya’s Gaddaffi” with a very
astonishing admission by “top military officers, CIA insiders and thinktankers” confirming the obvious truth that “conspiracy theorists” have been saying
since 2011. The US backed Al Qaeda in Libya and that the Benghazi attack was a
byproduct of this. Washington’s Blog notes that in 2012, it documented that:
The U.S. supported opposition which overthrew Libya’s Gadaffi was largely comprised of Al Qaeda terrorists.
According to a 2007 report by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center’s center,
the Libyan city of Benghazi was one of Al Qaeda’s main headquarters – and bases
for sending Al Qaeda fighters into Iraq – prior to the overthrow of Gaddafi:
The Hindustan Times reported last year:
“There is no question that al Qaeda’s Libyan franchise, Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group, is a part of the opposition,” Bruce Riedel, former CIA officer and a leading
expert on terrorism, told Hindustan Times.
It has always been Qaddafi’s biggest enemy and its stronghold is Benghazi.
Al Qaeda is now largely in control of Libya. Indeed, Al Qaeda flags were flown over
the Benghazi courthouse once Gaddafi was toppled.
What was once deemed conspiracy theory became confirmed reality when
the Daily Mail reportedas Washington’s Blog subsequently pointed out:
A self-selected group of former top military officers, CIA insiders and think-tankers,
declared Tuesday in Washington that a seven-month review of the deadly 2012
terrorist attack has determined that it could have been prevented – if
the U.S. hadn’t been helping to arm al-Qaeda militias throughout Libya a year earlier.
‘The United States switched sides in the war on terror with what we did in Libya,
knowingly facilitating the provision of weapons to known al-Qaeda militias and figures,’ Clare Lopez, a member of the commission and a former CIA officer, told
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MailOnline.
She blamed the Obama administration for failing to stop half of a $1 billion United
Arab Emirates arms shipment from reaching al-Qaeda-linked militants.
‘Remember, these weapons that came into Benghazi were permitted to enter by
our armed forces who were blockading the approaches from air and sea,’ Lopez
claimed. ‘They were permitted to come in. … [They] knew these weapons were
coming in, and that was allowed..
‘The intelligence community was part of that, the Department of State was part of
that, and certainly that means that the top leadership of the United States, our national security leadership, and potentially Congress – if they were briefed on this –
also knew about this.’
‘The White House and senior Congressional members,’ the group wrote in an interim report released Tuesday, ‘deliberately and knowingly pursued a policy that provided material support to terrorist organizations in order to topple a ruler
[Muammar Gaddafi] who had been working closely with the West actively
to suppress al-Qaeda.’
‘Some look at it as treason,’ said Wayne Simmons, a former CIA officer who participated in the commission’s research.
While Wayne Simmons’ characterization of such actions by the globalist, imperialist
establishment in the United States as “treason” is correct in the sense that it was a
clear violation of not only the Constitution, but the public interest of America, there
is a rather disingenuous factor involved when some people, especially on the NeoCon right, attempt to play the “treason card.”
To perpetuate the false political theater of left-wing vs. right-wing designed to capitalize on myopic divisions, some Neo-Conservatives involved with the
same corporate agenda as Obama have taken the time to jettison responsibility of
U.S. financing of terrorism in Syria and Libya on “Obama the crypto-Muslim.” This
charge is found among the likes of Frank Gaffney who would have you delve into
partisan-driven Islamophobia blaming everything on the “liberals”, Obama’s
“foreign policy”, and treasonous elements within the US government. This, ofcourse, is done without insight into how such figures are merely cogs within a bipartisan machine of globalist aggression.
Interestingly, while the Neo-Con right attempts to distance itself from the Libyan
war, it was one of the most vocal factions, acting in concert with the Obama administration, in promoting greater US involvement in the war as Tony Cartalucci points
out in this article. He notes that, “In an open letter to House Republicans, the Foreign Policy Initiative which consists of Gaffney’s fellow Neo-Conservatives, stated in
regards to Libya (emphasis added)”:
We share the concerns of many in Congress about the way in which the Obama ad-
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ministration has conducted and justified this operation. The problem is not that
the President has done too much, however, but that he has done too little to
achieve the goal of removing Qaddafi from power. The United States should be
leading in this effort, not trailing behind our allies. We should be doing more to
help the Libyan opposition, which deserves our support. We should not be allowing ourselves to be held hostage to U.N. Security Council resolutions and irresolute
allies.
Clearly the Neo-Con agenda has been coming full circle since the first Gulf War in
the 1990s. The US “gun-walking” to jihadis in Syria from Libya, noted by
the Washington Times and New York Times (albeit with partisan spin and distortion), was actually planned under Bush in 2007 as noted by Seymour Hersh in “The
Redirection.” It has continued under Obama, influenced by Council on Foreign Relations figures throughout both administrations from Dick Cheney to Hillary Clinton.
Consider the following points from “The Redirection”:
To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in
clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations
aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are
hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.
To dispel critics’ notions that this is passive, uncontrollable, and indirect support,
consider:
[Saudi Arabia's] Bandar and other Saudis have assured the White House that “they
will keep a very close eye on the religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was
‘We’ve created this movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want
the Salafis to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—Hezbollah, Moqtada alSadr, Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran.
Neo-Conservative writer Gary Gambill would ride on this wave of terrorist aggression and pen an article for the Neo-Con “Middle East Forum” titled “Two Cheers for
Syrian Islamists.” As noted in the analysis of the piece by Tony Cartalucci titled “Globalist Rag Gives ‘Two Cheers’ for Terrorism”, one can see how terrorism is
a useful piece of capital of globalist imperialism that is easy to hide in the sight of
inattentive masses with easy ploys of political spin and plausible deniability.
The Syria Connection
Libyan terrorists are invading Syria. They have been doing so since the influx of jihadis began, enabled by outside powers. These are not simply rogue networks operating independently but rather include state-sponsorship, especially of NATOmember Turkey and NATO’s criminal proxy government in Tripoli, Libya. We are
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told by the media that the regime in Tripoli under the auspice of the National Transitional Council, and populated with puppets like Mustapha Abdul Jalil, is a moderate regime distinct from the “marginal Islamist forces.” However, even in mainstream accounts, one can note that these “official, moderate” groups are involved
with funding terrorism themselves as many geopolitical analysts have noted.
Tony Cartalucci notes that, “In November 2011, the Telegraph in their article,
“Leading Libyan Islamist met Free Syrian Army opposition group,” would report”:
Abdulhakim Belhadj, head of the Tripoli Military Council and the former leader of
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, “met with Free Syrian Army leaders in Istanbul
and on the border with Turkey,” said a military official working with Mr Belhadj.
“Mustafa Abdul Jalil (the interim Libyan president) sent him there.”
Another Telegraph article, “Libya’s new rulers offer weapons to Syrian rebels,” :
Syrian rebels held secret talks with Libya’s new authorities on Friday, aiming to secure weapons and money for their insurgency against President Bashar al-Assad’s
regime, The Daily Telegraph has learned.
At the meeting, which was held in Istanbul and included Turkish officials, the Syrians requested “assistance” from the Libyan representatives and were offered arms,
and potentially volunteers.
“There is something being planned to send weapons and even Libyan fighters to
Syria,” said a Libyan source, speaking on condition of anonymity. “There is a military intervention on the way. Within a few weeks you will see.”
Readers would be wise to note the heavy saturation of Al Qaeda terrorists in eastern Libya,particularly in Darna, and whose historical role has been documented by
the US’s West Point Combating Terrorism Center. It is inconceivable that these
forces would not have played a central role of the uprising. According to a October
2011 Christian Science Monitor, Mustapha Abdul Jalil has given a “nod to Islamist
fighters” who fought against Gaddafi by courting Islamist interests and in permitting polygamy, formerly banned under Gaddafi. He was seen as catering to Islamists by establishing Sharia law as the foundation of Libya’s future government;
under Gaddafi, Shariah had also played a role with limited, moderate interpretation
and in context to Gaddafi’s own political ideology. There are fears are that Islamists, repressed under Gaddafi, would make a forceful resurgence, as they have. The
article states:
Gadhafi saw militants as a threat to his authoritarian rule…Islamists are a small minority among Libya’s population of 6 million, but they were by far the largest and
most powerful faction among the fighters who battled pro-Gadhafi forces in eight
months of civil war. Abdul-Jalil, analysts said, was likely to have given his address an
Islamic slant as a nod to those fighters who were united with other factions by the
common goal of ousting Gadhafi but now are jockeying to fill the political vacuum
left by his ouster.
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Furthermore:
“It may not be quite be the country that NATO thought it was fighting for (when
Sharia is implemented in Libya),” said David Hartwell, a British-based Libya expert.
“But the huge amounts of oil and gas in Libya will make everyone learn how to reconcile themselves with the new Libya.”
And just for the record, I don’t equate every single Libyan fighter on the ground as
Islamist extremists and I believe there were individuals who felt disenfranchised
and had legitimate grievances. As in any society, you have an opposition and in the
case of Libya, a Library of Congress page that concedes meddlesome US support for
opposition groups, notes that the opposition is, “Divided ideologically into such
groups as Baathists (see Glossary), socialists, monarchists, liberals, and Islamic fundamentalists…” Islamists, nonetheless, were one of the most critical driving forces
of the conflict on the ground. Gaddafi also had popular support on the ground, especially in the west and among Black Libyans who Gaddafi had protected. One must
not neglect the role of racist elements among the opposition fighters targeting
blacks under false accusations of them being “mercenaries” as well as the accomplishment of the Gaddafi regime in bringing Libya from one of the poorest countries in the world to a nation that ranked as “high” in the UNDP’s Human Development Index
Full Circle of Destruction
The globalist agenda wanted Libya out of the equation for its role in opposing the
global financial order envisioned by Wall Street, namely in challenging the petrodollar by proposing a “gold dinar” currency for Africa with which to sell oil. This is
explained in “Are The Middle East Wars Really About Forcing the World Into Dollars
and Private Central Banking?” which notes the role of banking interests in orchestrating global aggression. Not to be missed is the “Wolfowitz Doctrine” proposed in
the 1990s upon which Libya was a nation slated for regime change.
In seeking to reorient the Middle East according to its interests, the western powers have, in essence, attempted to alter the very forces of nature and reaped undue consequences. Libya is now a failed-state and a terrorist safe-haven. Regardless of one’s opinion of Gaddafi and his short-comings, no one can seriously argue
that Libya is better off today. Innocent people continue to die in order to fulfill the
hegemonic ambitions of the western elite. This will continue unless we collectively
rise up, boycott, and replace these interests. That is real revolution.
Sam Muhho is a student of history at Florida State College (FSCJ) and an advocate
of anti-imperialism and anti-globalism. He can be reached at [email protected].
http://www.globalresearch.ca/
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Mali
Mali: Fear and Loathing In The Desert
June 28, 2014: The June 15 agreement by the government to negotiate a peace
deal with the Tuareg is bad news for AQIM and other Islamic terrorists in the north
because the Tuareg are native to the north and comprise most of the population
there. After dealing with foreign Islamic terrorists during the 2012 al Qaeda
“occupation” of the north most Tuareg have lost their enthusiasm for Islamic terrorists. The foreigners (most of them Arab) were found to be arrogant and disdainful of Tuaregs. There is an Arab minority in the north, but these Arabs have learned
to respect the Tuareg and generally get along. Some of the Malian Arabs will help
the Islamic terrorists, but most are reluctant to do so lest they be discovered and
driven out or killed.
The peace talks with the largely black southerners can still come to nothing as
there has long been mutual fear and loathing between Tuaregs and the southern
majority. All both sides can agree on at this point is that continued fighting favors
no one except the Islamic terrorists. The negotiations also have to deal with the
fact that the southerners are still humiliated at how the Tuareg defeated the largely
southern (black) army in 2012 and again in May 2014 when the army tried to take
control of Kidal. Many southern soldiers understand that the main reason the
better armed and more numerous soldiers continually get defeated by the Tuareg
irregulars is because of the massive corruption in the south. This means a lot of the
money allocated to the military is stolen and many senior officers are there because of political loyalty and corruption, not any skill in military affairs. Southern
politicians don’t like to discuss this and the most corrupt ones will not even
acknowledge this problem exists. Meanwhile many southerners now have another
reason to fear and mistrust the Tuareg; the fact that some of them are attracted to
Islamic terrorism. The southerners are largely Moslem but not attracted to Islamic
radicalism at all. Ten percent of Malians (mostly blacks) are Christian or still follow
the ancient tribal religions. Most southerners fear and despise Islamic radicalism
and see the Tuareg as “infected” with this “disease.” One thing the negotiations
must do is convince the southerners that few (too few to really matter) Tuaregs still
support Islamic terrorism.
Most of the remaining terrorists in the north belong to the North African al Qaeda
organization ( Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM) and its smaller affiliates
(like MUJAO) . Many terrorist bases, and large quantities of weapons, ammo and
other equipment have been captured and destroyed but there are still several hundred Islamic terrorists up there. The shortage of weapons, equipment and manpower has prevented the Islamic terrorists in the region (the Sahel) from launching
any major attacks in over a year or to do much beyond a few terror attacks a month
in Mali.
In order to maintain the pressure France plan to establish a special force of 3,000
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troops to fight Islamic terrorists throughout the Sahel (actually just Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso). This would include a thousand just in Mali and the
rest ready to quickly move from bases elsewhere in the region to wherever the
most Islamic terrorist activity had been detected. The Americans are a junior partners in this, providing satellite and UAV surveillance and other intel services
(especially analysis and access to nearly all American data on Islamic terrorist activities in the region). All this is meant to keep the Islamic terrorists in the Sahel weak
and disorganized. So far that has worked, but AQIM is still getting support from Islamic terrorists in Europe and the Persian Gulf, where wealthy Islamic conservatives are still willing to finance Islamic terrorism in Africa.
Algeria has been helpful, especially with securing its long, largely unguarded borders. These are 6,343 kilometers long and include frontiers with seven countries.
Moreover most of these borderlands are in the thinly occupied desert. Before aircraft were invented it was impossible to secure these borders. But even with aircraft a tightly sealed border remains impossible. About half that area is dangerous
because of the Islamic terrorist threat in those countries. Libya, Mali and Tunisia
comprise 52 percent of Algeria’s borders and the 1,376 kilometer long Mali border
is particularly troublesome since it is all desert and very popular with smugglers
and other outlaws from the regions to the south. Thus the Algerian effort to more
effectively patrol those borders. Most of those caught sneaking in are smugglers,
mainly because Algeria is now considered a hostile refuge for Islamic terrorists fleeing increasingly successful counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel.
While the May violence in the northern town of Kidal has subsided, there are still
about 18,000 additional refugees created by that fighting, at least a quarter of
them from Kidal itself. The problem is always getting refugees to return home.
Some do but many fear that the warring groups are still around and ready to start
shooting again. That is often the case. So there are still more than 130,000 Mali refugees in foreign countries and more than 150,000 refugees inside Mali. The total
number of refugees is down from 2013 but at the current rate of return refugees
will be a problem for several more years.
June 25, 2014: The UN extended the peacekeeping operation in Mali until June 30,
2015.
June 24, 2014: Police captured Mahamed Aly Ag Wadoussene, the criminal who
led a June 16 jailbreak. Wadoussene is infamous for leading the gang that kidnapped two French citizens in 2011 and sold them to al Qaeda. Wadoussene was
still in the capital when caught. Wadoussene is a Taureg, an army deserter and led
a criminal gang in 2011 that saw kidnapping Westerners as a way to get rich. Selling
the captives to Islamic terrorists was profitable but it did not make Wadoussene
and his gang rich. Meanwhile the police found out about Wadoussene and his kidnapping activity and eventually caught up with the gang. Wadoussene is not believed to be an Islamic terrorist but rather an immoral opportunist.
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June 16, 2014: Convicted kidnapper Mahamed Aly Ag Wadoussene and 21 other
prisoners broke out of a prison in the capital, killing two people in the process.
Wadoussene got hold of a gun and police are now investigating if bribery was involved in the incident.
June 15, 2014: In Algeria several Mali Tuareg separatist groups signed an agreement to hold peace talks with each other and the Mali government to create a permanent settlement to the many disputes between the Tuareg and the Mali government. The Tuareg includes MNLA (the main Tuareg rebel group) and several smaller and less well-armed groups.
June 11, 2014: In the north (north of Kidal on the road to Algeria) a car bomb exploded outside a peacekeeper base. This killed four Chadian peacekeepers and
wounded six others. Four Malian soldiers were also wounded. AQIM was suspected
of being responsible.
June 5, 2014: In the capital an army lieutenant was arrested and charged with being part of another plot to stage a coup and overthrow the government. Other
officers are being sought as well. All these men belong to the Red Berets, who are
paratroopers who were rivals of the officers who led the last coup.
June 4, 2014: The government announced the reintroduction of conscription. It will
be for all physically and mentally capable men aged 18 to 35. This is to begin in
2015 and will mainly be to train as many men as possible during six months of active service. After that the armed men will provide a large trained “reserve” force.
This is unlikely to work. That’s because 250,000 Mali males turn 18 each year. Applying high standards would eliminate about half of those from eligibility for military training, leaving 125,000 recruits to be trained each year. Currently the military only has about 7,000 active duty personnel and peak size recently was 9,000.
Assuming three months of training for recruits, most active duty military personnel
would be devoted to training in order to put 125,000 men a year through the program. After that some of the more capable newly trained men could be brought
back to active service just to help with the training and after a few years all eligible
18 year olds would be getting their training and know how to use weapons and
fight in an organized and disciplined manner. Another big problem is financial.
Where would the money for this come from? Even if you pay the recruits very little
you have to feed and house them during the training and there are other training
expenses as well (fuel, ammo and some medical care). The government plans to
begin this program in 2015 but odds are financial and organizational problems will
derail it. Mali last had conscription from 1983 to 1991 and it was not popular or
very effective.
May 30, 2014: Spain announced they had arrested six men and accused them of
recruiting young Moslem men to go fight for Islamic terrorist groups in Mali and
Libya. One of those arrested was a member of the Mauritanian Islamic terrorist
group MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) and had recently re-
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turned from Mali where he had received terrorist training.
May 29, 2014: In the north (west of Timbuktu) two aid workers (Malians employed
by a foreign group) died when their vehicle hit a mine.
In neighboring Burkina Faso Mali officials called for a meeting with Tuareg representatives and proposed resuming peace talks.
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/mali/articles/20140628.aspx
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Les dessous de Serval au Mali : « En réalité les terroristes ne sont pas
l’objectif de cette guerre. Ils sont seulement le prétexte »
« Et vous verrez, quand l’opération sera terminée, la France conservera, bien entendu, des bases militaires au Mali. Ces bases serviront aussi aux Américains et, en
même temps, parce que cela se passe toujours comme ça, des sociétés occidentales mettront la main sur des contrats juteux qui priveront, de nouveau, les pays
re-colonisés de leurs richesses et de leurs matières premières. »
L’intervention française au Mali, comme toute intervention militaire étrangère,
suscite de nombreuses interrogations. Au lendemain de son déclenchement déjà,
des voix hostiles avaient dénoncé les incohérences dans les actions antiterroristes de la France.
D’un côté, elle aide des rebelles djihadistes en Syrie pour renverser le régime de
Bachar Al-Assad. De l’autre, sous couvert de la lutte contre le terrorisme et l’obscurantisme, elle dépêche ses soldats au Mali.
Si au Mali, la question de l’opportunité et la nécessité de l’intervention militaire
française ne posait pas à son déclenchement, les opinions commencent à se contraster de nos jours. Et depuis le nouvel embrasement du nord au mois de mai dernier, le doute qui était palpable dans l’opinion publique malienne s’est désormais
transformé en réelle conviction de l’existence d’un agenda caché pour Serval.
Une guerre pour des ressources naturelles
Les richesses naturelles sont souvent assimilées en Afrique à des « malédictions ».
Cette perception résulte de l’observation d’une profonde réalité : il existe une multitude de conflits armés sur toutes les terres africaines réputées riches en ressources naturelles.
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Le nord du Mali est considéré par beaucoup de spécialistes de la question comme
une zone extrêmement riche en uranium et autres minerais.
Michel Collon, un journaliste belge, qui lutte contre la désinformation, pense que
« les terroristes ne sont pas l’objectif de cette guerre. Ils sont seulement le prétexte. » Pour lui, l’intervention française au Mali camoufle un projet d’accaparement des richesses naturelles du pays.
Selon lui, les medias sont les principaux vecteurs de la propagande en cachant
« les intérêts en jeu ». Ces intérêts sont d’ordre économiques mais aussi stratégiques car, défend M. Collon, l’intervention militaire au Mali n’est pas que pour
« les richesses du Mali. C’est sa position stratégique…»
Objectif : « des bases militaires, tout en favorisant entreprises »
Pour Laurent Louis, « l’objectif de cette guerre au Mali est très clair ». A long
terme, le député belge soutient que l’objectif pour la France est de maintenir en
permanence sa présence militaire au Mali, en faire un Etat sous tutelle des occidentaux pour leur réserver l’exclusivité des richesses du pays.
« Et vous verrez, quand l’opération sera terminée, la France conservera, bien entendu, des bases militaires au Mali. Ces bases serviront aussi aux Américains et,
en même temps, parce que cela se passe toujours comme ça, des sociétés occidentales mettront la main sur des contrats juteux qui priveront, de nouveau, les
pays re-colonisés de leurs richesses et de leurs matières premières. »
Dans un cadre plus général, il croit que « sous les apparences de bonnes actions »
l’intervention française au Mali » ne vise d’autres objectifs que la défense « des
intérêts financiers, dans une totale logique néocolonialiste. »
Le maintien des soldats français au Mali est désormais officiel depuis quelques
mois. Toujours, sous couvert de la lutte anti-terroriste, les autorités françaises
ont décidé de mettre un terme à Serval qui n’était qu’éphémère. Il s’agit maintenant de trouver la bonne formule pour légitimer la présence militaire sur un territoire souverain. On a donc décidé de l’inscrire dans un cadre, dit-on, plus global
s’étalant sur tout le Sahel.
Un accord de défense avec le Mali est en vue pour peaufiner les contours de
cette réorganisation militaire. Ce qu’il faut savoir c’est que le Mali a exclu, dans
l’accord militaire qui lie actuellement les deux pays, toute installation de base militaire française sur son territoire. Le nouvel accord permettra de lever cet obstacle.
Serval et le spectre de l’invasion islamiste imminente de Bamako : une invention
selon Jean-Christophe Notin
Ce spécialiste des interventions militaires françaises à l’étranger écrit dans son
livre « La Guerre de la France au Mali » que « les autorités françaises n’ont disposé d’aucun élément tangible », au moment de la prise de décision d’intervenir au
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Mali, prouvant que des colonnes de djihadistes se dirigeaient sur la capitale malienne.
« Pas plus que les avions de reconnaissance, aucun satellite, français comme américain, n’a jamais pris de mouvement massif en flagrant délit. Jamais un conseiller n’a
déposé sur la table du président de la République les clichés fatidiques, qui seraient
à la guerre ce que l’analyse ADN est dans une enquête criminelle : une preuve irréfutable. »
Le jeu trouble de la France au nord du Mali
Si depuis longtemps des voix dénoncent l’intervention française au Mali, pour le
malien, il s’agissait d’une mission de sauvetage pour laquelle il ne se serait autorisé
d’aucune manière de jeter un quelconque doute quant à sa finalité réelle. Cette
époque passée, la réalité des actions françaises amènent de plus en plus de Maliens à s’interroger sur les vraies raisons de Serval au Mali.
Au mois de mai, une résurgence des affrontements entre l’armée malienne et les
groupes armés a permis de prouver une chose : la France n’est pas préoccupée par
l’intégrité territoriale du Mali ; ou du moins, tant que ces territoires du nord restent
sous la main de ses alliés rebelles.
Le problème avec le Mali, contrairement à la Syrie, c’est qu’en 2012 les garants
(groupes rebelles) des intérêts que la France entrevoyait au nord du Mali, n’était
plus en phase avec les terroristes qui les avaient chassés de leurs positions. L’intervention n’aurait surement pas lieu si les djihadistes du Mali étaient, comme ceux
de la Syrie, en parfaite symbiose avec les rebelles.
Ces garants ont été les premiers à fouler les territoires reconquis par la France en
2013. Une manière de mettre l’Etat malien devant le fait accompli d’une réoccupation provoquée par cette même France qui était censée rétablir l’intégrité territoriale du Mali.
Pour Francis Simonis, « L’autorité de l’État n’a pas été retrouvée (à Kidal) et ne
peut pas l’être, puisque la France l’interdit. »
Ce spécialiste du Mali affirme que la partition du pays n’est pas à craindre, « ce qui
à craindre c’est que la situation actuelle se perpétue, c’est-à- dire une zone de nondroit dans la région de Kidal, qui échappe de fait au gouvernement malien. »
La revendication principale de ces groupes tolérés par la France était d’obtenir rien
de plus, rien de moins que l’indépendance de tout le nord du Mali. La France, sachant bien qu’ils ne peuvent étendre leur mainmise sur cette vaste région, les a invités à changer de discours. C’est désormais une autonomie qu’ils demandent. Le
vice-président du MNLA ne cache pas que cela ne sera qu’un préalable à l’indépendance de « Azawad ».
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L’autonomie est une formule qui arrangerait la France car ces régions auront une
indépendance financière. Avec un tel pouvoir, il ne fait aucun doute la France sera
la première à bénéficier, de la part des garants de ses intérêts, de l’exclusivité de
l’exploitation des richesses de cette partie du Mali.
En janvier 2012, Alain Juppé, le ministre français des affaires étrangères n’avait-il
pas appelé à la discussion avec le MNLA ? Il proposait un an plus tard « des solutions de décentralisation poussée, voire d’autonomie. » Qu’est-ce qui bloquait
pendant tout ce temps ? L’Etat malien.
En effet, comme il a pu être constaté en mi-mai, les Maliens avaient toujours gardé
l’espoir de la reconquête totale par la force souveraine. Mais, c’était également
l’occasion pour la France de casser définitivement le moral des maliens en leur
prouvant leur incapacité.
L’armée malienne qui était présente à Kidal avec à peine 200 militaires n’avait aucune chance de vaincre les milliers de combattants rebelles et leurs alliés djihadistes « modérés » (ceux du HCUA, le nouveau nom d’Ançardine, un groupe financé par AQMI, l’organisation des qataris). La France savait très bien que tôt ou
tard ces « évènements de Kidal » allaient survenir car, poussés par la fierté commune à tout patriote, guidés par la passion et l’exaspération, les maliens seront
amenés, à leur dépens, à vouloir un jour récupérer leurs terres.
Le plan a suffisamment marché pour mettre l’armée malienne dans une situation
morale comparable à celle d’après l’humiliation de la déroute de 2012. Ne parlons
pas de perte quelconque, autre que le moral, car l’armée malienne ne
s’est nullement améliorée du point de vue de son armement.
L’Etat malien est sous tutelle depuis l’intervention française et les nouveaux colons
lui interdisent tout achat d’armement. Et quand bien même il déciderait de le
faire, le FMI et la banque mondiale sont toujours là pour lui tirer les oreilles,
l’asphyxier économiquement pour qu’il n’ose plus se dérober à la pensée unique du
« maître à penser ».
http://maliactu.net/les-dessous-de-serval-au-mali-en-realite-les-terroristes-ne-sont
-pas-lobjectif-de-cette-guerre-ils-sont-seulement-le-pretexte/
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Nigeria
International Analysis: Nigerian Security in the Face of Boko Haram
JUNE 20, 2014 10:49 AM0 COMMENTSVIEWS: 17
Current Nigerian security services have never experienced anything like what they
are facing with Boko Haram. They are not equipped for the asymmetrical warfare
that is taking place.
Weaknesses in the existing security structures are becoming more evident as the
security forces find themselves unable to cope with this new threat. It is good that
Nigeria has accepted international assistance to begin to address some of these
structural challenges.
Nigeria is at the beginning of a long conflict. This is no longer a localized insurgency.
The security services need to acknowledge that there is no easy fix, and develop a
strategic plan for dealing with Boko Haram.
There are people and elements in the Nigerian military that are committed to this
cause, but they are under-supported and need resources. Past reports of corruption
and failure to respond are real challenges, as are institutional weaknesses.
If the entire security structure becomes demoralized, who will fight this war? A few
incidents have already been reported where military units have shown their frustration by shooting at commanders’ convoys.
Intelligence gathered from villagers in Nigeria and neighboring countries will be
critical to fighting this war, so we need to help build trust among neighboring countries’ security services.
The international community also needs to monitor the food-security situation.
Food shortages could become an issue down the line, since Boko Haram’s brutality
has caused several villages and markets to simply disappear.
Boko Haram is not a new organization. It has been around, in some form, since the
late 1990s. Before 2010, it was responsible for localized sabotage, attacked police
stations, and recruited young people, but it was not involved in kidnappings.
Evidence of some contact between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) began to surface in 2010, about nine months after the extrajudicial
killing of Boko Haram’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and his lieutenant, Alhaji Buji Foi.
In August 2011, Boko Haram bombed the United Nations building in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, using Al Qaeda-inspired tactics to show its power. Since then, it has become expansive in its reach and its brutality, and has been designated as a foreign
terrorist organization.
In April 2014, Boko Haram militants kidnapped more than 200 schoolgirls in the
town of Chibok. Despite reports out of Nigeria, it is unlikely that the girls remain in
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the country. It is more likely that most of them have been taken to Chad, Cameroon, or elsewhere.
Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekauis acting on one of his stated goals. In May
2013, he said that he would make the mothers and daughters of Nigeria suffer in
revenge for the capture of some of Boko Haram’s family members by Nigerian security forces.
Communication with the families of the missing girls must be improved, and more
trauma and grief counseling should be offered. These are areas in which the international community could be of assistance.
Not enough has been done to locate the missing girls. The same level of financial
and technological resources that have been used in the search for the missing Malaysia Airlines plane should be used to find the abducted girls, no matter which
country (or countries) they are in.
Furthermore, A number of village task force groups have cropped up in Borno
State, northeast Nigeria. They are usually called joint-force, vigilante, or village
watch groups. These groups exist to fill the security vacuum left by the Nigerian
official security forces, who are unable able to respond to the Boko Haram threat in
certain villages. More attention needs to be paid to this dynamic.
We have also seen in the case of the Central Africa Republic (CAR) the emergence
of the Anti-balaka groups that have become in some cases just as violent and uncontrollable as the Islamist Seleka rebels that they want to eliminate. Another example is the situation in Libya today. Some of the militia groups that the international community depended on have now become forces unto themselves. They
can add another dimension to an existing crisis if they operate lawlessly.
The international community needs to monitor the Borno-based vigilante groups
and make sure that they do not become a part of the problem.
Robin Renee Sanders is the former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria (2007-2010) as well
as the former U.S. Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (20022005).
http://www.peruviantimes.com/20/international-analysis-nigerian-security-in-theface-of-boko-haram/22336/
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Somalia
Somalia: Al-shabaab still poses serious threat to the region
Nairobi (HAN) June 18, 2014 – Al-Shabaab’s attack on Kenya over the past two
nights, in which more than 60 were killed, shows the group still poses serious
threat to the region’s stability, writes Jamal Osman of channel4, Who should govern Somalia: Somalis or the UN?.
Last week the UN Special Representative for Somalia, Nicholas Kay spoke at Chatham House. The talk was about the country’s successes and the difficulties it faces:
the role of the UN mission in Somalia (Unsom) and the “political in-fighting within
the government”.
But there’s in-fighting elsewhere that he would have been unlikely to mention: the
power struggle between the UN and the current government. It comes down to
who should govern Somalia: Somalis or foreigners?
Mr Kay is seen as the most powerful man in the country. He is accused of undermining the government, siding with Somalia’s archenemies, Ethiopia and Kenya,
blackmailing and threatening those who oppose him, including the president, and
generally using divide-and-rule tactics.
This is a critical year for Somalia. The people have set themselves an ambitious
agenda for reform.Aleem Siddique, Unsom
Responding to the allegations, Aleem Siddique, Unsom spokesperson said: “The
United Nations is mandated to support and help co-ordinate international assistance for Somalia’s state and peace building efforts.
“This is a critical year for Somalia. The people have set themselves an ambitious
agenda for reform. Unsom is committed to supporting these efforts, guided by the
principles of Somali ownership and leadership to restore peace and stability for all
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Somali people.”
With no functioning central authority caused by the country’s two-decade-long
war, most local administrations receive some sort of financial or military support
from foreign entities. Therefore, as a matter of fact, non-Somalis have leverage in
the country.
‘Yes men’
For instance, the current central government in Mogadishu cannot survive without
the backing of the African Union forces, which is part of a UN mission.
Relying on external actors means that, in Somalia, all want to have influence. The
main players are the UN, the US, the EU, international NGOs, the African Union,
neighbouring countries, Arab nations and Turkey, a relative newcomer.
In public, all of them say they have the same vision, but the reality is that they have
their own agendas and interests, which at times collide.
Abukar Arman, a writer and former Somali diplomat thinks the whole problem is
that “there is no clear demarcation of executive authority” between top two Somali
leaders and also amongst key international bodies.
[Authority in Somalia] boiled down to a game of diplomatic stare-down that sidelines the one who blinks first.Abukar Arman
“So, it boiled down to a game of diplomatic stare down that sidelines the one who
blinks first. Meanwhile, the Somali government functions within said power dynamic and blinks on most occasions.”
But some believe that the current leaders want to look different to their predecessors, whom the Somali public regarded as “yes men”.
The local media often analysis Mr Kay’s appearances, speeches and photo-shoots
with foreign players. And people become suspicious when he’s pictured comfortably sitting with Ethiopian or Kenyan leaders, Somalia’s foes.
What’s more, Somalis are uneasy with the UN man speaking on behalf of them on
international arenas, especially when there is a government that should be playing
that role.
Senior government officials told me that they have even considered filing an official
complaint against the UN man in the hope of changing him.
‘Decades of bloodshed’
Somalia faces numerous obstacles in its desire to end decades of bloodshed. Some
are obvious, others not. Current leaders accept they cannot achieve progress without outside help.
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But they would like to claim some sort of ownership of the process. They also feel
that the very people who were supposed to support them are sabotaging the system for their own sake.
As Mr Arman puts it, there are “some influential elements – domestic and foreign
profiteers – who are hell-bent on keeping business as usual”.
Meanwhile, ordinary Somali citizens who suffer most are holding onto their hope
for a better tomorrow. It’s those civilians that decision makers should be thinking
about.
- See more at: http://www.geeskaafrika.com/
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Tunisia
Le terrorisme en Tunisie : entre réalité et manipulations
juin 16, 2014
L’équation démocratique est à variables multiples et complexes, reflet de sociétés
aspirant au changement et écrivant une nouvelle page de leur histoire. Tout processus révolutionnaire bouleverse profondément une société, la nature et les modalités
d’exercice du pouvoir engendrant une montée en puissance des rivalités et du désordre. L’ampleur des frustrations sociales, la montée des revendications, les inégalités sociales, économiques et politiques, la confusion et la désorganisation des pouvoirs à la recherche d’un nouvel équilibre, l’incertitude croissante, l’insécurité et le
prurit anarchique qui en découlent sont autant de facteurs ouvrant une fenêtre
d’opportunités à des acteurs malveillants cherchant à en tirer profit. En ce sens,
l’instabilité et la confusion postrévolutionnaires peuvent s’avérer profitables à des
mouvements terroriste locaux ou se revendiquant d’A MI. En outre, cette phase de
recomposition interne des régimes engendre des exclus, des perdants et des minoritaires pouvant être tentés, par des man uvres illicites de déstabilisation, de verser
dans la violence armée nourrissant ainsi tous les extrémismes, notamment religieux.
L’équation démocratique est à variables multiples et complexes, reflet de sociétés
aspirant au changement et écrivant une nouvelle page de leur histoire. Tout processus révolutionnaire bouleverse profondément une société, la nature et les modalités d’exercice du pouvoir engendrant une montée en puissance des rivalités et
du désordre. L’ampleur des frustrations sociales, la montée des revendications, les
inégalités sociales, économiques et politiques, la confusion et la désorganisation
des pouvoirs à la recherche d’un nouvel équilibre, l’incertitude croissante, l’insécurité et le prurit anarchique qui en découlent sont autant de facteurs ouvrant une
fenêtre d’opportunités à des acteurs malveillants cherchant à en tirer profit. En ce
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sens, l’instabilité et la confusion post-révolutionnaires peuvent s’avérer profitables
à des mouvements terroriste locaux ou se revendiquant d’AQMI. En outre, cette
phase de recomposition interne des régimes engendre des exclus, des perdants et
des minoritaires pouvant être tentés, par des manœuvres illicites de déstabilisation, de verser dans la violence armée nourrissant ainsi tous les extrémismes, notamment religieux.
Attaque de l’ambassade des Etats-Unis en septembre 2012.
Attaque de l’Ambassade des Etats-Unis, lynchage de Lotfi Nagdh, double assassinat
politique, multiplication d’attentats et d’attaques visant les forces de sécurité et
l’armée nationale, tentative de porter atteinte à la rente touristique à travers les
attentats manqués de Sousse et de Monastir, enracinement d’un foyer terroriste au
Mont Chambi et le long de la frontière algérienne, événements de Raoued, faux
barrage à Jendouba marquant l’importation d’un mode d’action typiquement algérien, etc. constituent autant d’éléments témoignant d’une montée en puissance du
terrorisme islamiste en Tunisie et plaçant le pays dans un périmètre de ciblage préoccupant.
Par ailleurs, fragmentation du Maghreb, percée de l’islamisme radical et du jihadisme, éclatement d’un foyer d’instabilité durable au Sahel menaçant la stabilité
et la sécurité des pays du Maghreb, profonde déstabilisation de la Libye déstructurant l’Etat et érigeant le pays en épicentre de la menace terroriste, dissémination et
prolifération des armes légères et lourdes à notre frontière Est, poussée de fièvre
en Algérie marquée par de profondes tensions à la veille de l’élection présidentielle
du 17 avril 2014, enracinement du crime organisé transnational et généralisation
de l’économie informelle, gel du Grand Maghreb aggravant sa dépendance économique et stratégique, zone euro en récession risquant de déboucher sur une recon-
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figuration géopolitique de l’Europe et restructuration en cours de la scène moyenorientale sur fond de tensions croissantes, constituent autant de défis géopolitiques pour la Tunisie en transition démocratique.
C’est à travers le système de crises (sécuritaire, politique, économique et sociale)
usant l’Etat et le corps social tunisien et les profonds bouleversements géopolitiques restructurant le voisinage tunisien que doit être analysée la montée en puissance du terrorisme menaçant la sécurité nationale tunisienne et hypothéquant la
transition démocratique du pays. Dans ce contexte, qu’en est-il de la menace terroriste, entre réalité et manipulation ?
Le terrorisme, entre fantasme et réalité
Analyser les actes terroristes ayant secoué le théâtre tunisien sans s’interroger sur
les motivations, la nature des acteurs et des cibles, les stratégies de l’ombre, l’imbrication de multiples facteurs, etc., c’est se cantonner à la description de la face
visible de l’iceberg, face dont se délectent de nombreux pseudo-chercheurs ayant
érigé le terrorisme en fonds de commerce. En réalité, tout terrorisme s’enracine
dans un territoire, c’est-à-dire un milieu géographique et humain ayant ses propres
singularités. Par voie de conséquence, tout raisonnement globalisant est à proscrire. Par ailleurs, toute violence de nature terroriste doit être analysée au regard
de deux plans : un plan national caractérisé par des spécificités sociales, économiques et politiques pouvant alimenter la violence terroriste et, un environnement
géopolitique régional et international dopant les facteurs internes tout en introduisant une dimension manipulation par des acteurs loin de toute foi religieuse et
poursuivant, derrière le voile islamiste, des objectifs d’ordre stratégiques.
Face à la complexité de la menace terroriste, la prudence doit guider tout effort de
recherche. Deux questions s’imposent :
- Quelle est la part relevant du local et la part s’inscrivant dans une dimension globale établissant un lien avec une « internationale » terroriste ?
- Quelle est la part authentique (combattants instrumentalisés, simples pions sur
un échiquier, mais fondamentalement imprégnés par l’importance de leur cause)
et la part manipulation et instrumentalisation (groupe infiltré par des services secrets étatiques et dont les actions téléguidées répondent à un agenda loin de toute
foi islamique) ?
Le terrorisme islamiste semble combiner une part d’authentique et une part de
manipulation par des services étatiques et des sources obscures. En ce sens, il convient d’établir une distinction entre commanditaires avisés, poursuivant des objectifs stratégiques ou personnels et les exécutants instrumentalisés. Cette distinction
est au cœur du raisonnement : il ne s’agit pas de nier la réalité d’authentiques jihadistes mus par une volonté de lutter contre un Occident impie attaquant des
terres d’islam ou voulant restaurer le Califat, mais de ne pas s’en contenter. Il est
utile de prendre en considération les stratégies secrètes d’acteurs divers poursuivant des intérêts loins de toute foi religieuse, encore plus de l’islam. Le chômage et
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les injustices sociales, conjugués à l’absence de progrès économiques et sociaux,
jouent en faveur des commanditaires et de la persistance du terrorisme. En outre,
la stratégie occidentale de harcèlement et de stigmatisation des musulmans alimente le choc Occident-Islam et favorise l’endoctrinement et le recrutement des
exécutants.
Le fantasme d’A M
AQMI est une organisation complexe, officiellement franchise d’Al Qaïda à l’échelle
maghrébine et sahélienne et, officieusement, levier utilisé par de multiples acteurs
au gré de leurs intérêts stratégiques ou criminels. En intégrant « officiellement » AlQaïda en janvier 2007, le Jihad au Maghreb change de dimension, de doctrine et de
mode d’action. Il devient la quatrième branche armée d’Al-Qaïda, après celles établies en Afghanistan, en Irak et en Arabie Saoudite avec pour vocation d’unifier les
mouvements jihadistes à l’échelle maghrébine. Telle est la face visible de l’iceberg,
une partie d’une réalité extrêmement complexe et volatile. Les apparences sont
souvent trompeuses !
L’idée d’une Al-Qaïda, maison mère, dirigeant ses différentes franchises à l’image
d’une multinationale du terrorisme relève aujourd’hui du pur fantasme. L’organisation a été, conformément aux conclusions de nombreux analystes, décapitée sur le
plan opérationnel en 2002 suite à l’intervention occidentale en Afghanistan. Progressivement, ses principaux responsables, dont Ben Laden, ont été neutralisés.
Dès lors, la violence islamiste s’est recentrée sur des problématiques locales ou régionales inhérentes à la prise du pouvoir ou à la captation des richesses et le contrôle des trafics. Derrière les objectifs affichés, au Yémen, en Syrie, en Irak et au
Liban, elle vise le renversement de pouvoirs chiites réfractaires à l’islam sunnite
obéissant à un agenda géopolitique transcendant la doxa islamiste. Au Pakistan ou
en Afghanistan, elle aspire à assurer le maintien au pouvoir de forces politiques
islamistes.
Au Sahel, la menace salafiste, réelle car porteuse d’un message politico-religieux,
est « mise à la sauce » de toutes les problématiques locales : trafics en tous genres,
recherche de rentes, rivalités politiques, conflits d’intérêts entre nomades et sédentaires (Arabes et Touaregs, Maures et Noirs), poids relatif de l’armée et des services de sécurité au sein des différents pays, appétits des grandes multinationales,
rivalités entre Etats, etc. Dans ce cadre, AQMI semble être l’arbre qui cache la forêt, le terrorisme amplifié voilant les véritables enjeux. Qu’ils s’appellent AQMI,
MUJAO, Ansar Dine ou autre, il s’agit d’acteurs cherchant à tirer profit du désordre
sahélien. AQMI ne constitue en tant qu’entité politico-religieuse qu’un irritant aggravant les facteurs géopolitiques et géoéconomiques à la base de l’instabilité de
l’espace sahélien. La menace terroriste, ne doit pas masquer la défaillance politique, économique et sociale des Etats sahéliens minés par leurs faiblesses internes
et par les appétits spéculatifs et rivaux des puissances étrangères.
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Ce que l’on désigne sous le nom d’AQMI n’est en réalité qu’un conglomérat mafieux non homogène, composé de bandes aux intérêts disparates, souvent rivales,
parfois unies quand elles sont collectivement menacées. Parcourue par des querelles de chefs mafieux, AQMI est aussi, et peut-être avant tout, une organisation
de banditisme ayant érigé les enlèvements et les prises d’otages en commerce ordinaire. Vernis idéologique, l’islamisme est instrumentalisé afin de permettre à ces
groupes criminels de s’enraciner et de prospérer au sein d’un espace dérégulé sur
la plan stratégique. Alain Chouet souligne : « l’action d’AQMI tient plus de la « piraterie barbaresque » (trafics d’armes, de biens de consommation divers et surtout
de drogues, racket des transporteurs, commerçants et entrepreneurs, prise
d’otages contre rançon, etc.) que de la rhétorique salafiste. Ses revendications «
idéologiques » (abrogation des lois européennes sur le port du voile, libération des
militants islamistes violents, etc.), d’ailleurs soutenues avec mollesse, ainsi que ses
proclamations répétées d’allégeance à la mouvance de Ben Laden et d’Ayman Zawahiri semblent d’abord destinées à lui donner un paravent idéologique islamique
pour ses activités criminelles ».
L’islamisme radical apparaît comme étant le conduit par lequel s’enracine le crime
organisé. Les mouvements se revendiquant de l’islamisme aspirent principalement
à contrôler les routes et les trafics prospérant grâce aux vulnérabilités fragilisant
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l’espace sahélien. Il est donc important de dédramatiser cette appellation Al-Qaïda,
qui est essentiellement un moyen de démultiplier l’attention médiatique dans
l’intérêt des ravisseurs. Peter Pham, directeur du département Afrique du groupe
de réflexion Atlantic Council, précise : « Le mouvement jihadiste en Afrique n’est
clairement pas dirigé par le successeur d’Oussama Ben Laden, l’Egyptien Ayman AlZawahiri, si tant est qu’il contrôle quoi que ce soit. La marque Al-Qaïda aide certains groupes locaux à se distinguer des groupes rivaux, cela facilite notamment le
recrutement de jeunes adeptes et dans certains cas le tampon Al-Qaïda leur permet d’obtenir des fonds de l’étranger, en particulier des pays du Golfe. De l’autre
côté, cela permet à Al Zawahiri de faire croire au monde qu’il a plus d’influence
qu’il n’en a réellement. En fait c’est un homme seul, caché dans une maison
quelque part. Il apprécie de pouvoir tirer crédit, partiel ou total, de ce que font ces
acteurs indépendants en Afrique. Mais dans les faits le commandement central d’Al
-Qaïda n’a aucune influence opérationnelle. Rien ne provient de lui. Cela se passe
entre groupes, ils échangent des savoir-faire, des informations et parfois des combattants ». Autant de théâtres d’affrontements, autant de problématiques différentes qui ne peuvent être résolues en considérant à tort qu’elles émanent d’un
même courant ou d’un même chef d’orchestre tapi dans les zones tribales du Pakistan. « Le seul élément commun à toutes ces violences est le fait qu’elles servent
partout les intérêts stratégiques des Etats-Unis et le besoin de légitimation des pétromonarchies wahhabites d’Arabie-Saoudite et du Qatar qui ne se cachent même
plus en certains endroits de soutenir, financer et armer le djihadisme, à l’instar des
événements secouant la Syrie. Derrière le paravent usé d’une Al-Qaïda mythifiée,
ce sont là les véritables chefs d’orchestre de la violence islamiste ».
La menace terroriste en unisie
La menace terroriste affecte gravement la sécurité du pays et risque d’hypothéquer
la transition démocratique en entravant la tenue d’élections libres et transparentes. Cette menace découle de la combinaison de multiples facteurs internes et
d’un environnement géopolitique chargé de menaces.
Les facteurs internes
Divers facteurs structurant la scène tunisienne post-révolutionnaire s’avèrent favorables à un enracinement d’éléments jihadistes ayant recours au terrorisme : Le net
affaiblissement de l’Etat traversant une crise structurelle usant ses capacités de résistance et de lutte ; La dispersion des moyens et l’absence de stratégie cohérente
et globale de lutte contre le terrorisme fédérant les moyens sécuritaires mais également économiques et sociaux afin de mettre en avant le concept de sécurité globale et humaine; L’affaiblissement de l’appareil sécuritaire tunisien, notamment
quant à la dimension renseignement et anticipation, pierre angulaire de toute stratégie efficace de lutte contre le terrorisme (absence de centralisation du renseignement stratégique : détection et neutralisation de la menace, d’organes d’exécution
sûrs (non infiltrés) et efficaces (mobilisables rapidement et travaillant de manière
coordonnée) ; La dégradation de la situation économique et sociale amplifiant les
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capacités des groupes terroristes en termes d’endoctrinement et de recrutement ; La pauvreté et la croissance du chômage touchant principalement les jeunes
(absence de perspectives d’avenir); La corruption et la montée en puissance des
trafics illégaux et de l’économie informelle offrant un levier de financement aux
groupes terroristes. Plus globalement, nous assistons à une infiltration progressive
du crime organisé transnational, limité à ce stade à un état embryonnaire du fait de
la sauvegarde, en dépit de la crise, de certaines capacités de résistance de l’Etat
tunisien (administration, société civile, etc.) ; Les ambiguïtés relativement à la législation applicable : frilosité du ministère de la justice quant à une application rigoureuse de la législation antiterroriste dans le cadre du respect des Droits de
l’Homme ; La montée de l’extrémisme religieux et du salafisme prenant le contrôle
de centaines de mosquées amplifiant les capacités d’endoctrinement et de recrutement. Le premier ministre Mehdi Jemaa, lors de son discours télévisé du 3 mars
2014, a évalué leur nombre à 149 ; L’a aiblissement de la coopération avec des
partenaires clefs à l’échelle régionale et internationale du fait d’une relative détérioration de la confiance.
En dépit de la prudence inhérente à toute gestion de phase transitoire, laxisme,
voire complicités remontant au plus haut niveau de l’Etat prêtant à interrogations
alors que la situation exige fermeté en conformité avec les lois de la République à
l’égard de toute organisation basculant dans la violence armée aveugle : ambiguïtés quant à une réelle volonté politique de la Troïka relativement à la lutte
contre le terrorisme hypothéquant l’avenir du pays. Le gouvernement de Mehdi
Jomaa semble vouloir marquer une rupture et un durcissement à l’égard de la
sphère salafiste et jihadiste. L’intention est louable, encore faut-il en avoir les
moyens et la possibilité tant les obstacles sont nombreux : affaiblissement et infiltration de l’appareil sécuritaire, grave détérioration de la situation économique et
sociale offrant peu de perspectives d’embellissement à court terme, notamment
relativement au chômage des jeunes, absence de stratégie cohérente et globale de
lutte contre le terrorisme, environnement géopolitique chargé de menaces, duplicité de certains radicaux au sein du mouvement Nahdha et de ses divers satellites
instrumentalisant la violence islamiste au gré des vicissitudes de la vie politique tunisienne afin d’entretenir un climat de tensions en vue de peser sur les futures
élections, etc. constituent de sérieux défis qu’il conviendra de surmonter. Cette
stratégie est caractéristique du fonctionnement de la confrérie des Frères Musulmans et a rencontré un soutien déterminant auprès des Etats-Unis et de certains
pays européens.
Plus globalement, il est clair que les mouvements islamiques qui se sont approprié
les révolutions arabes bénéficient du soutien de certaines puissances européennes
et des Etats-Unis. Que dissimule cette alliance qui ne dit pas son nom ? Le pragmatisme et la Realpolitik semblent avoir pris le dessus sur les vertus de la démocratie
et de la bonne gouvernance. N’en est-il pas de même à travers le soutien apporté
par les Occidentaux à des mouvements ouvertement fascistes en Ukraine, l’objectif
étant de reproduire le scénario de la révolution orange de 2004 afin de repousser
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l’ours russe dans ses frontières du XVIIème siècle et d’otaniser sa périphérie ou son
étranger proche ? En effet, l’Afghanistan, l’Irak, la Somalie, etc. ont révélé l’incapacité des puissances occidentales à neutraliser les islamistes par la force : sur tous
ces fronts, les troupes occidentales se sont repliées sur un compromis de façade.
L’islam politique est enraciné et bénéficie du soutien d’une large base sociale et
culturelle. Prenant acte de cet état de fait, l’Occident, à la faveur des révolutions
arabes, apporte un soutien discret aux islamistes dits modérés dans l’objectif de
neutraliser les plus extrémistes (l’écume hostile) en plaçant ces groupes face aux
responsabilités de la gestion politique, économique, sociale et sécuritaire de leurs
propres sociétés : telle est la parade globale à l’islam politique visant l’ensemble de
la sphère de l’Islam. Conformément à cette logique, l’exercice du pouvoir politique
confrontant ces groupes aux difficultés d’ordre économiques, sociales et culturelles
(société civile) constituera un facteur déterminant de responsabilisation induisant
le sens de la mesure et de l’autorégulation et l’élimination des plus radicaux. Parallèlement, cette stratégie obéit à des calculs géopolitiques d’envergure mondiale.
Face à la percée de puissances rivales menaçant l’hégémonie américaine, il incombe pour l’Etat profond américain d’être en mesure de fragmenter le monde
musulman selon des lignes religieuses et communautaires afin d’entretenir une
zone d’instabilité durable sur le flanc sud de la Russie et de menacer la sécurité des
approvisionnements énergétique de la Chine. De plus, via un soutien à peine voilé
apporté aux séparatismes travaillant les périphéries de ces puissances majoritairement musulmanes (Caucase et Tchétchénie pour la Russie, Xinjiang pour la Chine),
l’instrumentalisation de l’islamisme radical vise clairement à affaiblir ces acteurs
menaçant le projet unipolaire américain.
Alain Chouet, ancien chef du service de renseignement et de sécurité de la DGSE et
fin connaisseur du monde arabe, abonde en ce sens : « s’approprier médiatiquement les violences politiques commises dans le monde par des musulmans isolés,
offrir gracieusement leur parrainage moral à des groupes jihadistes locaux, permettait à la mouvance salafiste internationale de valoriser les mythes issus du 11
septembre, de magnifier les peurs de l’Occident et d’accentuer le fossé entre la
terre d’islam et le reste du monde. Mais quand il apparaît à partir de 2010 que,
suite aux recommandations de nombreux think tanks américains, l’Occident n’a
nullement l’intention de protéger les régimes arabes des appétits des islamistes
mais est, bien au contraire, prêt à leur offrir le pouvoir sur un plateau, la donne
change du tout au tout.
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En effet, dès le milieu de la décennie 2000, des chercheurs néoconservateurs des
deux côtés de l’Atlantique recommandent de confier l’encadrement et la gestion
des sociétés musulmanes à la confrérie des Frères musulmans. Ceux-ci seraient des
sortes de démocrates-chrétiens à la sauce musulmane, aimablement conservateurs
et néo-libéraux, acquis à l’économie de marché mondialisée et susceptibles de
constituer un utile rempart contre les dérives violentes du salafisme. C’est évidemment ignorer ou dissimuler le fait que tous les ténors de la violence jihadiste sont
issus de la confrérie dont ils constituent de fait le bras armé. Cela n’empêche pas
l’administration américaine, le Département d’État, le Pentagone et les services de
sécurité américains, ainsi que nombre de correspondants européens au sein des
instances de Bruxelles, d’adopter ce concept et d’en tirer leurs lignes de conduite
lors des printemps arabes de 2011 ».
Georges Corm va plus loin en soulignant : « les mouvances islamiques qui ont kidnappé les révoltes à travers les processus électoraux semblent les bienvenues dans
le monde occidental. Nous retrouvons à nouveau la même alliance ancienne entre
les Etats-Unis et l’Arabie Saoudite, qui soutient ces mouvances pour faire échouer
ce processus révolutionnaire, tout comme elle avait réussi à faire reculer la vague
de nationalisme arabe laïque, anti-impérialiste et anti-israélien durant les années
1960
à
1980 .
L’erreur d’appréciation, les impératifs géopolitiques de la GWOT américaine, la volonté de simplification et de schématisation de nombreux experts et journalistes
contribuant à dénaturer la menace terroriste ont abouti à cette stratégie qui aujourd’hui trouve ses limites. En effet, « habiles, par l’utilisation des fonds alloués
par les théocraties pétrolières, à occuper de façon démagogique les créneaux sociaux et sanitaires abandonnés par les pouvoirs autoritaires, les islamistes politiques le sont beaucoup moins à contrôler et gérer des États en difficulté. Les manquements à leurs engagements et obligations, leur incurie et la rapacité de leur
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gestion suscitent l’exaspération et la réaction des peuples en Égypte, en Tunisie et
en Libye. Les débordements de violence des bandes salafistes provoquent la résistance des minorités en Syrie, en Irak, au Yémen et jusqu’au Pakistan. Moins de dixhuit mois après son instauration, « l’ordre islamique » prôné par les néoconservateurs occidentaux et soutenu par les pétromonarchies est au bord de l’implosion ».
Pour autant, le « Grand jeu » est loin d’être achevé dans le contexte d’une exacerbation des rivalités à l’échelle planétaire. Les Frères musulmans ne sont pas résolus
à abandonner facilement un pouvoir politique qu’ils convoitent depuis les années
1940. Conformément à leur idéologie et à leur doctrine, ils répondront certainement à la contestation par la violence. Non pas à l’instar des régimes dictatoriaux
s’appuyant sur l’armée et une redoutable police politique, instruments régaliens de
la violence institutionnelle. Comme le souligne Alain Chouet, « ils y répondront à
leur manière par les assassinats politiques comme en Tunisie, par les lynchages et
les viols comme en Égypte, par les règlements de comptes sanglants comme en Libye, par les voitures piégées comme en Irak. Autant d’actions subversives et d’entretien d’une insécurité permanente que l’on ne manquera pas d’attribuer à des
mains étrangères, au terrorisme incarné par la mythique Al-Qaïda, aux impies et
mal intentionnées qu’ils prétendront être les seuls à pouvoir couper. À ce petit jeu,
les Occidentaux ont toutes les chances de se voir désigner comme l’ennemi surtout
s’ils ont la mauvaise idée de ne plus soutenir, ou au moins de ne plus tolérer, les
Frères musulmans ». Ce schéma constitue l’exacte répétition du précédent afghan
voyant les « combattants de la liberté » soutenus par la CIA contre l’envahisseur
russe en 1979 puis abandonnés à leur sort lors du retrait russe se retourner contre
leurs bienfaiteurs américains et saoudiens. La Tunisie est désormais le laboratoire
de cette nouvelle thérapeutique.
Les facteurs extérieurs
A ces divers facteurs internes s’ajoute un environnement géopolitique en profonde
restructuration et chargé de menaces offrant de nombreux angles de pénétration
en territoire tunisien et dopant les vulnérabilités du pays. En effet, le voisinage
maghrébin (Libye et Algérie) et le flanc sud sahélien constituent une matrice amplifiant la menace terroriste et criminelle. Les autorités tunisiennes doivent prendre
pleinement la mesure de la gravité de la situation et élaborer une stratégie de lutte
contre ce fléau risquant d’hypothéquer l’avenir du pays.
Une impérieuse stratégie de lutte contre le terrorisme
Ce contexte en effervescence dicte une réforme de l’appareil sécuritaire tunisien
en deux temps : à court terme, faire face à l’urgence découlant de la montée en
puissance du jihadisme, de la menace terroriste et de l’enracinement du crime organisé transnational (multiplication des trafics illégaux en tous genres) sur fond
d’aggravation de la corruption et d’affaiblissement de l’Etat tunisien. Cette orienta-
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tion dicte une analyse rigoureuse et objective des facteurs alimentant le terrorisme
et de la nature des acteurs afin d’élaborer les contre-stratégies ou ripostes à court
terme en mesure de les contenir ; à moyen terme, une refonte de l’architecture
sécuritaire tunisienne visant une rationalisation du fonctionnement des institutions
impliquées dans la lutte contre ces menaces s’impose. Il conviendra d’être en mesure de dessiner les contours d’une stratégie nationale de sécurité (mission, composition et fonctionnement) pilotée par un le Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS).
Cette structure assumera notamment la centralisation du renseignement stratégique, pierre angulaire de la lutte contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé et sera
dotée d’unités diverses, notamment de renseignement, d’analyse géopolitique, de
veille et d’analyse prospective (élaboration de scénarios et identification de situations de seuil d’alerte sécuritaire avec construction de tableaux de bords d’alerte).
Le fonctionnement et la performance des forces de sécurité intérieures s’inscrivent
au sein d’une représentation du champ des menaces non pas simplement du passé
ou du présent mais également de l’avenir. Un Etat doit être en mesure de maîtriser
les enjeux d’avenir de sa politique de sécurité et les besoins qui en découlent afin
de jouer pleinement son rôle dans le maintien des grands équilibres internes. La
volatilité et la diversité des menaces pouvant peser significativement sur la sécurité
de la Tunisie dictent de sensibiliser les différents acteurs à la nécessité de la prise
en compte de l’avenir dans leurs processus d’évaluation, de diagnostic et de traitement des sources de menace avérées ou potentielles. Plus que jamais l’anticipation
est au cœur de la lutte contre le terrorisme en Tunisie.
http://afriqueinside.com/a-la-une/le-terrorisme-en-tunisie-entre-realite-etmanipulations16062014/
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Terrorism in the World
Russia, Iraq, China and Europe - The Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse
Politics / GeoPoliticsJun 26, 2014 - 06:32 PM GMT
Ian Bremmer, NYU professor and head of the geopolitical consulting powerhouse
Eurasia Group, consults at the highest levels with both governments and companies because he brings to the table robust geopolitical analysis and a compelling
thesis: that we are witnessing “the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order.” We live, as his last book told us, in a “G-0” world. In today’s Outside the
Box, Ian spells out what that creative destruction means in terms of events on the
ground today. As Ian notes, the most prominent feature of the international landscape this year has been the expansion of geopolitical conflict. That expansion is
gaining momentum, he says, creating larger-scale crises and sharpening market volatility.
Hold on to the reins now as Ian take us for a ride with the “Four Horsemen of the
Geopolitical Apocalypse.” (For more information about the Eurasia Group or to
contact Ian Bremmer, please email Kim Tran at [email protected].)
We’ll follow up Ian’s piece with an excellent short analysis of the Iraq situation
from a Middle East expert at a large hedge fund I correspond with. Pretty
straightforward take on the situation with regard to ISIS. This quagmire has real implications for the world oil supply. (It appears that the Sunni rebel forces are now in
complete control of the key Baiji Refinery, which produces a third of Iraq’s output.)
Back in Dallas, it’s a little hard to focus on geopolitical events when seemingly all
the news is about ongoing domestic crises. But the outrageous IRS loss of emails
doesn’t really affect our portfolios all that much. What happens in Iraq or with China does. There’s just not the emotional impact.
One domestic humanitarian crisis that is brewing just south of me is the massive
influx of very young children across the US-Mexican border. When this was first
brought to my attention a few weeks ago, I must admit that I questioned the credibility of the source. We have had young children walking across the Texas border
for decades but always in rather small numbers. The first source I read said that
40,000 had already come over this year. I just found that to be non-credible, but
then with a little reasonable research it not only became believable but could be a
bit low – it looks as many as 90,000 children will cross the border this year.
What in the name of the Wide Wide World of Sports is going on? First of all, how
do you cover up something of this magnitude until it is a true crisis? When the administration and other authorities clearly knew about it last year? (The evidence is
irrefutable. They knew.)
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I am the father of five adopted children. In an earlier phase of my life, I was somewhat involved with Child Protective Services here in Texas. It was an emotionally
difficult and heartrending experience. (One of my children came out of that system
and three from outside of the United States). I have no idea how you care for
90,000 children who don’t speak the language and have no connection to their new
locale. Forget the dollar cost, which could run into the tens of billions over time.
These are children, and they are on our doorstep and our watch. You simply can’t
ignore them and say, “They are not supposed to be here, so it’s not our responsibility.” They are children. Someone, and that means here in the US, is going to have to
figure out how to take care of them, even if it is only to learn why they try to come
and figure out where to send them back to. And frankly, trying to to send them
back is going to be a logistical and legal nightmare, not to mention psychologically
traumatic to the children.
Maybe someone thought that waiting until there was a crisis to let this information
slip out (and we found out about it because of photos posted anonymously of children packed together in holding cells) would create momentum for immigration
reform. And they may be right. But I’m not certain it’s going to result in the type of
immigration reform they were hoping to get.
I have to admit that I’ve been rather tolerant of illegal immigrants over the course
of my life. There are a dozen or so key issues that I think this country should focus
on, but I’ve just never gotten that worked up about illegal immigration. The simple
fact is that everyone here in the US is either an immigrant or descended from immigrants. It may be, too, that I’ve hired a few undocumented workers here and there
in my life. As an economist, I know that we should be trying to figure out how to
get more capable immigrants here, not less. What you want are educated young
people who are motivated to create and work, not children as young as four or five
years old who are going to need housing, education, adult supervision, healthcare,
and most of all a loving environment where they can grow up.
It is one thing for undocumented workers to come across the border looking for
jobs or for families to come across together. It is a completely different matter
when tens of thousands of preteen children come across the border without parents or supervision. They didn’t get across 1500 miles of desert without significant
support and a great deal of planning. This couldn’t be happening without the
awareness of authorities in Mexico and the Central American countries from which
these children come, and if this is truly a surprise to Homeland Security, then there
is a significant failure somewhere in the system.
And if it was not a surprise? That begs a whole different series of questions.
This is a major humanitarian crisis, and it is not in the Middle East or Africa. It is on
our border, and we need to figure out what to do about it NOW!
I don’t care whether you think we need to build a 20-foot-high wall across the
southern border of the United States or give amnesty to anyone who wants to
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come in (or both), something has to be done with these children. It is a staggering
problem of enormous logistical proportions, and we have a simple human responsibility to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves.
And on that note I will go ahead and hit the send button, and let’s focus on the
critical geopolitical events happening around the globe. Iraq is a disaster. Ukraine
is a crisis. What’s happening in the China Sea is troubling. It just seems to come at
you from everywhere. Even on a beautiful summer day.
Your stunned by the magnitude of it all at analyst,
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the [email protected]
(From Ian Bremmer)
dear john,
we're halfway through 2014, and the single most notable feature of the international landscape has been the expansion of geopolitical conflict. why should we
care? what's the impact; what does it mean for the global economy? how should
we think about geopolitics?
my thoughts on the topic, looking at the four key geopolitical pieces "in play"–in
eurasia, the middle east, asia, and the transatlantic.
geopolitics
i've written for several years about the root causes of the geopolitical instability
the world is presently experiencing. a new, g-zero world where the united states is
less interested in providing global leadership and nobody else is willing or able to
step into that role. that primary leadership vacuum is set against a context of competing foreign policy priorities from increasingly powerful emerging markets (with
very different political and economic systems) and a germany-led europe; challenges to the international system from a revisionist russia in decline; and difficulties in coordination from a proliferation of relevant state and non-state actors
even when interests are aligned. all of this has stirred tensions in the aftermath of
the financial crisis: instability across the middle east after a stillborn arab spring; a
three-year syrian civil war; a failed russia "reset"; rising conflict between china and
japan; fraying american alliances with countries like brazil, germany, and saudi arabia.
and yet geopolitical concerns haven't particularly changed our views on global
markets. each conflict has been small and self-contained (or the spillover wasn't
perceived to matter much). geopolitics has been troubling on the margins but not
worth more than a fret.
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that's about to change. though perceived as discrete events, the rise of these geopolitical tensions are all directly linked to the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order. it's a process that's gaining momentum, creating in turn larger-scale
crises and broader market volatility. we've now reached the point where near- to
mid-term outcomes of several geopolitical conflicts could become major drivers of
the global economy. that's true of russia/ukraine, iraq, the east and south china
seas and us/europe. in each, the status quo is unsustainable (though for very different reasons). and so, as it were, the four horsemen of the geopolitical apocalypse.
Russia/IUkraine
the prospect of losing ukraine was the last straw for a russian government that has
been steadily losing geopolitical influence since the collapse of the soviet union
over two decades ago. moscow sees nato enlargement, expanded european economic integration, energy diversification and the energy revolution as direct security threats that need to be countered. ukraine is also an opportunity for the kremlin...for president putin to invigorate a flagging support base at home.
putin intends to raise the economic and military pressure on kiev until, at a minimum, southeast ukraine is effectively under russian control. the ukrainian government's latest effort in response, a unilateral week-long cease fire in the southeast,
was greeted with lukewarm rhetoric by putin and rejected by russian separatists in
the region, who escalated their attacks against the ukrainian military. meanwhile,
thousands of russian troops recently pulled back from the ukrainian border have
now been redeployed there, bolstered by putin ordering 65,000 russian troops on
combat alert in the region.
the choices for kiev are thankless. if they press further, violence intensifies and russian support expands, either routing the ukrainian military, or taking serious losses
and requiring direct "formal" intervention of russian troops. if they back off, they
lose the southeast, which is critical for their internal legitimacy from the ukrainian
population at large. all the while the ukrainian economy teeters with much of their
industrial base off line, compounded by russian disruptions on customs, trade, and
gas supply.
the growing conflict will lead to further deterioration of russia's relationship with
the united states and europe: gas flow disruptions, expansion of defense spending
and nato coordination with poland and the baltic states, turbulence around moldova and georgia given their european association agreements this week...and "level
3" sectoral sanctions against russia. that in turn means a serious economic downturn in russia itself...and knock-on economic implications for europe, which has far
greater exposure to russia than the united states does.
for the last several years, the major market concern for europe was economic: the
potential for collapse of the eurozone. that's no longer a worry. the primary risk to
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europe is now clearly geopolitical, that expanded russia/ukraine conflict hurts europe, in worst case pushing the continent back into recession.
raq
like so much of the world's colonial legacy, many of the middle east's borders only
"worked" because of the combination of secular authoritarian rule and international military and economic support. that was certainly true of iraq–most recently under decades of control by the baath party, beginning in 1963. saddam hussein's
ouster forty years later by the united states and great britain, combined with the
dismantling of nearly all of the military and political architecture that supported
him (in dramatic contrast to, say, the ouster of egypt's hosni mubarak) undermined
iraq's territorial integrity. since then, iraqi governance could still nominally function
given significant american military presence and military and economic aid. once
that was removed, there was little left to keep iraq functioning as a country.
sectarianism is the primary form of allegiance in iraq today, both limiting the reach
of prime minister nouri al maliki's majority shia government and creating closer ties
between iraq's sunni, shia and kurdish populations and their brethren outside iraq's
borders. extremism within iraq has also grown dramatically as a consequence, particularly among the now disenfranchised sunni population--made worse by their
heavy losses in the war against bashar assad across the largely undefended border
with syria. the tipping point came with the broad attacks by the islamic state of iraq
and syria (isis) over the past fortnight, speeding up a decade-long expansion of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing between iraq's sunni and shia. the comparatively wealthy and politically stable kurds have done their best to steer clear of the
troubles, seizing a long-sought opportunity for de facto independence.
the american response has been cautious. domestic support for military engagement in iraq diminished greatly as the war in iraq continued and the economic and
human costs mounted. obama repeatedly promised an end to the occupation and
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considered full withdrawal a major achievement of his administration. there's little
domestic upside for taking responsibility in the crisis. obama's position has accordingly been that any direct military involvement requires a change in governance
from the iraqis--initially sounding like a unity government and increasingly evolving
into the replacement of prime minister maliki. the pressure on maliki has gained
momentum with shia grand ayatollah ali al-sistani calling on the iraqi prime minister to broaden the government to include more kurds and sunnis.
but maliki, having successfully fought constitutional crises and assassination
attempts, to say nothing of decisively winning a democratic election, is unlikely to
go. isis poses a threat to the unity of the iraqi state, but not to maliki's rule of iraq's
majority shia population, which if anything now stands stronger than it did before
the fighting. and maliki's key international sponsor, iran, has little interest in forcing
maliki into compromise as long as there's no threat to baghdad: they see themselves in far better strategic standing with a maliki-led iraqi government where they
exert overwhelming influence, than over a broader government where they're one
of many competing international forces. further, even if maliki were prepared to
truly share power with iraq's kurds and sunni (something made more likely by the
informal "influence" of 300 us military advisors now arriving in baghdad), he's unlikely to see much enthusiasm responding to that offer. the kurds are better off
sticking to nominal (and a clearer road to eventual formal) independence; and sunni leaders that publicly find common cause with maliki would better hope all their
family members aren't anywhere isis can find them.
absent american (or anyone else's) significant military engagement, the iraqi government is unlikely to be able to remove isis from leadership and, accordingly, reassert control over the sunni and kurdish areas of the country. that will lead to a significant increase in extremist violence emanating from the islamic world, a trend
that's already deteriorated significantly in recent years (and since obama administration officials announced that cyberattacks were the biggest national security
threat to the united states--a claim president obama overturned during his west
point speech last month). since 2010, the number of known jihadist fighters has
more than doubled; attacks by al qaeda affiliates have tripled.
the combination of challenging economic conditions, sectarian leadership, and the
communications revolution empowering individuals through narrowing political
and ideological demographic lenses all make this much more likely to expand.
that's a greater threat to stability in the poorer middle eastern markets, but also
will morph back into a growing terrorist threat against western assets in the region
and more broadly. that creates, in turn, demand for increased security spending
and bigger concerns about fat tail terrorism in the developed world, particularly in
southern and western europe (where large numbers of unintegrated and unemployed islamic populations will pose more of a direct threat).
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the broader risk is that sunni/shia conflict metastasizes into a single broader war.
isis declares an islamic state across sunni iraq and syria, becoming ground zero for
terrorist funding and recruitment from across the region. the saudi government
condemns the absence of international engagement in either conflict and directly
opposes an increasingly heavy and public iranian hand in iraqi and syrian rule. the
united states completes a comprehensive nuclear deal with iran and declares victory (but doesn't work meaningfully with teheran on iraq), steering clear of the growing divide between the middle east's two major powers. the gulf cooperation council starts to fragment as members see opportunity in economic engagements with
iran. iranian "advisors" in iraq morph into armed forces; saudi arabia publicly opposes isis, but saudi money and weapons get into their hands and an abundance of
informal links pop up. militarization grows between an emboldened iran and a
more isolated, defensive saudi arabia. that's when the geopolitical premium around
energy prices becomes serious.
East/south China sea
ukraine and iraq are the two major active geopolitical conflicts. but there are two
more geopolitical points of tension involving major economies that are becoming
significant.
in asia, it's the consequences of (and reactions to) an increasingly powerful and assertive china. the growth of china's influence remains the world's most important
geopolitical story by a long margin. but, at least to date, china's growth is mostly an
opportunity for the rest of the world. for the middle east, it's the principal new
source of energy demand as the united states becomes more energy independent.
for africa, it's the best opportunity to build out long-needed infrastructure across
the continent. for europe and even the united states, it's a critical source of credit
propping up currency, and a core producer of inexpensive goods. that's not to argue that there aren't significant caveats in each of these stories (or that those caveats aren't growing--they are), but rather that overall, china has been primarily perceived as an opportunity rather than a threat for all of these actors, and so it remains today.
for asia, a rising china has been seen more clearly as a double-edged sword. the
greater comparative importance of the chinese economy has translated into more
political influence (formal and informal) for beijing, at the expense of other governments in the region. meanwhile, china's dramatic military buildup has fundamentally changed the balance of power in asia; it's had negligible interest elsewhere.
china's military assertiveness has also grown in its backyard. in other regions, china
continues to promote itself as a poor country that needs to focus on its own development and stability. in east and southeast asia china has core interests that it defends, and it is increasingly willing to challenge the status quo as its influence becomes asymmetrically greater.
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that's been most clear with vietnam, where china first sent one oil rig to drill in contested waters directly off vietnam's shore--accompanied by several hundred chinese fishing vessels. they announced last week that they are repositioning four
more. unsurprisingly, the vietnamese response has been sharp--anti-chinese
demonstrations, violence, increased naval presence in the region, and coordination
with the philippines.
none of that creates significant political risk on its own: vietnam isn't an ally of the
united states and so engenders less support and response from washington than
the philippines or japan...which is precisely why beijing has decided that's the best
place to start changing the regional security balance.
but tokyo feels differently. the japanese government understands that a rising china is longer term a much more existential threat to its own security position in asia,
and it isn't prepared to wait to raise concern until its position weakens further. so
prime minister shinzo abe has declared his security support for vietnam. for america's part, obama has jettisoned the official "pivot" to asia. but the administration
continues to believe that america's core national security interests, now and in the
future, are in asia; and if china significantly escalates tensions in the east and south
china seas, the united states is not likely to sit as idly by as they have on syria or
ukraine.
the good news here is that--unlike with the countries driving the tensions in eurasia
and the middle east--china has solid political stability and isn't looking for international trouble. but the realities of chinese growth, coupled with strong leadership
from japan and (over time) india, along with the persistence of a strong american
footprint are contributing to a much more troublesome geopolitical environment in
the region.
the principle danger to the markets is what happens if the chinese government no
longer holds that perspective. president xi jinping's commitment to transformational economic reform has been strong over the first year of his rule, and he has
gotten surprisingly little pushback from the country's entrenched elites. but the uncertainty around china's near- to medium-term trajectory is radically greater than
that of any of the world's other major economies. should significant instability
emerge in china, very plausible indeed, china's willingness to take on a far more
assertive (and risk-acceptant) security strategy in the region, promoting nationalism in the way putin has built his support base of late, would become far more likely. and then, the east and south china seas move to the top of our list.
US -Europe
finally, the transatlantic relationship. advanced industrial economies with consolidated institutions and political stability, there's none of the geopolitical conflict
presently visible in the middle east, eurasia, or asia. geopolitical tensions have long
been absent from the transatlantic relationship, the great success of the nato alliance. for all the occasional disagreement in europe on us military and security poli-
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cy both during the cold war and since (the war in iraq, israel/palestine, counterterrorism and the like), european states never considered the need for broader security ties as a counterbalance for nato membership.
but the changing nature of geopolitics is creating a rift between the united states
and europe. american global hegemony had security and economic components,
and it was collective security that had been the core element holding together the
transatlantic alliance. that's no longer the case--a consequence of changing priorities for the americans and europeans, and an evolving world order (russia/ukraine
a major blip, but notwithstanding). the transatlantic relationship is much less closely aligned on economics.
it's not the conventional wisdom. most observers say that, after bush, american
policy looks more european these days--less militarist, more multilateralist. but actually, us foreign policy isn't becoming more like europe, it's becoming more like
china. it's less focused on the military, except on issues of core security concern (in
which case the united states acts with little need to consult allies), while american
economic policy tends to be unilateralist in supporting preferred american geopolitical outcomes--which is seen most directly in us sanctions behavior (over $15bn
in fines now levied against more than 20 international banks--mostly european)
and nsa surveillance policy (with no willingness of the us to cooperate in a germany
requested "no spying" mutual agreement)
transatlantic economic dissonance is also in evidence in a number of more fundamental ways: america's "growth uber alles" approach to a downturn in the economy, compared to germany's fixation on fiscal accountability. europe's greater alignment between governments and corporations on industrial policy, as opposed to a
more decentralized, private-sector led (and occasionally captured) american policy
environment. a more economy-driven opportunistic european approach to china,
russia and other developing markets; the us government looking focused more on
us-led/"universalist" principles on industrial espionage, intellectual property, etc.
as the g-zero persists, we will see the united states looking to enforce more unilateral economic standards that the europeans resent and resist; while the europeans
look to other countries more strategically as counterbalances to american economic hegemony (the german-china relationship is critical in this regard, but that's also
true of europe's willingness to support american economic policies in russia and
the middle east). all of this means a much less cooperative trans-atlantic relationship--less "universalism" (from the american perspective) and less
"multilateralism" (from the european perspective). more zero-sumness in the
transatlantic relationship is a big change in the geopolitical environment; a precursor to true multipolarity, but in the interim a more fragmented and much less efficient global marketplace.
***
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so that's where i see geopolitics emerging as a key factor for the global markets-much more than at any time since the end of the cold war. there's some good news
and bad news here.
the good news is none of these geopolitical risks are likely to have the sort of market implications that the macro economic risks did after the financial crisis. there
are lots of reasons for that. a low interest rate environment and solid growth from
the us and china--plus the eurozone out of recession--along with pent up demand
for investment is leading to significant optimism that won't be easily cowed by geopolitics. the supply/demand energy story is largely bearish, so near-term geopolitical risks from the middle east won't create sustained high prices. and markets don't
know how to price geopolitical risk well; they're not covered as clearly analytically,
so investors don't pay as much attention (until/unless they have to).
the bad news...that very lack of pressure from the markets means political leaders
won't feel as much need to address these crises even as they expand, particularly
in the united states. this is another reason the world's geopolitical crises will persist
beyond a level that a similar economic crisis would hit before serious measures
start to be taken to mitigate them. these geopolitical factors are going to grow.
now's the time to start paying attention to them.
***
every once in a while, it's good to take a step back and look at the big picture. hope
you found that worthwhile. i'll surely get back in the weeds next monday.
meanwhile, it's looking like a decidedly lovely week in new york.
very
ian
best,
From intel sources:
Dislodging S S Will Be a Difficult ask
The ISIS advance toward Baghdad may be temporarily held off as the government
rallies its remaining security forces and Shia militias organize for the upcoming
Battle for Baghdad. There is a rather clear reason why the ISIS leader has renamed
himself Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, meaning the Caliph of Baghdad . ISIS will at a minimum be able to take control of some Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad shortly and
wreak havoc on the city with IEDs, ambushes, single suicide attacks, and suicide
assaults that target civilians, the government, security forces, senior members of
government, and foreign installations and embassies. Additionally, the brutal sectarian slaughter of Sunni and Shia alike that punctuated the violence in Baghdad
from 2005 to 2007 is likely to return as Shia militias and ISIS fighters begin to assert
control of neighborhoods and roam the streets.
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Even if Iraqi forces are able to keep ISIS from fully taking Baghdad and areas south,
it is unlikely the beleaguered military and police forces will be able to retake the
areas under ISIS control in the north and west without significant external support,
as well as the support of the Kurds.
ISIS and its allies are in a position today that closely resembles the position prior to
the US surge back in early 2007. More than 130,000 US troops, partnered with the
Sunni Awakening formations and Iraqi security forces numbering in the hundreds of
thousands, were required to clear Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, Ninewa, Baghdad, and
the "triangle of death." The concurrent operations took more than a year, and were
supported by the US Air Force, US Army aviation brigades, and US special operations raids that targeted the jihadists’ command and control, training camps, and
bases, as well as its IED and suicide bomb factories.
Today, the Iraqis have no US forces on the ground to support them, US air power is
absent, the Awakening is scattered and disjointed, and the Iraqi military has been
humiliated badly while surrendering or retreating in disarray during the lightning
fast jihadists' campaign from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad. This campaign, by
the way, has been remarkably and significantly faster than the U.S. armored campaign advance to Baghdad in 2003 . The US government has indicated that it will
not deploy US soldiers in Iraq, either on the ground or at airbases to conduct air
operations. Meanwhile, significant amounts of US made advanced armaments, vehicles, ammunition, and diverse military equipment have fallen into ISIS jihadists’
hands .
ISIS is advancing boldly in the looming security vacuum left by the collapse of the
Iraqi security forces and the West's refusal to recommit forces to stabilize Iraq. This
has rendered the country vulnerable to further incursions by al Qaeda-linked jihadists as well as intervention by interested neighbors such as Iran. Overt Iranian
intervention in Iraq would likely lead any Sunnis still loyal to the government to
side with ISIS and its allies, and would ensure that Iraq would slide even closer to a
full-blown civil war and de facto partition, and risk a wider war throughout the Middle East.
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article46219.html
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Irak
How ISIS is winning the online war for Iraq
15:26 25 June 2014 by Paul Marks
As the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) claimed control of Iraq's biggest
oil refinery and a key border crossing between Iraq and Jordan–it lost a key
propaganda weapon: its powerful smartphone app. However, ISIS won't consider it a major setback, as it has an extensive and sophisticated online presence. New Scientist investigates the tools at its disposal.
What kind of app did ISIS have?
ISIS had written its own Android app, called The Dawn of Glad Tidings, to enable
it to spread information via social media. The app allowed users to make their
Twitter accounts available to ISIS, so that the organisation could use them to
send tweets. On 19 June, Google removed the app from its Android store "for
breaching its community guidelines" against violent content.
When ISIS took Mosul earlier this month, the app fired out 40,000 tweets in a
day, and their gory threats and images may have gone some way to inducing the
surrender of the Iraqi army. But ISIS is sophisticated in its use of propaganda. It
also puts out benevolent images of its supporters delivering food supplies, for
example.
What else is ISIS doing online?
ISIS seems to be aware of a key aspect of the power of social media: that it is a
conversation. Platforms such as Ask.fm, on which users can post questions and
give answers anonymously, enable people to have direct conversations with ISIS
fighters.
"Terror group communications used to be unidirectional - for instance al-Qaeda
publishing its magazine. Twitter and Ask.fm now allow people to have a conversation with, say, an ISIS fighter. And that two-way interaction humanises these
guys," says Shiraz Maher of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at Kings College London. "A 19-year-old from Bradford finds a 19-year-old
from Leeds in Syria and they find they have a lot in common, making it all a bit
more real."
What do wannabe insurgents ask ISIS?
Ask.fm's question-and-answer format is providing a handy ask-me-anything
platform for young people considering joining ISIS, Maher says. "Ask.fm is a very
important service in this regard. It is where people ask fighters practical questions like how they can get out to Syria, and what they should bring with them.
Most [respondents] ask that they bring indigestion tablets, books and iPads."
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What measures are being taken to counter ISIS's presence online?
The Iraqi government has tried various internet address blocking measures in a
bid to stop ISIS's online activities - but its approach has been piecemeal. For instance, it has blocked Facebook, Twitter and the instant messaging site Viber while leaving known ISIS websites online. When the government has managed
to block a site, ISIS has been adept at using proxies to evade it. There has been
some success, however. "There has been a purge of ISIS fighters' Twitter and
Instagram accounts recently: we think the British government has had a role in
it," says Maher, whose team are tracking 400 ISIS fighter accounts on a range of
online platforms including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Ask.fm and Tumblr.
When asked why it did not use anonymised machine analysis of tweets to pinpoint violent or threatening content, a Twitter spokesman said that would
amount to proactive review – something Twitter shuns.
What else is ISIS doing online?
A lot. It has produced a high-quality propaganda film, The Clanging of Swords
IV which seems to be influenced by Hollywood movies such as Zero Dark Thirty and which was extensively posted and reposted on YouTube ahead of the recent major ISIS offensive.
The group also records and publishes extensive information on the economics
and statistics of its activities. It publishes an "annual report" replete
withdetailed accounts and statistics-laden infographics on its missions.
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25788-how-isis-is-winning-the-online-warfor-iraq.html#.U7Aa5PldWSo
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Raqa, l’inquiétante capitale du « Djihadistan »
20/06/2014
Un convoi de djihadistes, juin 2014., en Irak, province de Saleheddin
Située dans la vallée de l’Euphrate et à moins de 200 km de la frontière irakienne la
ville abritant 250.000 habitants est devenue, selon des militants, la base de la mouvance islamique qui depuis le 9 juin mène une offensive en Irak.
L’année dernière, la révélation par des journalistes de Libération de plans de la direction d’Aqmi pour instaurer un État islamique au Nord-Mali témoignait du fait
que les mouvements djihadistes n’ont plus seulement vocation à semer la terreur
en menant des actions localisées. Aujourd’hui, un projet d’une autre ampleur
semble émerger, qui témoigne de la rationalisation des conduites politiques de ces
groupes. Ainsi, Raqa, selon une dépêche de l’AFP serait « la capitale très organisée
de l’Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant »
Souverain sur une population habitant un territoire délimité.
Drapeaux noirs flottants au vent, présence de forces armées ostensibles et emblèmes de l’EEIL, le groupe islamiste semble bien disposer du monopole de la « violence légitime » à Raqa. Située dans la vallée de l’Euphrate et à moins de 200 km
de la frontière irakienne, la ville de 250.000 habitants est devenue, selon des militants, la base de la mouvance islamique qui depuis le 9 juin mène une offensive en
Irak. Le groupe, après le retrait des forces gouvernementales en mars, s’est emparé
de la ville y chassant les rebelles. Ainsi le territoire semble hors de la juridiction du
gouvernement syrien ; ce sont bien les djihadistes qui, par exemple, ont interdit à
la population de fumer ou d’écouter de la musique.
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Les prémisses d’une bureaucratie
Point plus inquiétant, l’apparente efficacité technique du pouvoir en place. Rien de
comparable avec l’administration d’un pays établi, mais une organisation prend
corps. L’Etat prend en charge certaines fonctions en administrant « la santé, l’éducation, la sécurité, le secours islamique, la gestion des relations tribales, et même
une ambassade de l’émirat d’Alep », explique Omar al-Huweidi » écrivain et spécialiste de l’EIIL originaire de Raqa, ayant fui en Turquie. L’exercice de fonctions régaliennes donc, en ce que L’EIIL assure la sécurité des populations dominées, édicte
des normes, et sanctionne ceux qui les méconnaissent « L’EIIL a déjà commencé à
appliquer ce code de sanctions prévues par la charia, comme par exemple l’amputation de la main d’un voleur », explique M. Huweidi. Enfin un commandement hiérarchisé semble s’être établi. A son sommet, des Saoudiens et des Irakiens, et, dans
une moindre mesure, des Tunisiens, décrivent experts et militants, tandis qu’en bas
de l’échelle se trouvent Syriens, Egyptiens, Européens et Tchétchènes. Un groupe
dont la croissance a été spectaculaire, selon Omar al-Huweidi. « Quand les djihadistes sont arrivés dans la province, ils formaient un groupe de 10 ou 15. Aujourd’hui, l’EIIL contrôle chaque aspect de la vie à Raqa ».
L’armée et l’impôt
Côté « finances publiques » ? L’obscur chef de l’EEIL, Abou Bakr Al-Baghdadi, passé
en à peine 5 ans du petit combattant de base à l’héritier d’Oussama Ben-Laden, a
fait main basse sur les champs de pétrole et de gaz dans la province syrienne de
Deir-Ezzor (est), mettant en place un système de collecte d’impôts dans les zones
sous sa domination. Cependant L'EILL continue de faire grossir ses rangs dans l'objectif de constituer une force armée. Ne combattant plus le régime de Bachar alAssad le groupe peut donc se concentrer sur le recrutement de "volontaires" étrangers dans leurs groupes de combat. Ces derniers seraient, selon Jean-Pierre Filiu,
professeur à Sciences-Po Paris et spécialiste d’Al-Qaeda ", astreints à recruter des
compatriotes et des amis via les réseaux sociaux, " ce qui expliquerait la progression exponentielle des départs vers la Syrie. De surcroît L'EILL cherche à s'imposer
comme leader du jihad mondial en ralliant des groupes de combattants ou des
cheikhs venant du Moyen-Orient et au-delà. Aussi un renforcement de l'indépendance et de l'autonomie de cet "Etat" s'opère, du fait de la reconnaissance de sa
légitimité par d'autres mouvances djihadistes. Enfin l'EIIL apparaît comme une alternative crédible à l'Armée syrienne libre car au contraire de cette dernière il est
riche, bien armé et "paye les salaires de ses membres en dollars", souligne Hadi
Salameh. Le groupe aurait récemment pris aux forces irakiennes des armes lourdes
de fabrication américaine, qu’il a transportées à Raqa, selon l’Observatoire syrien
des droits de l’Homme.
Ce doux pouvoir
Si pour la population la vie à Raqa est extrêmement difficile, l'EIIL gouvernant par la
terreur « Les djihadistes étrangers blessés passent en priorité à l’hôpital. Les Sy-
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riens, même les enfants, sont (des citoyens) de deuxième catégorie », raconte Hadi
Salameh un militant travaillant à Raga, « des membres-clés de toutes les tribus ont
juré loyauté à l’EIIL, plus par peur que par conviction », explique M. Huweidi, Abou
Bakr Al-Baghdadi semble néanmoins essayer de rendre la sanglante domination
que l'EIIL exerce, désirable. Un double jeu donc, le groupe approvisionnerait les populations locales en nourriture, carburant bon marché - marqué du drapeau noir,
symbole du groupe - et financerait des kermesses pour les enfants, tout en se targuant d'exécuter sommairement des centaines de personne, pour ne citer que les
1700 soldats exécutés sommairement lors de la capture de la ville de Tikrit. Ainsi la
dangerosité du groupe réside dans sa capacité, son désir, d'être reconnus comme
des gouvernants légitimes auprès des populations qu'ils dominent. En tentant d'apporter une certaine prospérité matérielle ainsi qu'une aux habitants sous leur joug
le groupe pourrait peut être organiser une société approchant celles vivant sous
des régimes plus ou moins autoritaires, pour ne citer que l'Arabie Saoudite et le
Yémen.
Les ministères que nous devons garder pour nous concernent l'armée, les médias,
la justice, la prédication et les affaires islamiques. Les ministères qui peuvent être
laissés au MNLA sont ceux des Affaires étrangères, des Finances, des Travaux publics", selon l’analyse d'Abdelmalek Droukdel, chef présumé d’Aqmi, dans son mémo intitulé "Directives générales relatives au projet islamique djihadiste dans l'Azawad", découvert l’an dernier et dont Libération a fait état. C'est donc ce glissement
que semble opérer l'EIIL, tentant de passer d'un groupe terroriste à un Etat souverain.
http://www.lesechos.fr/monde/afrique-moyen-orient/0203582735358-raqalinquietante-capitale-du-djihadistan-1015478.php
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Map redrawn in blood
ISIS militants on the move.
THE snuff video has become the new calling card of ideological conflict in the 21st
century. This sadistic defiance of every civilised norm — the celebratory, often
stylised depiction of ritual murder — was pioneered by al-Qa’ida. It’s now been
adopted with depraved glee by al-Qa’ida’s ultra-violent offspring, the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham.
ISIS is not ashamed of its violence. It rejoices in murder. Death is its purpose. As it
drove through the Iraqi cities of Tikrit and Mosul it captured hundreds of Iraqi soldiers. The reports vary but it seems that when it captured Shi’ite Iraqi soldiers it
executed them summarily. But, according to the videos it has posted on Twitter, it
also took many to shallow mass graves and shot them for the camera.
Terrorism is always partly for the camera.
Prime Minister Tony Abbott says the situation in Iraq is “a -security disaster for the
Middle East, but also for the wider world”.
He says the triumph of ISIS in some parts of Iraq is a “humanitarian disaster”, and
that ISIS is “carrying out extraordinary brutality towards surrendering Iraqi soldiers
and policemen”, and that the areas of Iraq and Syria that ISIS controls are in danger
of becoming “a terrorist state”.
Tony Blair called for direct military intervention in the shape of airstrikes.
US Secretary of State John Kerry said the US would be happy to co-operate with
Iran if necessary to stop ISIS.
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President Barack Obama ruled out sending combat troops but did dispatch 275 US
servicemen to protect the American embassy in Baghdad.
Where does all this come from and what does it all mean?
The triumph, for the moment, of the Sunni terrorist ISIS is both a critical development in the Middle East, and a sign of the unravelling of the liberal international
order.
That liberal order, which we thought was born at the end of the Cold War, but
which really has its origins at the end of World War II, holds that big, powerful
FILE - This undated file image posted on a militant website on Tuesday, Jan. 14, 2014
shows fighters from the al-Qaida-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) marching in Raqqa, Syria. The Islamic State was originally al-Qaida's branch in Iraq, but it used
Syria's civil war to vault into something more powerful. It defied orders from al-Qaida's
central command and expanded its operations into Syria, ostensibly to fight to topple Assad. But it has turned mainly to conquering territory for itself, often battling other rebels
who stand in the way.MILITANT WEBSITE, FILE/AP PHOTO
states won’t seek to take territory from other states. It also holds that globalisation
and trade makes everybody so interdependent that large scale war is no longer
attractive or profitable. It stresses international co-operation on cross border issues under the auspices of the United Nations and regional and functional multilateral agencies. It talked even of an international rule of law backed up by such
institutions as the International Court of Justice and the like.
But now this international order, in so far as it ever existed at all, is breaking down
at all levels. The ISIS success is one key manifestation of this, but the breakdown is
occurring much more widely.
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The international order is being challenged at the bottom by terrorists who are
eroding state sovereignty across the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. AlQa’ida has had huge success during the war on terror in recruiting thousands of
young men in these regions to its religious and political vision.
The liberal international order is also being challenged above the level of the state,
as it were, by cyber warfare which is destroying the confidentiality and the security
of the intellectual property of Western nations.
And it is being challenged at the level of international relations by Russia and China.
The actions of Russia in invading Crimea and sponsoring violent rebellion in eastern
Ukraine have not been met with any decisive response from the West. These actions have succeeded.
Russia’s economy has suffered as a result of capital flight and some loss of confidence. The West has enacted some sanctions. But these are miles from being crippling. Germany is not going to give up Russian energy or trade. France is not going
to reverse military sales. Britain will not root Russia out of its financial system, or indeed its housing market. Old fashioned territorial conquest works after all.
China’s actions are on a much smaller scale, but they involve -occupying disputed
reefs and -islands in the South China Sea, and declaring an Air Defence Identification Zone over islands disputed with Japan in the East China Sea and then enforcing
those actions. No Southeast Asian nation can challenge Chinese control of a disputed island, and really only the US and Japanese air forces are prepared to flout the
ADIZ. Possession is 10 10ths of the law. Again, territorial conquest works. US disapproval, much less international opinion, is not decisive.
But terrorism is also exploding the liberal international order, -especially in the
Middle East.
ISIS has a specific and unique history which contributes to its extravagant brutality
and bloodthirstiness. But it is still representative of large social movements across
North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.
The West has not won the war on terror, as Obama claimed after the death of Osama bin Laden. He made a self-congratulatory speech then saying terrorism was no
longer a central concern of US foreign policy. This triumph was as short-lived as
George W. Bush’s “mission -accomplished” moment. In Obama’s recent West Point
speech, terrorism was back to centre stage.
The analysis of terrorism has been blighted in the West by stovepipe thinking. The
analysts of terrorism are pretty good but don’t tend to relate it to traditional geostrategic concerns. Those analysts more comfortable with geo-strategic issues always want to dismiss terrorism as no more important than a bad storm, or essentially a policing problem.
The real challenge of terrorism has eluded both schools of analysts in two ways.
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First, terrorism is an enormous and potentially existential threat, which consumes a
huge amount of resources. But it doesn’t remove the pre-existing geo-strategic
challenges posed by the likes of Russia and China.
Instead, the real complexity of terrorism lies in the way it interacts with traditional
geo-strategic challenges and complicates and magnifies them.
The momentum for the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 came from the 9/11 terror
attacks. Washington never suggested Iraq was behind those attacks but it was the
danger of Saddam Hussein possessing weapons of mass destruction and supporting
terrorists that motivated Washington.
Now, however, Iraq is ungovernable.
Nonetheless, we should not be too simple in our attribution of cause and effect.
The US did not invade Syria and it is equally ungovernable, perhaps more so.
For years the US was accused by critics around the world of supporting dictators in
the Middle East. It took one dictator out, in Iraq, and withdrew support from another dictator, in Egypt, and the result was chaos. In Iraq, for the moment, the terrorists are in the ascendant. In Syria the dictator and the terrorists are fighting out
a bloody draw. In Egypt the military dictatorship has come back. Meanwhile for the
last year the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, has been diverting himself by focusing on the Israeli/Palestinian dispute, perhaps the least urgent matter on the entire
Middle East agenda.
So this seems to be the policy choice for the West in the Middle East — either support dictatorship or empower terrorists.
In a recent interview British Foreign Secretary William Hague told me that he believed there was a need for Western foreign policy in general to re-establish its
credibility.
Yesterday I spoke at some length to Karl Eikenberry, a former general in the US Army who served in Afghanistan as a soldier and then later as US ambassador in Kabul.
He warned of the dangers of second and third order unanticipated consequences
of any military action in Iraq.
“What’s the compelling US interest?” he asked.
“We cannot allow a large part of that region to fall into terrorist hands. We also
have other interests, energy supply, the security of Israel, the reputational consequences should Iraq continue in a downward spiral.”
He said that the Obama administration was correct to talk to the Iraqi government
of Nuri al-Maliki and make clear that any support would depend on Baghdad running a more inclusive political strategy, one that catered for Sunni and Kurdish interests as well as the interests of the majority Shia population.
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Eikenberry does not mince words on the overall wisdom of the US involvement in
Iraq. “I would characterise the decision to attack Iraq as the most catastrophic foreign policy mistake in the history of the US.
“Look at the Middle East today. Look at the cost. We had 4500 (American) lives
lost. The fiscal cost to the US was probably $US1 trillion. Then if you look at the
added healthcare costs for personnel out to about 2050 it’s probably in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
“Then look at the Iraqi costs — hundreds of thousands of lives lost. And I’m not at
all sure Iraq is a better place today no matter how bad it was under Saddam Hussein.
“It just did not come out as it was hoped for. It’s been a disaster.”
Eikenberry, who is visiting Australia for the Alliance 21 Conference sponsored by
the US Studies Centre at Sydney University, does also stress, however, that he believes the US political leadership operated in good faith, both in their intentions for
their intervention and in their beliefs about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass
destruction.
Eikenberry’s claim is tough minded, but also contestable. ISIS, in its former incarnation of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, had been substantially defeated by the time the American
troops left Iraq. There is a reasonable criticism of Obama that he should have
worked harder for an agreement to keep a smaller US troop presence in Iraq for
longer. But as others have pointed out, the people who made Iraq ungovernable
over the past few years are primarily the Iraqi government of Maliki.
His government dismissed the prominent Shi’ites from virtually all significant positions in the state apparatus. He failed to maintain a good relationship with the
Kurds, who now look as though they have their best chance ever to establish a fully
independent state. Maliki’s government did not integrate Sunnis into the army as
he promised. He did not maintain a solid relationship with the Sunni tribal leaders
who had fought al-Qa’ida in the past.
All this made a Sunni revolt more likely, and explains why some Sunnis who don’t
share all of ISIS’s murderous ideology have nonetheless allied with ISIS.
It is impossible now to believe that Syria and Iraq will ever be reconstituted as the
states that they were. The map of the Middle East is being redrawn, and it is covered in blood.
The liberal international order, fraying at the edges and collapsing in the middle,
has nothing much, it seems, to offer this situation.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/map-redrawn-in-blood/storye6frg6z6-1226957913400#
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Pakistan
PAKISTAN’S WAZIRISTAN: TERROR DESTINATION – ANALYSIS
JUNE 16, 2014 SATP LEAVE A COMMENT
Waziristan, Pakistan’s lawless tribal region, which has for long served as a safe haven for terrorist groups operating in India, Afghanistan, and other countries, is, according to the latest reports, now hosting a new terrorist formation, the Ansar AlTawheed fi Bilad Al-Hind (ATBH, Supporters of Monotheism in the Land of India).
According to a May 22, 2014 news report, “the cadres of Ansar Al-Tawheed can be
seen training at al Qaeda training camps in Pakistan’s North Waziristan.”
Significantly, according to a May 20, 2014, report, the group issued a video in which
its leader Abdur al-Rehman al Hindi declares, “O lions of faith, target the oppressive
and infidel Indian Government’s financial centres and economic interests within
India and those located around the world, until Indian Government reaches the
brink of destruction”. In the video, al-Rehman appeals, in Arabic, to Afghan Taliban
leader Mullah Muhammad; al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri; Abu Bakr AlBaghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); as well as to al
Qaeda’s leaders in Yemen (Nasser Al-Wuhaishi), in Somalia (Mukhtar Abu AlZubair), and in North Africa (Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd Al-Wudoud), to come forward to
‘protect’ the Muslims of India. He also urges Indian Muslim youth to join the global
jihad of al Qaeda and migrate to the lands of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, and
warns Indian intelligence agencies against mistreating ‘Islamic scholars’ like Maulana Abdul Qavi, who was arrested by Indian Police on March 24, 2014, in New Delhi,
in connection with the Ahmedabad serial blasts and other terrorist incidents dating
back to 2003.
This emerging group is not the first to get apparent training in the disturbed tribal
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belt of Pakistan. Outfits like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) and Indian Mujahideen (IM)
have a history of receiving regular training in camps based in the region. According
to a 2007 report, in 2006-2007, Jihadi organisations operating in Jammu & Kashmir
(J&K) were moved to North and South Waziristan. The report maintains that these
groups brought with them a specific guerrilla strategy, which soon altered the dynamics of the Taliban, and asserts that the move “reorganised and regrouped the
Taliban movement along the lines of a separatist guerrilla movement that has had a
cascading affect in the region.”
The Waziristan region of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), comprising two Agencies – North and South – is located in a narrow belt which runs along
the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, the Durand Line. The area comprising North and
South Waziristan is characterized by rugged hills with deep gorges and it is mostly
impassable. The region provides safe-haven for terrorists because of the autonomous nature of the territory, with local tribal establishments exercising much of
the authority, creating an environment of impunity. The Shawal Valley of North
Waziristan and the Shakai Valley of South Waziristan have, respectively, provided
shelter to fleeing terrorists since the US Operation Enduring Freedom commenced
in Afghanistan in 2001. However, the volatile mix of terrorism and tribal affinities in
the region is not a post 9/11 phenomenon; the mountains of Waziristan had long
been used as a base for mujahideen (‘holy warriors’) during the Afghan Wars
against the Soviet occupation. The fighters, including a multi-national force drawn
from across the Muslim world, had been armed and trained by the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). When the Russians withdrew, many of those fighters settled down in Waziristan and became part of the
local population.
LeT, among the most prominent anti-India terrorist formations, has been working
from this region under the protection of the Haqqani Network, which maintains a
sophisticated insurgent complex that stretches from North Waziristan Agency,
through the southeastern provinces of Afghanistan, all the way to Kabul. The expansion of this network has provided the LeT, in tandem with the Haqqanis, the
ability to stage spectacular suicide attacks on Indian targets in Afghanistan. Notably, the LeT’s involvement in the attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7,
2008, and the May 23, 2014, attack on the Indian Consulate in Herat Province of
Afghanistan, has been well established.
LeT breakaways have also received training and refuge in the Waziristan region. An
unnamed Pakistani intelligence official told the media, “A lot of hard-liners have
broken away from LeT and gone to North and South Waziristan… There are a number of splinter groups that are much more radical. The problem is not LeT per se,
it’s the elements of LeT that have broken away and found their place in Waziristan…”
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Cadres of the IM, now principally acting as an LeT proxy, have also been trained in
the region. The IM has been involved in almost all the terrorist attacks in India, outside J&K, after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. A May 21, 2014, report cited Intelligence sources to claim that at least six IM operatives, including Mirza Shadab Baig,
Shahnawaz Alam, Muhammad ‘Bada’ Sajid, Alamzeb Afridi, Shafi Armar and Sultan
Armar, were believed to be training at al Qaeda-linked camps in North Waziristan
for a fresh round of attacks in India.
Investigations have further revealed that two Indian IM operatives based in the
Waziristan, were suspected of operating a website that invites Indian youth to join
the jihad. While one hails from Bhatkal, a port town in the Uttara Kannada District
of Karnataka, and has named himself after Mohammed Ata, the 9/11 attacker, the
other is from Mumbai in Maharashtra (name not known). Both of them are said to
be in touch with their IM counterparts in India.
The arrest of IM operative Zia-ur-Rehman alias Waqas, a Pakistani national, by the
Special Cell of Delhi Police in Ajmer, Rajasthan, on March 22, 2014, further revealed
the ‘importance’ of the Waziristan region in South Asian terrorist scenario. Deputy
Commissioner of Police (Special Cell), Sanjeev Kumar Yadav disclosed, “The 25-year
-old Rehman had undergone a 21-day training known as ‘daura-e-aam’ at the
Naushera camp of LeT in Pakistan. (He also) attended advanced training at a camp
in Waziristan- FATA.”
The region also hosts JeM terrorist camps, including one that was located in Gangi
Khel near Wana in South Waziristan. The JeM ‘chief’, Maulana Masood Azhar and
senior operative Rashid Rauf, are believed to be operating from Waziristan. Rauf
was thought to have been killed in a US airstrike in North Waziristan on November
21, 2008, but the report was never confirmed. Rauf has been identified as the primary plotter for the July 7, 2005, London bombings. JeI camps are also located in
the Mir Ali town of North Waziristan. According to a January, 2013 report, “Mir Ali
also hosts at least three suicide training camps for the Fedayeen-i-Islam, an alliance
between the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. In early
2011, a Fedayeen-i-Islam ‘spokesman’ claimed that more than 1,000 suicide bombers have trained at three camps.”
In February 2014, HM leader, Mast Gul alias Haroon Khan, who was involved in the
infamous attack on the Charar-e-Sharif shrine in J&K in 1995, emerged from the
Waziristan area. Little was known of his whereabouts after he was injured in an ambush near Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in August 2003. Along with Mufti
Hasaan Swati, who claims to be the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ‘commander’
for the Peshawar area, Gul appeared before the media on February 5, 2014, at Miranshah, the capital city of North Waziristan. Earlier on March 28, 2006, three HM
militants were arrested at Tank near South Waziristan, along with explosives and
ammunition. Senior Superintendent of Police Dar Ali Khattak disclosed that the
three were on their way from South Waziristan in a vehicle, when they were appre-
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hended at a checkpoint in Tank.
HuJI also established a training camp in the Razmak area of Waziristan, shifting
most of its fighters from the training camp at Kotli in Pakistan occupied Kashmir
(PoK) in 2008. In 2009, HuJI leader Ilyas Kashmiri reportedly operated from a militant training center in Miranshah in North Waziristan.
Terrorist activities in the region have been ‘legitimized’ by the presence of the socalled ‘good Taliban’ – sanctioned and supported by Islamabad – on the Pakistani
side of the Durand Line. Hafiz Gul Bahadar – the “good Taliban commander” maintains a “peace agreement” with the Pakistani military, which allows him to run a
state within a state in North Waziristan. The peace agreement allows North Waziristan to serve as a base for the movement of Taliban in Pakistan, along with other
terrorist groups that also include the anti-India LeT, IM, HuJI and JeM, among others.
The explosive mix of the jihadist ideology and terrorism in the tribal areas is creating a dynamic that can potentially destabilize not only the Af-Pak region, but
much of South Asia as well, creating a direct potential for escalating terrorism, supported and promoted by the Pakistani establishment, in India.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/16062014-pakistans-waziristan-terror-destinationanalysis/
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Syria
America’s “Nonconventional War” against Syria: Western Media
Narrative Enters into Comedy Act
“If all the world is a stage,” as William Shakespeare once said, then the current mainstream
media narrative on Syria must be the comedy act;
this time, however, it isn’t very funny. Having
spent the last three years failing to exert their desire for regime change in Syria, the western imperialist, globalist powers and the corporate financier interests that sustain them are becoming increasingly desperate for a change in the geopolitical tide. Beginning in 2014, they have constantly
attempted to leverage any potential outlet as a
means of toppling Assad and proceeding in the
implementation of their hegemonic agenda across the Middle East and Eurasia.
One example was their attempt to spin the Geneva II communiqué to falsely imply that
it mandated Assad should step down. This was done in context to the fact that the Syrian
National Council was vastly shedding any remaining legitimacy it may have had; one
must not forget an excellent Guardian piece by Charlie Skelton titled, “The Syrian Opposition: Whose Doing the Talking?”, which documented the clear connections between
the leading Syrian National Council front-group members and western corporatefinancier interest. By January 2014, many members were resigning over the illegitimacy
of the council as noted by Nile Bowie who stated:
In a recent letter explaining his resignation, former SNC Secretary-General Mustafa alSabbagh concedes that the organization failed to extend humanitarian relief efforts and
to make any political or military progress; he describes the SNC as “a body that is entirely separate from the Syrian domestic arena.” Former member Mohammad Bassam
Imadi’s description is no less critical; he stated in a recent interview that the SNC “…
was only some expatriates who were living outside Syria, they lost touch with reality in
Syria. They didn’t know what was going on… They thought that within a few months
they will become presidents or ministers so they were not interested in doing anything
other than contacting the foreign powers…”
The Issue of “Moderate Rebels”
That was in January 2014. It was in this context that the increasingly militant Syrian
opposition forces on the ground were increasingly being exposed as primarily driven by
Al Qaeda aligned militants that were the outgrowth of western financing and geopolitical posturing. Whatever multiplicity of identities and splinter groups that exist among
the opposition on the ground, the primary driving force had become the Islamists as noted in the New York Times’ “Islamist Rebels Create Dilemma on Syria Policy.” As the
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article notes, “Even the Supreme Military Council, the umbrella rebel organization
whose formation the West had hoped would sideline radical groups, is stocked with
commanders who want to infuse Islamic law into a future Syrian government.”
Furthermore, Reuters has admitted that the military command of the allegedly moderate, western-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA), is dominated by Islamists. One has yet to
name me any viable moderate opposition force on the ground of sizable influence that is
not in one way or another tied to Islamist groups from Al Qaeda’s Syrian franchise
Jabhat Al-Nusra to the Islamic Front which is heavily active on the ground. The paradigm presented in the mainstream media depicting a distinction between jihadis, who
are described as being small-numbered and mostly foreign, and indigenous
“democracy” factions is patently false. An 2012 interview with Omar Gharba’, a Wahhabi cleric and member of the US-backed “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) who had previously been seensmashing a statue of the Virgin Mary in Idlib, demonstrates clearly the FSA
mentality
The FSA boasts various unorganized brigades that serve as a magnet for extremist footsoldiers including the “Osama Bin Laden Brigade” of the Souqour Dimashq (Hawks of
Damascus) Battalionin the FSA. Furthermore, one must not ignore the role of western
intelligence in propping up and commandeering the FSA as was acknowledged by Saddam al-Jamal, leader of the FSA Eastern Front and a member of the FSA Staff Board or
Supreme Military Council who defected to join the even more extremist entity, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS). His previous involvement with the
Supreme Military Council umbrella group is particularly notable considering theNew
York Times’ statement that its formation was anticipated by the west for potentially
playing a role in sidelining the radicals; on the contrary, it is “stocked with commanders
who want to infuse Islamic law into a future Syrian government.”
The FSA, touted as the west’s last hope against the radicals, frequently cooperates with
the Al-Qaeda “Jabhat Al-Nusra” as was done in the Christian town of Sadad in late November 2013. Prominent rebel leader Jamal Maarouf of the Syrian Revolutionary Front
(SRF), seen as moderate by the west, admitted to The Independent that he carries out
joint operations with Al Qaeda and has no problem with them; he said, “this is a problem outside of Syria.”
Syrian Christians have also been severely affected because of the inherent extremism
that characterizes the militarized Syrian opposition Syrian Catholic Archbishop Jacques
Behnan Hindoexpressed dissatisfaction with US support for Islamist force in an interview with the French-language station, KTO, of the Archbishop of Paris. New York
Times’ “Christians Squeezed Out by Violent Struggle in North Syria” documents the
plight of Syrian Christians, particularly in the east, that were fleeing from Arab Islamist
rebel gangs. The rebels were also noted to be heavily entrenched in the refugee camps in
Turkey who would force young men in groups of 20 to 30 to be drafted into their armed
groups. Kurdish militias that controlled the region were seen as preferable to the rebels.
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Another point amiss in the mainstream media narrative is with regards to the beginning
and nature of the crisis in Syria. The mainstream media attempts to imply the Syrian
uprising began as a peaceful, nonviolent struggle that was subsequently suppressed by a
violent crackdown by the government. Missed in this simplistic, reductionist approach is
the broader reality of a concerted, foreign-sponsored insurrection, with the opposition
being armed and violent from the beginning. Numerous reports establish this including
Sharmine Narwani’s report “Syria: The Hidden Massacre” which notes the armed nature
of the uprising form the beginning. Murdered Dutch Priest Father Frans van der Lugt ,
working on the ground in Syria and having lived there since 1966, had made similar
points clearly undermining the western narrative through various publications he has
made. Among his most critical conclusions was that
From the start, the protest movements were not purely peaceful. From the start I saw
armed demonstrators marching along in the protests, who began to shoot at the police
first. Very often the violence of the security forces has been a reaction to the brutal violence of the armed rebels.
He also concluded regarding media coverage of the situation:
In the first place, it has to be said that it is very difficult to provide a nuanced and objective account of what is happening. Many journalists fall into describing matters in black
and white. For them, good and evil are not interwoven, but are clearly separated. They
demonize the one side and glorify the other. Thus, for example, it is not true that our
[the Syrian] government has only bad sides and the opposition only good ones. But because the US, Europe and certain Arab countries support the opposition, they endeavor,
whether consciously or unconsciously, to idealize it as much as possible, without engaging in any careful analysis of the real situation. Certain interests are obscuring our view
of the real situation and contaminating the description of it.
An independent investigative mission by the Arab League, comprising of over 160
monitors in November 2011 produced a reality different from media exaggerations and
spin put forth by the opposition. Unsurprisingly, the report was buried by Qatar, who
along with Saudi Arabia, was working with the west and proxies in Lebanon to undermine and overthrow the Syrian government and spread their hegemony across the Middle East.
The Council on Foreign Relations, one of the corporate-financier think-tanks that drive
US and NATO foreign policy also admitted:
The Syrian rebels would be immeasurably weaker today without al-Qaeda in their
ranks. By and large, Free Syrian Army (FSA) battalions are tired, divided, chaotic, and
ineffective. Feeling abandoned by the West, rebel forces are increasingly demoralized as
they square off with the Assad regime’s superior weaponry and professional army. AlQaeda fighters, however, may help improve morale. The influx of jihadis brings discipline, religious fervor, battle experience from Iraq, funding from Sunni sympathizers in
the Gulf, and most importantly, deadly results. In short, the FSA needs al-Qaeda now.
The Dire Significance
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It is significant to belabor this point in light of recent statements by the US that it was
pledging $500 million to the Syrian opposition, an absolute moral outrage considering
the systematic dismantling of the Syrian state that the rebels had done, carrying out the
directive of their western backers. Political football issues thrown around in the media
about whether the US should go back into Iraq or not or whether we should have armed
the Syrian rebels earlier or not misses the point and poses a danger to humanity as a
whole.
The point is the fact that the US had been funding Syrian opposition groups since 2005
under Bushas revealed by Wikileak cables. Obama is essentially carrying out “Bush’s
wars” in the Middle East through a different political cover; however, it would be erroneous to describe these as simply “Bush’s wars” but rather the wars of a corporatefinancier elite that dominates the west and whose agenda has been coming full circle
since 1991, merely disguised with updated political spin to cater to the dominant public
opinion.
Democracy in the west has become rule by intellectual confusion; imperialism is a system that has evolved to grant global corporate-financier domination in all major world
theaters, with the Middle East being the pivotal theater to secure access into Eurasia and
secure western hegemony versus Russia and China which is the stated objective of former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinzski’s “The Grand Chessboard” and the
Neo-Conservatives’ “Rebuilding America’s Defenses.” “Pax Americana” is the phrase
employed by the Neo-Cons but can we honestly say that what we are observing today from Libya to Syria is in anyway making the world more peaceful?
Enter the Jester
The media jester here enters the world with foolishness that is incredibly transparent to
those who are aware of the reality at play. The comedy act is that the Syrian rebels were
deliberately transformed into the extremist hordes that they are now, not by deliberate
financing by the west, but by Assad collaborating with the extremists against the moderates and seculars. This has become official US State Department dogma; the claim had
appeared around January 2014 in the The Telegraph and has been repeated by Al
Jazeera who stated:
Sources told the UK-based newspaper that the aim of the double game played by Assad
was to convince Western countries that the Syrian uprising was sponsored by “Islamist
militants” in order to hinder international support for it.
“Jabhat al-Nusra, and the even more extreme Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS),
the two al-Qaeda affiliates operating in Syria, have both been financed by selling oil and
gas from wells under their control to and through the regime, The Daily Telegraph quoted an anonymous intelligence source as saying.
“The regime is paying al-Nusra to protect oil and gas pipelines under al-Nusra’s control
in the north and east of the country, and is also allowing the transport of oil to regime-
129
held areas,” the source was quoted as saying. “We are also now starting to see evidence
of oil and gas facilities under ISIS control.”
The Daily Telegraph also reported that Syrian military defectors and rebels said that the
government “deliberately released militant prisoners” who joined the extremist groups
that are combating moderate rebel forces.
This is hardly reliable considering that the sources included western intelligence officials and anonymous, unverifiable activist accounts which in context to other, welldocumented facts, makes them unconvincing. Dr. Joshua Landis, who is hardly a proAssad figure, does an excellent job at poking holes in some of the specifics of these accusations but misses some significant points. In reality, it is the west that has deliberately created the political context that made the rise of Islamists in Syria and across the
greater Middle East possible. Pulitzer-Prize winning investigative reporter Seymour
Hersh documented in his 2007 piece in the New Yorker titled “The Redirection” that the
US government, then under Bush, was working with Saudi Arabia and the Hariri political faction in Lebanon to undermine Syria and Iran’s influence in the region through the
means of playing upon sectarian and ethnic lines to reorient the region in their own image. Let’s not forget that it has the European Union who had lifted its oil embargo on
Syria in order to purchase oil from oil fields clearly documented to be held by Islamist
rebels in a bid to further their destabilization of Syria.
Tony Cartalucci has written extensively of the implications of Hersh’s work in the context of Syria today, citing very prophetic quotes from “The Redirection” that predicted
the engineered quagmire today. As Cartalucci revealed, Seymour Hersh notes:
“To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by
Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally
Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups
that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al
Qaeda.” -The Redirection, Seymour Hersh
Hersh’s report would also note:
“Robert Baer, a former longtime C.I.A. agent in Lebanon, has been a severe critic of
Hezbollah and has warned of its links to Iranian-sponsored terrorism. But now, he told
me, “we’ve got Sunni Arabs preparing for cataclysmic conflict, and we will need somebody to protect the Christians in Lebanon. It used to be the French and the United States
who would do it, and now it’s going to be Nasrallah and the Shiites” -The Redirection,
Seymour Hersh
On the role of the Hariri faction, much was noted in the fact that Lebanon would be
used as a staging ground to organize Sunni militants to undermine Syria. Also included
is the fact that Walid Jumblatt, a Druze member of the Hariri faction, would meet with
Dick Cheney in 2006 and recommend using the Muslim Brotherhood in any attempt to
130
undermine Assad. Hersh noted how US support was already helping the Islamists:
There is evidence that the Administration’s redirection strategy has already benefitted
the Brotherhood. The Syrian National Salvation Front is a coalition of opposition groups
whose principal members are a faction led by Abdul Halim Khaddam, a former Syrian
Vice-President who defected in 2005, and the Brotherhood. A former high-ranking
C.I.A. officer told me, “The Americans have provided both political and financial support. The Saudis are taking the lead with financial support, but there is American involvement.” He said that Khaddam, who now lives in Paris, was getting money from
Saudi Arabia, with the knowledge of the White House. (In 2005, a delegation of the
Front’s members met with officials from the National Security Council, according to
press reports.) A former White House official told me that the Saudis had provided
members of the Front with travel documents.
And as if to dispel any claims by critics who fail the read the report in its entirety and
try to claim that this support is passive and not active, Hersh noted:
“…[Saudi Arabia's] Bandar and other Saudis have assured the White House that “they
will keep a very close eye on the religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was
‘We’ve created this movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want the
Salafis to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr, Iran,
and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran.” -The Redirection,
Seymour Hersh
What must be noted is the intimate relationship of Saudi Arabian interests to the corporate-financier, globalist interests in the west and the joint-investment by both forces to
perpetuate their hegemony across the Middle East at the expense of Iranian, Chinese,
and Russian influence. Saudi Arabia is also the primary underwriter of Islamist forces in
the world, financing the most violent of groups, and is used as a “Swiss Army knife” to
undermine nations against the western geopolitical objective fromMali to Pakistan. Also
to be noted is that Dick Cheney is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
as well Hillary Clinton, both who carried out the same agenda of undermining Syria under two supposedly different political administrations. Hillary Clinton has basically admitted that theCFR runs American policy, a fact that has been documented in the work
of renowned Dr. Carroll Quigley in “Tragedy and Hope.”
Democrats and Republicans; in terms of mainstream foreign policy and who benefits,
there is no different. The US has a historic role in supporting groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood against secular nationalist leaders to destabilize targeted countries. There is
also the role of “color revolutions” used to create protest movements through US government and corporate funded NGOs that capitalize on legitimate social dissent in places like the Middle East to push forward proxies into power (see also “The Revolution
Business”). When that fails, you get armed insurgencies; a classic case study of this was
the NATO destabilization of Libya and the manner in which the media attempted to spin
it on political lines as documented in this article, along with its connection to Syria.
Breaking Free From the Matrix
131
The reality is clear before us. We can continue to entertain the media jester fooling our
intelligence with acts of intellectual comedy and foolery or we can rise up and say no
more and work to spread true information at the grassroots level. The establishment
does not seek what is in our interest and the western corporate-financier agenda is not
only the enemy of those it attacks in the east but also its own people it is fooling and
robbing in the west.
The way to undermine this agenda is to boycott the corporate interests driving it and
replace them with local, self-sufficient options outside of the global economic scam of
corporatized globalization. That is the only way to reclaim political power and redistribute it into the hands of the people. Otherwise, we are only spinning a political hamster
wheel of faux-democracy, depriving us of the right of sovereignty under the very illusion that we have it. We must tip the balance of power in our favor. Otherwise, the media jester will continue dancing on the world stage before our eyes and mocking our intelligence with its foolishness. It is an act of intellectual comedy so detached from reality that those who are awake almost feel to urge to laugh but are stopped by the thought
of the utter depravity that has become the current world order.
Sam Muhho is a student of history at Florida State College at Jacksonville (FSCJ) and
is an advocate of anti-imperialism and anti-globalism. He can be reached
at [email protected].
http://www.globalresearch.ca/
132
USA
Jihadist Threat Calls For New US Strategy to Combat Terrorism, RAND
Study Says
06/18/2014
There is a growing terrorist threat to the United States from a rising number of
Salafi-jihadist groups overseas, according to the new RAND Corporation study, “A
Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al aeda and Other Salafi-Jihadists."
Since 2010, there has been a 58 percent increase in the number of jihadist groups,
a doubling of jihadist fighters and a tripling of attacks by Al Qaeda affiliates. The
most significant threat to the United States, the report concluded, comes from terrorist groups operating in Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
“Based on these threats, the United States cannot afford to withdraw or remain
disengaged from key parts of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia,” said
Seth Jones, author of the study and associate director of the International Security
and Defense Policy Center at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “After more
than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, it may be tempting for the US to turn
its attention elsewhere and scale back on counterterrorism efforts. But this research indicates that the struggle is far from over.”
For the study, Jones examined thousands of unclassified and declassified primary
source documents, including public statements and internal memorandums of Al
Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist leaders. The study also includes a database of information such as the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, their approximate size and
their activity -- attacks, fatalities and other casualties.
The RAND study focuses on Salafi-jihadist groups, a particular strand of militant
Sunni Islamism. These groups, which include Al Qaeda and its affiliates, emphasize
the importance of returning to a “pure” Islam, that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors. They also believe that violent jihad is a personal religious duty for every devout Muslim, Jones said.
One reason for the increase in groups, fighters and attacks is the weakness of governments across North Africa and the Middle East. Weak governments have difficulty establishing law and order, which allows militant groups and other sub-state
actors to fill the vacuum.
These trends suggest that the United States needs to remain focused on countering the proliferation of Salafi-jihadist groups, despite the temptation to shift attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific or other regions and to significantly decrease
counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint, Jones said.
The report documented how the broader Salafi-jihadist movement has become
more decentralized among four tiers: core Al Qaeda in Pakistan; formal affiliates
133
that have sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda; Salafi-jihadist groups that have not sworn
allegiance to Al Qaeda but are committed to establishing an extremist Islamic emirate; and inspired individuals and networks.
Jones said the threat posed by these diverse groups varies widely. Some are locally
focused and have shown little interest in attacking Western targets. Others, like Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, present an immediate threat to the US homeland,
along with inspired individuals like the Tsarnaev brothers who perpetrated the April
2013 Boston bombings. Others threaten US interests overseas, but not the homeland.
In addition to high-level threats from Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
RAND study concluded there is a medium-level threat from terrorist groups operating in Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Nigeria and Algeria. And there is a low-level
threat from Salafi-jihadist groups operating in such countries as Tunisia, Mali and
Morocco.
In response to these threats, Jones said the US should establish a more-adaptive
counterterrorism strategy, pursuing engagement -- the use of special operations,
intelligence, diplomatic and other capacities to conduct precision targeting of these
groups and their financial, logistical and political support networks -- where there is
a high threat to the US and a low local government capacity.
In other cases, the US may adopt a “forward-partnering” strategy, Jones said. Forward partnering involves deploying small numbers of US military forces, intelligence operatives, diplomats and other governmental personnel to train local security forces, collect intelligence and undermine terrorist financing. Unlike an engagement strategy, however, US forces would not directly become involved in the war
by conducting raids or drone strikes.
A third strategy, “offshore balancing,” should be used in cases where there is little
or no direct threat to the United States. Offshore balancing involves relying on allies and local governments to counter terrorist groups, while avoiding direct engagement or forward partnering.
Research for the study was funded by and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a
federally-funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy,
the Marine Corps, the defense agencies and the defense intelligence community.
http://www.hstoday.us/
134
Yemen
Fighting Al Qaida in Yemen and the ulterior motive
Published: 20:00 June 19, 2014
If the government’s main aim is to fight terrorism by eliminating this terror group,
then the methods that are being used — whether military or political — may actually weaken the position of the government and raise doubts about the scale and
limits of the anti-terror battle
From the presidential palace in Mukalla to the presidential palace in Sana’a there is
a long list of targets exposed to possible terrorist operations by Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Between the two palaces one can see gatherings of the
Yemeni army and hear the echo of massive bombardments by the security forces
and American drone attacks against Al Qaida training camps in the southern provinces of Abyan, Shabwa and Hadramout. The latest attacks have been ongoing since
April this year and the death toll is in the hundreds. But not all the dead belong to
Al Qaida.
According to statements by Yemen’s Interior Ministry, only a few victims have been
identified so far and the government is still trying to identify the others. With an
explicit recognition by the government, there have been civilians among the dead.
135
Abu Basir or Nasser Al Waheshi managed to dig a long tunnel in the political security prison in Sana’a to make good his escape in 2006 and earn the leadership of
AQAP with the blessings of the then second-most senior man in the organisation,
Ayman Al Zawahiri, in 2009. Al Waheshi holds the title of “Prince of Mujahideen”,
and had been declared to be among the dead during a US drone attack in April.
However, according to subsequent reports, DNA samples have confirmed that he
was not among those killed. This means that Al Qaida leaders in Yemen will continue to be chased, whether by the Yemeni authorities or the US government through
the use of drones and with the support of US Marines. On the top of the US list are
Al Waheshi, Ebrahim Al Asiri and Qasim Al Rimi. Yemen is the “safe haven” for Al
Qaida or at least this is what the CIA has believed — throughout its exhausting mission against the group since 9/11. The term “safe haven” has been used by Washington to indicate that the most senior figures in Al Qaida — whether in Pakistan,
Afghanistan or the militants released from Guantanamo — moved to Yemen after
the formation of AQAP. They found a safe haven in Yemen, away from the prying
eyes of the various security agencies.
It is a fact that Al Qaida in Yemen does not only embrace Yemeni fighters, but rather a mix of fighters from different countries, including Saudis, Chechens, Pakistanis, Egyptians and others. Perhaps the emphasis on the presence of these foreign fighters demonstrates that Al Qaida in Yemen has become a regional centre,
not just a branch of the organisation, and that the leaders present in Yemen have
the right to plan, guide and initiate attacks not only in Yemen, but also around the
world to achieve the objectives of the organisation. The episode involving the Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallib, who tried — but failed — to blow up a US airliner over Detroit confirms that. He had planned it inside Yemen with the help of the
late Al Qaida leader Anwar Al Awlaki and Saudi Ebrahim Al Asiri. The video
launched to announce the establishment of AQAP was titled ‘From here we start
and in Al Aqsa mosque we meet’.
Recurrent theme
The ideology of the organisation, as described by its members, is aimed at establishing an army in Yemen to wage battles in “Belad Al Sham” (Syria), under the slogan “Yemen is the land that contains the supply of fighters (Al Madad)”. According
to AQAP, 12,000 fighters have come from Abyan and Aden. Perhaps all this gave
the Yemeni regime, both before and after the 2011 revolution, the legitimacy needed to eliminate the organisation and get rid of members through arrests, imprisonment or execution (either following a trial or through the open skies with the use of
American drones). It is also a fact that AQAP has carried out terrorist operations —
from the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 to the recent bombings in Sana’a and most
notably the incident at Al Ardi Hospital in the Ministry of Defence compound in December 2013. And throughout this period, violence, kidnappings and assassinations
have been a recurrent theme in all the governorates of Yemen.
However, the recent escalation of clashes between AQAP and the Yemeni security
136
forces and the gross use of different mediums — whether political, military or the
media — to eliminate Al Qaida, particularly in the southern provinces, may indicate
that the Yemeni authorities have started mixing fact with fiction. This may lead to
an outcome that may end up benefitting AQAP, rather than eliminating the organisation. The demand by the Committee to Protect Journalists that the Yemeni government grant two journalists, Adam Barron and Ted Rock, the permission to reenter Yemen and report freely may be seen as a universal condemnation of the decisions of the government. It also leads to suspicions that the Yemeni government
may be using AQAP as an excuse to protect its interests and to obtain external support — whether political, financial or military — and that its efforts against AQAP
are not aimed at the eradication of terrorism.
Barron, one of the journalists deported from Yemen, had pointed out in an article a
year ago that “any unrest in south Yemen is often immediately linked to Al Qaida.
This is not wholly without reason. For much of the past two years, local fighters
affiliated to Al Qaida effectively controlled southern towns. But the anxiety over
the current situation in the south ultimately has little to do with the infamous terrorist franchise”. This may suggest that the Yemeni government uses the narrative
of Al Qaida to conceal or suppress other political events in the country that have no
connection whatsoever with Al Qaida — whether it is separatist demands in the
south or confrontations with the Al Houthis in the north or an attempt to overlook
the application of the resolutions of the national dialogue conference, which concluded in January this year.
Some even believe that America supports the approach of the Yemeni government
in this regard. According to Critical Threats, an initiative of the American Enterprise
Institute, “the claims of secession in the south and military confrontations between
the Al Houthis and the regime in the north may put the strategy of the US government to eradicate terrorism in Yemen at risk”.
This analysis of the attitude of the American government towards what is happening in Yemen may seem a rather superficial one that does not reflect a clear vision
or an honest picture of the complex and interrelated political reality in Yemen.
However, it confirms that the US puts its own interests first, not those of the Yemeni people. This may have played a key role, directly or indirectly, in shuffling of papers and in the loss of facts, which granted the present Yemeni regime and the former one the green light to utilise the narrative of Al Qaida in a negative way.
If the Yemeni government’s main aim is to fight terrorism by eliminating Al Qaida,
then the methods that are being used — whether military or political — may not be
approved by international observers. It may actually weaken the position of the
government and raise doubts concerning the scale and limits of its battle with Al
Qaida.
Not all southerners belong to Al Qaida. And not all members of Al Qaida are southerners, but the large-scale presence of the Yemeni army in the southern provinces
137
— whether the National Security Agency or reserve forces under the command of
the head of state, President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, or Yemeni air defence forces or military reinforcements from the US with the support of some local tribes in
Abyan and Shabwa — may convey a wrong message to the Arab and international
public that the south is a hotbed of Al Qaida activity. And that all political activities
in the south, such as public demonstrations or protests, are an extension of Al Qaida.
The political history of the south before Yemen’s reunification indicates that the
Socialist Party was the arch-enemy of Al Qaida and this was reflected in the visions
and attitudes of extremists in the 1990s. In addition to that, the “jihad” against the
Socialist Party was the latest action by Al Qaida in South Yemen before reunification and this continued later on when Osama Bin Laden had ordered his followers
in Yemen to engage in a battle against the Socialists and to fight alongside the
Northern Yemen army to overthrow “communism”.
The declared goal
The intervention of Al Qaida in the military confrontation between the southern
part and the northern part of Yemen in the 1994 war raises many doubts about the
existence of hidden political alliances between Al Qaida in Yemen and elements of
the political system at that time. That reflects negatively on the credibility of the
previous government and its declared goal of fighting Al Qaida. These doubts may
extend to include political figures in the present regime in Yemen.
Al Hirak, the most prominent political movement in South Yemen, currently claims
that it adopts a peaceful and moderate political approach and aims mainly at the
revival of southern states. Perhaps the claims of retired military southerners to get
equal rights with their counterparts in the north in 2007 were the first spark in
working towards this goal.
There are fears that the Yemeni government will continue to confront Al Qaida as
an element of political unrest in Yemen in a way that is far removed from the real
scale of the problem. It uses it to justify a military sweep of the southern provinces
and to justify the killing of innocent citizens. This short-term political move may
grant the Yemeni regime limited results in its battle with Al Qaida, but in the long
term it may cause damage to the fight against the organisation and may provide
fuel for it to expand.
We cannot rule out the assumption that the Yemeni government fabricates events
and victims to carry out an outdated political agenda that has not achieved the desired results. The time has come to change these shabby agendas and correct the
wrong policies so that Yemen can win its battle against Al Qaida.
Haifa AlMaashi is a former professor at the University of Aden and a senior researcher in ‘b’huth’ (Dubai).
http://gulfnews.com/
138
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While the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) strives
to make the information on this publication as timely and accurate as possible, the
ACSRT makes no claims, promises, or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness,
or adequacy of its contents, and expressly disclaims liability for errors and omissions in its contents. No warranty of any kind, implied, expressed, or statutory, including but not limited to the warranties of non-infringement of third party rights,
title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or freedom from computer virus, is given with respect to the contents of this publication or its links to other Internet resources.
It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors
and not of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), its
publication board, its management or any funder or sponsor of the ACSRT, nor that
of the African Union Commission (AUC),
Reference in this publication to any specific commercial product, process, or service, or the use of any trade, firm or corporation name is for the information and
convenience of the public, and does not constitute endorsement, recommendation, or
favoring by the ACSRT and AUC.
139

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