Review no. 72
Press Review
1—15 July 2014
Table of Contents
Pages
African Union
- L’UA offre 20 véhicules au ministère malien de l’Intérieur et de la Sécurité
- International Contact Group on the Central African Republic meets in Addis Ababa
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Terrorism in Africa
- Rising Terror In Africa: How Much A Factor Is Oil?
- Iraq, Libya, Syria: Three reasons African Americans should oppose U.S. intervention in Africa
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Algiers
- Efforts de l’Algérie pour résoudre la crise de l’Azawad
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DRC
- Est de la RDC : Le M23 se réorganise en Ouganda
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Egypt
- New Egypt terror group adopting 'lone wolf' approach
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Libya
- AP News Break: Different attackers in Benghazi?
- Does the New Benghazi Indictment Undermine the White House's Story?
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Mali
- Mali : après l'opération Serval, place à "Barkhane"
- « Pas d’indépendance ni d’autonomie. Il n’y aura pas de califat au nord du Mali »
- Nord-Mali : La partition est-elle consommée ?
- Situation au nord du Mali : Le drapeau du MNLA flotte presque partout
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Nigeria
- How to end Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, by Alao Akala
- Understanding, and predicting, Boko Haram tactics
- Don't Forget What Sustains Boko Haram – Poverty
- Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram
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Somalia
- JIHADISTS MOVE 'FROM POISONED ARROWS TO IEDS'
- AMERICA NEEDS A 'RESET' IN POLICY TOWARD SOMALIA
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Tanzania
- Attacks hit Tanzania and Kenya tourist sites
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Tunisia
- Le bilan de Mehdi Jomâa en six mois de lutte anti-jihadiste
- Il faut modifier le projet de loi antiterroriste, selon HRW
- An Analysis of Tunisia’s Draft Counterterrorism Law
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Terrorism in the world
- L’État islamique, le « Projet Califat » et la « Guerre mondiale contre le terrorisme »
- L’extrémisme au nom de l’islam rejeté par les musulmans
- Officials: ISIS Terrorists May Target Europe and US Homeland, Threat 'Extremely High'
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Afghanistan
- Forte hausse des combats et victimes
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France
- Le plan du gouvernement pour lutter contre le terrorisme
- Que prévoit le projet de loi antiterroriste?
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Iraq
- IRAQ CRISIS AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS – ANALYSIS
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Ukraine
- Ukraine rebel strongholds on edge as Kiev shrugs off calls for truce
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African Union
L’UA offre 20 véhicules au ministère malien de l’Intérieur et de la Sécurité
Bamako, le 14 juillet 2014 – M. Pierre Buyoya, Chef de la Mission de l’Union africaine (UA) pour le Mali et le Sahel (MISAHEL) a remis ce lundi 14 juillet 2014 à M.
Sada Samaké, ministre de l’Intérieur et de la Sécurité, les clefs d’un premier lot de
treize véhicules sur vingt offerts par l’UA. D’une valeur marchande d’un million de
dollars américains soit 481,642,430 francs CFA, le don est composé de treize (13)
camionnettes pick-up, quatre (4) ambulances et trois (3) camions.
Ce don contribuera, entre autres, au renforcement des capacités des Forces de défense et de sécurité de la République du Mali (FDSM). En sa qualité de Haut représentant de l’UA pour le Mali et le Sahel, dans son allocution, M. Buyoya, a tenu à
réitérer «la ferme détermination de l’UA à appuyer les autorités maliennes pour le
retour à la paix et à la stabilité du pays ». En effet, la sécurité dans la région du Sahel constitue un des trois principaux piliers de la Stratégie de l’UA pour le Sahel. Ce
pilier vise notamment la promotion de la sécurité collective dans la région, à travers le Processus de Nouakchott, une initiative regroupant onze (11) pays du Sahel,
dont le Mali.
«Des projets sont également en cours d’exécution pour le renforcement de
l’échange d’information entre les services de sécurité et de renseignement des pays
de la région ainsi que la mise en place de mécanismes opérationnels pour la lutte
contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transfrontalière, » a annoncé M. Pierre
Buyoya.
Au-delà de l’appui dans le secteur de la sécurité, la MISAHEL et les autres struc-
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tures pertinentes de l’UA continueront d’apporter leur appui dans d’autres domaines aussi importants que le processus de dialogue inclusif inter malien et la réconciliation nationale.
Pour sa part, M. Sada Samaké s’est félicité de « ce don qui marque la solidarité de
la communauté africaine et internationale » en faveur du Mali.
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International Contact Group on the Central African Republic meets in
Addis Ababa
Addis Ababa, 7 July 2014: The Fifth meeting of the International Contact Group on
the Central African Republic (ICG-CAR) was opened this morning by key speakers
from the African Union, United Nations, the Government of the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
The Contact Group has been meeting since May last year to discuss coordinated
regional, continental and international action to enable CAR to find a lasting solution to the political, security and humanitarian situation of the country.
In his opening remarks the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security,
Ambassador Smail Chergui, strongly appreciated the efforts of MISCA, (the Africanled International Support Mission to CAR), in carrying out its mandate. Paying tribute the troop and police contributing countries, he said “We bow to the memory of
the soldiers and police officers who have made the ultimate sacrifice to bring peace
to CAR”. Nine weeks before the transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA (the
United Nations Mission to CAR), Ambassador Chergui said this transfer will open a
new chapter. “In close cooperation with ECCAS and in the spirit of partnership with
the United Nations, the transfer will support the ongoing process of reconciliation,
elections and the reform of the defence sector and security,” he added.
The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Herve
Ladsous, said that “since March, there has been some improvement in the security
situation as a result of the hard work of MISCA, the French led Operation Sangaris
and the European force, EUFOR-RCA”. But he said the task remains daunting, and
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that there is a real urgency for political dialogue to consolidate progress made by
the CAR Transitional Authority. “The coming months will be critical”, said Mr Ladsous, “and Central Africans will need to re-double their efforts to address the challenges ahead. The region and international community also have an important role
to play”.
Further speakers included the ECCAS Secretary General, Ahmad Allam-Mi, who said
that in order put and end to CAR’s violence “we need a consensual political framework which is strong and could be shared by all CAR stakeholders.”
The Prime Minister of CAR, Andre Nzapayeke, commented that “To make peace
and to move forward to positive action is for the brave, so that lasting peace can
prevail in CAR. I appeal to the groups carrying out violence to join the brave.”
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Terrorism in Africa
Rising Terror In Africa: How Much A Factor Is Oil?
July 7, 2014
VENTURES AFRICA – The relationship between oil and terrorism is not a new find.
Since the turn of the century analysts and panellists have lunched on this topic and
churned out from in-depth exclusives to conspiracy theories, one of such is perhaps
the 2004 Documentary, the Oil Factor by Gerard Ungerman and Audrey Brohy.
However, most of these reports and theories on oil and terror have focused on the
Middle East crisis and the US-led Western World’s interventions. The Oil Factor, for
example, builds its story from the perspective of the US-led War on Terror being
primarily motivated by its interest in the abundant oil in the Middle East. Like earlier stated, these are not new postulations. What is perhaps more current is the rising state of terror in Africa coinciding with the boom in exploration of oil in Africa.
Terror groups whether styled as Islamists, separatists, rebels or freedom fighters,
are increasingly focusing on oil and in many cases seeking to control it.
In the past decade, militant groups in the Oil-rich Niger Delta of Nigeria had, in the
mantra of emancipating their people, sought to not just disrupt the exploration of
oil in their lands, but to also trade in this oil through illegal bunkering. Though the
Niger-Delta Militants’ activities have relatively calmed since the Nigeria Govern-
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ment’s amnesty programme, many have alluded to the sharing of Nigeria’s oil proceeds as the main grievance fuelling the insurgency in north.
Libya’s oil crises is currently the most pronounced in Africa with militant groups in
the country’s east seizing and controlling oil fields. Ever since the fall of the Gadaffi
regime, militant groups that fought to oust him have taken illegal oil trade. In
March, militants at the militant-held port of al-Sidra tried to export oil through a
North Korea-flagged tanker. Although the Libyan authorities claimed to have taken
control of the tanker, the vessel eventually broke through. Hope seems to be on
the horizon as the militant group in control of major oil ports have agreed a deal
with the Libyan government to release the three ports under their control. However, Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni declaration that the crises has ended may be
a little bit premature considering the fact that there are several other militant
groups in Libya who profit from attacking oil ports politically and financially.
The situation in South-Sudan is not so dissimilar. This newest African country, having engaged in decades-battle for secession from the North, a battle in no little way
motivated by a desire to control its vast oil resources, gained its independence in
2011. But all the joy and enthusiasm of the new independence and control of its
vast resources have fizzled away with the bloody clash between its two main leaders, nay tribal groups- the Dinka and the Nuer. The warring factions, Government
forces loyal to President Salva Kiir’s on one side and rebel soldiers loyal to his former vice and political opponent Riek Machar on the other, unsurprisingly concentrated their efforts to seize and control oil fields. Although both sides are now under a testy ceasefire agreement, a lasting solution to the crises is still nowhere
near.
The Republic of Congo, Angola and Algeria are among a host of other Oil producing
African countries to see their oil production threatened by crises and militant forces. It now seems that in Africa, where ever the oil goes, terror visits.
The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) in its 2003 report gives a partial background to this phenomenon, thus; “Terrorist organizations have always
been interested in targeting oil and gas facilities. Striking pipelines, tankers, refineries and oil fields accomplish two desired goals: undermining the internal stability of
the regimes they are fighting, and economically weakening foreign powers with
vested interests in their region”. That background is incomplete because it does
not take into account the weak government institutions, corruption and patronage,
tribal conflict and government’s indifference to the woes of oil-affected communities – that is common, if not prevalent, in these oil-producing African countries.
These factors are well sounded in Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s “Nigerian Warning” to Kenya- another African country on the verge of an oil boom.
Oil producing African Countries need to address the factors enumerated in the preceding paragraph as these oil–targeted terror becomes more potent in deflating
their economic success. For example, Libya’s Oil exploration fell from 1.4 million
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barrels per day before the 2011 revolution to around 300 thousand currently while
South-Sudan is virtually surviving on foreign aid.
http://www.ventures-africa.com/
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Iraq, Libya, Syria: Three reasons African Americans should oppose U.S.
intervention in Africa
JUL 3, 2014 - 6:13:19 PM
Mass slaughter, rape, torture, pillage, perpetual war, cultural degradation, creating
social divisions, psychological manipulation—the essential tools employed by Western powers to establish their 522-year domination over many of the peoples of the
world—are still being used with frightening efficiency and effect to maintain that
dominance.
Just over the last decade and a half the orgy of violence unleashed by the U.S. and
the gangster states of NATO in the name of promoting democracy and the racist
absurdity of a “responsibility to protect” has been incalculable. Masked by the oxymoronic language that connects the White West with humanitarianism, the U.S.
and its NATO allies have been on a killing spree in more than a dozen countries.
President Obama has conducted imperialism’s version of a drive-by shooting with
his drone warfare where wedding parties, funerals and even family gatherings are
subject to being blown to bits just because the U.S. has the technology to do so and
the power to get away with mass murder.
In “normal” times the racist megalomania of the U.S. that produced and is producing the carnage in Iraq, Libya, Syria and throughout the world would have been
enough to caution African Americans against any pleas to the U.S. to militarily intervene to “bring back our girls” in Nigeria. But of course these are not normal
times.
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A brief historical recap of U.S. policy in Africa
There have been two factors that help to explain the relative success of White supremacist capitalist power to construct and impose an historical narrative in which
they have been absolved of their criminal activities in Africa: the post 9/11 focus on
counter-terrorism, and the election of the first Black president of the U.S.
Puerto Rican activist and writer Aurora Levins Morales reminds us
that as the oppressed gain agency
in their fight against dominance,
memory is a site of struggle: “One
of the first things a colonizing power or repressive regime does is
attack the sense of history of those
they wish to dominate by
attempting to take over and control their relationship to their own
past.”
African American internationalism
has always been a central component of the Black radical tradition.
That approach to politics always
linked the struggle for Black liberation with that of the anti-colonial
President Obama speaking at West Point Academy in
May. Photo: MGN Online
‘A critical read of U.S. policy on Africa from that
perspective, one that is alien to the pro-imperialist
perspective of Barack Obama, suggests that
throughout the post-World War II anti-colonial
struggles that took place in Africa there is not one
instance of the U.S. being on the side of African
independence, not one.’
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struggle in Africa and throughout the colonial world. A critical read of U.S. policy on
Africa from that perspective, one that is alien to the pro-imperialist perspective of
Barack Obama, suggests that throughout the post-World War II anti-colonial struggles that took place in Africa there is not one instance of the U.S. being on the side
of African independence, not one.
In fact, in every struggle on the part of Africans to free themselves from the oppressive yoke of European colonialism, the U.S. aligned with the colonial powers
across the continent to undermine African independence. U.S. policy in Africa was
consistently pro-White power, from its continued support for the White settler regimes in Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa to its direct logistical and military support to the Portuguese through NATO to fight against African freedom
fighters in Angola and Mozambique.
This support for colonial White supremacy in Africa was consistently executed
by both corporate parties in the U.S.
The assault on historical memory continued and intensified with the election of
Barack Obama. Obama’s election not
only blurred a critical perspective on
U.S. policy in Africa and globally on the
part of many in the Black communities,
but did so at a historical moment when
the U.S. state was undergoing a severe
crisis of legitimacy and strategic confusion. That confusion was marked by vacillation between the use of aggressive,
hard power that characterized the large-scale use of the military under the Bush
administration, and more nuanced, soft power, i.e. the ideological, symbolic and
diplomatic manifestations of state power.
The institutional developments and key decision-making over the last six years has
reflected the inchoate character of that ongoing strategic confusion. But even with
that confusion, Obama’s deployment as the smiling face of imperial power has had
a devastating impact. His deployment has made it exceptionally difficult to demystify the elite interests embedded in his policies. The confusion is such that, for the
first time in U.S. history, it has become possible to win majority Black support for
the retrograde policies of U.S. imperialism.
The Strategic Plan for Africa under Obama
By the fall of 2008, many among the capitalist elite and within the agencies of the
U.S. government had concluded that the U.S. would have its first (and hopefully
only) Black president. It was also in the fall that the U.S. Strategic Command
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(AFRICOM) was created.
The clear objective of U.S. policy in Africa, as spelled out by U.S. State Department advisor to AFRICOM Dr. J. Peter
Pham in 2007, was “protecting access to
hydrocarbons and other strategic resources which Africa has in abundance,
a task which includes ensuring against
the vulnerability of those natural riches
and ensuring that no other interested
third parties, such as China, India, Japan,
or Russia, obtain monopolies or preferential treatment.”
Therefore, while the Chinese were involved in economic activities that resulted in direct investments in infrastructural and technological development as well as
access to low interest loans, the objective of U.S. policy was to encourage what the
U.S. does best—introduce death and destruction through destabilization and militarization.
In line with the historic role of capitalist development in Africa, a capitalist relationship that at its core has always been dependent on violence and plunder, is it an
incredulous position to conclude that the real interest of the U.S. policy in Nigeria is
less a concern with the lives of Nigerian girls and more with bringing key strategic
areas in Africa under their control in order to block the Chinese?
And while all of us mourn for the more than 200 girls who have been kidnapped
and can only imagine what their families must be going through, we also have to
make sure that we don’t allow the very real emotion of the issue to cloud our analysis—something that is probably easier for us who are not directly impacted. We
have to do this because it is precisely at these moments that we have to be cleareyed and not allow ourselves to be manipulated.
Militarization in the name of fighting terrorism—the terror phenomenon seems to
develop in whatever country the U.S. has a strategic interest—is the cornerstone of
the “new” strategy of counter-terrorism partnerships that President Obama revealed in his famous (or infamous, depending on one’s view) speech at West Point
on May 28.
Even though the speech was attacked by the Washington Post, New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal, the strategy of reducing the U.S. footprint by relying on
small numbers of special forces—Delta force, Seals, Green Berets, etc.—and not
committing massive ground forces, thus reducing the possibility of U.S. casualties
and the attention of the public, reflects a serious strategic threat to the cause of
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peace and anti-interventionism. It is not
only a strategy that commits the U.S. to
a permanent war posture, especially
since the connection of covert U.S. support to these terrorist operations is now
well established, it also means that the
plan for Africa is being written in the
blood of the people in Iraq, Syria and
Libya.
Similar to its policies in those countries,
the U.S. has embarked on a strategy of
destabilization in Africa, operating
through non-state terrorist operations
like their Al-Qaeda proxies directly, or Al
-Qaeda linked organizations like Boko Haram in Nigeria. The objective is to create
security emergencies that weaken the state and create a situation where the U.S.
then comes to the aid of the embattled states and is able to entrench itself within
the life of various nations on the African continent.
The educational and organizational imperative:
The aggressive posture of U.S. imperialism over the last few years has proceeded
with very little organized opposition from the capitalist center in the U.S. Not just
because of the institutional weakness of left and progressive forces but, even more
ominously, because of the ideological collaboration and alignment by left forces
with the imperial project. This latter phenomenon is more characteristic of positions taken by some of the more chauvinistic elements of the White Left than our
ranks, but even within our ranks the confusion seems to be increasing when, for
example, you look at the positions taken by some on Nigeria, Zimbabwe and the
U.S. NATO assault on Libya.
As a consequence of this theoretical and ideological confusion, we are not able to
meet the challenges posed by the new strategic innovations introduced in Obama’s
speech at West Point, innovations that not only have a military component but
powerful cultural and ideological elements. The confusion generated by the “bring
our girls back” campaign where we have African Americans calling on the U.S. to
intervene in Nigeria is understandable. But what it dramatically demonstrates is
that it is absolutely imperative that we embark on a massive educational campaign
with our folks that will expose the real intentions of the U.S. on the continent and
worldwide.
Black Left forces must engage in respectful ideological discussions with our people
at every level, from community organizations and youth groups to church groups
where we once again attempt to determine “who is a friend and who is an enemy”
related to U.S. policies. Global militarism and the growing domestic police state are
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fundamentally linked: Both are expressions of the desperate moves by capital to
maintain its hegemony. But its growing dependence on military options, as dangerous as that is, still provides revolutionary forces some strategic educational
and organizing opportunities.
That is why in my humble offerings I have been attempting to make the links between all of these various global maneuvers so that we can connect them theoretically and devise the correct response politically and organizationally as we
struggle to rebuild and unite the Black Left. The imperialist machinations in Iraq,
Syria, Libya and even the Ukraine are not exotic issues disconnected from our
concerns but part of the global right-wing collaboration the U.S. is leading to undermine national anti-colonial projects in the global South and the militarization
of working class and nationally oppressed communities and peoples’ in the U.S.
Making these connections and grounding ourselves in the global struggle against
White supremacist, colonial/capitalist patriarchy is a central element of the Black
radical tradition.
The explosion of death and destruction that we see from Kenya and Somalia
across the Sahel to Nigeria and down to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) and now developing in Mozambique, reflects the emergency situation that
we face today. We can no longer dance around the need to level direct and devastating criticism of the oligarchical and imperialistic interests being championed
by Barack Obama. Critical revolutionary consciousness does not emerge spontaneously from de-politicized “practice.”
We must arm our people with the critical theoretical tools needed to wage the
life-and-death struggle that we and the people of the world are waging against a
rapacious enemy willing to destroy the planet in order to maintain their unearned
privilege. As brother George Jackson reminded us, “International capitalism cannot be destroyed without the extremes of struggle. The entire colonial world is
watching the Blacks inside the U.S., wondering and waiting for us to come to our
senses.” It is time that we let the world know that we are back and that massa’s
days are numbered.
Ajamu Baraka is a human rights activist, organizer and geo-political analyst.
Baraka is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington,
D.C. and editor and contributing columnist for the Black Agenda Report. He can be
reached at [email protected] andwww.AjamuBaraka.com. Read more at
blackagendareport.com.
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Algeria
Efforts de l’Algérie pour résoudre la crise de l’Azawad
Les Maliens reconnaissants
10 Juillet 2014
L’Algérie ne cesse de déployer "nuit et jour des efforts gigantesques pour la résolution pacifique" de la crise malienne, a reconnu à Bamako le président malien, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.
L’Algérie ne cesse nuit et jour de déployer des efforts gigantesques pour que nous
comprenions enfin, nous Maliens, qu’il n’ y a pas d’alternative à la paix et que la
seule issue possible et souhaitable pour notre pays et nos communautés, c’est de
nous entendre, et mieux ça sera pour l’ensemble de la nation malienne", a déclaré
M. Keita, au terme de l’audience qu’il a accordée au ministre des Affaires étrangères algérien, Ramtane Lamamra.
Le chef de la diplomatie algérienne est arrivé mardi à Bamako, première étape
d’une tournée qui le mènera également au Burkina Faso et au Ghana. M. Keita a
salué l’engagement "constant et sans faille" du chef de la diplomatie algérienne,
dans "la clarté et la transparence" pour le règlement de la crise malienne.
"Nous sommes heureux aujourd’hui que nos frères des groupes armés et nousmêmes, nous nous soyons mis d’accord pour ne plus errer, çà et là, et nous retrouver en Algérie pour discuter des problèmes qui concernent notre pays et inchallah
nous entendre sur l’essentiel qui est de redessiner la gouvernance du pays et répondre aux besoins actuels et chaque communauté en son sein s’y sente pleinement à l’aise", a-t-il relevé. Le président malien a soutenu que "personne ne pouvait engager le développement d’un pays sans la réalisation de la paix", ajoutant
qu’il fallait que "chacun de nous en soit totalement imprégné de cette idée".
"Nous ne sommes pas des hommes à tricher et il y a un moment absolument fabuleux à saisir pour nous tous et une grande chance pour le Mali", a-t-il affirmé, soulignant qu’"il y a urgence absolue à ce que les fils du Mali du Nord au Sud, d’Est en
Ouest, blanc ou noir, se donnent la main pour bâtir ce pays".
"Le chemin que nous avons parcouru et le niveau que nous avons atteint, nous le
devons beaucoup aujourd’hui à nos frères d’Algérie", a-t-il dit, soulignant qu’ "au
plus fort de la crise malienne, sous les formes les plus diverses, l’appui multiforme
de l’Algérie n’a jamais manqué au Mali".
Evoquant la tenue de la phase initiale du dialogue intermalien devant se tenir en
ce mois de juillet à Alger, il a indiqué qu’elle "ne sera en aucun cas un rendez-vous
manqué", affirmant "nous seront à ce rendez-vous à coeur ouvert pour échanger
avec nos frères, pour la reconstruction d’un avenir radieux pour nous tous". Lamamra avait annoncé en juin dernier que la phase initiale du dialogue inter-malien
serait lancée en juillet à Alger.
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La phase initiale du dialogue entre le gouvernement malien et les six mouvements
activant au Mali sera lancée avec notamment la médiation de l’Algérie. Le dialogue
malien devra regrouper le gouvernement malien avec les représentants des six
mouvements que sont "le Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA)", "la Coordination
pour le peuple de l’Azawad (CPA)", "la Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts patriotiques de résistance (CM-FPR)", "le Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA)" et "le Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA)".
Le Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), la Coordination pour le peuple de l’Azawad (CPA) et la Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts patriotiques de résistance
(CM-FPR) avaient signé en juin une plate-forme préliminaire d’entente visant à
trouver une solution définitive à la crise malienne et à travers laquelle ils ont réaffirmé le plein respect de l’intégrité territoriale et de l’unité nationale du Mali".
Le Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), le Haut conseil pour
l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) et le Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA) avaient, de
leur côté signé la "Déclaration d’Alger" à travers laquelle ils ont affirmé leur volonté
d’oeuvrer à la "consolidation de la dynamique d’apaisement en cours et de s’engager dans le dialogue intermalien inclusif".
Des efforts également salués par les Américains. Le président des Etats-Unis
d’Amérique, Barack Obama a salué le "rôle de premier plan" de l’Algérie dans la
région et s’est dit "prêt à poursuivre la collaboration entre les deux pays sur les
questions d’intérêt commun", dans un message adressé au président Bouteflika à
l’occasion la célébration du 52e anniversaire de la fête de l’indépendance nationale.
"La relation entre l’Algérie et les Etats-Unis a une longue histoire et je suis ravi du
niveau de coopération et de partenariat que nous partageons avec le peuple de
l’Algérie", a poursuivi le président américain, ajoutant que "nous sommes engagés
à développer ce partenariat en tissant des liens économiques et sociaux plus resserrés, ainsi que de poursuivre notre coopération contre e fléau du terrorisme".
"J’applaudis l’Algérie pour le rôle de premier plan qu’elle joue dans la région et suis
prêt à poursuivre notre collaboration sur les questions d’intérêt commun, dans les
années à venir", a encore souligné Barack Obama.
http://www.lemidi-dz.com/
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DRC
Est de la RDC : Le M23 se réorganise en Ouganda
07/07/2014
M23 - Au milieu Sultani MAKENGA
Selon un nouveau rapport à mi-parcours du groupe d’experts des Nations unies
rendu public dernièrement, la branche du M23 qui se trouve en Ouganda se réorganiserait en l’absence d’avancées dans le processus de rapatriement en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). Dans un contexte de crise et de changement de stratégie dans les pays occidentaux, on ne voit pas quel est ce pays qui
accepterait de soutenir une telle aventure. Le moins que l’on puisse dire est qu’il
s’agit d’un nouveau vocabulaire trouvé par les agresseurs afin de pérenniser l’exploitation illégales des ressources naturelles de la Rd Congo.
Un nouveau rapport à mi-parcours du groupe d’experts des Nations Unies vient
d’être rendu public. Selon Rfi captée à Kinshasa, on apprend notamment que la
branche du M23 qui se trouve en Ouganda se réorganiserait en l’absence d’avancées dans le processus de rapatriement en Rd Congo. Mais ce rapport met surtout
l’accent sur deux groupes armés – les rebelles hutus rwandais des FDLR et les rebelles ougandais des ADF-Nalu – et sur la mort du chef de guerre Maï-Maï Simba
Morgan qui s’était rendu aux FARDC.
Pour revenir à la charge du M23 contre le Gouvernement afin de justifier sa réorganisation, il sied de faire observer que ces ex-M23 sont de mauvaise foi et ils doivent
dire à la face du monde le pourquoi de leur refus de revenir en Rd Congo.
Car en réalité, le Gouvernement de la République qui traite cette question avec
tout le sérieux possible, ne veut pas précipiter ou violer la procédure qu’elle a luimême adoptée.
En effet, à en croire la ministre de la Justice et Droits humains, les bénéficiaires de
l’amnistie doivent eux-mêmes signer un acte d’engagement dans lequel ils affirment qu’ils ne reprendront plus jamais les armes pour revendiquer quoi que ce soit
à la Rd Congo. En plus, les ex-M23 qui sont en Ouganda doivent se féliciter, d’autant que le Gouvernement y avait déployé une délégation, dont le but était de leur
permettre de se conformer aux conditions fixées par la République.
C’est ici qu’il convient d’insister sur le fait que concernant tous les ex-M23 qui sont
en Ouganda ou au Rwanda, la majorité d’entre eux est recherchée par la justice
internationale pour des crimes de sa compétence, même si la Rd Congo avait réclamé un bon nombre pour qu’ils répondent de leurs actes.
Quelle branche du M23 accuse alors le Gouvernement ? Est-ce ceux qui attendent
de remplir les conditions pour bénéficier de l’amnistie ou ceux qui sont recherchés
par la justice internationale ?
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Au-delà de cette accusation gratuite des ex-M23 ainsi que cette menace de reprendre la guerre, menace qui n’étonne personne lorsqu’on sait que la Société civile du Nord-Kivu avait déjà accusé le Rwanda de les masser à la frontière, disons
qu’actuellement, les pays occidentaux qui ont beaucoup de problèmes à gérer à
l’interne, ne sont plus à même de soutenir une quelconque rébellion qui naitrait
suite de la non-application des accords.
Car en réalité, non seulement que nombreux sont en pleine crise, il y a en qui ont
même changé de stratégies et qui ne préfèrent plus sponsoriser certains assoiffés
du pouvoir qui circulent dans plusieurs chancelleries africaines. La priorité est donc
ici donnée au respect des lois et à l’introduction de la bonne gouvernance dans la
gestion au quotidien, afin de permettre à la population de trouver son compte. En
réalité, ces ex-M23 veulent faire accréditer la thèse selon laquelle la Rd Congo est
de mauvaise foi et ne veut pas réaliser ses obligations.
Et pourtant, ceux qui savent analyser se rendront vite compte que les ex-M23 veulent que l’Est de la Rd Congo demeure le ventre-mou, pour leur permettre l’exploitation des ressources naturelles de ce pays.
Usage disproportionné de la force pour Morgan, pendant que les FDLR continueraient à recruter
Concernant le chef de guerre Morgan, les experts onusiens estiment qu’il y a eu, au
minimum, un usage disproportionné de la force et un défaut de soins. Mais surtout
que cette situation a déjà eu plusieurs conséquences négatives, en portant notamment un coup d’arrêt au processus de désarmement des Maï-Maï Simba de Morgan
et à la libération des femmes et des enfants qui sont sur leur coupe. Elle pourrait
également laisser penser à ceux qui voudraient désarmer qu’ils ne peuvent pas
faire confiance aux FARDC dans leurs négociations.
Et pourtant, les forces négatives n’ont pas d’autre choix que de déposer les armes
et de se rendre aux FARDC. Il n’est pas ici question d’un problème de bonne foi de
leur part, mais ils doivent le faire volontairement, en lieu et place que la coalition
FARDC-Monusco le fasse par la force. Logiquement, tout le monde a beaucoup à
gagner lorsqu’il n’y a pas l’usage de la force, lorsqu’on sait que de fois les dégâts
vont au-delà de ce qu’on aurait souhaité.
Les mêmes nouveaux experts notent qu’« à l’heure où le présent rapport a été rédigé, le gouvernement de la Rdc n’a pas autorisé d’opération majeure contre les
FDLR ». Ce rapport est aussi antérieur à la décision de la réunion des ministres des
Grands Lacs et de l’Afrique australe de donner six mois de plus, au maximum, aux
FDLR pour désarmer. Ce qu’ils assurent vouloir faire depuis décembre dernier.
Pourtant, des ex-combattants FDLR et des sources onusiennes ont assuré au
groupe d’experts que les FDLR continuaient de recruter et d’entraîner des individus. Les experts soulignent également que deux chefs importants, Ferdinand Nsengiyumwa, qui avait été arrêté par l’armée congolaise et s’était évadé, et Hamada
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Habimana qui avait déserté, ont à nouveau rejoint la rébellion rwandaise en mars
dernier. Hamada Habimana faisait d’ailleurs partie de la délégation qui était à
Sant’Egidio.
Le groupe rapporte aussi que le président par intérim des FDLR, e-mail à l’appui,
refusait de remettre ses armes à l’ONU, que les FDLR souhaitaient l’implication de la
communauté d’Afrique australe, et surtout qu’ils avaient créé des liens politiques
avec des partis d’opposition, comme celui de l’ex-Premier ministre Faustin Twagiramungu, pour « mobiliser des soutiens internationaux et forcer le gouvernement
rwandais à négocier ».
ADF-Nalu : une chaîne de commandement et de contrôle intacte
Le groupe d’experts a visité à plusieurs reprises les camps des ADF-Nalu repris par
l’armée congolaise depuis le début de son offensive en janvier. Il a récolté des centaines de pages de documents et d’enregistrement audio.
Deux conclusions s’imposent : d’abord, contrairement à ce que disaient leurs prédécesseurs, les nouveaux experts onusiens n’ont trouvé aucun lien entre les ADF-Nalu
et al-Qaïda ou les shebabs, ni aucune trace de soutien. Ensuite, le groupe croit que
malgré les opérations menées par les FARDC, la chaîne de commandement et de
contrôle des ADF reste intacte. Celle-ci a le potentiel de se reconstituer comme cela
a été le cas après la précédente offensive en 2010.
Les experts onusiens n’ont pas réussi à savoir ce que sont devenus les rebelles ougandais blessés qui, estiment-ils, devraient être nombreux. De même, il n’y a que
très peu de prisonniers, peu ou pas de libération d’otages que les ADF sont censés
avoir kidnappés.
A ce sujet, le porte-parole du Gouvernement, lors de son point de presse du 03 juillet 2014 a indiqué que quelques-uns des otages ont pu arriver au village, surtout les
femmes. A ce jour, les otages sont entre 600 et 800 qui sont amenés comme des
boucliers humains des rebelles des ADF.
Dans ce contexte, au moins 200 d’entre eux ont pu être libérés fortuitement et les
femmes qui sont arrivées au village et qui se sont confiées à la police faisaient partie de ce lot là. Toutefois, les patrouilles sont organisées pour localiser le reste,
même si les espaces sont difficiles d’accès.
Concernant les engins explosifs artisanaux retrouvés dans les camps des ADF, le
groupe note qu’ils sont peu sophistiqués, ce qui ne permet pas justement de confirmer l’existence d’un transfert de compétences ou de savoir-faire à d’autres groupes
comme Al-Qaïda ou les Shebabs.
A ce sujet, le fait pour les Etats-Unis d’avoir alerté sur la préparation d’un attentat
en Ouganda n’est pas un fait du hasard. Cela voudrait dire que rien n’empêche aux
ADF de coaliser avec les terroristes pour mettre l’Est du pays à feu et à sang.
http://afrique.kongotimes.info/
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Egypt
New Egypt terror group adopting 'lone wolf' approach
“In the name of God the Merciful, may He stand beside us.” With those words,
Ajnad Misr wrote their first tweet on Jan. 23, 2014, just two days before the third
anniversary of the January 25 Revolution.
Summary: Ajnad Misr, a new terrorist group in Egypt that emerged in January,
has taken responsibility for a number of bombings on social media.
Author Wissam MattaPosted July 3, 2014
After their first tweet praising God, Ajnad Misr continued tweeting and published
their manifesto titled “Retribution is Life” on Jan. 24. They later used that same
title as a slogan and “signature” on social networking sites and on all communiques issued to take responsibility for subsequent bombing operations.
In its manifesto, as in its other communiques, Ajnad Misr adopted a rhetoric closer to the one espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood or its ideological allies in political Islam than that of other jihadist factions. Meanwhile, it intentionally resorted to Salafist terminologies, such as the “soldiers of oppression” and the
“establishment of a state that pleases God almighty, the Quran and the Prophet’s
teachings,” as well as quoting Sheikh al-Islam (Supreme Muslim Authority) Ibn
Taymiyyah’s discourse about the “first emigrants and followers.”
The manifesto further stated: “The criminal agencies of the regime, and all the
members thereof, grew accustomed since the days of the defunct administration
to oppressing and humiliating the people, preventing them from living a dignified
life, while driving them away from religion. As a result, the people initiated their
blessed rebellion against those criminal apparatuses until they secured their freedom from their repression and tyranny, in the process deposing a number of their
symbols. But, our revolution is not complete. Our failure to exterminated the
roots of corruption left the door open for the men, remnants and earthly laws of
oppression’s institutions to exploit this weakness and re-emerge in an even uglier
and more criminal form. As a result, it is impossible for us to accept that our beloved Egypt remain humiliated, particularly considering that it is home to minds
and abilities capable of resisting the mightiest of Earth’s tyrants.”
Contrary to communiques issued by other jihadist factions active in Egypt, most
prominent among them the Sinai Peninsula’s Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, Ajnad Misr’s
statement included content that suggested their desire to win over the Egyptian
people, especially when it emphasized that “all those who stand up to those criminal bodies must remain extremely vigilant and careful not to inflict damage upon
the innocents among us, even if they opposed us.”
In another statement issued on the same day, Ajnad Misr claimed responsibility
for two bombings, one of which targeted Central Security forces near the Re-
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search Center in the Mohandiseen neighborhood of Cairo, which it described as
“forces tasked with killing and targeting the innocent every Friday,” in reference to
the demonstrations in support of deposed President Mohammed Morsi. Meanwhile, the second bombing they claimed responsibility for targeted the al-Talibiyah
police station on Al-Haram Street in Giza, which came as a response to the warning
issued by “the arrogant criminal [Interior Minister] Mohamed Ibrahim about the
need to stay away from police stations.”
Furthermore, Ajnad Misr’s communique took responsibility for a slew of previous
operations, “the purpose of which was to gauge the reaction of the criminal institutions.” Among them was the targeting of the July 26 roundabout checkpoint (Jan. 7,
2014), the tourist ambush (Nov. 25, 2013) and the Abboud ambush (Nov. 20, 2013).
Ajnad Misr continued its operations, in the context of the “Retribution is Life” campaign, when it took responsibility for two explosive devices that targeted the headquarters of the General Directorate of Special Operations in the Central Security
Forces of Greater Cairo on the Alexandria desert road (Jan. 31, 2014), as well as
two other explosions that targeted a Central Security patrol in Giza Square (Feb. 7,
2014) and three explosions that rocked Nahda Square near Cairo University (April
2, 2014). The latter led to the death of Brig. Inspector Tariq Almarjawi of the Giza
Security Directorate. This was followed by an explosive device that exploded in Lebanon Square (April 19, 2014) and the assassination of central Security Force
Gen. Ahmad Zaki with a bomb planted in his car in the 6th of October City. It also
took responsibility for the Ittihadiya Palace bombings, the night before last [June
30], which raised the level of its challenge to security forces, for it revealed details
about the operation two days before its execution.
An analysis of the statements issued by Ajnad Misr and its modus operandi when
conducting operations (planting and detonating improvised explosive devices), reveals that this group is affiliated or ideologically allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, or one of the other factions that compose the Alliance to Support Legitimacy.
Based on this analysis, Egyptian security experts have determined that the identity
of this faction — against which a judgment was issued by the Court of Urgent
Matters, characterizing it as a “terrorist organization” — revolves around it being a
terrorist group established by deputy leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat alShater, prominent Salafist leader Hazem Abu Ismail or splinter factions formed by
Brotherhood youth groups. This came following their imprisoned leadership’s decision to give the latter the authority to plan and execute operations on the ground.
This assumption is further bolstered by the fact that all of Ajnad Misr’s operations
— except for the one perpetrated two days ago — were carried out within a specific geographical area of Giza Governorate, known for its illegal slums that form a
fertile environment for the proliferation of Islamic cells.
It also would seem that the primitive manner by which the group executed its first
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operations led Egyptian security forces to underestimate its ability to execute
large-scale operations, such as the ones carried out by Ansar Bayt alMaqdis during the past three years.
But, a careful analysis of these operations reveals that Ajnad Misr, the membership of which — according to security forces estimates — does not exceed 20, is
growing more violent. This was evidenced by the Nahda Square bombings, its assassination of Gen. Ahmad Zaki and the explosions that targeted the Ittihadiya
Palace, all of which suggest that its terrorist activities have undergone a qualitative and geographical shift.
The intensification of operations on the part of Ajnad Misr is also cause for concern that this emerging group might become the source of a real threat to Egyptian security forces in the near future, and grow to be as dangerous as Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis. This is particularly true considering that its espoused ideological path
suggests that Ajnad Misr falls under the umbrella of “lone wolf” groups, the modus operandi of which was defined by the so-called Mustafa bin Abdel Qadir Set
Maryam, also known as Abu Musab al-Souri, and dubbed al-Qaeda’s philosopher.
According to Souri’s methodology, which he revealed in his book "Daawat alMuqawama al-Islamiya al-Alamiya" (Call to Worldwide Islamic Resistance), small
groups (composed of two to 15 people) espousing jihadist ideals, would choose
their own names and operate individually and independently from other groups.
They would begin by executing small, medium or large-scale self-funded operations and conduct indoor training sessions inside houses or industrial workshops,
while making use of primitive expertise acquired through jihadist websites, prior
to splintering and expanding like a cancer.
The purpose of these groups’ operations would be to spread terror as part of a
jihadist code of conduct — to terrorize, inflict damage and establish the “Muslim
state” — all within a jihadist environment similar to the one that prevails in the
Arab world today. This makes such groups difficult to control and raises the level
of concern that they might progress to executing more extremist violent acts.
In that regard, a statement spread on the Internet in the past two days, bearing
the stamp of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which included encouragement to Ajnad Misr for carrying out their threats. If the provenance of this
statement proves true, one could only imagine how the situation might deteriorate if other small groups were to emerge, similar to the one that carried out the
bombings in Egypt on June 30.
Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/
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Libya
AP News Break: Different attackers in Benghazi?
Jul. 9, 2014
WASHINGTON (AP) — Newly revealed testimony from top military commanders
involved in the U.S. response to the Benghazi attacks suggests that the perpetrators of a second, dawn attack on a CIA complex probably were different from
those who penetrated the U.S. diplomatic mission the evening before and set it
ablaze, killing Ambassador Chris Stevens and another American.
The second attack, which killed two security contractors, showed clear military
training, retired Gen. Carter Ham told Congress in closed-door testimony released
late Wednesday. The assault probably was the work of a new team of militants,
seizing on reports of violence at the diplomatic mission the night before and
hitting the Americans while they were most vulnerable.
The testimony, which The Associated Press was able to read ahead of its release,
could clarify for the first time the events of Sept. 11, 2012, that have stirred bitter
recriminations in the U.S., including Republican-led congressional investigations
and campaign-season denunciations of the Obama administration, which made
inaccurate statements about the Libyan attacks. The testimony underscores a key
detail that sometimes has been lost in the debate: that the attacks were two distinct events over two days on two different buildings, perhaps by unrelated
groups.
The U.S. government still has not fully characterized the first attack in which, according to Ham and eight other military officers, men who seemed familiar with
the lightly protected diplomatic compound breached it and set it on fire, killing
Stevens and communications specialist Sean Smith. A disorganized mob of looters
then overran the facility.
In testimony to two House panels earlier this year, the officers said that commanders didn't have the information they needed to understand the nature of
the attack, that they were unaware of the extent of the U.S. presence in Benghazi
at the time and they were convinced erroneously for a time that they were facing
a hostage crisis without the ability to move military assets into place that would
be of any use.
The testimony reveals how little information the military had on which to base an
urgent response.
Two House panels — Armed Services and Oversight and Government Reform —
conducted interviews with the nine officers on separate days from January to
April.
Four Americans died in Benghazi, including Stevens. To this day, despite the investigations, it's not clear if the violence resulted from a well-planned, multiphase
25
military-type assault or from a loosely connected, escalating chain of events.
In their testimony, military officials expressed some uncertainty about the first
attack, describing protests and looting in an assault that lasted about 45 minutes.
The military attache to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli told Congress the first attack
showed some advance planning. The Libyan police officer guarding the diplomatic
compound fled as it began.
The defense attache, whose name wasn't released, suggested the attackers "had
something on the shelf" — an outline of a plan based on previously obtained information about the compound and its security measures, so they were ready to
strike when the opportunity arose.
"They came in, and they had a sense of purpose, and I think it sometimes gets
confused because you had looters and everyone else coming in," he said. "It was
less than kind of full, thought-out, methodical."
Ham testified that the second attack, which killed security officers Tyrone Woods
and Glen Doherty at the annex a mile from the diplomatic compound where the
assault began the night before, showed clear military training. It was probably the
work of a new team of militants, taking advantage after reports of violence at the
first site and American vulnerability.
"Given the precision of the attack, it was a well-trained mortar crew, and in my
estimation they probably had a well-trained observer," said Ham, who headed the
U.S. command in Africa. The second attack showed "a degree of sophistication and
military training that is relatively unusual and certainly, I think, indicates that this
was not a pickup team. This was not a couple of guys who just found a mortar
someplace."
Ham said the nearly eight-hour time lapse between the two attacks also seemed
significant. "If the team (that launched the second attack) was already there, then
why didn't they shoot sooner?" he asked.
"I think it's reasonable that a team came from outside of Benghazi," he said of the
second attack in testimony on April 9. Violent extremists saw an opportunity "and
said, 'Let's get somebody there.'" He also acknowledged that the absence of American security personnel on the ground soon enough after the first attack "allowed
sufficient time for the second attack to be organized and conducted," he said.
Stevens had gone to Benghazi from the embassy in Tripoli to open a cultural center, State Department officials said.
The attacks came as President Barack Obama was in a close re-election battle, campaigning in part on the contention that al-Qaida no longer posed a significant
threat to the United States and that, blending the economy and the fight against
terrorism, General Motors was alive but "Osama bin Laden is dead." A terror attack
26
on American assets could have damaged that argument.
Five days after the attack, after feverish email exchanges about her "talking
points" among national security staff members and their spokesmen, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice linked the Benghazi attacks to protests in Tunisia and Cairo
over an anti-Islam video. Weeks later, U.S. officials retracted that account but
never fully articulated a new one.
Republicans seized on the inaccuracies, contending that the Obama administration was covering up a terror attack for political gain.
Several congressional and independent investigations have faulted the State Department for inadequate security, but they have not provided a full reading of
who was involved in the violence, what the motives were and how they could pull
off such a seemingly complicated, multipronged assault.
People on both sides of the debate tend to link the two incidents as one attack.
The congressional testimony that distinguishes the attacks came from military
officials in Tripoli or, like Ham, coordinating the response in Washington. Most
have never given a public account. But they agreed that confusion reigned from
the outset.
"We're under attack," was the first report the military received from Benghazi.
That message came from Stevens' entourage to Tripoli in the late afternoon of
Sept. 11. Word was relayed to the defense attache, who reported up the chain of
command.
That report gave no indication about the size or intensity of the attack.
The defense attache testified that the assault on the diplomatic mission was followed by a mob that complicated and confused the situation.
He said of the original attackers, "I don't think they were on the objective, so to
speak, longer than 45 minutes. They kind of got on, did their business, and left."
For hours after that, he said, there were looters and "people throwing stuff and
you see the graffiti and things like that."
Once the first attack ended around 10 p.m., the military moved to evacuate
Americans from Benghazi, while preparing for what it erroneously believed might
have been an emerging hostage situation involving Stevens.
In fact, Stevens died of smoke inhalation after the diplomatic post was set on fire
in the first attack.
Seven-and-a-half hours later, at dawn, mortars crashed on a CIA compound that
had been unknown to top military commanders.
The military worked up a response on numerous fronts.
27
At one point, fewer than 10 U.S. military personnel in Libya were grappling with
the mortar and rocket-propelled grenade attack on Americans who had taken cover at the CIA facility and, some 600 miles away, the evacuation of about three dozen people from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli by a convoy of armored vehicles.
An unarmed Predator drone conducting an operation nearby in eastern Libya had
been repositioned over Benghazi, yet offered limited assistance during the
nighttime and with no intelligence to guide it. A standby force training in Croatia
was ordered to Sicily, while another farther afield was mobilized. Neither was
nearly ready in time to intervene during the first 45-minute attack and couldn't
predict the quick mortar attack the next morning. An anti-terrorism support team
in Spain was deployed, though it, too, was hours away.
American reinforcements of a six-man security team, including two military personnel, were held up at the Benghazi airport for hours by Libyan authorities.
Drone images and intelligence hadn't provided indications of a new attack, but
word eventually came from two special forces troops who had made it to the annex and reported casualties from the dawn attack up the chain of command.
In Tripoli, military and embassy officials were evacuating the embassy there and
destroying computer hardware and sensitive information.
The administration last month apprehended its first suspect, Ahmed Abu Khattala,
and brought him to the United States to stand trial on terrorism charges.
The Justice Department maintains in court documents that Abu Khattala was involved in both attacks, and it describes the first breach on the diplomatic post as
equally sophisticated. The government said a group of about 20 men, armed with
AK-47- rifles, handguns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers, stormed the diplomatic facility in the first attack.
Abu Khattala supervised the looting after Americans fled, the government says,
and then returned to the camp of the Islamist militant group Ansar al-Sharia,
where the Justice Department says a large force began assembling for the second
attack.
The Justice Department provided no supporting documentation for those conclusions. They also reflect the divisions among current and former government officials about the two attacks.
In her book "Hard Choices," former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
wrote that there were scores of attackers with different motives. "It is inaccurate
to state that every single one of them was influenced by this hateful video. It is
equally inaccurate to state that none of them were. Both assertions defy not only
the evidence but logic as well."
Abu Khattala's lawyer says the government has failed to show that he was connected to either attack.
28
Ham, who happened to be in Washington that week, briefed Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey. They informed the
president.
Many of the military officials said they didn't even know about the diplomatic mission in Benghazi, let alone the CIA's clandestine installation nearby. Few knew of
Stevens visiting the city that day. Given all of the confusion, Ham said there was
one thing he clearly would have done differently: "Advise the ambassador to not go
to Benghazi."
http://hosted2.ap.org/
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Does the New Benghazi Indictment Undermine the White House's
Story?
Jul 02, 2014
The House of Representatives' Select Committee on Benghazi isn't expected
to gavel into open session until the early fall. When they do, today's indictment of
Ahmed Abu Khattala may provide another strand of evidence with which to challenge the Obama administration's public narrative in the aftermath of the attacks.
US forces captured Khattala, one of the alleged masterminds of the deadly attacks,
in mid-June -- a move dismissed by some intelligence officials as a politically-timed
clipping of "low hanging fruit." He's has been transferred to the United States
for today's appearance in district court. By a two-to-one margin, Americans disapprove of the decision to try him as a civilian -- replete with the same
rights as US citizens -- rather than as a military combatant in the tribunal system painstakingly carved out by the Bush administration, Congress and the courts.
The Washington Times reports that the government's indictment against Abu
Khattala "spells out a calculated conspiracy" to attack the US mission in Benghazi,
which would further undermine the White House's repeated references to an
online video as a major triggering event leading to the 2012 raid:. Here's how the
paper frames the court document:
The Obama administration’s just-released criminal complaint against the alleged
mastermind of the Benghazi terrorist attacks provides a final contradiction to its
own evolving explanations for what happened that day. The Justice Department’s
indictment spells out a calculated conspiracy by Ahmed Abu Khatallah and associates to attack the U.S. diplomatic mission and CIA annex, which killed four Americans. The indictment might be viewed as a death knell for a theory that the attack
30
resulted from a spontaneous protest against a U.S.-produced video. Now in custody, Khatallah was a commander of Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, a U.S.-designated
terrorist group, and is himself deemed a global terrorist by the State Department….The unsealed June 26 indictment, coinciding with Khatallah’s U.S. District
Court appearance in Washington, states that the grand jury does not know when
the conspiracy began. It says Khatallah “did knowingly and intentionally conspire
and agree with other conspirators, known and unknown to provide material support and resources to terrorists, that is personnel including himself and others.”
The indictment says Khatallah intended the material support and resources “to
be used in preparation for and in carrying out” the attacks that killed the ambassador, his aide and two ex-Navy SEALs protecting a CIA base that came under precision mortar attack.
Khatallah -- who lived openly in Libya for nearly two years after the attack,
granting media interviews to several outlets -- has self-servingly claimed that the
orchestrated attack was, indeed, a response to the 'offensive' internet clip.
Awaiting trial, he has every reason to play along with the administration's line and
distance himself from a criminal terrorist conspiracy. Some on the credulous Left
have taken his story at face value. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton continues to insist that the video played a role in the attacks, despite [a] the State Department's conclusion on September 13, 2012 that they had been the work of Ansar al-Sharia, [b] testimony from Amb. Stevens' second in command that the video
was a "non-event" in Libya, and [c] US intelligence estimates, which did not
link the clip to the coordinated acts of terror. Senior administration figures continued to emphasize the video explanation days after the attacks were
determined to be terrorism, with White House spokesman Jay Carney claiming,
"we have no information to suggest that it was a pre-planned attack" on September 14th. A previously-withheld internal email released in April demonstrated that
White House officials inserted the "video" explanation into Susan Rice's talking
points prior to her infamous appearances on all five Sunday shows. Previous Benghazi-related emails tracked the administration's efforts to scrub references to Al
Qaeda and previous attempts against the Benghazi compound from public accounts, for explicitly political reasons. But does the Justice Department's indictment directly contradict the White House's preferred storyline? Former federal
prosecutor Andrew McCarthy -- who brought down the so-called Blind Sheik -doesn't think so. He told me this morning that the indictment is striking for two
reasons:
First, it's remarkably short, clocking in at less than two pages. In his experience, he
said, terrorism indictments typically run dozens of pages and are packed with relevant background and context. This document contains none of that; it doesn't
even mention Khatallah's designation by the US State Department as a leader of
Ansar al-Sharia, an Al Qaeda affiliate. Second, the "conspiracy" is framed in a remarkably narrow a way, perhaps with the intent of avoiding any explicit contradic-
31
tion of the White House's story. The way it's drawn up, Khatallah is accused of a
conspiracy to lend his personal efforts to unnamed terrorists for perhaps as little as
two days. McCarthy called the indictment "laughable."
https://townhall.com/
32
Mali
Mali : après l'opération Serval, place à "Barkhane"
Publié le 14 juillet 2014
ACTE II - "Serval" terminée, l’armée française va désormais tenter d’empêcher les
groupes jihadistes sahéliens de se réorganiser.
Quel est l’objectif de l’opération "Barkhane" ? Jean-Yves Le Drianl’a annoncé dimanche au micro d’Europe 1, l’opération "Serval", lancée de toute urgence en janvier 2013, est désormais terminée. L’opération est un "succès" selon le ministre de
la Défense: "Il fallait que le Mali retrouve son intégrité, c’est fait", a-t-il déclaré dimanche. Place désormais à "Barkhane", dont l’objectif est plus ambitieux : "Il y a
toujours des risques terroristes majeurs dans la zone qui va de la corne d’Afrique à
la Guinée Bissau, dans le nord de pays comme le Mali, le Tchad, le Niger. (…) L’objectif est essentiellement (…) d’empêcher que ce que j’appelle "l’autoroute de tous
les trafics" ne devienne un lieu de passage permanent des groupes jihadistes de la
Libye à la façade Atlantique", a expliqué le ministre. Selon les informations du Parisien, l'opération devrait être lancée mardi, à l'occasion de la tournée du président
de la République au tchad, en Côte d'Ivoire et au Niger.
Pourquoi ce choix de nom ? Barkhane désigne les dunes en croissant allongé, formées par le vent qui fait rouler les grains de sable. Une référence au désert, futur
théâtre de "Barkhane" et déjà objet l’opération "Sabre". Didier François, spécialiste
des questions de défense à Europe 1, explique que l’opération "Sabre" est une
forme d’introduction à "Barkhane". Elle mobilise un contingent de soldats plus ré-
33
duit, membres des forces spéciales françaises, chargés de déstabiliser l’organisation de Mokhtar Belmokhtar, un cadre d’Aqmi dont la tête est mise à prix cinq millions de dollars par la CIA. Et pour le moment, "Sabre" est une réussite puisque
grâce à des actions discrètes et ponctuelles, huit des plus proches lieutenants de
Mokhtar Belmokhtar ont été tués depuis son lancement. Bien avancée, "Sabre"
permet maintenant à l’Armée de se lancer dans une nouvelle étape de plus grande
ampleur avec "Barkhane".
Quels moyens vont être mobilisés ? Pour détruire les katibas jihadistes (les factions disséminées dans la bande sahélo-saharienne) implantées notamment dans le
massif des Ifoghas, l’armée française va redéployer 3.000 hommes mobilisés dans
le cadre de "Serval". Ils bénéficieront d’un appui aérien, de drones de repérage et
aideront les forces spéciales déjà sur la piste des camps terroristes. Cette opération
de plus grande ampleur sera menée en coopération avec les armées de cinq Etats
africains concernés.
Des soldats de la Minusma, la force de l'ONU dépêchée sur place, enterrent deux
des leurs à Kidal. © Reuters
Quelles seront les difficultés pour mener "Barkhane" à bien ? Les katibas implantés dans le nord du Mali et plus généralement dans la région sont composées de
petites factions de jihadistes, extrêmement mobiles donc difficiles à tracer. De plus,
bien qu’ils se trouvent en plein désert, leurs membres disposent de technologies de
communication de pointe. Outre les groupes jihadistes (Aqmi, mais aussi Mujao,
Ansar Dine…), la région est aussi habitée par des populations touaregs, dont certains sont organisés en groupe armés indépendantistes comme le
MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad, du nom de la zone
nord-malienne). Pour couronner le tout, l’Azawad est également un lieu de prédilection pour les commerçants et trafiquants de tout poil, qui ont eux-mêmes tissé
des relations avec les groupes terroristes. De quoi compliquer un peu plus la donne
pour les militaires dépêchés sur le terrain.
http://www.europe1.fr/International/
34
« Pas d’indépendance ni d’autonomie. Il n’y aura pas de califat au
nord du Mali »
Publié le 10 juillet
Source : Nouvel Horizon
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK)
Alors que le début du dialogue inclusif inter-malien est annoncé pour la mi-juillet,
soit dans quelques jours, la propagande des groupes armés s’accentue.
Ces derniers jours, la propagande des groupes armés est sortie clairement de
l’ombre et annonce que l’Adminstration IBK et la communauté internationale est
d’accord pour signé un accord de création d’un État de l’Azawad.
Cette affirmation grotesque ne s’étale pas seulement à la “Une” de certains confrères de la presse locale, elle est aussi colportée par les militants du Mnla et
autres de porte en porte dans le septentrion. Le tout appuyé par une stratégie
d’implantation des cellules combattantes à travers les régions du nord.
Cette situation, le Chef de l’État l’a dénoncée au cours d’une audience qu’il a accordé, le 06 juillet 2014, au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas (La Hollande), M. Frans Timmermans en visite dans notre pays.
Au cours de cette audience, le chef de la diplomatie des Pays-Bas a rendu compte
au Président IBK de la visite qu’il a faite au contingent de son pays (450 soldats
chargés de former la police et l’armée maliennes et de collecter des renseignements) engagé auprès de la Minusma à Gao et a lui souligné que d’importants défis restent à être relevés. M. Frans Timmermans a assuré le Président IBK du sou-
35
tien constant de son pays au processus de stabilisation du Mali, à travers la Minusma pour une paix définitive dans le cadre d’un processus inclusif.
Dans ses propos, le Président IBK a remercié les Pays-Bas pour tous les efforts humains et l’appui logistique à la Minusma dans la cadre de la sécurisation et de la
stabilisation du nord de notre pays. Le Président IBK a confirmé les défis importants
qui restent à être relevés et a souligné le point d’honneur que le Mali met pour respecter ses engagements. Toujours.
Par contre, a relevé le Chef de l’État, les groupés armés (Mnla-Hcua-Maa) continuent de violer l’accord de cessez-le feu qu’ils ont signé le 23 mai avec le gouvernement malien, sous l’égide du président en exercice de l’Union Africaine. Une violation du cessez-le feu qui se traduit par l’implantation de cellule combattante dans
tout le nord du pays.
Cette dénonciation par le Chef de l’État confirme les propos similaires tenus le Chef
de la Minusma, M. Albert Koenders (il est de nationalité des Pays-Bas), il y a une
semaine (à l’occasion de son bilan d’un an de présence de la Minusma au Mali).
Propos selon lesquels la Minusma constate les groupes armés ont violé à plusieurs
reprises l’accord de cessez-le feu.
Le risque qui découle de cette situation de violation du cessez-le feu et d’implantantation de cellules combattantes, a souligné le Chef de l’État à l’attention du chef
de la diplomatie des Pays-bas, est possible infiltration des combattants djihadistes.
Surtout qu’il est établi que plusieurs combattants djihadistes se sont battus au côté
des groupes armés pendant les affrontements du 21 mai 2014 à kidal.
IBK SE DIT SEREIN
Malgré cette situation et l’attitude va-t-en guerre des groupes armés, qui sont en
fait des conséquences de l’échec essuyé par les forces armées maliennes au cours
des affrontements du 21 mai 2014, le Président IBK se dit serein pour aborder le
dialogue inclusif inter-maliens, la semaine prochaine. Il reste convaincu que seule la
paix est le passage obligé pour un développement du nord Mali. Aussi souligne-t-il
avec force que ce n’est pas la propagande qui fera que les rêves d’aventures autonomiste ou indépendatiste vont se réaliser.
“Nous nous allons à Alger très sereins, sincères, ouverts et disponibles pour le dialogue, la paix et la réconciliation mais avec une ligne rouge claire : pas d’indépendance ni d’autonomie. Il n’y aura pas de califat au Nord du Mali”, a dit le Président
IBK au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas (La Hollande), M. Frans Timmermans. “Notre projet est hautement humain. Car nous sommes convaincus et
nous le disons avec force qu’il n’y pas d’alternative à la paix. Sans paix, il n’y a aucun développement possible pour le Nord du Mali. Nous ferons en sorte que l’ensemble de la Nation soit dans cette dynamique. Il s’agit de mettre en place d’autres
types de gouvernance où chacun se sentira concerné par le devenir commun et le
vivre ensemble », a ajouté IBK.
36
Lorsque le Chef de l’État parle de “califat au nord du Mali”, il fait référence à ce
vieux rêve des djihadistes de Iyad Ag Ghaly de faire de Kidal un petit État islamique
indépendant. Le genre que des combattants islamistes viennent de décreter sur
une partie du territoire irakien. Car ne nous trompons pas: si les groupes armés
(mnla-Hcua-Maa) obtenaient aujourd’hui la moindre parcelle autonome, ils seront
aussitôt supplantés par les combattants djihadistes. Exactement comme en 2012,
où c’est finalement le Mujao, Ançardine d’Iyad Ag Ghaly et Aqmi qui contrôlaient
les 2/3 du Mali après avoir laminé le Mnla.
Chouaïdou TRAORÉ
http://depechesdumali.com/
37
Nord-Mali : La partition est-elle consommée ?
Publié le 10 juillet
Autonomie, indépendance, … ? En tout cas, le mystère reste bien présent autour
du sort à réserver à la capitale de l’Adrar des Ifoghas, alors que les négociations
entre le gouvernement malien et les mouvements armés doivent en principe s’ouvrir ce 16 juillet 2014 à Alger, selon de sources bien introduites.
De récentes révélations faites dans la presse malienne font cependant peser de réels soupçons sur une certaine communauté internationale de vouloir entériner la
partition du Mali.
Sous l’égide de la communauté internationale, gouvernement malien, représentants des groupes armés et ceux des mouvements d’autodéfense se retrouveront,
ce 16 juillet 2014, autour d’une même table, dans la capitale algérienne. Ces négociations qui se veulent inclusives devront aboutir à la signature d’un accord de paix
définitif dans le dossier de la crise malienne.
Le Gouvernement, lui, a réaffirmé son attachement indéfectible à l’indivisibilité du
territoire national, et proposé une décentralisation beaucoup plus poussée. Dans
quel cas l’Etat malien s’engage à accorder de larges compétences aux différentes
régions administratives afin de leur permettre de s’autogérer grâce à des autorités
décentralisées élues au suffrage direct et universel. Toutefois, des observateurs du
dossier du Nord craignent désormais que les discussions annoncées du côté d’Alger
ne passent que pour une simple formalité au regard de récentes révélations relatives au statut à accorder à l’«Azawad».
Le Mali au cœur du complot ?
Si, dans les discours officiels, la communauté internationale ne fait jusque-là pas
38
mystère de son attachement au caractère laïc, à l’unité et à l’intégrité territoriale
du Mali, les récentes révélations distillées dans la presse malienne font grincer les
dents à plusieurs de nos compatriotes qui s’interrogent désormais sur ce qui se
trame contre notre pays. En effet, dans sa parution de mardi 8 juillet 2014, nos
confrères de L’indépendant font état de l’existence d’un document concocté par
les partenaires impliqués dans la résolution de la crise malienne, et qui reflète parfaitement les doléances des mouvements séparatismes du Nord-Mali. Selon le confrère, ce document, tenu confidentiel, a été remis aux différentes parties lors des
récentes discussions préliminaires, et parvenu aux autorités maliennes. En clair, au
même titre que l’Etat du Mali, le document prévoit une administration, un parlement et un système judiciaire azawadiens, et habilite l’«Azawad» à signer des accords régionaux et internationaux et à exploiter ses ressources minières et minérales. Ces prérogatives laissent entrevoir que bien plus qu’un simple statut particulier réclamé par les groupes armés, c’est un vrai Etat azawadien qui en train de
s’ériger au Nord du Mali.
D’ailleurs, de sources proches du dossier du Nord la partition du Mali est d’autant
vraisemblable que l’Azawad disposent depuis de ses propres documents administratifs, notamment le passeport et la carte «nationale» d’identité. Aussi, selon les
mêmes sources, si les examens de fin d’année 2013-2014 n’ont pas été organisés à
Kidal, cela est dû en grande partie à des velléités indépendantistes, l’ «Etat» Azawad ayant déjà en projet d’ouvrir ses propres universités et autres écoles. Pire,
l’administration régionale kidaloise aurait même cessé de délivrer des documents
administratifs «maliens». Toute cette situation serait entretenue par la communauté internationale au détriment de l’Etat malien qui assiste, impuissant, à sa partition de fait. En tout cas, les négociations qui s’annoncent à Alger sont vues par
plusieurs observateurs du dossier comme le temps de la clarification de la situation
de Kidal.
Bakary SOGODOGO
SOURCE: Le Prétoire du 10 juil 2014.
http://www.depechesdumali.com/
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Situation au nord du Mali : Le drapeau du MNLA flotte presque partout
Publié le 09 juillet
Au grand dam de ses habitants, des localités entières sont aujourd’hui occupées
par des terroristes et autres jihadistes qui ont naguère écumé le septentrion de
notre pays. Tout est parti de la visite mouvementée du Premier ministre Moussa
Mara à Kidal.
Le Premier ministre Moussa Mara peut continuer à dire des contre-vérités et rouler
les Maliens dans la farine avec ses tournées fantaisistes, qui ont le mérite de gaspiller les fonds d’un Etat malien déjà très mal en point. Moussa Mara a beau tenter de
nous faire oublier la situation de Kidal, qu’il n’arrivera pas à effacer de nos mémoires toutes ces pertes en vie humaine occasionnées par sa visite du 17 juin 2014.
Les conséquences plus que visibles de cette situation, ce sont l’insécurité, le retour
en masse des terroristes et jihadistes.
Rien de tout cela n’est un secret pour les populations des régions nord de notre
pays. Le fautif, une seule personne : Moussa Joseph Mara. Lequel a sacrifié les acquis de la transition sur l’autel de son ambition politique et de son populisme soudain et de mauvais aloi. Résultat : non seulement le Mali n’a plus aucun symbole
dans la ville de Kidal, pire, les autres cercles sont en train d’être occupés par les terroristes et jihadistes. Au nez et à la barbe des forces onusiennes qui sont cantonnées dans leurs différents camps, que ce soit à Aguel Hoc ou à Tessalit. Partout,
dans ces zones-là, le Mnla a hissé son drapeau.
40
À Ménaka, comme à Ber, à 25 Km de Gao, pour ne pas dire dans la ville de Gao, les
jihadistes sont de retour. Les populations affirment avoir vu plusieurs fois la 2ème
personnalité du Mujao au marché de Gao. À Ber, on ne parle plus d’ailleurs de
l’Etat malien. Le pire, c’est que les hommes du Mnla avec le Maa sont en train de
faire une chasse à l’homme dans ces localités dont les cibles ne sont autres que les
personnes qu’ils accusent d’avoir aidé les forces alliées et les Fama à les démasquer. Certaines d’entre elles sont aujourd’hui portées disparues à Ber, autant dire
qu’on ignore où elles sont passées. Par ailleurs, les terroristes et les jihadistes occupent l’île de Kadji à Gao, une île vierge de toute présence militaire malienne. Selon
une source militaire, «Ils (terroristes et jihadistes) n’ont pas voulu pour le moment
occuper Tombouctou et Gao, sinon ils seraient aujourd’hui dans ces villes. Et, souvent, ils sont acceptés par les populations qui ne peuvent rien contre eux parce
qu’elles ne voient plus l’armée malienne dans les patrouilles pour les rassurer».
Toute chose qui est corroborée par les populations du Gourma qui font face à des
vols de bétail et de motos, depuis le 22 juin 2014. Des inconnus viennent autour
des points d’eau, des foires et autres marchés de bétail, pour prendre des bêtes et
partir avec. Les populations en ont informé les militaires maliens basés à Gao, sans
succès. D’où la colère d’un ancien député de la région de Gao : «On nous a laissés à
la merci de nos ennemis. Ils ont rempli nos villes ; et à Bamako, on fait comme si
de rien n’était. Les gens vaguent à leurs occupations alors que ce qui nous attend
est plus difficile que ce qui s’est passé, parce que nous devrons travailler à la réconciliation. Mais nos autorités ont joué à la provocation inutile».
À l’instar de cet ancien député, beaucoup d’habitants des régions du nord assistent
impuissamment au retour des anciens occupants sous d’autres formes. «Où est
passée la République exemplaire qu’IBK nous avait promise pendant la campagne
électorale ?», s’interroge cet enseignant de Gao qui se dit étonné de ne voir à la
télé que des cérémonies avec des annonces de signature de conventions chiffrées
en milliards de Fcfa pour le Mali. Alors que, dit-il, «l’insécurité les habite nuit et
jour».
Apparemment, seul le gouvernement du Mali semble vouloir respecter le cessez-le
feu. Contrairement aux bandits et terroristes qui continuent à occuper le terrain.
Illustration : le samedi 5 juillet 2014, il y a eu un accrochage à Agachère Tilemsi
entre les milices d’auto-défense arabe et Imrad et le Mnla/Maa. Bilan : 2 véhicules
équipés saisis et 10 combattants fait prisonniers. Ces combats devraient permettre
au Mnla de renforcer sa position à Anefiss, et visent à asphyxier économiquement
Gao en faisant retourner tous les camions d’approvisionnement en provenance
d’Algérie pour le sud du pays. Et dire que tout cela nous arrive par la faute d’un
homme aux ambitions démesurées, Moussa Mara !
http://depechesdumali.com/
41
Nigeria
How to end Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, by Alao Akala
July 09, 2014
Christopher Adebayo Alao-Akala, is former governor of Oyo State and strong member of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). In this interview he speaks on his
life outside government House and the current security situation in the country and
how to end the cycle of insurgency among other burning issues.
YOU have been out of office for some time now, how have you been coping?
I have been enjoying myself. I have time to myself. As a politician I
have time to think of the past and focus on the future. I don’t have any office work
bothering me. Since I left office, I have less of responsibilities.
2015 is around the corner, what are you up to?
Adebayo Alao-Akala
I am thinking of coming back, I don’t think anything is wrong with that. I am am giving it a very serious consideration and I will soon come back to the race. And my
chances are very bright, considering my track records. They have tried me before,
they are trying another person now, and if you do analysis or comparison between
the two of us I will be rated higher than the other person.
You are quoted as saying without you PDP is dead in Oyo State is it true?
Let me put it this way; I don’t want to arrogate that to myself alone, but myself and
my associates. Without them and me I don’t think PDP will exist in Oyo State because anybody in the party now can never know PDP more than me. I have seen it
all in PDP. We started the party. I thank God am in charge.
The security situation of the country is becoming alarming, as an
42
ex-police officer what do you think should be done to arrest the situation?
Security should not be left in the hands of the federal government alone.
It is the responsibility of all. The current security situation in the country is the
problem of all of us. Each state government should be responsible for whatever is
happening in its domain. Nobody in Abuja would help govern Yobe, Adamawa or
Borno State; it is the duty of the governors in the respective states to take charge
and ensure that there is peace and stability in those places.
But at the federal level, the government should allow police to tackle the menace
being posed to the nation’s security before deploying the army. If I were the government, I would not deploy the army first; the army will be a backup for the police. The police should face the insurgents first and not the army.
The army should come in at the request of the police. The police are more civil, and
the people we are looking for are not in the army. There are trained police officers
and men, who are very conversant with the task of mingling with the civil society
and getting the information that is required to tackle the enemy. That is why they
should allow the police to be in the fore front. They should equip the police the
more and allow them to tackle insurgency, which is not a normal war that the army
can fight. The army does not know those we are looking for, but the police are everywhere in the country, so the police know how to give on-the-spot-assessment if
given the chance. Intelligence gathering is very important, and if the police are well
equipped they would have been trained on how to combat these insurgents. During my time I had the opportunity of going to Jaji and I was trained alongside the
army. I was trained on how to face and combat this type of insurgence. They
trained us every year. I don’t know whether they are still doing it or not. They
trained us on how to deal with this particular situation we are in now.
With due respect to the army, no matter how sophisticated the army is, this is not a
war they can easily win. It is one that everybody has to participate in order for the
nation to win.
What they should do is to make sure the police are well equipped to face the challenge. If you see when they started they first of all scared away the police. They are
attacking police station all over the place just to scare them. And they allowed police to be scared by bringing in army, no!
They should have fortified the police by giving them more money and vital equipment to enable them to face these people. The police are more widespread in this
country than the army. We have police post in every locality, but soldiers are not
everywhere. If you remember, at the commencement of the civil war, there was
what they called police action first, but when they felt the police could not deliver,
they brought in the army.
Right now, there is a department in the police called CIB, Civil Intelligence Bureau.
The CIB will gather intelligence report, which will not be sent to anywhere but used
43
within the immediate environment and action taken immediately based on the intelligence gathered and analysed by the officers.
If the police are in charge, they would send intelligence officers to mingle with the
areas they consider as Boko Haram black spots to be able to gather vital information in dealing with them. So, my suggestion is that the police should be brought
in; army should be in the background. Why we have mobile policemen is because
of this type of situation, MOPOL is a sort of para-military and they are well armed
and well trained to face this type of a threat to the society.
Have you ever advise the government on this?
No! No, because have not had the opportunity doing such. There was no effective
way of communicating such to the government. You see there is a standard way of
carrying over the operation of the police to the army.
I have not been able to see where the police will say they are not able to combat a
situation and they transfer it to the army. All the information is from the police and
again the army is talking too much. I was involved in Maitasine in 1980. Although
we knew where they were, we could not enter and we suffered a lot of causalities.
It was at that point that the military cordoned off the area and within some hours
they were able to subdue the Maitasine fighters because they knew who they were
going to fight and we knew their entry and exit points.
These Boko Haram insurgents are mobile and it is difficult to pinpoint their exit or
entry point. If you approach them from the North, they will exit from the East and
when they are moving, they do so in trickles and not enmass like the way they
were able to identify them in Abia. My thinking is that the police are trained to dialogue while the military is trained to fight and kill.
So, what exactly should be done now? What advice do you give to the police authorities?
They should give more money to the police to be able to do their work effectively. I
believe that if they give the police half of the money given to army, the police
would do a very good
job. Why we had to invite the military against Maitasine was because they were
not using guns but bows and arrows, which made it possible for them to target anyone anywhere they chose to attack. In fact, one could be targeted anywhere. In
the present circumstance, I believe that there is a Divisional Police Station in Chibok
and that they can detect the movement of people and take action against the insurgents.
The insurgents are wearing army uniform not police uniform. I am sure the police
would have detected who is a police officer
and who is not. If you are not in my division and you are in police uniform and I see
you, you will explain to me why you are in police uniform, but army formations are
44
far apart and it is a bit difficult to identify who is not a real soldier.
I want to suggest the full involvement of the police in fighting the insurgents while
the army is brought in only when the police feel it is necessary to do so.
But the police, particularly, the Mobile Police, should be deployed to assist in the
fight because this insurgent is not a conventional war that the army can easily win.
- See more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/end-boko-haram-insurgency
-nigeria-alao-akala/#sthash.Iv4Ot8PM.dpuf
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Understanding, and predicting, Boko Haram tactics
Published 8 July 2014
A recently published analysisoffers insights on how to predict future attacks by
Islamist militant group Boko Haram. The group, whose name translates to
“Western education is sin” in its Hausa language, has been launching attacks primarily in northern Nigeria since 2004. The group’s 15 April 2014 abduction of 276
schoolgirls from a school in Chibok, Borno State is unlike earlier attacks, which
targeted Nigeria’s civilian population in public markets and transportation hubs.
The analysis notes that there has been a shift in the group operation patterns following a May 2013 state of emergency declaration in the north-eastern states of
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa.
A recently published analysis by IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center offers
insights on how to predict future attacks by Islamist militant group Boko Haram.
The group, whose name translates to “Western education is sin” in its Hausa language, has been launching attacks primarily in northern Nigeria since 2004. The
group’s 15 April 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from a school in Chibok, Borno
State is unlike earlier attacks targeting Nigeria’s civilian population in public markets and transportation hubs.
HIS notes that following a May 2013 state of emergency declaration in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, Boko Haram’s core operational region, there has been a shift in the group’s operation patterns.
First, Boko Haram has increased the attacks directed at ordinary civilians, and its
attacks are becoming more lethal. Between January 2010 and March 2013, roughly
2.9 people were killed per attack, while between April 2013 and May 2014, Boko
Haram attacks led to 17.7 fatalities per attack. So far in 2014, roughly 27.9 civilians
have been killed per attack.
Second, Boko Haram’s area of operations has contracted during the past eighteen
months, with majority of attacks between 2013 and early 2014 carried out in Borno
State, where the group originated. The group has managed to stage some attacks
in central Nigeria, including an April attack in the capital, Abuja, and a May attack in
Jos. Attacks outside of Boko Haram’s area of operations tend to be bombings, suggesting that the group’s ability to mount assaults, ambushes, and other guerrilla
operations is limited to its northeast strong hold.
IHSreports that attacks on secular schools did not occur until 2012, eight years after
the group’s first attack, and are largely a response to the population’s cooperation
with the government’s counterterror efforts, and specifically to the participation of
local youths in government-backed anti-Boko Haram vigilante groups. Attacks on
students resulted in mass killings at dormitories and male students were generally
the targets. A 29 September 2013 attack in the College of Agriculture in Gujba,
Yobe resulted in at least ninety deaths when militants attacked four male dormito-
46
ries while sparing the single female dormitory on campus. The Chibok abduction,
directed at female students, led analysts to believe that additional factors might
have motivated the operation.
The May 2013 state of emergency in Borno State pushed Boko Haram into remote
bush camps, including those in the Sambisa Forest. The abduction of girls in Chibok
could have been motivated by the need to find orderlies and wives to make it easier for the fighters to sustain life in the forest. Similar motives have led to mass abductions of girls by other militant groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in
Uganda. Should this be the motivation, analysts believe that Boko Haram foresees
its immediate future as a rural guerrilla movement, and that Boko Haram camps
are sufficient and secure enough to accommodate both fighters and non- fighters
such as the abducted girls.
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/
47
Don't Forget What Sustains Boko Haram - Poverty
5 July 2014
Before the kidnapping of over 250 teenage girls from their school in an obscure
Northern Nigerian town, the activities of Boko Haram were just a local nuisance.
Perhaps, they were just a pinprick in the under belly of the African giant. I often
wondered whether that brazen act was a cry for attention or an unintended own
goal. However, the repetition of that audacious act about a week ago pulverises
any amateurish analysis of this deadly organisation.
When America was attacked on 9/11, and subsequently declared war on terrorism,
many wide eyed liberals claimed that they brought it on themselves. A lot of decent people in the Islamic world felt that they were immune to such a barbaric assault on civilisation. They did not see the need to condemn such a bold shaheed. I
believe there are some people in Nigeria who might have jubilated like it did happen openly in the Middle East. They never thought for a minute that the chicken
will come home to roost. Obviously, it’s no longer a laughing matter, because the
unacceptable slow pace of our development is further being stalled by these convulsive outbursts of anger when every inch of progress is more than welcome.
We live in a copycat world. Whatever happens in any part of the world is splashed
instantaneously on our televisions, on the airwaves and on the internet. Just think
about the Arab spring, which started in Tunisia and copied across the sub-region
with devastating consequences in places like Libya while Syria still burns. Many
people erroneously think that suicide bombing was started by the Palestinians. It
was actually pioneered by the Tamils of Sri Lanka and perfected by the Palestinians.
It is now a global lethal weapon of war that is copied by the so called freedom
fighters all over the globe. Therefore, nobody is immune to terrorism, when the
conditions are at a tipping point it will just go bang.
Any good examiner will tell you that understanding a question is half of it solved.
Clearly, Boko Haram is not a question, but a toxic problem. Alternatively, the question above can equally be substituted with problem and Boko Haram can be neutralised without the uproar, pain, fear and the emotional trauma supping our energies needlessly. There are those who will blame it on religious extremism. There
might be a shard of truth in it. However, it does not provide comprehensive solutions to all the queries churning in our minds. Therefore, we need to process the
historical facts in the light of current experiences. Christians and Muslims have
lived together based on conservative estimates for over a century in Nigeria. And I
also believe traditional believers existed in the same melting pot. Why did they not
experience these sectarian violence, but now?
We might take comfort in the fact that the leader of Boko Haram is uneducated
and his evil beliefs are fuelled by ignorance. To characterise him as such is to miss
the point. The fact is there are very well educated people with equally insidious
48
ideas. You will be surprised to know that quite a few wacky professors are dotted
around European and American universities who believe that, because the black
man has not been able to come up with, for example, the theory of relativity we
are subhuman. And these people wouldn't blink to sign our death warrant. However, those ridiculous ideas are kept alive only in a little corner of their brains. The
evils of the Nazis existed in fragments in the minds of some individuals and they
were synthesised and brought into lethal focus by Adolf Hitler courtesy of the social evils of the meltdown of the German economy after the 1929 stock market
crush. Likewise, there are lots of people who subscribe to hideous ideologies, taste
and beliefs. For example, there are people who believe that the world is over populated. However, they will never consider education, the most effective way of curbing population explosion, but birth control through the use of the pill, condoms and
other ridiculous practices that does not work. On the other hand, if you should follow the premise of their argument to its logical conclusion, it means some people
should be deprived of life. What pops to mind is the sterilisation of people in Nazi
Germany. Thank God, there is a huge difference between them and Boko Haram,
their ideas only flourish in their little cranium.
Now, the question is what keeps this Boko Haram cancer alive? What sustains and
fuel this monster? You don’t have to stretch and bend your mind for the answer. It
is poverty. Poverty is the fertilizer of this preposterous medieval belief. A drowning
man will clutch at anything. The foot soldiers of this primitive Al-Qaeda franchise
are people who have given up on life. The leader of Boko Haram does not go about
kidnapping and detonating bombs himself. They are wrought by his lieutenants and
foot soldiers. Unfortunately, these are people, as a result of their life experiences;
do not value their own lives. It is much easier to identify with life after death and
the promise of endless debauchery, besides the icing on the cake induced by 77
virgins on a journey of unlimited pleasure. Graduates and undergraduates in European universities, who have everything to live for, are being brainwashed to kill
themselves and their fellow citizens. How much less a hungry man? What do you
think if you cannot afford a decent square meal a day; don’t you think it is a good
prospect?
This is what African leaders have bequeathed to us. And I personally think that they
are just a waste of space and oxygen. It appears their middle name is corruption.
The few who are not, also adopt some worthless economic and political ideologies
that produce the same effects as corruption. The monstrosity of the vice taking
place on the continent is mind boggling. What the perpetrators don’t realise or perhaps don’t really care is that its effects are providing a giant crucible likely to mould
a megaton bomb ultimately to explode in our faces. The sad fact is, time is on the
side of these goons who don't care to blow themselves up and the rest of mankind
to hell. Cutting edge technology like the internet, mobile communication is providing perfect platform for these dangerous radicals to fuse together. And they have
abundant raw materials to work with as a result of high unemployment.
49
Ghana, for instance, is one of the capitals of cyber crime due to high unemployment especially amongst university graduates. Politicians don’t think about a prodigious problem like this and keep rolling out policies that will help keep them in
power like GYEEDA. Obviously, when it comes to corruption what happens in Ghana is just a small change compared to Nigeria the turf of Boko Haram. The national
coffers are looted in billion trunches. The famous villain that comes to mind is
Umaru Dikko who is reputed to have done away with $7 billion, though conservative estimates put it at $1billion. Can you imagine the number of thermal plants
that could have been built with such amount for the people of Nigeria at the time?
Funny enough, there is a joke in Nigeria that the acronym for the former electricity
company NEPA is ‘never expect power always’.Also, there are unsubstantiated reports that Abacha stashed away over $4 billion in foreign banks. Though, that is
very difficult to prove, however, a more credible lead is the freezing of accounts
worth $485m by the United States government department of justice. If this is
what one man is able to get away with, just conceptualise his lieutenants who will
be working below the radar. Can you quantify how much Nigerians are losing to
unproductive government officials to the detriment of sick people in hospitals and
inadequate resources for schools and what have you?
In this deplorable state of affairs, the little glimmer of hope we have is protest. And
even that is a dangerous turf. If you are a big mouth who questions their modus
operandi you will be sent to the gallows like Ken Saro-Wiwa who was railroaded
through the legal system and hanged. In effect, it seems like a state of hopelessness. All the people who are running the country are Western educated; and for all
that the eye can survey Western education turns our leaders into thieves who ransack their various national kitties. So I am not surprised that Boko Haram means
Western education is sin.
In our own backyard, our population is expanding at an alarming rate consistently.
Our population census provides us with such information. Strangely, the first action
to come out of it is to increase the number of parliamentarians instead of thinking
about the energy or educational needs of a growing population. All their manifesto
promises experience still birth. Those that excruciatingly see the light of day succumb to their first infantile disease. In my candid opinion, our democracy has become an oscillation between those who will dip their hands moderately into the
national kitty and those who will do it with caution. The SADA programme, for instance, will be scuttled and sunk beneath the waves due to corruption and incompetence. A very good idea that, in reality, could have lifted people out of poverty is
at the mercy of vultures. I don’t indulge in loose talk, but Ghana is sitting on a time
bomb. I must make it more explicit; we are playing with a lighted fuse as far as
graduate unemployment is concerned. And the solution is clear, the government
don’t need to do anything in particular, but just make it easier for people to start
their own businesses: by keeping interest rates down. Reducing the bureaucratic
nightmare that would be entrepreneurs are forced to endure. And most importantly all African governments need a lean leviathan not a monstrous juggernaut.
50
The truth remains the truth it doesn't matter whether it is coming from a scoundrel
or a saint. As a result of anger against colonialism and imperialism, leaders like
Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and many more abandoned a
system that we practiced long before the European landed on our shores. They
opted for some ridiculous ideologies such as socialism and communism. Capitalism
is inherent with our traditions. It does not even have a reference point in the past.
But we eluded ourselves and embraced foreign concepts, which kept us in retrogression. All countries that kept their minds and eyes open are advancing at neck
breaking speed with capitalism while we are experiencing unpardonable atrophy.
And the sad thing is our leaders still can’t see that capitalism is the way forward
and keep banging their heads in the dark. While they grope like zombies, the little
wealth that is created is also at their mercy. They behave like the spider arm of the
Indian goddess dipping their hands into the national kitty from all directions.
Boko Haram is a destroyed reaction to the status quo. In the past it would have
been a military coup, but that is gone out of fashion. In the current raping of the
country, about thirty years ago I would have advocated for a coup d'etat, but that
would be tantamount to being thrown from the cauldron into the furnace. If the
sub-region want to neutralise Boko Haram practice capitalism – the half way house
is the worst form of it. Crony capitalism is as bad as socialism or communism. PPP is
a delusion. Anything short of the above and Boko Haram will live forever.
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?
ID=315270
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Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram
July 4th 2014
TWO months after a hashtag brought Nigeria’s Islamic insurgency to international
attention, the security situation continues to deteriorate, posing a growing crisis for
Goodluck Jonathan’s embattled government.
The world started paying attention after the militia group Boko Haram, whose
name means “Western education is forbidden”, abducted more than 200 schoolgirls from Borno state in April. But that was just one episode in a near-constant
stream of violence by the insurgents, who have their stronghold in the country’s
northeast.
Over the past year, the number of terrorist attacks in Nigeria has almost doubled,
killing close to 3,500 people, according to the risk analysis group Maplecroft. Abductions have been a common tactic of the group, which either holds hostages for
ransom or sells them as slaves. But since the girls were taken, it has stepped the
practice up a gear. More than 100 people have been kidnapped since May,
Maplecroft reckons, implying that the organisation is increasingly using hostages to
boost its international profile and bargain with the government.
In the past few weeks, attacks on villages, schools and churches in the northeast
have been relentless. Reports suggest that Boko Haram has erected its black flag in
a number of villages in Borno’s Gwoza region, where it has murdered hundreds of
people, including the influential emir. It is unclear whether this is a symbolic ges-
52
ture, or an actual attempt to control and administer the territory. If it’s the latter,
this is a serious tactical shift for the insurgents. They have traditionally focused on
hit-and-run attacks and suicide bombings, but analysts say that seizing territory
could be the next step in their campaign.
Elsewhere in the north, explosions have hit Kano, Bauchi, Jos and Kaduna. But there
are signs that Boko Haram is expanding its reach further south too. Last week, a
bomb in a major shopping mall in central Abuja left 21 dead. This wasn’t the deadliest in the capital to-date (an explosion in a suburban bus park in April killed at least
75 people), but it did incite greater fear. If Boko Haram was responsible, it shows
that the organisation is sophisticated enough to hit the heart of the city, despite
increased security measures.
A car bomb in Lagos also prompted concern, though it is unclear whether this was
the Islamists’ work. Either way, diplomats and security experts agree that it is possible that the commercial capital will be targeted in the run-up to 2015 elections.
“There is every chance that Boko Haram will eventually attack Lagos,” says Ben Payton, Maplecroft’s senior Africa analyst. “Mass casualty attacks in Lagos would
shatter the perception that the Boko Haram insurgency is confined to a remote corner of the country.”
That would be a serious blow to Nigeria’s reputation as an investment destination.
Scores of multinationals use Lagos as their base. They already spend a fortune on
security, and would be rattled if the insurgency stretched this far south.
As the situation escalates, the government looks increasingly idiotic. Armed forces
are capable of providing some security in major cities, but are ill-equipped for counter-insurgency campaigns. One general in the northeastern state of Adamawa told
your correspondent that less than 50 percent of his forces’ equipment is
“serviceable”. Others say that is optimistic. Allegations of collaboration by armed
forces with Boko Haram don’t help. Nor do violations. Foreign diplomats stress that
there is only limited support their governments can give to an army accused of human rights abuses.
With elections on the way, terrorists will be looking to wreak as much havoc as possible. Most expect things to get worse before they get better.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/07/nigerias-fight-against-bokoharam
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Somalia
JIHADISTS MOVE 'FROM POISONED ARROWS TO IEDS'
Boko Haram, al-Shabaab networking to boost terror threats
13 July 2014
Terrorism analysts are concerned that information sharing between Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram and Somali group al-Shabaab will mean a new, deadlier
wave of violence.
Consultancy Africa Intelligence and TheIntelligenceCommunity.com analyst Maha
Hamdan says the connection will further enhance Boko Haram’s increasingly sophisticated operations and add incentives to al-Shabaab.
“The effectiveness of its operations and capabilities to operate and hit targets in a
country duped as one of Africa’s security power houses is a security nightmare for
anti-terrorism experts,” Hamdan said. “While many scholars share a view of the
organization as limited to only local confines, such information trading will help
both to expand operations.”
She added, “With the emergence of the African continent as a growing pawn for
Islamic extremism and radicalism, the linkages and cooperation of these groups
cannot be underestimated. Boko Haram and al-Shabaab have quickly evolved, and
have the intention of developing the capability to coordinate on a rhetorical and
operational level with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.”
Analyst Hussein Solomon, a University of the Free State political science professor
and research associate at the Israeli think tank Research on Islam and Muslims in
Africa, added that the recent report documents an intensified relationship.
“This (information sharing) accounts for the increasing sophistication of Boko Ha-
54
ram in the past two years from using poisoned arrows from bows to the use of
IEDs,” Solomon said.
Hamdan added that the cooperation will give both groups power to actually change
the direction of politics in Africa.
“So trading tactics between Boko Haram and al-Shabaab is an effective tool that
fills the (information) gap and enables them to maintain a capacity to shape events,
keep the initiative, increase the level of ‘shock and awe’ along the time line and
achieve an asymmetric edge,” he explained.
“Both are terror organizations with regional and international capabilities and look
forward to be the most advanced, well-prepared, disciplined and solidly financed
terror organizations in the next 50 years,” Hamdan said.
Adding to the concern, Solomon said the networking goes further than just Boko
Haram and al-Shabaab.
She said the connections extend to “al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar Dine in Mali and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen-based).”
A former CIA station chief, who asked not to be identified for security reasons, confirmed that the information sharing almost guarantees an increase in both groups’
activities.
“It’s absolutely guaranteed. The Muslims all imitate success. There are no boundaries in Islam, be it geographical or tactical,” the former station chief said.
Center for Security Policy Vice President for Research and Analysis Clare Lopez said
that while the information sharing has the potential to increase their ability, the
motivation comes from a common source.
“Tactics exchange could certainly enhance the capabilities of both groups, but the
bottom line, as both are Islamic jihad groups, they’re both going to be following
essentially the same script. They’re following the Quran, the hadiths, the Sirat and
Shariah, things laid out for them by Muhammad 13-plus centuries ago,” Lopez said.
Lopez explained that the common inspiration for the operations comes from a central source some jihadist groups have added to their arsenal.
“The kidnapping, ransom demands, rape and sale of captured girls, etc., they’re all
straight out of pure Islamic doctrine, although the modern-day ISIS Caliphate example of how to be self-sufficient through bank robbery, extortion, kidnapping and
ransom, and the capture and exploitation of oil facilities is quite recent.
“So, while some tactics involving weapons, or operating against Western forces like
the French or U.S., might be 21st century, the fundamentals have been tried and
true (and legitimate under Islam) for a long, long time,” Lopez said.
55
The former station chief zeroed-in on one common source of inspiration for all of
the jihadist groups.
“Since al-Qaida was formed, global jihadists have all followed the same tactics, objectives, training, etc. Boko Haram’s original membership trained and was financed
by al-Qaida, like al-Shabaab,” the former station chief said.
Along with the increased capability because of shared tactics, Hamdan said a valid
concern is funding. She said the networking includes money transfers and “dummy
corporations.”
“A confirmed member of Boko Haram revealed during interrogations that one of
the ways through which Boko Haram funds its activities is by purchasing and sending items to its members in other locations. These items are sold at inflated prices,
and the proceeds are used to finance the activities of the terrorist organization, including renting apartments and procuring improvised explosive device materials for
their operations.
“In one case, a Canadian citizen of Somali origin residing in Dakar, Senegal, established a real-estate company in conjunction with a Senegalese national. An account
was opened for the company at a bank in Senegal. Shortly afterward, this account
received a wire transfer of approximately $106,000 from a Somali national living in
the United States. A financial institution based in Dubai executed the transfer.
Hamdan explained, based on the suspicious circumstances of the transaction – including the country of origin of the funds, lack of adequate information documenting the identity of the new customer and the destination of the funds – the
Senegalese bank filed a report with the Senegalese government.
“During the subsequent FIU investigation, it was revealed that the company had no
legal status in Senegal and was established specifically for laundering illicit funds
through the sale of imported goods. All three parties were found to be in contact
with extremist groups involved in terrorist activities in East Africa, North America,
Europe and in Mauritania,” she said.
“The three established a related company together with other Senegalese nationals
to import used goods. Some of the goods were sold locally and the remainder exported to a third country for re-sale. The proceeds of these sales were sent to a
number of terrorist groups.”
Hamdan added, “The bottom line is that trading tactics will involve better networking that will help them raise more funds.”
Read more at http://www.wnd.com/
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AMERICA NEEDS A 'RESET' IN POLICY TOWARD SOMALIA
1 JULY 2014
In this photo taken Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2013, Somali students line up in the
courtyard of the Moalim Jama school in Mogadishu, Somalia.
At next month's Africa Leaders' Summit in Washington D.C., it'll be important for
President Barack Obama to refrain from prioritizing counter-terrorism, resource
extractive or aid-only agendas - which is what has dominated White House policies in the past - and pursue, instead, a more just path for the 54 countries on
the continent, 47 of which have been invited to the Washington summit.
Of the seven countries that have been excluded from the invite list, Somalia is not
one of them, thankfully. And lest the United States get increasingly interested in
the kinds of military-first interventions that have characterized U.S. foreign policy in
Somalia, as I witnessed in my trip there last year, the Summit should serve as a reflection point before the West worsens the war it's waging on the Horn and elsewhere.
When Americans think of Somalia, the first thing they likely think of is al-Shabaab,
the violent rebel group that sprung from the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union that once ran the country. The al-Shabaab fit nicely into the characteristics of
the West's war on terrorism, as well as the conservative narrative about Islam and
violence.
There is much that is misunderstood about this movement and the country that is
trying to quell it.
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Al-Shabaab means "youth" in Arabic and is largely made up of young persons who
were previously unemployed, aimless and impoverished. They are recruited with
nothing more than a $20 gift or a cell phone. Much of the mid-level leadership is
filled by marginalized clans, persons who didn't get to participate in the political
process, at least not in a meaningful way, like the handful of majority clans have
historically.
The majority of al-Shabaab is not composed of people who are inherently set with
a sinister agenda for Somalia and the West, but rather people in search of job security and political power. The good news here is that these needs can be met
through more legitimate means.
In fact, not unlike Somalia, some of the most unstable and insecure countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa perform the poorest in the JustJobs Index's country rankings
concerning employment opportunity, income security, employment security, safety
at work and healthy work conditions, equality of treatment and opportunity. Any
young man - in Somalia on the Horn or in Nigeria in West Africa - is going to be
much less inclined to pursue violence if he's got a good job, a quality education and
socio-economic opportunities available. Without these basic ingredients, this young
man has nothing to lose.
While this may not be an easy task, the outline is clear. First order of business is to
prioritize socio-economic development, something that has not been on the West's
agenda for the Horn. As I walked the streets of Mogadishu late last year, thousands
of youth milled about, aimless, listless and jobless. In speaking with the women and
youth organizations and coalitions operating throughout the country, the United
States has not invested in strategies to get these kids off the streets and into just
jobs. This is a missed opportunity, one that does not require much funding, and one
that should be remedied immediately.
The U.S. Department of Justice's Terrorist Watch list creates obstacles to aid - e.g.
support for socio-economic development and job creation for youth who are at risk
of recruitment by al-Shabaab. This is problematic. Somalia's most recent famine, in
2010-2012, which killed more than 250,000 Somalis, is believed to be partially a
result of the World Food Programme retracting its food distribution out of fear it
would end up in the hands of al-Shabaab.
While I understand why policymakers wouldn't want U.S. aid to end up in the
hands of people who do violence, what about U.S. aid for preventing people from
doing violence? These Somali youth need our help and if we fail to offer it to them,
they will go to the loudest local recruiter, who, in many cases, is the Shabaab.
Whether it's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs and rigorous
religious retraining and rehabilitation for former fighters, or, for future fighters,
something more preventative like skills training and job placement to ensure that
the Shabaab's recruitment strategies are ineffective, the West must be ready to
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reconsider how we prevent violence overseas, because the current approach isn't
working. We're allowing new recruits to be swept up for something as simple as a
cell phone. We can do better.
There's incredible opportunity for engagement but we're not seizing it, and, instead, sticking to our old ways in America's so-called "war on terror." Those ways
are military-focused, not socio-economically inclined, and engaging only segments
of the population, not the disenfranchised and marginalized. If we want to win over
Somalis, an about-face is needed, and it is needed now.
As President Obama plans his August summit in Washington D.C, we can help tip
the scales in Somalia towards something very positive. But it requires a serious. Rethink on how we wage war. In Somalia, a war on poverty and unemployment would
go a lot farther in meeting our objectives than our current strategy and for a lot less
money. The time for that rethink is now.
Michael Shank, Ph.D., is the associate director for legislative affairs the Friends
Committee on National Legislation, adjunct faculty at George Mason University's
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, and senior fellow at the JustJobs Network. Follow him on Twitter at @Michael_Shank.
http://politix.topix.com/
59
Tanzania
Attacks hit Tanzania and Kenya tourist sites
Published July 08th 2014
Attacks included restaurant bomb in Tanzania that wounded 8 and gun battle at
wildlife center in Kenya
Tanzania and Kenya were targeted in separate attacks in key tourist sites in the east
African nations, police said Tuesday, the latest in a series of bombings and gun
battles scaring off foreign visitors.
While the attacks -- including a restaurant bomb blast that wounded eight in Tanzania and a gun battle at a wildlife conservation centre in Kenya -- are not reported to
be connected, they threaten to badly dent the countries' crucial tourism industry.
Eight people were wounded late Monday when unknown attackers hurled a bomb
through the window of a restaurant popular with foreigners and wealthy locals in
the north Tanzanian town of Arusha.
"It was an improvised explosive device thrown through a window," top Tanzanian
police officer Issaya Mngulu told AFP.
The floor of the upmarket Indian restaurant in the centre of Arusha was covered in
blood, with overturned chairs amid broken glass, an AFP reporter said.
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Visitors come to Arusha before travelling on to the snowcapped peak of Mount Kilimanjaro, Africa's highest mountain, as well as to the Serengeti national park, famed
for its spectacular great migration of wildebeest.
In Kenya, gunmen stormed conservation offices on the coast near the tourist island
of Lamu, battling with police before setting fire to buildings and vehicles and escaping, following a series of massacres in nearby settlements, government officials
said.
"They set ablaze the camp and also several vehicles, then there was also shooting
between the attackers and police at the base," said government official Shahasi
61
Abdalla, the local area chief, adding that there were no casualties.
The ranch hosts offices of the Lamu Conservation Trust, which works to support
local peoples and traditional ways of life, and protect some 63,000 acres (25,000
hectares) of coastal forest inhabited by elephants and buffalo.
- Shebab targeting Kenya Lamu island has in the past hosted wealthy visitors including celebrities. In January,
American actress Kristin Davis visited the site where the attack took place, as part
of her work supporting elephant conservation efforts.
There was no claim of responsibility for that attack, but it follows several killings in
the area which claimed at least 87 lives, according to the Red Cross.
Somalia's Al-Qaeda-linked Shebab have claimed responsibility for previous attacks
in the Lamu area, saying they were in retaliation for Kenya's military presence in
Somalia as part of the African Union force supporting the country's fragile and internationally-backed government.
However, police have blamed the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a group
that campaigns for independence of the coastal region, while Kenyan President
Uhuru Kenyatta accused "local political networks" and criminal gangs.
Kenyan police chief David Kimaiyo said Tuesday 45 people had been arrested along
the coast in connection to the spate of recent violence.
However, the unrest has already provoked scores of cancellations for the tourist
industry -- a key foreign currency earner and massive employer for the country -- at
one of its traditionally busiest times of the year.
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In a further blow to the sector, a Russian tourist was murdered on Saturday in Kenya's port city of Mombasa while touring Fort Jesus -- a 16th century Portuguesebuilt fort and a UNESCO World Heritage Site -- in what police said was "normal
thuggery".
Tanzanian police said they had arrested two Tanzanian nationals were arrested following the attack in Arusha, but said they did not believe Shebab extremists were
to blame.
"We do not know who the attackers are, but we do not suspect any involvement
with Al-Shebab," Mngulu said.
On July 3, two people were wounded when an improvised bomb was hurled into
the home of leading Muslim cleric in Arusha, Mngulu said.
In a separate attack in Kenya's restive northeastern Wajir region also late Monday,
some 450 kilometres (240 miles) north of Lamu, gunmen hurled a grenade into a
restaurant before spraying diners with bullets, killing one and wounding several
others.
The remote rural region is one of Kenya's most volatile areas, awash with guns and
armed bandits, and while the Shebab have also carried out attacks there, local revenge killings between rival clans are also common.
(AFP)
http://www.i24news.tv/
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Tunisia
Le bilan de Mehdi Jom a en six mois de lutte anti-jihadiste
09/07/2014
Des soldats tunisiens en patrouille dans le Jebel Chaambi,
(province de asserine), en juin 2013
Abderre ak hli /AFP
Dans ce billet en deux parties, Laurent Touchard revient sur les événements qui
ont jalonné les six derniers mois de lutte anti-terroriste en Tunisie depuis l'arrivée
de Mehdi Jomâa à la tête du gouvernement.
toire militaire. Il a collaboré à plusieurs ouvrages et certains de ses travaux sont utilisés par l'université Johns-Hopkins, aux tats-Unis.
Le 9 janvier 2014, le Premier ministre Ali Larayedh démissionne. Geste qui annonce
le retrait du pouvoir du parti islamiste Ennahdha quelques heures plus tard. Le lendemain, Mehdi Jomâa est nommé à la place de Larayedh à la tête d'un gouvernement religieusement neutre et de "philosophie" technocratique. Le 26 janvier,
l'Assemblée nationale constituante (ANC) vote une nouvelle Constitution, avec 200
voix favorables (145 étaient nécessaires) contre seulement 12. Dans le même
temps, elle vote la confiance au nouveau Premier ministre qui, dès lors, peut entamer la marche vers les élections législatives et présidentielle de 2014 (qui pourraient avoir lieu en octobre pour la première, en novembre et décembre pour les
deux tours de la seconde) tout en s'attaquant résolument au terrorisme qui menace grandement la stabilité nationale.
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Les forces de sécurité reprennent l'initiative
Moins d'un mois plus tard, le 3 février 2014, la Garde nationale et la police cernent
une maison à Raoued. Dans celle-ci ont été "logés" plusieurs terroristes, dont Kamel Gadhgadhi, l'assassin présumé de Chokri Belaïd L'assaut est lancé Les jihadistes parviennent à échapper à l'étau des forces de sécurité. Ils se retranchent
dans une autre maison. Une vingtaine d'heure sera nécessaire à la Brigade antiterroriste (BAT) de la police pour venir à bout des islamistes. Mission accomplie dans
des conditions particulièrement complexes : ces derniers disposent en effet de 600
kilos d'explosifs tandis qu'est rapportée la présence d'engins explosifs improvisés
(EE ) dans les murs qu'ils occupent Autre di culté, le BA doit s'efforcer de capturer Kamel Gadhgadhi vivant Sur ce point, c'est un échec L'homme est tué
Ce qui ne manque pas de soulever une polémique qu'alimentent des propos contestables de Lofti Ben Jeddou, annonçant : "C'est le plus beau cadeau qu'on puisse
faire aux Tunisiens." Au-delà du jugement que l'on peut porter sur cette déclaration, ce genre de polémique est quasiment inévitable en démocratie sitôt qu'un
terroriste est tué lors d'une action des forces de sécurité. Sont facilement oubliés le
caractère extrêmement délicat de ce type d'opérations, la violence dont font
preuve les "bad guys", ainsi que leur détermination à ne pas être pris vivants... Le
facteur "chance" joue donc considérablement, influencé par le professionnalisme
des unités engagées. Chance au rendez-vous cinq jours plus tard, le 8 février 2014.
La BAT intervient à Borj Louzir. Six terroristes sont interpellés, à commencer par
Hamid al-Malki, impliqué dans l'assassinat de Mohamed Brahmi
Des groupes de jeunes n'hésitent plus à agresser verbalement ou physiquement les
femmes qu'ils estiment vêtues de manière indécente.
Faux barrage
Le 10 février, le ministère de l'Intérieur indique que les femmes portant le niqab
seront désormais davantage contrôlées. Il s'agit d'éviter l'infiltration ou la fuite de
jihadistes déguisés en femmes. La mesure fait suite à l'arrestation, le même jour,
d'un salafiste recherché, retrouvé "camouflé" sous ledit voile. Méthode à laquelle
recourent également les jihadistes syriens. Cet incident sert également de
"prétexte" légitime à l'idée d'une interdiction du niqab dans les lieux publics dée
qui elle-même fait écho à des troubles survenus à la Facultés des Lettres, des Arts
et des Humanités de Manouba. Fin février 2012, un professeur refuse de laisser
entrer dans son cours des étudiantes ainsi voilées, provoquant la colère d'islamistes... Idée qui est également la conséquence de tensions croissantes entre fondamentalistes et modernistes : dans certains quartiers des villes tunisiennes, des
groupes de jeunes (islamistes radicaux véritables ou opportunistes) n'hésitent pas à
agresser verbalement ou physiquement les femmes qu'ils estiment vêtues de manière indécente.
Souhaitant se démarquer clairement des terroristes, plusieurs représentants de la
65
communauté religieuse radicale donnent raison au gouvernement... Ceux qui ont
opté pour la voix des armes n'ont pas cette modération. Les jihadistes ne manquent pas de répondre à la mort de Gadhgadhi et à la question du niqab. Le 17 février 2014, à Jendouba (plus précisément, à Sidi Hamed), quatre membres des
forces de sécurité et un civil sont tués à un faux barrage que tiennent des terroristes vêtus d'uniformes gouvernementaux. Ils trompent ainsi la vigilance de leurs
victimes, recourant à une tactique "éprouvée" par les salafistes lors de la guerre
civile algérienne. Est d'ailleurs rapportée, parmi les tueurs de Jendouba, la présence d'un Algérien... Par chance, cette tactique semble ne pas s'être généralisée :
elle induit la paranoïa, favorise les bavures (les civils étant susceptibles de forcer ce
qu'ils supposent être un "faux barrage"...) et augmente de plusieurs crans le climat
de terreur.
Dans le reste du pays, après un été et une fin d'année 2013 marqués par les actes
terroristes et les opérations militaires (en particulier dans le mont Chaambi), la virulence des jihadistes (que soutient au moins implicitement une frange de la population par le biais du mouvement Ansar al-Charia et de ses quelques milliers de
membres) ne s'atténue donc pas, comme l'illustre les raids de la police contre des
"safe house", le faux barrage de Jendouba Par ailleurs, mines et autres engins explosifs improvisés (EEI) continuent d'être posés. D'autres cellules plus ou moins
constituées "d'amateurs" se mettent en place, financées par des trafics divers... Le
caractère délétère de cette situation profite du chaos qui s'installe en Libye ainsi
que de la guerre civile syrienne.
Les volontaires tunisiens pour le jihad en Syrie
Conflit "lointain", cette guerre civile syrienne n'est pas sans conséquences directes
pour la stabilité de la Tunisie. En effet, plusieurs centaines de volontaires sont partis mener le jihad, contre le régime syrien et ses alliés, au sein d'organisations salafistes : "modérés", la myriade de groupes qui combattent sous la bannière du Front
Islamique, al-Nosra et surtout, l'État islamique en irak et au Levant (EIIL).
Le nombre de ces volontaires fluctue selon les sources. Alors qu'ils étaient autour
de 800 en 2012-2013, Lofti Ben Jeddou évoque environ 2 400 ressortissants tunisiens en 2014. Des sources américaines parlent d'approximativement 3 000
femmes et hommes. D'autres vont jusqu'à 4 000 personnes. À noter que le chiffre
de 8 000 a parfois été cité. Cependant, il s'agit d'une confusion avec le total de Tunisiens ayant été empêchés de se rendre en Syrie.
Abdellatif Hanachi, universitaire tunisien, se montre plus nuancé. Il mentionne un
total (précis) de 1 902 individus. Leur moyenne d'âge va d'une vingtaine à une trentaine d'années, ils proviennent de milieux sociaux souvent défavorisés bien que les
volontaires soient eux-mêmes en majorité diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur
(voire, sur-diplômés) mais sans travail Abellatif Hanachi indique aussi qu'ils résident (ou plutôt, leur famille) surtout dans les villes côtières comme Tunis, Sousse,
Bizerte ou Médenine plutôt que dans le centre rural.
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Il est difficile de savoir précisément combien de Tunisiens sont partis faire le jihad
en Syrie. © AFP
Dans des camps à proximité de Benghazi et de Derna, les apprentis jihadistes sont
sommairement entraînés au maniement des armes légères.
Recrutés via des filières plus ou moins élaborées (accessoirement concurrentes)
généralement affiliées à Ansar al-Charia (ou du moins avec des membres qui s'en
réclament), les futurs combattants gagnent la Libye. Là-bas, dans des camps à
proximité de Benghazi et de Derna, ils sont sommairement entraînés au maniement des armes légères. Après ce séjour, ils sont alors envoyés en Syrie, transitant
par la Turquie avec la complicité (au moins passive) des services de renseignement
turcs. Actuellement, un certain nombre combat probablement dans les rangs de
l'EIIL en Irak. De 2012 jusqu'au printemps 2014, une cinquantaine de ces volontaires auraient été tués et 43 seraient aux mains Damas. Si tous ceux qui rentrent
ne deviendront pas nécessairement des terroristes, ils en ont néanmoins la
"stature" ce jour, environ 400 sont rentrés en unisie
Initiative disputée
En 2013, les forces de sécurité donnaient le sentiment de subir les événements plutôt que d'influer leur cours, tandis que le pouvoir politique était au mieux dépassé,
au pire passif. Un an plus tard, le renouveau gouvernemental crée une dynamique.
À défaut d'une stratégie bien établie, l'objectif est évident : tout d'abord reprendre
l'initiative et ensuite, la conserver afin d'éradiquer dans le temps, la menace terroriste. Le Premier ministre, Mehdi Jomâa, explique en avril 2014, que "Avant, on
était dans une lutte où l'on subissait. On avait des groupes qui infiltraient certaines
zones urbaines (…), maintenant on est en train de progresser, d'aller les chercher
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dans leurs fiefs en montagne."
De janvier à juin 2014, se multiplient les opérations de la police, de la Garde nationale et de l'armée. À la mi-avril, une vaste offensive militaire est lancée dans le
mont Chaambi. Au préalable, dès le 11 du mois, le président Moncef Marzouki décrète le djebel comme étant zone militaire fermée. Décision qui facilite l'action des
militaires, permet de rendre plus souples les règles d'engagement. Désormais, des
drones ScanEagle assurent le renseignement, la surveillance et la reconnaissance.
Ils contribuent au repérage des jihadistes qui ensuite sont pris sous le feu de l'artillerie ou de l'aviation. Début mai, l'armée contrôle 80 du relief. Comme toute statistique en matière de lutte anti-insurrectionnelle, celle-ci est à relativiser.
"Contrôler" un territoire face une guérilla (ou adversaire assimilé à une guérilla) n'a
pas beaucoup de sens, alors même que ladite entité est prompte à échanger de
l'espace géographique contre du temps...
Grosse prise
Le 25 mai 2014, la Garde nationale entre en action dans les environs de Ben Guerdane, non loin de la frontière libyenne. Trois hommes sont arrêtés, des EEI (dont
des ceintures d'explosifs), des détonateurs et des mines antichars découverts...
Dans le cadre du démantèlement de cette cellule, 16 individus au total seront interpellés. La plupart d'entre-eux ont été entraînés en Libye. Ils envisageaient des
attentats et prises d'otages contre des sites industriels et touristiques du pays...
C'est donc une grosse prise. En réaction, les jihadistes attaquent, cinq jours plus
tard, un poste de la Garde nationale, non loin de la localité.
Du 31 mai au 1er juin 2014, les forces tunisiennes interviennent au nord-ouest du
pays, à Fernana. Des renforts, notamment en hélicoptères, rejoignent rapidement
le dispositif initial. À la mi-juin, 2 terroristes présumés sont abattus, cette fois-ci à
Jendouba située à une cinquantaine de kilomètres de la frontière algérienne. Des
Kalachnikov et des explosifs sont saisis. Dans la nuit du 12 au 13 juin, toujours dans
le secteur de Fernana, une opération conjointe est lancée par la Garde nationale et
l'armée, permettant la prise de plusieurs armes. Dans le même temps, sous les
coups de l'armée, les jihadistes du mont Chaambi semblent s'essou er. Mais, cet
affaiblissement est une illusion, dans la logique expliquée quelques lignes plus
haut. Ils le prouvent dans la nuit du 27 au 28 mai 2014.
Dans la deuxième partie de ce billet, nous aborderons le "message de Kasserine",
l'examen de la nouvelle loi antiterroriste qui doit remplacer celle de décembre
2003, ainsi que la nécessité de la coopération internationale
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/
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Tunisie : Il faut modifier le projet de loi antiterroriste, selon HRW
07/07/2014
Les législateurs tunisiens devraient réviser le projet de loi relatif à la lutte contre le
terrorisme pour le rendre pleinement compatible avec les normes internationales
des droits humains sur le droit à un procès équitable, le respect de la vie privée et
la liberté d'expression. La nouvelle loi remplacera une loi de 2003 utilisée pendant
des années pour étouffer la dissidence en limitant la liberté d'expression, d'association et de réunion. Human Rights Watch a publié un rapport le 7 juillet 2014, qui
analyse la loi en détail et contient des recommandations pour les révisions.
Le projet conserve certaines des dispositions les plus troublantes de la loi de 2003.
Il comprend des dispositions qui ouvrent la voie à la poursuite de la dissidence politique en tant que terrorisme, confèrent aux juges de trop larges pouvoirs pour ordonner des procédures dérogatoires et réduisent la capacité des avocats à fournir
une défense efficace. En outre, le projet n'offre pas un contrôle judiciaire suffisant
sur l'autorité de la police d'interférer avec la vie privée dans les opérations antiterrorisme.
« L'expérience de la dernière décennie est que des lois relatives à la lutte antiterroriste formulées en termes trop vagues et en l’absence de garanties peuvent causer
des violations terribles et engendrer la haine et un cycle d'autres exactions », a déclaré Eric Goldstein, directeur adjoint de la division Moyen-Orient et Afrique du
Nord. « Même si les pays ont la responsabilité de prévenir et de punir le terrorisme, cela ne les autorise pas à déroger aux droits fondamentaux.»
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En 2003, sous le règne de Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, la Tunisie a adopté une loi antiterroriste qui a été largement critiquée pour sa définition vague du terrorisme, comprenant des actes tels que le « trouble à l'ordre public », qui a conduit à des poursuites menées contre la dissidence pacifique. La loi a également violé le droit d'un
suspect à une défense juridique efficace en criminalisant le fait qu’un avocat ne
fournisse pas aux autorités des « informations relatives à toute activité terroriste. »
Le projet conserve des dispositions similaires.
Sous le régime de Ben Ali, les autorités ont mené des poursuites contre bien plus
de 3 000 personnesdans le cadre de cette loi. Certaines personnes ont été accusées
parce qu'elles avaient des tendances religieuses et ont été condamnées sur la base
d'aveux extorqués sous la torture. L'ancien Rapporteur spécial des Nations Unies
sur la promotion et la protection des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales dans la lutte antiterroriste, Martin Scheinin, a déclaré que la loi de 2003 «
n'apportait pas davantage de sécurité au peuple tunisien, mais a été largement utilisée de manière abusive comme outil de répression contre toute forme d’opposition politique. »
En janvier 2014, le chef du gouvernement a présenté un nouveau projet de loi antiterrorisme. La Commission chargée de la législation générale de l'Assemblée nationale constituante (ANC) est en train de débattre au sujet du projet et soumettra
son rapport général à la session plénière pour le vote.
Ces derniers mois, les groupes armés ont commis un certain nombre d'attaques
contre les forces de sécurité et l'armée en Tunisie. Les autorités judiciaires ont annoncé qu'elles ont mis en accusation des personnes détenues lors des opérations
de lutte contre le terrorisme en vertu de la loi de 2003.
Les groupes armés ont tué plus de 37 membres des forces armées et des services
de sécurité tunisiens et en ont blessé 148 depuis la chute de Ben Ali. L'attaque la
plus récente, dans laquelle quatre membres des forces de sécurité ont été tués,
était dirigée contre la maison du ministre de l'Intérieur à Kasserine, une ville proche
de la frontière algérienne.
Le nouveau projet contient plusieurs améliorations par rapport à la loi précédente
de 2003. Il assurerait les réparations aux victimes du terrorisme, notamment les
soins de santé dans les hôpitaux publics et l'assistance judiciaire gratuits. Il créerait
une commission comprenant des représentants des ministères concernés et dirigée
par un magistrat, afin d'élaborer une stratégie exhaustive de lutte contre le terrorisme à travers l'éducation et d'autres moyens.
La loi interdirait également aux autorités d'extrader ou d'expulser dans un autre
pays une personne accusée de terrorisme quand il existe des risques crédibles que
cette personne y serait confrontée à la torture ou à des traitements inhumains.
Toutefois, le projet contient encore une définition vague et ambiguë de l'activité
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terroriste qui pourrait permettre au gouvernement de réprimer un large éventail
de libertés protégées à l’échelle internationale. Par exemple, le projet pourrait être
utilisé pour poursuivre comme un acte terroriste une manifestation publique ayant
conduit à « nuire à la propriété privée et publique » ou à la perturbation des services publics.
Une terminologie vague sur « l’éloge du terrorisme » permettrait aux procureurs
d’utiliser un terme ou un symbole réputé favorable au terrorisme, indépendamment du fait qu'il aurait été oui ou non susceptible d'entraîner un acte concret de
violence. Certaines dispositions pourraient porter atteinte aux droits fondamentaux
à une procédure régulière, en donnant aux juges le pouvoir trop large de décider
d’audiences fermées et de convoquer des témoins anonymes, par exemple.
Le projet de loi ne contient pas de garanties suffisantes contre l’atteinte au droit à
la vie privée en autorisant la surveillance. Plutôt que de placer les décisions de surveillance sous le contrôle exclusif de juges indépendants, il confère le pouvoir
d'ordonner de telles mesures aux procureurs, qui sont encore liés au pouvoir exécutif en vertu de la loi tunisienne.
Les législateurs tunisiens devraient retirer du projet les infractions formulées de
façon trop vague telles que « l’atteinte à la propriété publique ou privée » et nuire
« aux moyens de transport, aux réseaux de communication, à l'information et aux
systèmes informatiques ou aux établissements publics. » Ils devraient veiller à ce
que tous les crimes, notamment les crimes de terrorisme, soient clairement et
strictement définis dans les lois du pays, afin que les personnes soient en mesure
de prévoir si un acte spécifique constitue un crime. Le rapport de l'ancien rapporteur spécial des Nations Unies stipule que la violence mortelle ou les atteintes
graves à la sécurité physique contre des membres de la population générale ou des
segments de celle-ci doit être l'élément central de toute définition du terrorisme.
L'incitation au terrorisme devrait exiger à la fois une intention expresse d'inciter à
la commission d'un acte terroriste et un danger concret que l'acte puisse être commis par la suite. La loi devrait également être révisée afin de s'assurer que tous les
droits fondamentaux à l’équité des procès, tels que le droit de l'accusé d'interroger
ou de faire interroger les témoins à charge, s'appliquent également aux personnes
accusées de délits liés au terrorisme tout comme à celles qui sont accusées
d'autres crimes graves. La loi devrait garantir que tous les accusés puissent contester les preuves et témoins clés présentés contre eux, et que l'identité des témoins
ne soit protégée que dans des cas exceptionnels.
Le caractère privilégié des communications entre avocat et client, notamment les
dossiers des avocats, devrait être respecté, et le fait de refuser de divulguer ces
informations privilégiées ne devrait pas constituer une infraction criminelle.
« La Tunisie a été un chef de file dans la région en matière de réformes fondées sur
les droits et elle doit jouer le même rôle dans la lutte contre le terrorisme », a con-
71
clu Eric Goldstein. « Trop souvent, la lutte contre le terrorisme a été utilisée comme
une excuse pour faire taire les critiques légitimes. »
http://www.businessnews.com.tn/
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An Analysis of Tunisia’s Draft Counterterrorism Law
7July 2014
Summary
This report analyzes Tunisia’s draft counterterrorism law and assesses to what extent the proposed law conforms to international human rights standards. The draft
law was submitted to the National Constituent Assembly, Tunisia’s parliament, by
the Council of Ministers in January 2014 and is under review.
The draft contains several improvements over the previous 2003 law. It includes a
section on reparations for terrorism victims, including free health care at public
hospitals and judicial assistance. It would create a commission with representatives
of relevant ministries, and headed by a magistrate, to devise a comprehensive
strategy to combat terrorism aimed at drying up funding sources through education and other means.
However, the law still contains a broad and ambiguous definition of terrorist activity that could permit the government to repress a wide range of internationally protected freedoms. The draft includes as “terrorism crimes” acts such as “harming
private or public property” and harming “resources and infrastructures, transportation means, communication networks, information and computer systems or public
facilities” that could lead to criminalizing political dissent or minor acts of violence
during social protests. The draft’s vague terminology on incitement to commit a
terrorist act means that people could be prosecuted for using a term or symbol
that is deemed supportive of terrorism, regardless of whether it was likely to result
in any concrete action.
The draft would give judges overly broad discretion to close hearings and to hear
anonymous witnesses and would undermine the right to an effective defense by
obliging lawyers of presumed terrorists to reveal information about their clients. In
addition, the draft does not offer sufficient judicial oversight over giving police exceptional powers to interfere with privacy in counterterrorism operations.
Background
In 2003, during Zine al Abidine Ben Ali's rule, Tunisia adopted a counterterrorism
law that was widely criticized for its vague definition of terrorism, including acts
such as “disturbing the public order,” which led to prosecution of peaceful dissent.
The law also violated the right of a suspect to mount an effective legal defense by
making it a crime for a lawyer not to provide authorities with “information relating
to any terrorist activity.”
Under Ben Ali, the authorities prosecuted well over 3,000 people under the law.
The former special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, said that
the 2003 law “did not provide the Tunisian people with more security, but was
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widely abused as a tool of oppression against any form of political dissent.”
In January 2014, the head of government submitted a new draft law on counterterrorism. The Commission on General Legislation of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) is debating the draft and will submit its general report to the plenary session for voting.
In recent months, armed groups have committed a number of attacks against security forces and the army in Tunisia. Judicial authorities announced that they have
charged people detained during counterterrorism operations under the 2003 law.
Armed groups have killed more than 37 members of Tunisian security and armed
forces and injured 148 since the ouster of Ben Ali. The most recent attack, in which
four members of security forces were killed, was on the interior minister’s house in
Kasserine, a city close to the Algerian border.
Recommendations
The National Constituent Assembly should:
Amend article 13 to ensure that all acts mentioned in the law constitute offenses
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism ratified by Tunisia. As a matter of best practice suggested by the special rapporteur, reformulate the definition of terrorism to
meet these criteria: Employing deadly means or otherwise serious violence
against members of the general population or segments of it, or taking hostages; having the intent to cause fear among the population or the destruction of
public order or to compel the government or an international organization to
take or refrain from an action; and having the aim to further an underlying political or ideological goal.
Amend article 28 to avoid infringements to freedom of expression, possibly using
the definition suggested by the special rapporteur and stating that incitement
to terrorism requires intentionally and unlawfully distributing or otherwise
making available a message to the public with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offense, where such conduct, whether or not expressly advocating terrorist offenses, causes a danger that one or more such offenses may
be committed.
Amend article 33 to specify that the lawyers of presumed terrorists need to reveal
only information “necessary” for preventing specific acts of terrorism.
Amend article 67 to specify that hearings for terrorism suspects shall be public and
that the judge may order closed or restricted sessions only in exceptional circumstances justified by the protection of court proceedings, victims, and witnesses when there is real danger arising from making proceedings public. Restricted sessions should be for the minimum period necessary, and should not
diminish the right of defendants to hear and challenge witnesses and other evi-
74
dence against them.
Specify in articles 67 and 69 that the information provided by anonymous witnesses could be used in court as evidence only when in exceptional circumstances,
and should not be the sole or decisive basis of the conviction.
Amend articles 51 and 58 by specifying that the most intrusive special investigative
measures such as “taping” and “surveillance” will be ordered in exceptional circumstances in which there are credible risks that terrorist acts will be committed. Judges alone should have the authority to authorize such measures.
Areas of Concern
Overly Broad Definition of Terrorism and Terrorists
The draft law defines a terrorist act as any act that: “First: kills a person or several
people, or inflicts considerable physical damage; Second: causes damages at facilities of diplomatic and consular missions, and international organizations; Third:
does substantial damage to the environment, putting residents’ lives and health at
risk; Fourth: Harms public or private property, vital resources and infrastructures,
transportation means, communication networks, information and computer systems or public facilities; or aims by its nature and context to terrorize the population or to force a state or an international organization to carry out or refrain from
carrying out an action.”
Although this definition is better than the one included in the 2003 law, which included other broad concepts such as “disturbing the public order, peace or international security,” it still includes acts that do not involve or intend to cause violence
or injury to people, such as property crimes and disruption of public services.
The broad and ambiguous definition of terrorist acts under the draft law could
readily be used to criminalize acts of peaceful political dissent that result in harming public transportation or public facilities, as sometimes happens during protests.
A nonviolent march that blocked traffic could qualify as a terrorist act, subjecting
protesters to several years in prison.
The law might also permit prosecutions on terrorism charges for minor acts of violence committed in the context of political activism. A political protestor who damages a police car or breaks the window of a government building could conceivably
be prosecuted as a terrorist. Furthermore, an individual need only "threaten to
commit" any of the relevant acts, including property crimes and harming public
transportation or other facilities to be prosecuted as a terrorist and punished with
a minimum of six years in prison.
In resolution 1566, the United Nations Security Council considered that these elements are needed for a definition of acts of terrorism:
Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death
or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state
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of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and
as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are
under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.
The former UN special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism addressed the issue of defining conduct that is “genuinely of a terrorist nature:”
The specificity of terrorist crimes is defined by the presence of three cumulative
conditions: (i) the means used, which can be described as deadly, or otherwise serious violence against members of the general population or segments of it, or the
taking of hostages; (ii) the intent, which is to cause fear among the population or
the destruction of public order or to compel the Government or an international
organization to do or refraining from doing something; and (iii) the aim, which is to
further an underlying political or ideological goal. It is only when these three conditions are fulfilled that an act should be criminalized as terrorist; otherwise it loses
its distinctive force in relation to ordinary crime.
The special rapporteur thus attempted to give a model definition of terrorism. He
considers that:
Terrorism means an action or attempted action where:
.1 The action:
( a) Constituted the intentional taking of hostages; or
( b) Is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to one or more members of
the general population or segments of it; or
( c) Involved lethal or serious physical violence against one or more members of the
general population or segments of it; and
.2The action is carried out or attempted with the intention of:
( a) Provoking a state of terror in the general public or a segment of it; or
( b) Compelling a Government or international organization to do or abstain from
doing something; and
.3The action corresponds to:
( a) The definition of a serious offence in national law, enacted for the purpose of
complying with international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism or
with resolutions of the Security Council relating to terrorism; or
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( b) All elements of a serious crime defined by national law.
The draft law contains a list of other offenses deemed as terrorist acts. The list
draws the offenses from international conventions ratified by Tunisia, focusing on
various aspects of the fight against terrorism. These include the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons;
the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages; and the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and other conventions.
The draft law defines as criminal offenses a range of acts, including crimes committed on board aircraft; offenses against safety at airports serving civil aviation;
offenses related to maritime navigation and fixed platforms; use and discharge of
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and other substances from a ship or fixed
platform; transportation of weapons and other substances on board a ship; offenses against internationally protected persons and the taking of hostages.
The formulation of the draft law suggests that the listed offenses are not linked to
the overall general definition of terrorism and that they represent a separate type
of terrorist acts. While the list is drawn from international conventions ratified by
Tunisia, they still should closely follow guidelines on the definition of terrorist acts.
In particular, these offenses need to satisfy the general three test elements outlined above: the means used must be deadly; the intent must be to cause fear
among the population or to compel a government or international organization to
do or to refrain from doing something; and the aim must be to further an ideological goal.
Several listed offenses do not satisfy this test. For example, article 17 of the draft
law states that anyone who intends to control or seize a civil ship by whatever
means will be punished with 10 to 20 years in prison. This definition could lead to
the condemnation of peaceful environment activists who attempt to stop a ship
from conducting illegal fishing or any other activity harmful to the environment.
The law has also a section defining membership in a terrorist group or helping or
supporting terrorists. Articles 29 to 32 provide for prison terms of 6 to 12 years for
anyone who intentionally:
-Joins in any way a terrorist organization or a terrorist agreement or receives
training inside or outside Tunisian territory aimed at committing a terrorist attack;
-Intentionally joins such a terrorist organization or agreement outside of
Tunisian territory;
-Uses Tunisian territory to recruit a person or group with the aim to commit
one of the terrorist offenses specified in this law inside or outside Tunisian territory
or to commit one of the acts against another country or its citizens;
-Provides weapons, explosives, ammunition or other materiel and means to a
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terrorist organization or to persons in relation with a terrorist act defined in this
law;
-Makes available competency or expertise to such terrorist organizations;
intentionally divulging or providing, directly or indirectly, a terrorist organization or
agreement with information aiming at helping the commission of a terrorist act or
to cover up such an act;
-Creates false documents for a terrorist group or persons in relation to
terrorist acts;
-Donates money knowing that its aim is to finance terrorist groups or
agreement or a person with relation to a terrorist act.
These requirements for charging a person with participation in a “terrorist” enterprise are an improvement over the 2003 law, which had an overly broad definition
of membership in a terrorist group. Article 13 of the 2003 law criminalized “…[b]
elonging to an organization or entity, whatever its form and the number of its
members, that has, even if coincidentally or incidentally, used terrorism as a means
of action in the realization of its objectives.” There was no requirement for the accused to have been aware of the terrorist nature of the organization or intended to
adhere to an organization involved in terrorism.
The 2003 standards encompass members of a very large group that met the requirements, and/or members of a group that had used “terrorism” only
“coincidentally or incidentally.” In both cases individuals could be sentenced to
long prison terms even if they had not been shown to have had any role in a terrorist act. The new definitions are more specific and include the elements of
knowledge and intent necessary for criminal liability.
Overly Broad Definition of “Praising” Terrorism
Consistent with recognized limitations on the right to freedom of expression, governments may prosecute speech that incites criminal acts—speech that directly
encourages the commission of a crime, is intended to result in criminal action, or is
likely to result in criminal action—whether or not criminal action does, in fact, result. Yet laws that impose criminal punishment for what has been called “indirect
incitement”—for example, justifying or glorifying terrorism—can encroach on expression protected under international human rights law.
The draft law has two articles relating to incitement or praising terrorism. Article 5
provides that “any person publicly calling for the perpetration of acts of terrorism
when these calls, by nature or due to context, may constitute real execution
threats, shall be considered a perpetrator of acts of terrorism and shall be sentenced to half the sanctions provided for in this type of crimes.” This article is
aligned with international human rights norms as it links the criminalization of the
expression with the real threat of execution of a terrorist act.
Article 28 punishes with prison terms of one to five years and a 5,000 to 10,000 di-
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nar (US $2,960 to $5,920) penalty anyone who has “publicly and in any way praised
a terrorist crime, the perpetrator of a terrorist crime, an organization or an alliance
connected with terrorist crimes, their members or their activities.”
This article raises many concerns regarding its potential encroachment on freedom
of expression. Its formulation is even broader than in the 2003 law. Article 12 of
that law imposed prison terms of 5 to 12 years and a fine on anyone who: …[c]alls
for the commission of terrorist infractions, or to join an organization or to enter
into an agreement related to terrorist infractions, or uses a name, a term, or a symbol or any other sign in order to justify a terrorist organization, or one of its members or its activities.”
Article 28 could be used to penalize individuals or groups for legitimate freedom of
expression. For example, a person could risk imprisonment if they use a term or
symbol that is deemed supportive of terrorism, regardless of whether doing so results in any concrete act of terrorism.
Under article 19 paragrah 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), restrictions on freedom of speech may only be imposed if they are
provided by law and are necessary for (a) respect of the rights or reputations of
others; and (b) the protection of national security or of public order, or of public
health or morals.
The UN Human Rights Committee, in its general comment on the ICCPR’s article 19,
wrote:
State parties should ensure that counterterrorism measures are compatible with
paragraph 3 [of article 19]. Such offences as “encouragement of terrorism” and
“extremist activity” as well as offences of “praising”, “glorifying”, or “justifying” terrorism, should be clearly defined to ensure that they do not lead to an unnecessary
or disproportionate interference with freedom of expression.
The former special rapporteur had said that protecting national security or countering terrorism cannot be used to justify restricting the freedom of expression unless
the government can demonstrate that:
The expression is intended to incite imminent violence;
It is likely to incite such violence; and
There is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence.
The special rapporteur further said that such expression needed only to cause an
objective danger of a terrorist offense being committed whether or not [the
speech] was “expressly” advocating a terrorist offense.
The special rapporteur thus proposed the following definition of incitement to terrorism:
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It is an offence to intentionally and unlawfully distribute or otherwise make available a message to the public with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist
offence, where such conduct, whether or not expressly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed.
Having clear and specific standards on the definition of “incitement to” or “praising
of” terrorism is particularly important in light of public comments from Tunisian
politicians and leaders of police unions who attempt to brand as “terrorist” lawyers
who defend “alleged terrorists” or activists who criticize security forces for their
human right violations during counterterrorist operations.
For example, in a news conference in December 2013, the National Federation of
Police Unions said that Imen Triki, a human rights activist and president of the nongovernmental group Freedom and Equity, serves as a cover for terrorists and protects them. Triki had earlier that month released a report documenting security
force abuses during their counterterrorism operations. The broad definition of
“praising” terrorism could easily be used to brand as a terrorist anyone who defends the right of accused terrorists to humane treatment.
Fair Trial Guarantees and Due Process
The draft law contains several provisions that could have serious implications on
the right to a defense. The 2003 law imposes a penalty one to five years in prison
and a fine on “anyone, even those bound by professional secrecy, who do not immediately inform the relevant authorities of the facts, information, or intelligence
relative to terrorist infractions about which they have knowledge.” Only family
members are exempt. The provision applies to professionals normally bound by
confidentiality, such as defense lawyers, medical workers, or clergy. It jeopardizes
the right to lawyer-client confidentiality that is a key component of the internationally guaranteed right to a fair trial.
Unlike the 2003 law, article 33 under the draft law extends the exemption to cover
lawyers. However, it backslides on this exemption by including an exception when
lawyers have “information that they have knowledge about and that informing the
relevant authorities about could prevent the commission of terrorist acts in the future.” This broad wording could potentially include any kind of information and
could criminalize a wide range of information that the lawyer could have
knowledge about that is not tied to specific impeding acts of terrorism.
Special Protective Measures
The draft law provides for special protection for some people, including law enforcement agents in charge of terrorism offenses, victims, witnesses and informers
and their families when necessary.
Closed Hearing
Article 67 law states that the investigative judge or the president of the tribunal can
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order, in cases of imminent danger, preliminary investigations or a hearing outside
of the normal setting while protecting the rights of the accused to a fair trial. The
judge can also order a closed hearing.
Article 14 of the ICCPR states that, “in the determination of any criminal charge
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” A judge is entitled to order a hearing closed but under specific conditions laid down by article 14: “the press and the public may be excluded
from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”
To avoid giving judges overly broad leeway to close hearings, the draft law should
state that these measures could be made only in exceptional circumstances, limited only to the extent necessary and in cases of proven threat or danger to the security and safety of witnesses, victims or judges.
Anonymous Witnesses
Article 67 states that the investigative judge or the president of the court could accept “video and audio testimonies of the accused or the witnesses without their
physical presence.” In that case, the court officials would take all necessary
measures not to disclose the identity of the person to be heard.
Article 69 states that “in cases of imminent danger, and when necessary, it is possible to collect all information likely to identify the victim, witnesses or informers or
any other person who gave relevant information in statements separate from the
main investigative file and recorded in a secret register to be kept by the public
prosecutor.” The accused or his lawyer can request the relevant judicial authority
to disclose the identity of the people referred to in article 69 within 10 days of the
date of access to the content of their testimonies.
The judicial authority can order the disclosure of the information when the request
appears to be well-founded and there is no credible threat against the life or livelihood of the person to be protected or its family. This decision can be appealed before the indictment chamber. In addition, the measures of protection cannot in any
case prevent the accused or his lawyer from access to the content of the testimony
and other statements.
The use of anonymous witnesses as specified in article 67 and 69 could jeopardize
the rights of the accused to mount an effective defense and curtail a person’s ability to challenge the witnesses against them. Article 14 of the ICCPR provides that
the accused has the right to examine, or to have examined, the witnesses against
them.
The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa, adopted by the
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African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, says that: “The accused has a
right to examine, or have examined, witnesses against him or her and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her. It further states that: “The testimony of
anonymous witnesses during a trial will be allowed only in exceptional circumstances, taking into consideration the nature and the circumstances of the offence and
the protection of the security of the witness and if it is determined to be in the interests of justice.”
In its 2002 report on terrorism and human rights, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights stated that:
The right of a defendant to examine or have examined witnesses presented against
him or her could also be, in principle, the subject of restrictions in some limited instances. It must be recognized in this respect that efforts to investigate and prosecute crimes, including those relating to terrorism, may in certain instances render
witnesses vulnerable to threats to their lives or integrity and thereby raise difficult
issues concerning the extent to which those witnesses can be safely identified during the criminal process.
Such considerations can never serve to compromise a defendant’s non-derogable
due process protections and each situation must be carefully evaluated on its own
merits within the context of a particular justice system. Subject to these caveats,
procedures might in principle be devised whereby witnesses’ anonymity may be
protected without compromising a defendant’s fair trial rights. Factors to be taken
into account in evaluating the permissibility of such procedures include the sufficiency of the grounds for maintaining a particular witness’s anonymity and the extent to which the defense is nevertheless able to challenge the evidence of the witness(es) and attempt to cast doubt of the reliability of their statements, for example through questioning by defense counsel.
Other pertinent considerations include whether the court itself is appraised of the
witness’s identity and is able to evaluate the reliability of the witness’s evidence,
and the significance of the evidence in the case against the defendant, in particular
whether a conviction may be based solely or to a decisive extent on that evidence.
The European Court of Human Rights examined the issue of anonymous witnesses
and their impact on fair trial guarantees in a number of cases. The ruling of the
court depended on the circumstances of the case. For example, in the Ellis and
Simms and Martin v. the United Kingdom case, the court considered that the following three criteria must be met to be satisfied that anonymous witnesses did not
impair the right to a fair trial: first, whether there are good reasons to keep secret
the identity of the witness; second, whether the evidence of the anonymous witness was the sole or decisive basis of the conviction; third, whether there are sufficient counterbalancing factors, including the existence of strong procedural safeguards, to permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to
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take place.
In the case Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, the European Court examined a conviction for attempted manslaughter and robbery based on evidence from anonymous police officers. The court expressed a particular concern and highlighted
dangers associated with granting anonymity to witnesses who are agents of the
state:
[Tlhe balancing of the interests of the defence against arguments in favour of
maintaining the anonymity of witnesses raises special problems if the witnesses
in question are members of the police force of the State. Although their interests
- and indeed those of their families - also deserve protection ..., it must be recognised that their position is to some extent different from that of a disinterested
witness or victim. They owe a general duty of obedience to the State's executive
authorities and usually have links with the prosecution; for these reasons alone
their use as anonymous witnesses should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances.
The Council of Europe, in its recommendation N. R (97) 13 to member states concerning intimidation of witnesses and the rights of the defense, considered also
that:
Where available and in accordance with domestic law, anonymity of persons who
might give evidence should be an exceptional measure. Where the guarantee of
anonymity has been requested by such persons and/or temporarily granted by
the competent authorities, criminal procedural law should provide for a verification procedure to maintain a fair balance between the needs of criminal proceedings and the rights of the defence. The defence should, through this procedure,
have the opportunity to challenge the alleged need for anonymity of the witness,
his/her credibility and the origin of his/her knowledge.
It further states that “when anonymity has been granted, the conviction shall not
be based solely or to a decisive extent on the evidence of such persons.”
Special Investigative Measures
The draft law has a section on special investigative measures in counterterrorism
operations, such as surveillance. It states that for the needs of the investigation,
the prosecutor or the investigative judge may request with a written order surveillance of a person’s personal communications for a period of no more than
four months renewable once for the same period, through either phone tapping,
or by “setting up a technical package aimed at capturing, recording and conveying
words and photos of an individual secretly monitored in their private space, and
in private or public locations or vehicles.” The draft specifies that if the collected
information does not lead to criminal procedures or sentences, it will be protected under the law on personal information and data applicable in Tunisia.
These provisions could have important implications for the right to privacy, as
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enshrined in article 17 of the ICCPR. The former special rapporteur, in one of
his reports to the Human Rights Council, recommended that:
Any interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence should
be authorized by provisions of law that are publicly accessible, particularly precise
and proportionate to the security threat, and offer effective guarantees against
abuse. States should ensure that the competent authorities apply less intrusive investigation methods if such methods enable a terrorist offence to be detected, prevented or prosecuted with adequate effectiveness. Decision-making authority
should be structured so that the greater the invasion of privacy, the higher the level of authorization needed.
He further stated that:
Strong independent oversight mandates must be established to review policies and
practices, in order to ensure that there is strong oversight of the use of intrusive
surveillance techniques and the processing of personal information. Therefore,
there must be no secret surveillance system that is not under the review of an
effective oversight.
The provisions regarding special investigative mechanisms do not seem to conform
to this requirement in two ways. First, the draft does not specify the circumstances
in which surveillance will be allowed, and only uses the vague wording of “in the
cases where the needs of the investigation so requires...” That departs from the
requirement to allow interference with privacy only in exceptional circumstances
and in cases in which there is credible suspicion that serious terrorist attacks will be
committed.
Second, the law gives both the prosecutor and the investigative judge supervisory
mandate over the taping, surveillance and other investigative technics. Under Tunisian law, prosecutors are under the supervision of the executive branch. Article 22
of the Tunisian code of criminal procedures states that, “the public prosecutor is in
charge, under the authority of the justice secretary of state, of ensuring the enforcement of the penal law on the whole territory of the republic.” Thus, the prosecutor cannot be considered a fully independent oversight authority for police surveillance.
Improvements over the 2003 Law and Previous Versions of the Draft Law
The draft law contains a number of improvements over the 2003 law as well as earlier drafts.
Non-refoulement: An earlier version stated that, ”A foreigner who was tried and
convicted for terrorist acts inside the Tunisian territory must be expelled and deported as soon as he serves his term in prison.” This provision raised concerns over
the possibility of extraditing a person to a country where there is risk that they will
be tortured or subjected to inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. In
the new draft, article 82 provides for an exception to extradition or deportation
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when there are “real grounds to believe that the person is at risk of facing torture
or that the extradition request is for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing that
person for its colour, race, origin, religion, nationality, gender or political opinions.”
Reparation for victims: The Tunisian commission for combating terrorism will coordinate with the relevant authorities the necessary medical care and social assistance for the victims of terrorism, who will have free medical care in public hospitals. In addition, they will receive special legal aid.
http://www.hrw.org/
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Terrorism in the World
L’État islamique, le « Projet Califat » et la « Guerre mondiale contre
le terrorisme »
05 juillet 2014
La légende d’al-Qaeda et la menace d’un « Ennemi Extérieur » est entretenue par
de nombreux médias et par la propagande gouvernementale.
Dans l’ère post-11 septembre 2001, la menace terroriste d’al-Qaeda constitue la
pierre angulaire de la doctrine militaire des USA/OTAN. Elle justifie – sous un mandat humanitaire – la conduite « d’opérations anti-terroristes » à travers le monde.
Connues et documentées, des entités affiliées à al-Qaeda ont été utilisées par les
USA/OTAN dans de nombreux conflits comme des « membres actifs du renseignement » depuis les grandes heures du conflit entre l’Afghanistan et
l’Union Soviétique. En Syrie, les rebelles d’al Nusrah et d’ISIS sont les fantassins de
l’alliance militaire occidentale, qui à son tour supervise et contrôle le recrutement
et l’entraînement de forces paramilitaires.
Tandis que le Département d’État US accuse plusieurs pays « d’héberger des terroristes », les États-Unis sont, au niveau mondial, le « Sponsor Étatique du Terrorisme » Numéro Un: l’État slamique de l’ rak et d’al-Sham ( S S, slamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham, ndlr) – qui sévit à la fois en Syrie et en Irak – est secrètement
soutenu et financé par les USA et leurs alliés, dont la Turquie, l’Arabie Saoudite et
le Qatar. De plus, le projet de califat sunnite de l’État Islamique de l’Irak et d’alSham coïncide avec un vieil agenda US visant à découper l’Irak et la Syrie en terri-
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toires distincts: un Califat Islamique Sunnite, une République Arabe Chiite,
une République du Kurdistan, entre autres.
La Guerre Mondiale contre le Terrorisme emmenée par les USA constitue la pierre
angulaire de la doctrine militaire états-unienne. « Faire la chasse aux terroristes » est un élément central de la guerre non-conventionnelle. L’objectif sousjacent est de justifier la conduite d’opérations anti-terroristes à travers le monde,
permettant aux USA et à leurs alliés de s’ingérer dans les affaires de nations souveraines.
Beaucoup d’auteurs progressistes dont des médias alternatifs, tout en concentrant
leur attention sur les développements récents en Irak, ne parviennent pas à comprendre la logique derrière la « Guerre Mondiale contre le Terrorisme ». L’État Islamique de l’Irak et d’al-Sham (ISIS) est souvent pris pour une « entité indépendante » plutôt qu’un instrument de l’alliance militaire occidentale. Par ailleurs,
beaucoup d’activistes pacifistes engagés – qui s’opposent aux éléments de l’agenda
militaire de l’OTAN – approuveront néanmoins l’agenda anti-terroriste de Washington dirigé contre al-Qaeda. La menace terroriste mondiale est considérée comme
« réelle »: « Nous sommes contre la guerre, mais nous soutenons la Guerre Mondiale contre le Terrorisme ».
Le projet Califat et le Rapport du Conseil National du Renseignement US
Un nouveau flot de propagande a été mis en mouvement. Le chef du désormais
défunt État Islamique de l’Irak et d’al-Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a annoncé
le 29 juin 2014 la création d’un État Islamique:
Les combattants fidèles au « Calife Ibrahim ibn Awwad » du groupe, ou Abu Bakr alBaghdadi tel qu’il était connu jusqu’à l’annonce du dimanche 1 juillet, sont inspirés
par le califat Rachidun, qui a succédé au Prophète Mahomet au septième siècle, et
est vénéré par la plupart des Musulmans. » (Daily Telegraph, 30 juin 2014)
C’est d’une ironie cruelle, le projet califat en tant qu’instrument de propagande a
été dans les tiroirs du renseignement US depuis plus de dix ans. En décembre 2004,
sous l’administration Bush, le Conseil National du Renseignement (NIC, National
Intelligence Council, ndlr) avait prédit que d’ici l’année 2020, un Nouveau Califat
s’étendant de la Méditerranée Occidentale à l’Asie Centrale et à l’Asie du Sud-Est
émergerait, menaçant la démocratie et les valeurs occidentales.
Les « découvertes » du NIC ont été publiées dans un rapport de 123 pages accessible au public intitulé « Tracer l’Avenir Mondial » (« Mapping the Global Future« ,
ndlr).
Un Nouveau Califat fournit un exemple de la façon dont un mouvement mondial
alimenté par des politiques radicales d’identité religieuse pourrait constituer un
défi aux normes et aux valeurs occidentales comme fondation du système mon-
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dial. (emphase de l’auteur)
Le rapport du NIC de 2004 frise le ridicule; il est dénué de renseignements, tout
comme d’analyse historique et géopolitique. Son récit inventé en rapport au califat,
cependant, est doté d’une ressemblance troublante avec l’annonce de com’ hautement relayée de la création du Califat par le chef de l’ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Le rapport du NIC présente un soi-disant « scénario fictionnel d’une lettre écrite par
un petit-fils fictionnel de ben Laden à un membre de la famille en 2020. » C’est sur
cette base qu’il fait des prédictions pour l’année 2020. S’appuyant sur un récit de
lettre d’un petit-fils de ben Laden inventé de toutes pièces plutôt que sur des renseignements et une analyse empirique, la communauté US du renseignement en
conclut que le califat représente un réel danger pour le monde occidental et la civilisation occidentale.
D’un point de vue de propagande, l’objectif qui sous-tend le projet Califat – tel qu’il
est décrit par le NIC – est de diaboliser les Musulmans en vue de justifier une croisade militaire:
Le scénario de fiction dépeint ci-dessous fournit un exemple de la façon dont un
mouvement mondial alimenté par un communautarisme religieux radical pourrait émerger
Selon ce scénario, un nouveau Califat est proclamé et parvient à faire avancer un
puissante contre-idéologie qui rencontre un intérêt répandu.
Il est mis en scène sous la forme d’une lettre hypothétique d’un petit-fils fictionnel de ben Laden à un membre de la famille en 2020.
Il relate les luttes du Calife pour essayer d’arracher le contrôle aux régimes traditionnels et les conflits comme la confusion qui s’ensuivent à la fois au sein
du monde musulman et à l’extérieur, entre les Musulmans et les États-Unis, l’Europe, la Russie et la Chine. Alors que la réussite du Calife à mobiliser un soutien varie, des lieux loin du cœur musulman au Moyen-Orient – en Afrique et en Asie – se
convulsent à la suite de ses appels.
Le scénario se termine avant que le Calife ne réussisse à établir à la fois l’autorité
spirituelle et temporelle sur un territoire – ce qui a été historiquement le cas pour
les Califats précédents. À la fin du scénario, nous identifions les leçons à retenir.
(« Mapping the Global Future », p 83) (emphase de l’auteur)
Ce rapport « d’autorité » du NIC « Mapping the Global Future » n’a pas seulement
été présenté à la Maison Blanche, au Congrès et au Pentagone, il a aussi été envoyé
aux alliés des USA. La « menace émanant du Monde Musulman » à laquelle se réfère le rapport du NIC (comprenant la section sur le projet de califat) est fermement installée dans la doctrine militaire des USA/OTAN.
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L’intention était que le document du NIC soit lu par des responsables de haut rang.
En gros, il faisait partie de la campagne de propagande « TOPOFF » (« Top Official »,
responsable de haut rang, ndlr) qui cible les hauts fonctionnaires qui prennent les
décisions en politique étrangère et militaire, sans oublier des intellectuels, des
chercheurs et des « activistes »
d’ONG. Le but est de s’assurer que
les « responsables de haut rang »
continuent de croire que des terroristes islamistes menacent la sécurité
du monde occidental.
La base théorique du scénario du califat est le « Choc des Civilisations »,
qui fournit une justification, aux yeux
de l’opinion publique, à ce que les
USA interviennent à travers le
monde dans le cadre d’un agenda
mondial anti-terroriste.
D’un point de vue géopolitique et
géographique, le califat s’étend sur
une vaste région dans laquelle les
USA cherchent à accroître leur influence économique et stratégique.
Selon les termes de Dick Cheney en
relation au rapport du NIC de 2004:
la page 90 du rapport
Ils parlent de vouloir rétablir ce que
vous pourriez appeler le Califat du
septième siècle C’est le monde tel qu’il était organisé il y a 1200, 1300 ans en fait,
quand l’Islam ou des gens islamiques contrôlaient tout depuis le Portugal et l’Espagne à l’Ouest; à travers la Méditerranée vers l’Afrique du Nord; toute l’Afrique
du Nord; le Moyen-Orient; en remontant dans les Balkans; les Républiques d’Asie
Centrale; l’extrémité sud de la Russie; une bonne partie de l’Inde; et jusqu’à ce
qui est l’Indonésie aujourd’hui. En un sens de Bali et Djakarta à un bout, à Madrid à
l’autre. – Dick Cheney (emphase de l’auteur)
Ce que décrit Cheney dans le contexte d’aujourd’hui, c’est une vaste région s’étendant de la Méditerranée à l’Asie Centrale et à l’Asie du Sud-Est dans laquelle les
USA et leurs alliés sont directement impliqués dans diverses opérations militaires
et d’espionnage.
Le but avoué du rapport du NIC était « de préparer la prochaine administration
Bush aux défis qui vont l’attendre en faisant des projections à partir de tendances
actuelles pouvant poser une menace aux intérêts US ».
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Le document de renseignement du NIC était basé, ne l’oublions pas, sur « une
lettre hypothétique d’un petit-fils fictionnel de ben Laden à un membre
[fictionnel] de la famille en 2020. » « Les leçons à retenir » telles qu’elles sont
ébauchées par ce document « d’autorité » de renseignements du NIC sont les suivantes: (emphase de l’auteur)
le projet de califat « constitue un défi sérieux à l’ordre international ».
« La révolution des technologies de l’information va probablement amplifier le choc entre le monde occidental et le monde musulman… »
Le document se réfère à l’appel aux Musulmans lancé par le Califat et conclut que :
la proclamation du Califat n’amoindrirait pas les risques du terrorisme et la provocation de nouveaux conflits [sic] (emphase de l’auteur)
« Leçons à retenir »
L’analyse du NIC suggère que la proclamation d’un califat génèrera une nouvelle
vague de terrorisme issue de pays musulmans, justifiant ainsi une escalade dans la
Guerre Mondiale contre le Terrorisme de la part des USA:
la proclamation du califat … pourrait alimenter une nouvelle génération de terroristes résolus à l’attaque contre ceux qui s’opposent au califat, que ce soit à l’intérieur ou à l’extérieur du monde musulman. (emphase de l’auteur)
Ce qu’omet de mentionner le rapport, c’est que les renseignements US, en liaison
avec le MI-6 britannique et le Mossad israélien, sont secrètement impliqués dans le
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soutien à la fois aux terroristes et au projet califat.
À leur tour, les médias se sont embarqués dans une nouvelle vague de mensonges
et d’inventions, se focalisant sur « une nouvelle menace terroriste » émanant non
seulement du monde musulman, mais de « terroristes islamistes domestiques » en
Europe et en Amérique du Nord.
http://www.mondialisation.ca/
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L’extrémisme au nom de l’islam rejeté par les musulmans
Jeudi 3 Juillet 2014
Les habitants des pays musulmans se montrent de plus en plus inquiets face à l’extrémisme émanant de groupes se présentant comme défenseur de l’islam, selon
une étude de l'Institut américain Pew Research dévoilée mardi 1er juillet.
Pour cette analyse, plus de 14 200 personnes vivant dans 14 pays majoritairement
musulmans ont été interrogés à ce sujet, du 10 avril au 25 mai, avant l’avancée
de l’Etat islamique en Irak et en Levant (EIIL) en Irak qui se targue d’avoir créé un
califat à cheval sur la Syrie et l'Irak.
Résultat : la montée de l’extrémisme fait peur à un plus grand nombre. Au Liban,
où de nombreux Syriens trouvent refuge, 92 des personnes interrogées déclarent
avoir peur de « l’extrémisme islamiste » C’est 11 points de plus qu’en 2013 Qu'il
soient chiites, sunnites ou chrétiens, cette crainte est autant partagée. Les Tunisiens interrogés sont 80 dans ce cas contre 71 en 2013.
Les Turcs sont 50 à exprimer cette peur. Ils étaient 37 l’an dernier. Du côté de
l’Afrique, au Nigeria déstabilisé par Boko Haram, 72 % se déclarent inquiets contre
seulement 46 des sondés sénégalais. Ces derniers étaient plus préoccupés par
l’extrémisme en 2013 au moment où leurs voisins maliens devaient faire face
à l’offensive de groupuscules « jihadistes »
Les Indonésiens, eux, se montrent encore moins inquiets par ce fléau (39 ). C’est
l’inverse pour les autres pays asiatiques faisant partie du panel (Bangladesh, Pakistan et Malaisie), où plus de 60 des sondés déclarent craindre « l’extrémisme islamiste » Ce sentiment monte à 65 % dans les erritoires palestiniens et de 84 % en
Israël, seul pays non musulman sondé.
Des groupes radicaux moins soutenus
L’étude de Pew montre, par ailleurs, que les habitants des pays étudiés sont moins
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nombreux qu’auparavant à soutenir des
groupes terroristes comme Al-Qaïda Ainsi,
25 % des Palestiniens - 9 % de moins qu'en
2013 - disent avoir une bonne opinion de
cette
organisation.
Mis sur le même plan qu’Al-Qaïda par l’institut américain Pew, le Hamas, mouvement
de résistance palestinienne considéré
comme terroriste par l’Union européenne
et les Etats-Unis, est également moins plébiscité, peut-on voir dans l’étude. Une majorité des Palestiniens (53 ) disent ainsi
avoir une mauvaise opinion de l'organisation, alors qu’en 2013 ils étaient une majorité à en avoir une bonne image. Cette opinion négative est en hausse chez les habitants de Gaza (63 contre 54 en 2013).
La baisse de popularité s'explique notamment par son incapacité à répondre aux demandes grandissantes des Gazaouis face
au blocus d'Israël et à sa gestion critiquée des affaires intérieures.
Ailleurs, une large majorité de Nigérians (79 ) disent leur opposition à la secte Boko Haram, auteure de l’enlèvement de 200 adolescentes en avril dernier Au Pakistan, 59 des sondés se disent hostiles aux Talibans contre 8 qui disent en avoir
une opinion favorable et 33 qui ne se prononcent pas.
En outre, la grande majorité des musulmans considère comme injustifiés les attentats-suicides commis contre des civils au nom de la défense de l’islam. Les plus
nombreux à estimer que cela peut parfois être justifié sont les musulmans du Bangladesh (47 ). Mais, en Indonésie et au Pakistan, marqués par l’horreur des attentats de ces dernières décennies, peu nombreuses sont les personnes à partager
cette opinion (respectivement 9 et 3 ). En Tunisie, ce taux n’est également que de
5 % En revanche, en Palestine, 46 % considèrent qu'ils peuvent parfois être justifiés contre 62 l’an dernier. La situation d'occupation vécue depuis 66 ans et les
agressions permanentes d'Israël à l'égard des Palestiniens finissent par exaspérer la
population, tant musulmane que chrétienne.
Premières victimes du terrorisme, les musulmans, dans leur grande majorité, ne
peuvent que s’opposer à des actes visant des innocents, contraires à la foi musulmane.
http://www.saphirnews.com/
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Officials: ISIS Terrorists May Target Europe and US Homeland, Threat
'Extremely High'
July 01, 2014
With the partisan blame game over the current meltdown in Iraq consuming much
of the media's attention, NBC News' chief foreign correspondent Richard Engel is
reporting on the increased terrorism threat Americans face from ISIS radicals as
they establish a stronghold in the crisis-stricken country. Engel -- who was kidnapped and released in Syria in 2012 -- tweeted a series of disquieting assessments from US national security sources (via Noah Rothman):
Engel's sources say that roughly 70 American nationals have taken up arms with
ISIS in the region over the course of the violent unrest, with about a dozen
"currently active:"
McClatchy reported last week that thousands of Europeans have joined the jihad in
Syria, and now Iraq -- worrying counter-terrorism officials, who call the 'tourism
terrorism' numbers "unprecedented:"
At least 320 Germans and more than 2,000 other Europeans are thought to have
made the trip -- so many that last week Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erodgan asked European nations to stop their citizens wanting to join the fight in
Syria and now Iraq from traveling to Turkey...European Union Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove this month noted that the phenomenon of young
Muslims leaving Europe to fight elsewhere is decades old. But the current numbers
dwarf previous migrations. He described the current flow as “huge.” “Compared to
previous jihads, it’s unprecedented,” he said. The trend is openly discussed in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy. Europe has long
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needed immigrant labor, but it has done little to integrate those who come from
Muslim regions--North Africa, Pakistan and the Middle East. Their children often
grow up without close ties to their adopted nations and end up finding a sense of
community online and in the radical splinters of Islam set up to prey upon the lost.
The concern is obvious: Radical Muslims traveling to the Middle East to join the
fight, becoming battle-hardened while procuring lethal expertise, then returning to
their adoptive countries to carry out attacks against Western targets. Engel's
sources confirm that's exactly what they fear, noting that a notorious Al Qaeda
bomb-maker is offering his tutelage to ISIS radicals, who are developing skills in the
creation of sophisticated improvised explosive devices:
These warnings should serve as timely reminders that foreign policy debates are
not academic. Developments in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere aren't simply relegated to
"over there." Throwing up our hands and demanding that "they" -- whomever that
may be -- just "sort it out themselves" is a seductive but dangerous mindset. Regardless of one's thoughts of the decision to invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein, that country has deteriorated from relative stability (upon our recklessly executed departure) to all-out crisis today. Afghanistan became a safe haven for hardcore Islamist terrorists to launch attacks against the West, which led to the horror
of 9/11. If a similar foothold is established in Iraq, that's a bona fide national security threat. Nearly as devastating, it would represent the erasure of the massive gains
achieved by our men and women in that country, which came at a terrible price.
http://townhall.com/
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Afghanistan
Forte hausse des combats et victimes
Le 09.07.14
Un policier afghan sur le site d'un attentat-suicide qui a fait 16 morts dont 10 civils,
le 8 juillet 2014 dans la région de Parwan
Le nombre de victimes civiles du conflit afghan a fortement augmenté cette année
selon l'ONU, un signe inquiétant de l'intensification des combats à six mois du retrait de l'Otan et en pleine crise autour de l'élection présidentielle.
Dans son rapport semestriel sur le sujet, publié mercredi, la mission de l'ONU en
Afghanistan (Unama) a recensé une hausse de 24 du nombre de civils tués ou
blessés par des combats, bombes artisanales ou attentats suicide entre le 1er janvier et le 30 juin, par rapport à la même période de 2013.
Sur les 4.853 victimes, 1.564 sont décédées (+17 ) et 3.289 ont été blessées
(+28%)
Il s'agit de la plus forte augmentation jamais observée par l'ONU depuis qu'elle a
commencé à recenser ces chiffres en Afghanistan en 2009.
L'Unama l'explique par la recrudescence des combats au sol, dont le nombre de
victimes a presque doublé (+89 ) et qui désormais, avec 39 du total, tuent ou
blessent plus que les bombes artisanales (30 ).
"La nature du conflit en Afghanistan a changé en 2014 avec une escalade du
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nombre d'engagements au sol dans des zones peuplées", a expliqué dans un communiqué le chef de l'Unama, Jan Kubis.
Cela a un "impact dévastateur sur les civils afghans, y compris les plus vulnérables"
comme les enfants (+34 de tués et blessés, avec 295 morts et 776 blessés) et les
femmes (+24 , 148 tuées et 292 blessées), a-t-il souligné.
La publication de ce rapport semestriel, la dernière avant le départ des troupes de
l'Otan prévu à la fin de 2014, intervient alors que les combats entre les forces
afghanes et les insurgés talibans sont particulièrement intenses et sanglants, notamment dans le Helmand (sud), un fief historique des talibans.
Outre des morts et des blessés civils, ces combats ont entraîné le déplacement de
dizaines de milliers de personnes.
- "Niveau de violences inédit depuis 2011" Plusieurs attaques ont également atteint la capitale afghane la semaine dernière,
dont un attentat suicide contre un bus de l'armée qui a tué huit officiers.
Selon Graeme Smith, expert au groupe de réflexion International Crisis Group (ICG),
"le niveau de violence atteint des sommets inédits depuis 2011, et c'est inquiétant
car il y a désormais moins de forces étrangères".
L'Unama attribue 74 des victimes civiles aux insurgés, et 9 aux forces "progouvernement" (8 pour les forces afghans et 1 pour les forces internationales).
Le reste des victimes est le fait de munitions non explosés.
Visiblement émue aux larmes en présentant le rapport à la presse mercredi à Kaboul, Georgette Gagnon, la directrice de l'Unama pour les droits de l'Homme, a demandé aux acteurs du conflit "davantage d'efforts pour protéger les civils et s'assurer que ceux qui les tuent délibérément rendent des comptes".
Face à cette hausse importante, l'Unama appelle notamment les deux camps à
"cesser les tirs de mortiers, roquettes et grenades" dans les ones peuplées
La publication des chiffres de l'Onu intervient de plus dans un contexte de crise politique aigüe autour de la désignation du nouveau président devant succéder à Hamid Karzaï, seul homme à avoir dirigé le pays depuis la chute du régime fondamentaliste des talibans à la fin 2001.
Le désaccord persistant entre les deux candidats Abdullah Abdullah et Ashraf Ghani
à propos du résultat du deuxième tour de la présidentielle du 14 juin fait craindre
une montée des tensions communautaires, en plus des menaces insurgées.
La tension est encore montée d'un cran mardi lorsque M. Abdullah, qui dénonce
des fraudes massives en faveur de son adversaire, s'est proclamé vainqueur de
l'élection malgré les premiers résultats officiels plaçant Ashraf Ghani largement en
tête (56,4 ).
Mercredi, le camp Abdullah s'est toutefois efforcé de calmer ses partisans, les appelant via Facebook à laisser le temps à la "diplomatie" et aux "négociations".
Malgré les appels au calme, la communauté internationale reste préoccupée par la
situation afghane et en particulier les Etats-Unis, premier bailleur de fond et soutien militaire du pays depuis 2001. Le secrétaire d'Etat américain John Kerry a me-
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nacé cette semaine de couper les vivres au gouvernement afghan si le conflit électoral n'était pas résolu.
AFP
http://www.elwatan.com/
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France
Le plan du gouvernement pour lutter contre le terrorisme
Le projet de loi présenté mercredi 9 juillet en conseil des ministres va sensiblement
renforcer l’arsenal antiterroriste.
(
À
Strasbourg, coup de filet anti-djihadiste dans le quartier de la Meinau.
Avec cet article
Lutter contre la propagande djihadiste sur le Web, une entreprise difficile
Les pistes du gouvernement pour lutter contre le cyberdjihadisme
Les individus potentiellement dangereux pourront être interdits de sortie du territoire, voire être poursuivis pour « entreprise individuelle à caractère terroriste ».
Malgré de sévères entorses aux libertés individuelles, les mesures proposées font
peu débat.
Hasard du calendrier, c’est tous les dix ans en moyenne qu’on « toilette » l’arsenal
antiterroriste. Les grandes lois en la matière datent de 1986, 1996, 2006. Ces dernières années pourtant, tout s’est accéléré. Policiers et magistrats ont vu leurs prérogatives renforcées en 2011, puis 2012. Et la réforme présentée mercredi 9 juillet
par Bernard Cazeneuve permettra d’aller plus loin encore.
« La menace terroriste a changé d’intensité et de nature ces derniers mois, justifie-t
-on dans l’entourage du ministre de l’intérieur. Les départs vers la Syrie ne cessent
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de se multiplier. Par ailleurs, les filières se réorganisent et attirent de nouveaux profils, notamment des mineurs et des femmes. Il faut se préparer à des modes d’action encore plus imprévisibles qu’auparavant et à des passages à l’acte d’individus
isolés. »
Objectif : pouvoir poursuivre des terroristes potentiels
À menaces nouvelles, moyens nouveaux : il ne s’agit plus de surveiller d’éventuels
suspects mais bien d’encadrer leur liberté d’aller et venir, voire de les poursuivre
en justice. En témoignent les deux propositions phare du projet de loi présenté
mercredi. Le texte crée d’abord une « interdiction administrative de sortie du territoire ». L’idée est d’agir en urgence – sur demande expresse du ministre de l’intérieur – lorsque le départ d’un individu présente « une menace terroriste » ou porte
« atteinte aux intérêts fondamentaux de la Nation ». Le suspect pourra alors se voir
privé de son passeport et être fiché dans le cadre de Schengen (1).
Le projet de loi crée ensuite une nouvelle incrimination : « l’entreprise individuelle
à caractère terroriste. » Objectif : pouvoir poursuivre en justice des individus dont
on pense qu’ils pourraient passer à l’acte. Les magistrats instructeurs pourront,
pour ce faire, se fonder sur la collecte d’indices tels que l’achat d’armes, la consultation de sites Internet djihadistes, etc. L’idée, à terme, est de pouvoir poursuivre
des terroristes isolés tels que Mohammed Merah ou Mehdi Nemmouche.
Une législation préventive qui convainc
La judiciarisation préventive du terrorisme n’est pas nouvelle. Depuis 1996 en effet,
les magistrats peuvent poursuivre tous ceux qui s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’une
« association de malfaiteurs en lien avec une entreprise terroriste ». La France a
longtemps été la seule à permettre des poursuites préventives. « Ce dispositif s’est
révélé très efficace, assure Alain Chouet, ancien officier de renseignement. Il a permis, notamment via l’usage assez extensif qu’en a fait le juge Jean-Louis Bruguière,
d’échapper à bon nombre d’attentats. »
À entendre Jean-Charles Brisard, spécialiste des questions de terrorisme, la France
aurait ainsi déjoué une douzaine de projets d’attaques terroristes depuis 2001. Ces
bons « résultats » auraient convaincu certains de nos voisins européens d’adopter
une législation identique ces toutes dernières années. C’est notamment le cas de
l’Angleterre, des Pays-Bas et de l’Espagne.
Faut-il aller encore plus loin dans cette direction, comme le prévoit le texte dévoilé
mercredi ? Nombre de spécialistes en sont convaincus. Et ce pour plusieurs raisons.
D’abord du fait de l’évolution de la menace terroriste. « Elle est beaucoup plus
diffuse qu’auparavant, note le criminologue Alain Bauer. Nous sommes passés de
l’hyperterrorisme, avec les événements sophistiqués et concertés comme les attentats du 11-Septembre, à une nouvelle forme d’attaques qu’on pourrait qualifier
de “lumpen-terrorisme’’, en référence au lumpen-prolétariat de Marx. On fait en
effet face aujourd’hui à des actions menées par des petits délinquants, certes con-
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nus des services de police, mais pas forcément considérés comme dangereux. Ils
sont potentiellement très nombreux… »
L’autre évolution du moment, plus conjoncturelle, a trait au conflit syrien. « Il attire
des centaines de jeunes qui reviennent parfaitement formés aux techniques terroristes et totalement désinhibés vu les scènes terribles auxquelles ils ont assisté sur le
terrain », note Jean-Charles Brisard. À l’entendre, les mesures préconisées par Bernard Cazeneuve seraient pleinement justifiées.
La notion floue de « terrorisme »
Entraver la liberté d’aller et venir, voire engager des poursuites à l’encontre d’individus n’étant pas encore passés à l’acte est toutefois loin d’être anodin juridiquement. On quitte en effet le droit commun selon lequel ne sont poursuivis que les
auteurs d’actes bel et bien commis, et non ceux d’actes susceptibles de l’être. « Il
va falloir être très pointu dans la rédaction de la loi si on veut qu’elle passe le filtre
du Conseil constitutionnel », met en garde Alain Chouet.
D’autres se disent surtout préoccupés par l’absence de définition claire du terrorisme en droit français. Le code pénal le définit en effet ainsi : « Une entreprise
ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur. » Rien, sur le papier, n’empêche les juges de faire une lecture extensive d’une
définition aussi lâche. « Ce flou pose encore plus question à l’heure où l’on s’apprête
à adopter toute une série de mesures préventives à l’encontre des supposés terroristes », note Alain Bauer.
Plusieurs observateurs parient d’ailleurs déjà sur une saisine de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH) de la part d’éventuels condamnés. « Ils n’hésiteront pas à contester l’appellation “ terroriste’’, renchérit Alain Bauer. Et feront
valoir, non sans raison d’ailleurs, que la différence entre un terroriste et un résistant
est parfois très ténue. »
Un renforcement législatif qui ne suscite pas de débat
Cette question de fond est toutefois totalement absente des débats. Le renforcement de l’arsenal antiterroriste ces dernières années s’est fait sans susciter la polémique. Ni dans l’opinion publique, ni sur l’échiquier politique. « La gauche défendait beaucoup plus les libertés individuelles par le passé, se souvient l’avocat Michel
Tubiana, président d’honneur de la Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH). Tout a changé après les attentats de 2001. Désormais, chaque événement traumatisant est suivi d’une loi, à droite comme à gauche. »
Certains juges ont eux aussi évolué. À commencer par le plus médiatique d’entre
eux en matière d’antiterrorisme : Marc Trévidic. Il y a deux ans de cela encore, il
vitupérait contre la « judiciarisation massive » ayant succédé aux attentats de 2001.
Il a depuis changé d’avis du fait de l’extension du conflit syrien et réclame de nouveaux outils de « neutralisation précoce » à l’encontre de potentiels futurs terro-
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ristes.
Les principales mesures du texte
Le projet de loi antiterroriste prévoit une « interdiction administrative de sortie du
territoire ». D’une durée maximum de six mois, elle pourra être renouvelée et ne
sera contestable que devant le juge administratif. Une nouvelle incrimination est
également créée : l’« entreprise individuelle à caractère terroriste ». Reste à savoir
sur quels indices pourront se fonder les poursuites. Le texte prévoit une répression
accrue de l’apologie d’actions terroristes, notamment sur Internet l pourra être
demandé aux fournisseurs d’accès Internet de bloquer l’accès à certains sites,
comme cela existe déjà en matière de pédopornographie. Les cyber-enquêteurs
seront par ailleurs autorisés à utiliser des pseudonymes afin d’infiltrer des sites projihadistes et pourront intercepter de nouvelles données à distance.
MARIE BOËTON
(1) Cette mesure sera limitée dans le temps et susceptible de recours devant un juge.
http://www.la-croix.com/
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Que prévoit le projet de loi antiterroriste?
INFO «20 MINUTES» - Nouvelle incrimination personnelle, interdiction de sortie
du territoire, perquisitions dans les «clouds»… «20 Minutes» s’est procuré le
texte du projet de loi antiterroriste qui sera présenté mercredi en conseil des ministres…
De l’aveu d’un haut fonctionnaire de la Place Beauvau, «la menace terroriste est
particulièrement inquiétante et la France doit faire face à des défis nouveaux».
Après avoir adopté un plan de lutte contre la radicalisation violente, Bernard Ca eneuve va présenter ce mercredi en conseil des ministres son projet de loi antiterroriste.
Ce texte, dont 20 M
s’est procuré l'exposé des motifs, vise à répondre aux
nouvelles problématiques de lutte contre le terrorisme que les récentes affaires Merah, Nemmouche…- ont illustré. Il est découpé en cinq chapitres et comporte 18
articles. Il doit être examiné par les députés en commission des lois avant la fin du
mois de juillet. Nouvelle incrimination, interdiction de sortie du territoire, djihad
sur le Web, techniques d’investigation… Ce qu’il faut en retenir, en six points.
Interdiction de sortie du territoire
Le premier chapitre du projet de loi, qui pourrait concerner environ 200 personnes,
veut permettre à l’Etat d’interdire le départ d’un Français vers des zones de djihad. «Cette disposition vise à éviter qu’ils n’aillent se radicaliser sur un théâtre
d’opérations à l’étranger et qu’ils ne deviennent une menace à leur retour», commente-t-on à l’Intérieur. La mesure pourrait être prise par le ministre pour une durée de six mois maximum mais renouvelable «aussi longtemps que les conditions
en sont réunies», précise le texte qui prévoit une «procédure contradictoire» dans
les quinze jours qui suivent la décision.
Concrètement, un individu sous le coup d’une telle mesure se verrait retirer et invalider son passeport. Les compagnies de transport auront l’obligation de transmettre les données d’enregistrement des passagers à l’autorité administrative qui
pourra alors contrôler les interdictions de sortie du territoire. «Souad Merah, par
exemple, qui a rejoint la Syrie, n’aurait pas pu s’envoler depuis l’Espagne pour la
Turquie», assure un conseiller, Place Beauvau. Principale difficulté, prouver que la
personne veut réellement se rendre dans une zone de djihad. Par ailleurs, le texte
ne prévoit pas de contrôle en cas de franchissement en voiture d’une frontière interne à l’espace Schengen.
Lutte contre l’apologie du terrorisme
«Il ne s’agit pas […] de réprimer des abus de la liberté d’expression mais de sanctionner des faits qui sont directement à l’origine des actes terroristes», introduit
l’article 4. Pour lutter contre l’apologie du terrorisme, le projet de loi entend sortir
de la loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse les délits de provocation et
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d’apologie du terrorisme et de les inscrire dans le code pénal dans un nouvel article. «Cela nous permettra, par exemple, de faire des saisies, impossibles aujourd’hui dans le cadre de la loi de 1881.»
Une nouvelle incrimination
Cette disposition est le fruit d’échanges avec le juge antiterroriste Marc Trevidic,
censée répondre au développement de «l’auto-radicalisation». Jusqu’à présent,
seul le délit d’association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste
permettait de poursuivre les individus. Désormais, ils pourront être poursuivis individuellement sur la base de cette nouvelle incrimination: l’entreprise terroriste individuelle.
Le texte prévoit de la limiter «à la préparation des actes terroristes les plus graves
et les plus violents». Les policiers devront démontrer «que la personne agissant
seule dispose déjà des instruments nécessaires à la commission de l’infraction,
chercher à les obtenir, à les acquérir ou à la fabriquer».
Bloquer l’accès aux sites de propagande
L’autorité administrative pourra demander aux fournisseurs d’accès de bloquer les
sites qui font l’apologie du terrorisme ou qui y incitent. Cette disposition est appliquée de la même manière que celle déjà prévue concernant les sites pédopornographiques. Ainsi, les opérateurs Internet devraient avoir l’obligation d’inscrire
dans la liste de leurs contenus illicites l’incitation et l’apologie du terrorisme. Par
ailleurs, la circonstance aggravante de bande organisée est ajoutée aux délits de
piratage informatique.
Perquisition des «clouds»
Pour s’adapter aux nouvelles techniques de stockage de données, les policiers vont
pouvoir perquisitionner les «clouds», ou «nuages». Le texte précise que les règles
de la perquisition s’appliquent «si les données stockées sont accessibles à partir
d’un système informatique implanté dans les services de police ou unité de gendarmerie».
Capter les discussions sur Skype
Les policiers auront le droit d’intercepter et d’enregistrer les discussions sur les logiciels d’appels téléphoniques sur Internet, tels que Skype. Jusqu’à présent, ils pouvaient capturer l’activité de l’écran mis sous surveillance mais ils ne pouvaient pas
retranscrire sur procès-verbal les communications passées par les périphériques
audiovisuels.
http://www.20minutes.fr/
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Iraq
IRAQ CRISIS AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS – ANALYSIS
JULY 5, 2014
Iraq has been in a state of crisis for over a decade now. To specify an exact date in
its recent history as the commencement of its crises is indeed hard. But what has
been happening in Iraq in the last few weeks is particularly horrifying. They seem
worse than the Taliban, the Al-Qaeda, the Boko Haram and the Al-Shabab, all put
together. This outfit, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams — the Arabic word
for the Levant) has already established a ‘Caliphate of Islam’ under the leadership
of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a state that is more primitive and savage than the one established by the one-eyed Mullah Omar in Afghanistan. If the ‘Caliphate of Islam’ is
to be established by killing Muslims other than Sunnis, then the region is in for a
genocide, the kind of which has not been seen ever before.
What is inexplicable, particularly for a lay reader of the western media, is the question about how do certain extremist groups in the Islamic world get so much funding and arms as to become a danger to established States, particularly those states
that do not have Sunni leadership. The answer is obvious, but the western media is
loath to admit it. They dare not mention the Gulf monarchies, especially those that
have been in the forefront of the war against the Alawite rulers of Syria, and now
the Shia rulers in Iraq. The ‘Economist’ which looked into the question of ISIS’s
many parents found Turkey to be one of them, but does not mention the many private individuals and charities in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that have propped up the
ISIS (a fact that has been obliquely referred to by the New York Times). It is a moot
point whether the so-called private citizens in these kingdoms, who get to know
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what’s happening within and outside the country only from the State controlled
media or the State- subservient Mullahs have so much surplus cash as to fund and
arm mercenary forces to take on neighbouring States.
Let us get some facts straight. One, there is no escaping the reality that the two
U.S. wars against Iraq have contributed substantially to the present crisis. The first
was about saving Kuwait from Saddam Hussain’s invasion and the second was to
liberate Iraqis from Saddam Hussain. Now Washington wishes to save one group of
Iraqis from the others. But the problem is who is to be defended against whom,
particularly when the US has no clear enemy in sight. Second, America’s War on
Terror has clearly sputtered. After more than 13 years, America is still waging the
war and the enemy has neither been defeated nor destroyed, despite the killing of
Osama bin Laden. More offshoots of Al-Qaeda have sprung up in the Middle East
and Western Africa and have endangered states that were not only ungoverned
and failing but also those that were stable and effectively governed.
Now, who does America protect against whom, in Iraq? If it strikes at the ISIS, it
would be seen siding with the ‘discredited’ Shia regime of Nouri al-Maliki, an ally of
Iran and a supporter of Syrian President Assad. Certainly not the best of credentials
for the US and its allies — the Gulf monarchies and Israel. Can America be on the
same side as Iran, Syria and now Russia – all of who are coming to rescue the beleaguered President al-Maliki? Facing this enviable situation, President Obama has
very cautiously has sent 300 (plus another 200) military advisors, who have been
called by some ‘barefoot’ advisors due to his refusal to ‘put boots on the ground’.
America, now it appears, will not be able stop the march of soldiers of the
‘Caliphate of Islam’, however, brutal and savage they may be. That task is falling on
Iran, Syria and the Kurdish Government in Erbil. That means, saving Baghdad from
the ISIS is effectively left to Iran. Whether it will do so with its quasi-military force –
the Al-Quds Force with support from the Hezbollah and Muqtada al-Sadr or will it
send its regular troops remains to be seen. Now if they prevail over the ISIS, the
Gulf monarchies are bound to cry foul. It is truly a Hobson’s choice for the US. Despite its overwhelming military, air and naval presence in the region, America
stands wringing its hands as terrorists who are decidedly hostile to it take control of
resource-rich territories and empower themselves.
There are attempts in sections of the Western media to sanitise the negative role of
the ISIS. It is being reported that they are actually the fighters of the ‘Revolutionary
Tribes Council’ and that they are indeed working under the command of the former
Vice President Tarek al-Hashmei, who had earlier fled to Kurdistan. This is disingenuous. The people of Iraq, even the Sunnis, have no love lost for the mercenary jihadists of the ISIS, just as the Sunnis of Syria had no sympathy for the JubhatulNusra that was parachuted from the outside.
Much is also being made of the so-called differences between the ISIS and the AlQaeda and the Jubhatul-Nusra etc., but this kind of analysis ignores the fact that all
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of them have common parentage and same goals — of killing non-Sunnis first, and
then bleeding America.
Whatever may follow, the old colonial borders drawn in the Middle East appear
headed for a major overhaul and the fresh re-drawing of the map will set-out tremors far beyond the region. The Gulf monarchies are now caught in an awful bind
and America appears neither willing nor capable of protecting them from the ensuing implosion.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/
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Ukraine
Ukraine rebel strongholds on edge as Kiev shrugs off calls for truce
July 09th 2014
French president and German chancellor expected to hold calls with
Kiev to push end to fighting
Rebel strongholds in eastern Ukraine braced for more fighting on Wednesday as
European leaders prepared to pile new pressure on President Petro Poroshenko for
a truce with pro-Russian separatists.
French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel were
expected to push the Western-backed leader on a ceasefire in three-way telephone
talks but Kiev has until now shrugged off calls to halt an offensive that has reclaimed a string of key rebel towns.
In Lugansk -- one of two regional capitals still held by the insurgents -- the streets
were deserted and an AFP team heard regular artillery fire to the north of the city
with shooting seeming to be focused around the rebels' military headquarters.
"Let them bomb us, let them kill us," said a distraught local resident called Olga.
"We have nowhere to go. Where could we go?" asked her husband Yevgeny.
Still, the couple were trying to get their young son out of town -- saying he was too
scared to sleep at night.
Three people were killed in the city and five injured in the past 24 hours, local au-
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thorities said.
Another three servicemen were killed and four injured in clashes across east
Ukraine in the same period, Kiev's National Security and Defence Council said
Wednesday.
In the main rebel-held industrial hub of Donetsk the situation remained calm despite airstrikes Tuesday on a rebel position in its western outskirts, with public
transport working and some shops still open.
Ukraine's military says it controls all routes in and out of Donetsk and Lugansk and
defence council spokesman Andriy Lysenko warned a plan was in place that would
give the rebels an "unpleasant surprise."
Dressed in military fatigues Poroshenko pledged to win back the two cities "very
soon" during a lightning visit Tuesday to the vanquished rebel bastion of Slavyansk,
abandoned by rebels last week in the face of a government onslaught.
Following the retreat rebel military chief Igor Strelkov -- whom Kiev accuses of being a Russian intelligence officer -- said the insurgents are working fast to boost
their weak defences around Donetsk and bolster their numbers.
"We are taking urgent measures to prepare Donetsk for battle," Stelkov was reported as telling the insurgents' TV station Wednesday by Russia's state ITAR-TASS
news agency.
Poroshenko -- who signed a historic political and trade deal with the EU last month
-- tore up a 10-day ceasefire on July 1 because of uninterrupted rebel attacks that
claimed the lives of more than 20 Ukrainian troops.
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Diplomatic tug-of-war
Uneasy EU leaders are hoping that a new truce and a Kremlin promise not to meddle can take pressure off the bloc to adopt sweeping sanctions that could damage
their own strong energy and financial bonds with Russia.
The Kremlin has been unusually restrained since the string of military advances by
Kiev with analysts saying Putin could be distancing himself from the rebels despite
calls from hawks to send troops across the border.
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated calls from Moscow for Ukraine to
sit down with the rebel leaders without "conditions".
"They (the rebels) are not ready to fulfil Kiev's ultimatums to capitulate and lay
down their arms before negotiations begin," Lavrov said at a press conference with
Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini.
The Italian minister was visiting Moscow after Rome took over the EU's rotating
presidency and was to discuss the Ukraine crisis with President Vladimir Putin later
Wednesday.
Washington meanwhile has consistently backed the stepped-up campaign being
waged by Ukrainian troops and irregular forces since Poroshenko's promise after
his election in May to quash an uprising that has cost nearly 500 lives and inflamed
East-West ties.
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The United States views Ukraine's territorial integrity as vital to European security
and important to halting Putin's seeming ambition to resurrect a tsarist or postSoviet empire.
Poroshenko on Tuesday dismissed the man who had headed Kiev's self-proclaimed
"anti-terrorist operation" since its launch on April 13 and replaced him with Vasyl
Grytsak -- a career security service officer.
The reshu e was one of several in the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and appeared to represent an attempt by Poroshenko to place trusted associates in top
positions rather than any change in tactic in the campaign.
[AFP]
http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/europe/36757-140709-ukrainerebel-strongholds-on-edge-as-kiev-shrugs-off-calls-for-truce
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Disclaimer of Liability and Endorsement
While the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) strives
to make the information on this publication as timely and accurate as possible, the
ACSRT makes no claims, promises, or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness,
or adequacy of its contents, and expressly disclaims liability for errors and omissions in its contents. No warranty of any kind, implied, expressed, or statutory, including but not limited to the warranties of non-infringement of third party rights,
title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or freedom from computer virus, is given with respect to the contents of this publication or its links to other Internet resources.
It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors
and not of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), its
publication board, its management or any funder or sponsor of the ACSRT, nor that
of the African Union Commission (AUC),
Reference in this publication to any specific commercial product, process, or service, or the use of any trade, firm or corporation name is for the information and
convenience of the public, and does not constitute endorsement, recommendation, or
favoring by the ACSRT and AUC.
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