グローバリゼーションと国際開発研究 ｢脆弱国家の開発戦略 II｣ 研究報告書 目次 1 はしがき 3 アフリカ大陸地図 4 序章 5 第 1 部：テーマ別研究 第 1 章 サハラ以南アフリカにおける経済発展の展望：脆弱国家に着目して 8 秋山孝允（日本大学教授、FASID国際開発研究センター 参与） 第 2 章 東アフリカにおける民主化と分権化 26 笹岡雄一（JICA研究所 上席研究員） 第 3 章 コンディショナリティと政策対話―脆弱・紛争国家へのインプリケーション 53 小野真依（FASID国際開発研究センター 研究助手） 第 2 部：国別研究 第 4 章 スーダン：平和の定着と復興の追求 71 渡邉恵子（FASID国際開発研究センター 主任） 第 5 章 ジンバブエ：急速な衰退からの復興への展望 104 キャサリン･マチンガウタ（政策研究大学院大学） 第 6 章 ナイジェリア：豊かさと貧困の逆説 キャサリン･マチンガウタ（政策研究大学院大学） 1 126 Globalization and International Development Study “Development Strategy for Fragile States II” Contents 1 Preface 3 Map of Africa 4 Introduction 5 Part I: Thematic Studies Chapter 1：Economic Development Prospects for Sub-Saharan Africa: Focus on Fragile States 8 Takamasa Akiyama (Professor, Nihon University / Senior Advisor, IDRI, FASID） Chapter 2：Democratization and Decentralization in East Africa 26 Yuichi Sasaoka (Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute) Chapter 3：Conditionality and Policy Dialogue: Implications for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States 53 Mai Ono（Research Assistant, IDRI, FASID） Part II: Country Studies Chapter 4：Sudan: Pursuit of Consolidation for Peace and Reconstruction 71 Keiko Watanabe (Program Officer, IDRI, FASID) Chapter 5：Zimbabwe -Prospects for Restoration After Rapid Decline 104 Catherine Machingauta (GRIPS) Chapter 6：Nigeria - So Rich, Yet So Poor - Looking Behind the Paradox Catherine Machingauta (GRIPS) 2 126 ߪߒ߇߈ ᤓᐕᐲޟ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ㐿⊒ᚢ⇛ߣޠ㗴ߒߡޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߣ㐿⊒េഥߩࠕࡊࡠ࠴ߦ㑐ߔࠆ⎇ⓥ ႎ๔ࠍ ߒߚޟߪߢߎߎޕ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩޠቯ⟵߿ಽ㘃ߣ⸒ߞߚⷐޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍኻ⽎ߣߒ ߚਥⷐេഥᯏ㑐ߦࠃࠆ㐿⊒េഥߩࠕࡊࡠ࠴ߩታ㓙ޔᣣᧄߩޟ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟߩ߳ޠ ᡰេ߿ᐔ᭴▽ᡰេ╬ߩኻᔕޔ ޟ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅᦨࠆߋࠍޠㄭߩ⎇ⓥേะޔᣣᧄ߇ޟ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅޠ ࠍᡰេߔࠆߢߩ㗴ὐ߿⺖㗴ࠍ⼏⺰ߒߚߩߎޕႎ๔ᦠߪޔ⇇㌁ⴕ╬ߢ߽㗀߇ᄢ߈ߊޔ ⧷⸶ߐࠇޔGlobalization and International Development Research: Study Report on “Development Strategy of Fragile States”ߣߒߡ FASID ߩ࠙ࠚࡉߦ߽ឝタߐࠇߡࠆޕ (http://www.fasid.or.jp/english/publication/research/pdf/development_strategy_of_fragil e_state.pdf) ࿁ߩ⎇ⓥႎ๔ߪޔᤓᐕߩᚑᨐࠍ〯߹߃ౕߦᦝޔ⊛ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ㐿⊒ᚢ⇛ߣេഥߩࠕࡊ ࡠ࠴ࠍࠨࡂએධࠕࡈࠞߦὶὐࠍᒰߡ⼏⺰ߔࠆߚߦ╙ޔ㧝ㇱߩ࠹ࡑ⎇ⓥߣ╙㧞 ㇱߩ࿖⎇ⓥ߆ࠄ᭴ᚑߐࠇߡࠆޕ ࠹ࡑ⎇ⓥߢߪࡂࠨޟએධࠕࡈࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩᣣᧄߩ⽸₂ޠ ࠞࡈࠕ᧲ޟޔ ߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻޠ ߣࠖ࠹࠽࡚ࠪࠖ࠺ࡦࠦޟޔኻ㧦⣀ᒙ⚗࿖ኅߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄޠ ߣࠇߙࠇߘޔᚲᓧಽᏓߦ⌕⋡ߒߚ⚻ᷣ⊛ⷞὐޔ᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻࠍᛒߞߚᴦ⊛ⷞὐޔ㐿⊒ េഥࠍㅢߓߚ࿖㓙㑐ଥߩⷞὐ߆ࠄಽᨆࠍⴕߞߚޕ࿖⎇ⓥߢߪࠕࡈࠞߩࠬ࠳ࡦࡦࠫޔ ࡃࡉࠛߩࠕࠚࠫࠗ࠽ޔ㧟ࠞ࿖ࠍߣߒߡขࠅߍޔฦ࿖ߩ⁁ᴫࠍౕ⊛ߦಽᨆߒߡࠆޕ ᧄᦠߩ✬㓸ߪᤓᐕߦᒁ߈⛯߈⑺ጊቁమ㧔ᣣᧄᄢቇᢎޔFASID ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ෳ ਈ㧕߇ᜂᒰߒߚޕᄖㇱ߆ࠄ╣ޔጟ㓶৻᳁㧔࿖㓙දജᯏ᭴ JICA ⎇ⓥᚲᏨ⎇ⓥຬ㧕ߩၫ╩ߩ ߏදജࠍᓧߚߎߣߦᔃ߆ࠄᗵ⻢ߒߚޔߚ߹ޕFASID ߣߩㅪ៤ߢᄢቇ㒮ߢࡊࡠࠣࡓࠍㆇ ༡ߒߡࠆ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㧔GRIPS㧕ߩᄢቇ㒮↢࠲࠙ࠟࡦ࠴ࡑࡦࠨࡖࠠޔ᳁ߪ⥄ りߩり࿖ߢࠆࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߦߟߡޔ߽ߡߟߦࠕࠚࠫࠗ࠽ߚ߹ޔห࿖りߩ GRIPS ߩᄢቇ㒮↢ߢࠆ࡛ࠞ࠺Mࠝ࠾ࡗࡦ᳁ߩදജࠍᓧߡၫ╩ࠍᜂᒰߒߡࠆޕౝㇱ߆ࠄߪ ⑺ጊቁమߦട߃ߡߢࡦ࠳ࠬޔ㐿⊒េഥߩᬺോ⚻㛎߽ࠆᷰㆺᕺሶ㧔ਥછ㧕 ޔᤓᐕߦᒁ߈⛯ ߈ޟ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ⎇ޠⓥࠍⴕߞߡࠆዊ㊁⌀ଐ㧔⎇ⓥഥᚻ㧕߇ၫ╩ࠍᜂᒰߒߚޕ ᧄᦠߩฦ┨ߩౝኈߪ㑐ଥᯏ㑐ߩ⸃ࠍ␜ߔ߽ߩߢߪߥߊޔၫ╩⠪ߩ⸃ߦၮߠߡᦠ߆ ࠇߚ߽ߩߢࠆޔߚ߹ޕᚲዻߪၫ╩ᒰᤨߩ߽ߩߢࠆޕ ᧄᦠ߇ࠆࠁࠊޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩេഥᚢ⇛ߦ㑐ߒߡߩ⼏⺰ࠍᷓߩࠄࠇߘߪߡ߭ޔ࿖ޘ ߩᐔߣቯ߳ߩᣣᧄߩ⽸₂ߦᓎ┙ߡࠇ߫ᐘߢࠆޕ ⽷࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙㐿⊒㜞╬ᢎ⢒ᯏ᭴ ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ᚲ㐳ઍⴕ Ḋ ⋥ା 3 Medi t Algiers Tunis Madeira Is. er TUNISIA Rabat ra ne an Sea (PORTUGAL) MOROCCO Tripoli Canary Is. (SPAIN) Cairo ALGERIA LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA Laayoun EGYPT Western Sahara Re d Se a MAURITANIA Nouakchott NIGER MALI CHAD Dakar Bamako BURKINA FASO GUINEA SIERRA LEONE Monrovia A AN H CÔTED'IVOIRE BENIN TOGO G Conakry Freetown Yamoussoukro Accra LIBERIA Abidjan of A de n Socotra (YEMEN) Djibouti NIGERIA Addis Ababa CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Porto Novo L ETHIOPIA Abuja Bangui CAMEROON Malabo A GUINEA-BISSAU lf DJIBOUTI Gu N'Djamena Ouagadougou Yaoundé EQUATORIAL GUINEA Annobón NG (EQUATORIAL GUINEA) Brazzaville Cabinda A T L A N T I C Ascension Lake Albert O GABON O Libreville C Principe Sao SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE Tome Sao Tome SO Lake Turkana UGANDA Kampala DEMOCRATIC RWANDA REPUBLIC Kigali OF THE Bujumbura Mogadishu KENYA Nairobi INDIAN OCEAN Lake Victoria CONGO BURUNDI Kinshasa Lake Tanganyika (ANGOLA) Pemba Dodoma Amirante Is. Zanzibar TANZANIA Providence Is. Aldabra Is. O C E A N Lake Nyasa Moroni COMOROS ANGOLA Victoria SEYCHELLES UNITED REPUBLIC OF Luanda (UK) A Bissau Asmara SUDAN M Banjul ERITREA Khartoum Lake Chad Niamey e GAMBIA SENEGAL om Praia LI CAPE VERDE Farquhar Is. Agalega Is. (MAURITIUS) Lilongwe ZAMBIA MALAWI ZA Kariba NAMIBIA Windhoek MO ZIMBABWE BOTSWANA Gaborone UE A IQ Tromelin R (FRANCE) Cargados Carajos C B AS M Lake Harare AG (UK) Antananarivo MAURITIUS Port Louis MAD Lusaka St. Helena Réunion (FRANCE) Pretoria Maputo AFRICA Mbabane SWAZILAND Bloemfontein SOUTH AFRICA Maseru LESOTHO Cape Town 0 0 500 1000 km 500 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 1000 mi Map No. 4045 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS January 2004 Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section 4 ᐨ┨ Introduction FASID ߦ߅ߌࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ㑐ߔࠆᧄ⎇ⓥߪޔᤓᐕᐲߦ⛯߈ࠍ⺰⼏ߡߟߦࡑ࠹ᧄޔᷓ ࠆߎߣߣ࿖⎇ⓥࠍㅢߒߡౕ⊛ߦࠨࡂએධࠕࡈࠞ㧔SSA㧕ߩ 3 ࠞ࿖ߩታᖱࠍᬌ⸽ߔࠆ ߎߣࠍ⁓ߞߚޕ ߹ߚ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ࿖㓙េഥࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖ߇ᦨ߽ὶὐࠍᒰߡߡࠆ SSA ߦ⼏⺰ࠍ⛉ߞߚޕ ᦨೋߩ 2 ߟߩ┨ߪޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍ⚻ᷣ㕙ޔᴦ㕙߆ࠄಽᨆߒߚ ╙ޕ3 ┨ߪ࠼࠽߇ߎࠇࠄߩ ࿖߳េഥࠍⴕ߁㓙ߦᄢ߈ߥ㗴ߦߥࠆࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࠹ࠖߣ╷ኻߩታᖱߣ⺖㗴ࠍㅀ ߴߡࠆޕ࿖⎇ⓥߢߪ 20 ᐕએߦਗ਼ࠆධർߩౝᚢࠍ 2005 ᐕߦࠃ߁߿ߊ⚳⚿ߐߖߚࠬ ࠳ࡦޔෂᯏ⊛ߥ⁁ᘒߦࠆࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ ߡߒߘޔSSA ߢੱญ߇ᦨ߽ᄙߊ⚻ޔᷣ⊛ߦ߽㊀ ⷐߥ࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕࠍขࠅߍߚ⎇ߩࠄࠇߎޕⓥ߆ࠄ߹ߕ⊕ߦߥߞߚߎߣߪޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߣ ⸒ߞߡ߽࿖ߦࠃࠅ⁁ᴫߪᄢ߈ߊ⇣ߥࠅࠅ߹ߪ⺰⥸৻ޔᓎߦߚߚߥߣ߁ߎߣߢࠈ߁ޕ ߘߩᗧߢߪࠆࠁࠊޔេഥߩ“ࡌࠬ࠻ࡊࠢ࠹ࠖࠬ”ࠍᔕ↪ߔࠆߣ߁ᣇᑼߦߪ㒢⇇߇ ࠅޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩេഥ߇߆ߦ㔍ߒ߆߇ℂ⸃ߢ߈ࠆޕ࿖㓙េഥࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߦߣߞߡᱷ ߐࠇߚᦨ߽㔍ߒߎߩ⺖㗴ࠍ⋥ⷞߒߥߌࠇ߫ޔ࿖㓙ᴦੱߚ߹ޔ㗴ߪ⸃ߐࠇߥߢ ࠈ߁ޕ ╙ 1 ┨ߪޔᣣᧄᄢቇ࿖㓙㑐ଥቇㇱᢎߢޔFASID 㐿⊒⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ෳਈࠍോࠆ⑺ጊቁమ ߩ“Economic Development Prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa: Focus on Fragile States”㧔ࡂࠨޟએ ධࠕࡈࠞߩ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߩዷᦸ㧦⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ⌕⋡ߒߡޠ 㧕ߢࠆޕ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ㗴ߪޔ㐳ᦼ⊛ ߦߺࠇ߫⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߩ㆐ᚑࠍᛮ߈ߦ⸃ߢ߈ߥޕᣣ߹ߢߩ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ㑐ߔࠆ⼏⺰ߪᴦ ⊛ⷞὐࠍಾࠅญߣߒߚ߽ߩ߇ᄙ߇ᧄޔⓂߢߪߘߩ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߦὶὐࠍᒰߡߡࠆޕ21 ♿ ߦࠅޔᄙߊߩ SSA ⻉࿖ߪ৻ᰴ↥ຠߩ࿖㓙Ꮢ႐ߦ߅ߌࠆଔᩰ߽ࠅ⚻ޔᷣᚑ㐳₸߇㜞 ߹ߞߚ ߒ߆ߒޕ2008 ᐕ⑺߆ࠄߩ⇇หᤨਇᴫߦࠃࠅߩߎޔᢙᐕߩᚑᨐ߇Ꮽᶖߒߦߥࠅޔᚑ 㐳߇ㅒᚯࠅߔࠆน⢻ᕈ߇ࠆᧄޕⓂߢߪ SSA43 ࠞ࿖ߩࠢ࠲ಽᨆࠍⴕੱޔญ߇ᄢ߈ ߊჇ߃⛯ߌࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍᄙߊᛴ߃ࠆ SSA ߢᄢߥ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳߇㆐ᚑߢ߈ߥߌࠇ߫ᄙߊߩ࿖ޔ ․ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ߅ߌࠆ⽺࿎ߪᷓ߹ࠅ␠ޔળᴦਇ߇Ⴧᄢߔࠆߣ੍᷹ߒߡࠆߩࠄࠇߎޕ ⻉࿖ߢ᳓ߣㄘᬺߦㆡߒߚߩᄢߥଏ⛎Ⴧട߇߹ࠅᦸߥߎߣࠍ⠨ᘦߔࠆߣߒ⪺ޔ ↢↥ᕈߩჇᄢ߇㆐ᚑߢ߈ߚߣߒߡ߽ㄘᬺࠢ࠲ߢߎࠇࠄߩ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣࠍᒁߞᒛߞߡ ⴕߊߩߪ߶ߣࠎߤਇน⢻ߢࠆઁޕᣇੱ৻ޔᒰߚࠅߩ㕖ㄘᬺࠢ࠲GDP ߪᄙߊߩ SSA ߢ ᷫዋߒߡ߅ࠅߩߎޔะߪ․ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ߅ߡ㗼⪺ߢࠆޕSSA ⻉࿖ߦ․ޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ ⽺࿎ࠍᷫߔࠆߦߪഭ㓸⚂ဳߩㅧᬺ߿ࠨࡆࠬࠢ࠲ߩ⊒ዷߒ߆ߥޕஜోߥ㕖ㄘ ᬺࠢ࠲ߩᚑ㐳ߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߇ᛴ߃ࠆᴦ⊛ߥ㗴ߩシᷫߦ߽⽸₂ߔࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆޕᣣᧄ ߩߎࠇࠄߩ࿖߳ߩេഥߪޔᲧセఝߩὐ߆ࠄߡޔㅧᬺߩ⊒ዷࠍ⁓ߞߚ߽ߩߦߔߴ߈ߢ 5 ࠆޕ ╙ 2 ┨ࠆߌ߅ߦࠞࡈࠕ᧲ޟ᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻ ߪޠJICA ⎇ⓥᚲᏨ⎇ⓥຬߩ╣ጟ㓶৻ߩၫ╩ ߦࠃࠆ߽ߩߢࠞࡈࠕ᧲ޔห 3 ࠞ࿖ߩᴦᒻᘒߦߟߡ᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻࠍਛᔃߦᬌ⸛ ߒߡࠆ ߩࠕ࠾ࠩࡦ࠲ޔ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࠕ࠾ࠤޕ3 ࠞ࿖ߪℂ⊛ߦߪ࿖Ⴚ߇ធߒߡߡޔᣥ⧷ ࿖ᬀ᳃ߢߞߚߣ߁ㅢὐ߇ࠆ߇ߩࠇߙࠇߘޔᱧผ⊛ߥ⢛᥊┙⁛ߦ․ޔᓟߩᴦ⊛ ⊒ዷߪᄢ߈ߊ⇣ߥߞߡࠆ⊒ߚߞߥ⇣ߩߎޕዷߦߪࠛࠬ࠾ࠪ࠹ࠖ߇㊀ⷐߦ⛊ࠎߢࠆߎߣ ߇ࠊ߆ࠆޕ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ᳃ਥൻߪ㕖Ᏹߦ㊀ⷐߥ⺖㗴ߢࠆ߇ߪࠇߎޔಽᮭൻߣ㑐ㅪߒߚᚢ⇛ ⊛ߥኻᔕࠍ⠨ᘦߔߴ߈ߢࠆࠖ࠹ࠖ࠹ࡦ࠺ࠗࠕߩߤߥࠖ࠹ࠪ࠾ࠬࠛޔߚ߹ޕ㓸࿅㑆ߩਇᐔ ╬ࠍᗧߔࠆޟ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬(HI)ޠ⺑߇࠙ࠟࡦ࠳ߣࠤ࠾ࠕߩᴦㆊ⒟ߩ⋧㆑࠾ࠬࠛߦ․ޔ ࠪ࠹ࠖߣ᳃ਥൻߩ㑐ଥࠍ⺑ߔࠆലᕈࠍ߽ߟߎߣ߽ࠄ߆ߦߒߡࠆޕេഥ߳ߩࠗࡦࡊ ࠤ࡚ࠪࡦߪޔ㕙ߪૃ߆ࠃߞߚ࿖ߢ߽ޔᴦ⊛ߥ⺖㗴ࠍࠄࠇߘޔᡷༀߔࠆᚻ┙ߡߪ ࿖ߦࠃߞߡ⋧ᒰ㆑߁ߎߣࠍ⼂ߒߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥߣ߁ߎߣߢࠈ߁ޕ ╙ 3 ┨ “Conditionality and Policy Dialogue: Implications for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States” 㧔 ߣࠖ࠹࠽࡚ࠪࠖ࠺ࡦࠦޟ╷ኻ㧦⣀ᒙ⚗࿖ኅ߳ߩࠗࡦࡊࠤ࡚ࠪࡦޠ 㧕ߪ FASID 㐿⊒⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ഥᚻዊ㊁⌀ଐ߇ၫ╩ߒߚޕ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߪቯ⟵ࠍࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔᴦ⊛ ߥ࿎㔍ߥ⺖㗴ࠍᛴ߃ߡࠆ࿖ߢࠅޔេഥߩലᨐޔല₸ߩᒝൻߦߪࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࠹ࠖ ߥࠅޔ╷ኻ߇ᔅⷐߣߥࠆ႐ว߇ᄙޕ2005 ᐕߩࡄޟት⸒߇ࡊ࠶ࠪ࠽࠻ࡄߪߢޠ ᒝ⺞ߐࠇߡࠆ߇ߣ࠽࠼ߪࡊ࠶ࠪ࠽࠻ࡄޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩᐭ㑆ߢߪߘ߽ߘ߽ᚑࠅ┙ߜ ߦߊ࠽࠼ߪߦߎߘޕߩᩮᧄ⊛ߥ⋧ᚻ࿖ߦኻߔࠆਇାᗵ߇ࠆ߆ࠄߢࠆߢ┨ߩߎޕ ߪߩࡊ࠶ࠪ࠽࠻ࡄޔේೣߦၮߠߚ᭽ߥޘ࿖㓙េഥࠕࡊࡠ࠴߇ޟ⣀ᒙ⚗࿖ኅޠ ߦ߅ߌࠆ࿖ኅᑪ⸳߿ᐔߩቯ⌕ߦ߽ߚࠄߒᓧࠆน⢻ᕈߣ㒢⇇ߣࠍ⺑ߒߩߘޔ㒢⇇ߩ࠼࠽ ߩ↢ᚑⷐ࿃ࠍᬌ⸛ߒޔਥⷐߥ㐿⊒េഥ࠼࠽㧔☨ޔ⧷ޔEU㧕ߦࠃࠆࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽ ࠹ࠖߣⵍេഥ࿖ߣߩኻߦ㑐ߔࠆ╷ᣇ㊎ޔ߮ߘࠇࠍណ↪ߔࠆߦ⥋ߞߚ࿖ౝߩᴦ⊛ⷐ ࿃ߣࠍ⼏⺰ߔࠆߩߎߚ߹ޕಽᨆ߆ࠄᣣᧄ߳ߩࠗࡦࡊࠤ࡚ࠪࡦࠍតߞߡࠆ߇ࠅࠃޔല ᨐ⊛ߥ╷ኻࡊࡠࠬߩታߦߪޔ ޟ⣀ᒙ⚗࿖ኅޠ㗴ߦኻߔࠆᣣᧄߣߒߡߩ╷ࠬ ࠲ࡦࠬߩ⏕ൻ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆߣߒߡࠆޕ ࿖⎇ⓥߩᦨೋߩ┨ߢࠆ╙ 4 ┨ࡦ࠳ࠬޟ㧦ᐔߩቯ⌕ߣᓳ⥝ߩㅊ᳞ޔߪޠFASID 㐿⊒ ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ਥછᷰㆺᕺሶߦࠃࠆ߽ߩߢ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔߥߤߢ⇇߆ࠄᵈ⋡ࠍ㓸ߡ ࠆࠬ࠳ࡦߦ㑐ߒߡߢࠆޕ ޟ൮ᐔวᗧ㧔CPA㧕 ޠᓟ 4 ᐕ߇⚻ߜࠆ⒟ᐲߩᚑᨐ߽ߡ ࠆ߇ߛ߹ޔධർߩႺ⇇✢߇วᗧߐࠇߕᧄޔᐕ੍ቯߩ✚ㆬ߽ࡦࠨࠬߩ⚿ᨐ߇ߥߚ ㆃࠇ߇੍ᗐߐࠇࠆߥߤਇቯⷐ࿃ࠍᛴ߃ߡࠆޕᱧผ⊛⢛᥊߇⋧ᒰߒߊㅀߴࠄࠇߡ ࠆ߇ޔਥᣦߪޔ㐳ᱧผ⊛⚻ㆊࠍᛠីߒߥߌࠇ߫ߎߩ࿖ߩߩ⁁ᴫࠍℂ⸃ߔࠆߎߣߪߢ ߈ߥߣ߁ߎߣߢࠆߩࡦ࠳ࠬޕ⣀ᒙᕈߪޔ㐳ᦼൻߒߚౝᚢߦߺࠆⶄᢙߩⷐ࿃߆ࠄ᧪ ࠆ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ߽ߩߣޔᴦੱޔᮭޔᐭߩ⢻ജߥߤ⋥㕙ߒߡࠆ⺖㗴߇ࠆޕ࿖㓙␠ળ 6 ߽ࠬ࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈߩᡷༀޔᐔߩቯ⌕ߩଦㅴߦᡰេࠍⴕߞߡࠆ߇ޔᩮᧄ⊛ߥ㗴ߩ⸃ ߳ะ߆ߞߡࠆ߆⇼ߢࠆޕਛ࿖ߩᄢⷙᮨߥេഥ߽߆߃ߞߡ㗴ࠍ৻ጀⶄ㔀ൻߔࠆน ⢻ᕈ߇ࠆޕᣣᧄ߇ࠬ࠳ࡦߩࠃ߁ߥ࿖߳ߤߩࠃ߁ߥេഥࠍⴕ߁߆㔍ߒ㗴ߢࠆ߇ޔ ߎߩ┨ߢലߥࠕࡊࡠ࠴ࠍតߞߡࠆޕ ╙ 5 ┨ “Zimbabwe-Prospects of Restoration After Rapid Decline”㧔 ࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޟ㧦ᕆㅦߥㅌ߆ ࠄߩᓳ⥝߳ߩዷᦸޠ㧕ߪޔFASID㧛╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㧔GRIPS㧕ㅪ៤ᢎ⢒ࡊࡠࠣࡓߢ ࠆ IDS㧔࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥ㧕ୃ჻⺖⒟ୃੌ↢ߢࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛりߩᄢቇ㒮↢ Catherine Machingauta ߦࠃࠆ߽ߩߢࠆ⚻ߩࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޕᷣ⁁ᴫߪߎߩᢙᐕᖡൻࠍߚߤࠅࡈࡦࠗࡄࠗࡂޔ ࡚ࠪࡦߩߚߦ⥄࿖ㅢ⽻߇ᱴߤㅢ↪ߒߥߊߥࠅޔᄢ㊂ߩ㙈ᱫ⠪ࠍߔน⢻ᕈ߇ߡ߈ߡ ࠆ⁁ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕᴫߩਅޔ࿖㓙េഥࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߪㆡಾߥኻಣᴺࠍ⻠ߓࠆߎߣ߇᧪ߕޔ ⚿ᨐߣߒߡ㐿⊒េഥߪᷫߐࠇੱޔ⊛ߥ⋡⊛ߩ߽ߩߦ㒢ࠄࠇߡࠆߦ⁁ޕ㒱ߞߚᦨᄢ ߩⷐ࿃ߪ߇ࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޔஜోߥᴦࠍ▽ߊߎߣ߇ߢ߈ߥ߆ߞߚߎߣߦࠃࠆޕห࿖ߪ⁛ ┙એ᧪৻ౄ⁛ⵙࠍណߞߡ߈ߡ߅ࠅޔ㊁ౄࠍജߢᛥߒߡ߈ߚߚ߹ޕᐭߪ⧷࿖ࠍߪ ߓߣߔࠆ࠼࠽ߦኻߒޔᑪ⸳⊛ߥࠕࡊࡠ࠴ࠍߣߞߡ߈ߚߣߪߒߡ߃ߥޕⵙភ ⟎ߩ✭ߩዷᦸ߇ࠄࠇߥਛߢޔᐭߪᴦᡷ㕟ߩታᣉߢߪߥߊޔਛ࿖ߣߩㅪ៤ࠍᒝ ࠆേ߈㧔”Look East”╷㧕߽ߖߡࠆޕޔេഥߪޔNGO ߥߤࠍㅢߓߚੱ⊛ᡰេߩ ታᣉએᄖߦߥߣᕁࠊࠇࠆ߇ࠆߚᦨߪࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩߢࠅޔ㗴ߪ࿖㓙␠ળ ߇߽ߒߥߌࠇ߫ᭂ┵ߦᖤᗌߥ⁁ᴫ߇↢ߕࠆน⢻ᕈ߇ᒝߎߣߢࠆޕ ╙ 6 ┨̌Nigeria - So Rich, Yet So Poor - Looking Behind the Paradox”㧔 ࠕࠚࠫࠗ࠽ޟ㧦⼾߆ߐ ߣ⽺࿎ߩࡄ࠼࠶ࠢࠬޠ 㧕߽ Catherine Machingauta ߦࠃࠆ߽ߩߢࠍࠬࠤߩࠕࠚࠫࠗ࠽ޔ ᛒߞߡࠆ⼾ߪࠕࠚࠫࠗ࠽ޕንߥ⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߣੱ⊛⾗Ḯߦᕺ߹ࠇޔචಽߥ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߩẜ ᕈࠍ߃ߡߥ߇ࠄޔਥߦࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ㗴߇ේ࿃ߢ⽺࿎ߦ⧰ߒੱ߇ᄙߊࠆ࿖ߢࠆޕ ࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕߪౖဳ⊛ߥޟᄤὼ⾗Ḯߩ⟂ߚࠇࠊࠄߣߦޠ࿖ߢࠈ߁ޕMachingauta ߪࠗ࠽ޔ ࠫࠚࠕߩ㐿⊒㗴ߩ৻ߟߪ࠼࠽㑆ߩਇචಽߥද⺞ߦࠆߎߣߣ࠽࠼ߚ߹ޔᐭ㑆ߦ ሽߔࠆᖱႎߩ㕖ኻ⒓ᕈ߿ߩ࠽࠼ޔេഥ╷߇࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕߩ╷ߦᔅߕߒ߽ᢛวߐࠇ ߡߥὐߥߤࠍߍߡࠆޕ ࿁ߩ⎇ⓥࠍㅢߒߡ⼂ࠍᡷߡᷓߚߎߣߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩេഥߩ㔍ߒߐߢࠆߦߎߎޕ ߍߚ 6 ߟߩ⺰ᢥ߇ޔᣣᧄᐭࠍ࿖㓙េഥࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖ߇ߎߩ㊀ⷐ⺖㗴߳ขࠅ⚵ߦ 㓙ߒޔෳ⠨ߦߥࠆߎߣࠍ㗿߁ޕ 7 ╙ 1 ┨ ࠨࡂએධࠕࡈࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߩዷᦸ㧦⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ⌕⋡ߒߡ Chapter 1: Economic Development Prospects for sub-Saharan Africa: Focus on Fragile States ⑺ጊቁమ㧔ᣣᧄᄢቇ࿖㓙㑐ଥቇㇱ ᢎ㧛 FASID ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ ෳਈ㧕 Takamasa Akiyama (Professor, Department of International Relations, Nihon Univeristy / Senior Advisor, IDRI, FASID㧕 㧔ⷐ⚂㧕 ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍᄙߊࠨࡂએධࠕࡈࠞ⻉࿖㧔SSA㧕ߦኻߒߡߩㄭᐕߩេഥᚢ⇛ߩࡆࡘ ߆ࠄะߣߒߡߪࠃࠅౕ⊛ߥេഥ╷߇ߣࠄࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥߞߡ߈ߡࠆ߇ޔ㐳ᦼᚢ⇛⊛ߥ ᣇ㊎ߪߡ߈ߡߥ࠲ࠢޕߦ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ะࠍ 43 ߩ SSA ⻉࿖ߦߟߡⴕ◲ޔනߥ ࡕ࠺࡞ࠍၮߦㄘᬺࠢ࠲ߩ੍᷹ࠍⴕߞߚޕಽᨆߩ⚿ᨐੱޔญ߇ᄢ߈ߊჇ߃⛯ߌࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ ኅࠍᄙߊᛴ߃ࠆ SSA ߢ⋧ᒰߥ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳߇㆐ᚑߢ߈ߥߌࠇ߫ᄙߊߩ࿖ߦ․ޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߢߪ⽺ ࿎ߪᷓ߹ࠅ␠ޔળޔᴦਇߪჇᄢߔࠆߎߣ߇್ߒߚߚ߹ޕ᳓ߣㄘᬺߦㆡߒߚߩᄢ ߥଏ⛎Ⴧട߇߹ࠅᦸߥߎߣࠍ⠨ᘦߔࠆߣ⋧ᒰߥߩ↢↥ᕈߩჇᄢ߇㆐ᚑߢ߈ߚ ߣߒߡ߽ㄘᬺࠢ࠲ߢߎࠇࠄߩ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣࠍᒁߞᒛߞߡⴕߊߩߪ߶ߣࠎߤਇน⢻ߢࠆߣ ߁ߎߣ߇⸒߃ࠆޕ᧪ߩഭੱญჇടಽ߇ߩࠢ࠲ഭੱญ㈩ಽࠍ⛽ᜬߒߡㅴ ࠎߛ႐วޔㄘᬺዞᬺੱญ৻ੱᒰߚࠅߩㄘᬺ GDP ߪᕆỗߦᷫዋߔࠆߣ੍ᗐߐࠇࠆ৻ޕᣇߎޔ ߩ 15 ᐕ㑆߶ߤߩዞᬺੱญ৻ੱᒰߚࠅߩ㕖ㄘᬺ GDP ߪ߶ߣࠎߤߩ SSA ߩ࿖ߢᷫዋߒߡࠆޕ ߎߩะߪ․ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ߅ߡ㗼⪺ߢࠆ ޕᄙߊߩ SSA ⻉࿖ߦ․ޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ⽺࿎ࠍ ᷫߔࠆߦߪഭ㓸⚂ဳߩㅧᬺ߿ࠨࡆࠬࠢ࠲ߩ⊒ዷ߇ߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥޕஜోߥ㕖 ㄘᬺࠢ࠲ߩᚑ㐳ߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߇ᛴ߃ࠆᴦ⊛ߥ㗴ߩシᷫߦ߽⽸₂ߒ߁ࠆޕᣣᧄߪߎࠇ ࠄߩಽ㊁ߢߩេഥ⽸₂ߦߪᲧセఝ߇ࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆޕ 1-1 Introduction Over the past few decades the there has been a bipolarization of development performance among developing countries. At one pole are a number of developing countries with dynamic emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil. These have been experiencing high economic growth and have as a result become important players in global politics and economics. At the other pole are countries often described as fragile states (FS), many of which are situated in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These fragile states, as was discussed in a previous FASID report (FASID 2008), have governments that are either incapable or unwilling – or both – to provide essential services to their people. They suffer from governance problems, having policies and institutions too weak to support healthy development. The problems of sub-Saharan Africa have attracted the interest of many researchers and 8 organizations since at least 1980 when the Bretton Woods Institutions launched Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs). A multitude of papers, reports and books have been published on SSA since that time. Occasionally optimism is expressed, most recently when high economic growth rates were recorded by a number of sub-Saharan countries in the mid-2000s. But the development community is not fully convinced that a viable and sustainable development path has taken hold in these countries and optimism may be fading as the current serious global economic slowdown, with its accompanying sharp fall in commodity prices, continues its course1. The argument of this paper is that in many cases, past attempts to analyze, propose and implement development assistance for SSA countries have lacked sufficiently long-term vision and strategy. The paper analyzes sectoral economic performance of the SSA region and of the fragile countries within it. Based on these analyses, simple forecasts for the SSA economies are made by sector, with a particular focus on agriculture, to identify why development does not take hold in SSA’s fragile states what is required for this to happen. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses recent trends in development thinking with special attention to SSA. Section 3 analyzes the sectoral economic performance of SSA countries with a focus on agriculture, the largest sector in terms of GDP and employment, and based on the analysis makes simple projections. Section 4 proposes the direction that the international development community, including the new JICA, might go in with their assistance programs for SSA countries. 1-2 Trends of Development Assistance Thinking on SSA Development assistance strategies, concepts and implementation for SSA have evolved over time; from large infrastructure projects closely coordinated with recipient governments until the late 1970s, to addressing “government failures” and policy issues under the Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) in the 1980s and early 1990s, and then on to poverty reduction through strengthening health and education systems and governance institutions from the late 1990s (Akiyama et al 2003). These strategies and concepts and their implementation were often proposed and championed by “experts” who had only limited knowledge of the region, with the result that frequent changes in emphasis often confused aid practitioners and recipient country governments. Examining various ideas about development of recent years and critical evaluations of them, the following seem to be gaining currency: - It is important to strengthen the factors that contribute to economic growth. Since the late 1990s, the international development community has emphasized a concept of poverty 1 See, for example, Financial Times (2009) 9 reduction which entails assistance to human capital formation activities such as health and education . At this time, however, some analysts seem to recognize that this emphasis has gone a too far at the cost of economic growth (Ndulu 2007: 8). In the absence of economic growth, infrastructure that supports human capital cannot be maintained. - Government is important. The government-led development strategies followed until around 1980 were criticized because there was “government failure” in sub-Saharan Africa. This situation led to Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) which embodied a strategy of reducing the government’s role in economic activities, the main element of SAL conditionalities. Subsequently, however, evaluation of market reforms has shown that the existence of politically-powerful champions of reform in recipient countries is a condition for successful policy reform (World Bank 1995, Ndulu 2007). This conclusion effectively establishes the importance to economic development of the government. - There is a need for increasingly detailed and concrete suggestions. The basic tone of the SAL conditionalities was libertarian. It assumed that reducing the role of government and creating a development-enabling environment would automatically persuade the private sector to participate and prosper. Having recognized that things do not necessarily work this way in SSA, studies on more concrete impediments to economic growth have been carried out (World Bank 2004, Broadman 2007). - There are difficulties with policy and institutional reforms. There was optimism about policy reform when SALs were launched in the 1980s, but actual implementation proved disappointing. It became increasingly understood that meaningful policy reform is deeply connected to social and political institutions developed over a long period of time and that changing them requires a profound knowledge of the recipient countries which the donors lacked (Lancaster 1999). - There are difficulties in promoting agricultural sector growth in SSA. The developing assistance community appears to have shied away from assistance to non-agricultural sectors, preferring to concentrate on agriculture in SSA following the traumatizing failed industrialization policies of the 1960s, soon after SSA countries gained independence. The failure of post-independence industrialization policy in Ghana has become a symbol of this failure. Another reason for attention to agriculture was that it has been the main source of employment. But in spite of tremendous efforts by the international community over several decades to strengthen agriculture, the results have not been satisfactory. The difficulty of the agricultural sector has been recognized for some time (Lele 1991) and a recent World Bank evaluation report provides detailed reasons for the unsatisfactory results (World Bank 2007), including institutional and incentive system problems at the Bank, 10 itself. As the analysis below suggests, it is doubtful whether most SSA countries will be able to increase their per-capita income in the future. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that agriculture is a land- and water-intensive industry and by the fact that the rate of population growth in the SSA region is the world’s highest. This means that most SSA countries are fast losing comparative advantage in agriculture. - There are considerable political, economic and social differences among SSA countries. This implies that a “one size fits all” approach should not be pursued. Although there should be no argument about this statement, the reality is that the cookie-cutter approach has been popular and aid practitioners have always looked for “best practices.” Probably the reasons for this are related to institutional problems in the aid organizations. Prominent experts, usually economists, do not have in-depth knowledge of many developing countries but love to make sweeping statements on how development assistance should be provided. This often leads to some popular theme, which once adopted by an influential organizations like the World Bank will inspire many studies to support it. When this happens, it becomes very difficult for anyone to voice opposition. Aid practitioners on the ground, conversely, are not well enough equipped theoretically or hierarchically to question the prevailing theme. Many of them lack deep knowledge of the country they are working on and confidence about what path to follow. Slogans also are attractive because they play a role in raising general public awareness; the MDGs are a recently example of this. - Active participation by the private sector is indispensable for economic growth. Possibly the most important lesson from East Asia’s miraculous economic growth experience is that fostering the private sector is essential. In spite of the clarity of this lesson, the international community has been hesitant to attend to private sector development. This attitude is due mainly to the nature of ODA, which is government-to-government (G-to-G) assistance. There have been efforts to create environments friendly to private sector development, but given the slow growth of the private sector in SSA, innovative measures aimed at assisting private sector growth more directly should be studied. 1-3 Overview of the Economies and Prospects of SSA Countries This section examines the economic performance in SSA by sector over the last several years and makes simple projections. The economic analyses focus on value-added and working population in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors2. The agricultural sector is analyzed in 2 These data are from the World Bank website 11 more depth using data on agricultural land, agricultural labor and agricultural sector value-added 3. Table 1 shows statistics of average annual growth rates (% p. a.) of GDP4 by sector and per working population, and total and sectoral working populations for the period 1990-2002. The countries covered are 43 SSA countries further divided into two sub-groups of 17 fragile states and 26 non- fragile states5. Selection of the countries was based on data availability. For the period covered, GDP for the total 43 countries increased by 2.7 % p.a., but on a per working population basis there was a complete stagnation. Breaking the data down into the two sub-groups of fragile and non-fragile states, the GDP growth rates were 2.1% p.a. and 2.9% p.a. respectively. These figures on a per capita basis are -0.4% p.a. and 0.3% p.a. respectively. Among the three groups considered – the total 43 countries and the two sub-groups of non-fragile states (26) and fragile states (17) – the total countries and the non-fragile states both show relatively balanced sectoral growth; sectoral growth rates for these groups range between 2.1% p.a. and 3.1% p.a. Conversely, in the fragile states group, agriculture shows the highest growth rate (3.8% p.a.), but growth rates for other sectors are very low, 1.8% p.a. for industry and only 1.2% p.a. for services. 㪫㪸㪹㫃㪼㩷㪈㪑㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㪸㫃㩷㪞㪛㪧㩷㪸㫅㪻㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿㩷㪩㪸㫋㪼㫊㪒㩷㪈㪐㪐㪇㪄㪉㪇㪇㪉㩷㩿㩼㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀 㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㪋㪊㩷㪚㫆㫌㫅㫋㫉㫀㪼㫊 㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㩷㩷㪥㫆㫅㪄㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃 㪧㪼㫉㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㪼㫉 㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃 㪧㪼㫉㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㪼㫉 㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃 㪧㪼㫉㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㪼㫉 㪞㪛㪧 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷 㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐㩷 㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺 㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃㩷 㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼 㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐 㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺 㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃 㪊㪅㪋 㪉㪅㪈 㪉㪅㪏 㪉㪅㪎 㪈㪅㪍 㪄㪈㪅㪍 㪇㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪏 㪈㪅㪍 㪇㪅㪐 㪉㪅㪈 4 5 㪄㪇㪅㪋 㪊㪅㪈 㪉㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪉 㪉㪅㪐 㪈㪅㪏 㪋㪅㪉 㪈㪅㪈 㪋㪅㪊 㪉㪅㪇 㪋㪅㪈 㪉㪅㪎 㪉㪅㪎 㪉㪅㪎 Source: Author 3 㪉㪅㪎 㪄㪉㪅㪐 These data re from FAO website In 2000 constant US$ See Annex I for countries analyzed. 12 㪈㪅㪇 㪄㪈㪅㪈 㪇㪅㪊 㪫㪸㪹㫃㪼㩷㪉㪑㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㪸㫃㩷㪞㪛㪧㩷㪸㫅㪻㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪪㪿㪸㫉㪼㫊㩷㪸㫅㪻㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿㩷㪹㫐㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㪒㩷㪈㪐㪐㪇㪄㪉㪇㪇㪉 㪞㪛㪧 㪮㫆㫉㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㪁 㪘㫍㪼㫉㪸㪾㪼 㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿 㩿㩼㪀 㩿㩼㩷㫇㫆㫀㫅㫋㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀 㪘㫍㪼㫉㪸㪾㪼 㩿㩼㪀 㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿 㩿㩼㩷㫇㫆㫀㫅㫋㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀 㪋㪊㩷㪺㫆㫌㫅㫋㫉㫀㪼㫊 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼 㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐 㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺 㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃 㪈㪏㪅㪇 㪊㪊㪅㪍 㪋㪏㪅㪋 㪈㪇㪇㪅㪇 㪇㪅㪈㪊 㪄㪇㪅㪈㪏 㪇㪅㪇㪋 㪍㪋㪅㪋 㪊㪌㪅㪍 㪄㪇㪅㪌㪋 㪇㪅㪌㪋 㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㫊㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼 㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐 㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺 㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃 㪉㪋㪅㪐 㪋㪉㪅㪏 㪊㪉㪅㪊 㪈㪇㪇㪅㪇 㪇㪅㪋㪉 㪄㪇㪅㪉㪇 㪄㪇㪅㪊㪋 㪌㪌㪅㪏 㪋㪋㪅㪉 㪄㪇㪅㪎㪌 㪇㪅㪎㪌 㪥㫆㫅㪄㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼 㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐 㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺 㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃 㪈㪋㪅㪏 㪉㪐㪅㪊 㪌㪍㪅㪇 㪈㪇㪇㪅㪇 㪇㪅㪇㪊 㪄㪇㪅㪈㪋 㪇㪅㪈㪌 㪎㪇㪅㪍 㪉㪐㪅㪋 㪄㪇㪅㪋㪇 㪇㪅㪋㪇 㩷 * Industry includes Services, etc Source: Author 13 On a per working person basis, the agricultural sector in fragile states shows higher growth rates than the agricultural sector in non-fragile states, 2.7% p.a. versus 1.0% p.a. The reason behind this seems mainly to be the slow rate of growth of the agricultural working population, 1.1% p.a. for fragile states and 2.0% p.a. for non-fragile states. Because a breakdown of working population data between industry and services is unavailable, growth rates per working person for non-agriculture GDP were calculated (This is shown as “Industry” in Table 1). These figures are negative for all three country groups, but the figure for fragile states (-2.6% p.a.) is considerably lower than that for the non-fragile states (-1.1% p.a.). Working population growth rates by sector given in the lower portion of Table 1 show that non-agricultural sectors had considerably higher rates of population growth than the agricultural sectors for all three groups. Some countries such as South Africa and Mauritius have recorded absolute decline inn agricultural working population in recent years. These differences in sectoral population growth rates are the main reason why per working person agricultural GDP growth rates are higher than those for non-agricultural sectors. This is also evident in Table 2 which shows sectoral shares of GDP and working population and their changes over time. Agriculture contributed 18% to total GDP on average for the period in the 43 countries and has increased by 0.13% points on average each year. Corresponding figures for the fragile states are 24.9% and 0.42% points p.a. For the non-fragile states these figures are 14.8% and 0.03% points p.a. These statistics show that for the period 1990-2002, GDP per working person for SSA countries has stagnated. The breakdown shows that the agricultural sector has shown positive growth but non-agricultural sectors have recorded significant declines. This is especially true for fragile states which show a 2.9% p.a. decline in non-agricultural GDP per working person. Despite this decline, and as reflected in GDP per working person, the level of income in non-agricultural sectors is still considerably higher than in agriculture. This is probably the main reason why the share of the non-agricultural working population is increasing. The analysis above shows that agricultural sectors performed considerably better than non-agricultural sectors. The question is, can this continue or even accelerate to become the engine of SSA economic growth?. To examine this question some statistics on the agricultural sector are given in Table 3. Table 3 shows that agricultural GDP per working person has been increasing for the three groups of countries, helped by increases in land productivity (Agriculture GDP/Agriculture Land) and land expansion. It also shows that agricultural land per working population (Agriculture Land/AG. WP) has been declining at 0.87% p.a., 0.57% p.a., and 0.98% p.a. for the 43 countries, FS and non-FS respectively. Given the significant population increases expected in the SSA countries, land productivity and expansion have to increase dramatically for the agricultural sector to serve as an engine of growth. 14 Simple exercises were performed to make projections for the agricultural GDP per agricultural working population up to 2030 for the 43 SSA countries individually and as a group, and for the 17 FS and 26 non-FS states. Such projections should provide good indications of how much the agricultural sector can contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction in these countries. To conduct this exercise the variable was broken down to the following three components: Ag. GDP/Ag. WP = Ag. Production Index/Ag. Land *Ag. Price Index* Ag. Land / Ag. WP where Ag. Price Index = Agricultural price index; Ag. GDP/Ag. Production Index Ag.WP = Agricultural working population Ag.Land = Agricultural land (Arable land and permanent crops) Ag. WP = Working population in agriculture Ag. GDP was broken down to the product of Ag. Production Index and Ag. Price Index, which was derived by dividing Ag. GDP by Ag. Production Index, to enable projections of the physical productivity of land (Ag. Production Index/Ag. Land). In addition to this variable, projections were made for Ag. Price Index, Ag. Land and Ag. WP. Projections for these variables were carried out in the following ways: Ag. GDP/Ag. Land and Ag. Land Three time-series regressions (linear, log linear and double log) were performed to identify the best fit for these variables for each of the 43 countries. These equations were used for projections. Agricultural Working Population Two sets of projections were conducted; one using the same growth rates as the UN projections for the total population and the other one adjusted for the fact that the growth rate of agricultural working population is considerably smaller than that of total population.6 Agricultural Price Index This variable is assumed to stay constant throughout the projection period at the average value of the period 2001-2005. Ag. GDP per Ag. Working Population was projected also for the three aggregates; 43 SSA countries, 17 FSs and 26 non-FSs. These were calculated using the weighted average of relevant countries with Ag. GDP average for the period 2001-2005 as weights. Projection results are given in Table 4 and Figures 1-4. This exercise clearly indicates that the prospects for agricultural GDP and land per working agricultural population critically depend on where the incremental population over the next few decades will work. Prospects for agricultural GDP per working person is positive only if a large portion of the incremental population goes to 6 See Annex II for more detailed explanation. 15 non-agricultural sectors. This implies that it is very difficult if not impossible for the agricultural sector to absorb the expected population increase, especially in the fragile states of SSA. This is the case considering the limited expansion of land suitable for agriculture (As Figures 3 and 4 show, this is especially the case with FS.), the declining availability of water, the possible detrimental effects of global warming7 and the expected high population growth. The conclusion is that the non-agricultural sector must grow to accommodate the growing population. Unfortunately, however, industry and service sector GDP per working population has been declining sharply since 1990. Most SSA countries will not achieve meaningful overall economic growth without significant growth in these sectors, especially the fragile states. 㪫㪸㪹㫃㪼㩷㪊㪑㩷㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿㩷㪩㪸㫋㪼㫊㩷㫆㪽㩷㪢㪼㫐㩷㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪸㫃㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㩷㪭㪸㫉㫀㪸㪹㫃㪼㫊㪒㩷㪈㪐㪐㪇㪄㪉㪇㪇㪉㩷㩿㩼㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀 㪋㪊㩷㪚㫆㫌㫅㫋㫉㫀㪼㫊 㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㪥㫆㫅㪄㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪞㪛㪧㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪮㪧 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪞㪛㪧㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪣㪸㫅㪻 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪣㪸㫅㪻 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪸㫃㩷㪮㪧 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㫃㪸㫅㪻㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪮㪧 㪈㪅㪍㪋 㪈㪅㪉㪎 㪇㪅㪏㪎 㪈㪅㪎㪍 㪄㪇㪅㪏㪎 㪉㪅㪍㪉 㪈㪅㪇㪉 㪇㪅㪍㪈 㪈㪅㪈㪐 㪄㪇㪅㪌㪎 㪈㪅㪇㪈 㪈㪅㪊㪎 㪈㪅㪇㪎 㪉㪅㪇㪎 㪄㪇㪅㪐㪏 Source: Author 㪫㪸㪹㫃㪼㩷㪋㪑㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㪼㪻㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿㩷㪩㪸㫋㪼㫊㩷㫆㪽㩷㪢㪼㫐㩷㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪸㫃㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㩷㪭㪸㫉㫀㪸㪹㫃㪼㫊㪒㩷㪉㪇㪇㪍㪄㪉㪇㪊㪇㩷㩿㩼㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀 㪋㪊㩷㪚㫆㫌㫅㫋㫉㫀㪼㫊 㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㪥㫆㫅㪄㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪞㪛㪧㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪮㪧㪁 㩷㪑㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅 㩷㪑㩷㪘㪻㫁㫌㫊㫋㪼㪻㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅 㪄㪇㪅㪇㪋 㪉㪅㪌㪐 㪄㪇㪅㪉㪏 㪈㪅㪎㪐 㪇㪅㪈㪏 㪊㪅㪉㪍 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪞㪛㪧㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪣㪸㫅㪻 㪇㪅㪐㪇 㪈㪅㪍㪈 㪇㪅㪌㪋 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪣㪸㫅㪻 㪈㪅㪇㪐 㪇㪅㪏㪋 㪈㪅㪉㪎 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪸㫃㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅 㩷㪑㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅 㩷㪑㩷㪘㪻㫁㫌㫊㫋㪼㪻㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅 㪉㪅㪈㪋 㪈㪅㪋㪎 㪉㪅㪈㪋 㪈㪅㪇㪍 㪉㪅㪈㪋 㪈㪅㪍㪍 㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㫃㪸㫅㪻㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪮㪧 㩷㪑㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅 㩷㪑㩷㪘㪻㫁㫌㫊㫋㪼㪻㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅 㪄㪈㪅㪇㪋 㪈㪅㪇㪏 㪄㪈㪅㪇㪈 㪇㪅㪉㪊 㪄㪈㪅㪇㪌 㪈㪅㪋㪋 * Agricultural Working Population Source: Author 7 See, for example, Dinar et al (2008) 16 Figure 1: Actual and Projected Agricultural GDP per Agricultural Working Population; 1981-2030 (Assuming Agricultural Working Population Increasing less than the Total Population) 㪊㪃㪇㪇㪇 㪉㪃㪌㪇㪇 㪉㪃㪇㪇㪇 㪈㪃㪌㪇㪇 㪈㪃㪇㪇㪇 㪌㪇㪇 㪉㪇㪉㪐 㪉㪇㪉㪍 㪉㪇㪉㪊 㪉㪇㪉㪇 㪉㪇㪈㪎 㪉㪇㪈㪋 㪉㪇㪈㪈 㪉㪇㪇㪏 㪉㪇㪇㪌 㪉㪇㪇㪉 㪈㪐㪐㪐 㪈㪐㪐㪍 㪈㪐㪐㪊 㪈㪐㪐㪇 㪈㪐㪏㪎 㪈㪐㪏㪋 㪈㪐㪏㪈 㪇 Source: Author Figure 2: Actual and Projected Agricultural GDP per Agricultural Working Population; 1981-2030 (Assuming Agricultural Working Population Increasing the same as the Total Population) 㪈㪃㪍㪇㪇 㪈㪃㪋㪇㪇 㪈㪃㪉㪇㪇 㪈㪃㪇㪇㪇 㪏㪇㪇 㪍㪇㪇 㪋㪇㪇 㪉㪇㪇 Source: Author 17 㪉㪇㪉㪐 㪉㪇㪉㪍 㪉㪇㪉㪊 㪉㪇㪉㪇 㪉㪇㪈㪎 㪉㪇㪈㪋 㪉㪇㪈㪈 㪉㪇㪇㪏 㪉㪇㪇㪌 㪉㪇㪇㪉 㪈㪐㪐㪐 㪈㪐㪐㪍 㪈㪐㪐㪊 㪈㪐㪐㪇 㪈㪐㪏㪎 㪈㪐㪏㪋 㪈㪐㪏㪈 㪇 Figure 3: Actual and Projected Agricultural Land per Agricultural Working Population; 1981-2030 (Assuming Agricultural Working Population Increasing less than the Total Population) 㪐㪇㪅㪇 㪏㪇㪅㪇 㪎㪇㪅㪇 㪍㪇㪅㪇 㪌㪇㪅㪇 㪋㪇㪅㪇 㪊㪇㪅㪇 㪉㪇㪅㪇 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪉㪇㪉㪐 㪉㪇㪉㪍 㪉㪇㪉㪊 㪉㪇㪉㪇 㪉㪇㪈㪎 㪉㪇㪈㪋 㪉㪇㪈㪈 㪉㪇㪇㪏 㪉㪇㪇㪌 㪉㪇㪇㪉 㪈㪐㪐㪐 㪈㪐㪐㪍 㪈㪐㪐㪊 㪈㪐㪐㪇 㪈㪐㪏㪎 㪈㪐㪏㪋 㪈㪐㪏㪈 㪇㪅㪇 Source: Author Figure 4: Actual and Projected Agricultural Land per Agricultural Working Population; 1981-2030 (Assuming Agricultural Working Population Increasing the same as the Total Population) 㪎㪇㪅㪇 㪍㪇㪅㪇 㪌㪇㪅㪇 㪋㪇㪅㪇 㪊㪇㪅㪇 㪉㪇㪅㪇 㪈㪇㪅㪇 Source: Author 18 㪉㪇㪉㪐 㪉㪇㪉㪍 㪉㪇㪉㪊 㪉㪇㪉㪇 㪉㪇㪈㪎 㪉㪇㪈㪋 㪉㪇㪈㪈 㪉㪇㪇㪏 㪉㪇㪇㪌 㪉㪇㪇㪉 㪈㪐㪐㪐 㪈㪐㪐㪍 㪈㪐㪐㪊 㪈㪐㪐㪇 㪈㪐㪏㪎 㪈㪐㪏㪋 㪈㪐㪏㪈 㪇㪅㪇 1-4 Importance of Development and Labor-Intensive Manufacturing and Services Sectors The sectoral analyses and projections above suggest that the major issue SSA countries, especially fragile ones, will face in the coming decades is employment, and this is mainly due to increasing population. Most SSA countries will face wide-spread unemployment or declining income per capita or both unless major steps are taken. Analyses shows that these steps should be in the area of labor-intensive manufacturing and services sectors Development of the labor-intensive manufacturing and services sectors will not only create jobs and make income grow, but will also have an important impact on the main political institutional issue faced by SSA countries; neopatrimonialism. As Ishikawa argues, the major political problem for SSA is neopatrimonialism. This is the issue Bates (1981) noted and that the international community has been addressing since the late 1970s. According to Ishikawa, it can be “overcome in the way that the Japanese advocate, by actively incorporating modernization elements supported by a growing middle class, or in the way that British analysts advocate, through early realization of democracy by strengthening competition among political parties.” (Ishikawa 2008: 2) Recent experience suggests that the “British approach” has not worked in many SSA countries, especially in the fragile ones. Various carrot-and-stick approaches have been tried but political institutions die hard. While some SSA countries are touted as “successes,” including Uganda and Tanzania, attempts to apply these countries’ “best practices” to other countries has met difficulty. Rural populations possess weak political power because they lack information and have low educational levels. Traditional rural ways of living do not provide sufficient incentives for rural populations to acquire information or attain high levels of education. As pointed out by Easterly (2006), incentive is the key to getting things accomplished. Development of these sectors and accompanying urbanization is likely to affect information flows efficiently and quickly8. This in turn would have a positive impact on political institutions, as note by World Bank (2005: 313): “In political markets, the information that voters have about the characteristics of political competitors and government performance is crucial.” Placing emphasis on the manufacturing and services sectors in urban areas is unlikely to weaken the agricultural sector. Not only does an emerging manufacturing and services sectors offer a market for agricultural products, as Japanese experience suggest most urbanites with roots in rural areas are supportive of a healthy rural agricultural sector. Probably the major obstacle to this proposed strategy will come from recipient governments Several chapters, especially 3 and 4 in Spence et al (2009) argue the relationship between urbanization and development. 8 19 characterized by neopatrimonialism because they are aware of the threat the middle-class can pose. As Ndulu argues “…what some governments still seem to fear the most is a private sector that generates wealth independent of government controls and that makes its own unfettered decision.” (Ndulu 2007:181) 1-5 Suggestions for JICA’s Strategies for SSA and Fragile States Our analyses in this paper suggest that prospects for the economies of most SSA countries, especially fragile ones, are rather grim. An important factor in this grim outlook is expected large population increases. Even under an optimistic scenario, per capita income of most SSA countries will barely increase or increase not at all. As discussed above, with little prospects for large increases in land suitable for agriculture, the long-term strategy for JICA in SSA should be to strengthen labor-intensive manufacturing and services sectors. The new JICA which can now utilize grants, loans and technical assistance in a coordinated manner is in an excellent position to implement an innovative multifaceted strategy toward assisting SSA countries. JICA seems to have a comparative advantage in relation to other major donors in pursuing such a strategy; more specifically: (1) Compared with many other donor aid organizations, the new JICA has the potential of adopting a long-term and hence in-depth approach to development. Staff evaluations are conducted over a longer term. Strategic thinking and strong leadership may have been lacking, but the new JICA is in a better position now to fill these lacunae. (2) Japanese experts are aware of the importance of the manufacturing sector from Japan’s own economic development experience and that of other East Asian countries. (3) With many competent private sector baby-boomers retiring, JICA can usefully obtain cooperation from these experienced people to assist in the development of private manufacturing sectors in SSA. (4) Japan’s strength in assistance has been on building and strengthening economic infrastructure. This activity is indispensable for the suggested strategy. (5) Japan is eager to assist SSA; this is clearly reflected in its sponsorship of the TICADs. A recent paper by Watanabe (2008) emphasizes the importance of a strategy focused on economic growth, government-private sector cooperation, and the role of government in the context of industrial policy. In this context, recently Japanese development researchers have conducted several interesting studies that could contribute to forming the needed strategy. 20 Below are some suggested directions the new JICA might consider in formulating strategies toward SSA countries, especially the fragile ones. In pursuing a strategy, recent lessons of development discussed in Section 2 above should be taken into consideration. - Developing and strengthening private manufacturing and services sectors. It is clear that the main reason behind East Asian economic development was the rapid growth of the private sector. The international development community is well aware of this but has limited its activities in this area because its mandate is to deal with the governments of recipient countries. What activities there have been have been mainly about creating an environment for private sector growth. Private firms in most SSA countries critically need information and expertise on conducting international business. Japan’s own development experiences would be very valuable to the private sectors in SSA countries and more direct technical assistance to private firms would be desirable. In Vietnam, for example, Japan has valuable experience in assisting with the design of a long-term development plan; and in Kenya there has been a detailed study of industrial sector development9. - Designing comprehensive multifaceted development strategies. It has become clear that the fundamental problem in most SSA countries is the weakness of their institutions; and as North (1990) notes, building or strengthening institutions requires a long time as they are intrinsically related with history and culture. The world developing assistance community has not yet figured out how to tackle this issue effectively. situation, an integrated and long-term approach is necessary. approach is the Ishikawa project. Given this One example of such It would be worthwhile for JICA to review this approach and assess whether such an approach can be applied to SSA. - Infrastructure building. Japanese assistance has been characterized by an emphasis on infrastructure building and this approach has met success in helping East Asia’s economies to grow. Applying this approach in SSA has been much discussed and somewhat implemented; this effort should be strengthened and expanded. - Strengthening agriculture and rural organizations. There are several promising approaches being studied and/or implemented by Japan in this area. These include the REPEAT project by FASID/GRIPS and a number of projects carried out by the Sasakawa Foundations. In addition Japan’s own agricultural producers’ organizations should be See http://lvzopac.jica.go.jp/external/library?func=function.opacsch.mmindex&view=view.op acsch.toshoshozodsp&shoshisbt=1&shoshino=0000173976&volno=0 9 21 studied with a view toward application in SSA. The importance of such organizations is argued by Hayami. 1-6 Concluding Remarks This paper briefly reviewed the strategies that have been applied by the international development assistance community to SSA over the past few decades and identified lessons that have been learned. These lessons suggest that development of SSA, especially the fragile states, is an extremely complex issue. Consequently, as the recent cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan show, the world community seems at a loss on what direction to take. Over the last decade the aid community has focused its development efforts on achieving the MDGs. However it is becoming unpleasantly clear that most SSA countries will not be able to reach them10. Such failure after putting tremendous human and financial resources toward the effort will definitely drive the development community to some serious soul searching as to what did not go right. Japan should participate in such an exercise. This paper recommends more concerted and detailed efforts to foster labor-intensive manufacturing and service sectors. If SSA countries are to achieve a decent level of income given their rapidly increasing populations, fostering manufacturing and services sectors appears to be the only recourse. There are reasons why this approach has not been adopted and there are difficulties that it poses. However, this issue demands a long term perspective. We have to start somewhere sometime, and this is as good a time as any. 10 Better start late than never. See latest on MDGs in SSA, Easterly (2009) 22 References Akiyama, Takamasa, S. Akiyama and N. Minato (2003), International Development Assistance: Evolution and Prospects with specific reference to the World Bank and Japan, FASID and also Chisenshokan (in Japanese) Bates, Robert H. (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies, Berkeley University of California Press Broadman, Harry G. (2007) Africa’s Silk Road, World Bank Dinar, Ariel, Rashid Hassan, Robert Mendelsohn, and others (2008) Climate Change and Agriculture in Africa, Earthscan EasterlyޔWilliam (2006) The White Man’s Burden, Penguin Books ___________ (2009) “How the Millennium Goals are Unfair to Africa” World Development Vol. 37, No.1 FASID (2009) Study on “Development Strategy of Fragile States, Globalization and International Development Research, FASID Financial Times (2009) “Africa’s Aid Plea as ‘Development Crisis’ Looms,” March 17 2009 Ishikawa, Shigeru (2008) “Comparison of African and Asian Development Models: For Mutual Understanding of International Development Policies Between Japan and the United Kingdom” FASID Discussion Paper No. 14, FASID Lancaster, Carol (1999) Aid to Africa; So Much to Do So Little Done, University of Chicago Press Lele, Uma (1991) ed. Aid to African Agriculture: Lesson from Two Decades of Donors’ Experience, Johns University Press for the World Bank North, Douglass (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance Cambridge University Press Ndulu, Benno J. (2007) Challenges of African Growth, The World Bank Spence, Michael, Patricia Clarke Annez and Robert M. Buckley ed. (2009) Urbanization and Growth, Commission on Growth and Development, World Bank Watanabe, Matsuo (2008) “Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy in Transition: An Interpretation of TICAD IV”, Japan Aktuell 3/2008, Global and Area Studies World Bank (2004) Doing Business, World Bank ___________ (2005) Economic Growth in the 1990s; Learning from a Decade of Reform, World Bank ___________ (2007) World Bank Assistance to Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa; An IEG Review, IEG World Bank 23 Annex I: 43 SSA Countries Analyzed Fragile states are those with “FS” in brackets. They have World Bank CPIA below 3.2 Angola (FS) Benin Burkina Fasso Burundi Cape Verde Central African Rep. (FS) Chad (FS) Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. (FS) Comoros (FS) Botswana (FS) Cameroon (FS) Cote d’Ivoire (FS) Equatorial Guinea Gabon Gambia, the (FS) Guinea (FS) Guinea Bissau (FS) Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania (FS) Mauritius Mozambique Nambia Niger Nigeria (FS) Rwanda S. Tome&Principe (FS) Senegal Seychelles South Africa Sudan (FS) Swaziland Tanzania Togo (FS) Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe (FS) 24 Annex II: Description of Methodology used in Projecting Agricultural Working Population Two sets of calculations were made to project agricultural working population for the 43 SSA countries: (1) In the first set of projections, the agricultural working population for each country was assumed to increase at the rate of increase of the total country population as projected by the UN (see .http://esa.un.org/unpp/). (2) In the second set of projections, it was assumed that the past trend would continue of the growth rate of the agricultural working population being considerably lower than that of the population overall. More specifically the following formula was used for each country. AGWPGR = UNPRGR x AGWPGR01-05/UNGR01-05 Where AGWPGR = projected growth rate of agricultural working population UNPRGR = UN projected growth rate of total population AGWPGR = average actual agricultural working population growth rate for the period 2001-2005 UNGR = average actual total population growth rate for the period 2001-2005 25 ╙ 2 ┨ ᧲ࠕࡈࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻ Chapter 2 Democratization and Decentralization in East Africa JICA ⎇ⓥᚲᏨ⎇ⓥຬ㩷 ╣ጟ㓶৻ Yuichi Sasaoka (Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute) <Abstract> Ethnicity-driven politics is a major cause of fragility in many Sub-Saharan Africa countries today. This paper examines political conditions in East African community (EAC) with a focus on democratization and decentralization. Tanzania has attained some level of democratization and political stability due to inclusive policies created in the Nyerere's time, even though there are governance issues. However, Kenya and Uganda have not attained political stability yet. A part of the problem could be probably alleviated by the introduction and facilitation of democratic decentralization policy and its related strategic measures, although there are other critical issues such as those related to the government budget and wide-spread of poverty. An emerging task for Uganda is the facilitation of multi-party system, and the new challenge for Kenya is democratic decentralization. Democratization and decentralization complement each other, while they are closely related to the history of state formation. In order to make sound assessment on these two important political principles, we need to examine the pre-colonial social structure, colonial legacy and the political process after independence driven by ethno-politics. This paper attempts to show that the Horizontal Inequality (HI) hypothesis is quite relevant in explaining the difference of the political processes in Uganda and Kenya, especially the relationship between ethnicity and democratization. This paper also evaluates the importance of new regional organization (EAC) and extracts some policy implications for future development assistance. 2-1 ߪߓߦ 䉰䊑䉰䊊䊤䉝䊐䊥䉦䋨એਅ䇸䉝䊐䊥䉦䇹䋩䈱࿖ኅ䈲䇮⁛┙એ㒠㐳ᦼ㑆䈮䉒䈢䈦䈩㐿⊒䈱ṛ䈫ᘟᕈ⊛ 䈭⚗䈮䉂䉁䉒䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ㄭઍ࿖ኅ䈱ᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈲 1960 ᐕઍ䈱ᄙ䈒䈱࿖ኅ䈱⁛┙䈏␜ 䈜䉋䈉䈮䇮ઁ䈱㐿⊒ㅜၞ䈫Ყ䈼䈩㕖Ᏹ䈮ㆃ䉏䈩㐿ᆎ䈘䉏䈢䇯࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈱ㆊ⒟䈲ᬀ᳃ᦼ䈱 ੱᎿ⊛䈭䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ᓇ㗀䉕ฃ䈔䇮㑆ធ⛔ᴦ(indirect rule)䈱ㇺว䈎䉌䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ု⋥⊛䈭㑐 ଥ䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈢䇯ᰴ䈮䇮⁛┙ᓟ䇮ᄙ䈒䈱ᒻᑼ⊛䈮᳃ਥ⊛䈭䈲䈜䈓䈮ᮭᆭਥ⟵⊛䉇৻ౄ 䈮ᄌᦝ䈘䉏䈢䈏䇮᧲಄ᚢ䈫䈇䈉࿖㓙ⅣႺ䈲䈖䈱⁁ᘒ䉕⛽ᜬ䈜䉎ᣇะ䈮䈇䈢䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢⚻ㆊ䉕 ⚻䈩䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱Ꮢ᳃䈲࿖ኅ䈮ኻ䈚䈩㕖Ᏹ䈮⼊ᚓ⊛䈎䇮ዋ䈭䈒䈫䉅ᶖᭂ⊛䈭ᗧ⼂䉕䉅䈧䉋䈉䈮䈭䈦 䈢䇯 ᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱䉬䊆䉝䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱 3 䉦࿖䋨એਅ䇸3 䉦࿖䇹䋩䈲䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈪䉅Ყセ⊛䈮ቯ䈚䇮 26 ᚑ㐳䈚䈩䈇䉎࿖䈫䉂䈭䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮ᴦ⊛䈭ቯᕈ䉕੨ฃ䈚䈩䈇䉎䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯2007 ᐕ 12 䋭08 ᐕ 2 䈱䉬䊆䉝䈪䈱ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬᓟ䈱േ䈲䈠䉏䉕‛⺆䉎䋨ᱫ⠪ 1000 ฬએ䇮࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃ 30 ਁੱ䋩1䇯䉁䈢䇮1970䋭80 ᐕઍ䈱䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲䉝䊚䊮⁛ⵙᮭ䈱⯦Ვ䋨ᱫ⠪ 30 ਁੱએ䋩䉇 1980 ᐕઍ೨ඨ䈱ౝᚢ䋨ᱫ⠪ 30䋭50 ਁੱ䋩䈪ᄙ䈒䈱‶†䉕䉂䈢2䇯䈖䉏䉌䈲ᮭജ䉕䉄䈓䉎䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞㓸 ࿅䈱ኻ┙䈮䉋䉍ᒁ䈐䈖䈘䉏䈢䈫䈖䉐䈏䈅䉎䇯1986 ᐕ䈮ᚑ┙䈚䈢䊛䉶䊔䊆ᮭ䈲ቯ䈚䈢ᴦ䉕ታ 䈚䈢䈏䇮ർㇱၞ䈪䈲 LRA(Lord Resistance Army)䈫䈇䈉․ᱶ䈭ജ㓸࿅䈱ᵴേ䈏የ䉕ᒁ䈇䈢䇯 䉝䊐䊥䉦䈪ᦨ䉅ቯ䈚䈢࿖䈱৻䈧䈪䈅䉎䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈪䈜䉌䉅䇮2000 ᐕ 11 䈱ㆬᓟ䈱䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦 䈱ઙ䈪䈲 50 ฬએ䈱ᱫ⠪䇮600 ฬ䈱㔍᳃䈏⊒↢䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯 3 䉦࿖䈲ૐᚲᓧ࿖䈪䈅䉍䇮䉬䊆䉝䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱 2 䉦࿖䈲䇸⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ䇹䈮ಽ㘃䈘䉏䉎䈖䈫䉅ᄙ䈇3䇯ᐔဋ ⊛䈭Ꮢ᳃䈲⽺䈚䈇ㄘ᳃䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮ㇺᏒ䈫ㄘ䇮䈱⢈ᴅᐲ䈭䈬࿖ౝ䈱␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈲ዊ 䈘䈒䈭䈇䇯3 䉦࿖䈲⁛┙ᤨὐ䈪䈲䈎䈭䉍㘃ૃ䈚䈢ᴦ᭴ㅧ䇮ᄙ᳃ᣖᕈ䇮㐿⊒╷䉕䈚䈩䈇䈢䈏䇮 䈠䈱ᓟ⋧ᒰ䈮⇣䈭䉎ᴦㆊ⒟䉇⚗䉕⚻䈢䇯䈠䈱⋧㆑䈱⸃䈲䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦⻉࿖䈮䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡷ㕟 䉕䈐䈎䈔䉎వㅴ࿖䈮䈫䈦䈩ᄢ䈐䈭⺖㗴䈪䈅䉎䇯ᧄⓂ䈪䈲䈖䉏䉕 3 䉦࿖䈱᳃ਥൻ䇮ಽᮭൻ䇮࿖ኅ ᒻᚑ䈱 3 ⠪䈱㑐ଥ䋨એਅ䇸3 ⠪䈱㑐ଥ䇹䋩䇮․䈮᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱ⷰὐ䈎䉌⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯䈖䉏䉌䈲䉧䊋 䊅䊮䉴䈱ਛᔃ⊛䈭⺖㗴䈪䈅䉍䇮ᴦ⊛ቯᕈ䉇㐿⊒䈱ലᕈ(effectiveness)䈮䉅ᷓ䈒㑐ଥ䈚䈩䈇 䉎䇯 ᧄⓂ䈱⿰ᣦ䈲䇮䇸⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ䇹䈱ᴦ䈱⣀ᒙᕈ䈱ᄢ䈐䈭ℂ↱䈫䈚䈩䇮ᴦ䈏䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮ᡰ㈩䈘䉏 䈩䈐䈢ὐ䉕⠨⸽䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈅䉎䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲⺖㗴䈲䈅䉎䉅䈱䈱䇮䊆䉣䊧䊧䈱ഞ❣䉅䈅䈦䈩᳃ਥൻ䈫 ᴦ⊛ቯᕈ䉕㆐ᚑ䈪䈐䈢䈫䈖䉐䈏䈅䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲ਇቯⷐ⚛䈏䉁䈣ᄢ䈐䈒ሽ 䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䉏䈲ಽᮭൻ╷䈱ផㅴ䈪ㇱಽ⊛䈮⸃䈪䈐䉎䈫䈖䉐䈏䈅䉎䇯ᓟ䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ⶄᢙ ౄ䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈉ᣂ䈚䈇⺖㗴䈏᧪䈜䉎䈭䈎䈪䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱⋧ଦㅴ⊛ 䈭㑐ଥ䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯 䋼3 䉦࿖䈱㑐ଥ䋾 3 䉦࿖䈲ᣥ⧷࿖ᬀ᳃䈫䈚䈩 1960 ᐕઍ䈱ᱴ䈬หᤨᦼ䈮⁛┙䈚䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮10 ᐕ䉅䈜䉎䈫䉬䊆䉝䈲⾗ ᧄਥ⟵䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲䉝䊐䊥䉦␠ળਥ⟵䈫⇣䈭䉎╷䈏ዷ㐿䈘䉏䈢䇯1970 ᐕઍᧃ䈮䈲䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈫 䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲⚗䉕⚻㛎䈚䈢䇯3 䉦࿖䈲䊎䉪䊃䊥䉝ḓ䉕䉖䈪㓞ធ䈚䇮1918 ᐕ䈎䉌⁛┙䉁䈪⧷࿖䈱㑆 ធ⛔ᴦਅ䈮䈅䉍䇮⁛┙⋥ᓟ䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ታൻ䈚䈭䈎䈦䈢䈏ㅪ㇌(federation)䉕ណ↪䈚䈢䇯 䈘䉌䈮䇮3 䉦࿖䈲 1967 ᐕ䈎䉌 70 ᐕઍᧃ䉁䈪᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦ห(EAC: East African Community)䉕⚿ 1 Dague(2008)ߦࠃࠆޕ Klugman, et al.,(1999) ߦࠃࠆޔߒߛߚޕฦ⒳⾗ᢱߦࠃࠆផቯੱᢙߩᏅߪᄢ߈ޕ 3 ࠤ࠾ࠕߪ DfID(2005)ߩ fragile states ߩಽ㘃ߦᒰߒޔ Brookings Institution ߩ Rice and Patrick(2006) ߩ Index of State Weakness ߢߪ࠙ࠟࡦ࠳߇ bottom quintile ߇ࠕ࠾ࠤޔsecond quintile ߦޔFund for Peace(2007)ߩ Failed State Index ߢߪ࠙ࠟࡦ࠳߇ critical ߇ࠕ࠾ࠤޔin danger ߦᒰߒߡࠆޕ 2 27 ᚑ䈚䈩⚻ᷣ⛔ว䉕⋡ᜰ䈚䈢4䇯䈖䉏䈲 2001 ᐕ䈮ౣ⚿ᚑ䈘䉏䇮2005 ᐕ䈮㑐⒢ห⋖䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏5䇮2007 ᐕ䈮ౝ㒽ㇱ䈱䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈱ട⋖䉕䉂䈩䈇䉎䇯ᣂ䈚䈇 EAC 䈲 2010 ᐕ䈱න৻ㅢ⽻䇮⛔৻ Ꮢ႐䈶ㅪ㇌䉕᭴ᗐ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯3 䉦࿖䈲 40 ᐕએ䈱ಽⵚ䉕⚻䈩䇮ౣ䈶⛔ว䈮ะ䈎䈦䈩ᱠ䉂ᆎ 䉄䈩䈇䉎䇯 䋼3 ⠪䈱㑐ଥ䋾 ࿖ኅᒻᚑ䊶᳃ਥൻ䊶ಽᮭൻ䈱㑐ଥ䈲Ყセ⊛䈮⸃䈪䈅䉎䇯᳃ਥਥ⟵䈮䈲䇮ᐭ䉕䉍䈣䈜ᚻ⛯䈐 䈮㑐䈜䉎㗔ၞౝᏒ᳃䈱วᗧ䈏䉁䉏䉎(Linz 䋧Stepan1996)䇯䈧䉁䉍䇮࿖ኅ䈱ᚑ┙䈭䈚䈮䈲Ꮢ᳃ᮭ 䈲ሽ䈞䈝䇮Ꮢ᳃ᮭ䈭䈚䈮䈲᳃ਥਥ⟵䈲ሽ䈚䈭䈇䇯ㆬ䈻䈱ෳട䈮వ┙䈦䈩䇮࿖ኅ䈱Ⴚ⇇䉇 ⺕䈏Ꮢ᳃䈭䈱䈎䈲੍䉄ቯ䈘䉏䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈏䈇䈎䈭䉎᳃ਥਥ⟵⺰䈮┙䈧႐ว䈪䉅䇮࿖ኅ 䈫᳃ਥൻ䈱ၮᧄ⊛䈭㑐ଥ䈪䈅䉎䇯ઁᣇ䇮࿖ኅ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱㑐ଥ䈲ㅢᏱਛᄩᐭ䈎䉌䈅䉎⚵❱䈻䈱ᮭ 㒢䈱ᆔ⼑䉇ᆔછ䇮ᧄㇱᯏ㑐䈱⣕㓸ਛൻ䈫䈚䈩ℂ⸃䈘䉏䉎䈏䇮ᧄⓂ䈪⠨ኤ䈜䉎䈱䈲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈪৻⥸ ⊛䈭ᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅ䈮䈍䈔䉎ᴦ⊛⺖㗴䈫䈚䈩䈱ಽᮭൻ䈪䈅䉎䇯 ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈫ಽᮭൻ䈮䈧䈇䈩ᔨⷙቯ䉕䈚䈩䈍䈐䈢䈇䇯೨⠪䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䉻䊷䊦(Dahl㩷 1971)䈱䇸䊘䊥 䉝䊷䉨䊷䇹䇮䈧䉁䉍ㆬᮭ䉇ᴦ⊛ᮭ䈏㓚䈘䉏䈢䉕ᗐቯ䈜䉎䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮ᐭ䈱Ꮢ᳃䈮ኻ䈜 䉎䉝䉦䉡䊮䉺䊎䊥䊁䉞䉇䇮ᴦ䈮ෳട䈜䉎Ꮢ᳃䈱৻ቯ䈱䇸ᯏળ䈱ᐔ╬䇹䉅ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎䋨ᕡᎹ 2006䋩䇯ઁ ᣇ䇮ಽᮭൻ(decentralization)䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䇸ਛᄩᐭ䈎䉌ਅ䉁䈢䈲ඨ⁛┙⊛䈭ᐭ⚵❱䇮ᚗ䈇䈲 ᳃㑆䉶䉪䉺䊷䈻䈱⊛ᯏ⢻䈱ᮭᆭ䈫⽿છ䈱⒖ォ(Rondinelli, 1998)䇹䈫⠨䈋䉎䇯ಽᮭൻ䈮䈲⺰⠪ 䈮䉋䈦䈩㗔ၞ⊛(territorial)䊶㕖㗔ၞ⊛(non-territorial)䈭ᐞ䈧䈎䈱ᰴర䉇䉺䉟䊒䈏䈅䉍䇮ᓟ⠪䈪䈲 Rondinelli 䈲᳃༡ൻ䉇⚵❱䊧䊔䊦䇮Ꮢ႐䋨ੱ䋩䈻䈱ಽᮭൻ䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎6䇯᳃ਥ⊛䋨ᴦ⊛䋩ಽᮭ ൻ䈲೨⠪䈱ㅴൻ䈚䈢ᒻᘒ䈪䇮Ꮢ᳃䈏ᣇᐭ䈱⼏ຬ䉇㚂㐳䉕᥉ㅢㆬ䈮䈍䈇䈩ㆬ䈚䇮⊛ ᗧᕁቯ䉕ⴕ䈉䈖䈫䉕ᗧ䈜䉎7䇯 ᧄⓂ䈱᭴ᚑ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮╙ 2 ▵䈪᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱⋧㑐ଥ䉕⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯ਔ⠪䈲࿖ኅ᭴ㅧ(state structure)䈱ਥⷐ䈭ේℂ䈪䈅䉎䇯⁛┙એ㒠䇮ᴦ㓸࿅䈱ᄙ᭽ᕈ䉇ല₸⊛䈭⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈱ᔅⷐᕈ䈭䈬 䈎䉌 2 䈧䈱ේℂ䈲᭽䇱䈭ᒻ䈪⹜䈘䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈲䇮ਔ⠪䈱㊀ⶄ㗔ၞ䈮䈅䈢䉎䇯⁛┙એ 㒠䈱 3 䉦࿖䈱ᴦㆊ⒟䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈪䈲ਔ⠪䈲⋧ଦㅴ⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮 䉻䈪䈲ਔ⠪䈲⋧ឃ㒰⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯ਔ⠪䈱ᄙ䈒䈱ⷰᔨ䉇ଔ୯ⷰ䈲࿖㓙䊜䊂䉞䉝䈫ᄖ࿖េഥᯏ㑐 4 ᐕએ೨ߦ ߩࠞ࠾ࠟࡦ࠲ޔᐕߩ⁛┙ᤨ߆ࠄ East African Services Organisation ߇ሽޕන৻ㅢ ⽻ޔหᓽ⒢ᯏ᭴ޔ㋕ޔ᷼ḧ⥶ޔⓨળ␠ߩหᚲ߇ߥߐࠇߡߚ ޔߪࠇߎޕᐕߦ᧲ࠕࡈࠞห ߦߥߞߚᓟ ޔᐕߦߞߚࠎ⸃ޕ 5 㑐⒢ห⋖ߪㅢၞᄖ㑐⒢ޔ㕖㑐⒢㓚ოߩ᠗ᑄޔၞౝߩ࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕߩ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔャຠࡠ㑐⒢ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ ߆ࠄ࠙ࠟࡦ࠳ߩ߳ࠕ࠾ࠩࡦ࠲ޔャߩ 5 ᐕએౝߩࡠ㑐⒢ߩታࠍ⋡ᜰߒߡࠆޕ 6 㗔ၞ⊛ಽᮭൻߦߪ⒟ᐲߩᒝ߽ߩ߆ࠄᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑(devolution)ޔᮭ㒢ᆔછ(delegation)ޔ⣕ਛᔃൻ(deconcentration)ߩ 3 Ბ㓏߇ࠆޕBray(1994)ߪ㗔ၞ⊛ߥ㧔ᣇ㧕ಽᮭൻߪု⋥⊛ಽᮭൻߣ߽⸒ޔ᳃༡ൻ߿Ꮢ႐ൻߪᯏ ⢻⊛ಽᮭൻߥߒ᳓ᐔ⊛ಽᮭൻߣ߱ޕ 7 ᳃ਥ⊛ޔᴦ⊛ಽᮭൻߩࠞ࠹ࠧߪ㗔ၞ⊛ಽᮭൻߩߥ߆ߩᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑ߣ߁Ბ㓏ߦኻᔕߔࠆޕ 28 䋨䊄䊅䊷䋩䈏ᜬ䈤ㄟ䉖䈣䉅䈱䈪䇮․䈮 1990 ᐕઍ䈱ᕆㅦ䈭᳃ਥൻ䈲䊄䊅䊷䈏ᴦ⊛䉮䊮䊂䉞䉲䊢䊅䊥 䊁䉞䈫䈚䈩ⷐ᳞䈚䈢ⷐ⚛䈏ᄢ䈐䈇(Selbervik 1999; Adar 2000)䇯ઁᣇ䇮ฦ䇱䈱ᐭ䈮䈫䈦䈩䉅࿖ኅᒻ ᚑ䈱ㆊ⒟䈪ਔ⠪䈱⺖㗴䈲ਇนㆱ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯 ╙ 3 ▵ߢߪ╙ 2 ▵ߢ␜ߐࠇߚ 3 ࠞ࿖ߩᴦ␠ળ⁁ᴫࠍ⸃ߔࠆℂ⺰⊛ߥ⠨ኤᨒ⚵ߺࠍᲧセ ᬌ⸛ߔࠆౕޕ⊛ߦߪⷰߩࠖ࠹ࠪ࠾ࠬࠛޔὐ߆ࠄߺߚ᳃ਥൻߣᴦ⊛ਇቯᕈߩ㑐ଥࠍ␠ ળ⚻ᷣ᭴ㅧ߿ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ․ᓽ߆ࠄಽᨆߒޔᰴߢߎࠇࠄߦኻᔕߔࠆಽᮭൻߩ⺰ὐࠍᢛℂ ߔࠆߎߣߦߥࠆᦨޕᓟߦ ╙ޔ4 ▵ߢߪోߩಽᨆࠍ〯߹߃ߚ✚ߣ╷⊛␜ໂࠍ␜ߔޕ 2-2 ᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱⋧㑐ଥ ᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱ᗧ⟵䈲࿖ኅᒻᚑ(state formation)䈭䈇䈚࿖ኅᕈ(stateness)䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈎䉌⠨ኤ䈜䉎 ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈲䇮㗔ၞ䉕↹䈜䉎䇸Ⴚ⇇(boundaries)䇹䇮䈠䈱▸࿐䈮䈹䇸ᮭᆭ(authority)䇹䇮 䈠䈖䈮Ꮻዻ䈜䉎࿖᳃䈱䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞(identity)䇹䈎䉌᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䉎䋨દ⮮ 2007䋩8䇯䈖䉏䉌䈲ੱ䇱䈱 ⼂ᨒ⚵䉂䉕ㅢ䈛䈩䇸␠ળ⊛䈮᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䈢ᐲ䇹䈪䈅䉍(p.49)䇮ẜ⊛䈮ੱ䇱䉕േ䈎䈜ᄢ䈐䈭䉣䊈 䊦䉩䊷䉕ᜬ䈦䈩䈇䉎䈫䈮ᱧผ⊛䈮ᄌ䉒䉎䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯 䋼Ⴚ⇇䋾 3 䉦࿖䈱䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈲 1885 ᐕ䈱䊔䊦䊥䊮ળ⼏䈏Ḯ䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮䈱䉬䊆䉝䈲⧷࿖㗔᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦 䋨1902 ᐕ䈮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱৻ㇱ䈏ᆔ⼑䋩䇮䈱䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䇮䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈲䊄䉟䉿㗔᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦 䈮Ꮻዻ䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯1918 ᐕ䈮䊄䉟䉿䈲╙৻ᰴᄢᚢ䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦䈮䈍䈔䉎ዪᚢ䈮䉅ᢌർ䈚䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝 䈲⧷࿖㗔䇮ઁ䈱 2 䉦࿖䈲䊔䊦䉩䊷㗔䈫䈘䉏䈢䇯1917 ᐕ䈮䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫䉬䊆䉝䈮⒢㑐ㅪว䈏ᒻᚑ䈘 䉏䈢䈏䇮䈖䉏䈏 EAC 䈱Ḯ䈪䈅䉎䇯3 䉦࿖䈲 1948 ᐕ䈎䉌⁛┙䈱⋥೨䉁䈪⧷࿖䈱᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦㜞╬ᑯ ോᐭ䈮䉋䈦䈩⛔ᴦ䈘䉏䇮15 ᐕ㑆⒟ᐲ䈲᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦䊶䉲䊥䊮䉫䈫䈇䈉ㅢ䈱⽻ᐊ䉕↪䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯⁛┙ એ㒠䈱䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈲䈱䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈫╬䈚䈇䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮1961 ᐕ䈮⁛┙䈚䈢䉺䊮䉧䊆䊷䉦䈏䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈫 䈮 1964 ᐕ䈮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈫䈚䈩ౣ⁛┙䈚䈢⚻✲䈲䈅䉎䇯㗔ၞ⊛䈭䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈫䈚䈩䈲࿖Ⴚ䇮ਅ䈱න 䈱ᣇᐭ䊶ⴕ䈱Ⴚ⇇䇮䈱න䈱 EAC 䈏䈅䉎䇯ઁᣇ䇮㕖㗔ၞ⊛䈭䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈫䈚䈩࿖ኅ䈫ઁ 䈱⚵❱䈱ᓎഀ䈱Ⴚ⇇䈏䈅䉎䋨 1 ෳᾖ䋩䇯 1㩷 ᳃ਥൻ䊶ಽᮭൻ䈫࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈱ኻᔕ 㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷 Ⴚ⇇㩷 㩷 ᮭᆭ 䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞 ᳃ਥൻ㩷 㩷 ࿖ኅ䋨ోᏒ᳃䈏ᛩ䈜䉎ⓨ㑆䋩 ࿖᳃ઍ 䈱⛔ᴦ Ꮢ᳃䋨ᮭ䋩 ಽᮭൻ ᣇᐭ䋨ၞ᳃䈏ᛩ䈜䉎ⓨ㑆䇮 䈭䈇䈚䈲Ꮢ᳃䈏ಽ㔌䈘䉏䉎ⓨ㑆䋩 ⻉㓸࿅䈮 䉋䉎⥄ᴦ ၞ᳃䉁䈢䈲䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞 䊁䉞䋨䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪䋩䉫䊦䊷䊒 ౖ㩷 ╩⠪ᚑ 8 દ⮮᳁ߪߎࠇࠄߩ 3 ⠪߆ࠄ᭴ᚑߐࠇࠆ߽ߩࠍޟ㗔ၞᕈ(territoriality)ߣޠ߱ޕ 29 䋼ᮭᆭ䋾 䇸ᮭᆭ䇹䈫䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈲䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱વ⛔⊛䈭ห䈱ౝㇱ䈪䈲ಽ䈎䈤䈏䈢䈒⚿䈶䈧䈇䈩䈇 䈢䇯೨ᬀ᳃ᦼ䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦␠ળ䈲ಽᢔ⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮⦟⾰䈭ფ䈫᳓Ḯ䈱䈅䉎ၞ䈮䈲ੱญ 䈏ኒ㓸䈚䉇䈜䈒䇮䈖䉏䉕⛔䈜䉎ᮭജ䈏⸳ቯ䈘䉏䈢䇯ච♿䈮䉡䉧䊮䉻ධㇱ䈮ഺ⥝䈚䈢䊑 䉧䊮䉻₺࿖䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲₺(Kabaka)䈏⒢䉕ᜂᒰ䈜䉎㚂㐳(chief)䈱䈮ำ⥃䈜䉎䊊䉟䉝䊤䊷䉨䊷᭴ ㅧ䈏ሽ䈚䈢䇯⧷࿖䈲䈖䈱ᐲ䉕↪䈚䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ઁၞ䈮䉅ห䈛᭴ㅧ䉕ᒛ䈚䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䉇䉺 䊮䉱䊆䉝䈮䉅㚂㐳䈲䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱䉋䈉䈭ਛ㑆៦ขጀ䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ᬀ᳃ᦼએ 㒠䈱࿖ኅᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈮䈍䈇䈩ਔ⠪䈲ਵ㔌䉕ᆎ䉄䉎䇯䊑䉧䊮䉻䈮䈍䈇䈩ฃኈ䈘䉏䈢䉅䈱䈲䇮ઁၞ䈮 䈍䈇䈩䈲䇸ᮭᆭ䇹䈱ᒝⷐ䈫䈭䈘䉏䈢䇯 䋼䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䋾 䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈲䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䇮ੱ⒳䇮ቬᢎ䇮␠ળ䉦䊷䉴䊃䈭䈬䉕䉄䉎䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䇮ේೋ⊛䈭 䉌䈎䈱䊔䊷䉴䉇ᴦᠲ䉕䉃䈫䈮䇮นᄌ⊛䈪䇮ᱧผ⊛䈮᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䈢ⷐ⚛䈏䈅䉎(Stewart 2008, p.7-14) 9䇯䈖䉏䈮ㅢ⸒⺆䉇ㅢၞዬ䉕䉄䉎⠨䈋ᣇ䉅䈅䉐䈉䇯䈭䈍䇮3 䉦࿖䈱䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁 䉞䉕᭴ᚑ䈚䈩䈇䉎ਥⷐ䈭䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈫ቬᢎ䉕 1 䈮⸥䈜䇯 3 䉦࿖䈲ᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅ(multi-ethnic state)䈪䈅䉎䇯ᧄⓂ䈪䈲䈖䈱↪એᄖ䈲᳃ᣖ䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲 䊁䉞䈫䈇䈉↪⺆䉕↪䈇䉎10䇯ᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅ䈮䈲䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈫䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈏ว⥌䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇⺖㗴䈏䈅 䉎䇯䉝䊐䊥䉦⻉࿖䈲 1960 ᐕઍએ㒠䈮⁛┙䈚䈩䈎䉌࿖ኅᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈪䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭ᴦᄌേ䉕⚻䈢䈏䇮 䊊䊮䉼䊮䊃䊮䈱䇸╙ਃ䈱ᵄ䇹䈱᳃ਥൻ䈮ㆣㆄ䈚䈢11䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢䈭䈎䈪䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱㑐ଥ䉕ද⺞⊛䈮 ᒻᚑ䈚䈢䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䉕䈅䉎⒟ᐲ㗅⺞䈮ㅴዷ䈘䈞䈢䈱䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱㑐ଥ 䈏ኻ┙⊛䈣䈦䈢䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲ᄢ䈐䈭ᴦ⊛ਇቯ䈏䈉䉁䉏䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲㐳ᦼ㑆䈱ᛥ⊛ ᡰ㈩䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲㕖ੱ⊛䈭⁛ⵙ䉇ౝᚢ䈏➅䉍䈘䉏䈢䇯䈭䈍䇮 2 䈲䇮ฦ࿖䈱⁛┙ᓟ䈱᳃ਥ ൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈮㑐䈜䉎◲න䈭ᴪ㕟䈪䈅䉎䇯 ࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈫᳃ਥൻ䈏ᅢᓴⅣ䈜䉎႐ว䈲䇮Ꮢ᳃䈲࿖ኅ䈱ਛ䈪⋧ᒰห⾰䈭䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䈫䈭䉍䇮 䇸ᮭᆭ䇹䈫䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈱䈅䈇䈣䈮ᷓೞ䈭ಽⵚ䈲䈭䈇䇯㗴䈲ਔ⠪䈏ኻ᛫⊛䈭႐ว䈪䈅䉍䇮․ 䈮ᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅ䈱႐ว䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈱⁁ᘒ䈪䈲ᄙᢙઍဳ(majoritarian)᳃ਥਥ⟵䈲䈉䉁䈒ᯏ⢻䈞䈝䇮 䊧䉟䊒䊊䊦䊃(Liphart 1977)䈏ឭ໒䈚䈢ᄙᭂሽဳ(consociational)᳃ਥਥ⟵䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎ᔅⷐᕈ䈏 䈅䉎䇯᳃ਥൻ䈫䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈱㑐ଥ䈮㑐䈚䇮䉻䊷䊦䈱䇸䊘䊥䉝䊷䉨䊷䇹䈲࿖ኅ䈱วᗧᒻᚑ䈮࿖ 9 䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䇮Stewart 䈫ห᭽䈮 3 䈧䈱┙႐䉕⏕䈜䉎䇯䈠䉏䉌䈲ේೋ⊛䇮ታ⊛䈭ᔨ䇮ᠲ⊛䈭 ᔨ䇮␠ળ᭴ᚑਥ⟵⊛䈭ᔨ䈪䈅䉎䇯 10 ࠛࠬ࠾ࠪ࠹ࠖߣ᳃ᣖߦߪ᭽ߥޘቯ⟵߇ࠆ߇ࠢ࠶࠾ࠬࠛޔ㓸࿅ߪઁߩ㘃ૃ㓸࿅ߣߦࠍࠇߘޔ൮ߔࠆ ߩ␠ળ㧔ㄭઍ࿖ኅ₺ޔ࿖ޔㇺᏒ࿖ኅޔ㚂㐳࿖ޔᬀ᳃ᐭ㧕ߦ߹ࠇࠆઁޕᣇޔ᳃ᣖߪߘߩߦ൮ ⊛␠ળ߇ࠆߎߣࠍᔅߕߒ߽᧦ઙߣߒߡߥ㧔㕍ᩉ 1996㧕ޕ 11 ╙ਃߩᵄߪ 1974 ᐕߩࡐ࡞࠻ࠟ࡞߆ࠄᆎ߹ࠅޔ1980 ᐕઍ߆ࠄ 90 ᐕઍߦ߆ߌߡ᧲᰷⻉࿖߿ㅜ࿖ߦᐢ߇ ߞߚ᳃ਥൻࠍߐߔޕ 30 2㩷 3 䉦࿖䈱ᐕ 䉬䊆䉝 䉡䉧䊮䉻 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝 1963㩷 ⁛┙ 1962㩷 ⁛┙ 1961 䉺䊮䉧䊆䊷䉦⁛┙ 1963 䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺ᄢ⛔㗔 1967 䉥䊗䊁䈱⁛ⵙ 1963㩷 䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦⁛┙ 1978 䊝䉟ᮭ 1971 䉝䊚䊮䈱䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷 1964㩷 ㅪว࿖䈫䈚䈩⁛┙ 1982 䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷ᧂㆀ䇮৻ౄ 1981 ╙ੑᰴ䉥䊗䊁ᮭ䇮ౝᚢ 1965㩷 ৻ౄ䋨䊆䉣䊧䊧䋩 1983 ಽᮭൻ䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛 1986㩷 䊛䉶䊔䊆(NRM)ᮭ 1967 1992 ⶄᢙౄㆬ䋨ᒻᑼ䋩 1995㩷 ᙗᴺቯ 1972 㓸ᮭൻ䋨20 Ꮊ䈻䈱ಽᮭ䋩 1995㩷 ᣇᐭᡷ㕟䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛 1996 ᦨೋ䈱ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ 1982㩷 ᣇᐭ䈱ᓳᵴ 2002㩷 NARC ㆬൎ 1997 ᣇᐭᴺ 1995㩷 ⶄᢙౄㆬ 2005 ᙗᴺᡷᱜ࿖᳃ᛩ 1998 䉱䉟䊷䊦䋨DRC䋩䈻䈱 1996 ᣇᐭᡷ㕟䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛 2007䋭08㩷 ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬᓟേ 2006㩷 ⶄᢙౄㆬ 2005 ᄢ⛔㗔䈱ᐔ⵰䈱ઍ 䉝䊦䊷䉲䊞ት⸒ ౖ㩷 ╩⠪ᚑ ᳃䈱ห⾰ᕈ䉕೨ឭ䈫䈚䈢䋨Dahl 1966䋩䇯䊧䉟䊒䊊䊦䊃䈲ᔅ䈝䈚䉅ห⾰ᕈ䈲೨ឭ䈪䈲䈭䈇䈫䈚䈢䇯䈠䈚 䈩䇮ᄙᭂሽဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱⻉ᣇ╷䈫䈚䈩⻉㓸࿅䈱ᄢㅪว䇮⋧ᜎุᮭ䇮Ყᕈේℂ䇮↹䈱⥄ ᓞᕈ䈫ㅪ㇌䉕⺰䈛䈢䇯䈖䈱䊝䊂䊦䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦䈻䈱ㆡ↪น⢻ᕈ䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲᭽䇱䈭⼏⺰䈏䈅䉎䈏12䇮 ╩⠪䈲ಽᨆᔨ䊶╷ಣᣇ▐䈫䈚䈩䇮ಽᮭൻ䈫䉅㑐ㅪ䈚䈢ᗧᕈ䈏䈅䉎䈫⠨䈋䉎䇯 1䋩᳃ਥൻ 1980 ᐕઍᧃએ㒠䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈲䊘䉴䊃಄ᚢ䈱᳃ਥൻ䈱േ䈐䈮⠡ᑲ䈘䉏䈢䇯䈠䈱ౖဳ䈏ⶄᢙౄ䈱 ᵄ䈪䈅䉎13䇯ᄙ䈒䈱ᐭ䈲ౝᄖ䈱ജ䈮䈘䉏䈩หᐲ䉕ฃ䈔䉏䈢䇯ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅 ┹⊛䈭ㆬ䈏ዉ䈘䉏䈢14䇯3 䉦࿖䉅䈖䈱⿲䈮ᄌ䉒䉍䈲䈭䈇䇯1991 ᐕ䇮䉬䊆䉝䈏ᦨೋ䈮৻ౄ 䈎䉌ⶄᢙౄ䈻䈱⒖ⴕ䉕น⢻䈫䈜䉎ᙗᴺᡷᱜ᩺䉕ណᛯ䈚䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮᭽䇱䈭ᚻ⛯䈐⊛䈭ᅹኂ䈮 䉋䉍䊝䉟ᮭ䈲䈠䈱ᓟ 10 ᐕ㑆ᮭജ䉕ី䈚䈢䇯2002 ᐕ䈮ਈౄ KANU(Kenya African National Union)䈱䊝䉟䈱ᓟ⛮䈲 NARC(National Alliance for Rainbow Coalition)䈱⛔৻䉨䊋䉨䈮 ᢌർ䈚䈢䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ౝᚢᓟ䈱 1986 ᐕ䈎䉌ήౄᴦ(Non-Party Politics)䈫䈇䈉⁛․䈱䉕ណ ↪ 䈚 䈩 䈇 䈢 䈏 䇮 2006 ᐕ 䈮 䈭 䈦 䈩 ⶄ ᢙ ౄ ㆬ 䉕 ታ ᣉ 䈚 䈢 䇯 ౝ ᚢ 䈮 ൎ 䈚 䈢 ᴦ ജ 12 Mphai(1999)ߪ߇࡞࠺ࡕߩߎޔධࠕࡈࠞߢᯏ⢻ߒߚߩߪޔ㓸࿅㑆ߩᢜᘇᔃ߇ᣢߦᷫߞߡߚ߆ࠄߛߣ ㅀߴߡࠆޕHorowitz(2000)ߪߩߎޔ᰷Ꮊࡕ࠺࡞ߩᤃߥㅜ࿖߳ߩㆡ↪ࠍᛕ್ߒߡࠆޕ 13 1989 ᐕએ೨ߦᙗᴺߦ߅ߡᄙౄࠍߡߚ࿖ߪޔၞౝ 48 ࠞ࿖ߩ߁ߜࠟࡦࡆࠕࠟࡀޔࠕࡌޔ ࡞ޔࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޔ࠽ࡢ࠷ࡏޔࡦ࠳ࠬޔධࠕࡈࠞߩ 7 ࠞ࿖ߢߞߚᤨޕὐߢߪ৻ౄࠍណ↪ߒߡࠆ ߩߪࠛ࠻ࠕߩߺߢޔή࿖ኅ⁁ᘒߩ࠰ࡑࠕࠍ㒰ߌ߫ޔᒻᑼ⊛ߦߪߔߴߡߩ࿖߇ⶄᢙౄࠍណ↪ߒߡ ࠆޕ 14 1960 ᐕઍ䈮䈲ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ 26 ઙ䈱䈉䈤⡯䈏┹⋧ᚻ䈫ᚢ䈦䈢䈱䈲䈢䈦䈢䈱 2 ઙ䈪䈅䉍䇮ㆬ䈲ታ䈱ାછ ᛩ䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮1990 ᐕઍ䈮䈲 90䋦䈏┹䈚䈩ⴕ䉒䉏䇮䈖䈱䉲䉢䉝䈲 2000䋭2005 ᐕ䈮䈲 98䋦䈮䈚䈢(Posner and Young, 2007)䇯1960䋭90 ᐕ䈮ㆬ䈪ᢌർ䈚䈢ᄢ⛔㗔䈲䊔䊆䊮䈱 1 ฬ䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮1990 ᐕએ㒠䇮⡯ᄢ⛔㗔䈱 ᢌർ₸䈲 14䋦䈮Ⴧട䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯 31 NRM(National Revolutionary Movement)䈫䊛䉶䊔䊆ᄢ⛔㗔䈲 22 ᐕ䉕䈋䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲৻ౄ ␠ળਥ⟵䉕ណ↪䈚䈩䈐䈢䈏䇮1995 ᐕ䈮ⶄᢙౄㆬ䉕ታᣉ䈚䈢䇯CCM䋨Chama Cha Mapinduzi: Revolutionary Party of Tanzania䋩䈲ୟ⊛䈮ఝ䈭ᴦ䉕⛮⛯䈚䇮㊁ౄ䈲ᱴ䈬䈏 CCM 䈎䉌 ಽ㔌䈚䈢ౄ䈪䈅䉍䇮2005 ᐕ䈮ᄢ⛔㗔䈲 2 ᦼോ䉄䈢䊛䉦䊌䈎䉌䉨䉪䉡䉢䊁䈮ઍ䈚䈢䇯 ᓥ᧪䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦䈮䈍䈔䉎᳃ਥൻ䈲䇮ᄙᢙઍဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱ዉ䈱䈘䉏ᣇ䈫ㅦᐲ䈮㗴䈏䈅䉍䇮㗫 ❥䈮ዋᢙᵷ䈱ᗧ䈏ឃ㒰䈘䉏ᄙᢙᵷ䈱ኾ䈏䈐䈢䇯䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞㓸࿅䈗䈫䈮␠ળ䈱ኂ䈏 ᭴ㅧൻ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䋨䈫⼂䈘䉏䉎䋩႐ว䇮ᄙᢙઍဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈪䈲ᄙᢙᵷ䈏䈜䈼䈩䈱ቯᮭ䉕 ី䈚䈩䈚䉁䈉䊥䉴䉪䈏䈅䉎䇯䈖䈱䉳䊧䊮䊙䈏䉏䈢䈱䈏䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈫䊦䊪䊮䉻䈪䈅䈦䈢15䇯1993 ᐕ䈮 䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈪䈲ᄙᢙᵷ䊐䉿♽䈱䊮䉻䉻䉣ᄢ⛔㗔䈏ೋ䉄䈩ㆬ䈘䉏䈢䈏䇮ዞછ 5 䉦ᓟ䈮䉿䉼♽ァ ㇱ䈱৻ᵷ䈮ᥧᲕ䈘䉏䈢䇯⠉ᐕ䇮䊐䉿♽䈏ᄙᢙᵷᡰ㈩䉕䈚䈩䈇䈢䊦䊪䊮䉻䈪䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈎䉌ଚ䈚䈢 䉿䉼♽䈱ᱞⵝജ RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front)䈮ਇ䉕ᛴ䈇䈢䊐䉿♽ㆊỗᵷ䈏䊊䊎䊞䊥䊙䊅ᄢ⛔ 㗔䈱ᥧᲕ䉕ᄾᯏ䈮 50䋭80 ਁੱ೨ᓟ䈱䉿䉼♽᳃䈶㕖දജ⊛䈭䊐䉿♽᳃䉕⯦Ვ䈜䉎ઙ䈏 䈐䈢䋨UN 1999䇮Human Rights Watch 1999䋩䇯 䊦䊪䊮䉻䈪䈲ⶄᢙౄ䈱ᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈪บ㗡䈚䈢䊐䉿ㆊỗᵷ䈱ᴦജ䈏࿖㓙␠ળ䈎䉌ⷐ᳞䈘䉏 䈢 RPF 䈫䈱ᐔวᗧ䉕ㅴ䉄䉎䊊䊎䊞䊥䊙䊅ᮭ䉕ᒙ⣶䈫䉂䈭䈚䇮䉿䉼ትવ䉕ᧄᩰൻ䈘䈞䈢䇯᳃ਥ ൻ䇮᭴ㅧ⺞ᢛ䇮ᐔวᗧ䈫䈇䈉ᄖ䈎䉌ട䈋䉌䉏䈢ജ䈏⚵䉂ว䉒䈘䈦䈢䈖䈫䈪หᮭ䈲ਇቯൻ䈚 䈢(Andersen, 2000)䇯䈖䈱ㆊ⒟䈱ᢎ⸠䈲䇮Ꮑᅱ䈎䈧ᆭ⊛䈭ᖱႎᠲ䈏䈅䈦䈢䉅䈱䈱䇮᳃ਥൻㆊ ⒟䈏ੱ䇱䉕⥄↱䈮䈚䇮䉣䊮䊌䊪䊷䈜䉎ㆊ⒟䈮䈲䈭䉌䈝䇮ළ䈦䈩䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮┙⣉䈚䈢ᴦ㓸࿅䈏 㕖Ᏹ䈮ឃઁ⊛䈭ᵴേ䉕ⴕ䈦䈢䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎16䇯ᐢ⟵䈱ಽᮭൻ䉇ਅᢥൻ㑆䈱ද⺞䈏ቯ⌕䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇 ␠ળ䈮䈍䈔䉎ᄙᢙઍဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱ᕆỗ䈭ዉ䈏ਛᄩ䈮䈍䈔䉎䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ౄ䈱ⴣ⓭䉕ᒝ䉄䈢 䈱䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯 3 䉦࿖䈱ᮭജ䉣䊥䊷䊃䈲䊦䊪䊮䉻䈫䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈱⚗ㆊ⒟䉕⋡䈱ᒰ䈢䉍䈮䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯ኻ┙䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁 䉞䈏⯦Ვ䈱ᔕ㈽䉕䈚䈢䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈲䇸ಽᮭൻ䈭䈐ᕆㅦ䈭᳃ਥൻ䇹䈱䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈖䉏䈮ኻ 䈚䇮3 䉦࿖䈱ข䈦䈢ኻᔕ䈲䈠䉏䈡䉏⇣䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯1980 ᐕઍ䉁䈪䈮ᄢⷙᮨ䈭⚗䉇⯦Ვ䉕ᣢ䈮⚻ 㛎䈚䈢䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈫ኻ䈱䇸ᛥ䈘䉏䈢᳃ਥൻ䈫ᕆㅦ䈭ಽᮭൻ䇹䉕ㆬ䉖䈣䇯䉬 䊆䉝䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫䈲ኻᾖ⊛䈭䇸䋨ਈౄ䈏ൎ䉕⛯䈔䉎䋩ẋㅴ⊛᳃ਥൻ䈫㓸ᮭ䈱⛽ᜬ䇹䉕ㆬᛯ䈚䇮໑ ৻䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈏䇸᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䇹䉕䈅䉎⒟ᐲਗⴕ䈚䈩ㅴ䉄䈢䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䋨䈠䈱䉟䊜䊷䉳䈲࿑ 1䋩䇯 䈭䈍䇮 3 䈲 3 䉦࿖䈱⁛┙ᓟ䈫䈱ᮭ䈪䈅䉎䇯 15 EAC ߩᣂⷙട⋖࿖ߢࠆ࡞ࡢࡦ࠳ޔߪࠖ࠺ࡦ࡞ࡉޔ1991 ᐕߦ࡞ࡢࡦ࠳ޔ1992 ᐕߦࡉ࡞ࡦ࠺ࠖ߇ⶄᢙ ౄ߳ߩᙗᴺᡷᱜ᩺ࠍណᛯߒߡࠆޕ 16 ࡞ࡢࡦ࠳ߣࡉ࡞ࡦ࠺ࠖߪ 1990 ᐕઍߦ᳃ਥൻㆬࠍⴕ߁߹ߢߪޔァㇱ৻ౄ߿ァ⹏⼏ળߩᡰ㈩ߩ߽ߣ ߦࠅޔ᳃ਥൻ߿ಽᮭൻ߇ᧄᩰ⊛ߦផㅴߐࠇߚᤨᦼߪߥ߆ߞߚޕ1980 ᐕઍᓟඨߦࡉ࡞ࡦ࠺ࠖߢࡈ࠷♽ߦኻ ߔࠆᐭߩ㊀ⷐࡐࠬ࠻⊓↪ߥߤߩⲢ╷߇ߞߚ߇ߪࠇߘޔᄖ⊛ߥߢߞߚޕ 32 3㩷 3 䉦࿖䈱ᮭ䋨⁛┙ᓟ䈫䋩 䉬䊆䉝 䉡䉧䊮䉻 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝 ⁛┙ᓟ䈱 ౄ䋺KANU ౄ䋺UPC/KY ౄ䋺TANU(CCM:1977-) ᮭ ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺 ᄢ⛔㗔䋺1962䋭64 䊛䊁䉰䇮64䋭䉥䊗䊁 ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䊆䉣䊧䊧 ᦼ㑆䋺1962-2002 ᦼ㑆䋺1962-1971 ᦼ㑆䋺1964䋭 䈱 ౄ䋺PNU/ODM ౄ䋺NRM ౄ䋺CCM ᮭ ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䉨䊋䉨 ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䊛䉶䊔䊆 ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䉨䉪䉡䉢䊁 ᦼ㑆䋺2006䋭 ᦼ㑆䋺1986䋭 ᦼ㑆䋺2005䋭 ౖ㩷 ╩⠪ᚑ 䋨䉡䉧䊮䉻䋩 䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲 2006 ᐕ䉁䈪ⶄᢙౄ䈏ዉ䈘䉏䈝䇮NRM 䈏৻ౄ⁛ⵙ䈮ㄭ䈇⛔ᴦ䉕䈚䈢䇯䊛䉶䊔 䊆ᄢ⛔㗔䈲ⶄᢙౄ䉕ౄᵷਥ⟵(sectarianism)䈱ᓳᵴ䈫ᝒ䈋䇮䈖䉏䈮䉋䈦䈩ਛᄩ䈪䈱ቬᢎ䊶䉣䉴 䊆䉲䊁䉞ኻ┙䉕ౣΆ䈘䈞䉎䉋䉍䉅ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅴ䉄䈩ਛᄩ䈪䈱ኻ┙䉕ᒙ䉄䉎ᣇㅜ䉕ᮨ⚝䈚䈢(Museveni㩷 1997)䇯䊛䉶䊔䊆䈭䈇䈚 NRM 䈲 1990 ᐕઍ䈮ᾲᔃ䈮ಽᮭൻ╷䉕ផㅴ䈚䇮⨲䈱ᩮ䈱᳃䈱ᴦ䊶 ⴕㆊ⒟䈻䈱ෳട䉕ᅑബ䈚䈢䈏䇮ⶄᢙౄ䈲 1995 ᐕ䈮ᚑ┙䈚䈢ᙗᴺ䈪⛔ᴦ䈱ㆬᛯ⢇䈫䈘䉏 䈩䈇䈢䈏䇮ዉ䈲䈘䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯 䊛䉶䊔䊆䉇 NRM 䈏ಽᮭൻ╷䉕ផㅴ䈚䈢ᤨᦼ䈲 1996 ᐕ䈱ೋ䉄䈩䈱ੱ⾗ᩰ䈱ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ䈱 ೨ᓟ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯NRM એ೨䈲䉥䊗䊁䇮䉝䊚䊮䇮╙ੑᰴ䉥䊗䊁䈫ർㇱり⠪䈱ᮭ䈏⛯䈇䈢䇯╙৻ᰴ 䉥䊗䊁ᮭ䈲᳃ਥㆬ䉕⚻䈩ධㇱ䈱䊑䉧䊮䉻₺䈫䈱ㅪ┙ᮭ䈫䈚䈩ᆎ䉁䈦䈢䈏䇮䉇䈏䈩⁛ⵙൻ䈚䇮 ァㇱ䉕ᴦㆊ⒟䈮ᛩ䈚䈢䇯䉝䊚䊮ァ䈏䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷䈮䉋䉍ᮭ䉕ᅓข䈚䈢䈫䈐䈮䈲⻉ᄖ࿖䈲䈖䉏 䉕᱑ㄫ䈚䈢䇯䉝䊚䊮䉅⁛ⵙൻ䉕ᒝ䉄䇮ᣇᐭ䇮ౄ䈶⼏ળ䉕ᑄᱛ䈚䈢䇯NRM 䈱೨り⚵❱䈲䉝䊚 䊮ᮭᛂୟᤨ䈮䈲䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝ᐭ䉇䉥䊗䊁ᵷ䈫䈮䈚䈢䈏䇮╙ੑᰴ䉥䊗䊁ᮭ䈱ㆬਇᱜ 䈮᛫⼏䈚䈩ౝᚢ䉕㐿ᆎ䈚䈢䇯䊛䉶䊔䊆䉇 NRM ᐙㇱ䈲ㇱ䈱䉝䊮䉮䊷䊧(Ankole)り䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮 䉥䊗䊁䈮ᗵ䉕䉅䈧䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ജ䈫ឭ៤䈚䈢䇯 䋨䉬䊆䉝䋩 䉬䊆䉝䈲䊝䉟ᮭ䈱䉅䈫䈪 1992 ᐕ䈎䉌 2002 ᐕ䉁䈪᳃ਥൻ䈱ᢛ䉕䈚䈢䈏䇮ታ⾰⊛䈭ㆊ⒟䈮䈲〯 䉂䈘䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈐䉒䉄䈩㓸ᮭ⊛䈭䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱᭴ㅧ䈏⁛┙ᢙᐕᓟ䈎䉌䉁䈪⛯䈇䈩䈇䉎䇯䉣䉴 䊆䉲䊁䉞䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䉨䉪䊡(Kikuyu)䈫䈇䈉ᦨ䉅ఝ䈭㓸࿅䈫䇮䊦䉥(Luo)䈭䈬䈱┹ว䈜䉎㓸࿅䈱䈅䈇䈣 䈪ᭂ䉄䈩ኻ᛫⊛䈭㑐ଥ䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯㓸ᮭ⊛䈭᭴ㅧ䈲䇮ᮭജ䉕ី䈚䈢㓸࿅䈱⋉䈱⁛භ䉕 ⸽䈜䉎䇯䈠䉏䈲⢈ᴅ䈭䈏ᱴ䈬䉨䉪䊡䊤䊮䊄䈫䊥䊐䊃䊋䊧䊷䈮㒢ቯ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎ታ䈮ኻᔕ䈚䈩䈇 䉎䇯䊝䉟ᮭ䈪䈲䊝䉟䈏ዋᢙᵷ䈱䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮(Kalenjin)り䈪䈅䈦䈢䈖䈫䈎䉌䇮䉨䉪䊡䈲␠ળ⚻ᷣ㕙 䈪䈱ታᮭី䈮⇐䉁䈦䈢䇯2002 ᐕ䈮䉨䊋䉨ᮭ䈲 NARC 䈫䈇䈉ᡷ㕟ᵷജ䈱ㅪ┙䉕ઍ䈚䈢䈏䇮 䈖䉏䈲ㆬ↪䈱⋴᧼䈪䈚䈎䈭䈒䇮ౝ⚗䉕⚻䈩䉨䉪䊡ਛᔃ䈱ᮭ䈮䈭䉍䇮䉨䉪䊡䈲ᴦ⚻ᷣਔ㕙䈪䈱 33 ᡰ㈩ᮭ䉕ី䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䈦䈢䇯 䉬䊆䉝䈱․ᓽ䈲ᬀ᳃ᦼ䈱㓸ᮭ᭴ㅧ䈱⛽ᜬ䈮䈅䉎䇯⺕䈏ᮭജ䉕ី䈜䉎䈱䈎䈏ᴦജ䈮䈫䈦 䈩ὶ⋲䈱⊛䈫䈭䉍䇮࿖䈪䉅ౄౝ䈪䉅ᄙᢙᵷ䈫䈭䉎䈢䉄䈱วᓥㅪⴧ╷䈏➅䉍䈘䉏䈢䇯᳃ਥൻ䈲 2002 ᐕએ㒠ታൻ䈚䈢䈏䇮ᴦജ䈱⚿㓸䈫ಽⵚ䈲➅䉍䈘䉏䈢䇯䉨䊋䉨䉅䊝䉟ห᭽㓸ᮭ᭴ㅧ䈮 ਸ਼䈦䈎䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉍䇮2007 ᐕᧃ䈱ㆬ⚿ᨐ䉅ᱜᕈ䈮⇼䈏䈅䈦䈢䈫䈇䉒䉏䉎(Dagne㩷 2008)䇯㗔 ၞ⊛䈭ಽᮭൻ䈲Ꮊⴕ᭴ㅧ䈱䈭䈎䈪ᛥ䈘䉏䇮ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈲Ꮢ↸⥄ᴦ䈮ᒻᑼ⊛䈮ਈ䈋䉌䉏䈢 䈏䇮ਥⷐ䈭䉶䉪䉺䊷ⴕ䈲ᄖ䈘䉏䈢䇯ಽᮭൻ䈱ᰳᅤ䈮䉋䉎ᴦ⊛ਇቯ䈲䇮2008 ᐕ䈱േᓟ䈱䉨 䊋䉨䇮䉥䊂䉞䊮䉧䈮䉋䉎ᄢ⛔㗔䊶㚂⋧䊘䉴䊃䈱ᮭജಽ䋨power sharing䋩䉁䈪⛯䈇䈢17䇯 䋨䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䋩 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ᄢⷙᮨ䈭⚗䉕⚻䈩䈇䈭䈇䇯䈠䈱ⷐ࿃䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞ኻ┙䈱ዋ䈭䈘䋨䈢䈣䈚䇮 ፉᎩㇱ䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈮䈲ᄢ㒽䉺䊮䉧䊆䊷䉦䈫䈱䈅䈇䈣䈮ᢥൻ⊛䈭ኻ┙䉇⥄┙ᜰะ䈏ሽ䋩䇮䉱䊮䉳 䊋䊦䈎䉌ᄢ⛔㗔䉕ㆬ䈜䉎ᮭജಽ䇮␠ળਥ⟵ᤨઍ䈱䉴䊪䊍䊥⺆䈱↪⺆䈫䈚䈩䈱ᶐㅘ䈭䈬䈏 ㊀ⷐ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢䈭ⅣႺ䉕ᵴ䈎䈚䈩䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱ਈౄ CCM䋨⁛┙ᤨὐ䈲 TANU [Tanganyika African National Union]䇮1977 ᐕ䈮䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈫䊕䊮䊋䈱 ASP 䈫⛔ว䈚䈩ᡷ⒓䋩䈲᳃ ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䉕ਗⴕ䈚䈩ផㅴ䈚䈢䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮2000 ᐕ 11 䈱ㆬᓟ䇮䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈪㐿䈱ਇᱜ䉕 䉄䈓䉎㊁ౄ(CUF)䈱᛫⼏䊂䊝䈮⼊ቭ㓌䈏ⴣ⓭䈚䇮ኻ┙䈎䉌 50 ฬએ䈱ᱫ⠪䉕䈣䈚䇮600 ฬ䉕䈋 䉎ᴦ㔍᳃䈏䉬䊆䉝䈮ᷰ䈦䈢䇯 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱␠ળਥ⟵╷䈲⚻ᷣ⊛䈮䈲ᄬᢌ䈚䈢䈏䇮䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭൮៨⊛䈭(inclusive)╷䉕ዉ 䈚䈢䇯CCM 䈱ౝㇱ䈮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ᵷ㑓䈲䈭䈒䇮ോຬ䈱ណ↪䉅ਛ┙⊛䈮ⴕ䉒䉏䇮ฦၞ䈻䈱ォ ൕ䈏ᅑബ䈘䉏䈢䇯৻ౄ䈫䈇䈉⚂䈲䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮ᮭജಽ┙䈮㑐䈚䈩䈲ᄢ⛔㗔䊶㚂⋧䈏ዉ䈘䉏䇮 䉁䈪⛮ᛚ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎18䇯䉁䈢䇮৻ౄਅ䈪䈲䉬䊆䉝䈱 KANU ห᭽䇮ㆬ䈱࿖ળ⼏ຬ䈲 2 ฬ એ䈏┙䈜䉎䉋䈉䈮ቯ䉄䉌䉏䇮┹䈏ᅑബ䈘䉏䈢䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫ห᭽䈮ᅚᕈ䉇⧯⠪䈱⼏ ຬㆬᨒ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱㑐ଥ䈪䈲䇮1965 ᐕ䈱ㆬᴺ䈪ੱ⒳⊛䇮ၞ⊛䈭ಽ㔌䈱ଦㅴ䈏 䈛䉌䉏䇮䈘䉌䈮ⶄᢙౄ䉕วᴺൻ䈚䈢 1992 ᐕ䈱ᡷᱜᙗᴺ䈪䈲࿖ኅ⛔৻䉕䉎䈢䉄䈮ㇱᣖ⊛䇮ቬ ᢎ⊛䈶ੱ⒳⊛䈭䊋䉟䉝䉴䉕ᡷ䉄䈩ᱛ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯 䋨3 䉦࿖䋩 ಄ᚢᦼ䈮ᡰ䈋䉌䉏䈩䈐䈢㓸ᮭ⊛䈲䇮1980 ᐕઍ䈎䉌䈱⚻ᷣෂᯏ䉇ౝᚢ䈪ㅌ䈚䇮1990 ᐕઍ䈱 ᳃ਥൻ䈱ᯏㆇ䈱ਛ䈪࿖㓙⊛䇮࿖ౝ⊛䈭ᡰᜬၮ⋚䉕ᄬ䈦䈢䇯䉫䊨䊷䊋䊦䈮ዷ㐿䈚䈢᳃ਥൻ䈲䇮ㅜ ࿖䈱ᴦ䈮䉅ᴦ⊛⥄↱䉕ᶐㅘ䈘䈞䇮㊁ౄ䈏ᧄᩰ⊛䈮ᵴേ䉕㐿ᆎ䈚䈢䈏䇮ᮭ䈲ᔅ䈝 17 䈖䈱ᮭജಽ䈲䇮2002 ᐕ䈱 NARC ᮭᚑ┙䈱䈫䈐䈮දജ㑐ଥ䈮䈅䈦䈢ਔജ䈱䈅䈇䈣䈪৻ᐲ䈲ᢥᦠ䈪วᗧ䈘 䉏䈩䈇䈢䈫⸒䉒䉏䇮5 ᐕ䉕⚻䈩ౣ䈘䉏䈢(Kadima and Owuor 2006)䇯 18㩷 䉡䉧䊮䉻䉅ห䈛ᐲ䈪⊒䈚䈢䈏䇮䉥䊗䊁ᄢ⛔㗔ᤨઍ䈮৻రൻ䈘䉏 NRM 䈱䉅䈫䈪ᓳᵴ䇯 34 䈚䉅⥄↱䈪ᱜ䈭ㆬ䈮Ⓧᭂ⊛䈪䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉇ၞ䉕ၮ⋚䈫䈜䉎ౄ 䈏ਛᄩ䈪วᓥㅪⴧ╷䉕➅䉍䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲ౄ䈏⢒䈦䈩䈇䈭䈇䈏䇮ᣥ᧪䈱㊁ౄ䈏⪭ 䈜䉎䈭䈎䈪 FDC(The Forum for Democratic Change)䈏િᒛ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱ᐞ䈧䈎䈱ㇺᏒ ㇱ䈱㊁ౄ䈲╷ᜰะ䈣䈏ജ䈏ዊ䈘䈇䇯᳃ਥൻ䈲Ꮢ᳃䈱ᮭᗧ⼂䉕⋡ⷡ䉄䈘䈞䇮ਛᄩ䈎䉌䈱 ઃ㊄䊔䊷䉴䈱⽷⊛ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅴⴕ䈘䈞䈢䈏䇮หᤨ䈮ౄᴦ䉕ㅢ䈛䈩䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞㓸࿅䈱 ኂ䈱ኻ┙䉕ᜬ䈤ㄟ䉖䈣䇯 2㧕ಽᮭൻ 䉝䊐䊥䉦䈮䈍䈔䉎ಽᮭൻ䈱േ䈐䈮䉅ᐞ䈧䈎䈱ᤨᦼ䈏䈅䉎䈏䇮1990 ᐕઍએ㒠䈲᳃ਥൻ䈫䈮ᵄ䈚 䈢19䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮ᄙ䈒䈱ಽᮭൻ╷䈲ਛᄩᐭ䈱ᮭജ䉕ቯൻ䈜䉎ౕ䈫䈚䈩䊃䉾䊒䉻䉡䊮ᣇᑼ䈪ⴕ 䉒䉏䇮ᣇᐭ䈏ᧄᒰ䈮ታലᕈ䈱䈅䉎⸘↹䉕ᚑ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈲⒘䈪䈅䉎(United Cities and Local Governments 2007)䇯⁛┙ᒰೋ䈮䉬䊆䉝䉇䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈲ㅪ㇌䈱ⷙቯ䈏䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䈠䉏䉌䈲ᯏ⢻䈚 䈭䈇䈉䈤䈮㓸ᮭ䈮ᄌᦝ䈘䉏䈢䇯䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺䇮䉥䊗䊁䇮䊆䉣䊧䊧ᮭ䈲㓸ᮭൻ䉕ㅴ䉄䇮㊁ౄ䈲ਈౄ 䈮ๆ䈘䉏䉎䈎ᱛ䈘䉏䈩৻ౄ䈱ᴦᒻᘒ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯1980 ᐕઍ䈮䈲Ꮢ႐⚻ᷣൻ╷䈏ᒝൻ䈘 䉏20䇮ਛᄩᐭ䈱ⷙᮨ䈏ᷫ䈘䉏䇮ಽᮭൻ䈱৻ᒻᘒ䈫䈚䈩䈱᳃༡ൻ䈏ㅴዷ䈚䈢䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮1990 ᐕ ઍ䈮䈲㒯༡䉕េഥ⾗㊄䈪⛽ᜬ䈜䉎േᯏ䈏ᶖ䈋䇮䈎䈧េഥ䈮ᴦ⊛䉮䊮䊂䉞䉲䊢䊅䊥䊁䉞䋨╷ ઃᏪ᧦ઙ䋩䈏⺖䈘䉏䈢䈖䈫䈪䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ᡷༀ䈏 3 䉦࿖䈮䈫䈦䈩ਇนㆱ䈱ㆬᛯ⢇䈫䈭䈦 䈢䇯 䋨䉡䉧䊮䉻䋩 1990 ᐕઍ䈮ᦨ䉅↹ᦼ⊛䈭ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅴ䉄䈢䇯LC(Local Council)䈫䈇䉒䉏䉎䈎䉌⋵䉁䈪䈱ᣇ⼏ ળ䈱䊊䉟䉝䊤䊷䉨䊷䉕ਛᩭ䈮ᝪ䈋䇮NRM 䈱ታ䈱৻ౄ䈫䈇䈉㒢⇇䉕ᣇ䊧䊔䊦䈱᳃䈱ෳ ട䈮䉋䈦䈩䈍䈉䈫䈚䈢䇯䈧䉁䉍䇮᳃ਥൻ䈏Ꮢ᳃ෳട䉕ㅢ䈚䈩ಽᮭൻ䉕ផㅴ䈜䉎ㅢᏱ䈱䉶䉥䊥䊷䈫 䈲⇣䈭䉍(Crook and Manor 1998)䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲᳃ਥൻ䈱ઍᦧᚻᲑ䈫䈚䈩ಽᮭൻ䉕⊒㆐䈘䈞䈢䋨╣ጟ 2005䋩䇯䈖䈱േ䈐䈲䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ㅪ㇌ᜰะ䉕ኽᲕ䈜䉎േ䈐䈪䉅䈅䈦䈢䇯䉁䈢䇮1991 ᐕ䈮䉬䊆䉝䈮ኻ 䈜䉎䊄䊅䊷䈱᳃ਥൻജ䈏ട䈋䉌䉏䈢ઙ䉅ᓇ㗀䈚䈢21䇯1980 ᐕઍ䈮ỗ䈚䈇ౝᚢ䉕⚻ㆊ䈚䈢䉡䉧 䊮䉻䈲䉬䊆䉝䉇䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈾䈬䊄䊅䊷䈎䉌䈱᳃ਥൻജ䉕ฃ䈔䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮1996 ᐕ䈱ᄢ⛔㗔 ㆬ䈱ታᣉ䈲ᣇ䈮ኻ䈜䉎䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱ឭଏ䈱ᔅⷐᕈ䉕 NRM 䈮ౣ⼂䈘䈞䉎ᄾᯏ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯 LC ߩḮߪ 1980 ᐕઍߩౝᚢᤨߩ RC(Resistance Council)ߢࠅ߇❱⚵ߩߎޔァ㓌ߣၞ᳃ ߣߩ㑐ଥࠍ᭴▽ߒߚޕNRA(National Resistance Army)ߪߘࠇ߹ߢߩァ㓌ߣߪ⇣ߥࠅޔ᳃ࠍ ⇛ᅓߖߕޔ㘩ᢱߦ߽ኻଔࠍᛄߞߚߩߢᒝᡰᜬࠍᓧߚޕRC ߪ NRA ߇ᚢ㑵ὐߣߒߚධㇱ 19 2008 ᐕᤨὐ䈪䇮䉣䉼䉥䊏䉝䇮䉧䊷䊅䇮䊙䊥䇮䉦䊜䊦䊷䊮䇮䉬䊷䊒䊶䊔䊦䊂䇮䊅䊚䊎䉝䇮䊅䉟䉳䉢䊥䉝䇮䉶䊈䉧䊦䇮ධ䉝 䊐䊥䉦䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䇮䉧䊷䊅䈭䈬䈏ᣇᐭ䈱ሽ䉕ᙗᴺ䈪ⷙቯ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯 20 ࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕߦ߅ߡ߽ 1986 ᐕએ㒠᭴ㅧ⺞ᢛ╷߇ዉߐࠇߡࠆޕ 1991 ᐕ 11 䈮ኻ䉬䊆䉝េഥ࿖ળ⼏䈏৻ౄᡰ㈩䉕፣䈠䈉䈫䈚䈭䈇䊝䉟ᮭ䈮ኻ䈚䈩ᣂⷙេഥ䈱ᱛ䉕ቯ䈚䇮 䈠䈱⋥ᓟ䈮䉬䊆䉝䊶䉝䊐䊥䉦᳃ᣖห⋖(KANU)䈏৻ౄ䈱ᑄᱛ䉕ฃ䈔䉏䈢䇯 21 35 ߿ㇱၞߦ߅ߡ⊒㆐ߒߚޕ 1995 ᐕߦ RC ߪᣇߩ┙ᴺⴕࠍᡰ߃ࠆ LC ߦᡷ⒓ߐࠇߚޕ ࠤ࠾ࠕߢߪ㚂㐳߇ᣇⴕࠍᡰ߃ࠆࠪࠬ࠹ࡓ߇⁛┙ᓟ߽⛮⛯ߒߚ߇ࡦࡒࠕߪߢ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ ᮭ߇ߘࠇࠍ፣უߐߖ㧔ో࿖ߩ 9 Ꮊߦァߩ⍮߇ዞછ[Golloba-Mutebi 2008:142]㧕ࠩࡦ࠲ޔ ࠾ࠕߢߪ 1961 ᐕߩ⁛┙એᓟᑄᱛߐࠇߚߩߢޔ ⛮⛯ᕈߪࠄࠇߥ߆ߞߚޕ ߎߩߚߦ․ߦ LC1 ߣ߁(Village)ࡌ࡞ߦ߅ߡߪ NRM ⁛ⵙߣ߁⚂ߪߞߡ߽᳃߇⥄↱ኻ╬ߦ⼏⺰ ߒ߿ߔⓨ㑆߇ឭଏߐࠇߚޕ 㧔࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕ㧕 1990 ᐕઍ䈱䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ಽᮭൻᚢ⇛䉕〯ⷅ䈚䈢䇯㑐ਈ䈚䈢䊄䊅䊷䉅䊂䊮䊙䊷䉪䇮䉝䉟䊦 䊤䊮䊄䇮䉴䉦䊮䊂䉞䊅䊎䉝⻉࿖䈭䈬ㅢ䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲 1972 ᐕ䈮䊆䉣䊧䊧䈏䇸ಽᮭൻት⸒䇹 䉕ⴕ䈇ਛᄩ䈎䉌 20 Ꮊ䈱⍮䈮ᒝജ䈭ⴕᮭ㒢䉕ਈ䈋䈢䇯䈠䈱㓙䈮⋵ᐭ䈲ᑄᱛ䈘䉏䇮ౄ䈱ᣇ ᯏ㑐䈮ๆ䈘䉏䈢䇯䈖䈱ᤨᦼ䉁䈪㓸ᮭൻ䉕ᒝ䉄䈢䈏䇮␠ળਥ⟵〝✢䈱ૐㅅ䈎䉌ᐭ䈲 1980 ᐕઍ ᓟඨ䈮䈲╷ో⥸䉕⋥䈜䉋䈉䈮䈭䉎䇯1985 ᐕ䈮ᡷᱜ䈘䉏䈢ᙗᴺ䈮ᣇ⥄ᴦ䈏⸥䈘䉏䇮 1990 ᐕઍ䈎䉌ᧄᩰ⊛䈭ಽᮭൻ╷䈏Ḱ䈘䉏䈢䈏䇮1998 ᐕ䈱ᣇᐭᡷ㕟╷ᢥᦠ䈪䈲ห ╷䈏䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫ห᭽䈮ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䇮䈧䉁䉍”Decentralization by Devolution(D by D)”䈪䈅䉎䈖䈫䉕ቯᑼ ൻ䈚䈢䇯Ꮊ䈱ᓎഀ䉕ᄢ䈮ᒙ䉄䈩䇮ᣇᐭ䈱᭴ᚑ䈲⋵䈫䈱䋲ጀ䈏ਛᔃ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯 ห࿖䈱ಽᮭൻᡷ㕟䈲䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈾䈬䈱ౝ⊛േᯏ䈏ਲ䈚䈒䇮䉶䉪䉺䊷ᡷ㕟䈱ᑧ㐳䈱ᕈᩰ䈪 (Fjeldstad 2001 p.2)䇮 䊄䊅䊷䈱㑐ਈ䈏ᒝ䈇䈖䈫䈲ุ䉄䈭䈇䇯ὼ䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮ਛᄩ㓸ᮭ䈱ᝂ᛬䈎䉌 1980 ᐕઍᓟඨ䇮․䈮⚻ᷣ䈏࿁ᓳ䈚䈩䈐䈢 1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈎䉌ᐭ䈲⌀䈮ᣇᐭ䈱⢻ജ䉕ะ 䈘䈞䈩ല₸䈱䉋䈇䉰䊷䊎䉴䉕⋡ᜰ䈚䈢22䇯ർ᰷⻉࿖䈲ോຬᡷ㕟䈱▸࿐䉕䈖䈋䈢ⴕ⽷ᡷ 㕟䉕ᐭ䈮䈐䈎䈔䈢(Prime Minster’s Office 1996)䇯㐿⊒⸘↹䈲 1972 ᐕ䈱䊃䉾䊒䉻䉡䊮ဳ䈎䉌 ᣇ䈱᳃ෳട䈮䉋䉎䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒ဳ䈮ಾ䉍ᦧ䉒䉎ᣇะ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱േᯏ䈫䈚䈩䈲㗔 䈱ᐢ䈘䇮ㄘㇱ䈏ୟ⊛䈭 CCM 䈱ᡰᜬၮ⋚(Munkandala 1998)䇮ਛᄩ䈫ᣇ䈏ౄੱ⣂䊈䉾䊃䊪 䊷䉪䈪❬䈏䈦䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈏䈕䉌䉏䉎䇯ౄੱ⣂䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䉅ห᭽䈪䈅䉍䇮ਈౄ䈏ୟ⊛䈮ᒝ䈎䈦䈢 䈢䉄䇮ಽᮭൻ╷䈲ਛᄩ䈫ᣇ䈱ౄౝ䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱䈅䈇䈣䈱⾗Ḯౣ㈩ಽ╷䈪䉅䈅䈦䈢䋨╣ጟ 2005䋩䇯 䋨䉬䊆䉝䋩 䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲ઁ 2 䉦࿖䈱䉋䈉䈭ో⥸⊛䈭ಽᮭൻᡷ㕟䈲ⴕ䉒䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯㓸ᮭဳ䈱ᴦ䈏࿕⌕䈚䈩䈍 䉍䇮䉁䈢ᣇ䈱㐿⊒ⴕ䈮ⶄᢙ䈱䉼䊞䊮䊈䊦䈏䈅䉍䇮䈠䉏䉌䈏⺞ᢛ䈘䉏䉎ዷᦸ䉅䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮 1995 ᐕ䈮⇇㌁ⴕ䈏ᡰេ䉕㐿ᆎ䈚䈢䉬䊆䉝ᣇᐭᡷ㕟䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛(KLGRP:Kenya Local Government Reform Program)䈲Ꮢ᳃ෳട䈱ᄢ䈮䉋䉎䉰䊷䊎䉴䊶䊂䊥䊋䊥䊷䈱ᡷༀ䉕ⷞ㊁䈮䉏 䈢⽷⊛ಽᮭൻ╷䉕ዉ䈚䈢䇯䈠䈱⚿ᨐ䇮ㅢᏱ䈱㐿⊒⾗㊄䈱ઃ㊄䊦䊷䊃䈫䈲⇣䈭䉎ⶄᢙ䈱䊐 22 ࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕߪ Local Government Reform Team ߣ߁⚵❱ࠍ㚂ㇺ࠼࠼ࡑߦࠆᣇ⥄ᴦ⋭ߣߪ㔌ߒߡ ฦ࿖ᄢ㙚ߩࠆ࠳࡞ࠛࠬࠨࡓߦ⸳┙ߒޔಽᮭൻផㅴߩḰࠍⴕߞߚޕ 36 䉜䊮䊄䈏⸳┙䈘䉏䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮ో⥸⊛䈭ಽᮭൻᡷ㕟䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲 NARC 䈏ᄢ⛔㗔䋭㚂⋧䈭䈬䈫䈮 ᙗᴺᡷᱜ䈱ㆬ⚂䈫䈚䈢䈏䇮〝✢㑵䈪䉨䊋䉨ᮭ䈱 NARC-KENYA 䈫䉥䊂䉞䊮䉧䈱 LDP 䈭䈬 䈮ಽⵚ䈚䈩ㅍ䉌䉏䈢䇯2005 ᐕ䈮䉨䊋䉨ᮭ䈲ಽᮭൻ䉕䉄ᮭജಽᢔ䈮䉋䉍ᶖᭂ⊛䈭⨲᩺䉕࿖ ᳃ᛩ䈮䈎䈔䈢䈏䇮ุ䈘䉏䈢䇯 ೋᦼ᧦ઙ䈫䈚䈩䇮䉬䊆䉝䈏ಽᮭൻ䈚䈭䈎䈦䈢ℂ↱䈲䇮KANU 䉇䉨䉪䊡䈲ᬀ᳃ᐭ䈻䈱⊒䈏ᒝ 䈒䇮ㅪ㇌䉕ᣥᬀ᳃ജ䈱ᣂᐭ䉕ᒙ䈮䈜䉎⟂䈫䈚䈩ℂ⸃䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯KADU 䈲䊙䉟䊉䊥䊁䉞䈏 ᄙ䈒䈩ಽᮭൻᜰะ䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䉇䈏䈩 KANU 䈮ๆ䈘䉏䈢䇯䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺ᮭ᮸┙䈱䈫䈐䈮ฦ㓸࿅ 䈲දജ䈚䈢䈏䇮䉇䈏䈩ᮭ䈏㒢䉌䉏䈢㓸࿅䈮䉋䉎㓸ᮭ᭴ㅧ䈮⒖ⴕ䈚䇮㐳ᦼ⊛䈭ᛥ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯 䉬䊆䉝䈱ౄ䈲ၞ䊶䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ౄ䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮ᐔ䈭ၞ㈩ಽ䉕ᮭ䈮ⷐ᳞䈜䉎䈖䈫䈲䈪䈐䈝䇮 ઍ䉒䉍䈮ᮭജ䈮㑐ਈ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎ᯏળਥ⟵⊛䈭ᴦ⁁ᴫ䈏䈉䉁䉏䈢䇯 䋨3 䉦࿖䋩 䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲⧷࿖䈫ද⺞䈚䈩࿖ౝ䈱ઁၞ䉕ᒝ⊛䈮ᡰ㈩䈚䈢䊑䉧䊮䉻䈏䈠䉏⥄りㅪ㇌䉕ᜰ ะ䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯4 䈧䈱₺࿖䈫 1 䈧䈱Ḱ₺࿖䇮ઁ䈱ၞ䈮䈲㚂㐳㗔䈏ሽ䈚䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕⠨ᘦ䈜䉎 䈲⁛┙ᒰೋ䈎䉌ሽ䈚䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䉅䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈫䈱ㅪว࿖䈫䈭䈦䈢⚻✲䈎䉌䇮ಽᮭൻ䈲ㆬ ᛯ⢇䈫䈚䈩䈲ೋ䉄䈎䉌ሽ䈚䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮䊆䉣䊧䊧ᤨઍ䈲␠ળਥ⟵䈱ਛᄩ㓸ᮭ䈏ᡰ㈩⊛䈭㐿⊒ 䊝䊂䊦䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯1980 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈎䉌䈖䈱䊝䊂䊦䈱ᄬᢌ䈏⼂䈘䉏ᆎ䉄䇮CCM 䈲ᣂ䈚䈇䊝䊂䊦䉕 㐿⊒䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈮ㄼ䉌䉏䈢䇯 ᤨὐ䈪䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䇮䉬䊆䉝䈲⣕ਛᔃൻ䈭䈇䈚৻ㇱ䈮ኻ䈜䉎ᒻᑼ⊛ᮭ㒢 ᆔ⼑(formal devolution)䈱Ბ㓏䈪䈅䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈲ಽᮭൻ䉕ផㅴ䈜䉎േᯏ䇮䉬䊆䉝䈮䈲䈠䈱ㅒ䈱 㓸ᮭൻ䉕⛽ᜬ䈜䉎േᯏ䈏䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䈖䈱⢛᥊䈮䈲䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ಽ㔌ᜰะ䇮䉨䉪䊡䈱⛔ᜰะ䈏䈅䈦 䈢䇯ਔ㓸࿅䈮␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮䈲ථ䈚䈢ᒝ䈘䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䈢䈏䇮ᴦ䈏ઁ㓸࿅䈮ᛥ䈋䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䈫 䈚䈢䇯NRM 䈮䈲䊑䉧䊮䉻䉅ട䉒䈦䈢䈏䇮৻ㇱ䈱䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ᕆㅴ⊛ಽ㔌ਥ⟵䋨ㅪ㇌ਥ⟵䋩䉕ᙬ ᨵ䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䉅䈅䉍䇮䈖䉏䈏⋵ਛᔃ䈱ಽᮭൻ䉕ផㅴ䈜䉎ೋᦼ䈱േᯏ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯KANU 䈲㓸ᮭ⊛䈪䈅 䈦䈢䈏䇮䉨䉪䊡䈲 1980 ᐕઍ䈮ᴦᮭജ䈎䉌ᓟㅌ䈚䈢䇯䈠䈱↪䈫䈚䈩䇮2003-04 ᐕ䈎䉌䉨䊋䉨 ᮭ䈏䉨䉪䊡ਛᔃ䈮ㅴ䉄䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎䈫䇮ઁ㓸࿅䈏⊒䈚䈢䇯 ᮭജಽ╷ߣಽᮭൻߪߦࠇߡࠆߩࠗࡕޕೋᦼߦߪ Stewart ߇൮៨ᕈߣࠎߛ⻉㓸 ࿅ߩ㑑ෳട߇ታߒߡߚߪࠇߎޕᮭജಽ╷ߢࠆ߇ߩࠗࡕޔᓟᦼߦߪ㑑ౝ߇ࠞ ࡦࠫࡦਥዉߦߥࠆ৻ᣇޔ㗔ၞ⊛ಽᮭൻ߇㒢ቯ⊛ߦផㅴߐࠇߚ㧔㓸ᮭߩၮᧄ⊛ߥᨒ⚵ߺߪ ፣ࠇߥ߆ߞߚ㧕ߩߘޕᓟߩࠟࡦࠖ࠺ࠝߣࠠࡃࠠޔ㑐ଥߢߪ߇ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ㓸ᮭ⊛ߥᄢ⛔㗔ᐲ ߢࠆߚߦ㚂⋧ࡐࠬ࠻ߩᣂ⸳ࠍࠝ࠺ࠖࡦࠟ߇ᦸߺޔ2007-08 ᐕߩേᓟߩ⺞ࠍ⚻ߡታ ߔࠆߩߎޕㆊ⒟߽ᮭജಽߢࠆޕNRM ߽ೋᦼߦߪ㑑ߦߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ㓸࿅ࠍࠇߡ൮៨ᕈ ߇㜞߆ߞߚޕ1990 ᐕઍᓟඨߩಽᮭൻߩផㅴߣߦߩߘޔ൮៨ᕈߪᷫዋߒߚࠟ࠙ޔߒߛߚޕ 37 ࡦ࠳߽࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕ߽ᅚᕈ⧯ޔ⠪߇⼏ຬߦߥࠆෳടᨒ߇ࠅ߽ࠇߎޔᄙᭂሽဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵ߩ ᕈᩰߢߞߚޕ 2-2 ℂ⺰⊛䈭⠨ኤ 䈖䈖䈪䈲ᴦ䊒䊨䉶䉴䈱⢛᥊䈮䈅䉎᭴ㅧ⊛䈭ⷐ࿃䈮䈧䈇䈩ᬌ⸛䈚䈢ℂ⺰⊛䈭⺑䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎䇯䉁 䈝䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈪䈲࿖ኅౝㇱ䈱ኻ┙᭴ㅧ䉕⺑䈜䉎䊝䊂䊦䈫䈚䈩 Stewart 䈱᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䉕 ⚫䈚䇮ᰴ䈮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ⷰὐ䈎䉌ᄙᢙઍဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱ෂ㒾ᕈ䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎䇯ᰴ䈮䇮࿖ኅᄖㇱ 䈮ᴦ⊛ਇቯᕈ䈱ⷐ࿃䉕䈜⠨䈋ᣇ䉕⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱⺑䉕ฃ䈔䉏 䈢႐ว䈮䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ኻ┙✭䈱ⷰὐ䈎䉌䈱ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈉ⷞὐ䈏䈉䉁䉏䉎䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮ಽᮭൻ䈮ኻ 䈜䉎᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ᱧผ␠ળ⊛䈭ᗧ⺰䈮䈧䈇䈩䉅⸒䈜䉎䇯 1) ࿖ኅᒻᚑߣ᳃ਥൻߩࠖ࠹ࠪ࠾ࠬࠛޔ㑐ଥ Stewart 䉌䈲␠ળ⚻ᷣ䊶ᴦ᭴ㅧ䈮䈍䈔䉎䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞㓸࿅㑆䈱ਇᐔ╬䇮䈧䉁䉍䇸᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬ (HI: Holizontal Inequality)䇹䈎䉌⚗䈱⊒↢䊶࿁ㆱ䊜䉦䊆䉵䊛䉕⺑䈚䈢䋨Stewart 2008䋩23䇯ౖဳ⊛ 䈭ᚑഞ䊝䊂䊦䈲䊙䊧䉟䉲䉝䈱䊑䊚䊒䊃䊤╷䈪䇮⪇♽䉋䉍䉅␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮ഠ䈮䈅䉎䊙䊧䊷♽䉕 ᴦ⊛䈮ఝㆄ䈚䈢╷䈮䉋䉍䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞㓸࿅㑆䈱ਇᐔ╬䈏ᡷༀ䈘䉏䇮⚗䈏࿁ㆱ䈘䉏䈢䈫⠨ኤ 䈜䉎䋨Brown 2007䋩䇯䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱Ყセ⎇ⓥ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮䉬䊆䉝䈲 Central Ꮊ䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ධ ㇱၞ䈮ఝ䈭䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱䉨䉪䊡䈫䊑䉧䊮䉻䈏䈇䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮䉬䊆䉝䈲ർㇱ䈫䊆䊞䊮䉱Ꮊ䋨63䋦䊦 䉥䋩䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ർㇱၞ䈏⋧ኻ⊛䈭⽺࿎⁁ᘒ䈮䈅䉍䇮䈖䉏䉌䈱䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮䈲ਇḩ䈏⬧ᑧ䈚䈩 䈇䈢(Klugman et al.,1999,Stewart & O’Sullivan 1998)䇯䈖䈱᭴࿑䈎䉌䈲䊑䉧䊮䉻䉇䉨䉪䊡䈲ୟ⊛ 䈮ఝ䈭䈱䈪䇮⽺࿎ၞ䈱᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈏ᷫዋ䈜䉏䈳ਔ࿖䈲ቯൻ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䇯䈭䈍䇮䉺䊮 䉱䊆䉝䈲ఝ䈭㓸࿅䈏䈭䈒䇮ฦၞ䈮൮៨⊛䈪ᐔ╬䈭╷䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈢䈫⺑䈜䉎䇯 Stewart & O’Sullivan 䋨1998䋩䈲䇮䊑䉧䊮䉻䇮䉨䉪䊡䈏ఝ䈫䈇䈉᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱ၮᧄ᭴ㅧ䈲㘃ૃ 䈚䈩䈇䈢䉅䈱䈱䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲 1960㵥80 ᐕઍ䈮᳃ਥ⊛ౄᐲ䈏䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕ㅢ䈛䈩ౄᵷ⊛䈭 ᡰ㈩䉕䈉䉂䇮⚗䉕ഥ㐳䈜䉎ᣇะ䈮䈇䈢䈱䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲䊝䉟ᮭ䈪᳃ਥਥ⟵䈏ᛥ䈋䉌䉏 䈢䉅䈱䈱䇮൮៨⊛䈭㐿⊒䈏ో࿖䈪ⴕ䉒䉏䇮␠ળᜰᮡ䈱ᡷༀ䈏䈅䈦䈢䈖䈫䈪ᄢⷙᮨ䈭⚗䈏࿁ㆱ䈘 䉏䈢䈫⺑䈜䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮ఝ䈭䊑䉧䊮䉻䈮ኻ䈜䉎ർㇱ䈱⻉㓸࿅䈏ᴦ⊛䈭 ਇḩ䉕Ⴧ䈚䈩ജ䈏䈉䉁䉏䈢䈫⺑䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮ఝ䈭䉨䉪䊡䈏䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮䈱䊝䉟 ᮭ䈪䈲ᴦ⊛䈮ఝㆄ䈘䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䈱䈪ో⥸⊛䈭᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱ᄢ䈏㒐䈏䉏䈢䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯 ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱䊝䊂䊦䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䉥䊗䊁ᮭ䈏ᚑ┙䈚䈢ㆊ⒟䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䊝䉟ᮭ䈏⚗䉕࿁ㆱ 䈚䈢ㆊ⒟䇮NARC 䈱ಽⵚ䈮䉋䈦䈩䉨䉪䊡䈏ో⥸⊛䈮ఝㆄ䈘䉏䇮䈠䉏䈏 2007-08 ᐕ䈱േ䈱৻䈧䈱 ⊒↢ේ࿃䈮䈭䈦䈢ㆊ⒟䈮䈧䈇䈩⺑䈪䈐䉎(Stewart 2008)䇯వ䈝䇮䉥䊗䊁䈱᠄䈲᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬ 23 ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬ߣߪ㓸࿅㑆ߩਇᐔ╬ߩߎߣߢࠅߦࠇߎޔኻߒੱ㑆ߩਇᐔ╬ࠍု⋥⊛ਇᐔ╬(vertical inequality)ߣ߱ޕ 38 䈱ⷞὐ䈎䉌䈲⁛┙ᤨὐ䈱䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ఝㆄ䈘䉏䈢ᴦ⊛⟎ઃ䈔䈮ኻ䈜䉎䉅䈱䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䊑䉧䊮䉻 䈲ᙗᴺઁ䈱ၞ䈮䈲䈭䈇৻ቯ䈱⥄ᴦᮭ䉕ઃਈ䈘䉏䈭䈏䉌䇮₺䈏䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ᄢ⛔㗔䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯䉥 䊗䊁䈲䉅䈫䉅䈫䊑䉧䊮䉻ജ䉕⚿㓸䈚䈢 UPC(Uganda People’s Congress)䈱ઍ䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䊑䉧 䊮䉻䈏䉦䉸䊥䉾䉪♽䈱 DP(Democratic Party)䈫䊒䊨䊁䉴䉺䊮䊃♽䈱 KY㩷 (Kabaka Yekka-King Alone) 䈮ಽⵚ䈚䇮UPC 䉅䊒䊨䊁䉴䉺䊮䊃♽䈱ᡰᜬ䈏ᒝ䈎䈦䈢䈢䉄䈮 UPC-KY 䈫䈇䈉ଢቱ⊛䈭ㅪ┙䉕ᒻᚑ䈚 䈩ㆬ䈪㚂⋧䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ᮭജ₪ᓧᓟ䈮 UPC 䈫 KY 䈱ኻ┙䈏ᾷὓ䈮䈭䉍䇮䉥䊗䊁䈲 1966 ᐕ 䈮ᙗᴺ䇮ㅪ㇌䇮㚂⋧⡯䉕ᑄᱛ䈚䈩ᄢ⛔㗔䈱䉂䈱ᣂᙗᴺ䉕ቯ䈚䇮⥄䉌䈏ዞછ䈚䈢䇯 ᰴ䈮䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱ೋઍ䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺ᄢ⛔㗔䈲䉨䉪䊡㊀䈱╷䉕ⴕ䈦䈢䈏䇮⁛┙೨䈮ᬀ᳃ᐭ䈮ᦨ 䉅ᨐᢓ䈮ᛶ᛫䈚䈢䉨䉪䊡䈲৻ቯᦼ㑆ఝㆄ䈘䉏䉎ᱜ⛔ᕈ䉕䈚䈩䈇䈢䋨Klugman, et al. p.17䋩䇯2 ઍ⋡ 䈱䊝䉟䈲䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺䈱ᱫ䈮䉋䉍ዋᢙᵷ䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮䈱ᄢ⛔㗔䈫䈭䉍䇮ᓢ䇱䈮ห㓸࿅䈱ᴦ⊛ఝㆄ ╷䉕ⴕ䈦䈢䈏䇮␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮ఝ䈭䉨䉪䊡䈫䈱䊋䊤䊮䉴䈲ข䉏䈩䈇䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮2002 ᐕ䈱䉨䊋䉨 ᮭ䈪䈲ㅜਛ䈎䉌䉨䉪䊡ᡰ㈩⦡䈏ᒝ䉁䉍䇮2007 ᐕᧃ䈱ㆬ䈲䉨䊋䉨䉕ᡰᜬ䈜䉎䉨䉪䊡♽䈱ౄ (Party of National Unity) 䈫 䉥 䊂 䉞 䊮 䉧 䉕 ᡰ ᜬ 䈜 䉎 䊦 䉥 ♽ 䈭 䈬 䈱 ౄ (Orange Democratic Movement)䈱ኻ┙䈫䈭䉍䇮ㆬ⚿ᨐ䈱㐿䈏ᕆ䈮㐽䈛䉌䉏䈩䉨䊋䉨䈱ൎ䈏๔䈕䉌䉏䉎䈫䇮ⴝ㗡䈪 ⚿ᨐ䉕⇼ⷞ䈜䉎᛫⼏ⴕേ䈏䈐䈢(Stewart, 2008)䇯 䈖䉏䉌䈱⺑䈲䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱Ყセ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲৻⽾ᕈ䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮⇣䈭䉎⸃㉼䈲䈭䈇䈱䈣 䉐䈉䈎䇯╙৻䈮䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮ᴦᠲ⊛䈭䉟䊂䉥䊨䉩䊷ᕈ䈲䈭䈇䈱䈣䉐䈉䈎䇯᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱 ⺑䈲䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪㓸࿅㑆䈱ਇᐔ╬䈮┙⣉䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕䊔䊷䉴䈫䈚䈢ᙍᙴ(grievance) 䈲ᴦኅ䈏ᴦᠲ䈱䉲䊮䊗䊦䈫䈚䈩↪䈜䉎㕙䈏䈅䉎䇯ਇᐔ╬䈱⼂䉅ᒰ⠪䈮䈫䈦䈩䈲ቴ ⷰ⊛䈮᷹ቯ䈘䉏䈢䉅䈱䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮↢ᵴታᗵ䈮ᩮ䈙䈚䈢หਥⷰ⊛䈭䉅䈱䈪䈅䉐䈉䇯䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱 㓸ว⊛⽎䈲᭴ᚑຬ䈮ᔘ⺈䉕ⷐ᳞䈚䇮ᓐ䉌䉕⛔ᓮ䈜䉎䈖䈫䉕น⢻䈮䈜䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮৻⒳䈱ౝᘷᄖ ᖚ╷䈫䈚䈩䇮㓸࿅ౝㇱ䈱ਇᐔ╬䉕㓝⭁䈪䈐䉎䇯䇸䉨䉪䊡䈲ห⢩䈪䇮䊦䉥䈎䉌⢿ᆭ䉕ฃ䈔䉎ኋ䈫 䈇䈉⺋⸃䈮┙⣉䈚䈩䇮䉨䉪䊡䈱⾗↥ኅ䈲䉴䊤䊛ዬ⠪䈱䉨䉪䊡䈱䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪䈭ᗵᖱ䉕ᚸേ䈚䈩䊦䉥 ዬ⠪䈫ᚢ䉒䈞䉎(Kibara 2005)䇹䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮䈖䈱䉟䊂䉥䊨䉩䊷ᕈ䉅᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈫ਔ┙䈚ᓧ䈭䈇⼏ ⺰䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯 ╙ੑ䈮⠨ᘦ䈜䈼䈐䈲䇮ᬀ᳃ᦼ䈱䊙䉟䊅䉴䈱ㆮ↥(colonial legacy)䈪䈅䉎䇯䊑䉧䊮䉻䈏ᬀ᳃ᦼ䈮 ⧷࿖䈎䉌ᡰ䈋䉌䉏䈢ਛ㑆៦ขጀ䈫䈭䈦䈩䈇䈢ὐ䈲䉬䊆䉝䈱䉨䉪䊡䈫䈲⇣䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎24䇯䉁䈢䇮ఝ⠪ 䈪䈅䉍䈭䈏䉌䈱ಽ㔌ᜰะ⠪䈲․ᓽ⊛䈪䈅䉎䇯ઁ㓸࿅䈎䉌䉂䉏䈳␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮⼾䈎䈭㓸࿅䈏㔌⣕䈘 䉏䈩䈲࿎䉎䇯䈘䉌䈮ౝ㒽࿖䈫䈇䈉ⅣႺ䈲ᴦ㓸࿅䈱࿖ኅᮭജ䈻䈱䉝䉪䉶䉴䉕ᒝ䉄䉎䇯䉁䈢䇮ർㇱ ജ䈲⽺࿎ᐲ䈏㜞䈒䇮ᯏળ⾌↪䈏ૐ䈒䇮⚗䈮ෳട䈚䈩䉅ᄬ䈉䉅䈱䈏ዋ䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯ᓟㅀ䈜䉎ァㇱ䈱䉣 䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞᭴ᚑ䉅ᬀ᳃ᦼḮ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䉌䈱ⷰὐ䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱․ᓽ䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮᳓ᐔ⊛ਇ ᐔ╬䈱⼏⺰䈫ਔ┙䈚䈋䈭䈇䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯 24 ࡙ࠠࠢߪ⊕ੱᬀ⠪߇ᚻߒߚ⢈ᴅߥ White Highland ߩߩ㈩ಽߢࠤ࠾ࠕࡗ࠶࠲ᤨઍߦఝㆄߐࠇߚޕ 39 ╙ਃ䈮䇮Elischer㩷 (2008)䈲䊝䉟ᮭᓟᦼ䈱ⶄᢙౄ䉅䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪䈭ᘾᖡ䉕ហ䈐䈢䈩䈩䈐䈢䈫⺑ 䈜䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮1998 ᐕ䈎䉌ౄ䈲䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ᮮᢿ⊛䈮ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈩䉅䇮ᮭജ䉕ី䈜䉎ㆊ⒟䈮䈍䈇䈩 ឃ㒰䈘䉏䈢䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪㓸࿅䈏⣕ㅌ䈚䇮ᓢ䇱䈮䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ౄ䈱᭽⋧䉕Ꮺ䈶䈩䈐䈢䈫⺑䈜䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮 ౄ䈱ಽ㘃䈮䈍䈇䈩䉬䊆䉝䈲 Horowitz㩷 (2000)䈱䈇䈉䇸ଢቱ⊛䈭䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ㅪ┙(Ethnic Coalition of Convenience)䇹䉕⛯䈔䈩䈇䉎䈫⹏ଔ䈜䉎䇯Elischer 䈲䊝䉟䈱ᡰ㈩䉕ోᦼ㑆৻ቯ䈮䈢 Stewart 䈮 ኻ䈚䇮䊝䉟䈱ᓟᦼ䈮ὶὐ䉕䈅䈩䈩䈇䉎䇯䊝䉟䈱ᓟᦼ䈮䈲䇮1991 ᐕ䈎䉌䈱᳃ਥൻ䈱ᓇ㗀䈏䈅䉍䇮ᧃᦼ 䈮䈭䉎䈫ᓟ⛮⠪䈲⺕䈎䈫䈇䈉䉭䊷䊛䈏ട䉒䈦䈢䇯䈘䉌䈮㆚䉍䇮䊝䉟䈲 1982 ᐕ䈱䉨䉪䊡ਥዉ䈱ⓨァ䈱 䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷ᧂㆀઙ䈱ᓟ(Klugman et al.,:28)䇮䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮䈫ዋᢙᵷ䈱䊜䊮䊋䊷䈏ᄢᄙᢙ䉕භ䉄䉎䉋 䈉䈮ౝ㑑䈱᭴ᚑ䉕ᄢ䈮ᄌ䈋(Widner 1992:165-166)䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱൮៨ᕈ䈲㑑䊧䊔䊦䈪䈲ㅌ䈚 䈢䇯 䊝䉟ᓟᦼ䈱ᴦ⊛䈭൮៨ᕈ䉕ቢ䈚䈢䈱䈲䇮䈅䉎⒟ᐲ䈱ಽᮭൻ╷䈱ㅴዷ䈪䈅䉎䇯1983 ᐕ䈮䇸⋵ ὐᣇ㐿⊒╷(DFRD:District Focus for Rural Development)䇹䈏㐿ᆎ䈘䉏䇮⋵⍮䈫⋵㐿⊒ᆔ ຬળ䈮ᄢ䈐䈭ᮭ㒢䈏ਈ䈋䉌䉏䇮䈠䈱ਅᯏ᭴䈏⸘↹䊒䊨䉶䉴䉕ታᣉ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䈦䈢䇯䈖䈱䊒䊨䉶 䉴䈲ᦨ⚳⊛䈮ਛᄩ⋭ᐡ䈱ᮭ㒢ី䈏ᒝ䈒䈩ᯏ⢻䈚䈭䈎䈦䈢䈏䇮䈠䈱ᓟ䉅ᡷ㕟䈏ข䉍⚵䉁䉏䈢䇯䈢 䈣䈚䇮䈖䉏䈲ㇺᏒ䈱⾗Ḯ䉕ᣇ䈮ዬ䈜䉎䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮䈮࿁䈠䈉䈫䈜䉎╷䈫䈚䈩䉅ᝒ䈋䉌䉏䉎 䋨Barkan 1992, p.184䋩䇯䉁䈢䇮䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷ઙᓟァ㓌䉕 KANU 䈱䉮䊮䊃䊨䊷䊦䈱䉅䈫䈮⟎䈐䇮․ቯ䉣 䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ᓇ㗀䉕ឃ㒰䈚䈩൮៨⊛䈭⚵❱䈫䈚䈢䇯 ╙྾䈮䇮᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䉇 Elischer 䈱ㅪ┙ౄ⺰䈲䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ᡰ㈩䈏ᒝ䈇࿖䈱᳃ਥൻ䈮ኻ䈚 䈩⼊ᚓ⊛䈭⺰⺞䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮Okuku(2002)䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈍䈇䈩⁛ⵙ䉇ౄ䉕ᱛ䈚䈢ᦼ㑆䈮䈍 䈇䈩䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ⵚ䈏ᷓ䉁䉍䇮ജ⚗䈮䈭䈦䈢䈫䈇䈉⚻✲䉕ᒝ⺞䈚䇮᳃ਥൻ䈏䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪㓸࿅ 䈱ኻ┙䉕ਸ਼䉍䈋䉎䈢䉄䈮㊀ⷐ䈫ㅀ䈼䉎䇯1964-66 ᐕ䉥䊗䊁䈲᳃ਥਥ⟵⊛䈭⸃╷䉕᫈䈚䈩ァ ࿖ਥ⟵䉕ᜰะ䈚䇮1962 ᐕ䈎䉌⊒ዷ䈚䈩䈐䈢᳃ਥਥ⟵䈫ᄙరਥ⟵䉕ㅌ䈘䈞䈢䇯䉁䈢䇮╙ੑ䈱⺰ὐ 䈮䈅䉎ァㇱ䈏ᬀ᳃ㆮ䈮䉋䈦䈩ർㇱ䈫᧲ㇱり⠪䉕ਛᔃ䈮᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䈩䈇䈢䈖䈫䈏ౄᵷਥ⟵䈱ኻ ┙䉕ᒝ䉄䈢䈏䇮䈖䉏䉌䈱ೋᦼ᧦ઙ䈲᳃ਥൻ䈫䈲ή㑐ଥ䈣䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮ⶄᢙౄ䈣䈔䈪䈲 䈭䈒䇮৻ౄ䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞ኻ┙䈲ଦㅴ䈘䉏䉎䈫ㅀ䈼䇮৻ౄ䈲ῳⷫ⊛䉟䊜䊷䉳䈱䉅䈫䈪ౄ ౝ䈶࿖ౝ䈪ᴦᮭജ䉕⁛භ䈜䉎␠ળၮ⋚䈱৻䈧䈫䈚䈩䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕ᡰ䈋䉎䈫ᜰ៰䈜䉎䇯 ╙䈮䇮⋧ኻ⊛䈮ᄖㇱⷐ࿃䈱㊀ⷐᕈ䉕ᒝ⺞䈚䈢䈱䈏 Golooba-Mutebi (2008)䈪䈅䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ౝ ᚢ䊌䉺䊷䊮䈲ၮᧄ⊛䈮㓞࿖䈱⚗䉇࿖ኅ䈫ੂ㓸࿅䈱Ⴚᵴേ䈮ᓇ㗀䈘䉏䈩䈐䈢䈫ᜰ៰䈜䉎䇯䉡 䉧䊮䉻䈱ᱧઍ䈱ᮭ䈱ઁ䈱䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪㓸࿅䈮ኻ䈜䉎ឃઁ⊛䈭╷䈲䇮䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹ౝ䈮࿖ኅ䈱䇸ᮭᆭ䇹 䉕චಽ䈮ᶐㅘ䈘䈞䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈖䈱䈖䈫䈲ၞ⊛䈭ᴦ䉣䊥䊷䊃䉇ᛶ᛫ㆇേ䈮ੂ䉕ડ↹䈘䈞䇮ᐭ 䈱ᱦၮ⋚䈱ᅓ䉕น⢻䈮䈜䉎ⓨ㑆䉕ឭଏ䈚䇮ᑼ䈭⚻ᷣᵴേ䉕⛔ว䈜䉎น⢻ᕈ䉕ᅹ䈕䈢䈫䈇䈉䇯 䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮DRC䇮䉴䊷䉻䊮䈫䈇䈉䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ਥዉ䈱⚗࿖䈮㓞ធ䈚䇮䉥䊗䊁䇮䉝䊚䊮䇮䊛䉶 䊔䊆ᮭ䈏ᚑ┙䈚䈢㓙䈮ౝᚢ䈪ᢌർ䈚䈢ജ䈲Ᏹ䈮㓞࿖䈮ㅏ䉏䇮᠄䈱ᯏળ䉕┍䈦䈢䇯䉁䈢䇮䉡 40 䉧䊮䉻䈮ㅏ䉏䈩䈇䈢䉿䉼♽㔍᳃䈫䈠䈱ሶቊ䈏 RPF 䈫䈚䈩䊦䊪䊮䉻䈮ଚ䈚䇮䉴䊷䉻䊮䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮 ଚ䈜䉎 LRA 䉕ᡰេ䈚䇮NRM 䈲ධㇱ䉴䊷䉻䊮䈪ᵴേ䈜䉎 SPLA(Sudan People’s Liberation Army) 䉕ᡰេ䈚䈢䇯 એ䈱ಽᨆ䈲䇮䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱⚗䈱ౝㇱⷐ࿃䈮㑐䈚䈩䈲᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱⼏⺰䈮৻ቯ䈱 ലᕈ䈏䈅䉎䈖䈫䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯Okuku 䈱⼏⺰䉅ⶄᢙౄ䈱ᦼ㑆䈱䉂䈭䉌䈝䇮৻ౄᡰ㈩䈱ᦼ㑆 䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞ኻ┙䈏Ⴧ㐳䈜䉎䈫䈇䈉ቢ⊛䈭⼏⺰䈮䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯ቯൻ╷䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䉬䊆 䉝䈱䊝䉟ᮭ೨ඨᦼ䉁䈪䈱᳃ਥൻ䉕ᛥ䈋䈭䈏䉌൮៨ᕈ䉕㊀ⷞ䈚䈢䉝䊒䊨䊷䉼䈏ഞ䉕ᄼ䈚䈢䈎䈮䉂 䈋䉎䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕䉃᭴ㅧ⊛ⷐ࿃䈏ᄌൻ䈚䈢䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䈱䈪䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁 䉞䊁䉞䇹㑆䈱ኻ┙䈲ᜪ䈞䈝䇮2000 ᐕઍ䈱䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪⚗䉕⚻䈩25䇮᳃ਥ⊛ㆬᓟ䈱 2007-08 ᐕ䈱േ䈮⊒ዷ䈚䈢䇯ᰴ䈮䇮ౝㇱⷐ࿃䈮㑐䈚䈩䉅᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬એᄖ䈱ⷐ࿃䈏ሽ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉡䉧 䊮䉻䈱႐ว䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ኻ┙᭴ㅧ䈲⁛ⵙ䉇ౝᚢ䈱⢛᥊䈮䈅䉎䈏䇮ർㇱၞり⠪䈪࿕䉄䉌䉏 䈢䊝䊤䊦䈱ૐ䈇ァ㓌䇮ㄭ㓞࿖䈫䈱䈅䈇䈣䈱䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䉕ኈᤃ䈮Ⴚ䈜䉎ァ⚵❱䋨ᄖㇱⷐ࿃䋩䈏⚗ 䈱㐳ᦼൻ䉕ଦ䈚䈢䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䇯 2䋩 ࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱⎇ⓥ ᧄ▵䈪䈲᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈏᳃ਥൻ䈫⚿ว䈚䈩ᴦ⊛ਇቯᕈ䉕䉅䈢䉌䈜႐ว䇮᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ኻ ᛫ജ䉕䉅䈧䈱䈎䇮䈠䈱႐ว䈱᧦ઙ䈫䈲䈎䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎䇯1990 ᐕઍ䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ಽᮭൻ䈲᳃ਥ⊛䈭 ಽᮭൻ䇮ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑(devolution)䈏ᦨ䉅㗼⪺䈭േะ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈠䉏䈮䈲ਛᄩᐭ䈱㕖ല₸䈭ⴕ䇮 Ꮢ᳃␠ળ䈎䉌䈱ⷐ᳞䇮ᄖ࿖䊄䊅䊷䉇䊜䊂䉞䉝䈱ჿ䈭䈬䈏ᓇ㗀䈚䈢䇯1990 ᐕઍᧃએ㒠䈮ฦ࿖䈮ട䉒 䈦䈢ᄖㇱ᧦ઙ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䊄䊅䊷䈱េഥᄢ䈫䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡷ㕟䈱ⷐ᳞䈏䈅䉍䇮េഥଐሽᐲ䈱㜞䈇䉡䉧 䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ಽᮭൻ䈮ᾲᔃ䈭䊋䉟䇮䊙䊦䉼䈱䊄䊅䊷䈱ᓇ㗀䉅ฃ䈔䇮⻉ᡷ㕟䈫䈱ㅪേ䈱ਛ䈪䈖 䉏䉕ㅴ䉄䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲൮⊛䈭ಽᮭൻᡷ㕟䈲ⴕ䉒䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䈏䇮1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈎䉌 ᣇ䈱㐿⊒䉕ડ࿑䈚䈢⽷⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯 ኻ᛫ജ䈮㑐䈚䈩䈲䇮3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈇䈩ㆊ䈱ᴦ⊛䈭ਇቯᕈ䈲㓸ᮭൻ䈮ะ䈎䈉ㆊ⒟䈪䈐䈢䈱䈎䇮 ಽᮭൻ䈮ะ䈎䈉ㆊ⒟䈪䈐䈢䈱䈎䉕䈉ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉥䊗䊁䉇䉝䊚䊮䈲㓸ᮭൻ䈮ะ䈎䈉ㆊ⒟䈱ജ 䈪䈅䉍䇮䊛䉶䊔䊆䈲ജᓟ䈱ಽᮭൻ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈱 2000 ᐕઍ䈱䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪⚗䉅 2007-08 ᐕ䈱േ䉅㓸ᮭਅ䈪䈐䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱␠ળਥ⟵䈱㓸ᮭ䈲ㄘ᳃䉕ᒝ⒖ォ䈘䈞䈢䈏䇮ജ 䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯ಽᮭൻ䈪䈐䉎ജ䈲䇮ᣇ䈮䈍䈔䉎ᄙᢙᵷᒻᚑ䈱䈇䈫㑐ଥ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮ㅢᏱ䈲 ᄢⷙᮨ䈭䉅䈱䉇ಽ㔌ㆇേ䈮䈲䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯ᓥ䈦䈩䇮㓸ᮭൻ䈱ㆊ⒟䈪ജ䈏䈖䉎㗫ᐲ䈱ᣇ䈏㜞䈇䇯 ታ㓙䈮䇮䊛䉶䊔䊆ᮭ䈲ⶄᢙౄ䉕ዉ䈚䈭䈇ᦼ㑆䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅢ䈚䈩ਛᄩ䋭ᣇ䈱㑐ଥ䉕ౣ ᭴▽䈚䇮⽺࿎ᷫ䉕㊀ⷞ䈜䉎ᆫ䉕␜䈚䈩ෂᯏ䉕ਸ਼䉍䈋䈢㕙䈏䈅䉎䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䉅䉬䊆䉝䉅ಽ 25 Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005)ߪ 2000 ᐕઍߩࠤ࠾ࠕߩࠛࠬ࠾࠶ࠢ⚗ߦߟߡ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬߆ࠄߩ ᣇࠍㅌߌޔᮭߩㆬ↪ߩ╷⻎ߣߔࠆ⚗ߩࠄࠇߎޕࠍ Stewart ߪ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬߆ࠄ⸃㉼ߒߡߥޕ200708 ᐕߩേߩ⢛᥊ߪⶄ㔀ߢޔ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬ޔ2000 ᐕઍߩ⚗ޔᮭߩ࠺ࡕ㎾ߩㆊᔕߥߤߩⶄ วߣߒߡᝒ߃ࠄࠇࠆޕ 41 ᮭൻ╷䉇ෳട䈱ଦㅴ䈱⹜䉂䈏ᒙ䈪䈲䈅䈦䈩䉅䇮䈖䉏䈏ജ䉕䉅䈢䉌䈚䈢䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈲䈭䈇26䇯 ᰴ䈮䇮䉅䈉৻䈧䈱ኻ᛫ജ䈫䈚䈩᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ᬀ᳃Ḯ䈱ᅓ⊛䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䉕ォ឵䈜䉎䈫䈇䈉 ᗧ䈪䇮ੱ䇱䈮ᣂ䈢䈭ᮭ䈱ᱜ⛔ᕈ䉕ᗵ䈛䈘䈞䉎ലᨐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉝䊐䊥䉦䈲࿖ኅ䈏㓸ᮭ⊛䈪䉅␠ળ 䈏㜞ᐲ䈮ಽᮭ⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䈫䈱⼂䈏䈅䉎27䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ᬀ᳃䈲㓸ᮭ⊛䈭䊃䉾䊒䉻䉡䊮䈱ᗧᕁቯ᭴ ㅧ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱␠ળ䈏⁛┙ᓟ䉅䈖䈱᭴ㅧ䉕ㇱಽ⊛䈮⛽ᜬ䈚䈩䈚䉁䈇䇮ዋᢙ䈱ᴦ䉣䊥䊷䊃 䈏࿖ኅ䈱ን䉕⁛භ䈚䈢⚻✲䈎䉌䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱⍮⼂ੱ䈮䈲㓸ᮭ䈏ᬀ᳃ㆮ䈱ᡰ㈩ⵝ⟎䈪䈅䉎䈫 䈱⼂䈏ᒝ䈇(Mamdani 1993)䇯․䈮䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱䉋䈉䈮䈖䉏䉁䈪ᄢ䈐䈭䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡷ㕟䉕ⴕ䈦䈩䈇䈭 䈇࿖䈪䈲Ꮊⴕ䉲䉴䊁䊛䈱ᬀ᳃ᯏ᭴䈫䈱㘃ૃᕈ䈏ᜰ៰䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯ᓥ䈦䈩䇮ᬀ᳃ㆮ䉕৻ 䈚䈩䇮ᐭ䈮ኻ䈜䉎ੱᔃ䉕ᄌ䈋䉎䈮䈲ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䉕ዉ䈚䈭䈇䈫ᆎ䉁䉌䈭䈇䈫䈇䈉⠨䈋ᣇ䈏䈅䉎 (Kibara 2005)28䇯 ⁛┙ᓟ䈱ฦ࿖䈱㓸ᮭൻㆊ⒟䈮䈍䈇䈩⣕ਛᔃൻ(deconcentration)䈫䈇䈉ಽᮭൻ䈲ਛᄩ䈱ᮭജ䈱ᶐ ㅘ䉕ᗧ䈚䈢(Gaventa 2002, p,5)䇯䈢䈫䈋䈳䇮1972 ᐕ䈱䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱ಽᮭൻ╷䈲Ꮊ䉕㊀ⷞ䈚䇮⋵ ⼏ળ䉕⸃ᢔ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲 1966 ᐕ䈎䉌ᡷ⦟䉕㊀䈰䈭䈏䉌⋵㐿⊒⸘↹(DDP)䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈢䈏䇮 ᐲᡷᱜ䈘䉏䈩䉅䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䈱ᗧ䉕ๆ䈞䈝䈮ฦ⋭ᐡ䈱䊃䉾䊒䉻䉡䊮䈱⸘↹䉕᧤䈰䈩䈇䈢䇯㓸 ᮭ⊛䈭ⴕ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮䊊䊤䊮䊔䊷(Harambee)䈱䉋䈉䈭ᣇ䈱䉟䊆䉲䉝䊁䉞䊑䉅ᣇ䉕ข䉍ㄟ䉃ਛ ᄩ䈱↹╷䈫䈭䈦䈩䈚䉁䈉29䇯৻⥸Ꮢ᳃䈲䉰䊷䊎䉴䉕ᐭ䈮ᦼᓙ䈪䈐䈭䈇䈱䈪䇮ਛᄩ䈎䉌ⷐ᳞䈘 䉏䉎⒢䈎䉌䈲ㅏㆱ䈜䉎ะ䉕䉅䈦䈢䇯ಽᮭൻ䈏䇸䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䇹䈭ᗧᕁቯ䈱ᗧ䉕䈉䉋䈉䈮ℂ⸃ 䈘䉏ᆎ䉄䈢䈱䈲䇮3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈇䈩 1980 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌䈱᳃ਥൻ䈱ầᵹએ㒠䈪䈅䉍䇮䈠䈱ᐲᒻᚑ䈲 1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈮䈭䈦䈩䈎䉌䈪䈅䉎䇯 䈖䉏䉌䈱ኻ᛫ജ䈏᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱⸃ᶖ䈮⽸₂䈜䉎ẜᕈ䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䉎䈫ቯ䈚䈢႐ว䈱ઃᏪ᧦ ઙ䈫䈲䈪䈅䉐䈉䈎䇯╙৻䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈮䈍䈔䉎᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ╷䈲⽺࿎ᷫᚢ⇛ (PRS: Poverty Reduction Strategy)䈫ኒធ䈮⚿䈶䈧䈇䈩ടㅦ䈚䈢䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䇯ಽᮭൻ䈲Ꮢ᳃䈱ෳ ട䈫ᴦ䉇ⴕ䈱䉝䉦䉡䊮䉺䊎䊥䊁䉞䈱ᒻᚑ䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪᳃ਥൻ䈮㑐䉒䉍䇮ᣇᐭ䉇ᣇ䈱䉰䊷䊎 䉴ឭଏᯏ㑐䈱⢻ജᒝൻ䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪 PRS 䈱䉰䊷䊎䉴䊶䊂䊥䊋䊥䊷䈫㑐ଥ䈜䉎䇯䈖䈱৻ㅪ䈱⺰ℂዷ㐿䈲 䊄䊅䊷䈎䉌䈱េഥଐሽᐲ䈏㜞䈒䇮ᄢⷙᮨ䈭ௌോᷫ䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈢䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝ᐭ䈏 1990 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌ਥᒛ䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝ᐭ䉅 2003 ᐕ䈮䉬䊆䉝 PRS 䉕ᚑ䈚䈩ห⺞䈚䈢䇯3 䉦࿖䈫䉅⽺࿎ጀ䈲 ㄘㇱ䈮ᄙ䈒䇮ᣇ䈮⾗Ḯ䉕ౣ㈩ಽ䈜䉎ಽᮭൻ䈲 PRS 䈫䈱৻⥌ᐲ䈏㜞䈎䈦䈢䇯 26 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅢ䈛䈢⽺࿎ᷫ䉇ᣇ䈮䈍䈔䉎ෳടဳ⸘↹ᚑ䈫䈇䈉⹜䉂䉕ⴕ䈦䈢䇯ౄ䈫䈚䈩䈲 CCM 䈏⼏Ꮸ䈱 9 ഀ䉕භ䉄䇮㊁ౄ䈏ൎ䈜䉎น⢻ᕈ䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䉬䊆䉝䈲䊝䉟ᮭᦼ䈱ᣇ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲 NGO 䉇 CBO 䈏ᵴべ䈜䉎ะ䈏ᒝ䉁䉍䇮䈖䉏䉌䈏᳃ਥൻ䉕ታ‧ᒁ䈚䈢䇯 27 Olow (2003)䈲䇸䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ㄘ᳃␠ળ䈲࿖ኅ䈮䉋䈦䈩ᝒ䈘䉏䈭䈇(Hyden 1983)䇹䉕ᩮ䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯 28 Mamdani(1996)ߩޟಽᮭൻߐࠇߚኾ(decentralized despotism)ߩޠᔨߪ⧷࿖ߩ㑆ធ⛔ᴦߩᣇߦ߅ߌࠆ ᣉⴕታᘒࠍ␜ߒޔฦၞߢ㚂㐳߇┙ᴺޔมᴺⴕޔߩਃᮭࠍីߒޔኾᮮ⊛ߦᮭ㒢ࠍⴕߒߚ⁁ᘒࠍᗧ ߔࠆ⤿ߪޘੱޕ᳃ߣߒߡᣇߩ㚂㐳ߩනߦኽශߐࠇߥ⊛ⵙ⁛ޔᡰ㈩ࠍฃߌߚޕ 29 ߽ߣ߽ߣߪ pull together ߩᗧߢ␠ࠕ࠾ࠤޔળߩ⥄⊒⊛ߥ⚻ᷣᡰេⴕὑࠍᗧߒߚޕ 42 1990 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌䈱 3 䉦࿖䈱ಽᮭൻ䈲䇮⒟ᐲ䈱Ꮕ䈖䈠䈅䉎䉅䈱䈱 PRS 䉕䈦䈩㓸࿅䉇ၞ䈱ኻ┙ 䉕✭䈚䇮࿖䊧䊔䊦䈱ዋᢙᵷ㓸࿅䈏ᣇ䈪ᄙᢙᵷ䈫䈭䉎ᷤജ䉕ឭଏ䈚䈢䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮ᣇ䈱ᱦ ⢻ജ䈲㒢䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䈱䈪䇮⾗Ḯ䉕ౣ㈩ಽ䈜䉎䈮䈲ਛᄩᐭ䈏䉰䊷䊎䉴䉕䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹ౝ䈮᥉䈜䉎 ᗧᕁ䈫⢻ജ䉕䉅䈧ᔅⷐᕈ䈏䈅䈦䈢䇯ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈉ᣇ䈱ᰴర䈫⾗Ḯ䈱ౣ㈩ಽ╷䈫䈇䈉ਛᄩ䈱ᰴ ర䉕หᤨ䈮⏕┙䈘䈞䉎ᔅⷐᕈ䈮㑐䈚䈩䇮․䈮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ᐭ䈱䈭䈎䈪䉅⋧ኻ⊛䈮㜞䈇 ⢻ജ䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈎䉌Ყセ⊛䈮ቯ䈚䈢ૐᚲᓧ࿖䈫䈚䈩䊄䊅䊷䈎䉌䊝䊂䊦䈫䈘䉏䈢 䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ㅊട⊛䈭⾗Ḯ䈱ᄙ䈒䉕េഥ䈫ௌോᷫ䈎䉌ฃ䈔䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈲䉋䉍⥄࿖䈱ᱦ 䈮㗬䉎⽷᭴ㅧ䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮ㄭᐕ䈲䈎䈧䈩䈭䈇ⷙᮨ䈪䇮ၞ㑆䈪ઃ▚ቯၮḰ䈏ᐔ╬䈭ᣇ ઃ㊄䉕ᚑ┙䈘䈞䈩䈇䉎䇯 ╙ੑ䈱ⷰኤ䈘䉏䈢᧦ઙ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕ផㅴ䈚䈢䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈲 CCM䇮NRM 䈫䈇䈉 ୟ⊛䈭ਈౄ䈏ሽ䈚䇮ਛᄩ䈪䉅ᣇ䈪䉅ⴕᯏ᭴䈱䊃䉾䊒䈮䈭䉎䈮䈲ਈౄ䈮ᚲዻ䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䈦 䈢䇯ਛᄩ䈎䉌䈱⾗㊄䈱⒖ォ䈲䇮ਈౄ䈱ᣇ䈪䈱ᮭᆭ䉕㜞䉄䉎↪䉕䈦䈩䈇䉎30䇯䈖䉏䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉬 䊆䉝䈲 1990 ᐕઍᧃ䉁䈪㓸ᮭ䉕⛯䈔䉎䈖䈫䈪ᣇ䈮⾗Ḯ䉕࿁䈘䈭䈎䈦䈢䈱䈪䇮ਇḩ⸃ᶖ╷䈫䈚䈩 ᄙ䈒䈱ᣇ䉴䉺䉾䊐䈱ណ↪䉕ⴕ䈇䇮ௌോ䈱ᡰᛄ䈇䈫⋧଼䈦䈩䇮⚻Ᏹ੍▚䈱Ყ₸䈏ᩰᲑ䈮㜞䈒䈭䈦䈢 31 䇯1990 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌䈲⽷⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ㅴ䉂䇮ᣇᐭ䉇࿖ળ⼏ຬㆬ䈻䈱ઃ㊄䈏䉌䉏䈢䇯 䈖䉏䉌䈲㐿⊒੍▚䈪䈅䉍䇮⚻Ᏹ੍▚䈫䈱䊋䊤䊮䉴ᡷༀ䈱ദജ䈱৻Ⅳ䈫䉂䉌䉏䉎䇯 ╙ਃ䈮䇮ᄖㇱ᧦ઙ䈮㑐䈚䈩ᓟ䈱ᅢ᧚ᢱ䈫䈚䈩ᜰ៰䈪䈐䉎䈱䈏 EAC 䈱ㅴዷ䈪䈅䉎䇯ಽᮭൻ䈮䈧䈇 䈩䈲䇮࿖ౝ⚗䈏੍㒐䈪䈐䈢䈫䈚䈩䉅䇮࿖ౝ䈱ᮭജᡰ㈩䈏วᗧ䈱ᡰ㈩䈮ォ឵䈜䉎ಽ䈣䈔ᒙൻ䈜 䉎䈖䈫䈪࿖ኅ㑆⚗䈮ኻ䈜䉎⣀ᒙᕈ䈏Ⴧട䈜䉎ਇ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉬䊆䉝䈲䉸䊙䊥䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ർㇱ䈱䉣 䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈏࿖Ⴚ䉕䉖䈪ሽ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈎䉌䇮䈖䈱ਇ䈲ᛄ䈚䈐䉏䈭䈇䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮EAC 䈱ㅴዷ 䈏䈖䈱ਇ䉕ᛄ䈚䈉䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯ㄭ䈇᧪䈮䇮ၞᯏ᭴䋭࿖ኅ䋭ᣇᐭ䈫䈇䈉ਃጀ䉲䉴䊁 䊛䈱ዷ㐿䈏䈅䉎䈖䈫䈲䇮࿖㓙㑐ଥ䈱䈉䈋䈎䉌䉅ಽᮭൻ䈱ᴦ⊛ቯᕈ䈱ᯏ⢻䉕Ⴧട䈘䈞䈩䈇䉎䇯 એ䈱ಽᨆ䈎䉌䇮᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ᢥ⣂䈪䈲᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈲㓸ᮭൻએ䈮ᴦ⊛ቯᕈ䈮⽸₂䈚䇮 ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䉕✭䈜䉎൮៨ᕈ䉕᭴ᚑ䈜䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈔䉎ਥ䈢䉎ઃᏪ᧦ ઙ䈫䈚䈩ಽᮭൻ䈫৻⊛䈮ㅪ៤䈚䈢 PRS 䈏䈕䉌䉏䇮䉁䈢ᓟ䈱 EAC 䈱ㅴዷ䉅䈠䈱䉋䈉䈮䈭䉎น ⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯 30㩷 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱႐ว䇮Ꮊⴕ㐳ቭ(RAS)䈲 CCM 䉇ㅌᓎァੱ䈏ᄙ䈇䇯⋵⼏ળ䈱ോዪ㐳䋨DED䋩䈲ⴕ⊛䊃䉾䊒 䈪䈅䉎䈏䋨䉬䊆䉝䈱 Town Clerk 䉅ห᭽䋩䇮ᄙ䈒䈲 CCM ౄຬ䈪䈅䉎䋨ᣣᧄ䈪䈲ഥᓎ⡯䈮⋧ᒰ䋩䇯ᣇᐭᡷ㕟(LGR) ╷䈱ℂᗐ䈫䈚䈩䈲⼏ળ䈏છ䈪䈐䉎䈏䇮ታᖱ䈲ᣇᐭᄢ⤿䈏ᥳቯ⊛䈮છ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯ᱴ䈬䈱 DED 䈲⡯䊘䉴 䊃䉕⒖േ䋨ੱ⇣േ䋩䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱⋵㚢⍮(RDC)䈲 NRM 䈫❬䈏䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯 31 IMF ߩ Statistical Abstract ߦࠃࠇ߫ޔ 1997/98-2001/02 ᐕߩ 5 ᐕ㑆ᐔဋߩ⚻Ᏹ੍▚ߩ㐿⊒੍▚ߦኻߔࠆᲧ₸ ߪ ࠕ࠾ࠩࡦ࠲ޔ3.1 ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ1.4 ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ6.3 ߢࠆߪߢ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔߒߛߚޕඨ⥄ᴦ⊛⚵❱(Semiautonomous Agencies)ߩ੍▚ߪ߹ࠇߡߥޕ 43 3䋩 ᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ ೨▵䈪䈲ઃᏪ᧦ઙ䈫䈮䇮ಽᮭൻ䈏᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱䉅䈢䉌䈜㗴䉕࿁ㆱ䈪䈐䉎╭䉕⏕䈚䈢䇯 䈚䈎䈚䇮ಽᮭൻ䈲䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱⚿⸤(elite collusion)䈏࿁ㆱ䈪䈐䈭䈔䉏䈳ല䈭ᚻᲑ䈪䈲䈭䈇32䇯䈖䈱 㗴䈏䈅䉎႐ว䈮䈲䇮╷䈱ᚑᨐ䈏ਲ䈚䈒䈭䉎䈣䈔䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮ᴦ⊛ቯᕈ䉅㐳ᦼ⊛䈮䈲 ⸽䈘䉏䈭䈇䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䇯⸃╷䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮ಽᮭൻ䈏ታൻ䈜䉎䈮䈲᳃ਥൻ䈱ታ䉕䉒䈭䈔䉏䈳 䈭䉌䈭䈇䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯 ታ㓙䈱䈫䈖䉐䇮ᣇ䈮⾗Ḯ䉕㈩ಽ䈜䉎ಽᮭൻ╷䈲䇮৻ౄ䈏ታ䈮ㄭ䈇䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝 䈮䈍䈇䈩 PRS 䈱ᚻᲑ䈪䈅䉎䈫䈮䇮䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱⚿⸤䉕ᗧ䈜䉎⾗㊄䈱ᵹ䉏䈪䉅䈅䈦䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈪ㅴ ⴕ䈜䉎ઍ⊛䈭㐿⊒ઃ㊄䉅࿖ળ⼏ຬ䉇ᣇ⼏ຬ䈏㑐ਈ䈚䈩䈍䉍䇮✚䈛䈩ౄຬ䉇⼏ຬ䉕ਛᔃ䈫䈚 䈢䉪䊤䉟䉝䊮䊁䉞䊥䉵䊛䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䈧䉁䉍䇮3 䉦࿖䈪䈲ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈦䈩䉅᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈉 䊗䊃䊛䈎䉌䈱ჿ(voice)䈱Ⴧᄢ䈫䈇䈉䉋䉍䈲ਛᄩ䈎䉌䈱⾗Ḯ䈮❬䈏䉎䉪䊤䉟䉝䊮䊃䈱ⷐ᳞䈫䈠䈱ᙬᨵ╷ 䉇ᷤขᒁ䈮ㄭ䈎䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ೋ䉄䈩⾗Ḯ䈏ᄢⷙᮨ䈮ᣇ䈮ᵹ䉏䉎䉋䈉䈮䈭䈦䈩䇮䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈏 ᣥ᧪䈱㓸ᮭ⊛᭴ㅧ䈮䈍䈔䉎䉪䊤䉟䉝䊮䊁䉞䊥䉵䊛䈎䉌ᄌൻ䈜䉎䈱䈎䈬䈉䈎䈱ᬌ⸽䈲ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎䇯 ᳃ਥ⊛䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈮䈍䈔䉎Ꮢ᳃ෳട䈲䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕ᠩ⼔䈜䉎ઍ⊛䈭⼏⺰䈪䈅䉎(Crook and Sverisson 2002)䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱 NRM 䈲ಽᮭൻ╷䈮䈍䈔䉎Ꮢ᳃ෳട䉕ᒝ⺞䈚䇮ⶄᢙౄ䈱ෳട 䈲䈖䉏䈪ઍᦧ䈘䉏䉎䈫䈱┙႐䉕ណ䈦䈩䈇䈢䇯䈖䉏䈲 2003 ᐕ䈮ⶄᢙౄ䈻䈱⒖ⴕ䉕䉄䉎䉁䈪⛯ 䈇䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈲䊝䉟ᮭᓟᦼ䈮ಽᮭൻ䉕㒢ቯ⊛䈮ዉ䈜䉎䉅ᄬᢌ䈚䇮᳃ਥൻ䉅ᡷ㕟䉕ㆃᑧ䈘䈞䈢䇯 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲 1995 ᐕએ㒠ⶄᢙౄ䈮䈭䉍䇮ಽᮭൻ䉅ਗⴕ䈚䈩ㅴ䉄䉌䉏䈢䇯3 䉦࿖䈱᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽ ᮭൻ䈮ᓇ㗀䈜䉎ㅢ䈱ജቇ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮Ꮢ᳃䈱ήⷞ䈪䈐䈭䈇⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈻䈱ⷐ᳞䈏䈅䉎䇯᳃ਥൻ䈲䈖 䈱ⷐ᳞䉕ᒝ䉄䇮ಽᮭൻ䈲䈠䉏䈮ኻᔕ䈜䉎ᚻᲑ䈫䈭䉎䇯䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞㓸࿅䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈪䈲䇮㓸࿅ౝ 䈱㈩ಽ䈏Ყセ⊛䈮ᱜ䈭␠ળ䈪䈲ಽᮭൻ䈲᳃ਥ⊛䈮↪䈜䉎䈚䇮ਇᱜ䈭␠ળ䈪䈲ᔅ䈝䈚䉅䈠 䈉䈲䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯 ᱜᕈ䉕್ቯ䈘䉏䉎㓸࿅䈲䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈪䈅䈦䈩䉅䇮ᣇᐭ䈮䉋䈦䈩ಾ䉌䉏䈢ၞ᳃䈪䈅 䈦䈩䉅䉋䈇䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮ᴦ⊛ቯᕈ䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈮䈍䈇䈩ಽᮭൻ䈏䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ኻ┙䉕ᒙ䉄䉎䈫䈇䈉 ᗧ䈮⌕⋡䈜䉏䈳䇮ዋ䈭䈒䈫䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈗䈫䈮ਛ┙⊛䈭⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈏䈭䈘䉏䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮 ౄ䈏․ቯ䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕ઍ䈜䉎႐ว䈲䇮ᄙᭂሽဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈏ᦼᓙ䈘䉏䉎ᚻᲑ䈮䈭䉎䇯ᰴ䈮䇮 ᣇᐭ䈮ኻ䈜䉎ᱜ䈭⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈪䈅䉏䈳䇮ᣇᐭ㑆䈪ਇᐔᗵ䈱䈭䈇⽷⊛ಽᮭൻ䉕ⴕ䈉 ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯ታ㓙䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲࿖ኅ⊛ᦨૐၮḰ(NMS: National Minimum Standard) 䈫䈇䈉䉶䉪䉺䊷㈩ಽ䈱⠨䈋ᣇ䉕䉅䈤䇮ᣇᐭ䊧䊔䊦䈱ᐔ䈭㈩ಽ䈮ദ䉄䈩䈇䉎䇯 32 ಽᮭൻ䈮䉋䈦䈩ᣇᐭ䈮䈲ᣂⷙ䈱⾗Ḯ䈏ᵹ䈜䉎䈏䇮䈖䈱⾗Ḯ䈲ਛᄩ䈫ᣇ䈱ᮭജ䉣䊥䊷䊃㑆䈱⚿⸤䈮䉋䈦 䈩䈶ㄟ䉁䉏䈩䈇䉎ⷐ⚛䈏䈅䉎䇯Crook(2003)䈲䊌䊃䊨䊈䊷䉳ᴦ䈫ᒙ䈇䉝䉦䉡䊮䉺䊎䊥䊁䉞䈏ේ࿃䈫䈭䈦䈩䇮䈖䈱䉋䈉 䈭േ䈐䈏䈉䉁䉏䉎䈫⸃⺑䈜䉎䇯⾗Ḯ䈏ᦨ⚳⊛䈭䉰䊷䊎䉴䊘䉟䊮䊃䈮䈅䉁䉍ዯ䈇䈩䈇䈭䈇䈫䈇䈉ฦ⒳䈱⺞ᩏ⚿ᨐ䉅䈖䈱 ⼏⺰䉕ⵣઃ䈔䉎৻䈧䈪䈅䉎(Reinnikka Svensson 2004)䇯 44 ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈏㓸࿅㑆䈱ታᘒ䉕ᤋ䈚䇮䈎䈧㓸࿅䈏ၞ䈗䈫䈮ಽ䈎䉏䈩䈇䉏䈳䇮ಽᮭൻ䈲ᙍᙴ 䈱⸃ᶖ䈮ᓎ┙䈧น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉐䈉䇯ㅒ䈮䇮㓸࿅ౝ䈱ਇᐔ╬䈏ᄢ䈐䈇႐ว䈲䇮ᙍᙴ䈲㓸࿅ౝ䉣䊥䊷䊃 䈱䉟䊂䉥䊨䉩䊷ᕈ䉕ᒝ䉄䇮ಽᮭൻ䈚䈩䉅ᙍᙴ⸃ᶖ䈱ലᨐ䈲㒢ቯ䈘䉏䉎䇯䈖䈱႐ว䈲᳃ਥൻ䈏ၞ ␠ળ䈮䈘䉌䈮ᶐㅘ䈚䇮㓸࿅ౝ䈱㗴䈏ᡷༀ䈚䈭䈇䈫⁁ᴫ䈲ᅢォ䈚䈭䈇䇯ห᭽䈮䇮᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈏 ᄢ䈐䈒䈩䉅䇮⻉㓸࿅䈏ᷙ䈚䈩䈇䉎႐ว䈲䇮න⚐䈭ಽᮭൻ䈏䉲䊮䊗䊥䉦䊦䈭ലᨐ䉕䈅䈕䉎䈖䈫䈲䈭䈇 䈣䉐䈉䇯 䉨䉪䊡䈱ᬀ᳃ᐭ䈻䈱ᒝ䈇⊒䈫 1990 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌䈱䊄䊅䊷䈎䉌䈱ᒝ䈇ᓇ㗀䋨䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱 䊆䉝䋩䈫䈇䈉ੑ䈧䈱᧦ઙ䉕㒰䈔䈳䇮3 䉦࿖䈱ಽᮭൻ╷䈱⋧㆑䈲ਥ䈫䈚䈩ᱧผ⊛䈭ᴦ␠ળᐲ 䈮࿃䈚䈩䈇䈢䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䇯䈖䉏䈫᳃ਥൻ䈫䈱㑐䉒䉍䉕⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯 ╙৻䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈪 1990 ᐕઍ䈎䉌ಽᮭൻ䈏ផㅴ䈘䉏䈢ᄢ䈐䈭ⷐ࿃䈲 NRM 䉇 CCM 䈏䈚䈩䈇䈢␠ળਥ⟵⊛䈭╷䈫৻ౄᡰ㈩ะ䈏䈅䈦䈢33䇯䈖䉏䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䈲 1970䋭80 ᐕઍ 䈮䈲⽎ᶏጯ䈫ਗ䉖䈪䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱⾗ᧄਥ⟵䈱ઍ⊛䈭⊒ዷ䊝䊂䊦䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈲 90 ᐕઍ䈮 䉍ૐᚑ㐳䈮⒖ⴕ䈚䈢䈏䇮⾗ᧄਥ⟵䈮ᄌᦝ䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮ᣥ␠ળਥ⟵࿖䉇 ήౄ࿖䈱ᣇ䈏ਈౄ䈏ᒝ䈒䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅴ䉄䉎ၮ⋚䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮᳃ਥൻ䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䇮䈬䈤䉌 䈱䈱ᣇ䈏ㅴ䉂䉇䈜䈎䈦䈢䈫䈇䈉ⷰኤ䈲䈭䈇䇯 ╙ੑ䈮䇮3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈔䉎㚂㐳(chief)䉕䊔䊷䉴䈫䈚䈢㑆ធ⛔ᴦ䈱⋧㆑䈏䈅䉎䇯䈖䈱ᒻᘒ䈲ᬀ᳃ജ 䈏ᣇ䈮ᮭജ䉕ᐢ䈕䉎䈢䉄䈱䇸⣕㓸ਛൻ(de-concentrated)䇹䉲䉴䊁䊛䈪䈅䈦䈢(Gaventa 2002)䇯䈖䈱 ᐲ䉕ᦨᓟ䉁䈪⛽ᜬ䈚䈢䈱䈲䉬䊆䉝䈪䇮CCM 䈫䉝䊚䊮䈲䈖䉏䉕ุቯ䈚䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈱Ꮊⴕ䉲䉴䊁䊛 䈲䊗䊃䊛䈮㚂㐳䉕䈚䇮ᦨ䉅ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈎䉌㆙䈇䇯ઁᣇ䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱೨ᬀ᳃ᦼ䈱㚂㐳䈲ା↪ 䈏ᄬ䈜䉎䈫ᦧ䈜䉎ᓎഀ䉲䉴䊁䊛䈪䈅䈦䈢(Shivji and Peter 1999)䇯䈖䈱વ⛔䉕ฃ䈔䇮䇸ኅᣖ⊛ (Ujamaa)␠ળਥ⟵䇹䈱ਅ䈪䉅ోᏒ᳃䈱㓸ળ(Village Assembly)䈏ሽ䈚䈢䇯䈖䈱ᐲ䈲 NRM 䉅 ᆎ䉄䈢䈏䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲ᣇᐭ䈱⼏㐳䈏䉄䈭䈇㒢䉍㐿䈘䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢(Bazaara p.17)䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢䊗 䊃䊛䈫䈱ធὐ䈱⋧㆑䈲䉬䊆䉝䈱㚂㐳䈏ᓇ㗀䈚䈩䈍䉍䇮ಽᮭൻ䈣䈔䈪䈭䈒䇮᳃ਥൻ䉇䉰䊷䊎䉴䊶䊂䊥 䊋䊥䊷䈮䈫䈦䈩䉅㓚ኂ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯 2-4 ో䈱ಽᨆ ೨▵䉁䈪䈱ಽᨆ䈎䉌 3 䉦࿖䈱࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈮㑐䈚䈩ᓧ䉌䉏䈢ⷰኤ䈲એਅ䈱ㅢ䉍䈪䈅䉎䇯 Ԙ Ⴚ⇇䋺䉬䊆䉝䈫䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲䈅䉎⒟ᐲ䉁䈫䉁䈦䈩⁛┙䈚䈢䈱䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱Ⴚ⇇䈲 ⧷࿖䈏ផㅴ䈚䈢න䈪䈅䉍䇮䊑䉧䊮䉻䈫ઁၞ䈫䈱㑆䈮ਵ㔌䈏䈅䈦䈢䇯 33 䉡䉧䊮䉻䉅 NRM 䈱⠨䈋ᣇ䈮䈲ᒰೋ␠ળਥ⟵ᜰะ䈏䈅䉍䇮䈜䈼䈩䈱ᚑੱ䋨↵ᕈ䈫ൕഭᅚᕈ䋩䈏ౄຬ䈪䈅䉍䇮㊁ౄ 䈱ജ⠪䉅ੱ䈱⾗ᩰ䈫䈚䈩㑑䈮ᜰฬ䈜䉎䈭䈬൮៨ᕈ䈱╷䉕ข䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䈦䈢䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲 ⁛┙೨䈎䉌䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ᣇⴕᐲ䈏⊒㆐䈚䇮✚〈䈱ઍℂ䈫䈚䈩⋵⍮(District Commissioner)䈏ሽ䈚䇮㚂㐳䈎 䉌᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䉎ᣇᐭ䈏ሽ䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯 45 ԙ ᮭᆭ䋺䉨䉪䊡䈲⁛┙ㆇേ䉕ਥዉ䈚䈢䈱䈪䇮৻ቯᦼ㑆䇮䊝䉟ೋᦼ䉁䈪䈲ᡰᜬ䈘䉏䈢䇯䊑䉧䊮 䉻䈲ౝㇱ䈪䈲₺䈱ᮭᆭ䈏䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮ઁ㓸࿅䈎䉌䈲⊒䉕ฃ䈔䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈪䈲ᮭജ 䈲ਇ䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮♖⊛䈮䈲䊆䉣䊧䊧䈏உᄢ䈭ῳⷫ䈱䉟䊜䊷䉳䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯 Ԛ 䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䋺䉬䊆䉝䉅䉡䉧䊮䉻䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞㑆䈱ኻ┙┹䈏䈅䉍䇮䈖䉏䈏ⶄᢙౄ 䈫䊥䊮䉪䈚䈢䇯䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈏ᒝ䈒ౄ䈱᭴ㅧ䉕ⷙቯ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䉏䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲㕖Ᏹ 䈮⛔ว䈘䉏䈢䊅䉲䊢䊅䊦䊶䉟䊜䊷䉳䈱ᒻᚑ䈮ᚑഞ䈚䈢䇯 ᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱㑐ଥ䈪ᓧ䉌䉏䈢ⷰኤ䈲 3 ὐ䈪䈅䉎䇯╙৻䈮䇮ᄙᢙઍဳ䈱᳃ਥਥ⟵䈲䉣䉴䊆䉲 䊁䉞㑆䈱ਇᐔ╬䉇ኻ┙䈫ㅪ㑐䈜䉎䈫䇮㜞ᐲ䈱ᴦ⊛ਇቯᕈ䈮❬䈏䉍䉇䈜䈇䇯ಽᮭൻ䈲㓸ᮭൻ䉋 䉍䉅ᴦ⊛ቯᕈ䈮ነਈ䈜䉎䈏䇮⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈫䈇䈉ᗧ䈪䈲䇮৻ౄ␠ળ䈱䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱⚿⸤䈱⽎䈫 䈚䈩䉅ᝒ䈋䉌䉏䉎䇯᳃ਥൻ䈏ㅴዷ䈜䉎೨䈎䇮หᤨ䈮ಽᮭൻ䉇ᮭജಽ䈏䈅䉎⒟ᐲㅴⴕ䈚䈩䈇䈢ᣇ 䈏ਛᄩ䈪䈱ㆊᾲ䈚䈢ኻ┙䉕ㆱ䈔䉎䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䇯ᧄ᧪䈲䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈏หᤨㅴⴕ䈚䈩䉧䊋䊅䊮 䉴䈏᭴▽䈘䉏䉎䈖䈫䈏ᦸ䉁䈚䈇䇯ᦨ䉅ෂ㒾䈭䈱䈲ᐢ⟵䈱ಽᮭൻ䈏䈭䈇䈫䈖䉐䈪ᕆỗ䈭ᄙᢙઍဳ䈱 ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈏ㅴⴕ䈜䉎႐ว䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈲䇮䉥䊗䊁ᮭ䉇䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈭䈬䈪ⷰኤ䈘䉏䈢䇯 ኻ䈮䇮᳃ਥൻ䈭䈐ಽᮭൻ䈲⚗䈮䈲䈭䉍䈮䈒䈇䈏䇮ㆊ䈱 NRM 䈱䉋䈉䈮ᛥ⊛ᡰ㈩䈮䈲䈭䉍ᓧ 䉎䇯 ╙ੑ䈮䇮ᬀ᳃ㆮ䈱ᛂ⎕䈫䈇䈉ᗧ䈎䉌䈲 3 䉦࿖䈪䈲ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈏ᔅⷐ䈫䈘䉏䇮䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䈱ᗧ ᕁቯ䉇ⷐ᳞䈏䈘䉏䇮ಽᮭൻ䈏᳃ਥൻ䈫ㅪേ䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯Ꮢ᳃䈏ᐭ䉕Ⓧᭂ⊛䈮⋥䈜 䈢䉄䈮䈲ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈏ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎䈚䇮᳃ਥൻ䈲䈠䈱ၮ␆⊛䈭䉻䉟䊅䊚䉪䉴䉕ឭଏ䈜䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫䉺 䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈲␠ળਥ⟵ᜰะ䈱╷䋨╷䈫䈚䈩䈱㜞ᐲ䈭൮៨ᕈ䋩䈫ታ䈱৻ౄᡰ㈩䈮 ↱᧪䈜䉎䈏䇮㚂㐳䈱ᡷᑄ䉕ᄾᯏ䈮䊗䊃䊛䈎䉌䈱ᗧᕁቯ䈱ᒻᚑ䉕ᮨ⚝䈚䈩䈐䈢䈫䈖䉐䈏䈅䈦䈢䇯 䈖䉏䈲䉁䈣ᒙ䈪䈅䈦䈩䉅䇮᧪䈱Ꮧᦸ䈮䈭䉎䇯䉬䊆䉝䈱Ꮊⴕ䉲䉴䊁䊛䈲ᬀ᳃ㆮ䈪䈅䉍䇮㚂 㐳䈏ᡰ䈋䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䉏䉕䉋䉍ෳടਥ䈱䊨䊷䉦䊦䊶䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈮ᄌᦝ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䇮ᛮᧄ⊛䈭␠ળ 䈱ᄌ㕟䈲ⴕ䈋䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯䉁䈢䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱㓸ᮭ䈏ᓟ EAC 䈱ᴦ⊛䈭ၞ⛔ว䈮䊑䊧䊷䉨䉕ਈ 䈋䉎น⢻ᕈ䉅䈅䉎䇯 ╙ਃ䈮䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䇮ァ㓌䈱൮៨ᕈ䋨᭴ᚑ䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ਛ┙ᕈ䋩䉇ᄖ࿖䈱䈫䈇䈦䈢ⷰὐ 䈎䉌 3 䉦࿖䈱ㆊ䈱ᄌൻ䉕ⷰኤ䈜䉎䈫䇮䈅䉌䉉䉎ⷐ⚛䈲ᡷༀะ䈮䈅䉍䋨ᖡൻ䈲䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇䋩䇮䈖䈱 ⷰὐ䈎䉌 3 䉦࿖䈪䈲ᄢⷙᮨ䈭ᴦ⊛ਇቯᕈ䈲ᷫዋ䈚䈢䉋䈉䈪䈅䉎䇯ㆊ䈱䉋䈉䈭ᄢⷙᮨ䈭ౝᚢ 䉇⯦Ვ䈲䈖䉌䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯ઁᣇ䇮㒢ቯⷙᮨ䈱⚗䇮㐳ᦼ⊛䈭ᷙੂ䉇ੱᮭᛥ䇮㓞࿖䈫䈱⚗䈏 ⊒↢䈜䉎น⢻ᕈ䈲ឃ㒰䈘䉏䈩䈇䈭䈇䇯䈖䈱ᗧ䈪䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲৻ᔕ䈱᳃ਥൻ䉕㆐ᚑ䈚䈢䈏䇮䉁䈣 ᐲ䉇ᴦᢥൻ䈱㕙䈪䈚䈩ቯ䈚䈢Ბ㓏䈮䈦䈩䈍䉌䈝䇮ਇቯ䈭㓞࿖䈮࿐䉁䉏䈩䈇䉎ὐ䈮䉅 ⇐ᗧ䈏ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎34䇯 34 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䉅㐳ᦼ㑆䈱㓸ᮭ䈱ᓇ㗀䉕ฃ䈔䈩䇮ᴦ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈲䉁䈣┵✜䈮䈧䈇䈢䈳䈎䉍䈪䈅䉍䇮䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䈱 ᐲ䉇⠨䈋ᣇ䇮␠ળ⊛䈭䊐䉤䊷䊤䊛䈱ᒻᚑ䈏ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉐䈉䇯 46 䉎䈇ዷᦸ䈲 EAC 䈱ㅴዷ䈪䈅䉎䇯ᓥ᧪䈱࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈱ផ⒖䈫䈲⇣䈭䉍䇮䋼EAC䋭࿖ኅ䋭ᣇᐭ 䋾䈫䈇䈉ਃጀ䈱䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ㅴዷ䈏ታ䈜䉏䈳ᘒ䈲ᄢ䈐䈒ᄌ䉒䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯EAC 䈱⚻ᷣ⛔ว䈮䈲 ᖡᓇ㗀䈏䈭䈇䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇35䇯ὼ䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮࿖ኅ䉋䉍䈱ᰴర䈪䈱ၞ⛔ว䈫ਅ䈱ᰴర䈪䈱 ಽᮭൻ䈏หᤨㅴⴕ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈪䇮᳃ਥൻ䈏⚗䉕ᗖ䈜䉎࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈱✕ᒛ䈲䈅䉎⒟ᐲ⸃ᶖ䈜䉎น ⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䈱႐ว䇮 1 䈮䈲䍀⛔วൻ䍁䈫䈇䈉㗄⋡䈏䉍䇮䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈮䈲 EAC䇮䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹 䈮䈲᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦ੱ䈫䈇䈉ᔨ䈏䈦䈩䈒䉎䈱䈎䉅䈚䉏䈭䈇36䇯 ᦨᓟ䈮䇮࿖㓙␠ળ䈫䊄䊅䊷䈱ᓎഀ䈮䈧䈇䈩⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯࿖㓙␠ળ䈲㘃ૃ䈚䈩䈇䉎䉋䈉䈮䈋䉎 3 䉦࿖ 䈱⇣䈭䉎䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱⢛᥊䈫ᴫ䉕ᱜ⏕䈮ᛠី䈚䇮ᒰ࿖ᐭ䈱䉥䊷䊅䊷䉲䉾䊒䉕ዅ㊀䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮 ᣂ䈢䈭䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ᒻᚑ䈮⾗䈜䉎ᡰេ䉕ⴕ䈉䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯3 䉦࿖䈲䈅䉎ᗧ䈪䉋䈇┹⋧ᚻ䈪䈅䉎 䈏䇮㓞࿖䈪䈅䈦䈩䉅⋧ᒰ䈮⇣䈭䈦䈩䈍䉍䇮ห৻䈱ᡰេ䉕ⴕ䈋䈳ᷣ䉃䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯┙ᙗ⊛䈭ᐲ 䉇ᤨ䈮⁁ᴫ⊛䈭ᮭജಽ䈏ᴦ⊛䈭ቯᕈ䈮ਈ䈋䉎ᓇ㗀䉕Ᏹ䈮⠨ᘦ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䈚䇮 䉰䊷䊎䉴䈏৻ㇱ䈱ੱ䇱䈪䈲䈭䈒ᧄᒰ䈮ᐢ䈏䈦䈩䈇䉎䈱䈎䉕⛘䈋䈝⏕䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉁䈢䇮 ᣥᑷ䈮ᨴ䉁䈦䈢䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䉕ᡰេ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈲⺰ᄖ䈪䈅䉍䇮EAC 䈱ᒻᚑ䈫䈇䈉ᄢዪ⊛䈭ᵹ䉏䉅ᛠី䈚 䈭䈏䉌䇮ฦ࿖䈮ኻ䈚䈩䉋䉍Ⓧᭂ⊛䈭දജ䉕ⴕ䈉䈼䈐䈣䉐䈉䇯 ᓥ᧪䈱䊄䊅䊷䈱ᵴേ䈮䈲䇮1990 ᐕઍ೨ඨ䈮ᄙᢙઍဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱ዉ䉕ᒝ⺞䈚ㆊ䈑䈢䉍䇮䈖䉏 䉕ᴦ⊛䉮䊮䊂䉞䉲䊢䊅䊥䊁䉞䈫䈚䈢㕙䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲⺋⻪䈏䈅䈦䈢䈫⸒䈋䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡷ㕟䈲 ᘕ㊀䈮䇮ᒰ࿖䈱ੱ䇱䈱⊒᩺䉕ၮ␆䈫䈚䈩ⴕ䈉ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯ฦ࿖䈱េഥ䈱ಣᣇ▐䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲ฦ⺰ 䈪ᣇะᕈ䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮3 ὐ䈣䈔ઃ⸥䈜䉎䇯 ╙৻䈮䇮EAC 䈮䈍䈔䉎ᴦ⛔ว䈲䉅䈫䉋䉍⚻ᷣ⛔ว䈱ᓟ䈱Ბ㓏䈮⟎䈨䈔䉌䉏䈩䈇䈢䈏䇮2004 ᐕ 䈮䊛䉶䊔䊆ᄢ⛔㗔䉋䉍䊐䉜䊷䉴䊃䊶䊃䊤䉾䉪䈪ㅪ㇌䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎᩺䈏ᛂ⸻䈘䉏䈢䇯ട⋖࿖䈲䈖䈱ᬌ⸛ 䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲วᗧ䈚䈢䇯䈖䈱㗴䈮䈲ฦ࿖䈏䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭ᯏળ䈫䊥䉴䉪䉕ᛴ䈋䈩䈇䉎(ODI 2007)䇯⋡ᮡ ᐕᰴ䈲⋡೨䈮ㄼ䈦䈩䈍䉍䇮ᓟ䈱䊄䊅䊷䈱䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡰេ䈲䈜䈼䈩䈖䈱᭴ᗐ䉕ᗧ⼂䈚䈩ⴕ䈉ᔅⷐ 䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䉏䈡䉏䈱䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䉕ᱷ䈚䈢䉁䉁⛔ว䈜䉎䈖䈫䈲䈪䈐䈭䈇䈚䇮ో䈒ᣂⷙ䈱⸳⸘䉕ో䈮䈜 䉎䈖䈫䉅䈪䈐䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯ฦ࿖䈮ᒙὐ䈏䈅䉎䈏䇮․䈮䉬䊆䉝䈲᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ㆃᑧ䈚䇮䈎䈧㕖Ᏹ䈮 ⶄ㔀䈭ᣇⴕᯏ᭴䈮䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䈱䈪䇮PNU-ODM ㅪ┙ᮭ䈱䉅䈫䈪䈱ᕆㅦ䈭ᡷ㕟䉕ᡰេ䈜䉎ᔅ ⷐ䈏䈅䉐䈉䇯 ╙ੑ䈮䇮䈖䈉䈚䈢䈱േ䈐䈫䉅㑐ଥ䈚䈩䇮ᣇᐭ䈮ኻ䈜䉎ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈲ᡷ㕟䈏ㅴ䉖䈪䈇䉎䉡䉧䊮 䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅ಾታ䈭䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䈱᳃ਥൻ䈫䉺䉟䉝䉾䊒䈚䈢䉅䈱䈮䈲䈭䈦䈩䈇䈭䈇䇯ᤓ 䈱䊄䊅䊷䈱េഥ㗵䈱Ⴧട䈲䇮ᣇ䈱䊆䊷䉵䈮ᔕ䈋䉎䈫䈇䈉ᗧ䈪䈲ᴦ⊛ቯᕈ䈮⽸₂䈚䈢น 35 䉬䊆䉝⚻ᷣ䈱ᶐㅘ䈮䉋䈦䈩ઁ࿖䈱႐↥ᬺ䈏ଚ㘩䈘䉏䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䈚䇮ㅒ䈮䉬䊆䉝䈱ㄘ↥ຠ䈱┹ജ䈏䈭䈒 䈭䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮ㅌ䈜䉎↥ᬺ䈮ᓥ䈚䈩䈇䉎㓸࿅䈏⚗䉕䈖䈜น⢻ᕈ䉅䈅䉐䈉䇯 36 ಽᮭൻ߇ㅴࠎߢࠆ߶ߤၞ⛔ว߇ㅴߩ߆ߣߞߚਔ⠪ߩ⋧㑐ߪ⥝ޔᷓ⎇ⓥ࠹ࡑߢࠆޕ 47 ⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䈦䈢䉅䈱䈱䇮ᣇᐭ䈱ਛᄩ䊶䊄䊅䊷ଐሽ䈱ะ䉕ᒝ䉄䈢䇯ᣇ䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅ᱦၮ⋚䉕 ࿕䉄䇮⚻Ᏹ੍▚䈱ㆊඨ䉕ᜂ䈉䉋䈉䈭䈱᭴▽䈏᳞䉄䉌䉏䉎䇯䈖䈱੍▚䈱⥄┙ൻ䈲䇮䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒 䈱ᗧᕁᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈫ᔕ䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮ᣇᐭ䈱ਅ䈮ኻ䈜䉎⽿છ(downward accountability)䉕ᒝൻ 䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮⾗䈜䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯䊄䊅䊷䈲ታ㓙䈮ᣇᐭ䈱ᱦ䉕ะ䈘䈞䉎䉋䈉䈭䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛䈮ข䉍⚵䉃 䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯 ╙ਃ䈮䇮ಽᮭൻ╷䈮䉋䈦䈩ᧄᒰ䈮ᣇ䈱⽺࿎䈏ᷫ䈘䉏䉎䈢䉄䈮䈲䇮䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱භ䉇⚿⸤䈏 ᄢ䈚䈭䈇ᒻ䈪䈱⾗Ḯ䈱⒖ォ䉕࿑䉌䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯㗴䈲䇮ᔅⷐ䈫䈘䉏䉎႐ᚲ䈮⾗Ḯ䈏ዯ䈐䇮 ല䈮䉒䉏䉎䉋䈉䈮⁁ᴫ䈏ᡷༀ䈚⛯䈔䈩䈇䈔䉎䈎䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪䈅䉎䇯ಽᮭൻ䈫᳃ਥൻ䈏⋧ଦㅴ⊛ 䈮ㅴⴕ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䇮䈖䈱䉋䈉䈭ᡷༀ䈲㔍䈚䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯䈖䈱ⷰὐ䈎䉌䈱ᣇᐭ䉇ಽᮭൻ䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛 䈱ലᕈ䈱⹏ଔ䈮㑐䈚䈩䈲ઁ䈱䊄䊅䊷䈫䈮ข䉍⚵䉃䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯⸘↹䉇䊝䊆䉺䊥䊮䉫⹏ଔ䉕ᐭ 䈫䊄䊅䊷㑆䈪䈚䈢䈉䈋䈪䇮ታᣉᲑ㓏䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲ᕈ䈱䈅䉎ᡰេ䉕ⴕ䈋䈳䉋䈇䈫ᕁ䉒䉏䉎䇯 ෳ⠨ᢥ₂ Adar, K. (2000) The interface between political conditionality and democratization: the case of Kenya. Politics Administration and Change 33:1-24. Andersen, R. (2000) How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda, Third World Quarterly 21(3):441-456. Barkan, J. (1992) The Rise and Fall of a Governance Realm in Kenya. In Hyden, G. and Bratton, M. (eds.). Governance and Politics in Africa. Lynne Rienner: Colorado and UK. Bazaara, N. (2002) Legal and Policy Framework for Citizen Participation in East Africa: A Comparative Analysis, LogoLink research, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. Bray, M (1994) Centralization/Decentralization and Privatization/Publicization: Conceptual Issues and need for more research, International Journal of Educational Development 21(8):817-824. Brown, G. (2007) Making ethnic citizens: The Politics and practice of education in Malaysia. International Journal of Educational Development. 27:318-330. CIA-The World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html) Crook, R. (2003) Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The politics of local-central relations, Public Administration and Development 23:77-88. Crook, R. and Manor (1998) Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance. Cambridge University Press. Crook, R. and Sverrisson. (2001) Decentralisation and poverty alleviation in developing countries: a comparative analysis or is it West bengal unique ? IDS Working Paper, 130, Institute of Development Studies. Dagne, T. (2008) Kenya: The December 2007 Elections and the Challenges Ahead. No. 34378. CRS Report for Congress. 48 Dahl, R. (ed.). (1966) Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, Yale University Press. Dahl, R. (ed.). (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press. 㧔㜞⇗ޔ೨↰⸶ࡐޟ ࠕࠠޠਃ৻ᦠᚱ 1981㧕 DfID. (2005) Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States. Elischer, S. (2008) Ethnic Coalitions of Convenience and Commitment: Political Parties and Party Systems in Kenya, GIGA Working Papers No.68. German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Fjeldstad, O-H. (2001) Fiscal Decentralization in Tanzania: For Better or for Worse ? Working Paper No.10. Chr.Michelsen Institute. Fund for Peace.(2007) Fragile States Index 2007. (http://www.fundforpeace.org/) Gaventa, J. (2002) Legal and Policy Framework for Citizen Participation in Local Governance in East Africa: a regional report. LogoLink Research. IDS, University of Sussex. Glooba-Mutebi, F. (2008) Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda. – An analytical Narrative on State-Making, Crisis States Working Paper Series No.2. Glooba-Mutebi, F. (2008) Politics and Local Government in Uganda. In Saito, F. (ed). Foundations for Local Governance㧙Decentralization in Comparative Perspective. Physica-Verlag. A Springer Company. Horowitz, D.(2000) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press: Berkeley. Human Rights Watch (1999) The Genocide (http://www.hrw.org/ legacy/ reports/ 1999/ rwanda/ Geno1-3-02.htm#TopOfPage). Hyden, G. (1983) No shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective. University of California Press: Berkely. Kadima, D. and Owuor, F. (2006) The National Rainbow Coalition, In Kadima, D. (ed.), The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa. South Africa: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, pp. 179-221. Kimenyi, M. and Ndung’u, N. (2005) Sporadic Ethnic Violence-Why Has Kenya Not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War? In Collier, P. and Sambanis, N. (eds.). Understanding Civil War-Evidence and Analysis, Vol. I Africa, Chapter 5. World Bank. Kibara, G. (2005) Prerequisites for Democratic Consolidation in Kenya, In Democratic Transition in East Africa, Research for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), University of Dar es Salaam. Klugman, J., Neyapti, B. and Stewart, F. (1999) Conflict and Growth in frica. Vol.2: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Development Centre Studies. OECD. Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation – Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. 㧔J.ࡦࠬ㧒A.ࠬ࠹ࡄࡦޟ᳃ਥൻߩℂ⺰ޠ2005 ⨹ޔච፲⺈৻ޔ↰ᄥ㇢⸶৻⮫ ␠㧕 Liphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. Yale University Press. New Heaven, C.T. 㧔ౝጊ⑲ᄦ⸶ޟᄙర␠ળߩ࠺ࡕࠢࠪޠਃ৻ᦠᚱ 1979㧕 49 Mamdani, M. (1993) Imperialism and Facism in Uganda. Nairobi: Heinemann. Mamdani, M.(1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. McDonough, D. (2008) From Guerrillas to Government: post-conflict stability in Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda. Third World Quarterly 29(2):357-374. McLauchlin, T. (2008) Civil war and State Building in Uganda, Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. San Francisco, March 27-30, 2008. Mphai, V.T. (1999) The new South Africa: A season for power sharing, In Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.F. (eds.). Democratization in Africa, Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore. Munkandala,R.S. (1998) Decentralization and democratization in Tanzania, In Five Monographs on Decentralization and Democratization in Sub-SaSaharan Africa, Barkan JD (ed.). University of Iowa: Iowa City. Museveni, Y. (1997) Sowing the mustard seeds: the struggle for freedom and democracy in Uganda. Oxford: Macmillan. Nyang’oro(2004) Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Tanzania. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. ODI (2007) East African integration: How can it contribute to East African development? Briefing 2007 February. Okuku, J. (2002) Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratization Process in Uganda, Discussion Paper 17. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. Olowu, D. (2003) Local Institutional and Political Structures and Processes: Recent Experience in Africa, Public Administration and Development 23:41-52. Posner,D.N. and Young, O. (2007) The institutionalization of Political Power in Africa, Journal of Democracy, 1883:126-140. Reinnikka, R. and Svensson, J. (2004) Local Capture: Evidence from the Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2). Rondinnelli, D. (1998) Decentralization Briefing Notes. World Bank: Washington, DC. Rice, S. and Patrick,S.(2008) Index of Stateweakness. Brookings Institution: Washington. Selbervik, H. (1999) Aid and conditionality. OECD. Shiviji, I. and Peter, C. (1999) The Villege Democracy Initiative: A Review of the Legal and Institutional Framework of Governance at Sub-District Level in the Context of the Local Government Reform Programme.Report for the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government: Dar es Salaam. Stewart, F. (2008) Note for Discussion: Kenya, Holizontal Inequalities and the Political Disturbances of 2008, CRISE. University of Oxford. Stewart, F. and O’Sullivan, M. (1998) Democracy, Conflict and Development-Three Cases, QEH 50 Working Paper Series No.15.University of Oxford. Stewart, F. (ed.) (2008) Holizontal Inequalities and Conflict –Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies. Palgrave macmillan: New York. United Cities and Local Governments. (2007) Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World. First Global Report. United Nations (1999) Report of the independent inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/rwanda.htm.) Widner, J. (1992) The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya. Berkeley: University of California Press. 㕍ᩉ߹ߜߎ✬⋙⸶ (1996)ߪߣޢࠢ࠶࠾ࠬࠛޡޟ߆㧙ࠛࠬ࠾ࠪ࠹ࠖၮᧄ⺰ᢥㆬ ޠᣂᴰ␠ દ⮮ᱞ 2007 ޡޟ㗔ၞᕈ(territoriality)ޢᔨߩౣᬌ⸛ ޔޠችፉ༜᧻⧯ޔ㇌ᒄޔዊብ⟤ ✬ޟၞߩ࡛ࡠ࠶ࡄ㧙ᄙጀൻౣ✬ౣ↢ޠᚲ ੱᢥᦠ㒮 44-68 㗁 ╣ጟ㓶৻ (2005) ࠆߌ߅ߦࠞࡈࠕ᧲ޟᣇಽᮭൻߦߟߡޠDiscussion Paper on Development Assistance No.7. FASID. ᕡᎹᗆᏒ (2006) ޟ᳃ਥਥ⟵ߩ㐳ᦼ⊛ᜬ⛯ߩ᧦ઙޔޠᕡᎹ✬ޟ᳃ਥਥ⟵ࠕࠗ࠺ࡦ࠹ࠖ࠹ࠖ㧙 ᣂ⥝࠺ࡕࠢࠪߩᒻᚑޠᲧセᴦฌᦠ 1 ᣧⒷ↰ᄢቇ ㇱ ศ↰ᄦ (2008) ⎇ࠞࡈࠕޟⓥߣ⁛┙ᓟ 50 ᐕߩࠕࡈࠞޠ㦖⼱ᄢቇ␠ળ⑼ቇ⎇ⓥᚲ 㧝㩷 㪊 ࠞ࿖ߩਥⷐࠛࠬ࠾ࠪ࠹ࠖߣቬᢎ㩷 䉣䉴䊆䉲 䉬䊆䉝(40) Kikuyu(22 䋦 ) 䇮 Luyha(14 䋦 ) 䇮 Luo(13 䋦 ) 䇮 Kalenjin(12 䋦 ) 䇮 Kamba(11 䋦 ) 䇮 Kisii(6䋦)䇮Meru(6䋦) 䊁䉞㩷 䉡䉧䊮䉻(21) Ganda(16.9 䋦 ) 䇮 Ankole(9.5 䋦 ) 䇮 Soga(8.4 䋦 ) 䇮 Kiga(6.9 䋦 ) 䇮 Iteso(6.4 䋦 ) 䇮 Langi(6.1䋦)䇮Acholi(4.7䋦) 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝 Sukuma䋨12.4䋦䋩䇮Makonde(3.9䋦)䇮Chagga(3.6%)䇮Haya(3.3%)䇮Nyamwazi(3.3%) (126) ቬᢎ㩷 䉬䊆䉝 䊒䊨䊁䉴䉺䊮䊃 45䋦䇮䉦䉸䊥䉾䉪 35䋦䇮䊛䉴䊥䊛 10䋦䇮વ⛔⊛ቬᢎ 10䋦㩷 䉡䉧䊮䉻 䊒䊨䊁䉴䉺䊮䊃 42䋦䇮䉦䉸䊥䉾䉪 41.9䋦䇮䊛䉴䊥䊛 12.1䋦䇮䈠䈱ઁ 3.1䋦 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝 䉺䊮䉧䊆䊷䉦䈏䉪䊥䉴䉼䊞䊮 30䋦䇮䊛䉴䊥䊛 35䋦䇮વ⛔⊛ቬᢎ 35䋦䇮䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈏䊛 䉴䊥䊛 99䋦 ౖ䈲 CIA-The World Factbook 䈮䉎, ૉ䈚䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈲 Nyang’oro㩷 (2004)䈮䉋䉎 1967 ᐕ䉶䊮䉰 䉴䇯ฦ⒳⛔⸘䈮䉋䉎ᢙሼ䈲䇮․䈮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈫䉬䊆䉝䈱䊛䉴䊥䊛䈮䈍䈇䈩ᄢ䈐䈒⇣䈭䉎䇯 51 ࿑䋱䋮᳃ਥൻ䋨ⶄᢙౄ䋩䈫ಽᮭൻ䉕䉄䈓䉎ᴦㆊ⒟䈱䉟䊜䊷䉳㩿㪈㪐㪐㪇㪄㪉㪇㪇㪏 ᐕ㪀㩷 ಽᮭൻ ᒝ Ԙ 㪲⊒ዷ⚻〝㪴㩷 ԙ Ԛ 㽲 䉡䉧䊮䉻㩷 㽳 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝㩷 㽴 䉬䊆䉝㩷 㽵 䊦䊪䊮䉻㩷 ᳃ਥൻ ⚻〝䈲න⚐ൻ䈚䈩⋥ ᒙ ᒝ ✢䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 ԛ ⊒ὐ ᒙ ᵈ㧦Ԙߪ 1990 ᐕઍߦ NRM ߩ߽ߣߢ㨅ゲ㧔❑㧕ᣇะߦะ߆ߞߚ߇ޔ2003 ᐕߩⶄᢙౄߩ ዉࠍᄾᯏߦ㨅ゲࠍߒߡ╙৻⽎㒢ߦߞߚޕԙߪ 1990 ᐕઍ߆ࠄᦨ߽ 45 ᐲ✢ߦㄭᣇะ ߢㅴࠎߢࠆޕԚߪ 1990 ᐕઍో⥸⊛ߦ✭ᘟߥേ߈ߢߞߚ߇ޔฦ⒳ߩ⽷⊛ಽᮭൻࠍㅴ ߚ 2000 ᐕઍೋߦಽᮭൻ߇㨄ゲߦ㆐ߒߚޕԛߩߺ 1994 ᐕߩ⚗ߦ⥋ࠆㆊ⒟߹ߢࠍߒ ߡࠆޕ 52 ╙ 3 ┨ ࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࠹ࠖߣ╷ኻʊ⣀ᒙ⚗࿖ኅ߳ߩࠗࡦࡊࠤ࡚ࠪࡦ Chapter 3 Conditionality and Policy Dialogue: Implications for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States ዊ㊁⌀ଐ㧔FASID ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ ⎇ⓥഥᚻ㧕 Mai Ono (Research Assistant, IDRI, FASID) 㧔ⷐ⚂㧕 ࿖㓙េഥ␠ળߪ 80-90 ᐕઍߩ⚻㛎߿㜞߹ࠆេഥലᨐะ߳ߩ ᔨ߆ࠄⵍޔេഥ࿖ߦኻߔࠆេ ഥ⾉ઃଏਈ᧦ઙ㧔ࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࠹ࠖ㧕ߩ⋥ߒࠍㅴߡ߈ߚߩߟ৻ߩߘޕᏫ⚿ߪ 2005 ᐕߩࡄޟት⸒ߦޠ㓸⚂ߐࠇࠆߦࡊ࠶ࠪ࠽࠻ࡄޔၮߠߚ࠼࠽ⵍេഥ࿖㑐ଥߩ⏕ ┙ߦะߌߚ࿖㓙⊛ࠦࡒ࠶࠻ࡔࡦ࠻ߢࠆߒ߆ߒޕቯ⟵ޔ㐿⊒េഥߩࡄ࠻࠽ࠪ࠶ࡊߩ ၮ⋚ߣߥࠆᐭᐲߩ⛔ᴦ⢻ജ߹ߚߪ㧔߮㧕ᴦᗧᕁߩᒙߐ߇⪺ߒޟ⣀ᒙ⚗࿖ኅޠ ߦ߅ߡߚߒ߁ߎޔេഥലᨐะ߳ߩ ᔨ߇ߤߩ⒟ᐲᔕ↪ߐࠇᓧࠆߩ߆ߦߟߡޔ࿖㓙េ ഥ␠ળߩ⚻㛎ߪᧂߛචಽߢߥߊޔᄙߊߩ⺖㗴߇ᜰ៰ߐࠇߡࠆᧄޕⓂߢߪޔవߕ㧔1㧕ࡄ ࠻࠽ࠪ࠶ࡊߩේೣߦၮߠߚ᭽ߥޘ࿖㓙េഥࠕࡊࡠ࠴߇ޟ⣀ᒙ⚗࿖ኅࠆߌ߅ߦޠ ࿖ኅᑪ⸳߿ᐔߩቯ⌕ߦ߽ߚࠄߒᓧࠆน⢻ᕈߣ㒢⇇ߣࠍ⺑ߒޔ㧔2㧕․ߦߘߩ㒢⇇ߩ↢ᚑ ⷐ࿃ߣߒߡߩេഥ࠼࠽ߩ㗴ߦశࠍᒰߡޔਥⷐߥ㐿⊒េഥ࠼࠽㧔☨ޔ⧷ޔEU㧕ߦࠃ ࠆࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࠹ࠖߣⵍេഥ࿖ߣߩኻߦ㑐ߔࠆ╷ᣇ㊎ߣࠍࠇߘޔណ↪ߔࠆߦ⥋ߞ ߚ࿖ౝߩᴦ⊛ⷐ࿃ߣࠍ⼏⺰ߔࠆޕ㧔3㧕ᦨᓟߦޔᣣᧄߩ㐿⊒េഥ߳ߩᗧࠍᬌ⸛ߔࠆޕᣣ ᧄߪޟODA ᄢ✁߽ߡ߅ߦޠ╷ኻߩ㊀ⷐᕈࠍឝߍߡࠆ߇ࠅࠃޔലᨐ⊛ߥ╷ኻࡊ ࡠࠬߩታߦߪޟޔ⣀ᒙ⚗࿖ኅޠ㗴ߦኻߔࠆᣣᧄߣߒߡߩ╷ࠬ࠲ࡦࠬߩ⏕ൻ ߣࠍࠇߎޔᒝߔࠆ߽ߩߣߒߡᣣᧄ߇ߎࠇ߹ߢ߽ᄖಽ㊁ࠍㅢߓߡᵈജߒߡ߈ߚᐔ᭴▽ ಽ㊁߳ߩ࿖㓙⊛⽸₂ߩ৻ጀߩᒝൻ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆޕ 3-1 Introduction 3-1-1 Context and objectives of the paper Fragile and conflict-affected states by definition are marked by fractured governance. A development scenario propounded by donors to address this challenge revolves around the use of nuanced forms of conditionality including policy dialogue, “a mechanism to leverage political reform …(that) firmly rooted in persuasion (Morrissey 2005:237, in Koeberle 2005)”. The underlying premise reflects the lesson learned from past international experience that imposing external conditionality works well only when there is strong political support for the reform within the recipient country. To what extent is concern about aid effectiveness and partnership useful in fragile and conflict-affected situations? The record is mixed. Previous studies suggest that in fragile states progress in addressing the fundamental political problems varies, and while the development 53 partnership model based on the Paris Declaration may be applicable in “hopeful partnerships,” it may not be so in “problematic partnerships,” where social conditions are deteriorating and the basis for a dialogue is very weak (OPM/IDL 2008). Still, the need to identify opportunities for interaction with fragile and conflict-affected states on political issues is immense. The recent focus on state-building in these situations reflects also the growing international recognition of the importance of going beyond technocratic approaches, or one-size-fits-all approaches, to find a ‘new development paradigm’ that “orients itself at the model of an embedded and effective state and sees the role of external actors… in facilitating and supporting indigenous processes as long as they meet certain normative minimum criteria (Tobias 2007)”. This study focuses on the strategies by which major bilateral donors ensure the commitment of partner countries, while supporting the partners’ efforts to enhance their capacity to use aid effectively. Taking stock of past experiences, the paper aims to identify key challenges in employing various forms of conditionality. It then examines implications for Japanese development aid in strengthening the process of policy dialogue with fragile and conflict-affected states. 3-1-2 Structure of the paper The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a brief overview of the paper as a whole. Section 2 highlights how international debate on the donor-recipient relationship has evolved over past decades by examining the shift in the use of conditionality. It also discusses findings from recent studies on the application of the development partnership model in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Section 3 considers specific policy stances and approaches taken by some bilateral donors, namely the US, the UK, and the EU, with regard to the issues of conditionality and dialogue. Building on discussions presented in previous chapters, Section 4 examines implications for Japanese development aid. 3-2 Literature review 3-2-1 Aid, Conditionality and Dialogue Economists have often discussed donor-recipient relationships in terms of the principal-agent theoretical model, wherein recipients (the agents) implement the conditions desired by donors (the principals) (Killick 1996,1997, in Nissanke 2008). However, in reality, this is rarely a straightforward calculation. Aid is typically provided for mixed purposes - diplomacy, commerce, the expansion of cultural hegemony, concern for security, natural resources acquisition, and development. Also, aid relations are often characterized by asymmetric power structures, resulting in weakened commitments by recipients to take political risks and adjustment costs to attain the 54 development objectives that are intended by donors (Nissanke 2008:31). This is especially the case with regard to aid in fragile and conflict-affected situations. The issue of conditionality has always been central to the practice of aid-giving. In its origins, aid was based essentially on the idea that there should be a bargain between donor and recipient. Both sides have their own respective objectives on the basis of which they make deals such that each gets some of what it wants in return for giving the other some of what it wants. In contrast to this pattern, a partnership approach presumes shared objectives. The problem with applying the partnership concept to fragile and conflict-affected states is that there are insufficient shared objectives. (Collier 2005:113, in Koebeler et al 2005). Thus, various tools for persuasion have developed - such as policy dialogue. In theory, conditionality can help to strengthen the legitimacy of the state in countries emerging from conflict or at the risk of conflict, and if used carefully, can even contribute to the consolidation of peace in countries under ongoing conflict. Hence the question to be addressed is not whether conditionality is needed, but what conditionality is appropriate and why. (USAID 1982) 3-2-2 From Conditionality to Dialogue: In Theory Incorporating the “right” approaches for improved donor-recipient relationships has always been at the top of the agenda for international development discourse. But the prescriptions have changed, one after another, from the 'capital shortage' diagnosis in the 1960’-70’s to the 'policy failures' diagnosis in the 1980’s and then on to the 'institutional failures' diagnosis in the 1990’s (Nissanke 2008). From the mid-90s, a broad consensus was formed around the importance of good governance and on the role of democratic participation. This was in recognition that traditional approaches to conditionality did not work because political conditionalities yield positive results only when strong social groups in a recipient country called for such measures. In 1998, the World Bank published a well-cited report on this issue1 which claimed that the chances for successful external engagement were limited without recipient countries’ commitment to the principles of good governance (i.e. ownership). In response, the Bretton Woods Institutions moved to review the scope and content of conditionality; what was called incentive-based, ex-ante conditionality (such as in the Structural Adjustment Lending of the ‘80s) was replaced by selectivity-based, ex-post conditionality (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Country Policy Institutional Assessments (CPIA) in the ‘90s). The number of macroeconomic conditionalities attached to lending was also reduced and streamlined on average by 40% (Gould and Ojanen 2003:23). Since the latter half of the 1990s, the rhetoric of partnership has increasingly been World Bank (1998) Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t Work and Why. Washington DC, The World Bank. 1 55 discussed under the banner of harmonization and alignment and has been translated into concrete development practices and procedures, such as SWAps and budget support, which contain fewer conditions and are agreed and revised annually based on the recipient country’s performance in the previous year. (Box 1) The major exception to such ex-post approach is the use of “variable tranches” by the EU and some other bilateral donors, which is based on within-year performance measured in terms of policy and outcome indicators.2 The shift in donor thinking on conditionality and a general move toward the principle of partnership reflected an international consensus that there should be greater focus on aid effectiveness and results orientation. Long-term engagement based on fixed “fundamental understandings” or framework conditions meant reduction in transaction costs. In 2005, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness consolidated the international donor community’s commitment to provide aid through a partnership-based development model framed by 5 principles3 and established an agreed set of joint indicators for measuring aid effectiveness. The idea was to stimulate competition for aid between developing countries by promising to reward ‘good performers. To supplement this, donors have come to use more nuanced and informal forms of donor engagement tools (such as policy dialogue) to increase focus on capacity development and listening. There is, however, some criticism on the superficiality of donor approaches toward ownership. (For example, see OECD-DAC 2008, Action Aid 2006, Wilks and Lefrancios 20024). These types of tranches are designed to encourage the development of local policy solutions (and hence the ownership of recipient countries) by linking some part of the funding to outcome indicators rather than prior policy actions, while ensuring aid predictability by providing the large and remaining part of the funding through fixed tranches. However, there are also some concerns among partner governments who fear they may be penalized for falling short in meeting goals as a result of factors beyond their control, such as a collapse in international commodity price, etc., that might push the government to cut budget allocations for social sector spending. 2 3 Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results, and Mutual accountability. Available at:http://www.accrahlf.net/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ACCRAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21740505~ pagePK: 64861884~piPK:64860737~theSitePK:4700791,00.html 4 56 Box 1: Donor thinking on conditionality The World Bank and IMF The new guidelines on conditionality published in 2002 (IMF) and 2005 (World Bank) claim that disbursement conditions should (1) derive from government plans (notably Poverty Reduction Strategies), (2) be limited in number, and (3) be interpreted flexibly. DFID The UK government outlines three conditionality principles for UK engagement with developing countries in a policy paper published in 2005; (1) Reducing poverty and achieving MDGs, (2) Respecting human rights and other international obligations, and (3) Strengthening financial management and accountability, and reducing the risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption. (DFID 2005) 3-2-3 Experiences from Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: In Practice The development partnership model based on the Paris Declaration principle would not be straightforwardly applicable to fragile and conflict-affected situations because the basis for donor-recipient partnership is often fractured. One donor effort to address this challenge is the Fragile States Principles (OECD-DAC 2007) which highlights the importance of supplementing international engagement with these countries t by the principle of state-building and “Do No Harm.” A study by OPM/IDL (2008) identifies opportunities and challenges in applying the Paris Declaration development partnership model to these countries depending on the degree of progress in addressing the political issues that underscore state fragility (“hopeful partnerships” and “problematic partnerships”(Table 1)). 57 Table 1: Classification of fragile and conflict affected situations and issues and challenges that donors face in building partnerships “hopeful partnerships” Transition or Peace, national reconciliation or agreed transition process supported by the post-conflict settings international community. Government priorities generally expressed through a transitional results framework, based on a joint national-international needs assessment. Gradually improving State capacity improving and reform efforts have made some progress, but situations situation remains fragile and capacity-constrained. Includes many “post-conflict countries” where reform progress has been positive but gradual. What are the challenges? (i)The capacity constraints of the state (and civil society), resulting in poor quality and availability of baseline data and indicators of progress on which development partners align. (ii) Dominance of international community in many transitional context. “problematic partnerships” increasing risk of Deterioration in governance, rising conflict risk and increased diversion conflict between government and the international community in development strategy. prolonged crisis or No consensus between government and the international community on impasse development strategy. situations of ongoing Ongoing conflict between key national stakeholders, undermining the conflict stability, reach, capacity and the legitimacy of the state. What are the challenges? (i) Highly politicized context; (ii) Tightly restricted space for assistance; (iii) Atmosphere of secrecy and self-censorship; (iv) Limited financial and human resources, including weak capacity; and (v) Lack of reliable data. Source: Oxford Policy Management (OPM) /the IDL Group (2008) (1) Opportunities In transitional or post-conflict settings and gradually improving situations there is a greater scope for harnessing a development model based on the principle of donor-recipient partnership to help increase the stability of the situation, albeit the distinction between post-conflict and in-conflict is often a blurred one. Donor efforts to establish a strategic planning and coordination framework through improved international dialogue include Consolidated Action Plans 58 (CAP) and the Transitional CAP by OCHA, PRSPs and Interim-PRSPs (I-PRSPs) 5 , the development of Transitional Result Matrices (TRMs)6 to support the PRS process, and overarching monitoring frameworks for national budget management. Many expectations are also placed on the potential role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the development of Strategic Peace-building Framework (Box X), for the Commission’s ‘convening’ power and also for its unique ability to exert silent pressure on the government by having UN Security Council (UNSC) applying pressure, although the PBC, itself, does not has executive authority nor enforcement capacity. Box 2: Liberia GEMAP At the Liberia Partner’s Forum held in Feb 2007, donors (UNSC, World Bank, IMF, EU and US) committed to coordinate and harmonized their programs and track disbursements and projections of resources to allow for more coherent government planning. This resulted in the development of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) which has provided robust oversight of and conditionality for public financial management functions through positioning international experts in key public finance positions (The Institute for State Effectiveness 2008:13). Regular review of GEMAP by the UNSC has also provided another, indirect, oversight mechanism. While emphasizing the necessity of continued monitoring on the overall impact of the GEMAP, Dwan and Bailey (2006) observe that the presence of strong oversight mechanism was especially crucial because the national leadership was initially identified as a key source for corruption. Still, as of 2004, only 7 of 34 countries identified as Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) by the World Bank have developed PRSPs while 8 have developed I-PRSPs (Interim-PRSPs) (Thornton and Cox 2005). 5 The TRM is a planning, coordination, and management tool aimed at improved prioritization of actions necessary to achieve a successful transition in fragile states. The TRM helps launch PRS approaches in these environments, either by acting as an early framework to lay the groundwork for a PRS or later as a way to operationalize poverty reduction strategies in low capacity countries. See: UNDG and the World Bank (2005) 6 59 Box 3: The Role of PBC in Fostering International Dialogue Two episodes underscore the PBC’s unique advantages in fostering international dialogue: In Burundi, the PBC facilitated a government-IMF negotiation process, both at headquarters and at the field level, when IMF hinted its intention to delay completion of its Sixth Burundi Review, a decision which was regarded as potential threat to stabilization of the country. In Sierra Leone, the PBC created an arena for dialogue among relevant stakeholders to mobilize political support for the incorporation of energy, which is usually considered a medium-to long-term development agenda, into the strategic framework for peace consolidation. (CIC/IPI 2008) There is international consensus on the importance of aid “on budget” instead of “off budget” to ensure that donors work is compatible with national systems and to improve the government’s public financial management capacity while not unjustly legitimizing the government by subjugating aid to government priorities or policies (what is called by the UK as “shadow-alignment”). Pooled funds (e.g. Multi-Donor Trust Funds and joint programmes), which are also thought to provide a number of advantages7, should be limited in its use to avoid generating aid dependency. High macroeconomic and fungibility risks are compensated by intensive inputs of technical assistance, such as the case of Liberia GEMAP and also other fragile and conflict-affected situations receiving budget support (e.g. Sierra Leone, Rwanda). A survey on the impact of budget support on the donor-recipient relationship by the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA)8 finds that among 15 African States surveyed “[t]hree-quarters of respondents indicated that the MoU or joint performance assessment matrix had significantly improved the quality of the dialogue between government and donors (SPA 2006),” qualified with a remainder that it was not for a definitive conclusion. Even in conflict-affected settings, conditionality may help to build a durable peace – the role of conditionality discussed under the term “peace conditionality (Boyce 2004).” The conclusion of peace agreements and the use of needs assessments (e.g. Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA) and Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs)), joint planning and prioritization tools (TRMs and Multi-Donor Trust Funds), and joint donor offices may serve as benchmarks on which donors can decide whether to continue or to suspend aid provision while ensuring room for partnership as envisaged by the principle of alignment and harmonization. As Boyce (2003:3) notes, however, it is The benefits of using pooled funds include (1) promoting a more programmatic and long-term approach to service delivery etc, (2) reducing the tendency to projectisation, and (3) promoting harmonization and alignment. (Leader and Colenso 2005:7) 7 The Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) is the forum of multilateral and bilateral development agencies, now with rotating African country membership, on assistance to low-income Africa. 8 60 critical that the designing of “[p]eace conditionality moves beyond these all-or-nothing choices, in which the aid tap is either ‘on’ or ‘off’. .. Instead it seeks to calibrate the flow of support more closely to the peace process, by tying specific aid agreements to specific steps to build peace.” With regard to resource-rich fragile states, conditionality may also contribute to the three broader development challenges they face (Boyce 2003:5): (1) ensuring distributional equity of the resource, (2) ensuring that resource revenues be used for peaceful development purposes, and (3) promoting transparency and accountability. International campaigns against the illegal flow of such natural resources to international markets, as well as international arrangements such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) can help curtail the use of natural resources to further conflict. In Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the UN Expert Panel for DRC has proposed sanctions against all related parties (individuals and private corporations) involved in the illicit exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources by urging international donors to reduce development aid to the neighboring governments that host them. Diplomatic efforts also play a key role in promoting the adoption of international codes that aim to improve natural resources transparency (e.g. Liberia).㩷 㩷 (2) Limits and Challenges In principle conditionality can be used to support the objectives of enhancing state legitimacy and consolidating peace. In practice, such efforts have been rather the exception than the rule, and where intended the outcomes have been mixed. Boyce (2003) identifies three restraining factors for this: (1) governmental lack of legitimacy and authority over the national territory (e.g. Somalia as a whole) or situations where such control has existed but not backed by international recognition (e.g. Somaliland, Puntland), (2) the measures on offer is insufficient to attract the targets to adopt peace- and state-building policies (e.g. Angola), and (3) donors themselves may not accord peace- and state-building priority over other geopolitical, commercial, and institutional interests. Besides, the level of field representation by donor governments and agencies is still limited, which may have also hampered dialogue and consensus-building process on development agenda (e.g. Somalia and Zimbabwe). Experience highlights the limited extent to which conditionality, especially that related to political issues, can assert influence on the recipient government. In Rwanda, the World Bank’s prior action and the EU’s outcome-oriented variable tranche approaches seemed to be more intrusive than the UK and Sweden’s “broad performance assessment” approach, because of government sensitivity to “policy interference.” However, under the more specific WB/EU approach, the definition of performance gains clarity. More critically, government officials clearly state that political conditionality, even when garnished with ‘carrots,’ will not work, especially those on issues that the government considers as non-negotiable, such as national security matters (Purcell 61 et al. 2006:23-24). Leader and Conlenso note that “[t]he choice of instrument needs a sophisticated political economy analysis, donors need to examine how different aid instruments are likely to influence the bargaining process between actors in the country rather than seeing recipient governments as unitary agents to be manipulated with carrots and sticks.”(2005:43) Box 4: Burundi case study In Burundi there have been high levels of government involvement in the development of the country’s PRSP (CSLP1) and the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding (SFPB), providing it with increased power at the negotiating table and in facilitating the aid allocation process. Officials recognize, however, that the SFPB contains many aspects of the country’s CSLP and admit that if “effective planning been in place upon the initiation of the CSLP, elements of the SFPB could easily have been included within it, negating the need for two documents (OPM/IDL 2008:57)”. Confused donor-recipient alignment processes and harmonization efforts are also attributable to the recent deterioration in the country’s political and security conditions, which has resulted in frequent turnover of officials (e.g. changes twice in the Ministry of Finance during the budget support negotiations), and ineffective coordination among relevant ministries, which is partly owing to the factional conflict within the Burundian government. The challenge in engaging with these states is topped by the difficulties in orchestrating “3D” actors, i.e. Diplomacy, Defense, and Development. For example, the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in Southern Sudan exemplifies problems in coordinating donor policies on diplomacy and defense agenda. In Liberia, diplomatic-development planning and cooperation played a critical role in the successful sequencing of international interventions, but such international diplomatic support was not extended on the country’s debt negotiation. Often desirable objectives identified at the diplomatic level are not met with the provision of adequate resources at the development level that would make those objectives feasible or movement towards them credible. 3-2-4 Analysis and Lessons Learned Broad lessons of past donor experiences in promoting interaction with governments on political issues include, but are not limited to the following: (1) External actors have limited influence in the process of political reform. While the principle of ownership and policy dialogue (carrot-and-stick approach) may have some scope for fostering improved budget and resource management as well strengthening the government’s commitment to economic development, too often it merely sketches an ideal 62 model without providing the road-map and resources needed to reach this end-state. (2) When donor’s attempt efforts to positively influence domestic political reforms, allocation of adequate amounts of resources (financial, personnel, material) is required. This means that a greater ‘selectivity’ of donor commitment may be needed. (3) Aid to support key service sectors as well as humanitarian assistances must be based on what the UK terms “shadow-alignment,” and hence should ensure room for local service sectors to decide their own service delivery structure and enhance their own accountability. (4) Under circumstances in which donors are forced to take coercive attitude toward the recipient country, diplomatic engagement can play a critical role. It is also important to strengthen the appreciation of diplomats for the importance of longer-term engagement; because their principle task is to represent the interests of their countries, their orientation is more toward current events and short-term concerns. UN agencies may play a key role in bridging the 3Ds. (5) There are many problems on the donor side that must be addressed. Too often changes in donor policy serve only to confuse the government side. Easterly explains this issue in terms of the donors’ own incentive systems to improve their performance indicators, which are assessed in terms of aid disbursements (Easterly 2003, in Nissanke 2008:25). Even when aid delivery is genuinely for development purposes, donors find themselves in a double bind of ownership and the need for quick, tangible results on one hand and policy implementation acceptable to donor nations and their citizens on the other. This is all the more the case in fragile and conflict-affected situations, in which a greater intrusion of aid becomes evident (and in part explicit). Institutional gaps among the way 3D actors do business are still widely seen. Parallel structures of coordination frameworks, especially those of the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions, also remain a critical challenge. To ensure the effectiveness of conditionalities, it is critical that donors redefine their political stance toward the recipient country while ensuring that their own agenda do not contradict with stabilization of local condition. 3-3 Donor Approaches to Conditionality and Dialogue The last point highlighted in the previous section is recognized among development officials themselves. One major reason why donor aid agencies cannot always do the ‘right thing’ relates to their accountability to their Parliament or Congress. As Killick notes, The long-term course of the policies of any institution is the result of interplay between inertial forces tending to perpetuate the status quo, and active forces for change. Policy-makers are constrained by history, by special interests which benefit from existing policies, by settled ways of viewing problems and by the perceived dangers or 63 uncertainties of changing course. (Killick 2005:672) The following section examines how major donors, in spite of difficulties highlighted in the previous section, try to manage the challenges with regard to the issue of conditionality and dialogue. The discussion is based on three case studies from the US, the UK, and the EU. 3-3-1 US US foreign aid underwent dramatic changes in the early years of the twenty-first century. In response to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration announced the elevation of foreign aid to one of three pillars to US foreign strategy in National Security Strategy for the United States of America (2002), an apparent reflection of the gravitation of the US toward “anti-terrorism” under the rubric of ‘freedom agenda.’ The budget for US aid increased by roughly 40% between 2001 and 2005 (Lancaster 2005:91), presenting a stark contrast with the downward trend in overall aid volume during mid-1990s under the Clinton administration. The US is often viewed as being the donor that most explicitly links foreign state fragility with domestic concerns, especially its own security9. There were, however, also several other elements that helped to revitalize the strategic use of foreign aid: (1) the Bush administration’s intent to “balance … assertive military posture and tendency toward US unilateralism10 (Lancaster 2005:92)”, and (2) the growing pressure from NGOs, especially faith-based organizations, to focus foreign aid on objectives such as humanitarian relief, debt reduction, and fighting HIV/AIDS. Lancaster notes that ideas framing US foreign aid can be characterized by an enduring dualism between libertarians, or classical liberals, on the right, who favor a limited role for government including expenditure on foreign aid, and humanitarians on the left, who support increased use of US public resources for development-purpose (both at home and abroad). The humanitarians have become increasingly involved in the sphere of foreign aid since the 1990s. The reason why the US domestic argument is so robust on the rightness of aid is due also to a fragmentation in US political power and a resulting weak political constituency for foreign aid. This in part is generated by the structure of US political institutions: (1) a presidential political system, (2) election based on the winner-take-all, and (3) the power of the Congress to oversee the content as well as use of the federal budget. Bipartisan support for democracy promotion as a prerequisite to effective state-building11 A temporary exception was when President George H.W. Bush announced a “new world order” policy following the fall of the Berlin wall. During the 1990s US foreign aid experienced a period depicted by a former USAID administrator as a “vacation from history (Andrew Natsios, in Cammack et al 2006:31),” albeit some developing regions remained top priority for US ODA, such as Cuba and those in the Horn of Africa. 9 10 E.g. Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, opposing a treaty banning small arms transfers. Note that the term “state-building” used by Bush administration is not the same as is meant by the same term in OECD-DAC discussions; the former conflates state building and a democracy-promotion agenda. 11 64 strongly underpins US engagement with the developing world, which seems to remain a prominent feature of the US global agenda. Whilst the US does not explicitly articulate a policy on conditionality, some of the main instruments for US democracy assistance can be understood as indirectly approaching conditionality and dialogue; such as building people-to-people networks at all levels of society (e.g. exchanges of students, scholars and other citizens); providing technical training programs; directly assisting democratic-minded forces within recipient countries; granting new democracies with admission to existing multilateral institutions (the means also used by the EU and NATO) (Stanley Foundation 2007). Reflecting the lessons learned from its operation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US government is now moving toward a rebalancing between defense and development. In Nov 2007, the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed a “dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of natural security.12” The extents and ways in which future US development policy will employ a dialogue-based approach toward countries that face the most critical challenges on the globe remain to be seen.㩷 㩷 3-3-2 UK The UK’s aid strategy toward fragile and conflict-affected states is marked by high selectivity in terms of target countries, concentrating mostly on Commonwealth countries. Being relatively decentralized,13 each DFID country offices play a central role in the process of policy dialogue with the recipient country on its development agenda; although in situations where firm coherence between 3D actors is particularly required (i.e. countries emerging from armed conflict and where UK defense missions are in operation, such as Darfur in Sudan), the UK extends its support for peacebuilding mainly through its Stabilisation Unit in the form of dispatching and management of experienced civilian personnel as well as targeted and rapid assistance to ensure a regular and inclusive dialogue process under the supervision of the Cabinet Office-based Board of Directors. The Stabilisaton Unit is jointly-owned by DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD)14. The extent of UK commitment (both in terms of budget allocation and length of 12 USAID Frontlines November 2008, excerpted from Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2008 In contrast to the greater emphasis in aid allocation on political, industrial and commercial considerations during the Conservative administration (1979-97), the successor Labour government introduced substantial change in British aid thinking by (1) emphasizing a poverty reduction agenda, as epitomized by the enactment of International Development Act of 2002 which ruled out “British aid [being] used for any purpose other than the furtherance of sustainable development or improving the welfare of the populations of assisted territories” (Killick 2005:675), (2) ending the tying of aid and the mixed-credit ATP scheme, and (3) decentralizing DFID’s operational structure. 13 14 For example in Darfur, the Unit supports the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process by dispatching American negotiation specialists as well as internationalized Sudanese. 65 engagement) is decided on the basis of the degree of trust established between the UK and recipient government. Other key criteria for UK engagement with fragile and conflict-affected recipient countries relate to (1) its poverty reduction agenda, (2) respect for international obligations, and (3) improved public financial management (see 3-2-2 box 1). Policy dialogue is a means for reaching agreement on shared objectives. But even in cases where the UK resorts to suspensions of aid (e.g. Ethiopia, where in response to the election-related violence and detention of the opposition, DFID withheld budget support aid delivery), it continues to channel aid through safety net programmes for the most vulnerable and to support service delivery by local governments in order to ensure that the neediest people do not suffer as a consequence of the actions of their Government. Indeed, the importance attached to the “right mixture” of various aid delivery channels is a notion commonly shared among UK development officers (DFID 2008). Backed by broad Parliamentary concern with the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty the UK is also widely seen to be a leading donor promoting a partnership-based approach to development (epitomized by a preference for the use of programme-based aid, including budget support15). However, challenges remain. A recent study by the National Audit Office (2008) points out that its formal monitoring frameworks for tracking the progress of aid delivery, especially on the human rights issue, is often not systematic. Setting consciously high-level but less detailed arrangements in Memoranda of Understanding also risks delaying response (quickly and firmly) to the need for resolving disputes that arise (National Audit Office 2008:33). UK is trying to address this issue by providing technical assistance16 and also by harmonizing efforts with other donors.㩷 㩷 3-3-3 EU The EU’s development cooperation is framed by its political and historical relations with developing countries, among others the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The Cotonou Agreement (2003) spells out the EU’s emphasis on an ownership agenda by viewing signatory countries as more equal partners and seeking their development through a process of economic liberalization (e.g. bilateral EPA negotiations), while explicitly setting (1) human rights, (2) democracy and (3) the quality of governance as prerequisites to European development cooperation (article 8&917). In case concerns arise over these three principles of engagement, the EU will 15 DFID policy on budget support is set out in the 2000 White Paper “Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor,” and the subsequent “Poverty Reduction Budget Support, A DFID policy paper,” published in 2004 and revised in 2008. 16 Killick (2005) notes that British development aid to Africa “has always been highly concessional” as significant part of it has been provided in the form of grants, which goes counter to the UK's strong preference for budgetary support yet is consistent with the UK’s commitment to a poverty reduction agenda. 17 Proposed Guidelines for ACP-EU Political Dialogue (Article 8) ACP-CE 2153/1/02 REV 1. Brussels, 25 February 2003 66 conduct policy dialogue among the parties (Act no.8) prior to considering the suspension of aid (Act no.96). Past cases of EC aid suspension include Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau and Chad. On practical level, the EU approach to dialogue is largely built on a general agreement that the weak government ownership is substitutable to some extent by increased civil society participation. As such, the EU facilitates a dialogue process with multiple stakeholders, such as local governments, civil society and diaspora. Also, the EU now requires governments seeking EU membership to engage in dialogue with their civil society organizations about how to enhance respect for human rights and other democratic principles. This signals a clear precondition that adherence to liberal democratic values is an prerequisite to membership in multilateral institutions that officer concrete benefits. Reflecting a strong political imperative in the European Parliament and among the public to link development cooperation to governance and human rights standards, the EU is also increasingly committed to the improved use of financing instruments that are linked to development outcomes (e.g. in its budget support agreements the EU typically makes provision for variable tranches). The greatest challenge the EU faces in advancing its engagement with fragile and conflict-affected states is the issue of coherence, both in terms of coherence among EU Member states and with 3D actors.18 The geographical scope of and political climate for EU development cooperation policy historically has been influenced largely by changes in membership occurring over time. The divergence between the Member countries’ interests and their motivations has been regarded as a fundamental challenge. This was further fueled by the recent admission to the EU of 10 relatively poor countries which are less interested in engaging with fragile- and conflict affected states than are the traditionalists member countries such as France.19 It is also the case that the EU must take care in effectively asserting its influence over the domestic policies of recipient states because it is easily criticized as being neo-colonial (e.g. Zimbabwe).㩷 㩷 3-4 Concluding Remarks and Implications for Japan Conditionality can serve as a means for enhanced government ownership, improved state legitimacy and consolidation of peace. The experiences suggest, however, that productive results are more likely to be sucured when recipient governments are aware of the potential enforcement measures that donors may take but such potential in effect is not put in action. To address the question of what conditionality is appropriate and why (not whether conditionality is needed), 18Concrete improvements are thought in the following 3 areas; (1) EU speaking with one voice, (2) coherence between 3Ds and other related divisions (WGA), (3) aid effectiveness. 19 For example in 2003, France, out of consideration for many African leaders, invited President Mugabe to the Franco African Summit and then put pressure on the other EU member states to lift travel ban measures on him by issuing veto threat on the continuation of sanctions. (Jon Henley, ‘France flexes its muscles in Africa’, The Guardian, 29 January 2003.) 67 donors should understand their political positions toward the recipient government because all development aid involves political effect whether delivered conditionally or unconditionally. Donors then needs to pay a greater effort to re-evaluate the effects of such aid directed for other purposes than development, while they secure a venue for continuous international dialogue with recipient governments on peace- and dtate-building agenda. Japan articulates its emphasis on the process of policy dialogue in its ODA Charter (MOFA 2003), but the way it implements this in practice is largely framed and driven by the principle of “request-based aid.” Underlying this concept is skepticism of the uncriticized premise that development policies propounded by donors are always more appropriate than those designed by recipient government, particularly when the latter is equipped with an appropriate institutional framework that builds on the principle of good governance. This principle underlies Japan’s strong preference for non-intervention in the domestic policies of recipient governments. Japan has maintained a highly cautious stance in the use of aid for economic and political sanctions and has even avoided officially adopting the concept of “fragile state.” However, as highlighted in the previous section, the practice of aid-provision can never really be understood separately from political factors. In light of the fragile states agenda, the absence of a clear political stance on the issue and a defined rationale for engagement become quite problematic. The state-building process in such settings requires a long-term, whole-government commitment as well as adequate allocation of financial and human resources. This means that Japanese policy toward these states should be pursued with a greater selectivity (such as is done by the UK) as to which countries it works with based on Japan’s own comparative advantage in development aid (e.g. Japan-Vietnam policy dialogue on the country development plan). The leveraging for diplomatic initiatives in the area of peace-building through support of multilateral agencies (notably the UN-PBC), an arena in which there has been increasing Japanese government commitment, can supplement efforts to redefine a political stance on the agenda. Enhancing linkages between diplomacy and development for a peace-building agenda is one arena in which Japan can seek a way to enhance its response to fragile and conflict-affected countries. The Ambassador from Japan to the UN, Yukio Takasu (2008) notes Japan’s strength as a nonpermanent member country for SCPC as (1) its past experiences serving as a coordinating country (e.g. in Afghanistan and Timor Leste) and -role as a consensus-maker, (2) its commitment to promoting nonproliferation and disarmament, (3) its own experience with peace- and state-building, and (4) Japan’s holistic approach to security, namely the concept of human security. This once again highlights the need for the government, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to take a leading role in articulating an explicit Japanese development policy on the fragile states agenda, and hence to establish a focal point for Japan’s aid strategy on this issue. 68 References Boyce, JK (2003) Aid, Conditionality, and War Economies. University of Massachusetts Amherst Department of Economics Working Paper 2004-05. Cammack et al. (2006) Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice. Report submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency. March 2006. DFID (2005) Partnerships for poverty reduction: Rethinking conditionality. A UK policy paper. March 2005 ______(2008) Poverty Reduction Budget Support: A DFID policy paper Dwan R & Bailey L (2006) Liberia’s Governance and Economic M Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP): A joint review by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and the World Bank’s Fragile States Group. Gould and Ojanen (2003) ‘Merging in the Circle’: The Politicls of Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki. Policy Papers 2/2003. IMF(2002) Guidelines on Conditionality. September 25, 2002. Killick, T (2005) Policy Autonomy and the History of British Aid to Africa. Development Policy Review, 2005, 23 (6) pp665-681. Koeberle, et al ed.(2005) Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons. The World Bank. Lancaster (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago Press. Leader and Colenso (2005) Aid Instruments in Fragile States. PRDE Working Paper 5 – January 2005. National Audit Office (2008) Providing budget support to developing countries. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, ordered by the House of Commons. Feb 2008 Nissanke M, (2008) Donor-Recipient Relationships in the Aid effectiveness Debate. in Shimomura, Y (ed). Aid Relationships in Asia : Exploring Ownership in Japanese and Nordic Aid NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and International Peace Institute (IPI) (2008) Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission. OECD-DAC (2007) The Principles for Good International Engagement with Fragile States. Purcell, R et al. (2006) Evaluation of General Budget Support –Rwanda Country Report. A Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994-2004. 69 Oxford Policy Management (OPM) /the IDL Group (2008) Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Thematic Study – The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations. SPA (2005) Strategic Partnership with Africa: Survey of Budget Support, 2005. A Report for the SPA Budget Support Working Group http://www.spa-psa.org/resources/SPA7/2005%20BSWG%20Survey%20on%20Budget%20Supp ort.pdf Stanley Foundation (2007) A Real-World Approach to Democracy Promotion. Policy Dialogue Brief. Takasu, Y (2008) “Kokuren Anzen Hoshou Rijikai to Nihon no Yakuwari.” Presentation prepared for the Forum: “Nihon wa Ampori de Nani wo Subekika – Hijyouninnrijikoku no Ninennkan wo Kangaeru.” The Tokyo Foundation, Jan 13 2009. Tokyo. The Institute for State Effectiveness (2008) Recent Experiences in Linking Diplomatic Peacemaking with Development Efforts. Thornton N and Cox M (2005) Developing Poverty Reduction Strategies in Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), Agulhas Applied Knowledge, January 2005 Tobias D (2007) From “aid conditionality” to “engaging differently”: How the development discourse copes with state failure. Paper, prepared for the ISA Annual Convention 2007 in Chicago. USAID(1982) USAID Policy Paper: Approaches to the Policy Dialogue. Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, USAID. Washington, D.C. United Nations Development Group and World Band (2005) An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/TRM.pdf World Bank (2005) Review of World Bank Conditionality. Sep 2005 70 ╙ 4 ┨ ࠬ࠳ࡦ㧦ᐔߩቯ⌕ߣᓳ⥝ߩㅊ᳞ Chapter 4: Sudan: Persuit of Consolidation of Peace and Reconstruction FASID ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ਥછ ᷰㆺᕺሶ Keiko Watanabe (Program Officer, IDRI, FASID) <Abstract> Sudan is a post conflict country. After 22 years of conflict, the longest lasted civil war in Africa, the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A (Southern Sudan) has finally reached an agreement and signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. After four years of CPA, several achievements have been recognized, however, the implementation of CPA is now facing the serious instability factors including unresolved issue on demarcation of boarder between North and South, interrupted preparation for forthcoming election by the delay of census results. Furthermore, Darfur issue including ICC’s arrest warrant to the President shadows the future implementation of CPA. This paper examines the effective ways and approaches for international community to assist such post-conflict fragile states like Sudan in nation building and consolidation of peace. The paper first identifies the fragilities of Sudan by reviewing historical background and using index of fragile states. The underlining fragile factor includes the legacy of colonialism, concentration of resources by a handful elites, weak capacity of the government and governance, lack of human resources, devastated economic and social infrastructure, heavily dependence of oil resources, etc. The international community including Japan is making efforts to reduce these fragilities of Sudan, while the paper finds that China’s economic and political influence is becoming very considerable. Finally, this paper explores some implications for Japan to intervene in post conflict country for implementation of more effective ODA. 4-1 ߪߓߦ 2005 ᐕ 1 ޔ22 ᐕ㑆ߣ߁㐳ᦼߦࠎߛࠬ࠳ࡦߩධർߩ⚗ߦࠃ߁߿ߊ⚳ᱛ╓߇ᛂߚ ࠇ ࡦ ࠳ ࠬ ޔ ᐭ ߣ ࠬ ࠳ ࡦ ੱ ᳃ ⸃ ㆇ േ ⸃ ァ 㧔 SPLM/A 㧕 ߇ ޟ൮ ᐔ ว ᗧ 㧔Comprehensive Peace Agreement: CPA㧕⟑ߦޠฬߒߚ ߩߎࠆߌ߅ߦࡦ࠳ࠬޕ20 ᐕࠅߩ ౝᚢߪ†‶ޔ⠪ 200 ਁએޔ㔍᳃ 55 ਁੱޔ࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃㧔IDP㧕400 ਁੱ1ࠍߒߚߣࠊࠇޔ ධㇱ߿ධർ࿖Ⴚઃㄭߥߤ⋥ធᚢ᷵ߦߥߞߚၞߢߪ〝ޔ᳓ޔቇᩞ∛ޔ㒮ߥߤੱ㑆ߩో 㓚ࠍ⏕ߔࠆၮ␆⊛࠾࠭ࠍឭଏߔࠆ⚻ᷣ␠ળࠗࡦࡈ߇უṌ⊛ߥ⁁ᘒߣߥߞߚޕᣣᧄ ࠍߪߓ࿖㓙␠ળߪ CPA ⺞ශࠍᯏߦޔ4 ߦᡰេ࿖ળว㧔ࠝࠬࡠળว㧕ࠍ㐿ߒ࠳ࠬޔ 1 ࿖ㅪផቯ 71 ࡦ߳ߩᓳ⥝ᡰេ߇ᆎ߹ߞߡࠆޔߒ߆ߒޕ㐳ᐕߩ⚗ߦࠃࠅࠗࡦࡈਇ⿷ߩߺߥࠄߕޔ ᐭߩ⢻ജਇ⿷᧚ੱޔਇ⿷2ߥߤߦࠃࠅߩࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔ㗴ޔᐲᒝൻ᧚ੱޔ⢒ᚑߩ㗴ߥߤ ᷓೞߥ⺖㗴ߦ⋥㕙ߒߡࠆޕᐔวᗧᓟޟޔᮭജಽޟ߿ޠንߩಽߤߥޠਔ⠪ߢߩၮ␆ ⊛ߥᨒ⚵ߺߪᢛߞߚ߇ޔᐔวᗧᓟ 4 ᐕ߇⚻ߞߚߢ߽ᄙߊߩ࿖᳃߇ޟᐔߩ㈩ᒰࠍޠታ ᗵߔࠆ߹ߢߦߪ⥋ߞߡߥޕ ᧄⓂߢߪޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽ࡐࠬ࠻ࠦࡦࡈࠢ࠻࿖ߢࠆࠬ࠳ࡦࠍขࠅߍߩߘޔ⣀ ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽࠍࠄ߆ߦߒߚߢޟߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔ࿖ㅧࠅޟ߿ޠᐔߩቯ⌕ߦߚߩޠ࿖㓙␠ ળ߇ߤߩࠃ߁ߥࠍⴕߞߡߌ߫ࠃ߆ឭ⸒ߔࠆߎߣߢࠆߪࡦ࠳ࠬޕ߽⚗ਛ ߢࠆ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ၞࠍᛴ߃ޔ2009 ᐕߦ✚ㆬޔ2011 ᐕߦߪධㇱߩಽ㔌⁛┙ࠍ߁᳃ᛩ ࠍប߃ߡࠆᦨޕㄭߢߪ࿖㓙ೃⵙ್ᚲ㧔ICC㧕ࠃࠅࡃࠪ࡞ᄢ⛔㗔ߦኻߒߡ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ ⚗ߦ㑐ߔࠆᚢ‽⟋ߣੱߦ㑐ߔࠆ⟋ߢㅱ⁁߇ߐࠇߡ߅ࠅ3ߛ߹ޔධർߩႺ⇇ၞ ߢߩⴣ⓭߇㗫⊒ߔࠆߥߤޔᐔߩቯ⌕ߦߪ߹ߛᄙߊߩਇቯⷐ࿃ࠍౝ൮ߒߡࠆޕᐔߩ ቯ⌕ߦߪޔCPA ߩጁⴕ߳ߩਔᐭߩᒝࠦࡒ࠶࠻ࡔࡦ࠻߇ᔅⷐߢࠅࠍࠇߘޔᡰ߃ࠆ࿖㓙 ␠ળߩߩࠅᣇ߇ࠊࠇߡࠆޕ ᧄⓂߩࠕࡊࡠ࠴ߣߒߡߪޔᮮゲߢߪࠬ࠳ࡦߩᱧผ⊛ࡆࡘ❑ޔゲߢߪߩࠬ ࠳ࡦߩ࿖ኅߩ․ᓽࠍᢙ୯ൻߒߡ␜ߒߚ⹏ଔࠍวࠊߖߥ߇ࠄ⠨⸽ߔࠆޕੑᐲߦࠊߚࠆ㐳ᦼౝ ᚢࠍ➅ࠅߒߡߒߦ߁ࠃߩߤ߇ࡦ࠳ࠬޔߩ⁁ᴫߦߥߞߚߩ߆ޔᩮᷓ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ㗴 ߇ߤߎߦࠆߩ߆ࠍតࠆߚߦߪᱧผ⊛ߥࡆࡘ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆ࠶࡚ࠪࡊ࠶࠽ࠬޔߚ߹ޕ ࠻⊛߅ࠃ߮㒢ቯ⊛ߢߪࠆߦߖࠃ࿖ኅߩ․ᓽࠍᢙ୯ൻߒߡ␜ߒߡࠆ㌁ߩ࿖╷ᐲ ࠕࠬࡔࡦ࠻㧔CPIA㧕ޔBrooking Institute ߦࠃࠆޟ࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡ⹏ߩߤߥޠଔ߆ࠄࠬޔ ࠳ࡦߩߩ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽࠍᶋ߈ᓂࠅߦߔࠆ45ߩߘޕߢޔᣣᧄࠍ࿖㓙␠ળ߇ࠬ࠳ ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᤚᱜߔࠆߚߦߤߩࠃ߁ߥኻᔕࠍⴕߞߡࠆ߆ޟߩࡦ࠳ࠬߦ․ޔ࿖ㅧࠅޠ ࠍᡰេߒޔ࿖ߩࠠࡖࡄࠪ࠹ࠖࠍߍࠆߚߩេഥേะࠍⷰߔࠆޕ ᱞౝ㧔2008㧕߇ᜰ៰ߒߡࠆࠃ߁ߦޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽․ߦࠬ࠳ࡦߩࠃ߁ߥ⚗ᓟ࿖ ኅࠍᡰេߔࠆߢᦨ߽㊀ⷐߥߎߣߪޔౣ߮⚗⁁ᘒߦ㒱ࠄߖߥߎߣߢࠅޔᐢߊ࿖᳃߆ ࠄᡰᜬߐࠇࠆቯ⊛ߥ࿖ኅߦߔࠆߚߩᡰេ߇࿖㓙␠ળߦ᳞ࠄࠇߡࠆ߹ߪࡦ࠳ࠬޕ ߐߦ⚗ߦౣ߮㒱ࠆෂ㒾ࠍሺࠎߢࠆ࿖ߢࠅߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᤚᱜߐߖࠆ࿖㓙␠ળ ߩലߥߩᚻᲑ߇Ꮧ᳞ߐࠇߡࠆᧄޕⓂߢߪᦨᓟߦޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩലߥ ODA ߩࠕࡊ ࡠ࠴ࠍᬌ⸛ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔᣣᧄߩᓎഀߦߟߡ⠨ኤߒߚޕ 2 3 4 5 ධㇱᐭߪ CPA એ㒠ᱜᑼߥᐭߣߒߡ⊒ߒߚߚޔᓎᚲߩᣉ⸳߽ࡠ߆ࠄߩࠬ࠲࠻ߣߥߞߚޕ 2009 ᐕ 3 4 ᣣ⊒ޕ ࠬ࠳ࡦߪ㌁ߩ CPIA ᜰᮡߢߪ 2.5 ߢ৻⇟ࡦࠢ߇ૐ”Severe” Countries ߦಽ㘃ߐࠇ(2007)ޔᐔၮ ㊄ߦࠃࠆޟᄬᢌ࿖ኅޔߪߢࠣࡦࠠࡦޠ⇇ 2 㧔2008㧕ߩ⟎ࠍභࠆ ߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔઁߩߘޕUNDP ߢߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽”top”ߦᰴߋ”high”㧔ᡰេఝవ࿖ኅ㧕ߦಽ㘃ߐࠇޔDFID ߩ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠬ࠻ߦ߽ ߞߡࠆޕ ᓟㅀߔࠆ߇ߩࠄࠇߎޔᢙ୯ൻߐࠇߚ࿖ኅߩ⹏ଔ߳ߩᛕ್ߩਛߦޔᛒ߁࠺࠲ߩᐕߢ್ᢿߐࠇࠆߚߘޔ ࠇએ೨ߩᱧผ⊛ߥⷐ⚛߇ടߐࠇߥ⹏ߩࠇߙࠇߘޔଔߩ⋡⊛߇㆑߁ߚᜰᮡߦࠅ߇ࠆߥߤߩᜰ៰ ߽ࠆ߇ᦨߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔㄭߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᝒ߃ઁޔ࿖ߣᲧセߒߚ⋧ኻ⊛ߥ᭽⋧ࠍ␜ߒߡࠆ߽ߩߣߒߡല ߢࠆޕ 72 4-2 ࠬ࠳ࡦⷐ 㧔㧝㧕ℂੱญ ࠬ࠳ࡦߪࡉࠕޔߩᦨ┵ᦨߩࠞࡈࠕࠢ࠶ࡉޔർ┵ߦ⟎ߒࡈࠕߣࡉࠕޔ ࠞߩਔᣇߩᓇ㗀ࠍฃߌߡࠆࠞࡈࠕޕᄢ㒽ߦ߅ߡᦨᄢߩ࿖㕙Ⓧ⚂ 250 ঠࠍߒ 㧔ᣣᧄߩ⚂ 7 㧕ޔ࿖Ⴚߪ 9 ࠞ࿖㧔ࠛࠫࡊ࠻ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࠕ࠾ࠤޔࠕࡇࠝ࠴ࠛޔࠕ࠻ࠛޔ ࠳ࠧࡦࠦޔ᳃ޔਛᄩࠕࡈࠞࠕࡆޔ࠼ࡖ࠴ޔ㧕ߣធߒߡ߅ࠅޔቇ⊛ߦ߽ⶄ㔀ߥ⟎ 㑐ଥߦࠆޕ㚂ㇺࡂ࡞࠷ࡓߪ㕍࠽ࠗ࡞ߣ⊕࠽ࠗ࡞ߩวᵹὐߦࠅੱޔญߪ 3,860 ਁੱ 㧔2007㧕ߜ߁ޔධㇱߦߪߘߩ 1/3 ߦߚࠆ 1,100 ਁੱ߇ࠆߣផቯߐࠇߡࠆޔߪࡦ࠳ࠬޕ ࠕࡆࠕ⺆ߢޟ㤥ੱߩ࿖ࠍޠᗧߔࠆ߇ޔ᳃ᣖ⊛ߦߪੱญߩ⚂ 4 ಽߩ 3 ߇ࠕࡉ♽ޔ4 ಽߩ 㧝߇㤥ੱ♽ߢࠆ⚦ޔߒ߆ߒޕಽൻߔࠇ߫ޔ400 એߩ⇣ߥࠆ᳃ᣖ߇ሽߔࠆߣ⸒ࠊࠇ7ޔ ߘߩඨಽએߪ࿖ߩ 4 ಽߩ㧝ࠍභࠆධㇱߦዻߒߡࠆߥߤᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅࠍᒻᚑߒߡࠆ8ޕ 1956 ᐕߦ⁛┙ߒߡએ᧪ࡓࠬࠗޔᜰะࠍᒝߊᛂߜߒߚァᮭߦࠃࠆ࿖ౝᴦ߇ᡰ㈩ ߒߡ߅ࠅޔᮭജ߿ንߪᏱߦർߩࠕࡉੱࠛ࠻ߦ㓸ਛߒߡࠆޕ 㧔㧞㧕⚻ᷣ␠ળ⁁ᴫ㧔㧝ෳᾖ㧕 50 ਁ B/D ⷙᮨߩේᴤ↢↥ߣේᴤଔᩰߩߦࠃࠆ⍹ᴤࠍਥߥⷐ࿃ߣߒߡ⚻ޔᷣ ᚑ㐳߇⋡ⷡߒ ࠅߚੱ৻ޕGDP ߽ 790 ࠼࡞㧔2005㧕ޔ1,034 ࠼࡞(2006)ޔ1,257 ࠼࡞㧔2007㧕 ߣિ߮ߡ߅ࠅ⚻ޔᷣᚑ㐳₸ߪޔ6.3%(2005)ޔ11.3%(2006)ޔ10.5%(2007)ߣㄭᐕߢߪੑᩴᚑ㐳 ࠍ⸥㍳ߒߡࠆ৻ߩߘޕᣇޔᣇߦ߅ߡߪޔ᳓ޔ㔚᳇ޔஜක≮ޔㅢାޔㅢߥߤߩၮ ␆ࠗࡦࡈߩᢛ߇ⴕ߈ᷰߞߡ߅ࠄߕߦ․ޔධㇱߦ⥋ߞߡߪ 22 ᐕ㑆ߦ߱ౝᚢߩᓇ㗀ߢ߶ ߣࠎߤ⎕უߐࠇߚ߹߹ߩᣇ߽ᄙ⽺ޕ࿎ࠗࡦએਅߩੱญߪർㇱߢ 50-60%ޔධㇱߢߪ 90% ߣ⸒ࠊࠇߡࠆߥߤ⽺ޔ࿎߇⬧ᑧߒߡࠆ⚗ߦ․ޕⵍἴ߿ㄘߦ߅ߌࠆ⽺࿎⁁ᴫߪᖡ ߊޔㇺᏒߣㄘߣߩᩰᏅ߿ၞᩰᏅ߇ᄢ߈ޔߚ߹ޕ࿖ኅ੍▚ߩ⍹ᴤߦභࠆഀวߪޔ ർㇱߢߪ⚂ 60%ޔධㇱߦ߅ߡߪ 99%ߣ㕖Ᏹߦ⍹ᴤଐሽᐲ߇㜞ߊޔ⍹ᴤએᄖߩߩ ᵴ〝ࠍߔߎߣ߇ᕆോߣߥߞߡࠆ9ޕ ␠ળ㐿⊒⁁ᴫ߆ࠄ߽ၞᩰᏅ߇ᢙሼߦߥߞߡࠇߡࠆޕUNDP ߦࠃࠆੱ㑆㐿⊒ᜰᮡߪޔ 177 ߆࿖ਛ 141 (2008)ߣਅߦㄭߊ␠ޔળᜰᮡో⥸ߦ߅ߡૐ୯ߣߥߞߡࠆ࠳ߦ․ޕ ࡞ࡈ࡞ޔධㇱޔධർ࿖Ⴚઃㄭߦࠆ 3 ၞ㧔ධࠦ࡞࠼ࡈࠔࡦޔࠗࠛࡆࠕޔ㕍࠽ࠗ࡞㧕ޔ ᧲ㇱߥߤᚢⵍἴߦ߅ߌࠆஜޔᢎ⢒ᜰᮡߪ⇇ోߩਛߢ߽ૐᜰᮡ߇ᄙߊޔ㚂ㇺࡂ ࡞࠷ࡓㄝߣߩၞᩰᏅ߇ᱧὼߣߒߡࠆోࡦ࠳ࠬޔ߫߃ޕߩᐜఽᱫ₸㧔 ↢ 1,000 ੱߚࠅ㧕ޔ5 ᱦએਅᐜఽᱫ₸㧔↢ 1,000 ੱߚࠅ㧕ߪ ࠇߙࠇߘޔ89ޔ162 ߢޔ ࠨࡂએධࠕࡈࠞၞߩᐔဋ୯ 91ޔ162 ߣᲧߴࠆߣ߿߿ૐ⒟ᐲߢࠆ߇ޔධㇱၞߢ 6 7 8 9 Sudan at a glance, World Bank (24/09/08)ޕ2008 ᐕ 4 ోࡦ࠳ࠬޔࠍኻ⽎ߣߒߚೋߡߩੱญ⺞ᩏ ߇ታᣉߐࠇߚ߇⚿ޔᨐߪ 2009 ᐕ 3 10 ᣣ߹ߛ⊒ߐࠇߡߥޕ ᩙᧄ Johnson (2004) 2007 ᐕ੍▚ޕർㇱᐭߩᱦߪ 89 ం࠼࡞ޔධㇱᐭߪ 14 ం࠼࡞ޕ 73 ߩᜰᮡߪ 150ޔ250 ߣᷓೞߥ⁁ᴫߦࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆߦ․ޕᅧ↥ᇚᱫ₸ߪోࡦ࠳ࠬޔ ߢ߽ 1,107 ੱ㧔10 ਁੱ↢ߚࠅ㧕ޔർㇱᐔဋߢ 509 ੱޔධㇱߢߪ⇇ᦨૐߩ 2,030 ੱߣߥ ߞߡࠆޔߚ߹ޕೋ╬ᢎ⢒ߦ߅ߌࠆ⚐ዞቇ₸ߪోࡦ࠳ࠬޔߢ↵ሶ 50%ޔᅚሶ 42%ߣૐ ߊߦࠄߐޔㆆ’᳃ᣖߢߪ 29.2%ޔධㇱߢߪߎࠇ߽⇇ᦨૐࡌ࡞ߩ 20%ߣផቯߐࠇޔ᳃ᣖ߿ ၞߦࠃࠆᩰᏅ߇ࠄࠇࠆޕోߥ᳓߅ࠃ߮ⴡ↢ᣉ⸳߳ߩࠕࠢࠬ߳ߩᜰᮡ߽ᖡߊޔၮ␆ ࠨࡆࠬㇱ㐷ߩᢛ߇ਇචಽߢࠅޔ࿖ㅪࡒ࠾ࠕࡓ⋡ᮡ㧔MDGs㧕ߩߤߩᜰᮡࠍߺߡ߽ 2015 ᐕ߹ߢߦ㆐ᚑߢ߈ࠆㄟߺߪߥ⁁ᴫߢࠆޕ 㧝㧦 ਥߥ⚻ᷣ␠ળᜰᮡ ৻⥸ᜰᮡ ੱญ 㕙Ⓧ ⽺࿎ࠗࡦએਅߩੱญᲧ ᐔဋ ⚻ᷣᜰᮡ GDP ৻ੱᒰߚࠅ GDP ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳₸ ࠗࡦࡈ₸ ⾏ᤃ㗵⾏ᤃຠ⋡ 㧔2006 ᐕ㧕 ὑᦧ࠻ ᄬᬺ₸ ⽶ௌ㧔GDP Ყ㧕 ␠ળᜰᮡ ᐜఽᱫ₸㧔IMR㧕 (2006) ᅧ↥ᇚᱫ₸㧔MMR㧕 (2006) HIV ᗵᨴ₸ ✚ዞቇ₸㧔GER㧕 (2000-2004) ⚐ዞቇ₸㧔NER㧕 ᚑੱ⼂ሼ₸(15 ᱦએ) ోߥ᳓߳ߩࠕࠢࠬ ⴡ↢ᣉ⸳߳ߩࠕࠢࠬ 3,860 ਁੱ㧔ᣣᧄߩ⚂ 27%㧕ޔ ർㇱ 600 ਁੱ(ផቯ)ޔධㇱ 1,100 ਁੱ(ផቯ)ੱ ޔญჇട₸ 2.0㧔00-06) 250 ਁঠ(ᣣᧄߩ⚂ 7 ) 50-60%ޔධㇱ 90%એ㧔ផቯ㧕 56.5 ᱦ(2004) 216.85 ం࠼࡞(2004)ޔ279.04 ం࠼࡞㧔2005㧕ޔ374.42 ం࠼࡞㧔2006㧕ޔ 467.08 ం࠼࡞(2007 ផቯ) 629 ࠼࡞㧔2004㧕ޔ790 ࠼࡞㧔2005㧕ޔ1,034 ࠼࡞㧔2006㧕ޔ1,257 ࠼ ࡞㧔2007 ផቯ㧕 6.3%(2005)ޔ11.3%(2006)ޔ10.5%(2007) 8.5%(2005)ޔ7.2%(2006)ޔ8.0%(2007) 㧔㧝㧕 ャ 57 ం࠼࡞㧦 ේᴤ㧛⍹ᴤຠ(90%)ޔ߹ߏޔ㘩⡺✎ޔ ⧎ࡓࠧࠕࡆࠕޔ㧔ኻᣣャ㧦5.2 ం࠼࡞(2006) ╙ 2 㧕 㧔㧞㧕 ャ 81 ం࠼࡞㧦 ᯏ᪾ޔㅧ‛ޔㅢゞਔ㧔ኻᣣャ㧦5.4 ం࠼࡞ ╙ 5 㧕 㧔㧟㧕 ਥⷐ⾏ᤃ࿖㧦ਛ࿖࠼ࡦࠗޔࠕࡆࠕࠫ࠙ࠨޔ 1 ☨࠼࡞㧩2.3 ࠬ࠳ࡦࡐࡦ࠼㧔2009 ᐕ 3 㧕 17%㧔2006 ផቯ㧕 113.0%(2005)ޔ80.0%(2006) 89 ੱ 㧔↢ 1,000 ੱߚࠅ㧕 1,107 ੱ㧔ో㧕ޔർㇱ 509ޔධㇱ 2,030㧔↥ 10 ਁੱߚࠅ㧕 1.6 (2002) 59.6%(ో)ޔർㇱ 62㧑(↵ሶ 73%ޔᅚሶ 57%)ޔධㇱ 22-23%㧔ᅚሶߪ ↵ሶߩ 1/3㧕 43% (2004) 60.9% (2004) 59.3%(ో)ޔ78%㧔ㇺᏒ㧕ޔ64%(ㄘ) 31.2%(ో)ޔ50%(ㇺᏒ)ޔ24%(ㄘ) (ᚲ) Sudan at a glance, WB (28 September 2008), Sudan Health Household Survey (SHHS) (2006)ޔHuman Development Report 2006, UNDP, World Economic Outlook, IMF (Apr 2008), Bank of Sudan (http://www.bankofsudan.org/ ) 74 㧔㧟㧕ౝᚢߩ᭽⋧ ⁛┙એ᧪ࠬ࠳ࡦߪ㧞ᐲߦਗ਼ࠆ㐳ᦼߩ⚗ࠍ➅ࠅߒߡ߅ࠅ10ⶄߩߘޔ㔀ߥⷐ࿃߆ࠄࠬ ࠳ࡦߩ⚗ߪ⸃࿎㔍ߢࠆߣ⸒ࠊࠇߡ߈ߚߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔߚ߹ޕౝᚢߪޔ࿑㧝ߦ␜ߒߚࠃ ߁ߦධർߩ⚗ߛߌߢߪߥߊ᧲ޔㇱߦ߅ߌࠆ⚗ޔㇱ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ߦ߅ߌࠆ⚗ߣⶄᢙߩ ⚗߇ᷙߒߡߚޕ2005 ᐕߦධർ⚗ߦ⚳ᱛ╓߇ᛂߚࠇࠆߣޔCPA ߩขࠅ⚵ߺߪࠬ࠳ ࡦ࿖ౝߩઁߩၞ߳ߩᐔ߳ߩ␆ߣߥࠅޔ2006 ᐕ 5 ߦߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ᐔวᗧ㧔DPA㧕11ޔ 2006 ᐕ 10 ߦߪ᧲ㇱᐔวᗧ㧔ESPA)߇ߘࠇߙࠇ⚿߫ࠇߚޕ ධർߩౝᚢߩⷐ࿃ߪޔၮᧄ⊛ߦർㇱߩ৻ីࠅߩࠛ࠻ߦࠃࠆධㇱߩ㕖ࠗࠬࡓᢎ߆ ߟ㕖ࠕࡉ᳃ߦኻߔࠆ⚻ᷣ⊛ޔᴦ⊛߅ࠃ߮␠ળ⊛ᡰ㈩߇ේ࿃ߩ৻ߟߢࠆߣߐࠇߡ ࠆޔߒ߆ߒޕᢙ⎇ࡦ࠳ࠬߩޘⓥ⠪߇ᜰ៰ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦޔධർ⚗ߩⷐ࿃ߪޟർߩࠕࡉੱޠ ኻޟධߩ㕖ࠕࡉߩࠕࡈࠞੱࡓࠬࠗޟޔޠᢎኻࠠࠬ࠻ᢎޟޔޠ㤥ੱኻ㕖㤥ੱߣޠ ߞߚੑర⺰ߢߪ⺆ࠇߥⶄ㔀ߥⷐ⚛߇ౝ࿃ߒߡࠆ12ߩࡦ࠳ࠬޕ᳃ᣖߪ 400 એߦ߽ ಽߐࠇࠆߣ߁߶ߤᄙ᳃ᣖߢࠅޔ᳃ᣖ߿⸒⺆᭴ᚑ߆ࠄߺߡ߽ޔධർߩ㑐ଥߪޔනߦᢥൻ ߿᳃ᣖߩኻ┙ߣ߁ߎߣߪ⸒߃ߥޕJohnson㧔2004㧕߇ᜰ៰ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦ⚗ޔߩⷐ࿃ߪޔ ቬᢎޔ᳃ᣖߦኻߔࠆ⚻ޔᷣ៦ขޔᬀ᳃ᡰ㈩ߣࡐࠬ࠻ᬀ᳃ߦ߅ߌࠆߥߤේ࿃ߪ ⶄᢙࠆߣߐࠇ㧔Root Causes ߣⶄᢙᒻߢᮡ⸥㧕ⷐߩࠄࠇߎޔ࿃߇ⶄ㔀ߦ⛊ߺวߞߡࠆޕ ৻ᣇޔᩙᧄ㧔2005㧕ߪޟޔቬᢎޔ᳃ᣖੱ⒳⊛ኻ┙ߣ߁ⷐ࿃ߪౝᚢߩේ࿃ߢߪߥߊޔౝ ᚢߩㆊ⒟ߢߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ┙႐ߩᒰ⠪ߦࠃߞߡᠲ↪ߐࠇࠆࠪࡦࡏ࡞ߢࠆߣ⠨߃ߚ߶ ߁߇ㆡಾߢࠆޠ13ߣߩ⸃ࠍ␜ߒߡࠆ߽ߢ߆ߥޕᓟㅀߔࠆ 1920 ᐕઍߩ⧷࿖ᬀ᳃ᐭ ߇ߣߞߚޟධㇱ╷ࠆࠃߦޠၞಽᢿ╷ߩᓇ㗀߇᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ␠ળਇᐔ╬߿ᩰᏅࠍ↢ߺߒ ߚߣ⸒߃ࠆ⚗ߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔߦ߁ࠃߩߎޕߩේ࿃ࠍℂ⸃ߔࠆߦߪߡߒߦ߁ࠃߩߤޔၞ⊛ ߥᩰᏅ߇ᄢߒޔ᳃ᣖ߅ࠃ߮ᢥൻ⊛ߥኻ┙ࠍ↢ߺߥ߇ࠄߩࠬ࠳ࡦ߇ࠆߩ߆ߕ߹ޔ 50 ᐕߦ߅ࠃ߱⚗ߩᱧผࠍℂ⸃ߔࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆޕ ╙৻ᰴౝᚢߪ 1955 ᐕ߆ࠄ 17 ᐕ㑆߽⛯߈╙ޔੑᰴౝᚢ߹ߢߩ 9 ᐕ㑆ߒ߆ᐔߥᤨᦼ߇ߥ߆ߞߚޕ ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ᐔวᗧߦ㑐ߒߡߪޔᐭജߩ৻ㇱ߇⟑ฬߒߚߩߺߢታലᕈ߇ߥߊޔߢ߽⚗ߪ⛯ ߈࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ၞߩੱ⁁ᴫߪᡷༀ߇ࠄࠇߡߥޕ 12 ߃߫ Johnson(2004)ޔᩙᧄ(1998, 2005)ޔIyob(2006)ߥߤߦߒޕ 13 ᩙᧄ(2005) ᶏᄖᖱ ᐔᚑ 17 ᐕ(2005)4 ภ 10 11 75 ࿑㧝㧦 ࠬ࠳ࡦߩⶄᢙߩౝᚢ Darfur Conflict Reconstruction East Conflict 䅃Actor䋺Gov䇮Anti Gov 䋨JEM, SLA/M) 䅃Actor: Gov Vs Eastern Front 䅃Period䋺2003-present 䅃Period: 2005-2006 䅃Peace Agreement :DPA (May 2006) (ineffective, though) 䅃Peace Agreement: ESPA (Oct 2006) Emergency/ Humanitarian Asst North-South Conflict 䅃Actor: Gov Vs SPLM/A 䅃Period: 1983-2005 䅃Peace Agreement: CPA (Jan 2005) Early Recovery/ Reconstruction ᚲ㧦╩⠪ᚑ 4-3 ࿑㧔UN㧕 ࠬ࠳ࡦߩౝᚢߩᱧผߣߘߩⷐ࿃ 㧔㧝㧕ࠝࠬࡑࡦ࠻࡞ࠦᤨઍ 1821 ᐕߩࠛࠫࡊ࠻ߦࠃࠆଚએ೨ߩᱧผߪ߹ࠅᦠ߆ࠇߚ߽ߩߪߥ߇࡞ࠗ࠽ޔᎹߦᴪ ߞߚࡆࠕੱߩዊߐߥ₺࿖ߩ㓸߹ࠅߢߞߚߣߐࠇࠆޕߩࠬ࠳ࡦߦߚࠆၞ߇㗔 ၞߣߒߡߩ߹ߣ߹ࠅࠍߥߔࠃ߁ߦߥߞߚߩߪࠆࠃߦ࠻ࡊࠫࠛޔᡰ㈩ߩ߽ߣߢࠆࡊࠫࠛޕ ࠻ߪᒰᤨࠝࠬࡑࡦ࠻࡞ࠦᏢ࿖ߩᡰ㈩ਅߦߞߚ߇ޔㄭઍ࿖ኅᑪ⸳ࠍߑߔࠛࠫࡊ࠻ߪᅛ 㓮⽎ޔޔ㊄ߥߤߩ⽷Ḯ߿⾗Ḯߩଏ⛎ࠍ᳞ࠬ࠳ࡦ߳ߩଚࠍⴕߞߚߪ࠻ࡊࠫࠛޕർㇱ ࠍᡰ㈩ߒߡߚࡈࡦࠫ₺࿖㧔1504 ᐕ㨪㧕ޔㇱߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞₺࿖㧔17 ♿㨪㧕ࠍ߽ߒޔ ߘߒߡᓢ߇⺆ࠕࡆࠕ߿ࡓࠬࠗߦޘᶐㅘߒߡߥ߆ߞߚධㇱ╬ߩၞ߽ᓕ૬วߒ 㗔ࠍᄢߒߡߞߚޕ 㧔㧞㧕ߩޠࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޟ ࠛࠫࡊ࠻ߦࠃࠆࠬ࠳ࡦ⛔ᴦߪ⚂ 60 ᐕ㑆⛯ߊ߇ޔ1880 ᐕઍߦߥࠆߣޔർㇱࠬ࠳ࡦߢ⡛ ⡯⠪ߢߞߚࡕࡂࡔ࠶࠼ࠕࡈࡑ࠶࠼߇ߦዉ߆ࠇߚ⠪ޠࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޟ㧔ࠗࠬࡓᢎߩ ᢇਥ㧕ߣ⥄ࠄฬਸ਼ࠅޟޔ⡛ᚢߡߒߣޠࠛࠫࡊ࠻ㆇേࠍߎߔࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޕㆇേߪࠛࠫ ࡊ࠻ᡰ㈩ߦਇḩࠍᜬߟ᳃ⴐ߆ࠄߩᄢ߈ߥᡰᜬࠍᓧࡦ࠳ࠬޔർㇱޔਛᄩㇱޔㇱߩㇱᣖࠍ ⛔৻ޔ1885 ᐕߦߪߟߦ✚〈ߣߒߡછߒߡߚࠗࠡࠬੱߩࠧ࠼ࡦ✚〈ࠍࡂ࡞࠷ࡓ ߢ㒱⪭ߒࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޟޔ࿖ኅ߇ޠ᮸┙ߐࠇߚࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޕ࿖ኅߪ 13 ᐕ㑆⛯ߊ߇ޔ1898 ᐕޔ 76 ᐲߪࠗࠡࠬߩଚ⇛ߦࠃࠅṌ߷ߐࠇࠆࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޕㆇേߪᄖ࿖ᡰ㈩ߦኻߔࠆ᳃ⴐ߆ࠄߩ 㑵ߦࠃࠅ⁛┙࿖ኅࠍൎߜขࠅޔ13 ᐕ㑆ߦਗ਼ࠅ⁛ജߢ࿖ኅࠍ⛽ᜬߒߡߞߚߣ߁ᗧߢ ㄭઍผᵈ⋡ߐࠇߡࠆㆇേߢࠆߩߘޕᓟࠬ࠳ࡦߪ࠻ࡊࠫࠛ⧷ޟห⛔ᴦޠਅߦ⟎ ߆ࠇࠆ߇ޔᒰᤨࠛࠫࡊ࠻⥄߇⧷࿖⛔ᴦਅߦ⟎߆ࠇߡߚߚ⧷ޔ࿖ߦࠃࠆ╷ߩᣉⴕޔ ᐭ㜞ቭߦߪ⧷࿖ੱࠍ㈩⟎ߒߚޕධㇱߦߚࠛࠫࡊ࠻ァ߿ࠛࠫࡊ࠻ੱߩⴕቭࠍ࿖ᄖㅌ ߐߖࠆ㧔1924 ᐕ㧕ߥߤߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔታ⾰⧷࿖ᬀ᳃ᡰ㈩ߣߥߞߚޕ 㧔㧟㧕ᬀ᳃⛔ᴦߩ╷㧦ධㇱ╷ߩዉ㧔Divide and Rule:ಽഀ⛔ᴦ㧕 ⧷࿖ߦࠃࠆᬀ᳃ᐭ14߇ណߞߚ․ᓽ⊛ߥᣉ╷ߪޟDivide and Ruleߣޠ߫ࠇࠆಽഀ⛔ᴦ ╷ࠍၫࠆ⧷ޕ࿖ߪઁߩࠕࡈࠞᬀ᳃ߦ߅ߡ߽ߎߩ╷ࠍ↪ޔવ⛔⊛ߥ᳃ᣖߩ⚵❱ 㧔㈧㐳ߥߤ㧕߿ᘠ⠌ࠍᵴ↪ߒߡߚߎߣ߆ࠄޔർㇱߩࠗࠬࡓ␠ળߣධㇱߩㇱᣖ⊛ߥ ␠ળࠍಾࠅ㔌ߒߡ⛔ᴦߔࠆ╷ࠍⴕߞߚޕർㇱߩࠗࠬࡓߦኻߒߡߪⓍᭂ⊛ߥ⼔╷ ࠍߣࠅ࠻ࠬࠠޔᢎߩᏓᢎ࿅ߩᵴേߦߪ㒢ࠍട߃ࠆߥߤߒߚ৻ޕᣇޔධㇱߦኻߒߡߪޔ ධㇱߩᧂޟ㐿⻉ߥޠㇱᣖߦኻߒߡ⁛⥄ߩᢥൻࠍ⼔ߒࠃ߁ߣߔࠆޟධㇱ╷ࠍޠᛂߜߒ ߚ15ౕޕ⊛ߦߪޔධർߘࠇߙࠇⴕߩޘߣมᴺޔർㇱߣධㇱߩੱߩ⒖േߩ㒢16↪ޔ ⺆ࠍർㇱߪࠕࡆࠕ⺆ޔධㇱߪ⧷⺆ޔධㇱߪᣣᦐᣣࠍભᣣߦߔࠆߥߤޔධർߪ߶ߣࠎߤ㆑ ߁࿖ߣߒߡ⛔ᴦ߇ⴕࠊࠇߚޕ ․ߦߎߩධㇱ╷ߢ․ᓽ⊛ߥߩߪᢎ⢒ᐲߢࠆޕධㇱߩੱߦኻߒߡߪᢎ⢒ߩ㔛ⷐ߇ߥ ߊਛ╬ᢎ⢒એߩᢎ⢒ߪᔅⷐߥߒߣߩ߆ࠄޔೋ╬ᢎ⢒ߪਥⷐ᳃ᣖ⸒⺆ߢᢎ߃ޔᏓᢎ࿅ ࠍⓍᭂ⊛ߦฃߌࠇࠆߥߤߢኻಣߒޔ㜞╬ᢎ⢒ߩᢛࠍ߶ߣࠎߤⴕࠊߥ߆ߞߚ17ߦࠄߐޕ ධㇱߩㆆ’᳃߿ࠕࠢࠬ߇ᖡၞߥߤߢߪೋ╬ᢎ⢒ߩᯏળ߽㒢ࠄࠇࠆߥߤޔධㇱߩਛߢ ߽ㇱᣖߦࠃࠅᢎ⢒ߩᏅ߇ࠆࠃ߁ߥࠅޔᢎ⢒ࠍฃߌߡߥㇱᣖࠍޟᓟㅴ⊛ޟޔޠવ⛔⊛ޠ ߢࠆߣߩ࠶࠹࡞߇⾍ࠄࠇ⚿ߩߘޔᨐޔ㊀ⷐߥ╷ቯߦࠇߥㇱᣖ߇ࠆࠃ߁ߦߥ ߞߚߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕධㇱߩ᳃ᣖ㑆ߩᩰᏅߪᣣߩධㇱᴦߦ߽ᓇ㗀ࠍ߷ߒߡࠆޕ ⚻ᷣ߿㐿⊒ᵴേߦ߅ߡ߽ޔർㇱߢߪᬀ᳃ᐭߢࠆ⧷࿖ߩ㔛ⷐߦᔕ߃ࠆߚࠕޔ ࡆࠕࠟࡓߤߥ⧎✎ޔャ↪ߣߒߡ৻ᰴ↥ຠߩ㐿⊒߇ㅴߺߣࡓࠠࠬࠫࠥޔ߫ࠇࠆᄢ ⷙᮨἠṴ㧔✎⧎㧕㐿⊒߿㋕ᢛ߇ㅴࠎߛ৻ᣇ18ޔධㇱ╷ߪධㇱߩ⚻ᷣ㐿⊒ࠍ⋡⊛ߣߔࠆ 1898 ᐕࠃࠅ⧷ࠛࠫࡊ࠻ห⛔ᴦ߇ᆎ߹ࠆ߇ޔㇱߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ၞޔධㇱߢߪ࠺ࠖࡦࠞߤߥ࡞ࠛޔ ⻉᳃ᣖߩᱞജᛶ᛫߇⛯߈ోࡦ࠳ࠬޔߣߒߡᬀ᳃⛔ᴦߐࠇࠆ߹ߢߦታ㓙ߪ⚂ 30 ᐕࠍⷐߒߡࠆޕ 15 ⢛᥊ߦߪධㇱߪߡߒߣޠࠞࡈࠕޟߊߥߪߢޠࡉࠕޟ㐿⊒ߒ⧷ޔ࿖㗔ߢߞߚ᧲ࠕࡈࠞ߳ߩ૬ว߽ ㄟࠎߢߚߣ߽ߐࠇࠆޕGadir Ali et al. (2005) 16 ർㇱੱߩධㇱ߳ߩ⒖േ߿ධർߩႺ⇇ᴪߩવ⛔⊛ߥ␠ળ߇ሽߒߚࡃጊ߳ߩ⥄↱ߥ⒖േࠍᱛ 17 ᢎ⢒ߦࠃࠆ⣕ㇱᣖൻߩ⧯⠪߿ᬀ᳃ᐭ߳ߩኻㆇേߩෂ㒾ࠍ⠨ᘦߒޔේ᳃ߦࠃࠆⴕࠍᜂ߁ਅ⚖ߩ ോቭࠍ↥ߔࠇ߫ࠃߩߣޔ⠨߃߇ᩮᧄߦߞߚߪࠇߎޕએ೨ࠬ࠳ࡦ߆ࠄߩᅛ㓮߇ධㇱ߿ࡃり ߢࠅޔධㇱߩੱߦޘኻߔࠆ߇ࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆߚ߹ޕೋ╬ᢎ⢒ߢ߁ਥⷐ᳃ᣖ⸒⺆߇ㆬ߫ࠇߚ߇ޔ ߘߩ⚿ᨐㆬ߫ࠇߚ⸒⺆ߩ᳃ᣖߪධㇱࠬ࠳ࡦߩᴦࠍᜂ߁㓸࿅ߣߒߡߩࠍ₪ᓧߒߩઁޔ᳃ᣖ㓸࿅ߣ ߩᩰᏅࠍ↢⚿ᨐߣ߽ߥߞߚޕ 18 ߎߩࠃ߁ߥᤃߢንࠍᓧߚߩߪࠡࠪࡖߩࠕ࠾ࡔ࡞ࠕޔࡦࡁࡃޔࠕࠪޔੱߢࠆ߇ߩߘޔਛߦߪ ർㇱࠬ࠳ࡦߩੱ߽߹ࠇߚޕධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆᤃߪ㒢ࠍฃߌߡߚߚޔධㇱߩᤃߪߎࠇࠄߩᄖ ࿖ੱ߹ߚߪࠬ࠳ࡦർㇱߩੱߦីࠄࠇߚޕ 14 77 ߎߣߪ⸒ߐࠇߡߥ߆ߞߚ19ޕධㇱߦߪታ⾰⊛ߥ⚻ᷣ㐿⊒ᵴേߪⴕࠊࠇߕޔ㐿⊒ߩᩰᏅߪ ߹ߔ߹ߔᐢ߇ߞߡߞߚޔߒ߆ߒޕർㇱߦ߅ߡ߽㐿⊒ߪࡂ࡞࠷ࡓㄝ߿એ೨߆ࠄ㐿⊒ ߇ㅴࠎߢߚၞ߳ᛩ⾗߇ਛᔃߣߥࠅޔർㇱߩਛߢߩၞᩰᏅ߇ᄢߔࠆߥߤ৻ីࠅߩࠛ ࠻߇ᡰ㈩ߒޔਥⷐㇺᏒߩߺࠍ㐿⊒ߒߡߊߣ߁ో⊛ߦᱡࠎߛ⚻ᷣ᭴ㅧ߇⏕┙ߒߡ ߞߚޕ ධㇱ╷ߩ⢛᥊ߦߪޔේ᳃ߦࠃࠆⴕ㧔Native Administration㧕ࠍଦㅴߒޔർㇱߩࠕࡉ ੱߦࠃࠆࡉࠕޟൻߩޠᓇ㗀߿ࠗࠬࡓߩᓇ㗀߆ࠄධㇱࠍ⼔ߔࠆߎߣߦߞߚ߇ޔ ᬀ᳃╷߇߽ߚࠄߒߚ߽ߩߪޔධർߩᢎ⢒ߩᩰᏅߛߌߢߪߥߊޔධㇱߩਛߢߩ᳃ᣖኻ┙ޔ ߘߒߡᱡࠎߛ⚻ᷣ᭴ㅧࠍ↢ߺߒޔධർߩ⚻ᷣᩰᏅࠍᄢߐߖߡߞߚޕ ߎߩࠃ߁ߦࠍ┙⁛߇ࡦ࠳ࠬޔᨐߚߔ೨ߦߔߢߦᢎ⢒⚻ޔᷣ㐿⊒ޔᐭ߿ⴕ߳ߩෳട ߩᐲวߢධർߩᩰᏅ߇ߢ߈߇ߞߡߚޔߪߦࠄߐޕධㇱౝ߅ࠃ߮ർㇱౝߢߩၞᩰᏅ ߇ᄢߒߚߎߣ߇᭴ㅧ⊛ߥᩰᏅࠍᐢߍߚේ࿃ߣߥߞߡࠆߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕᬀ᳃ᡰ㈩ߩ⽶ߩ ㆮ↥ߣ߽⸒߃ࠆ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ㗴ߦࠃࠅޔർㇱߩ৻ㇱߩࠛ࠻߇ን߿ᮭജࠍᡰ㈩ߔࠆߎߣߦ ߥࠅޔධㇱߩੱ߇ޘ࿖ኅᑪ⸳ߩㆊ⒟ߦෳടߔࠆࠍߥߊߒߡߚޕ 㧔㧠㧕ࠬ࠳ࡦߩ⁛┙ߣ╙৻ᰴౝᚢߩഺ⊒ ࠬ࠳ࡦߪ 1956 ᐕߦ⁛┙ࠍᨐߚߔ߇ࡦ࠳ࠬޔ࿖ౝߢߩㅢߩℂ⸃ߩਅߢⴕࠊࠇߚ߽ߩ ߢߪߥ߆ߞߚߦ․ޕධㇱߢߪޔධㇱಽ㔌⁛┙߿᧲ࠕࡈࠞ(ࠤ࠾ࠕߩ߳)࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ૬วߥߤ ߩ⼏⺰߽ߞߚਛߢߪ┙⁛ޔർㇱߩਥዉᮭߩਅߢⴕࠊࠇߚ20┙⁛ޕᓟ⧷ޔ࿖ੱ߇භߡߚ ධㇱߩ㊀ⷐࡐࠬ࠻㧔ᐭߩᓎ⡯⼊ޔኤቭޔᐭᚲ▤ߩቇᩞᢎຬߥߤ㧕ߪޔᢎ⢒ߩᏅߥߤ߆ ࠄർㇱࠬ࠳ࡦੱߦขߞߡઍࠊࠇߚޕౝㇱߩ⼏ຬㆬߦ߅ߡ߽ޔ࿖ోߣߒߡᄙᢙࠍභ ࠆർㇱᮭ߇ධㇱߩജࡐࠬ࠻ࠍභࠆߎߣߣߥࠅޔධㇱߦߣߞߡ⁛┙ߪ⧷ޔ࿖ᡰ㈩߆ ࠄർㇱࠬ࠳ࡦᡰ㈩ߦઍࠊߞߚߛߌߢࠅޔታ⾰ޟർㇱߦࠃࠆᬀ᳃ൻߩޠᆎ߹ࠅߣߥߞ ߚޕ ߎߩࠃ߁ߥർㇱੱ߇ୟߔࠆࡦ࠳ࠬޟൻࠅࠃߦࠬࡠࡊߩޠෂᯏᗵߣਇḩࠍᜬߞߚධ ㇱߩ჻ߚߜ߇ ߩ┙⁛ޔ1 ᐕ೨ޔ1955 ᐕߦ࠻࠶࠻ߦߡੂࠍߎߒߚߩ߇ࠬ࠳ࡦߩౝ ᚢߩᆎ߹ࠅߣߐࠇࠆޕੂߪߔߋߦ㎾㕒ൻߐࠇߚ߇ߩߎޔੂ߇߈ߞ߆ߌߣߥࠅޔᒰᤨർ ㇱァᮭ߇ㅴߡߚࠕࡉൻࡓࠬࠗޔൻߦኻߒޔධㇱߩಽ㔌⁛┙ࠍ⋡ᜰߔࠕޟ ࠾ࡖ࠾ࡖޠ㧔ⰬߩᲥ㧕ߣ߫ࠇࠆࠥㆇേ߇ᵴ⊒ൻߒౝᚢ߳ߣ⊒ዷߔࠆޕౝᚢߪධㇱో ߦᐢ߇ࠅ㐳ᦼൻߒߚޕ 1969 ᐕߦァࠢ࠺࠲ߢᮭࠍីߒߚࡔࠗᮭߪޔ1972 ᐕߦධㇱߣߩࠬࠖ࠺ࠕޟ ࠕࡌࡃදቯ ߮⚿ࠍޠ17 ᐕ㑆⛯ߚ╙৻ᰴౝᚢࠍ⚳⚿ߐߖࠆߣหᤨߦޔኻᄖ⊛ߦ߽ߎࠇ߹ߢ ߩᐭ⚵❱ࠍᡰេߒ㑐ଥ߇ᖡൻߒߡߚㄭ㓞࿖ߩࠛ࠴ࠝࡇࠕ߿࠙ࠟࡦ࠳ߣޔᐭ ߳ߩᡰេࠍᱛࠆදቯࠍ⚿߱ߥߤ㑐ଥߩౣ᭴▽ࠍ࿑ߞߚޕ 19 20 Gadir Ali et al (2005) ࠬ࠳ࡦ⁛┙ߪ᳃ᣖਥ⟵⊛ߥേᯏߦࠃࠆ↥‛ߣ߁ࠃࠅ߽ޔᬀ᳃ᐭߢߞߚ⧷࿖ߣࠛࠫࡊ࠻ਔ࿖ߩ ᄖ⊛ߥᓇ㗀߇ᒝߣᜰ៰ߔࠆ(Johnson (2004), ᩙᧄ(1998))ޕ 78 ࠕ࠺ࠖࠬࠕࡌࡃදቯߩ․ᓽߪޔධㇱߩޟᣇ⥄ᴦޔࠍޠධㇱߪೋߡ⥄ಽߚߜߩ ᐭߣߒߡߩޟධㇱᣇᐭࠍޠᚑ┙ߐߖߚߎߣߢࠆ21ޕᐔวᗧᓟߪޔධㇱߪർㇱߩࡔ ࠗᮭߦኻߒౝᚢߢ∋ᑷߒߚၞߩ㐿⊒ଦㅴߦᦼᓙࠍነߖߚ߇ᦼߩߘޔᓙߪⵣಾࠄࠇࠆ ߎߣߦߥࠅ╙ߡߒߘޔੑᰴౝᚢ߳ߣ⊒ዷߒߡߊߎߣߣߥߞߚޕ 㧔㧡㧕╙ੑᰴౝᚢ߳ߩㆊ⒟ߣⷐ࿃ Ԙ ࠗࠬࡓൻߩᵄߣ SPLM/A ߩ⊒⿷ ࡔࠗᮭߪࡃࡌࠕࠬࠖ࠺ࠕޔදቯߢධㇱߩ⥄ᴦࠍࠆߎߣߢޔධㇱ߆ࠄߩᡰᜬࠍ ₪ᓧߒߡߚ߇ޔධㇱߩࡌࡦ࠹ࠖ࠙ߢ 1978 ᐕߦ⍹ᴤ߇⊒ߐࠇࠆߣޔ⍹ᴤߩᮭࠍർㇱߩ ߽ߩߣߔߴߊേߚߢ߹ࠇߘޕᢜߢߞߚ㊁ౄߢࠆ࠙ࡦࡑౄ㧔ࠗࠬࡓቬᢎኅࡑࡈ ࠺ࠖߩሶቊ߇ౄ㚂㧕߿᳃ᣖࠗࠬࡓᚢ✢㧔ࠗࠬࡓේℂਥ⟵ౄ㧔NIF㧕㧕ࠍᆎޔ࿖ ᳃ߩᄙᢙࠍභࠆࠗࠬࡓᢎᓤߩᡰᜬࠍߣࠅߟߌࠆߚࡓࠬࠗޔൻߩࠠࡖࡦࡍࡦ ࠍታᣉߒࡓࠬࠗޔᴺ㧔ࠪࡖࠕ㧕ࠍ࿖ߩᴺᓞߣߒߡቯߚ22ޔߚ߹ޕධㇱࠍ 3 ߟߩ ၞߦౣ✬ᚑߒ23ޔධㇱၞߦኻߒߡ߽ࠕࡆࠕ⺆ࠍ↪⺆ߣߒޔධㇱァࠍਛᄩァߩ▤ℂਅߦ ⟎ߚߪࠇߎޕታ⾰ࠕ࠺ࠖࠬࠕࡌࡃදቯߦߒޔᒝᒁߦධㇱࠍർㇱߦ⛔วߐߖࠃ߁ߣߒߚޕ ߎࠇߦኻߔࠆㆇേ߇৻᳇ߦ㜞߹ࠅޔ1983 ᐕߩࡖ࠾ࡖ࠾ࠕޔర჻߇ࡏ࡞ߢർㇱァ߳ߩౣ ✬ߦኻߒੂ߇ߎࠅࠍࠇߎޔᄾᯏߦ╙ੑᰴౝᚢ߇ᆎ߹ߞߚߩߎޕਛᔃߦߚߩ߇ධㇱ りߩ࡚ࠫࡦࠟࡦᩞ24ߢࠅޔᓐࠍ⼏㐳ᦨ㜞มቭߦߒߚੱࡦ࠳ࠬޟ᳃⸃ㆇേ ⸃ァ㧔SPLM/SPLA㧕⚿߇ޠᚑߐࠇޔධㇱߢᐭㆇേ߇ౣ߮㐿ᆎߐࠇࠆ25ޕ ԙ 㗐ᝂߒߚධㇱ߳ߩੑᄢᄢⷙᮨ㐿⊒ ࡔࠗᮭߪ 1980 ᐕએ㒠ࠕࡔࠞߥߤ⻉࿖߆ࠄߩᄖ⾗ߩዉࠍଦㅴߒ⾗ᧄਥ⟵⊛ ߥ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷࠍ⋡ᜰߒޔධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆᄢⷙᮨ㐿⊒ࠍផㅴߒࠃ߁ߣߒߚ߇߇ࠇߎޔᄬᢌߒ࿖᳃ ⚻ᷣߪ∋ᑷߒ࿖ኅ߇୫㊄ẃߌߦߥߞߡߒ߹߁ߩߎޕᄢⷙᮨࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻߇⍹ᴤ㐿⊒ߣ࡚ࠫ 21 ධㇱᣇᐭߪ┙ᴺᮭࠍᜬߟޟᣇ⼏ળⴕߣޠᮭࠍᜬߟᦨޟ㜞⹏⼏ળޔࠇࠄ߇⟎⸳ߩޠධㇱᐭ ߩᄢ⛔㗔߇ਛᄩᐭߩᄢ⛔㗔ߩࠍභߚޕ 22 ᧄ᧪ࡕࠬࡓߩߺߦㆡ↪ߔࠆߪߕߩࠗࠬࡓᴺ߽ධㇱࠍߪߓർㇱߩ㕖ࡕࠬࡓᢎᓤࠍ࿖᳃ߔߴ ߡ߇ኻ⽎ߣߐࠇޔ㘶㈬ߩᱛޔ㖊ᛂߜೃߥߤ߇ታᣉߐࠇߚޕౝᚢਛߩධㇱߢߪታ㓙ߦߪㆡ↪ߐࠇߥ߆ߞ ߚ߇ޔർㇱߦࠆධㇱੱߦኻߒߡߪࠗࠬࡓᴺߢⵙ߆ࠇߚೃ⟏߇ਈ߃ࠄࠇߚޕCPA ࠗࠬࡓᴺߪධ ㇱߦߪㆡ↪ߐࠇߥߎߣ߇ᱜᑼߦ߹ߞߚ߇ߢ߹ࠇߘޔർㇱߩᮭ߇ᄌࠊߞߡ߽࿖ోߩᴺᓞߣߒߡᣉ ⴕߐࠇߡߚޕ 23 ධㇱߩ᳃ᣖಽᢿࠍᐲ⊛ߦ㓚ߔࠆߚߦⴕࠊࠇߚ߽ߩࠍࠞࡦࠖ࠺ޕਛᔃߣߔࠆ࠽ࠗ࡞♽᳃ᣖߣࠛ࡞ ࠍਛᔃߣߔࠆࠛࠢࠕ࠻ࠕ♽᳃ᣖߩኻ┙ࠍ߁߹ߊ↪ߒࠃ߁ߣߒߚ߽ߩޕ 24 ධㇱ SPLA ߩࠞࠬࡑ⊛ሽޕSPLA ߩ⊒⿷⠪ߢࠅޔSPLA ⼏㐳ᦨ㜞มቭޕධർᐔߩ SPLA ᷤઍߣߥࠅᐔวᗧࠍ㆐ᚑߐߖߚ߇ ߩߘޔ6 ࡩᓟߩ߳࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔೋߩᄖㆆߩᏫࠅߦࡋࠦࡊ࠲ ߇⪭ߒᱫޕ 25 ╙৻ᰴౝᚢߣ╙ੑᰴౝᚢߩ⇣ߥࠆὐߪߘߩౝᚢߩࠗ࠺ࠝࡠࠡ⊛ߥ⋡⊛ߢࠆ৻╙ޕᰴౝᚢ߇⋡ᜰߒߚ ߩߪޟධㇱߩ⁛┙╙ޔ߇ߚߞߢޠੑᰴౝᚢߢ SPLA/M ߇⋡ᜰߒߚߩߪ␠ߚࠇߐ৻⛔ޔળਥ⟵࿖ߣߒߡ ߩޟᣂࠬ࠳ࡦ㧔New Sudan㧕ࠍޠᑪ⸳ߔࠆߎߣߢࠅߩߎޔὐߢᏅ⇣߇ࠆޔߪࡦࠟޕർㇱᐭ߆ ࠄᏅࠍฃߌߡࠆߩߪޔධㇱߛߌߢߪߥߊޔർㇱߦ⟎ߔࠆࡃጊޔ㕍࠽ࠗ࡞᧲ޔㇱ࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ ߥߤߩ᳃ᣖ߽߅ࠅߩࠄࠇߎޔർㇱᮭ߆ࠄ៦ขߐࠇߡࠆ᳃ᣖࠍߡޟᣂࠬ࠳ࡦ⋡ࠍޠᜰߒߚߚޔ ධㇱ߅ࠃ߮৻ㇱߩർㇱ߆ࠄߩᡰᜬࠍൎߜขߞߚޕ 79 ࡦࠣࠗㆇᴡߩੑᄢ㐿⊒ߢࠆ߽ࠄߜߤޕධㇱၞߢߩ㐿⊒ߢࠆ߇ޔධㇱߩᴦ⊛ߥኻ ┙ࠍ↢ߺ╙ޔੑᰴౝᚢߩᄢ߈ߥේ࿃ߣߥࠆ㗴ߦ⊒ዷߒߚޕ ߹ߕ⍹ᴤ㐿⊒ߦ߅ߡߪޔ⍹ᴤ߇⊒ߐࠇߚߩ߇ධർႺ⇇✢ㄭߊߢߞߚߚࠗࡔޔ ᄢ⛔㗔ߪޔ⍹ᴤ⏕ߩߚߦධർߩႺ⇇✢ࠍᄌᦝߔࠆߎߣࠍ⋡⺰ߺධㇱ߆ࠄߩ⊒ ࠍ⾈߁♖ޕ႐ࠍධർߤߎߦᑪ⸳ߔࠆ߆ࠍߋࠅධർߩᴦ⊛ߥ㗴߳ߣ⊒ዷߒߡߞߚ ߇⚿ޔዪߩ࠙ࠖ࠹ࡦࡌޔណជᮭߪධㇱᣇᐭߣߩද⼏߽ߥߒߦࠕࡔࠞߩࠪࠚࡉࡠࡦ␠ ߦଏਈߒߚ߹ޔ㓞ធߒߚᴤ↰ߩណជᮭߪࡈࡦࠬߩ࠻࠲࡞␠ߦଏਈߒߚ26ޔࠅࠃߦࠇߎޕ ධㇱߩ⍹ᴤ⋉߇ỗᷫߔࠆߎߣߣߥࠅޔSPLA ߇ࠕࡔࠞߩࠪࠚࡉࡠࡦ␠ࠍ᠄ࡠࡉࠚࠪޔ ࡦ␠ࠍ᠗ㅌߦㅊ߿ߞߚޕ ߽߁৻ߟߩᄢⷙᮨࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߪޔධㇱ࡚ࠫࡦࠣࠗᎺߩㆇᴡᑪ⸳ߢࠆ߇࡞ࠗ࠽⊕ޕ ᵹࠇࠆ࡚ࠫࡦࠣࠗߪḨᏪߢޔᴡᎹㅢߩᢛ߅ࠃ߮ਅᵹߦߚࠆർㇱࠬ࠳ࡦ߳ߩ᳓ ߩଏ⛎ࠍ⋡⊛ߣߒߚᄢⷙᮨࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߢࠅ߽࠻ࡊࠫࠛޔᄢ߈ߥ㑐ᔃࠍᛴߡߚࡊޕ ࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ࠨࠗ࠻ߪ⢈ᴅߥၞߢ߽ߞߚߚޔㄘᬺ㐿⊒߽⸘↹ߐࠇߡߚࡊޔߒ߆ߒޕ ࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ࠨࠗ࠻ߦዬߒߡߚ᳃ߩ࠾࠭ࠍήⷞߒߚࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߢߞߚߎߣޔᄢ ⷙᮨߥ↢ᘒ♽ߩ⎕უ߇੍ᗐߐࠇޔධㇱ᳃߆ࠄߩኻㆇേ߇ߎߞߚޕᩙᧄ㧔1998㧕ߦࠃ ࠆߣ߿࠻ࡊࠫࠛߌࠊࠅߣޔർㇱࠬ࠳ࡦ߆ࠄߩᄢ㊂ߩㄘ᳃ߩᬀ߽⸘↹ߐࠇߡߚߎߣ߇ޔ ࠕࡉߦࠃࠆޟᬀ᳃ൻࠍޠᗧߒޔධㇱࠬ࠳ࡦੱߩᐭᗵᖱࠍᾜߞߚߣߐࠇࠆࡊޕ ࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߪߘࠇߦ߽߆߆ࠊࠄߕㅴⴕߒߡߚ߇ޔ1984 ᐕߦߪ SPLA ߩㇱ㓌߇Ꮏ႐ࠍ භߒࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߪਛᢿߦ⥋ߞߚޕ ߎߩ 2 ߟߩᄢⷙᮨࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߪධർኻ┙ߩὐߣߥࠅޔਔࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߣ߽ᱞജ ߦࠃࠅਛᢿߒߡߒ߹߁ߥߤ╙ޔੑᰴౝᚢߦ⊒ዷߒߡߞߚᄢ߈ߥⷐ࿃ߢࠆޕ Ԛ ╙ੑᰴౝᚢਛߩർㇱᮭߣࠗࠬࡓේℂਥ⟵ൻ㧔ࡃࠪ࡞ᮭߩ⺀↢㧕 ࡔࠗᮭߪ╙ޔੑᰴౝᚢ߳ߩഺ⊒ޔᄢⷙᮨ㐿⊒ߩᄬᢌߦࠃࠆ⚻ᷣߩ∋ᑷߥߤ߆ࠄ 1985 ᐕ᳃ⴐⱎߦࠃࠅᄬ⣉ߔࠆߩߘޕᓟ࠙ࡦࡑౄߦࠃࠆᢥ᳃ᮭ߇᮸┙ߔࠆ߇ޔ1989 ᐕࠬࠗޔ ࡓේℂਥ⟵ౄߢࠆ NIF ߣ⚿⸤ߒߚࡃࠪ࡞ಎ㧔ᄢ⛔㗔㧕ࠍਛᔃߣߒߚァㇱߦ ࠃࠆࠢ࠺࠲߇ߎࠅߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔౣ߮⁛ⵙᮭਅߦ⟎߆ࠇߚ࡞ࠪࡃޕᮭߩ⢛ᓟߦߪ ࠗࠬࡓේℂਥ⟵ߩ NIF ౄ㚂ߩ࠻࠘ࡆ߇ሽߒޔᢎ⢒ߪዊቇᩞ߆ࠄᄢቇߦ⥋ࠆ߹ߢ࿖ ోߢࠕࡆࠕ⺆ᢎ⢒߇⟵ോઃߌࠄࠇߚޕንߣᮭജ߽ NIF ᡰᜬ⠪ߩࠛ࠻ߦ㓸ਛߒߘޔ ࠇએᄖࠍឃ㒰ߔࠆ╷߇ⴕࠊࠇߚޔߚ߹ޕᮭജၮ⋚ࠍ࿕ࠆߚߦޔࠍ໒߃ࠆౄޔ ᄢቇᢎቭޔක⠪ޔᑯ⼔჻ߥߤߩࠛ࠻ጀߥߤߩᒢ߽ⴕߞߚ27ޕ 26 ᦨ⚳⊛ߦߪࡔࠗߪ࿖ౝߢߩ♖ࠍ߈ࠄࠍࡦࠗࡊࠗࡄޔᑪ⸳ߒේᴤߩ߹߹ർㇱߩญߢࠆࡐ ࠻ࠬ࠳ࡦߦャㅍߔࠆߎߣߣߒߚޕ 27 ߎߩᤨᦼࡓࠬࠗޔේℂਥ⟵࿖ኅߣߥߞߚࠬ࠳ࡦߪߩࠕࠚࠫ࡞ࠕޔේℂਥ⟵⠪߿ࠗࠢߩࠢ࠙ࠚ ࠻ଚࠍᡰᜬߒࡓࠬࠗߪࡓ࠷࡞ࡂޔㆊỗᵷ߿࠹ࡠ⚵❱ߩ᷷ᐥߦߥߞߡߚߣߐࠇࠆࠗࠞ࡞ࠕޕ ࠳ߩࠝࠨࡑࡆࡦ࠺ࠖࡦࠍ 1991 ᐕ߆ࠄ 1996 ᐕ߹ߢṛߐߖޔࠅߣߒߡࠬ࠳ࡦᐭߪ⼾ን ߥ⾗㊄ࠍߒߚࡆࡦ࠺ࠖࡦ߆ࠄࠗࡦࡈᛩ⾗߿⾗㊄⊛ଏਈࠍฃߌߚޕ1995 ᐕߦࠛࠫࡊ࠻ߩࡓࡃࠢ ᄢ⛔㗔ߩᥧᲕᧂㆀߦࠬ࠳ࡦ߇㑐ࠊߞߡߚߣ߁ᖱႎ߽ࠅޔ1996 ᐕޔ࿖ㅪߪࠬ࠳ࡦߦኻߔࠆⵙ 80 ԛ ධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆಽⵚ ㅢᏱౝᚢߩਥߪޔᐭኻᐭߣ߁ 2 ߟߦಽ߆ࠇࠆ߇ޔㄭᐕߩࠨࡂએධߩࠕࡈ ࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ⚗ߩ․ᓽߣߒߡޔౝᚢߩਥ߇ಽⵚߒᄙ᭽ൻߒߡ߅ࠅޔᐭߩ㑆ߢߩ⛔৻ ߒߚ⸃ࠍߖߕߦᐔᷤ߇ⶄ㔀ൻߒޔౝᚢ߇㐳ᦼൻߔࠆะߦࠆ28ޕ ╙ੑᰴౝᚢߩਥߪၮᧄ⊛ߦࠬ࠳ࡦᐭߣ SPLM/A ߩੑ⠪ߢߞߚ߇ޔౝᚢਛߪ SPLM/A ౝߢߩಽⵚޔർㇱᮭߩਃᐲߦࠊߚࠆᮭઍޔ㓞࿖߆ࠄߩᓇ㗀ߥߤࠍฃߌޔਥ ߪᄙ᭽ൻߒߚߚߞ߁ߎޕਛߢޔSPLM/A ߩㆇേߦห⺞ߔࠆർߩࠕࡉੱ߇ࠆ৻ᣇޔධ ㇱߩࠕࡉ♽ࠛ࠻߇ർߩᡰᜬࠍߔࠆߥߤޔධർߩኻ┙ߣ߃ߡ߽ౝᚢߩਥߪⶄ㔀 ߐࠍౝ൮ߒߡߚޕ 4-4 ౝᚢߩ⚳⚿ߣᐔวᗧ߳ߩࡊࡠࠬ ᐔࡊࡠࠬߪޔ1990 ᐕೋ㗡ࠃࠅㄝ⻉࿖߿ࠕࡔࠞߥߤ⻉࿖ޔ࿖ㅪߥߤߢ⺞ᢛࠍ ⴕߞߡߚ߇ޔᐔᷤ߇ᕆㅦߦㅴዷߒߚߩߪޔ2002 ᐕߦߞߡ߆ࠄߢࠆޕᐔࡊࡠ ࠬ ߢ ᄢ ߈ ߥ ᓎ ഀ ࠍ ᜂ ߞ ߚ ߩ ߇ ޔ ၞ ⊛ ߥ ᨒ ⚵ ߺ ߢ ࠆ IGAD 㧔 ᐭ 㑆 㐿 ⊒ ᯏ ᭴ 㧦 Intergovernmental Authority for Development㧕29ߢࠆ ߦ․ޕIGAD ߩᨒ⚵ߺࠍ㓞࿖ߩࠛ ࠻ࠕ ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࠕࡇࠝ࠴ࠛޔ4 ࠞ࿖߇ᐔ⺞ߩขࠅ⚵ߺࠍᆎޔ1994 ᐕߦ ߪ㧢ߟߩޟේೣት⸒㧔DOP㧕ࠍޠቯߒߚޕDOP ߢߪޔධㇱ⥄ᮭߩᛚޔᢎಽ㔌ⶄޔ ᢙౄߩዉੱޔᮭߩዅ㊀ޔㅪ㇌߆࿖ኅㅪวߦࠃࠆಽᮭൻޔධㇱߢಽ㔌⁛┙ߩㆬᛯ⢇߽ ߚ᳃ᛩߩታᣉ߇⋓ࠅㄟ߹ࠇߡ߅ࠅߩߘޔᓟߩᐔ߳ߩ╭ࠍ┙ߡߚߎߣߢ㊀ⷐߥ ᓎഀࠍᨐߚߒߚޔߒ߆ߒޕ6 ේೣߩਛߦߪᢎಽ㔌߇ߞߡ߅ࠅޔർㇱࠬ࠳ࡦᐭߪධㇱ ߦ⥄ᴦᮭࠍࠆߎߣߣᢎಽ㔌ߦߟߡࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ߕޔᒰᤨߩᷤߪⵚߒߚ30ޕ ߹ߚ ߪࠞࡔࠕޔGW ࡉ࠶ࠪࡘᮭߦߥࠆߣࠬ࠳ࡦ㗴․ࠍછߒࡈࠕޔࠢࠗޔ ࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦߣߪ⇣ߥࠅᐔ⊛ᷤߦࠃࠅ࿖ౝ㗴ࠍ⸃ߐߖࠆᣇᴺࠍㆬ߮31ߢ߹ࠇߎޔ ߆ࠄ߈߆ߌߡߚࠗ࠲ࠕ⧷ޔࠚ࠙࡞ࡁޔ࠳ࡦࠝޔ࿖ߦടࠊࠅޔᐔ⺞ࠍ࠼ ߒߚޕ 2002 ᐕߦ⼏ࠬࠦࡖ࠴ࡑޟቯᦠ⺞߇ޠශߐࠇࠃ߁߿ߊᐔᷤߪㅴዷߔࠆ⼏ࠬࠦࡖ࠴ࡑޕ ቯᦠߢߪޔධㇱߦ 6 ᐕ㑆ߩᥳቯ⥄ᴦᮭࠍਈ߃ߩߘޔᓟߩಽ㔌⁛┙ߦߟߡߪ᳃ᛩߦߡ Ꮻዻࠍቯߔࠆߎߣࡓࠬࠗޔᴺࠍධㇱߦㆡ↪ߒߥߎߣ߇วᗧߐࠇߚὐߢޔᐭޔ SPLM/A ਔᣇߩ⼑ᱠ߇ࠄࠇߚߩߘޕᓟ 2003 ᐕߦߪޔో㓚ߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧޔንߩ ⼏ࠍណᛯޕ1998 ᐕ߇࠳ࠗࠞ࡞ࠕޔ㑐ਈߒߚߣߐࠇࠆࠕࡔࠞᄢ㙚หᤨ⎕ઙ߇ߎࠆߣࡔࠕޔ ࠞߪႎᓳភ⟎ߣߒߡࠕ࡞ࠞࠗ࠳߇ὐߣߒߡߚࡂ࡞࠷ࡓߩ⮎ຠᎿ႐ࠍⓨߒߚޕ 28 ㄭᐕߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞߿࠰ࡑࠕߥߤޕ 29 IGAD ߪࠫࡉ࠴ ࠞࡈࠕ᧲ߩ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࡦ࠳ࠬޔࠕࡑ࠰ޔࠕ࠾ࠤޔࠕࡍࠝ࠴ࠛޔࠕ࠻ࠛޔ7 ࠞ ࿖߇ട⋖ߒߡࠆၞᯏ᭴ޕ1986 ᐕߦᐓ߫ߟኻ╷㐿⊒ᐭ㑆ᯏ᭴ߣߒߡഃ⸳ߐࠇߚ߽ߩ߇ޔ1996 ᐕ ߦᡷ⚵ߐࠇ⊒⿷ޕ1991 ᐕએ᧪ޔߢߤߥࡦ࠳ࠬ߿ࠕࡑ࠰ޔᱞⵝฦᵷߣߩ⺞߿ᐔᷤߢ㊀ⷐߥ⺞ ᓎߣߥߞߡࠆޕ 30 ᩙᧄ(2004a)ޔIyob (2006) 31 ᩙᧄ(2005) 81 ಽޔᮭജߩಽߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧᦠ߇ᰴޔࠇ߫⚿ߣޘ2005 ᐕ 1 CPA ⺞ශߣߥࠆޕ 4-5 ൮ᐔวᗧ㧔CPA㧕 CPA ߪࡑ࠴ࡖࠦࠬߢߩᷤએ᧪ᚑ┙ߒߚ৻ㅪߩ 4 ߟߩ⼏ቯᦠޔ2 ߟߩᨒ⚵ߺวᗧޔ2 ߟߩ ઃዻᢥᦠ߆ࠄ᭴ᚑߐࠇߡࠆ㧔㧞ෳᾖ㧕ޕCPA ߩ⌕ታߥታᣉ߇ᐔ߳ߩ╭ߣߥߞߡ߅ ࠅޔ࿑ 2 ߦ␜ߒߚࠃ߁ߦ CPA ߩታᣉㆊ⒟ߦ߅ߡޔࠬࠨࡦޔㆬޔ᳃ᛩߥߤ߇㊀ⷐ ߥታᣉ㗄ߦߥߞߡࠆޔ߅ߥޕCPA ߩࡕ࠾࠲ࡦࠣߪޔክᩏ⹏ଔᆔຬળ㧔Assessment and Evaluation Committee㧔AEC㧕㧕߇ታᣉߔࠆߎߣߣߥߞߡࠆ32ޕ ߎߎߢࠬ࠳ࡦోߩᐔߩቯ⌕߆ࠄ⇐ᗧߔߴ߈ὐߪޔCPA ߪޔධㇱ SPLM ߣർㇱ NCP ߣߩ㑆ߩᐔวᗧߢࠅ᧲߿࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔㇱࠍઁߩၞ߿ࠕࠢ࠲ߪ㒰ᄖߒߡࠆޕ ߹ߕޔਥ߇ߪߞ߈ࠅߣߒߡࠆධർ⚗ߦ㑐ߒᐔࠍᚑ┙ߐߖߚ߽ߩߢޔ࿖㓙␠ળ߽ߘ ࠇࠍᓟߒߒߚޔߜࠊߥߔޕCPA ᥳቯᦼ㑆ߩਛߢߪ࿖㓙␠ળߪධㇱߩ SPLM ߣർㇱ NCP ߦ ᱜ⛔ᕈ߇ࠆߎߣࠍ࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ㗴ࠍᓟ࿁ߒߦߒߚߎߣߦߥࠆޕ 㧞 CPA ߦ߹ࠇࠆ㧢ߟߩਥⷐวᗧᢥᦠ CPA ߩ᭴ᚑ ࡑ࠴ࡖࠦࠬ⼏ቯᦠ (2002.7) ో㓚㗴ߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧᦠ (Security Arrangement) (2003.9) ਥⷐߥౝኈ ንߩಽߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧᦠ 㧔Wealth Sharing㧕(2004.1) ᮭജߩಽߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧᦠ 㧔Power Sharing㧕(2004.5) ࠕࡆࠛࠗ⚗ߩ⸃ߦ㑐ߔࠆ ⼏ (2004.5) 32 ධㇱߦ 6 ᐕ㑆ߩᥳቯ⥄ᴦᮭߩઃਈ㧔2011 ᐕ 7 8 ᣣ߹ߢ㧕 ᳃ᛩߦࠃࠆධㇱߩᏫዻߩቯ ࠗࠬࡓᴺߪർㇱߛߌߦㆡ↪ߣߒޔධㇱߦߪㆡ↪ߒߥ ⚗ᱛ߅ࠃ߮㗴ߦኻߒߡߪኻ߅ࠃ߮ᴦ⊛ᷤߦࠃࠆ⸃ ߩㆩ ᐭァ(SAF)ߣ SPLA ߩਔᣇߩァߩ⛽ᜬߣ⛔วㇱ㓌㧔JIU㧕ߩ 3 ⒳㘃 ࠍァ㓌ߣߒߡ✬ᚑ㧔SAF ߣ SPLA ߪᥳቯᦼ㑆ਛߪߦޘᛒࠊࠇࠆ㧕 SAF ߩධㇱ߆ࠄߩ᠗ㅌ߅ࠃ߮ SPLA ߩർㇱ߆ࠄߩ᠗ㅌ㧔ᤨ㑆⊛ᨒ⚵ ߺߩ⸳ቯ㧕 ⍹ᴤࠍ 50:50 ߢධർߦ㈩ಽߔࠆ 㐿⊒ߦኻߔࠆဋ╬ߥᯏળߩᜬ ᓳ⥝㐿⊒ၮ㊄ߩ⸳┙ ࿖᳃⛔৻ᐭ㧔GONU㧕ਥⷐࡐࠬ࠻ߪർㇱਈౄ NCP52%ޔSPLM28%ޔ NCP એᄖߩർㇱജ 14%ޔSPLM એᄖߩධㇱജ 6%ߩ㈩ಽߣߔࠆޕ ධㇱᐭ㧔GOSS㧕ߩਥⷐࡐࠬ࠻ߪ SPLM70%ޔNCP15%ޔSPLM એ ᄖߩධㇱജ 15%ߣߔࠆޕ ࡃࠪ࡞ᄢ⛔㗔ߪ࿖ኅర㚂ߣߥࠅޔᄢ⛔㗔ߩߪධㇱᐭᄢ⛔ 㗔߇ߨࠆߎߣߣߔࠆޕ ․ߥⴕߩߩઃਈ ࠕࡆࠛࠗ߆ࠄߩ⍹ᴤߪർㇱᐭ 50%ޔධㇱᐭ 42%࠼࡞ࠦޔ ࡈࠔࡦᎺ 2%࡞ࠟ࡞ࠕ࡞ࡂࡃޔᎺ 2% ੱࠞࡦࠖ࠺ࠢ࠶ࠧࡦޔ2%ޔ ࡒࠕࠕࡉੱ 2%ߩഀวߢ㈩ಽ AEC ߩࡔࡦࡃߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔᐭ߆ࠄ NCPޔSPLA ߩઍޔCPA ߦ⟑ฬߒߚ 5 ࠞ࿖㧔ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ ⧷ޔ࿖࠳ࡦࠝޔࠞࡔࠕޔࠕ࠲ࠗޔ㧕 ޔIGAD ઍߣߒߡࠤ࠾ࠕߩࠕࡇࠝ࠴ࠛޔᄖ࿅ߥߤ 13 ߩ ࡔࡦࡃߣޔ࿖ㅪޔEUࠞࡈࠕޔㅪว㧔AU㧕 ߩࠣࡉࠕޔ4 ᯏ㑐߇ࠝࡉࠩࡃߣߥߞߡࠆޕᣣ ᧄߪࠝࡉࠩࡃߢ߽ߞߡߥ⼏ޕ㐳ߪ⧷࿖ోޕ⊛ߥળวߪ 1 ࿁㐿ޔో㓚㧔ࡁ㧕 ޔ ንߩಽ㈩㧔☨㧕 ޔᮭജߩಽ㈩㧔દ㧕 ޔ⒖ⴕ㧟ၞߩ㗴㧔⯗㧕 㧕ߦߟߡߩಽ⑼ળ߇ࠅߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ㧔 㧕 ౝߩ࠼࠽߇ಽ⑼ળߩ⼏㐳ߣߥߞߡࠆޕ 82 ධㇱߩ᳃ᛩߣߪߦหᤨᦼߦࠕࡆࠛࠗߩᏫዻߦ㑐ߒ᳃ᛩ ࠍⴕ߁ޕ ࠕࡆࠛࠗߩႺ⇇✢ߦߟߡߪࠗࠛࡆࠕޔႺ⇇✢ᆔຬળ㧔ABC㧕ࠍ⸳ ┙ߒද⼏ߔࠆޕ ධࠦ࡞࠼ࡈࠔࡦᎺ㧔ࡃጊ㧕 ᳃߇ㆬߢㆬ߱⍮ߦࠃߞߡ⛔ᴦޕ ߣ㕍࠽ࠗ࡞Ꮊߦ߅ߌࠆ⚗ߩ ࿖ኅᓳ⥝㐿⊒ၮ㊄㧔NRDF㧕ߪޔਔᎺࠍ 75%ࠍᚢⵍἴ߳ᝄ ࠅะߌࠆ ⸃ߦ߅ߌࠆ⼏ (2004.5) ਔᎺߩ⍮ߪߘࠇߙࠇ NCP ߣ SPLM ߣߢઍߦൕࠆ ᚲ㧦CPA ࠃࠅ╩⠪ᚑ ࿑㧞 ᐔ߳ߩߩࠅ ᥳቯᦼ㑆䋨㪍ᐕ㑆䋩 䋨㪉㪇㪇㪌㪅㪎㪄㪉㪇㪇㪈㪈㪅㪎㪀 ᥳቯᦼ㑆એ೨㩿㪍䊱䋩 䋨㪉㪇㪇㪌㪅㪈㪄㪉㪇㪇㪌㪅㪎㪀 ᓳ⥝䊶㐿⊒ 䋲䋰䋰䋵 㪡㪘㪤╙䋱䊐䉢䊷䉵 䋲䋰䋰䋶 䋲䋰䋰䋷 㪉㪇㪇㪌ᐕ㪈 㪚㪧㪘⟑ฬ 㪡㪘㪤╙䋲䊐䉢䊷䉵 䋲䋰䋰䋸 䋲䋰䋰䋹 㪉㪇㪇㪏ᐕ㪋 䉶䊮䉰䉴ታᣉ 䋲䋰䋱䋰 㪉㪇㪇㪐ᐕ㪎䉁䈪䈮 ✚ㆬ䋨੍ቯ䋩 䋲䋰䋱䋱 㪉㪇㪈㪈ᐕ㪎㩿੍ቯ䋩 䊶ධㇱ⥄䉕䈉 䇭᳃ᛩ 䊶䉝䊎䉣䉟䈱Ꮻዻ䉕 䇭䈉᳃ᛩ 䇭䇭䇭⋥㕙䈚䈩䈇䉎ਇቯൻⷐ⚛ 䋪㪡㪘㪤䋺ᐭ䇮࿖ㅪ䇮㌁䈏ห䈪⹏ଔ䈚䈢䉅䈱䈪䇮㪉㪇㪈㪈ᐕ䉕䉺䊷 䉭䉾䊃䈫䈚䇮ఝవ⺖㗴䈗䈫䈮ᔅⷐ䈭ᓳ⥝㐿⊒ᡰេ䉕䉁䈫䉄䈢ႎ๔ᦠ䇯 㪉䈧䈱䊐䉢䊷䉵䈮䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯 䊶㪠㪚㪚䈮䉋䉎䊋䉲䊷䊦ᄢ⛔㗔ㅱ⁁⺧ ᳞ 䊶ධർႺ⇇✢䈱㗴 䊶䉝䊎䉣䉟䈱Ⴚ⇇✢䈱㗴 䊶䉶䊮䉰䉴䈱⚿ᨐ䈏ᧂ 䇭䇭䋨ධㇱ䈏ᛚ䈚䈭䈇น⢻ᕈᄢ䋩 ᚲ㧦╩⠪ᚑ 4-6 ᜰᮡߦߺࠆࠬ࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈ 㧔㧝㧕ᜰᮡ߆ࠄߺࠆ⣀ᒙᕈ ᧄ⎇ⓥߩਥ㗴ߢࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦߟߡ᥉ㆉ⊛ߥቯ⟵ઃߌߪᧂߛߐࠇߡߥ߇߹ࠇߎޔ ߢઁߩ┨ߢ߽⸒ߐࠇߡࠆߣ߅ࠅ⎇ᧄޔⓥߢߪ OECD/DAC ߩቯ⟵ߦᴪޟၮ␆⊛ߥࠨ ࡆࠬࠍ࿖᳃ߦឭଏߔࠆ⢻ജ߇ߥߪࠆޔឭଏߔࠆᗧᕁ߇ߥ࿖ኅࠍߣߎߩޠᜰߔޕ⣀ ᒙ࿖ኅߣߐࠇࠆ࿖⁁ߩޘᴫߪᄙ᭽ߢࠅߩߘޔ⣀ᒙᕈߦߟߡ߽⏕ߥቯ⟵ߪߐࠇߡߥ ߇߷߶ޔㅢߩ․ᓽߣߒߡߪ ࠅߚੱ৻ޔGNI ߇ૐ⽺࿎࿖߇ࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔᒙޔ᳃ਥ ൻ߇ㅴࠎߢߥޔᚲᓧಽ㈩߇ਇဋ╬ޔၮ␆⊛ߥࠨࡆࠬឭଏ߇ߢ߈ߡߥޔេഥߩๆ ⢻ജ߇ૐߥߤ߇ߍࠄࠇߡࠆޕㅒߦ⣀ᒙᕈ߇߹ࠅߥ࿖ߩ․ᓽߣߒߡ Carment 㧔2008㧕ߪޔᚑ㐳߇ᣧޔ᳃ਥ࿖ኅߢࠆ⸃ޔ⊛ߥ⾏ᤃᐲࠍᜬߞߡࠆੱ⦟ޔᮭ ᐲ߇ࠆޔ᳃ᣖߩᄙ᭽ᕈ߇ૐߊ᳃ᣖ⚗ߩࠬࠢ߇ૐ․ᓽࠍᜬߞߡࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆߎޕ 83 ߩࠃ߁ߥ․ᓽࠍᜰᮡൻߒ⋧ޔኻ⊛ߦઁߩ࿖ߣᲧセߔࠆᣇᴺߣߒߡޔ⇇㌁ⴕ㧔WB㧕ޔᐔ ၮ㊄ߥߤេഥᯏ㑐߿⎇ޔⓥᯏ㑐ߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩࠬ࠻߿ࡦࠠࡦࠣࠍⴕߞߡࠆ33ޔ߫߃ޕ Steven and Brown ߪࠬࡆࠨޔឭଏߩ⦟ߒᖡߒ߇⣀ᒙᕈࠍࠆਥߥⷐ⚛ߢࠆߣߒߩߘޔ ᜰᮡߣߒߡޔᐜఽᱫ₸㧔IMR㧕ޔోߥ᳓ߩଏ⛎₸ߥߤࠍߍߡࠆޔߚ߹ޕCollier(2007) ߪޔ⇇ߩᦨᐩㄝߦࠆ 10 ਁੱ߇ࠆࠃ߁ߥ⣀ᒙߥ࿖ኅߪ㧠ߟߩ⟂㧔Ԙ⚗ߩ⟂㧔Conflict Trap㧕ޔԙᄤὼ⾗Ḯߩ⟂㧔Natural Resource Trap㧕ޔԚ㑐ଥߩᖡㄭ㓞⻉࿖ߦ࿐߹ࠇߚౝ㒽࿖ ߢࠆ⟂㧔Landlocked with Bad Neighbors㧕ޔԛᖡࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ⟂㧔Bad Governance in a Small Country㧕ߩ㧝ߟ߹ߚߪ 2 ߟએߦ㒱ߞߡࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆ34ߩࠄࠇߎޕᜰᮡߦኻߔࠆᛕ್ߣߒ ߡ⹏ޔଔ߇ᤨὐߢߩޟὐ್ߢ⁁ߩߡߒߣޠᢿࠍߒߡ߅ࠅߩߘޔ࿖ߩᱧผ߿ầᵹߦߪὶ ὐࠍᒰߡߕޔᜰᮡߦࠃߞߡߪᭂ┵ߥࠍᒁ߈วߦߒߚࠅޔో㓚߿ᴦ⊛ᱜ⛔ᕈߩ ߺߢ್ᢿߒߡࠆ႐ว߇ᄙߥߤ߇ᜰ៰ߐࠇߡࠆ35ޔߚߩߘޕ࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈ߿ᒙߺࠍ൮ ⊛߆ߟ⸘᷹น⢻ߢቴⷰ⊛ߥ್ᢿ߇ߢ߈ࠆᜰᮡࠍᔅⷐߣߒߡ߅ࠅޔߡߒߣߺ⹜ߩߘޔRice and Patrick ߪԘ⚻ᷣޔԙᴦޔԚో㓚ޔԛ␠ળ㓚ߩ㧠ߟߩಽ㊁ߦ߅ߡ 20 ߩᣢሽߩ ᜰᮡࠍ↪ߡޔฦ࿖ߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᢙ୯ൻߒߡࠆ߽ߩ߽ࠆޕ ߎߩࠃ߁ߥᜰᮡൻߩ⋡⊛ߪߩߘߦߎߤޔ࿖ߩ⣀ᒙᕈ߇ࠆߩ߆⏕ൻߒޔេഥߩ㈩ಽࠍ ࠆ㓙ߩ㊀ⷐߥ␜ໂߣߔࠆߎߣߢࠅࠆ߃ߦ⋡ޔᚻᴺߣߒߡ߭ߣߟߩലߥಽᨆᴺߣ ߥߞߡࠆޕ ᧄⓂߢߪߘࠇߙࠇߩ⹏ଔߩ㒢⇇ߪࠆ߇ޔ㌁ߩ CPIA”ޔGovernance matters”ߩᜰᮡࠍ↪ ࠃࠅᐢߊಽᨆߒߡࠆ Index of State of Weaknessࠄࠇߎޔᜰᮡߦࠃࠆಽᨆߩߦޟ࿖ኅޠ ࠍᒻࠆޟᮭᆭޔޠ ޟᱜ⛔ᕈޔޠ ޟ⢻ജ ߁ߣޠ3 ߟߩዪ㕙߆ࠄ߽ಽᨆࠍ⹜ߺߚ Country Indicators for Fragility Project (CIFP)߆ࠄߩಽᨆ߆ࠄࠬ࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽࠍᵞߒޔ೨㗄ߢߺߚᱧ ผ⊛ߥ⢛᥊ࠍ⚵ߺࠇߚߢࠬ࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᦨ⚳⊛ߦ್ᢿߔࠆߩࠇߙࠇߘޕಽᨆߢ↪ ࠆᜰᮡߦߟߡߪ㧟ߩߣ߅ࠅߢࠆޕ 㧟 ࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᜰᮡൻߒߚಽᨆ ಽᨆ Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ㌁ ⣀ᒙᕈࠍ್ᢿߔࠆᜰᮡ Ԙ ԙ Ԛ ԛ Governance Matters ㌁ 33 34 35 Ԙ ԙ Ԛ ԛ ⚻ᷣㆇ༡㧔ࡑࠢࡠ⚻ᷣㆇ༡⽷ޔ╷ޔௌോ╷㧕 ᭴ㅧ╷㧔⾏ᤃޔ㊄ⲢࠬࡀࠫࡆޔⅣႺ㧕 ␠ળෳᐲ㧔ࠫࠚࡦ࠳ᐔ╬ߩࠬ࠰ޔᱜߥ㈩ಽ᧚ੱޔ⢒ᚑ␠ޔળ ⼔ߣഭᮭޔᜬ⛯น⢻ߥⅣႺ╷㧕 ࠢ࠲▤ℂ㧔⽷↥ᮭ߅ࠃ߮ⷙೣߦၮߠߊࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ⏕⽷߮ࠃ߅▚੍ޔ ▤ℂߩ⾰ޔᱦേຬߩല₸ᕈⴕޔߩ⾰ࠆߌ߅ߦ࠲ࠢޔㅘᕈࠕ ࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࠹ࠖᳪ⡯㧕 ᳃ⴐߩჿߣࠕࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࠹ࠖ㧔Voice & Accountability㧕 ᴦ⊛ቯ㧔Political Stability㧕 ᐭߩലᕈ㧔Government Effectiveness㧕 ⷙߩ⾰㧔Regulatory Quality㧕 ਥⷐߥᯏ㑐ߩ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍಽ㘃ߔࠆᚻᴺ߿⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠬ࠻ߦߟߡߪޔFASID(2008)ߦߒޕ 4 ߟߩ⟂ߦߟߡߪޔዊ㊁㧔2007㧕߇߹ߣߡࠆޕ Rice and Patrick (2008) 84 Ԝ ᴺߩᡰ㈩㧔Rule of Law㧕 ԝ ᳪ⡯ߩ▤ℂ㧔Control of Corruption㧕 ⚻ᷣ㧔৻ੱߚࠅ GNI*1ޔGDP ᚑ㐳₸*1ޔᚲᓧਇᐔ╬ᜰᮡ*1*₸ࡈࡦࠗޔ2ޔ ⷙߩ⾰*3 ԙ ᴦ㧔ᐭߩലᕈ*3ޔᴺߩᡰ㈩*3ޔ᳃ⴐߩჿߣࠕࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࠹ࠖ*3ޔᳪ⡯ ߩ▤ℂ*3↱⥄ޔᜰᮡ*4㧕 Ԛ ᴦ㧔⚗ߩỗߒߐ*5ޔᴦ⊛ቯߣജߩਇ*3*₸࠲࠺ࠢޔ6ੱޔᮭଚኂ ₸*7⚗ޔߦࠃࠅᓇ㗀ࠍฃߌߚ㗔*8㧕 ԛ ␠ળ㧔ሶଏߩᱫ₸*9ޔೋ╬ᢎ⢒ቢੌ₸*1ޔᩕ㙃ᄬ⺞₸*10ޔోߥ᳓ߣ ోߥⴡ↢ᣉ⸳߳ߩࠕࠢࠬ*1ޔኼ*1㧕 1 * : World Development Indicators, WB, *2: International Financial Statistics, IMF *3: Governance Matters, WB, *4: Freedom House *5: Major Episodes of Political Violence, Center for Systemic Peace, *6: Archigos 2.8 and Economist Intelligence Unit, *7: Political Terror Scale, *8: Political Instability Task Force, *9: State of the World’s Children, UNICEF, *10: FAO Country Indicators for Ԙ ⚻ᷣޔԙ ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬޔԚ ᴦߣ‽⟋ޔԛ ੱ㑆㐿⊒ޔԜ ੱญേᘒޔԝ ⅣႺ Fragility Project ߩ 6 ࠢࠬ࠲߅ࠃ߮ᮮᢿ⊛ⷞὐߣߒߡࠫࠚࡦ࠳ߩᜰᮡࠍᵴ↪ߒޔ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡࠍ 㧔CIFP㧕 ߒߡࠆޔߦᦝޕ1. Authority㧔ᮭᆭ㧕 2. Legitimacy㧔ᱜ⛔ᕈ㧕ޔ3. Capacity㧔⢻ (Carment et al.) ജ㧕ߣ߁ޟ࿖ኅࠍޠᒻࠆ 3 ߟߩၮᧄ⊛ߥⷐ⚛ߦ߅ߌࠆᒝߺޔᒙߺࠍಽᨆߒ⣀ᒙ ᕈࠍ⸘ࠆޕ Failed State Index 㧝㧚␠ળࠢ࠲㧔Ԙੱญേᘒജޔԙ㔍᳃࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃ߩᄢ⒖േߦ߁ੱ✕ᕆ (Fund for Peace) ᘒޔԚ㓸࿅ߩਇḩޔԛᘟᕈ⊛ߥ㗡⣖ᵹߥߤߩੱญᵹ㧕 㧞㧚⚻ᷣࠢ࠲㧔Ԝਇဋ╬ߥ⚻ᷣ㐿⊒ޔԝ⚻ᷣߩᕆỗߥਅ㒠㧕 㧟㧚ᴦࠢ࠲㧔Ԟ࿖ኅߩ㕖ᱜ⛔ᕈޔԟࠨࡆࠬߩᖡൻޔԠᴺߩᡰ㈩ߣੱᮭ ଚኂޔԡᴦᯏ᭴㧔᳃ߩࠥޔޔԢᵷ㑓ߩࠛ࠻ߩบ㗡ޔԣᄖ⊛ 㧕 Index of State Weakness (Rice and Patrick, Brookings Institution & Center for Global Development㧕 Ԙ ᚲ㧦ฦ⹏ଔࠃࠅ╩⠪ᚑ 㧔㧞㧕㌁ߩ CPIA CPIA ߪߘߩ࿖ߩᐲ߿╷ࠍᜰᮡߢߒޔ⇇㐿⊒දળ㧔IDA㧕ߩⲢ⾗ࠍቯߔࠆ㓙ߩ ਥⷐෳ⠨ᜰᮡߢࠆ⹏ޕቯ୯ߪޔԘ⚻ᷣㆇ༡ޔԙᐲ╷ޔԚ␠ળෳᐲޔԛࠢ࠲ ▤ℂߩ㧠ߟߩࠢࠬ࠲߆ࠄᬌ⸛ߐࠇߡࠆޕ ᧄ⎇ⓥߢขࠅߍߡࠆ࿖߅ࠃ߮⚗ᓟ ߩ࿖╬ࠍ 4 ߦ␜ߒߚ߇ޔ2007 ᐕߩࠬ࠳ࡦߩ✚ว⹏ቯ୯ߪ 2.5 ߢޔIDA ୫࿖ 75 ߆࿖ਛ 70 ߩ severe countries ߩಽ㘃ߢࠆ36ޕ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽ߎߩ୯ߪ߿ࡦ࠲ࠬ࠾ࠟࡈࠕޔਛᄩ ࠕࡈࠞߣหࡌ࡞ߢࠅޔIDA ୫࿖ᐔဋߩ 3.2 ࠍᄢ߈ߊਅ࿁ߞߡࠆޕ㧠ߟߩࠢࠬ࠲ Ფߩᜰᮡߢߪ ࠇߙࠇߘߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔ2.7ޔ2.7ޔ2.4ޔ2.3 ߢࠅ⚻ߦ․ޔᷣㆇ༡ߩਛߢௌ ௌോ ╷(1.5)ߣࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬޔㅘᕈⴕޔߩ⾰ߥߤߩ ࠢ࠲▤ℂߦ߅ߌࠆ୯߇ૐߎߣ߇ ࠊ߆ࠆޔߪࡦ࠳ࠬޕ㊀ௌോ࿖㧔HIPC㧕ࠗ࠾ࠪࠕ࠹ࠖࡉ߇ㆡ↪ߐࠇࠆน⢻ᕈ߇ࠆ࿖ߛ߇ޔ 2006 ᐕᤨὐߢ 270 ం࠼࡞߽ߩኻᄖௌോࠍᛴ߃ߡ߅ࠅ㧔GDP ߩ 96.7%㧕 ߩߘޔ80%߇ṛ⚊㊄ ߣߥߞߡࠆޕHIPC ࠗ࠾ࠪࠕ࠹ࠖࡉㆡ↪ߩ᧦ઙߣߥߞߡࠆ⽺࿎ᷫࡍࡄߪቢᚑߐߖ 36 ⹏ቯ୯߇ 3.2 એਅߩ࿖ࠍ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߣߒޔ2.5 એਅࠍ”severe countries”ޔ2.6 એ 3.0 એਅߩ࿖ࠍ”core countries”ޔ3.1 એ 3.2 એਅߩ࿖ࠍ”marginal countries”ߣߒߡࠆޔ߅ߥޕ2007 ᐕߩᜰᮡߢߪޔࠕࡌޔ ࡒࡖࡦࡑ ߩࠕࡑ࠰ޔ3 ࠞ࿖ߦߟߡ⹏ቯߒߥ߆ߞߚߚ㒰ᄖߒߡࠆ⹏ޕቯ୯ߪޔ1 ߇ᦨዊޔ6 ߇ᦨ㜞 ߣߥߞߡࠆ⹏ޔ߅ߥޕቯ୯ߪޔ㌁ߩࠞࡦ࠻࠴ࡓߩⵙ㊂ߦၮߠߊ ߪ⚦ޕFASID(2008)ߦߒޕ 85 ߡ߅ࠄߕ37ޔᲑ㓏ߢṛ⚊㊄ࠍᷫࠄߔࠃ߁ߥ╷߇ᰳߌߡࠆߚߣ⠨߃ࠄࠇࠆޕㅒߦᲧセ ⊛⹏ቯ୯߇㜞ߩߪࠬࡀࠫࡆޔⅣႺߣᱦേຬ⢻ജߢࠆޕᱦേຬ⢻ജߦߟߡߪޔ⍹ᴤ ࠍേຬߢ߈ࠆߣ߁ᗧߢ㜞ߣ⠨߃ࠄࠇࠆ৻ޕᣇߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔᄖ⾗ߩዉࠍⓍᭂ⊛ߦ ⴕߞߡ߅ࠅޔᄖ⾗ߦኻߔࠆఝㆄភ⟎ߥߤᐲ⊛ߥⅣႺߪᢛߞߡࠆ⻉ࡉࠕߦ․ޕ࿖߿ਛ࿖ ߇ࠬ࠳ࡦ߳ߩᛩ⾗ࠍⴕߞߡࠆ␠ߩઁߩߘޕળ৻ᕈߢ߽ᐔဋ 2.4 ߣඨಽએਅߩૐὐᢙ ߦ⇐߹ߞߡࠆޕ 㧠 IDA ⾗㊄㈩ಽߩߚߩ⹏ቯ୯㧔2007㧕 䋱䋮⚻ᷣㆇ༡ 㪠㪛㪘⾗ ㊄㈩ಽ 㩿㩷㩷㪀ౝ䈲㪎㪌䈎࿖ਛ ᜰᮡ 䈱㗅 䊙䉪䊨 ⚻ᷣ ⽷ ╷ ௌോ ╷ 䋲䋮᭴ㅧ╷ ᐔဋ ⾏ᤃ ㊄Ⲣ 䊎䉳䊈 䉴ⅣႺ 䋳䋮␠ળ৻ᕈ ᐔဋ 䉳䉢䊮 䉻䊷 ᐔ╬ 䊥 䉸䊷䉴 䈱ᱜ 䈭㈩ಽ ੱ᧚ ⢒ᚑ 䋴䋮䉶䉪䉺䊷▤ℂ ᜬ⛯ ␠ળ น⢻䈭 ⼔䈫 ⅣႺ ഭᮭ ╷ ᐔဋ ⽷↥ᮭ ㅘᕈ䊶 䈍䉋䈶 ੍▚䈍 䉝䉦䉡䊮 ᱦേ ⴕ䈱 ⷙೣ䈮 䉋䈶⽷ 䉺䊎䊥 ຬ䈱ല ⾰ ၮ䈨䈒䉧 ▤ℂ 䊁䉞䊶 ₸ᕈ 䊋䊅䊮 䈱⾰ ᳪ⡯ 䉴 ᐔဋ 䉴䊷䉻䊮㩷㩿㪎㪇㪀 㪉㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪈㪅㪌 㪉 㪅㪎 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪎 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪉 㪅㪋 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪇 㪉 㪅㪊 䉝䊮䉯䊤㩷㩿㪍㪉㪀 㪉㪅㪎 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪇 㪊 㪅㪇 㪋㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪏 㪊㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪉 㪅㪎 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪌 㪉 㪅㪋 㪈 㪅㪏 䉳䊮䊋䊑䉣㩿㪎㪌㪀 㪈㪅㪎 㪈㪅㪇 㪈㪅㪇 㪈㪅㪇 㪈 㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪈㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪈㪅㪌 㪈㪅㪌 㪈㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪈 㪅㪏 㪈㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪌 㪈㪅㪌 㪈㪅㪇 䊅䉟䉳䉢䊥䉝㩿㪋㪈㪀 㪊㪅㪋 㪋㪅㪇 㪋㪅㪌 㪋㪅㪌 㪋 㪅㪊 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪉 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪊 㪅㪉 㪉㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪇 㪉 㪅㪐 䉝䊐䉧䊆䉴䉺䊮㩿㪎㪈㪀 㪉㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪊㪅㪇 㪊 㪅㪉 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪊 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪇 㪉 㪅㪊 㪈㪅㪌 㪊㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪌 㪉㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪇 㪉 㪅㪉 㪊㪅㪉 㪊㪅㪎 㪊㪅㪋 㪊㪅㪌 㪊 㪅㪍 㪊㪅㪏 㪊㪅㪉 㪊㪅㪊 㪊㪅㪋 㪊㪅㪋 㪊㪅㪋 㪊㪅㪋 㪊㪅㪈 㪊㪅㪈 㪊 㪅㪊 㪉㪅㪐 㪊㪅㪉 㪊㪅㪋 㪊㪅㪇 㪉㪅㪐 㪊 㪅㪈 䊶䊶䊶䊶䊶 㪠㪛㪘୫࿖ᐔဋ ᚲ㧦⇇㌁ⴕ 㧔http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/IRAI/2007/IRAI2007table1.pdf㧕 㧔㧟㧕Index of State Weakness㧔࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡ㧕Brooking Institute & Center for Global Development Rice ߣ Patrick ߪ㌁߿ Freedom House ߥߤ 20 ߩᣢሽߩᦨᣂ࠺࠲ࠍၮߦ⚻ޔᷣޔᴦޔ ᴦ␠ޔળߩ 4 ߟߩࠞ࠹ࠧߦಽߌߡ࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈߦߟߡᜰᮡൻࠍ⹜ߺߡࠆޕ ㌁ߩቯ⟵ߔࠆૐᚲᓧ࿖ޔૐਛᚲᓧ࿖߅ࠃ߮ਛᚲᓧ࿖ߦർᦺ㞲ࠍട߃ߚ 141 ࠞ࿖ࠍኻ⽎ ߣߒ⋧ޔኻ⊛ߥ࿖ߩᒙߐߩࡦࠢઃߌࠍߒޔ╷┙᩺⠪ߩߚߩ✚ว⊛߆ߟ⏕ߥෳ⠨࠷ ࡞ߦߥࠆߎߣࠍᗧ࿑ߒߡࠆ38ߩߎޕಽᨆߦࠃࠆߣޔၞ⊛ߦߪࠨࡂએධࠕࡈࠞ⻉࿖ ߇ 30 ਛ 23 ࠞ࿖߽ߞߡ߅ࠅࡂࠨޔએධࠕࡈࠞߦ․ߦ⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞࿖߇㓸ਛߒ ߡࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ39ޕ 5 ߦᧄ⎇ⓥߢขࠅᛒߞߚ࿖ߩ㗅ࠍ␜ߒߚ߇߽ᦨޔߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔᒙ࿖߆ࠄᢙ߃ ߡ 141 ਛ 6 ߩޟᭂߡᒙߥ࿖㧔critically weak states㧕ޠ40ߦ⟎ߒߡࠆޔߚ߹ޕ࿑ 3 ߦࠬ࠳ࡦߩ⋧ኻ⊛ߥᒙߐࠍ␜ߒߚߩߎޕ࿑߆ࠄߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔ⣀ᒙᕈ߇․ߦᴦ ᴦߩࠞ࠹ࠧ ਛ㑆 I-PRSP ᩺ࠍ 2006 ᐕߦ╷ቯߒߚ߇ޔർㇱߩߺࠍኻ⽎ߣߒߡߚߚᛚߐࠇߕޔߪߘߩ߹߹ ߣߥߞߡࠆޕCPA ᓟ㧢ᐕ㑆ߪᥳቯᦼ㑆ߣߥߞߡࠆߚޔ㌁ࠍᆎ࿖㓙␠ળ߽ PRSP ߩ╷ቯࠍᒝⷐ ߖߕߦޔ㌁࿖ㅪᐭ߇ߞߚ࡚ࠫࠗࡦ࠻ࠕࠬࡔࡦ࠻ႎ๔㧔JAM㧕߿⽺࿎ᷫࠍᦨ⋡ᮡߣߒ ߡࠆࠬ࠳ࡦߩ࿖ኅ㧡ࠞᐕ⸘↹㧔2007-2011㧕ࠍ⽺ޟ࿎ᷫ⸘↹ߡߒߣޠណ↪ߒߡࠆޕ 38 FASID (2008) 39 ߘߩઁߩ 30 ߆࿖ౝߩ 7 ࠞ࿖ߪࠕࡈࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦޔ࠴ࠗࡂޔࠢࠗޔർᦺ㞲ޔ࡞ࡄࡀޔࡑࡦࡖࡒޔ ࠗࠛࡔࡦޕ 40 ⣀ᒙ࿖ 1-3 㧔࠰ࡑࠕࠧࡦࠦޔࡦ࠲ࠬ࠾ࠟࡈࠕޔ᳃ਥ࿖㧕߇ޟᄬᢌ࿖ኅ㧔Failed States㧕 ޠ ޔ4-28 ߇ޟᭂߡᒙߥ࿖㧔critically weak states㧕 ޠ ޔ29-56 ࠍޟᒙ࿖ኅ㧔Weak States㧕 ߣޠಽ㘃ߒߡ ࠆޕ 37 86 㧔4 㧕ߢᭂࠊߛߞߡࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆߩߘޕਛߢ߽⚗ ⚗ߩỗߒߐ㧔Conflict Intensity㧕 ߣੱ ੱᮭଚኂ㧔Gross human rights abuse㧕ߩᜰᮡߦ߅ߡ 141 ࠞ࿖ਛᦨ߽ૐ୯ߦߥߞߡࠆޕ ߎࠇߪޔ2003 ᐕࠃࠅ⛯ߡࠆ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞⚗߇ 2008 ᐕ߹ߢߦᱫ⠪ 30 ਁੱޔ㔍᳃߿࿖ౝ ㆱ㔍᳃ߦߥߞߚੱ߇ 200 ਁੱ߽߅ࠅ㧔ߕࠇ߽࿖ㅪផቯ㧕ޔ߽ᱫ⠪߿ജ߇⛘߃ߥ ⁁ᘒߢࠅߥ߇ࠄޔᐭߦ⚗ᱛ⢻ജ߇ਲߒߎߣࠍ␜ߒߡࠆੱޕᮭᜰᮡߦ߅ߡߪޔ ࡃࠪ࡞ᄢ⛔㗔ߦㅱ⁁߇ߐࠇࠆߥߤ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ߦ߅ߌࠆੱ⊛ߥ㗴߇ᄢ߈ߊ࿃ߒ ߡࠆ߆ࠄߢࠆߣ್ᢿߢ߈ࠆ࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔߚ߹ޕએᄖߢ߽ 2007 ᐕߦߪࠕࡆࠛࠗߥߤධർ Ⴚ⇇ၞߦ߅ߡᱫ⠪ࠍ߁ኻ┙߇ߎߞߡ߅ࠅޔධർᐔวᗧߩᓟߢ߽ኻ┙ߩἫ⒳߇ߊ ߔ߱ߞߡࠆߎߣ߇ߍࠄࠇࠆޕ ߘߩઁޔ ᴦ⊛㕙ߦ߅ߡ߽ߔߴߡߩᜰᮡ߇ૐ୯ࠍ␜ߒߡ߅ࠅోޔߢਅ 10 ߦ ⟎ߒߡࠆޕౝᚢ⚳⚿߆ࠄ߹ߛ 4 ᐕߒ߆⚻ߞߡ߅ࠄߕޔᣂᐭߩਅߢࠨࡆࠬࠍឭ ଏߔࠆ⢻ജ߇ᒙߦ․ޕᣇ߳ߩࠨࡆࠬ߇ᒙ߇ޔධㇱߦ߅ߡߪᚢⵍἴߦߥ ࠅၮ␆⊛ߥ␠ળ⚻ᷣࠗࡦࡈ߇⎕უߐࠇߚޔ2005 ᐕએ೨ߦᱜᑼߥᐭ߇ሽߒߡߥ߆ ߞߚߎߣ߆ࠄޔᢎ⢒ޔஜޔ᳓ߥߤၮᧄ⊛ߥࠨࡆࠬࠍឭଏߔࠆ⢻ജ߇㕖Ᏹߦૐޕ ߹ߚޔධർᐭߣ߽ߘࠇߙࠇታ⾰৻ౄ⁛ⵙߩァᮭߢࠅߩઁޔ㊁ౄ߇ឃ㒰ߐࠇߡࠆ41ޕ ᴦ⊛㕙ߦ߅ߡ Freedom ߿ Voice and Accountability ߩᜰᮡ߇ૐߊޔᏒ᳃ߩᴦෳട߇㒢 ࠄࠇߡࠆߎߣ߇ુ߃ࠆޕౝᚢߩᓇ㗀ߢᏒ᳃␠ળ߇⢒ߞߡߥߎߣ߽ࠆ߇ޔർㇱߢߪ NGO ߳ߩⷙ߇෩ߒ42৻ޕᣇ⚻ߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔᷣߪ⍹ᴤࠍਥߥⷐ࿃ߣߒߡ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳₸ ߪ㜞ߊޔ10.5%(2007)ߣㄭᐕੑᩴᚑ㐳ࠍㆀߍߡ߅ࠅ ߽₸ࡈࡦࠗޔ7-8%บߣቯߒߡࠆޕ ߥ߅ᧄޔಽᨆ߆ࠄ⺒ߺขࠇߥὐߣߒߡߪ 2 ὐࠍߍߚޔߕ߹ޕᜰᮡࠍขࠅᛒ߁ᐕߩ ᤨὐߢ್ᢿߒߡࠆߚ߫߃ޔᜰᮡ߇▸࿐ߣߒߡࠆᐕߦࠢ࠺࠲߇ߎࠄߥߌࠇ߫ ޟIncidence of Coupߩޠᜰᮡߪ 10 ὐḩὐߣߥࠅᦨޔㄭߩዪേะ߿ᱧผ⊛ߥ⚻✲ߥߤ߇ࠄ ߕޟޔὐߩߡߒߣޠಽᨆߦ⇐߹ߞߡࠆ␠ߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔߚ߹ޕળߩᜰᮡߪ⋧ኻ⊛ߦᖡ ߊߪߥ߇ޔၞߦࠃߞߡߪ⇇ߢ߽㕖Ᏹߦᖡሶଏߩᱫ₸ޔᩕ㙃ᄬ⺞₸ߥߤ߇ࠬ࠳ ࡦోߣߒߡߩᜰᮡߣߒߡಽᨆߐࠇߡ߅ࠅ43ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޔၞᩰᏅߩ㗴߇ߎߎߢߪขࠅᛒ ࠊࠄࠇߡߥߎߣߦ⇐ᗧߔߴ߈ߢࠆޕ ߎߩಽᨆߦࠃࠅ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔࠍ࿃ߣߒߚੱᮭଚኂ߿ CPA ⟑ฬᓟߩᥳቯᦼ㑆ਛߢ ࠅධർߩኻ┙߇߹ߛࠄࠇࠆ44ߣ߁ᴦ⊛ߥਇቯߐߥߤߩޟᴦ⊛ߥⷐ࿃ࠨߣޠ ࡆࠬߩ⾰ߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆᐭߩ⢻ജޔᴺߩᡰ㈩ޔᳪ⡯ߩ㗴ޔᏒ᳃ߩᴦ߳ߩෳᐲߥߤޟ ᴦ⊛ⷐ࿃ߦ․߇ޠ⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞ߣߎࠈߢࠆߎߣ߇ᶋ߈ᓂࠅߦߥߞߚޕ ߃߫ CPA ⨲᩺ᚑߦ㊁ౄߪ㒰ᄖߐࠇߡߚޕ ICC ߩ್ᓟ࡞ࠪࡃޔᄢ⛔㗔ߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ߢᵴേߔࠆߩ 13 ߩ NGO ࠍ࿖ᄖㅌࠍޕ 43 ࠬ࠳ࡦోߩೋ╬ᢎ⢒✚ዞቇ₸㧔UNICEF ᜰᮡ㧕ߪ⚂ 60%ߢࠆ߇ޔධㇱߢߪ 22-23%ߜ߁ߩߘޔᅚ ሶߪ 7-8%ߣૐ୯ߣߥߞߡࠆޕ 44 2007 ᐕ 12 ޔධㇱߩ SPLM ߪ⍹ᴤߦ㑐ߔࠆਇㅘᕈߦࠬࠨࡦޔ㑐ߔࠆ⾰ߦࠇࠆ㗄⋡ߥߤ ߩኻ┙ߤߥࠗࠛࡆࠕޔධർႺ⇇✢ߩද⼏ߩㆃṛߥߤޔർㇱ߇ CPA ጁⴕߦߒߡࠆޔㆃᑧࠍߎߒߡ ࠆߩߣޔℂ↱ߢർㇱߦࠆ SPLM ߩᐭ㑐ଥ⠪ࠍධㇱߦᒁ߈ߍߐߖᴦ⊛ߥࡏࠗࠦ࠶࠻ࠍߎߒߚޕ ᭽ߥޘද⼏ޔᐭⷐੱߩ㈩⟎឵߃ߥߤද⼏ߩ⚿ᨐޔSPLM ߇ 3 ࡩᓟߦᓳᏫߒࡦࠨ੍߽ࠬቯࠃࠅߪ ㆃࠇߡታᣉߐࠇߚ߇ߦߛᧂޔᴦ⊛ߥቯߪࠄࠇߥޕ 41 42 87 㧡 ࿖ኅߩᒙߐߩᜰᮡ୯ߣ㗅㧔141 ߆࿖ਛ㧕 ࿖ฬ ోࠬࠦࠕ ⚻ᷣ ᴦ ᴦ ␠ળ ࠬ࠳ࡦ 3.29㧔6 㧕 5.05㧔29 㧕 2.06㧔10 㧕 1.46㧔4 㧕 4.59㧔38 㧕 ࠕࡦࠧ 3.72㧔11 㧕 5.42㧔44 㧕 2.67㧔19 㧕 5.32㧔21 㧕 1.45㧔10 㧕 ࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ 3.44㧔8 㧕 1.56㧔3 㧕 1.56㧔5 㧕 6.81㧔41 㧕 3.84㧔26 㧕 ࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕ 4.88㧔28 㧕 5.39㧔45 㧕 3.51㧔32 㧕 5.37㧔22 㧕 5.24㧔44 㧕 ࠕࡈࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦ 1.65㧔2 㧕 4.51㧔14 㧕 2.08㧔11 㧕 0.00㧔1 㧕 0.00㧔1 㧕 ᚲ㧦Index of State Weakness (2008) ࠬࠦࠕߪޔ0-10 ߢޔ10 ߇ᦨ㜞ὐ߇ࠕࠦࠬޕૐߊ㗅߇㜞߶ߤ⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞ߎߣࠍ␜ߒߡࠆޕ ࿑㧟 ࠬ࠳ࡦߦ߅ߌࠆฦᜰᮡߩ⋧ኻ⊛ߥᒙߐ 㪜㪺㫆㫅㫆㫄㫀㪺 㪧㫆㫃㫀㫋㫀㪺㪸㫃 㪪㪼㪺㫌㫉㫀㫋㫐 㪪㫆㪺㫀㪸㫃㩷㪮㪼㫃㪽㪸㫉㪼 㪌㫋㪿㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼 㩿㪏㪈㪄㪈㪇㪇㩼㪀 㪋㫋㪿㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼 㩿㪍㪈㪄㪏㪇㩼㪀 㪊㫉㪻㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼 㩿㪋㪈㪄㪍㪇㩼㪀 㪉㫅㪻㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼 㩿㪉㪈㪄㪋㪇㩼㪀 㪥㪆㪘 㪈㫊㫋㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼 㩿㪇㪄㪉㪇㩼㪀 㪸 㫇㫀㫋 㩷㪺 㪸 㪞 㪛㪧 㩷㪞 㪠㫅㪺 㫉㫆 㫆㫄 㫎㫋 㪿 㪼㩷 㪠㫅 㪼㫈 㫌㪸 㫃㫀㫋 㫐 㪠㫅 㪩㪼 㪽㫃㪸 㪾㫌 㪞㫆 㫋㫀㫆 㫃㪸 㫍㪼 㫅 㫋㫆 㫉㫅 㫉㫐 㫄 㩷㪨 㪼㫅 㫌㪸 㫋㩷㪜 㫃㫀㫋 㪽㪽㪼 㫐 㪺㫋 㫀㫍 㪼㫅 㪭㫆 㪼㫊 㪩㫌 㫀㪺 㫊 㪼㩷 㫃㪼 㪸㫅 㩷㫆 㪻㩷 㪽㩷㪣 㪘㪺 㪸㫎 㪺㫆 㪚㫆 㫌㫅 㫅㫋 㫋㪸 㫉㫆 㪹㫀 㫃㩷 㫆 㫃㫀㫋㫐 㪽㩷㪚 㫆㫉 㫉㫌 㫇㫋 㫀㫆 㫅 㪝㫉 㪞㫉 㪚㫆 㪼㪼 㫆㫊 㪻㫆 㫅㪽 㫊㩷 㫃㫀㪺 㫄 㪟㫌 㫋㩷㪠 㪫㪼 㫄㪸 㫅㫋 㪼㫅 㫉㫉 㫅㩷 㫀㫋㫆 㫊㫀㫋 㪩㫀 㫉㫐 㪾㪿 㫐 㩷㪘 㫋㫊 㪽㪽㪼 㩷㪘 㪹㫌 㪺㫋 㪼㪻 㫊㪼 㪧㫆 㩷㪹 㫊 㫐㩷 㫃㪅㩷㪪 㪠㫅㪺 㪚㫆 㫋㪸 㫀㪻㪼 㫅㪽 㪹㪅 㫃 㫅 㪺 㩷㩽 㪺㪼 㫀㫋 㩷㪘 㩷㫆 㪹㫊 㪽㩷㪚 㪼㫅 㫆㫌 㪺㪼 㫇㫊 㩷㫆 㪽㩷 㪭 㪠㫄 㫇㫉 㫀㫆 㫆㫍 㫃㪼㫅 㪚㪿 㪼㪻 㪺 㫀㫃㪻 㪼 㩷㪮 㩷㪤 㪸㫋 㫆㫉 㪼㫉 㫋㪸 㩷㪸 㫃㫀㫋 㫅㪻 㫐 㩷㪪 㪸㫅 㪬㫅 㫀㫋㪸 㪧㫉 㪻㪼 㫋㫀㫆 㫀㫄 㫉 㫅㫆 㪸㫉 㫅 㫐㩷 㫌㫉 㪪㪺 㫀㫊㪿 㪿㫆 㫄 㫆㫃㩷 㪼㫅 㪚㫆 㫋 㫄㫇 㫃㪼 㪣㫀 㫋㫀㫆 㪽㪼 㩷㪜 㫅 㫏㫇 㪼㪺 㫋㪸 㫅㪺 㫐 6/141 㪥㪠 㩷㫇 㪼㫉 㪞 Overall Rank ᚲ㧦Index of State Weakness (2008)ࠃࠅ╩⠪ᚑ 㧔㧠㧕࿖ߩ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻㧦Country Index for Fragility Project (CIFP) CIFP ߪޔ2005 ᐕࠃࠅࠞ࠽࠳េഥᐡ㧔CIDA㧕߇⾗ߒޔCarment ઁ߇࿖ㅪᄢቇ㐿⊒⚻ᷣ⎇ ⓥᚲ㧔UNU-WIDER㧕ߢ⎇ⓥߒߡࠆࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߢࠆߪ⊛⋡ߩߘޕ࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᜰᮡ ൻߒߡࠄ߆ߦߒޔេഥࠍ㈩ಽߔࠆ㓙ߩෳ⠨⾗ᢱߣߔࠆߎߣߢࠆޕ╷ቯ⠪ߦߣߞߡޔ េഥๆ⢻ജ߇ૐߣߐࠇࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦኻߒߡߩߤޔಽ㊁ߦߤߩࠃ߁ߥᒻߢេഥ⾗㊄ࠍ㈩ ಽߔࠆߩ߇ലᨐ⊛ߢࠆ߆ᭂࠆߎߣ߇㊀ⷐߢࠅߩߘޔ࿖․ߩ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽࠍࠄ ߆ߦߒេഥ╷ߦᤋߐߖࠆߎߣࠍ⋡⊛ߣߒߡࠆޕ೨ㅀߩ㌁ߦࠃࠆ CPIAޔBrooking Institution ߩ Index of State Weakness ߩࠃ߁ߦ࿖ߩ⁁ᘒࠍ␜ߔ⚻ᷣޔ ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬޔᴦߣ‽⟋ޔ ੱ㑆㐿⊒ੱޔญേᘒޔⅣႺߩ㧢ߟߩࠢࠬ࠲ߦ߅ߌࠆᜰᮡࠍߥ߇ࠄಽᨆߔࠆ߇ߎޔ ߩ⎇ⓥߩ․ᓽߪޟࠄ߆ߎߘޔ࿖ኅߡߒߣޠᔅⷐߥⷐ⚛ߣߒߡޟޔᮭᆭ(Authority)ޟޔޠᱜ⛔ 88 ᕈ(Legitimacy)ޟޔޠ⢻ജ(Capacityߩޠ㧟ߟߩⷐ⚛㧔ALC㧕45ߦ⌕⋡ߒᦝߦಽᨆߒߚߢ⣀ᒙ ᕈᜰᮡࠍߒߡࠆߣߎࠈߢࠆ46ޕ ᦨᣂߩ⚿ᨐ(2007)ߦࠃࠆߣ㧔㧢㧕 ߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔ186 ߆࿖ਛᦨ߽⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞࿖ߣߥߞߡ ࠆ ߦ․ޕAuthority ߣ Capacity ߩᜰᮡ߇ᖡޕ2007 ᐕᤨὐߩ 6 ࠞ࠹ࠧߩ⚦ߥᜰᮡ ߇ߥ߇ޔ2006 ᐕߢߺࠆߣޔⅣႺᜰᮡࠍ㒰ߊߔߴߡߩᜰᮡ߇ 6.5 એߣߥߞߡ߅ࠅઁޔ࿖ ߦᲧߴߡࡄࡈࠜࡑࡦࠬ߇ᖡߡߴߔߚ߹ޕਅ߆ࠄ 40 એౝߩࡦࠢߢࠅਅ 20%ߩࠢ ࠬߦዻߒߡࠆߎߣߦߥࠆߦ․ޕᴦ ᴦㇱ㐷ߪࠕࡈࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦߦᰴߢ 2 ⇟⋡ߦᖡ୯ߢ ࠅ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔߩㅴዷ߇ߥߎߣ߿ 20 ᐕએ⛯ߚධർߩౝᚢߦࠃࠅޔᐭ߇ࠬ ࠳ࡦߩ㗔ౝߩࠦࡦ࠻ࡠ࡞⢻ജ߇ᒙߎߣߤߥ࠼ࡖ࠴ޔ㓞ធ࿖ߣߩ㑐ଥ߇ᖡൻߒߡࠆ ߎߣߦࠃࠅ Authority ߩᜰᮡߦᓇ㗀ߒߡࠆߣ⸒߃ࠆޕCapacity ߦ㑐ߒߡߪޔ⸥ Index of State Weakness ห᭽ޔ㐳ᦼౝᚢߩ⚿ᨐߩࠬࡆࠨޔឭଏ⢻ജ߇ᒙߎߣ߇࿃ߒߡࠆޕ ߘߩ⚿ᨐߪߢࡦ࠳ࠬޔ㧝ߢ␜ߒߚࠃ߁ߦᄙߊߩ␠ળᜰᮡ߇ૐ⁁ᘒߦࠆޕ 㧢 ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡ Fragility Authority Legitimacy Capacity 2007 6.79 䋨1 䋩 7.20 䋨1 䋩 6.3㩷 䋨29 䋩 6.69 䋨8 䋩 2006 7.48㧔18 㧕 7.83㧔5 㧕 7.58㧔14 㧕 7.21㧔34 㧕 Fragility Governance Economics Security Human Demography Environment 6.95(33 ) 6.00(20 ) development 2006 7.48 7.13(23 ) 6.38(33 ) 9.22(2 ) 8.22(24 ) 㧔ὐᢙ㧕1-3.5: ઁߩ࿖ߣᲧセߒߡࡄࡈࠜࡑࡦࠬ߇࿖ޔ3.5-6.5: ᐔဋὐߩ࿖ޔ6.5+: ઁߩ࿖ࠃࠅ߽ࡄࡈ ࠜࡑࡦࠬ߇ᖡ࿖ ᚲ㧦CIFP (2008) 㧔㧡㧕ᄬᢌ࿖ኅᜰᮡ㧦Failed State Index㧔FSI㧕 ᐔၮ㊄㧔The Fund for Peace: FP㧕ߪ 2005 ᐕࠃࠅޟFailed State㧔ᄬᢌ࿖ኅ㧕ࠣࡦࠠࡦޠ ࠍ⊒ߒߡࠆޕFSI ߪޔ㐿ߐࠇߡࠆ⸥߿ႎ๔ࠍ߽ߣߦ࿖ኅߩࠬࠢಽᨆࠍⴕߞߡ߅ ࠅ␠ޔળࠢ࠲⚻ޔᷣࠢ࠲ޔᴦࠢ࠲ߩ 3 ߟߩಽ㊁߆ࠄ 12 ߩᜰᮡࠍၮߦ࿖ኅߩ ቯᐲࠍᜰᮡߢ␜ߒߡࠆޕ 2008 ᐕᤨߩᜰᮡࠍࠆߣ㧔 7㧕ߦࠕࡑ࠰ߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔᰴߢਅ 2 ߢࠅߣ߶ޔ ࠎߤߩᜰᮡߢᖡࡄࡈࠜࡑࡦࠬࠍ␜ߒߡࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ㧔9.5 એࠍᄥሼߢ␜㧕ᤨޕ Authority㧔ᮭᆭ㧕㧦࿖᳃ߦኻߒᴺᓞߢⷙߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ࿖ߩ⢻ജޔLegitimacy㧔ᱜ⛔ᕈ㧕㧦ᮭߦ ኻߔࠆ࿖᳃ߩᔘ⺈ᔃࠍᏁߺߦ㚟ߢ߈ࠆ⢻ജޔᐭᴺ᩺ߦ࿖᳃߆ࠄߩᡰᜬࠍ㓸ࠄࠇࠆ⢻ജޔCapacity 㧔⢻ജ㧕㧦↢↥ᕈߩࠆ߽ߩߦ࿖᳃ߩ⾗Ḯࠍേຬߢ߈ࠆ⢻ജ㧔ࠨࡆࠬࠍឭଏߢ߈ࠆ⢻ജߦㄭ㧕 Carment et al. (2008), pp.5. 46 Carment et al (2008)ߦࠃࠆߣޔ߫߃ޔർᦺ㞲ߪ 6 ߟߩࠢࠬ࠲ߩᜰᮡ߆ࠄഀࠅߒߚޟ⣀ᒙᕈᜰ ᮡߩޠ㗅ߢߪ 186 ߆࿖ਛ 35 ߢࠆ߇ޔALC ಽᨆߢߪޔᱜ⛔ᕈ߇ਅ 3 ߦࡦࠢߐࠇߡࠆߎߣ ߇ࠊ߆ࠅߩߎޔಽᨆߢߤߎߦ㜞⣀ᒙᕈ߇ࠆߩ߆߇⏕ߦߐࠇࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆޕ 45 89 ♽⊛ߦߡ߽ޔ⍹ᴤߦᡰ߃ࠄࠇߡࠆ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ࠍ㒰ߡߪ߶ߣࠎߤᜰᮡ߇ࡄࡈࠜ ࡑࡦࠬߩᖡߐࠍ␜ߒߡࠆߦ․ޕ㐳ᦼߦ߱ౝᚢ߮࠳࡞ࡈ࡞⚗ߦࠃࠆᄢ㊂ߩ㔍᳃ ࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃ߩ⊒↢ߣߘߩᏫㆶߩㆃࠇޔ⇇⊛ߦ߽㕖㔍ߐࠇߡࠆ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞⚗ߦ߅ߌࠆ ੱᮭଚኂߩታᖱ߅ࠃ߮ᴦߩᖡൻߡߒߘޔਇဋⴧߥ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߥߤ߇ᜰᮡߦᓇ㗀ߒߡࠆޕ ߃߫ޔਛᄩᐭ߆ࠄᣇᐭ߳ߩઃ㊄ߪޔCPA એ೨ߩ 2000 ᐕߢ 8%ߩߺ㧔ർㇱᎺߩߺ ߦᏓ㧕ߢߞߚޕCPA એ㒠ߩ 2006 ᐕߢߪ 35%㧔ർㇱߩᣇߦ 19%ޔධㇱᎺߦ 16%㧕ߣ ߪߒߡࠆ߇⊒ޔᏓߦߟߡߪㅘᕈߥߤߩ㗴߇ᱷߞߡࠆ47ޕ㓸࿅ߩਇḩ߇ 2007 ᐕ ࠃࠅ 10 ὐߣ㜞ߩߪࡎ࡞ࡓ࠭࿖ㅪੱ⺞ᢛቭ߇࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ߦ߅ߡ᳃ߦࠃࠅ 30 ਁੱߩ ‶†⠪ࠍߒߡࠆߣ⊒ߒߡࠆߎߣ߆ࠄߢࠆ(FSI 2008)ޕ 㧣 FSI ߦࠃࠆޟᄬᢌ࿖ኅࠣࡦࠠࡦޠ ␠ળ ⚻ᷣ ᴦ ࿖ኅ ᵷ㑓䉣 ਇဋ ᕆỗ䈭 䈱㕖 䉰䊷䊎 ੱᮭ ᴦ 䊥䊷䊃 ᄖ⊛ ੱญ ⴧ䈭⚻ ⚻ᷣ ᱜ⛔ 䉴䈱ᖡ ଚኂ ᖡൻ 䈱บ ᵹ ᷣ⊒ ૐਅ ᕈ ൻ 㗡 ዷ 㗅 ੱญ േᘒ ജ 㔍᳃䊶 㪠㪛㪧 㓸࿅ 䈱ਇ ḩ 䉴䊷䉻䊮 㪉 㪐㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪍 㪈㪇㪅㪇 䉝䊮䉯䊤 㪌㪍 㪏㪅㪍 㪍㪅㪐 㪌㪅㪐 㪌㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪇 㪋㪅㪇 㪏㪅㪋 㪎㪅㪍 䉳䊮䊋䊑䉡䉣 㪊 㪐㪅㪎 㪐㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪌 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪍 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪍 䊅䉟䉳䉢䊥䉝 㪈㪍 㪍㪅㪉 㪌㪅㪈 㪐㪅㪋 㪏㪅㪉 㪐㪅㪉 㪌㪅㪐 㪏㪅㪐 㪏㪅㪎 䉝䊐䉧䊆䉴䉺䊮 㪎 㪐㪅㪊 㪏㪅㪐 㪐㪅㪌 㪎㪅㪇 㪏㪅㪈 㪏㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪉 㪏㪅㪊 㪉㪇㪇㪏ᐕ 㪏㪅㪏 㪐㪅㪊 㪎㪅㪊 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪐 㪐㪅㪏 㪐㪅㪐 㪐㪅㪐 㪎㪅㪌 㪍㪅㪉 㪎㪅㪌 㪎㪅㪉 㪐㪅㪏 㪐㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪊 㪎㪅㪇 㪎㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪉 㪐㪅㪊 㪍㪅㪈 㪏㪅㪋 㪐㪅㪍 㪏㪅㪏 㪈㪇㪅㪇 䉴䊷䉻䊮ᤨ♽ ␠ળ 㗅 ੱญ േᘒ ജ 㔍᳃䊶 㪠㪛㪧 㓸࿅ 䈱ਇ ḩ ⚻ᷣ ᴦ ਇဋ ᵷ㑓䉣 ࿖ኅ ᕆỗ䈭 ੱญ ⴧ䈭⚻ 䈱㕖 䉰䊷䊎 ੱᮭ ᴦ 䊥䊷䊃 ᄖ⊛ ⚻ᷣ ᵹ ᷣ⊒ ᱜ⛔ 䉴䈱ᖡ ଚኂ ᖡൻ 䈱บ ૐਅ ዷ ᕈ ൻ 㗡 㪐㪅㪈 㪐㪅㪇 㪏㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪉 㪏㪅㪎 㪏㪅㪇 㪐 㪅㪏 㪏㪅㪎 㪎㪅㪊 㪉㪇㪇㪌 㪊 㪏㪅㪍 㪐㪅㪋 㪎㪅㪏 㪉㪇㪇㪍 㪈 㪐㪅㪍 㪐㪅㪎 㪐㪅㪎 㪐㪅㪈 㪉㪇㪇㪎 㪈 㪐㪅㪉 㪐㪅㪏 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪉㪇㪇㪏 㪉 㪐㪅㪇 䋪㪐㪅㪌એ䉕ᄥሼ䈪␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯 㪐㪅㪍 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪉 㪎㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪏 㪐㪅㪏 㪐㪅㪈 㪐㪅㪏 㪐㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪈 㪎㪅㪎 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪌 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪐 㪐㪅㪎 㪐㪅㪏 㪏㪅㪏 㪐㪅㪊 㪎㪅㪊 㪈㪇㪅㪇 㪐㪅㪌 㪐㪅㪐 㪐㪅㪏 㪐㪅㪐 㪐㪅㪐 ᚲ㧦Failed State Index (2008) ᜰᮡߪ 0㨪10ޕὐᢙ߇㜞߶ߤᖡ୯ޕ 4-7 ࠬ࠳ࡦߩౝᚢߩⷐ࿃ߣ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽ ߎࠇ߹ߢᱧผ⊛ߥㆊ⒟߅ࠃ߮ߩࠬ࠽࠶ࡊ࡚ࠪ࠶࠻⊛ߥ․ᓽ߆ࠄࠬ࠳ࡦߩ᭽⋧ࠍ ࡆࡘߒߡ߈ߚ߇ߩࡦ࠳ࠬߡ߃߹〯ࠍࠄࠇߎޔ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽߦߟߡ߹ߣߚޕ 㧔㧝㧕ၞಽᢿ╷ߣ᭴ㅧൻߐࠇߚ␠ળ⊛ਇᐔ╬ ᬀ᳃ߦߥࠆએ೨ࠃࠅࠬ࠳ࡦߢߪධㇱߪᅛ㓮ߩଏ⛎ߣߒߡߩᛒࠍฃߌߡߚ߇ޔ 47 Thomas (2009) 90 ᬀ᳃ᤨઍߢߪߘࠇ߇⽶ߩㆮ↥ߣ߽⸒߃ࠆಽഀ⛔ᴦߦࠃࠅ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ߽ߩߣߥࠅޔධㇱࠍߪ ߓㄝൻߐࠇߚੱߪޘᢎ⢒ߩᯏળ⚻ޔᷣ㐿⊒ߩᯏળޔᴦෳട߳ߩᯏળ߇ߎߣߏߣߊᅓ ࠊࠇޔർㇱߩ৻ㇱߩࠛ࠻ߦࠃࠆን߿ᮭജ߇㓸ਛߒߚߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕਇᐔ╬ࠍ↢⛔ᴦ ߪ⁛┙ᓟ߽ᒁ߈⛮߇ࠇ⚻ߔ߹ߔ߹ޔᷣޔ᳃ᣖޔᔃℂ⊛ߥࠕࠗ࠺ࡦ࠹ࠖ࠹ࠖߩಽᢿ߇ᄢ ߔࠆߎߣߦߥࠅޔධㇱ߆ࠄߩਇḩ߇ࠅౣ߮ౝᚢ߳ߣ⊒ዷߒߡߞߚߩߢࠆޔߚ߹ޕ ᄢ⛔㗔ߩࡃࠪ࡞ᮭ߽ಽഀ⛔ᴦࠍታᣉߒޔᏁߺߦ᳃ᣖ⊛ߥኻ┙ࠍ↪ߒߚޕ᳃ᣖ㓸࿅ࠍ නߣߔࠆ᳃ࠍ⚵❱ߒޔSPLM/A ߣߩᚢ㑵߿ SPLM/A ࠍᡰᜬߒߡࠆᏒ᳃߿ࠍ᠄ߩߚ േຬࠍ࿑ߞߡࠆޕධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆਥᵹ᳃ᣖߢ SPLM/A ߩਛᩭࠍߥߔ࠺ࠖࡦࠞ48ߣኻ┙㑐ଥ ߦߞߚࠛ࡞ߩ᳃ࠍ⚵❱ߒߚߩ߽ߘߩౖဳߢࠆ49ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕ᳃ᣖߩኻ┙ࠍ↪ߒߚ ࡃࠪ࡞ᮭߩ╷⇛ߪޔධㇱߩ SPLM/A ߦኻߒߡߛߌߢߪߥߊࡓࠬࠗޔൻࡉࠕޔൻ ࠍឝߍߚᐭߪޠ࠼ࡂࠫޟޔ㧔⡛ᚢ㧕ߣ⒓ߒޔ᳃ࠍߞߚޟᄢⴐ㒐ⴡァޔߒ❱⚵ࠍޠ ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ᣇ߿㕖ࠕࡉੱ߇ᄙߊࡃጊ50ߢޔ᳃ᣖᵺൻߣ߽⸒߃ࠆ㕖ࠕࡉੱ ߳ߩ⇛ᅓ߿ⷅ᠄ࠍ➅ࠅߒߚޕධർ⚗ߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆ᳃ߩ DDR ࠍㅴߡࠆ߇࡞࠳ޔ ࡈ࡞ߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ߩޠ࠼ࠖ࠙ࡖࠫࡦࡖࠫޟሽ߿᳃ᣖኻ┙ࠍഥ㐳ߔࠆࠃ߁ߥᚢ⇛ߪ ߢ߽⚗ࠍⶄ㔀ൻߔࠆ⢿ᆭߢࠆޕ 㧔㧞㧕⾗Ḯߩ㓸ਛൻߣਇᐔ╬ߥ㐿⊒ ⸥ߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆ߇ߢ߹ࠇߎޔ㐿⊒߿ᛩ⾗߇ⴕࠊࠇߡ߈ߚߩߪ㚂ㇺㄭ㇠ߦ㒢ࠄࠇޔධർߩ ᩰᏅߛߌߢߪߥߊޔർㇱ߿ධㇱߩਛߦ߅ߡ߽ၞᩰᏅ߇↢߹ࠇߡࠆޕਛᄩᐭ߆ࠄ ᣇ߳ߩઃ㊄ߩᵹࠇ߆ࠄ߽ㇺᏒ߳ߩ⾗ᧄߩ㓸ਛൻ߇ࠊ߆ࠆޔߚ߹ޕർㇱߦ߅ߡߪޔධർ Ⴚ⇇ၞߢߞߚࡃጊޔㇱߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞᧲ޔㇱߦ߅ߡධㇱߩ⁁ߣห᭽ߦੱޔ ᡰេએᄖߩ㐿⊒េഥ߇ਈ߃ࠄࠇߥ߆ߞߚޔߚ߹ޕർㇱߩਛߢ⋥ធᚢߪࠇߡࠆᣇߦ ߅ߡ߽╙ޔੑᰴౝᚢਛߩ 20 ᐕ㑆ߪ߽㐿⊒߇ⴕࠊࠇߡߥ⁁ᴫߢࠆޕޔධㇱߢ ߩᓳᣥᓳ⥝ᡰេ߇ㅴࠎߢࠆ߇ߔ߿ߒࠬࠢࠕޔㇺᏒߦ㓸ਛߒߡࠆะߦࠆࠬޕ ࠳ࡦߦ߅ߡޟၞᩰᏅ߇ޠ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ⚗ߩⷐ࿃ߣߥߞߡࠆޕ 㧔㧟㧕⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߩߣㆊᐲߥଐሽ Collier(2007)߇ᜰ៰ߔࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ㒱ߞߡߒ߹߁㧠ߟߩ⟂ߩ߁ߜߩ৻ߟߦޟᄤὼ⾗Ḯߩ⟂ 48 ධㇱᣇᐭᤨઍߦ߽࠺ࠖࡦࠞᣖ߇ਥⷐᣇᐭࡐࠬ࠻ࠍ⁛භߒߡߚߚߩઁޔ᳃ᣖੱ࡞ࠛߦ․ޔ ߣߩኻ┙߇ߞߚߔࠍ⺆ࠞࡦࠖ࠺ޕ᳃ᣖߪධㇱߩੱญߩ⚂ 3 ಽߩ㧝ࠍභࠆ߇ޔ᳃ᣖ⊛ߦߪⶄᢙ߆ࠄ ߥࠆޕ 49 ᩙᧄ㧔2005㧕 50 ࡃੱߪ࠻ࡊࠫࠛࠦ࡞࠻ޔ㗔ᤨઍߦߪޔᅛ㓮ߩଏ⛎ߣߒߡฬࡃޕጊߪධࠦ࡞࠼ࡈࠔࡦᎺߦዻ ߒⴕޔߪർㇱߦዻߔࠆ߇ޔ᳃ߪ㕖ࠕࡉ♽ߢㄘ⠹᳃ߩࡃੱ߇ਥᵹߢ♽ࡉࠕޔߒ߆ߒޕㆆ’᳃ ߩࡃࠞੱߣߩࠍᎼࠆ߇વ⛔⊛ߦࠅޔSPLM/A ߇ࡃੱࠍ჻ߣߒߡ⊓↪ߔࠆߣޔᐭァߪ ࡃࠞੱࠍ᳃ߣߒߡ㓹ࠍ࠻ࠛߩੱࡃޔߚ߹ޕ᠄ⷅࠍޘߩੱࡃޔㅱޔᜧߒߚࠅࡃޔ ੱߩࠍᒝ⊛ߦ⒖ߐߖߚࠅߒߚࡃޕጊߪ߳ࡦ࠳ࠬ࠻ࡐޔᑧ߮ࠆ⍹ᴤࡄࠗࡊࠗࡦ߇ㅢࠅ ߦ߽ߥߞߡ߅ࠅޔർㇱߦߣߞߡߪ㊀ⷐߥၞߢࠆߩߦኻߒޔධㇱߦߣߞߡ߽ࡃၞࠍᛥ߃ࠆߎߣ߇ ർㇱߩജࠍᛥ߃ࠄࠇࠆߣߒߡޔධർਔᣇߦߣߞߡ㊀ⷐߥၞߣߒߡࠄࠇߡߚޕ 91 㧔The Natural Resource Trap㧕ߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔ߇ࠆ߇ޠ⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߩߪ߹ߐߦߎߩ⟂ߦ㒱ߞ ߡࠆޕ⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߩ߇╙ੑᰴౝᚢߩᒁ߈㊄ߩ৻ߟߦߥߞߡ߅ࠅߡߒߘޔ߽߹ߛ⍹ ᴤ⾗ḮࠍᎼࠅධർߩႺ⇇✢㗴߇ ઃߡߥޕCollier ߪ⾗ޔḮߦ㑐ࠊࠆࠣ࡞ࡊߩߺ ߇ଢ⋉ࠍฃߌ⾗ޔḮߩല₸⊛↪߇៊ߥࠊࠇޔㆊᐲߥ⾗Ḯ߳ߩଐሽ߆ࠄ৻⥸ߩ↢↥ᵴേ߇ ਇᵴ⊒ߦߥࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆߩࡦ࠳ࠬޕ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍߔᜰᮡߢߪޔ⍹ᴤߦࠃࠆ⚻ᷣࡄࡈ ࠜࡑࡦࠬ߇㜞߇㧔߃߫ GDP ᚑ㐳₸㧕ޔධർߣ߽⍹ᴤߦㆊᐲߦଐሽߒߡ߅ࠅ⚻ޔ ᷣᵴേ߳ߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍሺࠎߢࠆޕ⍹ᴤଔᩰߩਅ⪭ޔ⇇⊛ߥ㊄Ⲣෂᯏߦ⥰ࠊࠇߡ߅ ࠅޔධㇱࠬ࠳ࡦߦ⥋ߞߡߪ⍹ᴤ߇೨ᐕᲧ 30%ᷫߦߥࠅޔධㇱߩ⽷ߦᄢ߈ߊᓇ㗀ߒ ߡࠆ51ޔߦࠄߐޕർㇱߪࠕࡔࠞ߆ࠄߩ⚻ᷣⵙࠍฃߌߡ߅ࠅޔ⻉࿖߆ࠄߩᛩ⾗߇㒢 ࠄࠇߡࠆޕ 㧔㧠㧕ࠬ࠳ࡦߩℂ⊛ߥ⟎ ࠬ࠳ࡦߪ 9 ߟߩ࿖ߣ㓞ធߒޔ࠼ࡖ࠴ޔ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࠕ࠻ࠛޔࠕࡇࠝ࠴߽ࠛࠇߘޔDRC ࠦࡦࠧߥߤ߶ߣࠎߤߩ࿖߇⚗⚻㛎࿖ߢࠆߪࡦ࠳ࠬߚߩߘޕ㔍᳃ߩឃ࿖ߢࠆߣ หᤨߦ㔍᳃ߩฃࠇ࿖ߦ߽ߥߞߡࠆ ࠍࠕࡇࠝ࠴ࠛޔߚ߹ޕSPLA ߩὐߣߒߡߚᤨߦޔ ኻߦࠬ࠳ࡦᐭߪࠛ࠴ࠝࡇࠕߩᐭࠍᡰេߒߚࠅ߽ߢ࠼ࡖ࠴ޔ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔห᭽ߦ ߩᐭ⚵❱ࠍᡰេߒߡࠆᤨᦼ߇ߞߚߥߤޔㄭ㓞࿖ߣߩ㑐ଥߪᏱߦ✕ᒛߒߚ㑐ଥߦ ࠆޕCollier ߩ㧠ߟߩ⟂ߩਛߦ߽ޟᖡ㓞࿖㧔Bad Neighbors㧕ߩ⟂ޔࠅ߇ޠ㓞ੱߣߩ㑐 ଥ߇Ᏹߦࠬ࠳ࡦߩᴦ⚻ޔᷣ⊛ߥᓇ㗀ࠍ߽ߚࠄߒߡࠆޕ 㧔㧡㧕ࠗࠬࡓේℂਥ⟵ߩบ㗡 ߎࠇ߹ߢߺߡ߈ߚࠃ߁ߦࡓࠬࠗޔේℂਥ⟵߇ᮭߣ⚿߮ߟߡࠪࡖࠕᴺࠍో࿖ ߦㆡ↪ޔᢎ⢒ߩࠕࡆࠕ⺆ൻߥߤᄢ߈ߥᓇ㗀ࠍਈ߃ߡ߈ߡ߅ࠅޔධㇱߦኻߔࠆߒઃߌ߇ ⚗ߩ৻ߟߩⷐ࿃ߦ߽ߥߞߡࠆޕේℂਥ⟵ౄߩ NIF ߽㊁ౄߣߒߡᓇ㗀ജ߇ࠅ߫ߒޔ ߒ߫ᴦߩᷙੂࠍߡࠆߪࡦ࠳ࠬޕᛩ⾗ߩࠅߣߒߡࠕ࡞ࠞࠗ࠳ߩࠝࠨࡑࡆ ࡦ࠺ࠖࡦࠍṛߐߖߚࠅ52ࡓࠬࠗޔㆊỗᵷ߿࠹ࡠ⚵❱ߣߩߟߥ߇ࠅ߇ߞߚߎߣ߽ ࠅޔㆊỗߥࠗࠬࡓߩേ߈߇ᵈⷞߐࠇࠆޕ 㧔㧢㧕ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬⴕޔߦ߅ߌࠆ⢻ജߣᏒ᳃ෳട ᜰᮡߦࠇߡࠆߣ߅ࠅⴕޔࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔ⢻ജ߇ૐߦ․ޕධㇱᐭߪౝᚢߢ⢻ߥ ੱ᧚ࠍᄬߞߚߎߣޔᢎ⢒ᯏળ߇㒢ࠄࠇߡߚߎߣࡉࠕޔൻߩᓇ㗀ߢ↪⺆ߣߥߞߚ⧷⺆ ߩ⢻ജ߇ૐߎߣߥߤޔၮ␆⊛ࠨࡆࠬࠍឭଏߔࠆⴕ⢻ജߪᭂߡૐ⁁ᘒߢࠆޕᳪ ⡯㗴ߢධㇱ⽷ോᄢ⤿߇ᄬ⡯ߔࠆߥߤߩઙ߽߈ߡ߅ࠅߩࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔᒝൻޔᴺߩ⛔ᴦ ߇ᕆോߣߥߞߡࠆޔߚ߹ޕධㇱߪ SPLMޔർㇱߪ NCP ߩァᮭ߇ីߞߡ߅ࠅߩઁޔ㊁ ᄖോ⋭ਥޟTICAD IV ࡈࠜࡠࠕ࠶ࡊࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓ৻╙࡞ࠠࡃ࡞ࠨޔߩߢޠᄢ⛔㗔ၮ⺞Ṷ⺑߆ࠄ 㧔2009 ᐕ 3 11 ᣣޔᣈ㧦࿖ㅪᄢቇ㧕 ޕ 52 1991-1996 ᐕ᧲ߪࡦࠖ࠺ࡦࡆޕㇱߩ㐿⊒㧔〝ߥߤ㧕ࠍታᣉޕ 51 92 ౄߪឃ㒰ߐࠇߡࠆޕIndex of State Weakness ߢ߽ Freedom ߿ Voice and Accountability ߩᜰᮡ ߇ૐߊޔᏒ᳃ߩᴦෳട߇㒢ࠄࠇߡࠆޕ 㧔㧣㧕ධㇱౝߩ⣀ᒙⷐ⚛ CPA ߦ߅ߡᦨ⚳⊛ߦߪ SPLA/M ߇໑৻ߩᐭߩᷤ⋧ᚻߣߥߞߚ߇ޔౝᚢਛߦߪ SPLA/M ߇ᐲ߽ಽⵚޔ૬วࠍ➅ࠅߒߚߩߘޕ⢛᥊ߦࠆධㇱߩ᳃ᣖ⊛ߥኻ┙ߪᧂߛየࠍ ᒁߡࠆޕCPA ߩᐨᢥߢޟMake Unity Attractiveߣޠධർ⛔৻ࠍ㝯ജ⊛ߥ߽ߩߦߔࠆߎߣ ߇ឝߍࠄࠇߡࠆ߇ߪߕ߹ޔධㇱౝߢߩ⛔৻㧔Unity㧕ࠍ⏕ታߥ߽ߩߣߒߚߢ 2011 ᐕߩ ᳃ᛩߦะߌ⼏⺰ࠍᚑᾫൻߒർㇱߣߩ Unity ࠍ⠨߃ࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆޕ 㧔㧤㧕࠳࡞ࡈ࡞⚗ߦ࿃ߔࠆ⣀ᒙᕈ ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩᜰᮡߩ߶ߣࠎߤోߡߦ߅ߡߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔ⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞ಽ㊁߇ޟᴦ⛽ᜬޔޠ ੱޟᮭଚኂޟޔޠ㔍᳃࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃ߩ⊒↢⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔࠅ߅ߡߞߥߦޠߦ࿃ߔࠆ⣀ ᒙᕈ߇㜞ߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆޕධർᴦ⛽ᜬߦߟߡߪࠆޔ⒟ᐲߩㅴዷ߇ࠄࠇࠆ߇ޔCIFP ߇ಽᨆߒߡࠆࠃ߁ߦ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔࠍࠦࡦ࠻ࡠ࡞ߔࠆᐭߩ⢻ജ߇ૐߎߣߢ࿖ߩ ᮭᆭ㧔Authority㧕߇ૐߊߥߞߡࠆߩߎޔࠅ߹ߟޕᜰᮡߪߩࠬ࠳ࡦᐭ߇࿖᳃߆ࠄߩ ା㗬ᐲ߇ૐߊޔᴺߩ⛔ᴦ߇ᒙߎߣࠍ␜ߒߡࠆޕ2003 ᐕࠃࠅỗൻߒߡࠆࠬ࠳ࡦㇱ ߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞⚗ߪߛ߹ޔᐔ߳ߩญ߇߃ߥ⁁ᘒߢࠆ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޕߪ࿖㓙 ␠ળ߆ࠄߩ CPA ᡰេ߳ߩ㑐ᔃࠍߋⷐ࿃ߦ߽ߥߞߡ߅ࠅޔታ㓙࠳࡞ࡈ࡞⚗ߩ⸃ࠍ ⏕ߥ᧦ઙߣߒߡർㇱ߳ߩេഥࠍᱛߔࠆ╷ࠍߣࠆవㅴ࠼࠽߽ࠆ53ߥߤ࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ 㗴߇ኻᄖ⊛ߥ㗴ߦ߽⊒ዷߒߡࠆߎߣ߇┍ࠊࠇࠆޕᄢ⛔㗔ߩㅱ⁁߇ᱜᑼߦ ICC ࠃࠅ ߐࠇޔᓟ⻉࿖߆ࠄߩᓳ⥝㐿⊒ᡰេ߇ߤ߁ᄌൻߔࠆߩ߆߽ਇㅘߢࠆޕ 㧔㧥㧕CPA ታᣉߦ߆߆ࠆਇቯⷐ࿃ ࿑ 2 ߦ␜ߒߚߣ߅ࠅ CPA ࠍጁⴕߒߡߊߢޔᓟ㊀ⷐߥࡑࠗ࡞ࠬ࠻ࡦߣߒߡߪޔ2009 ᐕ 7 ߹ߢߦ੍ቯߐࠇࠆ✚ㆬߩታᣉ54ޔ2011 ᐕ 7 ߦධㇱ⥄ࠍ߁᳃ᛩ߅ࠃ߮ࠕࡆ ࠛࠗߩᏫዻࠍ߁᳃ᛩ߇ប߃ߡࠆޔߒ߆ߒޕCPA ታᣉߦ㑐ߒᄢ߈ߥ⺖㗴ߦ⋥㕙 ߒߡࠆޕ ߹ߕޔ2009 ᐕ 7 ߹ߢߦ੍ቯߐࠇߡߚㆬߢࠆ߇ޔᤓᐕ 4 ߦታᣉߐࠇߚࡦࠨࠬ ߩ⚿ᨐ߇ 2009 ᐕ 3 ᤨὐߢ߽ߐࠇߡߥ⁁ᴫ߆ࠄߺߡޔㆬ⊓㍳߇ߢ߈ߕㆬߩᑧᦼ ߇੍ᗐߐࠇࠆ⚿ߩࠬࠨࡦޕᨐ߇ߢߥⷐ࿃ߣߒߡޔᐭ㑐ଥ⠪ߪᛛⴚ⊛ߥ㗴ߢࠆߣ ࿁╵ߒߡߚ߇55ޔታ㓙ධㇱߩੱญ߇࿖᳃ోߩ 25%ࠍഀࠆㄟߺߣߥࠅ56ޔධㇱ߇⚿ᨐࠍ 53 ߃߫࠼ࠗ࠷ޕߤߥࠞࡔࠕޔ ✚ㆬߪ 7 ߟߩࡌ࡞㧔ᄢ⛔㗔ޔ࿖᳃⼏ળ⼏ຬ㧔㒮/ਅ㒮㧕 ޔᎺ⍮ޔᎺ⼏ળ⼏ຬޔ࠽࡚ࠪ࠶ࡒࠦ⟲ޔ ࡄࡗࡓⴕቭޔᏒᓎᚲⴕቭ㧕ߢታᣉޔߦࠄߐޕධㇱߦ߅ߡߪධㇱᄢ⛔㗔ޔධㇱ࿖᳃⼏ળ⼏ຬߩㆬ ߇ࠆޕ 55 ࠬ࠳ࡦ⛔৻ᐭ࿖㓙දജ⋭߳ߩࠗࡦ࠲ࡆࡘ㧔2009 ᐕ 3 2 ᣣ㧕 ޕ 54 93 ߥน⢻ᕈ߇ࠆߪࠇߎޕ࿖᳃⼏ળߢධㇱ⥄ᮭࠍᙗᴺᡷᱜߥߤࠍᜎุߢ߈ࠆ⼏ ຬഀࠅᒰߡᢙࠍᄬ߁ߎߣࠍᗧߔࠆߛ߹ޕർㇱߣߩା㗬㑐ଥ߇㉯ᚑߐࠇߡߥਛߢޔධ ㇱߦߣߞߡߪࡦࠨࠬߩ⚿ᨐ߇㊀ⷐߥᗧࠍᜬߟߎߣߦߥࠆޕ ᄢ⛔㗔ߩㅱ⁁㗴߽ᐔߩቯ⌕ߦᵄ⚉ࠍᛩߍߡࠆࡦ࠳ࠬޕߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ߢᵴേ ߒߡࠆ 13 ߩ NGO ߦኻߒࠬࡄࠗኈ⇼ߢ࿖ᄖㅌࠍㅢ㆐ߔࠆߥߤߔߢߦႎᓳភ⟎ࠍᆎ ߡࠆߩߎޔߚ߹ޕ㗴ߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ߩᐔᷤߦ߅ߡޔᐭജ߇⟋‽ޟ⠪ߩޠ ᄢ⛔㗔ࠍ⋧ᚻߦหߓ࠹ࡉ࡞ߦߟ߆ߥߊߥࠆน⢻ᕈ߽ࠅޔᐔᷤ߇ౣ߮ᥧ␂ߦਸ਼ࠅ ߍࠆᕟࠇ߽ࠆઁߩߘޕධർႺ⇇✢ߩ㗴ߩࠗࠛࡆࠕޔႺ⇇✢ߩ㗴ߥߤౣ߮ᐔࠍ⢿߆ ߔⷐ࿃߇߹ߛᱷߞߡࠆޕ 4-8 ࠬ࠳ࡦ߳ߩ࿖㓙␠ળߩᡰេ CPA ⺞ශᓟޔ3 ࡩᓟߦߪࠝࠬࡠߢ╙ 1 ࿁ᡰេ࿖ળว߇㐿߆ࠇޔ2005-2007 ᐕߩ 3 ᐕ㑆ߩ ᡰេⷐ⺧㗵⚂ 41 ం࠼࡞ߦኻߒޔ45 ం࠼࡞ߩᡰេ߇ߐࠇޔᣣᧄ߽ᒰ㕙 1 ం࠼࡞ߩᡰេ ࠍⴕߞߚޕታ㓙ޔᣣᧄߪߎߩ 3 ᐕ㑆ߢߩ⚂ 2 ం 1 ජਁ࠼࡞ࠍߒߡࠆߩ࠽࠼ޕ ࠬ࠳ࡦᡰេߩၮᧄ⊛ߥᣇ㊎ߪ CPA ታᣉଦㅴߣޔ࿖ㅪ⇇㌁ⴕࠬ࠳ࡦᐭ߇หߢ ⺞ᩏߒߚ Joint Mission Assessment㧔JAM㧕57ࡦ࠳ࠬޔᐭ㧡ࡨᐕ⸘↹ߦၮߠߚᡰេߢࠆޕ ࠬ࠳ࡦߦኻߔࠆਥⷐ࠼࠽ߪ ޔ8 ߩߣ߅ࠅ☨࿖ࠍ╩㗡ߦޔEC⧷ޔ࿖ࡁޔ࠳ࡦࠝޔ ࡞࠙ࠚߥߤߢࠆ☨ޕ࿖એᄖߩ᰷☨⻉࿖ߪ߶ߣࠎߤࠦࡕࡦࡈࠔࡦ࠼߿࿖㓙ᯏ㑐ࠍㅢߓߚ ᡰេࠍⴕߞߡࠆߩ࠼ࡦࠔࡈࡦࡕࠦޕઍ⊛ߥ߽ߩ߇ Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)ߢࠬޔ ࠳ ࡦ ో ࠍ ࠞ ࡃ ߔ ࠆ MDTF-National ߣ ධ ㇱ ߦ ኻ ߔ ࠆ 㐳 ᦼ ⊛ ߥ ᓳ ⥝ 㐿 ⊒ ↪ ߩ MDTF-South ߩ 2 ߟ߇ࠆޕMDTF ߪ⇇㌁ⴕ߇▤ℂߒޔၮᧄ⊛ߦߪࠬ࠳ࡦᐭ߽ 2/3 ࠍߔࠆߎߣߣߥߞߡࠆੱઁߩߘޕᡰេ↪ߩ Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)ޔධㇱ ߩᣧᦼᓳ⥝ߩߚߩ Sudan Recovery Fund for the Southern Sudan (SRF-SS)߇ࠆ࠽࠼ߤߥ⁛ޕ ߦࠃߞߡߪ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ⸃ࠍ᧦ઙߦߒޔධㇱߩ MDTF-S ߩߺߦߔࠆ࠼࠽߽ ࠆޔߦࠄߐޕㄭᐕ⍹ᴤᮭߣߩ㑐ଥ߆ࠄਛ࿖ߩᡰេ߇⋡┙ߞߡࠆޔߚ߹ޕ࿑ 4 ߩߣ߅ ࠅ⚗ޔ⚳⚿⋥ᓟߣ߁ߎߣ߽ࠅ ⚂ޔ70%ߩᡰេ߇ੱᡰេะߌߦߥߞߡࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ ߆ࠆޕ 2008 ᐕ 5 ߦ╙ 2 ᦼߩࡊ࠶ࠫ࠶࡚ࠪࡦߢ߽ߞߚ╙ 3 ࿁ᡰេ࿖ળวߢߪࡦ࠳ࠬޔ ᐭߪ 2011 ᐕ߹ߢߦᔅⷐߥ㗵ߣߒߡ 61 ం࠼࡞ࠍⷐ⺧ߒߚߩߦኻߒ࠽࠼ޔฦ࿖ࠃࠅ⚂ 48 ం࠼࡞߇ࡊ࠶ࠫߐࠇߚޕ ᣣᧄߪߘߩ߁ߜ 2 ం࠼࡞ࠍᒰ㕙ߩᡰេߣߒߡࡊ࠶ࠫߒߡࠆޕ Thomas (2009)ޕධㇱᐭߪධㇱߩੱญߪ 12-500 ਁੱߣផቯߒߡࠆ߇㧔TICAD IV ࡈࠜࡠࠕ࠶ࡊ ࡒ࠽(2009 ᐕ 3 11 ᣣ)ߢߩ⊒⸒㧕 ޔ800 ਁੱߒ߆ߥߣߔࠆ⚿ᨐ߇ߢߡࠆߣߩ߽ࠆޕ 57 JAM ߪᐔߩቯ⌕ޔMDG ㆐ᚑߦะߌߚ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳⽺࿎ᷫੱޔ㑆㐿⊒ߚߩ᧦ઙࠍ␜ߒ ╙ޔ1 ࡈࠚ ࠭㧔2005-2007㧕ߢߪᐔߩቯ⌕ޔ⢻ജᒝൻࠆ߃ߦ⋡ޔᡷༀߦ㊀ὐࠍ⟎߈ ╙ޔ2 ࡈࠚ࠭㧔2008-2011㧕 ߢߪޔMDGs ߦะߌߡߎࠇࠄߩ⺖㗴ࠍଦㅴߐߖࠆߎߣ߇ㅀߴࠄࠇߡࠆޕ 56 94 㧤 ODA ࠻࠶ࡊ 10 ࠼࠽㧔2006-2007 ᐔဋ㧕 (න㧦⊖ਁ☨࠼࡞) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ☨࿖ EC ⧷࿖ 㨿㩡㩧㩊㩨 㩓㩣㨽㨴㨺 㨻㩡㩖㩨⻉࿖ ࠞ࠽࠳ 㩇㨽㨴㨺㩍㩨㩧 ᣣᧄ ࠼ࠗ࠷ 725 277 211 149 113 78 75 58 47 44 ᚲ㧦OECD/DAC ࿑ 4 ࠢ࠲ੑ࿖㑆 ODA㧔2006-2007㧕 㧔㧝㧕ࠕࡔࠞ ࠕࡔࠞߪࡠ࠹߇ࡦ࠳ࠬᤨ৻ޔᡰេ࿖ኅߢߞߚߎߣ߆ࠄࡂ࡞࠷ࡓ߆ࠄᄢ㙚ᬺോ ࠍᱛߒߚࠅ⚻ޔᷣⵙࠍታᣉߒߡࠆ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔߚ߹ޕࠍ(࠼ࠗࠨࡁࠚࠫޟᄢ㊂⯦ Ვ)ߣޠᛕ್ߔࠆߥߤർߩࠬ࠳ࡦᐭߦኻߒߡ෩ߒᘒᐲࠍߣߞߡࠆ৻ޕᣇޔධㇱߦኻ ߒߡߪ⚻ᷣⵙࠍ⸃߈ޔౝᚢਛ߆ࠄᢎ⢒ᡰេߥߤߢ㐿⊒ᡰេࠍⴕߞߚ໑৻ߩࡃࠗߩ࠼࠽ ߢࠅߦࡦ࠳ࠬޔኻߒߡߪ ⷫޟSPLM/A ࠬ࠳ࡦᐭ߁ߣޠੑ㊀ߩ┙႐ࠍߣߞߡ ࠆޕർㇱߦኻߒߡߪੱᡰេߩߺ㧔࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ਛᔃ㧕ߢޔർㇱߩ㐿⊒ᡰេߪⴕߞߡߥޕ ධㇱߦኻߒߡߪޔஜޔᢎ⢒߳ߩᡰេࠍਛᔃߦኾ㐷ኅߩᵷ㆜ ♽ࠞࡔࠕޔNGO ࠍㅢߓߚᡰ េࠍⴕߞߡࠆߦ․ޕ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦᔅⷐߥࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ߿᳃ਥൻᡰេߣߒߡߪޔᳪ⡯ᆔຬળ ᡰេࠝࠫޔዪޔᣂ⡞ߥߤࡑࠬࠦࡒ߳ߩᛛⴚᡰេߥߤ߽ⴕߞߡࠆޕ ߹ߚ ߪࠞࡔࠕޔ25 ᐕએ೨ࠃࠅᦨᄢߩੱᡰេ࿖ߢࠆޕ1989 ᐕߦߪ࿖ㅪࡦ࠳ࠬޟ ↢✢ᵴേ㧔OLS㧕ᦨߡ߅ߦޠᄢߩ࠼࠽࿖ߢࠅޔ㘩♳េഥࠍਛᔃߦ㘫㙈߳ߩኻᔕࠍⴕ ߞߡ߈ߚޕCPA એ㒠 3 ᐕ㑆ߢੱޔᡰេޔPKO ᡰេ߅ࠃ߮ධㇱ߿ᚢߦߞߚၞߩᓳ⥝ ߩߚߦߐࠇߚᡰេ㗵ߪ⚂ 40 ం࠼࡞ߦࠅޔWFP ߩ㘩♳េഥߩ⚂ 80%ߪࠕࡔࠞߦࠃ ࠆᡰេߢࠆޕ2007 ᐕᐲߦߪ 10 ం࠼࡞ߩᡰេࠍⴕߞߡࠆޔߚ߹ޕPKO ᵴേᡰេߢߪޔ ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ߢዷ㐿ߔࠆ࿖ㅪAU วหࡒ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ㧔UNAMID㧕ߦኻߒޔ✵⸠ޔᯏ᧚ࡦࡖࠠޔ ࡊ⸳༡ߥߤޔUNAMID ߩ੍▚ߩ 25%ࠍᡰេߒߡࠆ㧔US Department of State (2008)㧕ޕ ࠬ࠳ࡦߪࠕࡔࠞߦߣߞߡ㧠ߟߩ㊀ὐᡰេ࿖58ߩ৻ߟߣߥߞߡ߅ࠅ ╙ޔ3 ࿁ᡰេ࿖ળว 58 ࠬ࠳ࡦߩઁߩ㊀ὐᡰេ࿖ߪޕࡦ࠲ࠬࠠࡄޔࡦ࠲ࠬ࠾ࠟࡈࠕޔࠢࠗޔ 㧔USAID ࠼᧲੩ࠫࡓᚲ㐳ߣ ߩࠗࡦ࠲ࡆࡘޕ2008 ᐕ 10 10 ᣣ㧕 95 ߩ႐ߢޔ2008 ᐕᐲߩ 1 ᐕ㑆ߩ੍▚ߩߺߢੱ㐿⊒ᡰេߣߒߡ 16 ం࠼࡞㧔ੱᡰេ߅ࠃ߮ ᣧᦼᓳ⥝ᡰេߦ 9 ం 6 ජਁ࠼࡞ޔ㐿⊒ߦ 6 ం 4 ජਁ࠼࡞㧕 ߦࠄߐޔPKO ᡰេߣߒߡ 19 ం ࠼࡞ߩࡊ࠶ࠫࠍⴕޔ㗵ߢ⟲ࠍᛮߡࠆޕ 㧔㧞㧕EC EC ߪޔ2005-2007 ᐕ߹ߢߦੱᡰេ߽ 12 ం࡙ࡠࠍޕDAC ⛔⸘ߢߪࠕࡔࠞߦ ᰴߢ 2 ⇟⋡ߩ࠼࠽ߢࠆޕ㊀ὐಽ㊁ߪ㘩♳ోߣᢎ⢒ౕޕ⊛ߦߪࠢࠗ࠶ࠢࠗࡦ ࡄࠢ࠻ࠍ߽ߚࠄߔㄘ㐿⊒ޔㄘߢߩቇᩞᑪ⸳ޔᚢⵍἴၞߩᓳ⥝ᡰេޔ᳃ਥൻࡃࠟޔ ࠽ࡦࠬᡰេࠍⴕߞߡࠆޕ㐿⊒ะߌߩᡰេᣇᴺߪޔർㇱߦ 54%ޔධㇱߦ 46%ࠍ㈩ಽߒ߶ޔ ߣࠎߤ 2 ߟߩ MDTF ࠍㅢߓߡߒߡࠆޕ2008-2013 ᐕߩᡰេߦኻߒ ╙ޔ3 ࿁ࠬ࠳ࡦࠦ ࡦ࠰ࠪࠕࡓߢ㐿⊒ะߌߦ 300 ਁ࡙ࡠࠍࡊ࠶ࠫߒߡࠆޕ 㧔㧟㧕⧷࿖㧛DFID59 ኻࠬ࠳ࡦᡰេߪࠦࡕࡦࡈࠔࡦ࠼ࠍㅢߓߚᡰេࠍၮᧄߣߒߡࠆ߇ޔᛛⴚᡰេߣߒߡߪ ධㇱߩ⽷ോ⋭ߦ UNDP ࠍㅢߓߡኾ㐷ኅࠍᵷ㆜ߒ⽷ޔ▤ℂߥߤⴕ߿ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬଦㅴ ߳ߩᡰេߦ㊀ὐࠍ⟎ߡࠆ⧷ޕ࿖ߪධㇱ߳ߩᡰេߪࠚ࠙ࠬޔࠚ࠙࡞ࡁޔ࠳ࡦࠝޔ ࠺ࡦ࠳࠽ࠞޔࠢࡑࡦ࠺ޔ㧔2008 ᐕߦട⋖㧕ߩࠊࠁࠆ Like Minded Group ߣห࠼࠽࠴ ࡓ㧔JDT㧕ࠍ⚵❱ߒޔോᚲࠍߔࠆߛߌߢߪߥߊޔMDTF ߿ઁߩࠦࡕࡦࡈࠔࡦ࠼߹ޔ ߚߪࡃࠗߩេഥද⺞ࠍផㅴߔࠆߚหോᚲࠍ⸳┙ߒߡࠆޕ JDT ߩᚲ㐳ߪ DFID ߦߥߞߡࠆ߇ޔᢙᐕߏߣߩᜬߜ࿁ࠅߦߥࠆޕฦ࿖ࠃࠅ⡯ຬ߇Ᏹ㚢ߒ⥄ޔ࿖ߩេഥߣ߁ ࠃࠅߪߦߣߏ࠲ࠢޔᜂᒰߒࠦࡕࡦࡈࠔࡦ࠼ߩ▤ℂࠍⴕߞߡࠆޕ ৻ᣇޔ ർㇱߩ DFID ോᚲߦߪޔ DFIDޔᄖോ⋭ޔ 㒐ⴡ⋭ߩ㧟D ߩද⺞ Unit ߢࠆ Stabilisation Unit60߆ࠄੱ߇ᵷ㆜ߐࠇߡ߅ࠅޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߥࠄߢߪߩߣߥߞߡࠆޕStabilisation Unit ߩ ᓎഀߪޔᐔߩቯ⌕ߩߚޔᐔ᭴▽ߦ㑐ߔࠆᢥ᳃ኾ㐷ኅߩᵷ㆜߿ߘߩ⺞ᢛߢ࡞࠳ߦ․ޔ ࡈ࡞⚗ߦะߌߚᡰេࠍⴕߞߡࠆޕ 4 ฬߩࠦࡒࡘ࠾ࠤ࡚ࠪࡦኾ㐷ኅࠍᵷ㆜ߒ61ޔ ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ᐭߤ߁ߒߩ࡞ࡈ࡞࠳࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޟኻଦㅴ㧔DDDC㧕ࠍޠㅴߡࠆޕ ߘߩઁߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔ⣀ᒙᕈߦኻߔࠆ⧷࿖ߩᚢ⇛ߣߒߡߪޔCPA ࠍࡕ࠾࠲ࡦࠣߔࠆ AEC ߩ ⼏㐳ޔㆬᡰេޔUNDP ࠍㅢߓߚࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬᡰេ⼊ޔኤ⸠✵ߥߤᴦಽ㊁ᡷ㕟㧔SSR㧕ޔDDRޔ េഥ᭴ㅧ߿ࡕ࠳࠹ࠖ㧔aid architecture㧕߳ߩᡰេޔධㇱᐭᡰេࠍታᣉߒߡࠆޕ ⧷࿖ߪޟWhole-of-Government approachࠍޠታ〣ߒࠆߡߒࠍ࠼ߩ⺰⼏ޔ࿖ߢࠆ߇ޔ ࠬ࠳ࡦߦ߅ߡ߽ Stabilisation Unit ࠍㅢߓߡ 3 ⋭ᐡߩ❑ᮮߩදജࠍታ〣ߒߡࠆޕ႐ ࡌ࡞ߢߪޔㅳ 1 ࿁ߩળวࠍᜬߜ Stabilisation Unit ߇ᜬߟ⚗੍㒐ၮ㊄ߩᣇߥߤߦߟ DFID ࠬ࠳ࡦോᚲߦ Stabilization Unit ߆ࠄᵷ㆜ߐࠇߡࠆ Ms. Pankhurst ߆ࠄ⡞ขࠅ㧔2009 ᐕ 3 1 ᣣ㧕 ޕ 60 ᣥ Post Conflict Reconstruction Unitޕ2004 ᐕߦࠕࡈࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦኻ╷ߣߒߡ DFID ౝߦ⸳┙ߒߚ߽ߩޕ ߪࠕࡈࠞࠍߪߓઁߩၞ߽ኻ⽎ߣߒߡࠆޕ 61 1 ฬߪࠕࡔࠞੱޔᱷࠅ 3 ฬߪࠬ࠳ࡦੱߢࠆ߇ߤߥࡐࠬࠕࠖ࠺ޔᶏᄖߦ㐳ߊ⒖ߒߚੱࠍណ↪ޕ 59 96 ߡද⼏ࠍⴕߞߡࠆޕ 㧔㧠㧕ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ62 ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚߪᐔ⺞ߦⓍᭂ⊛ߦ㑐ਈߒߦ․ޔධㇱߦ߅ߡߪౝᚢਛࠃࠅࡁ࡞࠙ࠚߩ ᢎળ♽ NGO ߇ߞߡᡰេߒߡߚᦨޕೋߩᡰេ࿖ળวࠍࠝࠬࡠߢࡎࠬ࠻ߔࠆߥߤࠬ࠳ࡦ ߦߪᷓߊ㑐ࠊߞߡࠆ࠴ࠬࡄޔࡦ࠲ࠬ࠾ࠟࡈࠕߪࡦ࠳ࠬߡߞߣߦࠚ࠙࡞ࡁޔߚ߹ޕ ࠽ߦᰴߢ╙ 3 ߩᡰេ࿖ߢ߽ࠆޕ ╷⊛ߦޟ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅᚢ⇛⚗ߤߥࠞࡦࠬߓߪࠍࡦ࠳ࠬޔ߇ߥߪߩ߽߁ߣޠ ᓟߩ࿖ߩᐔ᭴▽߳ߩᡰេߦⓍᭂ⊛ߢࠆ ߚ߹ޕOECD/DAC ߩ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ㑐ߔࠆ⼏⺰ߦ߽ Ⓧᭂ⊛ߦෳടߒߡࠆޕ ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚߩ㐿⊒ᚢ⇛ߪᴦ⊛⺖㗴ߣኒធߦࡦࠢߒߡ߅ࠅࡁޔ࿖࿖㓙㐿⊒දജ⋭ߩ ╷ߪᄖോ⋭ߩ╷ߣว⥌ߒߡࠆ‛ޕℂ⊛ߦ߽㧞ߟߩ⋭ᐡ߇ߟߥ߇ߞߡ߅ࠅኒធߥㅪ៤ࠍ ⴕߞߡࠆߚ߹ޕេഥታᣉᯏ㑐ߩ NORAD ߪ⚵❱ౣ✬ᚑࠍⴕޔᄖߦ߅ߡᄢ㙚ߣޘ ߦ⸳⟎ߖߕޔᄢ㙚ౝߦ NORAD ⡯ຬࠍ⟎ߊࠃ߁ߦߥࠅ߹ߔ߹ߔㅪ៤߇ᒝൻߐࠇߡࠆޕ 㒐ⴡ⋭ߣ߽ࡦࠢߒߡ߅ࠅࡦ࠳ࠬޔᄢ㙚ߩਛߦߪ㒐ⴡ⋭߆ࠄะߒߡࠆ⡯ຬ߇߅ࠅޔ AEC ߩో㓚ಽ⑼ળߩ⼏㐳߽ോߡࠆޕ ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚߩࠬ࠳ࡦᡰេߪ߶ߣࠎߤ MDTF ࠍㅢߓߚេഥߢࠅઁߩߘޔ࿖ㅪ߹ߚߪࡁ ࡞࠙ࠚ♽ NGO ࠍㅢߓߡߒߡࠆޕධർ߳ߩᡰេഀวߪ߅߅ࠃߘ 60㧦40 ߢࠆ߇ޔ MDTF ߳ߩ╙ 2 ࡈࠚ࠭߳ߩᡰេ߇ ICC 㗴ߩߚᧄ࿖ߢᬌ⸛ߐࠇߡࠆ⁁ᘒߢࠆޕ㊀ ὐᡰេಽ㊁ߪࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬᡰេߣᐭ⢻ജߩะߢࠆ߇ߦ․ߪࠚ࠙࡞ࡁޔ⍹ᴤࠢ࠲ ߳ߩᡰេࠍ㊀ⷞߒ৻⛔߫߃ޔᐭ㋶‛ࠛࡀ࡞ࠡ⋭߿ධㇱ⽷ോ⋭߅ࠃ߮㋶‛⾗Ḯ⋭߳ߩ ࠠࡖࡄࡆ࡞ࠍታᣉߒߡࠆޔߚ߹ޕධㇱߩ⍹ᴤ╷╷ቯ߳ߩᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ߅ࠅ⥄ޔ࿖ߩ ᴦ⊛ߥ⺖㗴ࠍផߒㅴࠆ৻ᣇ⚻ߩࡦ࠳ࠬޔᷣ⊛ߥ⣀ᒙᕈ߳ߩኻᔕࠍⴕߞߡࠆઁߩߘޕ ㆬᡰេࠗࠛࡆࠕޔᓳᣥᓳ⥝ᡰេޔᳪ⡯ᆔຬળ߳ߩᡰេޔDDR ᡰេߥߤࠍታᣉߒߡࠆޕ 㧔㧡㧕ਛ࿖ ࠬ࠳ࡦߦ߅ߌࠆਛ࿖ߩࡊࡦࠬߪᐕޘჇߒߡࠆޕਛ࿖ߩᄤὼ⾗Ḯ₪ᓧᚢ⇛ߦၮߠ ߊ߽ߩߢࠆ߇ޔICC ߩㅱ⁁⺧᳞ᣣߩ೨ᣣߦߪޔਛ࿖ߩో㕙⊛ᡰេߢߢ߈ߚࠕࡈࠞᦨᄢ ⷙᮨߣߥࠆࠬ࠳ࡦർㇱߩࡔࡠࠛ࠳ࡓߩቢᚑᑼࠍⴕߞߚ✚ޕ㗵⚂ 1,300 ంߩࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ ߩ߁ߜޔਛ࿖ߪ⚂ 250 ంࠍ63ߒߚઁޔਛ࿖ߩᑪ⸳ળ␠߇Ꮏࠍታᣉߒߡ߅ࠅޔᑼౖߢ ࡃࠪ࡞ᄢ⛔㗔ߪࠍࡦ࠳ࠬߪࠞࡔࠕޟᢜⷞߒߡࠆ߇ਛ࿖߇ᡰេߒߡߊࠇࠆߩߢޔ࿖ ߩ⊒ዷߦߪ߽ᔃ㈩ߪߥޠ64ߣࠬ࠳ࡦߣਛ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣ⊛ߦ⦟ᅢߥᅢ㑐ଥࠍࠕࡇ࡞ߒߚޕ ࠬ࠳ࡦߩャߩ 2/3 ߇ਛ࿖߆ࠄߣ৻⇟ߩ⾏ᤃ⋧ᚻ࿖ߢࠅ⚻ᷣ⊛ߥᒝ㑐ଥࠍ␜ߒ ߡࠆޕ 62 63 64 ࠬ࠳ࡦࡁ࡞࠙ࠚᄢ㙚ࠃࠅ⡞ขࠅ㧔2009 ᐕ 3 2 ᣣ㧕ޕ ਛ࿖ャ㌁ⴕ߆ࠄߩⲢ⾗ޕ NHK ࠾ࡘࠬ㧔http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/k10014532721000.html, 2009 ᐕ 3 5 ᣣ㧕 97 ᱜ⏕ߥᢙሼߪቯ߆ߢߪߥ߇ޔਛ࿖߆ࠄߩࠬ࠳ࡦᡰេߪ 2005 ᐕߦߪ⚂ 4.1 ం࠼࡞ޔ2006 ᐕߦߪ⚂ 2 ం࠼࡞ޔ2007 ᐕߦߪ 6.87 ం࠼࡞ߣߥߞߡࠆ65߽ࠇߕޕർㇱ߳ߩࠗࡦࡈᡰ េ߇ਛᔃߢࠅ㔚ജޔ᳓ଏ⛎ޔᯅޔᄢ⛔㗔ᐭᑪ⸳ߥߤ߳ߩⲢ⾗߹ߚߪήఘ᩺ઙߣߥߞߡ ࠆ⾗ߩߘޕ㊄ߩᄢඨߪਛ࿖ャ㌁ⴕߢࠆߣᕁࠊࠇޔᑪ⸳ߪߔߴߡਛ࿖ߩળ␠ߢࠆޕ 2008 ᐕߦߪޔㄘᬺ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ޔ㕍࠽ࠗ࡞Ꮊߩ∛㒮ᑪ⸳ࡓ࠳ࡠޔᑪ⸳ޔㄘᬺᡰេߥ ߤઁߩ࠼࠽߇ࠅᡰេߒߡߥၞ߳ߩᡰេࠍ⊒ߒ᱑ㄫߐࠇߡࠆઁߩߘޕᛛⴚᡰ េߣߒߡਛ࿖ߦᐭ⡯ຬࠍ⡜ߔࠆ⎇ୃᬺ߽ታᣉߒߡࠆޕ⍹ᴤߩᮭ߇⛊ߺർㇱࠬ ࠳ࡦߣߩ㑐ଥ߇એ೨ࠃࠅᒝ߇ޔ2007 ᐕߦߪධㇱᄢ⛔㗔߇ਛ࿖ߦ⡜ߐࠇޔධㇱߣߩ㑐ଥ ߽ᒝൻߒߡࠆޕ2008 ᐕߦߪධㇱ㚂ㇺߦ✚㗔㙚߽㐿⸳ߒ∛ޔ㒮ᑪ⸳ߥߤᡰេࠍᆎߡ ࠆޕ ߹ߚޔਛ࿖ߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞․ࠍછߒ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞⚗⸃ߦ৻ᓎᜂߞߡࠆޕ⻉࿖ ߪࠬ࠳ࡦߩ໑৻ߩᅢ࿖ߣ߃ࠆਛ࿖߆ࠄࠬ࠳ࡦᐭߦኻߒ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞㗴ߩ⸃ࠍ ᦼᓙߒߡ߅ࠅޔਛ࿖ߩᴦ⊛ߥᓎഀ߇ᦼᓙߐࠇߡࠆࠆߌ߅ߦࡦ࠳ࠬ߿ޕਛ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣ ߅ࠃ߮ᴦ⊛ᓇ㗀ജߪήⷞߢ߈ߥ߽ߩߢࠆޕਛ࿖ߪ࿖ㅪAU ߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞วหࡒ࠶ࠪ ࡚ࡦ㧔UNAMID㧕߽߳ 300 ੱߩࠛࡦࠫ࠾ࠕࠍᵷ㆜ߒߡࠆޕ 㧔㧢㧕࿖ㅪ ࠬ࠳ࡦߪ⇇ߢ߽໑৻ 2 ߟߩ PKO ࡒ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ߇ሽߔࠆ࿖ߢࠆޕධർᐔࡊࡠࠬ ߩଦㅴᡰេߔࠆ࿖ㅪࠬ࠳ࡦࡒ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ㧔UNMIS㧕ߣߩ࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔᴦ⛽ᜬࠍᜂ߁ UNAMID ߢࠆޕUNMIS ߪ CPA ታᣉଦㅴߩઁޔᴦ⛽ᜬޔᴺߩ⛔ᴦੱޔᡰេࠍᜂߞߡ ࠆޕ PKO એᄖߢߪ UNDPޔUNICEFޔWFPޔUNHCRޔWHOޔFAOޔUNIDO ߥߤਥⷐߥ࿖ㅪ ᯏ㑐߇ߞߡࠆߩࠄࠇߎޕᯏ㑐ߪ 2009-2012 ᐕߩ 4 ᐕ㑆ߩ UNDAF㧔࿖ㅪ㐿⊒ᡰេᨒ ⚵ߺ㧕ߦᴪߞߡេഥࠍታᣉߒߡࠆޕ㊀ὐಽ㊁ߪ CPA ታᣉᡰេޔJAM ߩఝవಽ㊁ޔ5 ࡨᐕ 㐿⊒⸘↹ޔධㇱࠬ࠳ࡦ੍▚ࠢ࠲⸘↹ߦၮߠ߈ޔԘࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬޔᴺߩ⛔ᴦޔ⢻ജᒝ ൻޔԙၮ␆⊛ࠨࡆࠬ߅ࠃ߮↢⸘ะ㧔ஜޔᢎ⢒ޔㄘ㐿⊒㧕ޔԚᐔߣᴦ⛽ᜬ㧔DDRޔ ࿖᳃Ⲣᡰេ㧕 ߩޔ3 ᧄᩇߢᡰេߒߡࠆޕ 㧔㧣㧕ᣣᧄߩᡰេ ᣣᧄߪޟᐔߩቯ⌕ࠍޠၮᧄ⊛ߥេഥᣇ㊎ߣߒޔᚢ⇛⊛ߦߪԘ⚗ⵍἴ᳃␠ળౣ⛔ว ᡰេ㧔㔍᳃ᏫㆶଦㅴޔᏫㆶ㔍᳃ߩౣቯౣ⛔วଦㅴޔ㔗ኻ╷ޔDDR ଦㅴ࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ ੱᡰេ㧕ޔԙၮ␆⊛࠾࠭㧔ஜޔᢎ⢒⡯ᬺ⸠✵ޔ᳓ⴡ↢ಽ㊁㧕߳ߩᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ ࠆޕ⣀ᒙᕈ߳ߩኻᔕߣ߁ᗧߢߪߦ․ޔධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆᐭߩ⢻ജᒝൻࠍ㊀ⷞߒୃ⎇ޔ ࠍᄙ↪ߒ᧚ੱޔ⢒ᚑޔᏫㆶ㔍᳃ᡰេޔਇቯⷐ࿃ߩ৻ߟߢࠆరァੱ߿᳃ߩ DDR66߳ߩ 65 66 ⛔৻ᐭ࿖㓙දജ⋭߆ࠄߩ⡞ขࠅ㧔2009 ᐕ 3 1 ᣣ㧕 ޕ ࠬ࠳ࡦߢߪ 18 ਁੱߩర჻ߩേຬ⸃㒰ࠍߒߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߕޔ࿖ㅪߪ 430 ⊖ਁ࠼࡞ߩ⾌↪߇ᔅⷐߢ 98 ᡰេࠍታᣉߒߡࠆ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޔߚ߹ޕ⸃ߩߚߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ኻଦ ㅴ㧔DDDC㧕ߦኻߒ AU ࠍㅢߓߡᡰេߒᦨޔㄭߢߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ᐔ⺞ᢛળ⼏ߦᣣᧄઍߣߒ ߡᱜᑼߦෳടߒ⚗ޔ⸃ߦ߽ߒᆎߡࠆޕ 2005-2007 ᐕߩេഥ㗵ߩផ⒖߅ࠃ߮ะ߿․ᓽߦߟߡߪ࿑ 5 ߦ␜ߒߚߣ߅ࠅߢࠆ߇ޔ CPA ⺞ශᓟೋᦼߩ 3 ᐕ㑆ߪ⚂ 80%߇✕ᕆੱᡰេะߌߢࠅ߇ߤࠎߣ߶ߩࠄࠇߘߚ߹ޔ ࿖ㅪ⚻↱ߢࠆޕJICA ߇ታᣉߔࠆੑ࿖㑆ᡰេߪᐔวᗧ⋥ᓟߦ✕ᕆ㐿⊒⺞ᩏߣߒߡධㇱࠫ ࡘࡃߩㇺᏒࡑࠬ࠲⸘↹ࠍ╷ቯߒࡃࡘࠫߡߒߣ࠻ࠢࠚࠫࡠࡊ࠻࠶ࡠࠗࡄޔᴡᎹ᷼ࠍᑪ⸳ߒ ߚߪࠇߎޕධㇱߢઁߩᡰេ߇ㆃࠇߡࠆਛߢᦨ⇟৻ޔೋߦ⋡ߦ߃ࠆᚑᨐࠍߍߚ᩺ઙߣ ߒߡධㇱᐭ߅ࠃ߮ઁ࠼࠽߆ࠄ߽㜞⹏ଔࠍᓧߡࠆޕJICA ോᚲߪ 2007 ᐕ 7 ߦ㚂ㇺ ࡂ࡞࠷ࡓߣࠫࡘࡃ㧔ࡈࠖ࡞࠼ോᚲ㧕ߦ㐿⸳ߒޔർㇱᡰេ߽ᆎ߹ࠅੑ࿖㑆ᡰេ߇ᓢޘ ߦߢߪࠆ߇Ⴧ߃ߟߟࠆޕධർߩਔᐭߣ߽ᣣᧄߦኻߔࠆᦼᓙߪᄢ߈ߊޔ࿖ㅪ⚻↱ߢߪ ߥߊੑ࿖㑆දജ߳ߩᒝⷐ⺧߇ࠆޕੑ࿖㑆දജߢታᣉߒߚਥߥ᩺ઙߪ 9 ߩߣ߅ࠅߢ ࠆޕ ࿑㧡 ᣣᧄߩኻࠬ࠳ࡦᡰេ(2005-2007) Japan's Contribution to Sudan by Category Trends of Proportion 㪇㪅㪋㩼 㪈㪇㪇㩼 㪍㪅㪏㩼 Japan's Assitance to Sudan (2005-2007) by Assistance 㪏㪅㪐㩼 㪋㪅㪌㩼 㪌㪅㪊㩼 㪐㪇㩼 㪛㪼㫍㪼㫃㫆㫇㫄㪼㫅㫋 㪈㪍㪅㪐㩼 㪐㪅㪈㩼 㪏㪇㩼 㪎㪇㩼 㪙㫀㫃㪸㫋㪼㫉㪸㫃 㪍㪇㩼 㪌㪇㩼 㪐㪌㪅㪈㩼 㪏㪎㪅㪐㩼 㪏㪈㪅㪐㩼 㪥㪞㪦 㪋㪇㩼 㪬㪥㪆㪘㪬 㪊㪇㩼 㪉㪇㩼 㪈㪇㩼 㪇㩼 㪙㫀㫃㪸㫋㪼㫉㪸㫃 㪥㪞㪦 㪬㪥㪆㪘㪬 㪉㪇㪇㪌 㪉㪇㪇㪍 㪉㪇㪇㪎 㪇㪅㪉㪍㩷 㪊㪅㪈㪇㩷 㪍㪌㪅㪏㪐㩷 㪌㪅㪐㪏㩷 㪋㪅㪍㪉㩷 㪎㪍㪅㪎㪎㩷 㪋㪅㪎㪏㩷 㪋㪅㪐㪇㩷 㪋㪊㪅㪐㪈㩷 㪟㫌㫄㪸㫅㫀㫋㪸㫉㫀㪸㫅 㪏㪊㪅㪈㩼 㪬㪪㩻㩷㫄㫀㫃㫃㫀㫆㫅 ᚲ㧦ࠬ࠳ࡦᣣᧄᄢ㙚߆ࠄߩ࠺࠲ࠍ߽ߣߦ╩⠪ᚑ ߹ߚޔᓟ TICAD IV ߩࡈࠜࡠࠕ࠶ࡊ߿㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ㐿⊒߳ߩࠬ࠳ࡦᐭ߆ࠄߩᦼᓙ߽㜞 ߎߣ߆ࠄޔㄘᬺޔ᳇ᄌേಽ㊁߳ߩᡰេߦߟߡ߽ᬌ⸛ਛߢࠆ⚗ޕਛߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ ߦ߅ߌࠆᛛⴚᡰេߢߪߩ㊀ὐಽ㊁ߦᴪߞߚಽ㊁ߦ߅ߌࠆੱ᧚⢒ᚑࠍᣢሽ᩺ઙ߿╙ਃ࿖ ⎇ୃߥߤࠍㅢߓߡⴕ߁੍ቯߢࠆޕ ᣣᧄߩ PKO ᡰេߣߒߡޔ2008 ᐕߦ UNMIS ߦ 2 ฬߩ⥄ⴡ㓌ࠍᵷ㆜ޕᄢ㙚ߦ㒐ⴡ⋭߆ࠄ ߩ⡯ຬ߇ะߒߡࠆޕ ࠆߣⓍ߽ߞߡࠆޕDDR ߦߟߡߪޔᣣᧄߪ UNDP ߣห⼏㐳ࠍോࠆߥߤⓍᭂ⊛ߦ⽸₂ߒߡ߅ࠅޔ 2009 ᐕ 2 ߩߢࡉࡀࡘࠫޔDDR ળวߢᣣᧄߪ 17 ⊖ਁ࠼࡞ߩࠍࡊ࠶ࠫ✚ޕ㗵 88.3 ⊖ਁ࠼࡞ࡊ ࠶ࠫߐࠇߚ㗵ߩਛߢᦨᄢߩ࠼࠽ޕ 99 㧥 ࠬ࠳ࡦߦ߅ߌࠆਥߥੑ࿖㑆දജ ᩺ઙฬ ၞ ታᣉᦼ㑆 ࠫࡘࡃᏒౝㄭ㇠ၞ✕ᕆ↢ᵴၮ⋚ᢛ⸘↹⺞ᩏ㧔✕ᕆ㐿⊒⺞ᩏ㧕 ၮ␆⊛ᛛ⢻⡯ᬺ⸠✵ᒝൻ㧔SAVOT㧕(ᛛࡊࡠ) ஜੱ᧚⢒ᚑ㧔ᛛࡊࡠ㧕 ࠫࡘࡃ߅ࠃ߮ㄭ㇠ߦ߅ߌࠆ↢⸘ะ㧔ᛛࡊࡠ㧕 ℂᢙ⑼ᢎຬ㙃ᚑᡰេ㧔⍴ᦼኾ㐷ኅ㧕 ࠫࡘࡃ∛㒮▤ℂ㧔⍴ᦼኾ㐷ኅ㧕 ࠫࡘࡃㇺᏒㆇャࠗࡦࡈ߅ࠃ߮⢻ജᒝൻ㧔㐿⊒⺞ᩏ㧕 ࠫࡘࡃㇺᏒㄭ㇠ߦ߅ߌࠆ⛎᳓ᢛ߅ࠃ߮⢻ജᒝൻ㧔㐿⊒⺞ᩏ㧕 េഥ⺞ᢛ㧔ኾ㐷ኅ㧕 Უሶஜࡈࡠࡦ࠻ࠗࡦᒝൻ㧔ᛛࡊࡠ㧕 ⛎᳓ੱ᧚⢒ᚑ㧔ᛛࡊࡠ㧕 ⡯ᬺ⸠✵⸘↹ࡑࠬ࠲ࡊࡦ╷ቯ㧔㐿⊒⺞ᩏ㧕 ධㇱ ධㇱ ධㇱ ධㇱ ධㇱ ධㇱ ධㇱ ධㇱ ർㇱ ർㇱ ർㇱ ർㇱ 2005-200㧣 2006-2009 2008-2011 2008-2011 2008 2007ޔ2008 2008-2010 2008-2010 2005-2008 2008-2011 2008-2011 2008-2011 4-9 ߹ߣ CPA ߩጁⴕߪ੍ቯࠃࠅ߽ㆃࠇߡࠆ߇ ߩߎޔ4 ᐕ㑆ߢධㇱᐭߩᚑ┙ޔᣇ⥄ᴦߩᢛޔ 〝ޔㅢାޔᓎᚲߩᑪ‛ߥߤࠗࡦࡈᢛޔᢎ⢒߿ක≮ޔ㔍᳃IDP ߩᏫㆶޔSecurity Agreement ߦၮߠߚฦァߩ㈩⟎឵߃ߥߤߡߴߔޔචಽߢߪߥ߇ࠆ⒟ᐲߩᚑᨐߪߍߡࠆߒޕ ߆ߒ⚗࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ߦ߁ࠃߚ߈ߡߺߢ߹ࠇߎޔߩⴕᣇࠍ CPA ߩጁⴕࠍ⢿߆ߔᄢ߈ߥਇ ቯⷐ࿃߇ⶄᢙࠅޔᲑ㓏ߢߪ CPA ᥳቯᦼ㑆߇⚳ੌߔࠆ 2011 ᐕߩࠬ࠳ࡦߩ᧪߇ߪ ߞ߈ࠅߣߪ߃ߥ⁁ᘒߢࠆߩࡦ࠳ࠬࠎࠈߜ߽ޕ᧪ߪࠬ࠳ࡦੱ⥄り߇ߡߊ ߎߣߢࠆߡߒߘޕ᧪ߪ CPA ߩ࠲ࠗࡓ࠹ࡉ࡞ࠍㅊߞߡߊߛߌߢߪߥߊޔ࿖ౝߩ᭽ޘ ߥࡌ࡞ߢߩ⼏⺰ߩᚑᾫ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆᧄޕⓂߢߪޔ࿖ߩࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ㗴ޔᏒ᳃߳ߩࠨ ࡆࠬឭଏ⢻ജߩ㗴ޔᏒ᳃␠ળߩෳടߩ㗴ߥߤࠬ࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞ಽ㊁ߣޔၞᩰ Ꮕࠍ↢ࠎߛ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥࠍᡷߥ㒢ࠅౣ߮⚗ߦ㒱ࠆෂ㒾ᕈ߽ሺࠎߢࠆߎߣ߇ౣ⏕ ߐࠇߚᦨޕᓟߦࠬ࠳ࡦߩࠍㅢߓߡ․ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽ࡐࠬ࠻ࠦࡦࡈࠢ࠻࿖߳ߩ ᣣᧄߩኻᔕߦߟߡߊߟ߆ߩ␜ໂࠍឭ␜ߒߚޕ 㧔㧝㧕 ⚗⸃Ბ㓏߆ࠄߩ ߎࠇ߹ߢᣣᧄߪ⚗⸃ࡊࡠࠬ߳ߩߪ߶ߣࠎߤⴕߞߡߥᧄޕᩰ⊛ߥᡰេ߿ ߪၮᧄ⊛ߦߪ⚗ᓟᐔ߇ᚑ┙ߒߡ߆ࠄߢࠆߥ߁ࠃߩߎࠎࠈߜ߽ޕᡰេߪ ODA ࠍㅢߓ ߚេഥߣ߁ࠃࠅߪޔᴦ⊛ᄖ⊛ߥࡊࡠࠬߢⴕߞߡߊߴ߈߽ߩߢࠆޔߒ߆ߒޕ ⚗⸃ࡊࡠࠬߥߤ߹ߛᐔ߇ᚑ┙ߒߡߥᲑ㓏߆ࠄߩ߇⚿ޔᨐ⊛ߦߪലߥᓳ ⥝ᡰេ߿㐿⊒߳ߣߟߥߍߡࠁߌࠆߩߢࠅߩߎޔᲑ㓏߆ࠄߩ JICA ߥߤ㐿⊒ታᣉᯏ㑐ߣߩല ᨐ⊛ߥㅪ៤߇ᔅⷐߢࠆ ߪߢࡦ࠳ࠬޔ߫߃ޕCPA ࠍࡕ࠾࠲ࡦࠣߔࠆ AEC ߦߪޔCPA ᚑ┙ࡊࡠࠬߦᷓߊ㑐ࠊࠅ CPA ߦ⟑ฬࠍߒߚࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ⧷ޔ࿖ࠝޔࠞࡔࠕޔࠕ࠲ࠗޔ ࡦ࠳ߩߺ߇߆ࠄࡔࡦࡃߣߥߞߡ߅ࠅ߇ࠬࡦࡊߩ࠽࠼ߩࠄࠇߎޔᄢ߈ߎޕ ߩࠃ߁ߥળ⼏ߦෳടߔࠆߎߣߪេഥߦലߥᖱႎ߇ߜᣧߊࠅ⋧ߚ߹ޔᚻ࿖ߣߩା㗬㉯ 100 ᚑߥߤߢ߽ലᨐ⊛ߢࠆ⚗ޔߚ߹ޕ⸃ࡊࡠࠬߦෳടࠍߔࠆߎߣߢߩߘޔᓟߦᆎ߹ࠆ ᓳ⥝ᡰេߩߚߩ⹏ଔ⺞ᩏ࿅ߥߤߦⓍᭂ⊛ߦෳടߔࠆḰ߽චಽߦߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦߥࠆޕ ᣣᧄߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡞ߩᐔᷤߩળ⼏ߦࠝࡉࠩࡃߣߒߡෳടߒߡߚ߇ᦨޔㄭߢߪᱜ ᑼߦࡔࡦࡃߣߒߡ⺧ߐࠇࠆߥߤޔᓢߥ߁ࠃߩߎߦޘಽ㊁߳ߩࠍߒߡࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔ ⋧ᚻ߆ࠄߩᣣᧄߩᓎഀ߳ߩᦼᓙ߇㜞߹ߞߡࠆߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕೋᦼᲑ㓏߆ࠄޔᄖߩߺߥ ࠄߕ㐿⊒ޔ㒐ⴡߥߤࠊࠁࠆ㧟D㧔DiplomacyޔDevelopmentޔDefense㧕ߩߢㅪ៤ߒ ߒߡߊߎߣ߇ߩߘޔᓟߩല⊛ߥ㐿⊒߳ߩࠕࡊࡠ࠴߳⛯ߡߊߣᕁࠊࠇࠆޕ 㧔㧞㧕 㧟D ࠕࡊࡠ࠴ߩផㅴ㧦႐ࡌ࡞ߢߩផㅴ ⸥ߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆ߇ޔᣣᧄߪ߹ߛᄖോ⋭ޔJICAޔ㒐ⴡ⋭ߣ㧟D ߩᯏ⊛ߥㅪ៤߇ᐲൻߒ ߡߥߩࡦ࠳ࠬޕ႐วޔUNMIS ߳ߩ⥄ⴡ㓌ᵷ㆜ޔ㒐ⴡ⋭⡯ຬ߇ᄢ㙚ຬߣߒߡะߒ ߡࠆ߇ޔᄖߣ㒐ⴡߩㅪ៤߇ߢ߈ߡߡ߽߇ࠇߘޔ㐿⊒ߦߪ⋥ធߟߥ߇ߞߡߥޕ ⋥ធߦߪ㑐ଥߒߥ߆߽ߒࠇߥ߇ޔ ODA ࠲ࠬࠢࡈࠜࠬ(Ḱᆔຬળ)ߦ㒐ⴡ㑐ଥ ⠪߇ෳടߔࠆߎߣߦࠃࠅᖱႎ߇ଦㅴߐࠇࠄ߆ߎߘޔㅪ៤ࠍ࿑ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆޕㅢᏱ᭽ޘ ߥㅪ៤ߪ႐ࡌ࡞ߢߩᣇ߇ࠕࠢ࠲߽ዋߥߊታᣉߒ߿ߔ႐ว߽ᄙߩߢߪߕ߹ޔ႐ ࡌ࡞ߢߩᣣᧄߩ Whole-of-Government approach ߩᒻࠍᬌ⸛ߢ߈ࠆߩߢߪߥ߆ޕ 㧔㧟㧕 ࿖ߩℂ⸃ଦㅴ េഥታᣉ⠪ߩਛߦߪ⥄ᚓ߽ߡ࿖߳ߩℂ⸃߇චಽߢߥ႐ว߇ᄙⷺޕេഥታᣉ⠪ ߪޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅᜰᮡߩࠃ߁ߥࠬ࠽࠶ࡊ࡚ࠪ࠶࠻⊛ߦᤋࠆ⁁ߩ⺖㗴ߦኻߒߡኻᔕߒ߇ߜߢ ࠆ⚗ޔߒ߆ߒޕᓟߩ࿖ߦኻߒߡലߥេഥࠍታ〣ߒߡߊߚߦߪ⚗ޔߩⷐ࿃ߩߘޔ ࿖․ߩᱧผ⊛ߥ⢛᥊ޔᴦ⊛ߥേ߈ޔᢥൻ⊛ߥ⢛᥊ߥߤ߽ࠊߖߡታᣉ⠪ߩ৻ੱ৻ੱ߇ චಽߦℂ⸃ߒ⠨ᘦߒߚߢޔലߥេഥᚢ⇛߿᩺ઙߩᒻᚑߡߒߘޔታᣉߔࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆޕ JICA ߪ⚗⚻㛎࿖ߦኻߒߡޔᐔ᭴▽࠾࠭ࠕࠬࡔࡦ࠻㧔PNA㧕ࠍዉߒߡࠆ߇ߎޔ ߩࠃ߁ߥᬺࠍ㑐ଥ⠪ߣᐢߊߒߚࠅޔታ㓙ߘߩ࿖ߦⴕߊੱߦኻߒߡ⎇ୃߥߤࠍ೨ߦ ⴕ߁ࠃ߁ߥᯏળ߇ࠆߣലߢࠆޕ 㧔㧠㧕 ޟᐔߩ㈩ᒰࠍޠታᗵߢ߈ࠆេഥ CPA એ㒠 4 ᐕ߇⚻ߞߚ߇ޔᏒ᳃ߩ㑆ߢᐔߩ㈩ᒰࠍታᗵߢ߈ࠆ߹ߢߦߪ⥋ߞߡߥޕ Ꮢ᳃ߪ㐳ᐕߩ⚗߇⚳ࠊࠅᐔ߇ࠃ߁߿ߊ⸰ࠇߚߎߣ߳ߩᏗᦸ߇ᄢ߈ߊ߹ߚᦼᓙ߇㜞ޕ ߎߩࠃ߁ߥਛߢޟߦߣ߮ੱޔᐔߩ㈩ᒰ⋥ࠍޠធ⋡ߦ߃ࠆᒻߢߢ߈ࠆߛߌᣧߊ␜ߔߎߣ ߇ߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߥᡰេࠍⴕࠊߥߌࠇ߫ᦼޔᓙ߇㜞ߛߌߦᄬᦸ߅ࠃ߮ਇḩ߽ᄢ߈ߊߥߞߡߒ ߹߁ߦ․ޕㄘ߿ߎࠇ߹ߢ㐿⊒ߩᯏળ߇ਈ߃ࠄࠇߥ߆ߞߚᣇ߳ߩᡰេ߇㊀ⷐߢࠆ߇ޔ 㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ㐿⊒᩺ઙࠍḰߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔ1-2 ᐕߢᚑᨐ߇ࠇࠆࠃ߁ߥ⍴ᦼ⊛ߥᣧᦼᓳ⥝᩺ઙ ߩታᣉ߇㊀ⷐߢࠆޕᣣᧄߩᡰេౝኈ߽ߩ߳ࡦ࠳ࠬߛ߹ޔᡰេߪ✕ᕆੱᡰេ ะߌ߇ోߢ 70%ࠍභߡࠆ߿࡞ࡈ࡞࠳ޕධർႺ⇇ၞߥߤੱᡰេ߇ᔅⷐߥၞߪ 101 ᄙ߇✕ޔᕆੱᡰេߪ৻ㆊᕈߩ߽ߩߢ㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ㐿⊒ࠍ⠨߃ߚ߽ߩߢߪߥޕCPA ᓟ 4 ᐕ߇⚻ߜޔᓟេഥߩ㊂ࠍᓢߦޘᣧᦼᓳ⥝ᡰេ߿㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ㐿⊒ߦࠪࡈ࠻ߐߖߡ߆ߥߌࠇ ߫ߥࠄߥ߇ߩߘޔ㓙ᣧᦼᓳ⥝ᡰេߢ߽㐳ᦼ⊛ߥዷᦸࠍ߽ߞߚᡰេࠍⴕ߁ߎߣߦ⇐ᗧߔߴ ߈ߢࠆޕ 㧔㧡㧕 Ꮢ᳃␠ળෳടߣᏒ᳃␠ળߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ᣖⲢኻߩଦㅴ ᩙᧄ㧔2004b㧕߇ᜰ៰ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦޔCPA ߩ࠲ࠗࡓ࠹ࡉ࡞ߦᓥߞߡጁⴕߒߡࠇ߫ᐔ߇ ቯ⌕ߔࠆࠊߌߢߪߥߊޔᏒ᳃ࡌ࡞ߩޟਅ߆ࠄߩᐔߩ߳ޠദജ߽หߓࠃ߁ߦ㊀ⷐߢࠆޕ 2 ᐲߦਗ਼ࠆ 50 ᐕߩ⚗ߩᱧผࠍ➅ࠅߒߡࠆࠬ࠳ࡦᏒ᳃ߦߣߞߡᏒ᳃ࡌ࡞ߢߩኻ ߦࠃࠆ᳃ᣖⲢߩദജ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆޕ᳃ᣖⲢߢߪޔධࠕࡈࠞ߇ࠕࡄ࡞࠻ࡋࠗ࠻ᓟߦⴕ ߞߚ⌀ታ⸃ᆔຬળߥߤ␠ળࡂࡆ࠹࡚ࠪࡦᵴേ߇ฬߢࠆ߇ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޔദജࠍ ࠬ࠳ࡦߢ߽ታᣉߒߡߊᔅⷐ߇ࠆޕታ㓙ޔධㇱߩ NGO ߿ᢎળࠍㅢߓߡኻ┙ߒߚ᳃ ᣖ㑆ߩ People㧙People Reconciliation Conference ࠍ⚦߁ߎޔ߇ࠆߪࠈߎߣࠆߡߓߪߣޘ ߒߚദജߪ➅ࠅߒⴕ߁ᔅⷐ߇ࠅߥ߁ࠃߩߎޔᏒ᳃ࡌ࡞ߩⲢᵴേ߳ߩ⾗㊄㕙ޔᛛⴚ 㕙ߦ߅ߡ࿖㓙␠ળ߆ࠄᡰេߒߡߊߴ߈ߢࠈ߁ޕ ෳ⠨ᢥ₂ ᩙᧄ⧷ (1998) ޡ᳃ᣖ⚗ࠍ↢߈ࠆੱ߮ߣ㧦ઍࠕࡈࠞߩ࿖ኅߣࡑࠗࡁ࠹ࠖ ╙ޢ2 ⇇ᕁᗐ␠. 㨋㨋㨋㨋 (2004a) ޟIGAD ߦࠃࠆᐔ⺞ʊⷰߣಽᨆޠᐔᚑ 15 ᐕᐲ ᄖോ⋭ᆔ⸤⎇ⓥࡉࠨޡ ࠨࡂࠕࡈࠞߦ߅ߌࠆၞ㑆දജߩน⢻ᕈߣേะ ╙ޢਃ┨ ࿖㓙㗴⎇ⓥᚲ. 㨋㨋㨋㨋 (2004b) ޟޟ߆ࠄߩᐔޟߣޠਅ߆ࠄߩᐔޠ㧙ࠬ࠳ࡦౝᚢߣᐔ᭴▽ޠᐔᚑ 15 ᐕᐲ ᄖോ⋭ᆔ⸤⎇ⓥ⚗ޡ੍㒐 ╙ޢ㧢┨ ࿖㓙㗴⎇ⓥᚲ. 㨋㨋㨋㨋 (2005)ࡦ࠳ࠬޟౝᚢߩ⚳⚿ߣᚢᓟᓳ⥝ޡޠᶏᄖᖱޢᜏᱺᄢቇᶏᄖᖱ⎇ⓥᚲ ╙ 54 Ꮞ╙ 4 ภ pp. 2㧙21. 㨋㨋㨋㨋 (2006㧕 ޟᚢᓟࠬ࠳ࡦߩᴦ⊛േᘒ㧙൮⊛ᐔදቯߩ⺞߆ࠄ৻ᐕਃࡩࠍ⚻ߡ㧙ޠ ޡᶏᄖᖱޢᜏᱺᄢቇᶏᄖᖱ⎇ⓥᚲ ╙ 53 Ꮞ╙ 4 ภ pp. 77-92. ᱞౝㅴ৻㧔2008㧕⚗ޟ⸃ޔᐔ᭴▽ޔ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅᡰេʊ㐿⊒㗴ߣߒߡߩ⻉㕙ࡢ⎇ࠫࠕޡޠ ࡞࠼࠻ࡦ࠼ޢNo.158 2008 ᐕ 11 pp.20-22. Carment, David, et al. (2008) Determinants of State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Assessment Based on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project, Research Paper No. 2008/46, United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, April 2008. Collier, Paul (2007) The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What can be Done About It, Oxford University Press. FASID㧔2008㧕ޟޡ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ㐿⊒ᚢ⇛⎇ޠⓥႎ๔ᦠߣࡦ࡚ࠪࡃࡠࠣޔޢ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥޔ 102 ᐔᚑ 19 ᐕᐲᄖോ⋭ᆔ⸤⎇ⓥ⽷ޔ࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙㐿⊒㜞╬ᢎ⢒ᯏ᭴. Gadir Ali, A. A et al. (2005) “Sudan’s Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long?”, Understanding Civil War, Volume 1: Africa, edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, The World Bank. Iyob, Ruth and G. M. Khadiagala (2006) Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Johnson, Douglas H. (2004)The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Second Impression, The International African institute in association with James Currey, Indiana University Press, Fountain Publisher and East African Educational Publishers. Kevane, Michael (2004) Understanding Sudan: An Introduction, paper prepared for “The Sudan Course” organized by Rift Valley Institute on 7-12 May 2006. Khadiagala, Gilbert M. (2008) Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility, Africa Program Working Paper Series, October 2008, International Peace Institute. Large, Daniel (2008) Sudan’s Foreign Relations with Asia: China and the Politics of “looking East”, Paper 158, Institute for Security Studies, February 2008. OECD/DAC (2007) Fragile States: Policy commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Patrick, S. and K. Brown (2007) Greater than the Sum of Its parts?: Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States, International Peace Academy. Prendergast, J. and R. Winter (2008) Democracy: A Key to Peace in Sudan, Strategy Briefing Paper #10, The project to end genocide and crimes against humanity (enough), January 2008. Rice, Susan E. and S. Patrick (2008) Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution. Stiansen, E and M. Kevane (1998) Kordofan Invaded: Peripheral Incorporation and Social Transformation in Islamic Africa, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia, Volume 63, Brill. Thomas, Edward (2009) Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive peace Agreement, A Chatham House Report, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. U.S. Department of State (2008) Background Note: Sudan, Profile, Bureau of African Affairs, July 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm. UNOCHA (2006) “History of Sudan”, Information uploaded in the UN Sudan Information Gateway, http://www.unsudanig.org/sudan/index.php?fid=history, February 2006. USAID (2005) Fragile States Strategy, January 2005. USAID (2005) Strategy Statement 2006-08, Sudan, December 2005. 103 ╙ 5 ┨ ࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ㧦ᕆㅦߥㅌ߆ࠄߩᓳ⥝߳ߩዷᦸ Chapter 5 Zimbabwe - Prospects for Restoration After Rapid Declineࠠࡖࠨࡦ㨯ࡑ࠴ࡦࠟ࠙࠲㧔╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㧕 Catherine Machingauta (GRIPS)1 㧔ⷐ⚂㧕 ࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߢߪ 1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ߆ࠄޔ⊛ߥ⚻ᷣ␠ળᖱߩᖡൻ߇ㅴࠎߢ߅ࠅޔෂᯏ⊛ߥ⁁ ᴫߦἄߒߡࠆᧄޕⓂߢߪߩߘޔਥߥේ࿃ߣߥࠆࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍࠄ߆ߦߔࠆߣߣ ߽ߦޔᣣᧄࠍ࿖㓙ࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߩኻᔕࠍࡆࡘߒᦨޔᓟߦࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᤚ ᱜߔࠆߚߩᣇ╷ࠍᬌ⸛ߔࠆޕ ᧄⓂߢߪห࿖ߩ⣀ᒙᕈ߇ਥߦ 2 ߟߩⷐ࿃ߦࠆߣಽᨆߒߡࠆ ╙ޕ1 ߦ࿖ౝߩᴦ⊛ ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ㗴 ╙ޔ2 ߦ೨⠪ߦ࿃ߔࠆ࿖㓙㐿⊒ࡄ࠻࠽ߣߩ㑐ଥᖡൻߢࠆࡃࡦࠫޕ ࡉࠛߦ߅ߌࠆᴦ㗔ၞߪ⁛┙એ᧪ࠞࡈࠕࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޔ᳃ᣖห⋖ᗲ࿖ᚢ✢㧔ZANU-PF㧕 ߦࠃࠆ৻ౄ⁛ⵙߦࠃߞߡᡰ㈩ߐࠇߡ߈ߚޕหౄߪ߹ߚ㊁ౄߦኻߒޔ࿖ァ⼊ኤࠍ↪ߚ ജ⊛ജࠍᐲ⚿ߩߘޔⴕޘᨐ⼏ޔળ߿ቭᯏ᭴ߥߤࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߩ⊛ᯏ㑐ߪ⪺ߒߊ ᴦ⊛ᮭߦᏀฝߐࠇߡࠆޕᐭߩᳪ⡯߿ቭᯏ᭴ߦ࿖᳃߳ߩ⊛ࠨࡆࠬࠍឭଏߔࠆ⢻ ജ߇ਲߒߎߣߦࠃࠅ⚻ᷣߪ⎕✋ߒޔ࿖᳃ߩ↢ᵴ᳓Ḱߪᷓೞߦᖡൻߒߡࠆޕ ☨࿖ߦࠃࠆ⚻ᷣⵙភ⟎߿࿖㓙ࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߦࠃࠆេഥߩ㒢ߩߚ⪺ߒ⽷ਇ⿷ߦ 㒱ߞߚᐭߪㅢ⽻⊒ⴕᮭߩㆊᐲߥⴕߦォߓ⚻ߔ߹ߔ߹ޔᷣࠍᖡൻߐߖࡈࡦࠗࡄࠗࡂޔ ࡚ࠪࡦࠍ߈ޔᐭ⥄りߩᱜ⛔ᕈ߇ំࠄߢࠆޕ ⵙភ⟎ߩ✭ߩዷᦸ߇ࠄࠇߥਛߢޔᐭߪᴦᡷ㕟ߩታᣉߢߪߥߊਛ࿖ߣߩㅪ៤ ᒝൻࠍ࿑ࠆേ߈㧔”Look East”╷㧕ߐ߃ߖߡࠆޕᣣᧄߦࠃࠆኻࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ㐿⊒េഥߪ ޔᛛⴚදജߣ࿖ㅪࠍㅢߓߚੱᡰេࠍਛᔃߦታᣉߐࠇߡࠆ߇⚻ޔᷣ࿁ᓳࠍⷞ㊁ߦࠇ ߚࠛࡀ࡞ࠡ߿㋶ᬺㄘᬺࠢ࠲߳ߩᡰេᒝൻ߇ᅢ߹ߒ৻ޕᣇࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛᐭ⥄り߽ ࿖ౝߩฦౄ߿Ꮢ᳃ㇱ㐷ޔධㇱࠕࡈࠞ㐿⊒ห㧔SADC㧕ߣߩㅪ៤ࠍㅢߓߡࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ ߩಽᮭൻࠍㅴޔ㐿ᜏߩផㅴߦࠃߞߡ㘩♳↢↥ߩะࠍ࿑ࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆޕ 5-1 Introduction Zimbabwe gained full independence from Britain in 1980. The economy was fairly more advanced than other Sub-Saharan Africa countries, though characterized by racial inequality brought by colonial rule - a situation that compelled the incoming political leadership to channel expenditure towards improving education, health and adjusting pay policy to make wealth redistribution more equitable. Since 1980, Zimbabwe received ODA from donors including the World Bank, IMF, European 1 Masters Student at the National Graduate Institute For Policy Studies (GRIPS) Aug, 2007-Mar,2009 104 Commission, USAID, DFID and Japan, Sweden (SIDA).ODA increased from 3.8% of GDP in 1990 up to 10.9% GDP in 2005 (US$367m in ODA) but given unsuccessful policy reform and critical policies that drew international condemnation, aid focus significantly shifted from development assistance towards humanitarian assistance and human rights & democratic governance, through non state agents. Consequentially, the Zimbabwean economy deteriorated, from being a promising Sub-Saharan economy endowed with abundant land for agriculture, regarded as the bread-basket of Southern Africa, endowed with minerals including chrome, tin, gold and platinum, and a society with one of the highest adult literacy rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (98% youth and 89% adult [UNICEF,], to become the fastest shrinking economy outside a war zone at a rate of -6.1% (UNSD, 2007) barely 20 years after independence. From 2003 to 2007, per capita GDP declined from USD387 to USD159 and public debt as of 2007 estimates amounted to 218.2% of GDP. According to World-wide governance indicators, Zimbabwe has the third largest decline in government effectiveness2, after Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone, over the period 1996-2004. Following these events, Zimbabwe has been classified by World Bank as a fragile state, by Fund for Peace, as a failed state, and by the US as one of the six ‘Outposts of Tyranny3’. Zimbabwe’s downturn follows strained international relations, difficult dialogue between the government and donors regarding critical policy decisions, as well as deterioration of internal governance. This report aims to assess the core issues responsible for Zimbabwe’s current challenges, actions taken by donors to assist Zimbabwe and how aid can be more effectively applied in addressing challenged states like Zimbabwe. The report assesses factors determining policy choice and implementation, beginning with the political structure and system, followed by brief policy analysis and an analysis of what makes the country fragile, then examines strategies aid agencies have used to reduce fragility, and necessary ways to improve them. 5-2 Political Structure Zimbabwe’s political system is a parliamentary democracy, with a bicameral parliament. The African Elections Database 2007 describes the system as a ‘restricted democracy’, and the Freedom House country report 2008 rates the society as suppressed. President Robert, G. Mugabe, formerly Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister, was nominated to take over from retired President Banana in 1987, and after constitutional amendments incorporated the Prime Ministerial post into the presidency so that the position of executive president combined roles of head of state, head of government and commander in chief, authorizing the president to appoint the Police 2 See Appendix 1 As well as Iran, Myanmar, Cuba and Belarus [http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/powell18.12161.html] 3 105 Commissioner, Defense force commander, Attorney General, Permanent Secretary and their deputies, as well as cabinet ministers and 30 members of parliament, judges, executive heads of ministries and ambassadors. The constitutional amendment of 1987 also provided that presidential prerogatives cannot be challenged in court.4 Thus, directly elected by popular vote for a 6 year term, the President has been re-elected in 1990, 1996 and 20025. The Government comprises the President, two Vice Presidents, a 26 ministry cabinet as of 2003, each with a deputy minister and 8 provincial governors, a House of Assembly comprising 210 constituencies and a sixty member senate.6 Due to political power imbalance in government, the political system has been be labeled a particracy7, (as opposed to a democracy) i.e. the omnipresence of an all embracing character of a party in power with no contesters or regulators. In 2005 72% was ZANU Pf in the house of assembly and 89% in Senate. Opposition has generally been weak until the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, which became the parliamentary majority in 2008. The Presidential vote result prompted power sharing talks involving South African President Thabo Mbeki and Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) which led to a constitutional amendment introducing the Post of Prime Minister for opposition leader Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai. Shortcomings of Particracy are that it leaves room for the creation of an environment conducive for corruption and pork barrel politics, where policies, projects and legislation are designed with personal benefit in mind, and much less concern towards their impact on economic development and service delivery. Longstanding political ambitions for a one party have contributed to the firm grasp on power and patronage politics, channeling public resources more toward vote buying activities rather than economically beneficial activities. Beasley and Kudamatsu,(2007) describe the Zimbabwean political system as no longer democratic, but autocratic, where instead of relying on the electorate to stay in power, the government now relies on key ally groups referred to as the ‘selectorate’, which could be the defense forces, police or close allies within the political party (Beasley, 2007; de Mesquita et.al. 2002) Political leadership may thus find it more attractive to allocate resources towards provision of private goods to the smaller selectorate group as an incentive to keep the leadership in power, as opposed to allocating resources towards provision of public goods to the mass electorate. Such institutional political arrangements affect public administration and the type of policies that leaders pursue. Lastly, the important role of the judiciary as the cornerstone of a democratic nation has to be 4 Chikuhwa,2004 A Crisis of Governance , Chipungu,L.Governance in Zimbabwe 5 (African Elections Database, 2007). The Senate is the Upper chamber of the country’s bicameral parliament. Disagreements on the reintroduction of the senate in 2005 led to the split of the major opposition party MDC, with one party led by Morgan Tsvangirai and another led by Arthur Mutambara,set to be Prime Minister and deputy Prime Minister respectively, after successful coalition government talks. 6 7 See Zwizwai et.al (1999) 106 seriously considered. The doctrine of separation of powers between the Judiciary, Legislature and the State, serves as the primary constitutional guard against the mutation of the State into a dictatorship, and its applicability in Zimbabwe has of late been compromised. Unclear as it is, whether the Zimbabwean political system resembles democracy, particracy or autocracy, the effect on governance, particularly relating to policy direction and implementation, public service provision and accountability to the electorate in Zimbabwe, has not been favorable for Zimbabwe and its economy. The main challenges to policy are explained below, with the aid of two selected policy reforms that made a huge impact on Zimbabwe’s economy, relative to other policies that followed. 5-3 Economic Policy Design, Implementation and Reform Process In general, formulation of policies including monetary, fiscal and development related policies have not always followed a uniform procedure, but the following common challenges exist; a. Empirical studies by Zwizwai et.al in 1999 show that selection criteria for beneficiaries of certain policies were either heavily influenced by political or ethnic considerations. b. Research work is mostly government initiated, but results are not fully utilized. c. Preferential bias towards foreign technocrats/policy consultants to local consultants even in cases where local consultants are better placed. d. Policies designed with the policy maker’s personal interests in mind e. Insufficient consultation among ministries and stakeholders during policy formulation and refinement (Policies presented for discussion within short notice of becoming policy), resulting in lack of commitment to policy implementation and strained working relationships among ministries and government agencies under their control8. f. Limited consensus building among stakeholders to create national ownership of policies and programs and disparities between policy design and implementation. The case below describes events surrounding the implementation of the IMF led Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), focusing on how lack of policy ownership and dedication to policy implementation, as well as pursuance of political and personal interests contributed to reform failure. An example is Operation Sunrise 1(August 2006), a surprise currency reform implemented by the Central Bank Governor that gave deadlines for the public to deposit their money, set to trap money launderers including those in other ministries. Relations between the Central Bank and other ministries have been strained from thereon. 8 107 Case 1: ESAP 1992-1995 ESAP was introduced in 1990 by the Ministry of Economic Development, to improve annual economic growth from a previous average of 4% to 5% by 1995, and promote foreign investment, industrial development as well as employment creation. The desired outcome was not realized however. Numerous job losses resulted and the cost of living increased, as well as poverty rates and HIV/AIDS infection rates. Adult life expectancy declined from 56yrs to 37yrs from 1990-2004 (IFPRI,).Real GDP growth rate declined from 4.5% between 1981 and 1990 to 1.1% between 1998 and 1999 (WB OED, 2004).Furthermore, the 1992 drought reduced agricultural output and worsened the outcome. The reforms required government to liberalize trade and the exchange rate, as well as privatize parastatals, to reduce government burden and solve the government’s fiscal problems, but Chikuhwa (2004) describes how top government officials and cabinet ministers scurried to ‘make a killing before privatization’ as government property was sold at give away prices. Though the privatization was meant to raise money to solve the government’s fiscal problems, it only raised $7.1 billion of a budgeted $ 22billion. Zwizwai, Kambudzi and Mauwa (IDRC) attributed the failure to partial implementation of policies and non formulation of necessary policies. World Bank OED attributed reform failure to inadequate fiscal reform (the civil service and wage bill had remained high even after being cut from 46% to 39% of GDP between 1989 and 1994) and the impact external shocks, particularly the 1992 drought(OED,1996). Case 2 shows how disparity between policy implementation plan, inadequate consideration of technocrats’ advice and precedence of personal and political interests over national interests contributed to economic decline. Case 2: The Land Reform Policy Following numerous job losses, high cost of living and social discomfort after ESAP, discontentment towards the government emerged. War veterans demanded financial compensation, and land for taking part in the liberation war. Land had been unevenly distributed at independence, with the white population who comprised about 1% of the population owning about 70% of the arable land, and the remaining black population squeezed on the remaining 30% of the land. The land redistribution process was overdue and had made little progress since independence, and given the social unrest that was brewing under harsh economic conditions; the government fast tracked the program, ahead of parliamentary elections in 2000, gaining political support from smallholder farmers and war veterans in the process. Redistribution plans were laid out with technical support to the inception from the UNDP (UNDP,1999).Two resettlement models A1(for 160,000 small holder farmers) and A2 (for 51,000 native Zimbabwean commercial farmers) were presented, with laid down application procedures. However, the program derailed as ‘war veterans led a violent land-grabbing spree with unofficial but subtle government support. The most productive farms became property of elite politicians, and/or war veterans with many becoming underutilized due to 108 lack of farming equipment. Agricultural output dropped by 51%, real GDP fell by 7.5 % in 2001, and by approximately 6% in 2006 and 2007. Zimbabwe’s balance of payments problem worsened, following closure of most industries, and became heavily in need of foreign currency. Trade flows with the EU, FDI and ODA sharply declined with Zimbabwe’s international image. Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth in 2002 and subsequently withdrew in 2003. In total, 172 ZANU Pf senior stakeholders to date, including the executive, were slapped with targeted sanctions and travel bans from Britain and EU countries, on counts of violation of rule of law and declining good governance. Failure to repay arrears in 2004 led to withdrawal of World Bank and IMF support. With no access to international capital, the government resorted to local but hyperinflationary sources of capital. 㪈㪇㪇㪇 㪏㪇㪇 㪍㪇㪇 Zimbabwe before and after the Land 㪋㪇㪇 㪙㪼㪽㫆㫉㪼 㪘㪽㫋㪼㫉 㪉㪇㪇 㪇 㪝㪛㪠 Reform 㪝㫆㫉㪼㫏 㪙㪦㪧 㪩㪼㫊㪼㫉㫍㪼㫊 㪧㫆㫊㫀㫋㫀㫆㫅 㩿㪻㪼㪽㫀㪺㫀㫋㪀 Data Source; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 5-4 Causes of Zimbabwe’s fragility Since the fast tracking of the land reform in the country, relations between Zimbabwe and the international community have been tense, characterized by mistrust and difficult dialogue between international development partners and government. This has been compounded by donors’ suspension of development assistance; Zimbabwe’s restricted access to international capital due to bad credit rating, and domestic abuse of scarce public resources. Firstly, whilst donors accuse the Zimbabwean government of bad governance and failure to implement poverty alleviation policies, the government accuses donors of partisanship and withdrawal of much needed aid to rescue people from the poverty trap. The misunderstanding intensified after the donors condemned the implementation of the land reform program, for which government had strong historical and political justifications. The EU delegation to Zimbabwe views the standard definition of the term fragile as inapplicable to the Zimbabwean situation, citing instead 109 that Zimbabwe fits more under the ‘countries under difficult partnerships’ classification9. Secondly, internal issues of rapidly deteriorating governance, accountability, democracy and government effectiveness have compromised the government-people relationship, and these problems have suffered limited international interest due to restricted local and international media coverage. Zimbabwe rates poorly in international governance indicators 10 ranking in the bottom 5 when compared to other developing economies. Figure 1: Government Relationship with the Public, and International Development Partners Functional relationship Strained relationship 5-4-1 Challenges in Zimbabwe’s Governance The government-people bond has been strained due to public dissatisfaction with the government’s public administration and economic management. Levy et.al (2004)’s explanation of characteristic trends in African governance, via ‘The Governance Diamond,’ points out how public administration, as well as economic performance and quality of governance are part of a much more complex interdependent system that involves Political Interests 11 , Formal Political Institutions 12 , Bureaucracy 13 and The Economy 14 Prevalent characteristics of Zimbabwean governance are 9 EC Draft Progress Report on Principles of Good International Engagement (2005) 10 See Zimbabwe CPIA and Fund for Peace Failed States Index 11 Comprises the social and class structure of civil society 12 Comprises both the constitutional structure of the state (legislative structure and oversight; judicial independence; structure of decentralized, intergovernmental relationships; rules governing political representation) and the formal representative political leadership that results from the constitutional structure 13 The public employees and their associated responsibility (under direction and oversight of formal political leaders) for formulating policy, regulating economic activity and delivering services 14 Comprises the society’s productive factors and their associated levels of economic activity(Levy et.al. 2004) 110 highlighted in bold below, whilst weak interactions are shown by dashed arrows. Figure 2 Bureaucracy 3 2 Formal Political Interests 7 1 Economy 6 5 Political Interests 4 The Governance Diamond; Source: Levy, B. (2004) Relationship 1: Political Interests Formal Political Institutions How powerful institutions seek to influence formal institutions, not only through legitimate influence seeking, but also through efforts to reshape to their advantage the structure of formal institutions themselves The nature of the political system as explained in the political background bears on policy choice. The challenge is when political interests are prioritized over developmental projects and policies, resulting in patronage and manipulation of legislation and institutions to suit political interests and eliminate opposition. Electoral laws are subject to executive control; the Electoral Act, Article 15(2)The office of the Registrar General, is primarily responsible for conducting elections, but Article 158 specifically empowers the President to suspend or amend any provision of the Electoral Act and to alter any time period specified by the Electoral Act. (Electoral Act, Chikuhwa, 2004). Legislation has been manipulated to ban NGOs campaigning for democracy, but viewed as partisan, as well as media restriction on similar grounds. The voting process in itself faces limitations and is prone to abuse15 and followed by voter intimidation, as evidenced by a reign of terror known as Operation Mavhotera Papi ‘where did you vote,’ where urban residents were assaulted by for voting for opposition after the March 2008 elections, and an extract from a presidential speech , citing 15 [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2008/jul/04/election.zimbabwe] 111 unwillingness to respect the election outcome in the event of defeat ‘…we are not going to give up our country because of a mere X, how can a pen fight a gun?’, and in 2000, ‘...we have degrees in violence....’ (The Times, June 17, 2008). Public protests and demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction to these conditions have been minimized by intimidation and legislation that prohibits public gatherings and allows police to use any means possible to disperse people. (Public Order and Security Act, 2002 –amended in 2007) Zimbabwean lawyer, Msipa, L based in London writes, in an article entitled When Politicians Employ Judges (2004), that ‘Judges, Magistrates and Prosecutors are reminded constantly to tread carefully as the law, is a product of a political process called legislation,…Judges are ultimately appointed by politicians and their removal from office is decided by the same politicians’. As such, in 2001, a panel of five judges including the Chief Justice opposed to the land grabs was forced to resign; to be replaced by a politically biased panel (afrol.com, March, 2001). These are just a few examples of how governance is influenced by political interests. Relationships 2 and 5; Formal Political Institutions Bureaucracy; Political Interests Bureaucracy Agency relationship between political principals and their bureaucratic agents. Politicians have the authority both to set the policy, regulatory, and service delivery goals of bureaucratic actors and to monitor their performance in relation to these goals. Formal political institutions’ failure to constrain politics enabled political interests to influence bureaucracy directly (relationship 5) and indirectly in some instances, via the formal political institutions (relationship 2), as evidenced by the use of police and army against political opposition. Non-merit based hiring and promotion within the civil service, as well as declining retention ability owing to low salaries in the hyperinflationary environment, has led to low worker morale, negatively affecting service delivery and performance monitoring and effective implementation of development related policies. The brain drain of mainly skilled teachers, doctors, accountants and nurses to provide cheap labor in neighboring countries and abroad. Zimbabwe is currently the number 3 provider of UK’s expatriate health personnel after India and Nigeria (Schubert, 2003). Remaining workers at both junior and senior level turn to rent seeking activities to supplement income, resulting in uncontrolled slow and inefficient service delivery, absenteeism, and bottlenecks becoming a regular feature in civil service. Relationship 3; Bureaucracy economy The effects on the economy if bureaucratic decisions and actions in relation to policies, regulation and service delivery The lack of policy appreciation and subsequent partial or non implementation of policies, has had negative impact on the economy, e.g. policies meant to benefit agriculture by availing diesel for 112 farmers at subsidized prices are taken advantage of by custodians who distribute the benefit among themselves by selling the diesel at much higher prices, neglecting agriculture. Rent-seeking activities and weak monitoring mechanisms within the bureaucracy have generally increased the cost of doing business i.e. transaction costs, creating inefficiencies and an unfavorable business environment. Inability to retain labor in the hyperinflationary environment has resulted in severe brain drain that has compromised provision of accounting, health and education services, thus proving to be a major setback to the economy. Possible Impact of Seigniorage Some natural resource endowed countries rely on resource revenue such that they cease to be accountable to the public regarding tax expenditure. For other countries, aid takes the place of taxpayer funds and the government ceases to be accountable. In Zimbabwe, the Central Bank prints money for the government to meet its expenses, in addition to taxpayers’ money. This may also have a similar impact on accountability. Ideal Situation –Virtuous Cycle According to Levy, a virtuous cycle can be realized if formal political institutions constrain politics, check the extralegal activities by political interests and govern bureaucracies such that bureaucracies are accountable for service delivery and make the business environment favorable for investors. A diversified economy provides a variety of business activities such that lobbying efforts by the dispersed interests offset each other. The economy thus becomes characterized by a strong private sector and a productive private economy. The role of a good leadership chosen by the people and accountable to the people, removal of restrictions on democracy and media, as well as an independent judiciary, can not be undermined in driving Zimbabwe to a long lasting exit from fragility and sustained development. These factors will shift Zimbabwe from the current characteristic trend of decline shown below, to sustainable long term growth. 113 Figure 3 Source: Governance Matters 2008: World Governance Indicators, 1996-2007 Figure 4 - Core Five State Institutions and Their Condition in Zimbabwe Leadership Military Police Judiciary Civil Service Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Source: The Fund for Peace, 2007 114 An analysis made by the Fund for Peace for the year 2007 shows that Zimbabwe’s five major institutions are all rated poor as indicated above, and this is in sync with the governance indicators in figure 1 above. 5-5 What major Donors Are Doing to Make Zimbabwe Less Fragile 5-5-1 USAID, DFID, DANIDA and EU Due to the difficulty in dialogue between government and donors, the beginning of the millennium saw a significant number of donors cut engagements with government, abandon projects and resort to diverting aid resources to civic nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations so as to provide humanitarian aid (tackling HIV/AIDS and improving food security), direct support projects in micro enterprise, health, education, human rights promotion as well as democratization and anti corruption. This approach has been taken by major donors like UK Department for International Development (DFID),European Commission(EC),United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Swedish International development Agency (SIDA), and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) to name a few. Civic organizations supported by these donors include the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), Zimbabwe Red Cross Society and Center for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA) among others. In addition to that and relating to the governance issue, the European Union, in 2002, took restrictive measures against the ruling elite in the form of targeted sanctions that consist visa ban and freeze of assets within the EU. These measures have been extended six times and remain in effect until February 2009. To date, 172 elites are under targeted EU sanctions. Zimbabwe is ineligible to benefit from the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) because of weak governance, and the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, enacted by the US government, restricts assistance to Zimbabwe ‘until certain conditions are satisfied and to support democratic and economic transition to Zimbabwe’. However, the NGO approach has had its limitations because of the challenge it poses to government legitimacy by excluding the government in donor activities. Beneficiaries from NGO activities have been victims of political violence for not being government/ruling party loyalists. The government has taken this approach to be politically biased and as a result government has strictly controlled donor funded NGO activities, to the extent of banning all NGO activities, particularly those working to improve governance, and insisting on centralized control of donor resources The ban left some people vulnerable to hunger as some of the NGOs used to provide food aid and was later partially lifted for NGOs providing humanitarian aid. Thus donor activities in Zimbabwe have become limited to humanitarian aid, which, though highly appreciated, does not provide a sustainable solution 115 to Zimbabwe’s woes. Targeted sanctions may work as far as controlling abuse of state resources, but they have also created a sense of hostility towards the international development community in the West, such that chances of reaching a consensus with government are reduced. Instead, the Zimbabwe government resorted to new development partners, under a new slogan known as the “Look East Policy’. These include China, Iran, Malaysia and Korea. Efforts have been made by some donors to engage government, but the difficult relationship between international donors and government gets in the way. An example is the USAID which, since 2002, worked with the Zimbabwean Parliament in a Democracy and Governance Program, to strengthen parliament’s capacity to be responsive to the people it serves, enhancing public participation, empowering Parliament to hold itself and the Executive accountable. The program aimed to strengthen portfolio committees, by providing needed technical assistance for the analysis of bills, statutory instruments, and the national budget. The program facilitated the organization of public hearings and contributed to encouraging public participation. Favorable results from the program were noted in the form of the heightened assertiveness of committee chairpersons on both sides of the aisle, and in their increased willingness to challenge bills that transgress the principles of good law. However, in April 2007, without consulting the Members of Parliament, the Speaker advised USAID that further cooperation was no longer desired. Since that time, assistance has shifted toward helping civil society interface with the Parliament (USAID, 2008). 5-5-2 OECD-DAC & EU: The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States In view of the possible harm to ordinary citizens that aid may bring, the OECD-DAC introduced the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 16 , a set of ten principles complementing commitments set in the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness, and in general, aiming to maximize gain and minimize unintended harm that might befall a country due to international engagement. They aim to help reformed fragile states to build effective and legitimate state institutions, as well as engage productively with the people to achieve sustained development in the long term (OECD-DAC, 2007). Within the Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, the EU funds a section that serves to collect information on the ground, on behalf of EU. Recommendations are made from that unit to EU, enabling the EU to make informed decisions that meet the needs of the people in the country. Zimbabwe is one of the ten pilot countries, selected by donor countries to apply introduced by the 16 OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf 116 OECD-DAC, among other countries; Sudan, Nepal, DRC, Yemen, Somalia, Guinea Bissau, Solomon Islands and Haiti. Since 2005, the EC has been the facilitator for the Zimbabwe Pilot. The EC aims to support fragile states in a proactive way, by addressing the root causes and dealing with the negative outcomes of fragility, and accordingly, the EC Zimbabwe delegation’s major thrust is in going beyond the impasse by exploiting all available means to improve dialogue, particularly relating to governance and MDGs, between the Zimbabwean government and the international donor community. The success depends on the Zimbabwe government’s willingness towards improved relations and donor coordination. 5-5-3 Japan The Japanese government takes a government to government approach that is no longer practiced by afore-mentioned donors. Trough the official implementing agency of Japanese aid -JICA, Japan's development assistance has focused more on the four priority sectors for development assistance to Zimbabwe that were agreed on between the Zimbabwean and Japanese governments in 1998. These are (a) Improvement of business environment conditions for promotion of industry for income generation to afford every Zimbabwean access to good employment and entrepreneur opportunities, (b) Improvement of health and medical care, (c) Promotion of agriculture in communal and resettlement areas and (d) Environmental conservation including water supply. Under these four sectors, Japan has contributed towards infrastructure development projects including the Chirundu Bridge construction and rural electrification, made contributions towards humanitarian assistance, the latest one being donation of resources for water treatment to curb the cholera crisis. JICA dispatches volunteers and experts in various fields such as health, education, small business enterprise, energy conservation, telecommunication, rural electrification, agriculture and construction since 1989.However, most were recalled following election related political instability. Japan has also deployed of election observers in the 2000 and 2002 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in support of good governance and democracy. Japanese assistance is also channeled towards human capacity development by way or training government officials in various fields so as to improve government performance and effectiveness in provision of public services. Thus Japan’s approach has been to provide physical infrastructure, capacity building at national and grassroots level, and support for democratic elections as well as humanitarian assistance 5-5-4 The World Bank and IMF The World Bank and IMF suspended lending to Zimbabwe following Zimbabwe’s failure to pay arrears, and wait upon Zimbabwe to organize its governmental challenges before they can assist Zimbabwe financially. 117 5-6 Actions Taken by the African Community-SADC, AU, AfDB and NEPAD 5-6-1 SADC, AU, AfDB and NEPAD The Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) and the African Union (AU) have taken a ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach to Zimbabwe, as well as South Africa and Uganda at the UN Security Council. As such, SADC monitors the political and security situation in Zimbabwe, deploying election observers during parliamentary and presidential elections. SADC appointed a mediator, then South African President Thabo Mbeki, in efforts for the two rival political parties in Zimbabwe to form a unity government, as a possible solution to Zimbabwe’ political crisis. In addition, SADC has also mobilized resources to provide the Zimbabwean government with humanitarian aid. The Africa Development Bank (AfDB) has no activity in Zimbabwe because the World Bank suspended loan assistance for Zimbabwe. The New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is designed to redress challenges facing the African continent. It promotes good governance as a fundamental obligation for ‘peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development’, and proposes that good governance can be attained using 6 ways, namely, Administrative and civil service reform; Strengthening parliamentary oversight; Promoting participatory decision-making; Adopting effective measures to combat corruption and embezzlement; Undertaking judicial reforms; and The Peer Review Mechanism17. However, with these approaches, Zimbabwe’s governance and economic situation continuously decline. If successful, the benefits of quiet diplomacy may end political tension, but this may not be a sufficient solution to guarantee accountability and control of state resources, as well as improved relations between Zimbabwe and the international donor community. 5-6-2 The Look East Policy- China & Iran and its impact on Governance Following aid suspension and a weakened relationship between Zimbabwe and the Western donor community, the Zimbabwean government redirected its foreign policy towards the Asia, fostering diplomatic ties with new development partners, mainly China and Iran. In 2005, the Iran government became a promising source of finance for the Zimbabwe government whose access to international capital was minimal. In 2006, Zimbabwe signed an aid deal with China and adopted a slogan known as the ‘Look East’ Policy. Zimbabwe holds the world’s second largest platinum deposits after South Africa, uranium deposits in the Zambezi river valley, diamond deposits, high quality chrome, gold and other metals that it can exploit to improve power supply and the economic situation. Iran has interests in uranium enrichment for nuclear power supplies and China has interests in chrome 17 The Peer Review Mechanism is a voluntary, self monitoring mechanism for African States, funded entirely by African Resources and intended for African States to lever themselves out of the cycle of poverty and instability by practicing good governance, democracy and human rights, and submitting to periodic peer reviews (NEPAD Action Plans,2005) 118 and platinum. As such, the policy enables some natural resource diplomacy to take place as Zimbabwe is supplied with loans, electronic equipment from Iran and farm implements from China. Impact on Governance The impact of targeted sanctions imposed by Western donor partners, and conditional lending to squeeze the Zimbabwean government into improving governance is highly reduced and government has no push to change. Whilst Zimbabwe sympathizers and newly found development partners provide loans and farm implements, the bulk of the resources, due to limited accountability, remains in the hands of the elite and fails to trickle down to the neediest. As such, the gap between the rich and the poor in Zimbabwe grows, and the ruling elite have every incentive to remain in power. 5-7 What Japan can do to reduce fragility in Zimbabwe In many cases, a bottom-up approach, where recommendations come from the intended beneficiaries, can work towards improving effectiveness of development projects or other forms of development assistance. Given its Japan and Zimbabwe’s 4 priority areas ; (a) Improvement of business environment conditions for promotion of industry for income generation to afford every Zimbabwean access to good employment and entrepreneur opportunities, (b) Improvement of health and medical care, (c) Promotion of agriculture in communal and resettlement areas and (d) Environmental conservation including water supply, and grassroots advantage and experience in technical cooperation, Japanese aid can improve its aid effectiveness in a variety of ways. Figure 5 Humanitarian aid, Promoting Governance & democracy awareness JAPAN International donors NGOs The public RESTRICTED Declining governance, accountability and public service provision B A Government Strong Impact of political interests on government decisions, actions and democracy Functional relationship Source: Author, 2009 Regarding the first cause of fragility, the difficult dialogue between the Zimbabwean government and international donors, Japan has maintained a government to government assistance 119 strategy, and dialogue may not be as difficult as is the case with most international donors (a situation EC is trying to address). Given the current contribution Japan is making to Zimbabwe’s development, Japanese aid can take a more customized approach to Zimbabwe’s peculiar situation than taking a standard approach, addressing critical needs so that the country escapes the poverty trap and moves towards sustainable development. Japan can allocate its aid to physical infrastructure that can assuredly benefit the intended people, and minimize misappropriation of funds, at the same time, promoting sustainable growth and development in ways that are environmentally friendly. Possible ways are explained below. 5-7-1 The Batoka Gorge Hydroelectricity Project Following aid withdrawal, Zimbabwe has had foreign currency shortages, severely limiting the government’s capacity to import energy. Japan could make further contribution towards Energy production. The Batoka Gorge Hydroelectricity Project is situated in the Zambezi Valley between Zambia and Zimbabwe. A feasibility study was conducted in 1992, a lot of ground work has been done in Zimbabwe, and results show that once an RCC Gravity Arch Dam is constructed and the project completed, among other important factors, the electricity generation efficiency will be 86%, the expected internal rate of return would be between 10-12%, and CO2 emission savings amounting to 9 million tomes per annum could be credited to the Batoka Project (Zimbabwe Ministry of Energy and Development, 2007). Boosting energy availability positively affects commercial business, big and small, right from the manufacturing to the service sector. It will benefit the agriculture sector, because irrigation requires electricity for the water pumps to function, greenhouses need electricity for illumination at night for foreign currency earning products such as horticulture and tobacco. Availability of electricity will also be of benefit to the mining sector, schools and hospitals, and households. Food security is improved from the present declining situation. Bread is a significant part of the Zimbabwean diet, second to maize, but Zimbabweans have had to forego it after wheat harvests failed due to electric power cuts. In August 2007, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority had to implement 20 hour power cuts as it could not afford to import enough electricity to meet demand, and as a result the winter wheat crop harvest was much less than expected. The former CEO of the Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Board mentioned, in August 2008, that Zimbabwe requires 400 000 tonnes of wheat per annum but forecasted that the country would hardly harvest 80 000 tonnes, due to power shortages and lack of fertilizers. Other ways to boost energy availability would channel aid towards resuscitation the Hwange thermal power plant and the Hwange rail system. 120 The resulting energy provision is a service that cannot possibly be kept only to a small elite group once electricity is available, and takes advantage of JICA’s experience in construction project implementation. Emphasis would be on a Japanese company implementing the project, avoiding cases where tenders are allocated to inefficient companies belonging to some elite members of society. The recipient country benefits from the project, and the donor country provides contracts for its people, and the results benefit the majority. This would also be in line with the first priority area that the Japanese and Zimbabwean governments agreed on in 1998, on improvement of business environment conditions, and it paves way for economic growth and development. 5-7-2 Contribution towards urban infrastructure development To prevent health hazards such as cholera from recurring in future, close attention needs to be given to the urban planning. High rates of rural-urban migration led to concentration in urban areas where drainage ground infrastructure was sufficient to contain the population increase. In most cases, this infrastructure was laid out before independence when urban expansion was not expected to be at the current levels. As the ground infrastructure grows older, without resources to replace it, pipes begin to burst and the risk of disease increases particularly in the concentrated urban areas, yielding disastrous results. Again, a similar approach would have to be taken, one in which a Japanese company controls the replacement process of old ground infrastructure in urban areas. The benefit lasts for years and cannot be privatized. By preventing future disease outbreak, this would be in line with the second priority area on improvement of health and medical care. 5-7-3 Assistance of Small Holder Farmers Agriculture provides income for 60-70% of the population and the bulk of the people who rely on agriculture practice communal agriculture. Communal agriculture takes up 2/3 of agricultural land i.e. 21.3m ha of the 33.3m ha total land area. However, as focus goes to promoting commercial agriculture in the aftermath of the Fast Track Land Reform, communal farming tends to be neglected. Given Japan’s comparative advantage in grassroots projects, more Japanese assistance could be focused on the communal farmers, improving their farming techniques and working hand in hand with the periodical agricultural show organizers, giving incentives to promote good environmentally friendly farming practices and creativity, but achieving improved food security in the process. Japan is also working on improving rice production in Africa; the grassroots level could be one entry point to introduce varieties like Nerica to Zimbabwe, where rice is an accepted alternative to maize, and it also provides a source of income for communal farmers. Commercial farmers may choose to adopt rice production as well. The above described ways all aim to assist the ordinary person to whom aid normally fails to 121 infiltrate down to. Other donors have taken the NGO route to achieve the same goal, as previously explained. 5-7-4 Natural Resource Diplomacy By taking advantage of Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy, Japan can benefit from Zimbabwe’s mineral endowment whilst providing the government with financial needs to meet the country’ s requirements. 5-7-5 Addressing Governance If the Japanese government so wishes to tackle the critical issue of governance in Zimbabwe, which is a delicate issue, then once resolved, this would be one way that ensures that development assistance that goes through government certainly benefits the least individual without being misappropriated, and also improves the relationship between the government and the people. Policy dialogue between Japan and Zimbabwe needs to emphasize more strongly on the importance of good governance for development, and this message can be put across more in courses given to government officials from developing countries in general, so that a turnaround can be realized in the governance of developing countries in general. At the moment, no aid coordinating unit for development assistance exists in Zimbabwe. Only recently, a humanitarian aid coordination unit was introduced by the incoming Prime Minister. A development assistance coordinating unit that handles donors is necessary in Zimbabwe to improve aid effectiveness. 5-8 Conclusion The issue of fragility in Zimbabwe is a challenging and delicate one that is causing untold suffering to Zimbabwean citizens under limited international attention. Japan and the rest of the international community, in providing assistance to Zimbabwe and other fragile states, need to take customized approaches because no country is the same and no single strategy applies to all countries. Regarding the case of Zimbabwe, the issue of governance has to be a priority issue in putting an end to Zimbabwe’s fragility, but at the same time, dialogue with the government is important to enable donors to provide assistance without bringing further harm to the citizens. Japan has mainly provided technical assistance, and humanitarian aid through UN, but there is room to further assist in the energy, mining and agriculture sectors for faster economic recovery, while Zimbabwean political parties, citizens and the SADC Africa Development Committee (SADC) work on decentralization of power and improving internal governance and institutions with help from other donors, and bringing more land under agricultural production to be able to provide food for the nation. 122 References Africa / EU Joint Strategy and the Action Plan 2008-2010 http://europafrica.org/jointstrategy/governance/ AllAfrica.com (2008) Zimbabwe: Winter Wheat on Course for Smallest Ever Crop. 5 August, 2008. http://allafrica.com/stories/200808050933.html (accessed December3, 2008) Beasley, T. and Kudamatsu, M. (2007) What We Learn from Successful Autocracies. Economist’s View, July, 05.2007 http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/07/what-can-we-lea.html (accessed 10 February, 2009) Chikuhwa, J. (2004) A Crisis of Governance - Zimbabwe. Algora Publishing, United States of America, 2004 CPIF http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/.pdf Collier, P. (2007) The Bottom Billion – Why The Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford University Press Inc. New York DeMesquita, B.B., Morrow, J.D., Siverson, R.M., Smith, A. (2001) Political Competition and Economic Growth. Journal of Democracy - Volume 12, Number 1, January 2001, pp. 58-72.The John Hopkins University Press. http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/journal_of_democracy/v012/12.1mesquita.html Devarajan, S; Dollar, D; Holmgren, T. (2001) Aid and Reform in Africa (World Bank) DFID Zimbabwe. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/zimbabwe.asp (accessed February 8, 2009) European Commission Zimbabwe. http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/country_profile.cfm ?cid=zw&lng=en&CFID=2434436&CFTOKEN=35202205&jsessionid=24305726dcec3f4a5 822 (accessed 10 March, 2009) European Commission. 9 Intervention Areas – Addressing Situations of Fragility http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/governance/fragile_states_en.cfm (accessed 15 March, 2009) European Union (2005) – European Consensus on Development. 14820/05. 22 November, 2005. http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/eupresidency2005/eu-consensus-development.pdf (accessed, 12 February, 2009) Hayami, Y and Godo, Y. (2005) Development Economics. Oxford University Press Inc, New York. IMF (2008) Transcript of the African Regional Economic Outlook Press Briefing - With Antoinette Sayeh. October 10, 2008 http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2008/tr101008.htm (accessed November 20, 2008) JICA Zimbabwe. http://www.jica.go.jp/zimbabwe/english/activities/index.html (accessed 10 February, 2009) 123 Kagoro, B (2002) Can apples be reaped from a thorn tree? A case analysis of the Zimbabwean Crisis and NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism. Saprn. 2002. http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000068/P70_Kagoro.pdf Levy, B., Kpundeh, S. (Eds) (2004) Building State Capacity in Africa. New Approaches, Emerging Lessons. IBRD/World Bank.1818 H.Street, N.W. Washington D.C.20433, USA Meldrum, A. (2005) Mugabe Hails Uranium Find and Vows to Pursue Nuclear Power. The Guardian, 21 November, 2005. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/nov/21/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum (accessed 23 February, 2009) Munck, G.L. Measures of Democracy, Governance and Rule of Law: An Overview of Cross-National Data Sets. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/Measuresofdemocracy.pdf OECD- DAC http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,3380,en_2649_201185_1_70927_119656_1_1,00.html http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf OECD-DAC - The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html SIDA Zimbabwe http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=1337&a=24061&language=en_US (accessed 3 March, 2009) Schubert, Charlotte (2003) Nurses disappearing from developing nations. Nature Medicine 9, 979 (1 August 2003) | doi: 10.1038/nm0803-979; http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v9/n8/full/nm0803-979.html (accessed 10 March, 2009) Torres, M.M and Anderson, M. (2004) Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction. PRDE Working Paper 1 – August, 2004 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/64137341-1094571451760/20357055/PRDE_WP_ 1%20Defining%20Fragile%20States.pdf (accessed 20 March, 2009) The Fund for Peace- Zimbabwe 2007 http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=280&Itemid= 432 (Accessed 21 March 2009) USAID Zimbabwe http://www.usaid.gov/zw/ (accessed 23 February, 2009) UNDP Zimbabwe http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/ (accessed 23 February, 2009) World Bank Independent Evaluation Group http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/licus04_map.html (accessed 20 March, 2009) 124 Appendix Source: Governance Matters 2008: World Governance Indicators, 1996-2007 125 ╙ 6 ┨ ࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕ㧦⼾߆ߐߣ⽺࿎ߩㅒ⺑ Chapter 6 Nigeria – So Rich, Yet So Poor - Looking Behind the Paradox ࠠࡖࠨࡦ㨯ࡑ࠴ࡦࠟ࠙࠲㧔╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㧕 Catherine Machingauta1 (GRIPS)2 㧔ⷐ⚂㧕 ࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕߪࠕࡈࠞᦨᄢߩੱญࠍᜬߜ⼾ߩߘޔንߥ⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߣੱ⊛⾗Ḯߣߦⵣߠߌߐ ࠇߚ⤘ᄢߥ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߩẜ⢻ജࠍ߃ߡࠆޕ࿖ኅߩ 8 ഀࠍ⍹ᴤߦଐሽߒޔᏂ㗵ߩ㐿 ⊒េഥߩฃข࿖ߢ߽ࠆ߽ߩߩ⽺ޔ࿎ᷫޔᢎ⢒ޔஜᐽᡷༀߩಽ㊁ߢࡒ࠾ࠕࡓ㐿⊒⋡ᮡ (MDGs)ߩ㆐ᚑߪ࿎㔍ߣࠄࠇߡ߅ࠅޔ⇇㌁ⴕߪ 2004 ᐕࠃࠅห࿖ࠍ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߣಽ㘃ߒߡ ࠆᧄޕⓂߢߪ࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕߦ߅ߌࠆ⣀ᒙᕈߩⷐ࿃߇ޔ⍹ᴤࠢ࠲߳ߩᒝଐሽޔァ ᮭᤨߩㆊ୫㊄ߩᷣޔ࿖ᐶᱦߩਇㆡಾߥ▤ℂࠬࡆࠨޔឭଏߩᯏ⢻ਇోޔᳪ ⡯ߦ․ޔมᴺㇱ㐷ߦ߅ߌࠆᐲߩᒙߐ߮ේᴤ⾗Ḯߩ⼾ንߥ࠺࡞࠲ၞߩᖱਇቯߦ ࠆߣ․ቯߒߚޕᐭߩᒙࠝ࠽ࠪ࠶ࡊߣᡷ㕟߳ߩᴦ⊛ᗧᕁ߽࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕߩ㐿⊒ߩ ⊒ዷࠍ⪺ߒߊ㒖ኂߒߡࠆޕ 㐿⊒ࡄ࠻࠽ߦࠃࠆ㐿⊒េഥߪ⸥ߩࠃ߁ߥㅘᕈߩૐߐ߿ࠕࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࠹ࠖߩૐߐ ߆ࠄ⽷ᡰេߥߤߪⴕߞߡ߅ࠄߕޔਥߣߒߡ⋥ធࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߩታᣉߩᒻᘒࠍߣࠆ߽ߩ߇ ᄙޕᡰេಽ㊁ߪޔਛ㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ࿖ߩ⊒ዷߦਇนᰳߥㄘᬺ߿ࠛࡀ࡞ࠡޔⅣႺ⾏ޔᤃᛩ⾗ಽ ㊁ࠃࠅ߽ޔஜಽ㊁ߦ㓸ਛߔࠆะ߇ࠄࠇࠆߣ࠽࠼ޕᐭ㑆ߩࡄ࠻࠽ࠪ࠶ࡊߩᒙ ߐߪޔਔ⠪㑆ߦሽߔࠆᖱႎߩ㕖ኻ⒓ᕈߦ৻ㇱ࿃ߒߡࠆޕᣣᧄߩኻ࠽ࠗࠫࠚࠕ㐿⊒ េഥߪߘߩᲧセఝࠍᵴ߆ߒޔᛛⴚදജ߿Ꮢ᳃␠ળᒝൻޔᐲᡷༀߦᵈജߔߴ߈ߛ߇․ޔ ߦេഥࠍᦨ߽ᔅⷐߣߔࠆၞߩᖱਇቯᕈࠍ〯߹߃ߦࠇߎޔኻߔࠆኻᔕ╷ࠍ⏕ߦߔࠆ ᔅⷐ߇ࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆޕ 6-1 Introduction Nigeria is one of the largest African countries both in terms of geography and demography. Its population of about 140million people makes it the most populous African Nation. A full member of the OPEC and current holder of the rotating chairmanship of The Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria is also a recognized leader in regional initiatives including the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and has made contributions to international peace-keeping missions particularly across Africa. As such, Nigeria's success and stability are essential to growth and stability in West Africa and the rest of the African continent. Special Thanks to Mr Kayode. M.Olaniyan (GRIPS) for valuable contributions made during this study 2 National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) student Sept 2007- Mar 2009 1 126 Nigeria was under military dictatorship for nearly three decades, before returning to civilian democratic rule in 1999, with the election of former Military Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo. President Obasanjo led the country for 2 terms of 4 years each, before handing over power to the incumbent president Umar Yar’Adua in 2007, who won almost 70% of the votes while rallying against 17 other candidates from different parties in Nigeria’s first-ever civilian-civilian democratic transition. The President heads the state and a multi party government comprising 5 political parties, and is also the Army Commander in Chief. The People’s Democratic Party, to which the president belongs, has more that 50% seats in the National Assembly, made up of the Senate and House of Representatives. As in a presidential system, the President exercises executive power, the National Assembly exercises legislative power and the Supreme Court exercises judiciary power. The country has 36 states, each with a Governor elected by popular vote but subject to suspension by the Federal Government to be replaced with an administrator, for instance under emergency rule. Oil discovery in 1956 and subsequent exploitation in the 1970s made the country the sixth largest oil producer in the world, and transforming the economy from its dependence on agricultural exports such as palm oil, cocoa, rubber, cotton and groundnuts, to oil dependency. Since the 1970s’ petroleum boom, about 80% of the government revenue has continuously been derived from the oil industry, making fiscal stability highly susceptible to price fluctuations on the international oil market as well as OPEC quotas. However, the Nigerian economy has been perpetually dogged by poor fiscal and macroeconomic policy, corruption, misallocation of oil revenues as well as conflict over control of oil resources. These factors have contributed mostly to the poor state and slow recursive development of the country. For instance, in spite of the resource endowment, Nigeria’s electricity company only meets about 5% of national demand such that 60% of energy consumption needs are met from wood and agricultural waste sources (Ministry of Energy 2008). In addition, 54.4% of the population still live below the international poverty line of $1 a day (NPC, 2006) and 65% of population is food insecure according to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture. The country is heavily dependent on food imports, and forecasts on the world’s sixth largest oil exporting and global gas supplying economy show a poverty incidence of 70-80% by 2030 in the absence of effective change in development strategy (NEEDS, 2005). Resource rich as it is, Nigeria is likely to miss many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, particularly poverty, and health targets, but according to OECD-DAC data, on track for MDG 2 on universal primary education for all. On the other hand, Nigeria’s return to civilian administration also saw a rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) from an initial 1.02% of GDP in 1986, to 3.93% of GDP in 2002 (CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2002). Previously taken to be a non reformer, of late, new reforms in Nigeria such as the 127 National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 3 , the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (N-EITI), have responded fairly positively. However, real GDP growth has remained constrained given the poor physical infrastructure and, overstretched social services and poor public-sector governance. Nigeria has been designated a fragile state by the World Bank in 2004 (World Bank IEG, 2004), implying the government is unable or unwilling to deliver public service and security within its borders. Nigeria presents a unique case as an aid recipient; resource rich, and having an established financial sector, and at one time even receiving more aid per capita than other developing countries, but failing to grow. This makes it peculiarly different from other cases of aid recipients that do not have resources and are ‘clearly’ in need of financial assistance. A different assistance strategy is therefore necessary for Nigeria’s development. This case study tries to identify the causes of Nigeria’s fragility, stagnated growth and government’s non-provision of public services to citizens, despite access to vast oil resources. The study begins with an insight into the government structure and how it distributes funds for developmental purposes towards public service delivery and development policy, makes an assessment of why Nigeria is fragile. It presents a review of actions taken by various international donors to make Nigeria “less fragile”, and concludes with recommendations. 6-2 What Makes Nigeria a Fragile State? Nigeria’s slow development has been attributed to the Dutch Disease, also known as the natural resource curse or the paradox of plenty (Collier, 2007; Hayami and Godo, 2005), and more recently, to a Debt Overhang, and bad fiscal and macroeconomic policy, rife corruption and poor governance (Okonjo-Iweala, 2008; Budina, Pang and van Wijnbergen, 2006). The Government, as well as civil society contribute to the above factors. 6-2-1 The Nigerian Case of the Dutch Disease- over reliance on Oil A country or region characterised by the Dutch Disease tends to have an abundance of particularly non-renewable natural resources like minerals and fuels, but achieving slower economic growth and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources (van Wijnbergen, 1986; Corden and Neary, 1982). Nigeria became victim to the natural resource curse after benefiting from oil export booms at high prices during the first and second oil crises (1970s). Oil contribution became very significant to the Nigerian economy, but was largely mismanaged, often directed towards military expenditure as well as unsustainable investments nonetheless meant for national development. All This resulted in excess effective demand that increased inflation. A National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) is aimed at improving the functioning of government, supporting the private sector and enhancing the quality of life of citizens, in line with the MDGs targets. 3 128 real exchange rate appreciation caused by oil exports made agriculture and other non-oil tradeables uncompetitive on the export and domestic markets, as imports became relatively cheaper, creating unemployment. The growth of the petroleum industry and service sector also attracted a huge influx of migrant job seekers from neglected rural villages to urban slums as they abandoned agriculture, to the detriment of food security. Unfortunately, the employment capacity created by the capital intensive oil industry and its supporting industries was inadequate to absorb the mass. Thus, in addition to unemployment, inflation and non viability of non-oil tradeables, the Dutch disease phenomenon gave way to a myriad of problems, in the following ways: 6-2-2 Regulation of the Petroleum Industry – Fostering Corruption In 1973, soon after Nigeria began exporting oil, the Nigerian government, often led by military dictatorship, regulated the petroleum industry despite institutional challenges, inefficient checks and balances on public fund management and patronage driven appointments with limited expertise to cope with the Dutch disease problem. To date, the Nigerian Federal Government, through the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC)4, owns about 60% shares in the oil industry, and generally owns majority stake in numerous joint ventures with oil companies effectively maintaining control and regulating the oil industry. Consequently, the government’s control and reliance of oil revenues greatly weakened government’s reliance on taxpayer funds, undermining government accountability to the public. Political restraints are therefore weakened in resource rich countries (Collier, 2007). According to Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Nigerian writer, of all the countries that had black gold (oil), Nigeria was the only country that succeeded in doing absolutely nothing with it (qtd in Meredith ,M,2006). The government became the most lucrative employer for the mass jobseekers because of its access to oil revenues. Patronage politics under illegitimate regimes attracted those interested in personal benefit, to high government positions, while non merit based hiring and contract awarding to those who could bribe government officials became part of a corrupt culture within the government, compromising efficiency. Even worse, acts of intimidation, blackmailing and bribing of judiciary, policy makers, implementers and decision makers, perpetuated institutional decay and impeded national development and contributed towards reform failures. For instance, Collier (2007) describes how the head of a legislative committee, had expected to be bribed by the head of the tax authority in order to pass a tax law. The resultant institutional decay was at the expense of economic infrastructure development and general public service provision. The corruption culture also spread even beyond civil service, fostering financial crimes such as the advance-fee fraud scam, and destroying social capital (trust), essential in sound business practice. The NNPC was established in 1977 to manage all government interests in the Nigerian oil industry including involvement in production and marketing petroleum products. 4 129 6-2-3 Lack of Transparency in Revenue Distribution within the Federal and State System In accordance with the nation’s constitution, national revenues are pooled into the Consolidated Revenue Fund Account operated by the Federal Government, and allocated to the various government tiers according to a revenue-sharing formula. The challenge for the Nigerian Federal government has always been the optimal and transparent allocation of these national resources and oil benefits across the country’s 36 States inhabited by different ethnicities, and 774 local governments. Thus, resource allocation has always been central to Nigerian politics, and the cause of political mayhem within the country. The Federal Government receives about half of the total allocation, about a quarter goes to the States and the remainder is shared between the local governments, statutory bodies and the reserves. Population figures in the north and south are perceived to be of great practical influence as well in distribution of government revenues, because the larger populated area may receive more funding. However, cases of inadequate fund transfers, misallocation of resources by states due to over-reliance on federal transfers hinder efficient supply of public services across the country (Olowu and Erero, 1995; Ekpo and Ndebbio, 1998; The World Bank, 2002) see Case 1. Lack of transparency on the political arena also mars election legitimacy. Allegations of election fraud and election violence characterized by ethnic, religious and political differences are not new to Nigerian politics. 130 CASE 1- Electric Power Crisis in Nigeria Nigeria faces a grim energy challenge: 70% of urban dwellers have little or no access to electricity. The country’s electric power sector is dominated by the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), a government parastatal. The President, Alh. Umar Yar’Adua remarked in early 2008 that about $10billion was spent from proceeds of oil windfall prices from the Excess Crude Account by his predecessor to alleviate the power supply situation with little results. The Excess Crude Account is to act as a stabilization fund, closing budget deficits that are a product of oil price volatility, and to potentially fund domestic infrastructure investments. The Federal House of Representatives Speaker stated that the amount withdrawn from the Account was actually $16billion, and commenced a series of public hearings with public testimonies from former and current government officials. The public hearings revealed significant differences on; the exact amounts involved; the site location of projects, the contracts bidding and award process and a large number of projects not commenced or partially commenced but fully paid for. Initially, States and local governments were said to have bought into the National Integrated Power Project (NIPP), but with the revelations from the public hearings, they demanded for a refund of their share. Government officials attributed the meagre improvement in the power situation to various reasons including personal differences between the President and the Vice-president, inadequate diligence of the bureaucracy in ensuring transparency in the contract award process and under-investment in the sector as a whole. There were also reports of prominent former government officials having interests in some of the defaulting companies. In the meantime, the electricity situation is worsening with power generation below 2000MW compared to the target of 10,000MW that NIPP was supposed to generate once operational (Vanguard; Power probe opens a can of worms, gov officials sing discordant tones;20/2/09) http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/5667/116/ 6-2-4 Low Tax Revenue (and other internally generated revenue) Although more government revenue derives from oil revenues and less from taxes, when government fails to provide public services, public distrust for the government contributes in motivating widespread tax evasion by the individuals and commercial enterprises. The Nigerian government reportedly loses billions of dollars through tax evasion. Kapoor (2007) also describes how investors bribe and lose money to accountants and auditors who allegedly sell various schemes of tax avoidance and other unethical practices like illegal capital flight. In the extreme instance, government failure to provide public services has resulted in instability in some areas, particularly the Niger Delta. 6-2-5 Niger Delta – Income inequality and Social Instability Situated in the southern most part of Nigeria, about 90% of oil extraction is carried out in the Niger-delta region at the cost of severe environmental degradation. The Niger delta is inhabited by 131 31 million people (almost 20% of the total population) constituting 40 ethnic groups. Revenue allocated for environmental rehabilitation and development through government statutory bodies, including the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), is often inadequate or misappropriated. Meanwhile, the majority of oil revenues benefit a few, especially multinationals and elite Nigerians, widening the gap in income distribution. Using government neglect as a justification, civil groups and militia, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Urhoho Historical Society (formed by Nigerians based in the US), and the Niger Delta Congress have demanded political autonomy and total control of oil resources on the basis that the region was initially forcefully amalgamated into Nigeria. Further demands include participation in the oil industry, increased allocation of oil revenues from the government and development of basic infrastructure. Constant protest conflicts, kidnappings of employees from foreign oil firms, and oil bunkering (oil theft) among other actions, take place in the Niger Delta, often reducing oil mining efficiency. 6-2-6 The Problem of Insufficient Statistical Data One of the factors possibly contributing to the neglect or insufficient provision of public services is the presence of logistical problems in the form of largely unreliable demographic data sourced from both irregular and unreliable censuses, as well as poor monitoring of migration activities. According to UNICEF, about 70% of the 5 million annual births are not registered due to lack of information, limited centres, limited financial resources and lack of effective registration. Public service provision based on such statistics is likely to be insufficient. In explaining these constraints, Okonjo-Iweala (2008) and Budina et.al (2006) suggest that the Dutch disease was only responsible for Nigeria’s development challenges, only during the period before 1980. After 1980, they attribute Nigeria’s development challenges to poor public spending of natural resource revenues, poor macroeconomic policies and debt overhang, noting that widespread excess capacity and persistent unemployment are features that cannot be reconciled with the Dutch Disease explanation of low growth. The debt overhang is seen to be even more problematic than the Dutch disease, as explained below; 6-2-7 External Debt Overhang Nigeria’s fiscal spending patterns have long been highly correlated to oil revenues. The economy has been very susceptible to the volatility in the international oil market, previously ranked by the World Bank as the 3rd most volatile economy (Budina et.al, 2006). Wasteful public spending yielded low productivity and return on public investment projects. Previous military dictator authorities had focused on avoiding the Dutch disease and deterioration of the non–traded goods sector particularly agriculture and manufacturing such that revenues during oil booms were ironically augmented by additional borrowings collateralised by oil, to finance extravagant 132 expenditure on capital intensive commitments in the name of development. Unfortunately, when oil prices fell in 1982, they affected collateral value, while debt rescheduling with creditors became difficult without an IMF supported program (Okonjo-Iweala, 2008). Borrowing to cover old debts was also difficult under falling oil prices and high interest rates. Inflation rose and foreign exchange was controlled, resulting in a black market for foreign exchange, as well as incomplete projects and little done towards poverty reduction. The debts attracted high interest rates and penalties, and the lack of credibility reduced Nigeria’s attractiveness to Foreign Direct Investment even when returns to investment were high. Thus a debt overhang problem was created whereby external funds could not be attracted in times of genuine need. This was a more serious problem than the Dutch disease, characterized by lack of foreign investment, unemployment, lack of capital to complete projects. Given these issues, addressing the Nigerian development challenges may require focusing on strengthening five core institutions as identified by the Fund for Peace in 2006, as shown in figure 1. Figure 1 Leadership Military Police Judiciary Civil Service Moderate Moderate Weak Weak Weak Source – The Fund for Peace 2007 The Nigerian leadership, though under democratic rule, is still very delicate and its development is threatened by chaotic elections. Inefficiencies arise in the military and police, from use of violence to maintain peace and order in the country. The judiciary has for a long time been plagued by corruption and the civil service tends to be weak, inefficient and discontented with remuneration. Human flight is a major occurrence as professionals leave the country for the United States, the United Kingdom and other parts of the world. These issues need to be addressed along with ethnic and economic concerns in the oil producing regions. 6-3 What the Nigerian Government is doing to address the situation Political influence on social and economic reforms, particularly during the period 1970-1998 impeded reform effectiveness, and under collapsed institutions and deep rooted corruption there was little or no incentive to reform. Furthermore, domestic ownership of reforms has always been necessary for reform success. External reforms were generally viewed by the average Nigerian with resentment as they were viewed as imperialist, such that structural adjustment programs were met with rioting particularly in 1988-89 and had to be relaxed in some cases. But on the other hand, even 133 home grown economic reforms, such as one implemented by General Muhammadu Buhari in 1983, also caused social discontent and resulted in a coup because of its restrictive measures (see Aid and Reform in Africa (Nigeria), World Bank 2001). Lack of commitment to reform measures contributed to reform failure as well. In some cases, reforms were half heartedly adopted, cutting expenditure when the international oil market was down, only to be abandoned when oil prices rose and spending patterns returned to their high levels, such as the 1977-78. 6-3-1 Current Reforms towards Corruption and Governance - Changing the way government works Regarding corruption, the first anticorruption reform was implemented in 1995, the advent of civil rule in 1999 strengthened the implementation of anti corruption initiatives, as evidenced by The Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) founded 2003 and the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (N-EITI) 2003. N-EITI’s agenda is to promote transparency and optimal spending towards future development, in resource rich economies who are members of the EITI. Furthermore, following diagnostic studies to identify specific areas in which corruption was undermining public sector performance, governance and economic growth, measures including The ‘Due Process’ Mechanism, a procurement reform in issuing public contracts, where all government contracts are vetted for transparency by the department of due process so as to curb public treasury mismanagement, and part 4 of Nigeria’s National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) reform program, have been implemented to reduce corruption, promote accountability and tighten weak areas. Gradual progress has been realised in the fight against corruption as shown in figure 1 below. Figure 2 㪚㫆㫉㫉㫌㫇㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㪼㫉㪺㪼㫇㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪠㫅㪻㪼㫏 No corruption 㪈㪐 㪐㪍 㪈㪐 㪐㪎 㪈㪐 㪐㪏 㪈㪐 㪐㪐 㪉㪇 㪇㪇 㪉㪇 㪇㪈 㪉㪇 㪇㪉 㪉㪇 㪇㪊 㪉㪇 㪇㪋 㪉㪇 㪇㪌 㪉㪇 㪇㪍 㪉㪇 㪇㪎 㪉㪇 㪇㪏 Extremely corrupt 㪈㪇 㪐 㪏 㪎 㪍 㪌 㪋 㪊 㪉 㪈 㪇 Data source – Transparency International (www.transparency.org) Overall, there has been a slight improvement in corruption control since the initial implementation of corruption controls 1995, and more so after the implementation of the NEEDS development strategy in 2003. Given the recommendations, donor assistance and ideas ploughed into the NEEDS reform, successful implementation would require commitment, so the reform does not 134 follow the same direction as past failed reforms. 6-3-2 Towards dependence on oil revenues – Promoting Private Enterprise Because oil is a non renewable resource, its supplies are projected to run out in the next 44 years according to a Shell survey. The Nigerian economy is also likely to face a fall in oil demand in the event that new alternative energy sources are discovered by major oil importers such as the US. Nigeria‘s economy may face collapse if it is unprepared for such occurrences. The government efforts to discontinue the strong dependence on current oil revenues for public expenditure so as to insulate against the volatility of the oil industry include promotion of private enterprise by improving access to capital among other means, as well as a Fiscal Responsibility Bill passed in 2007 that follows an oil-price based fiscal rule and aims to constrain spending by transferring oil revenues to the budget in accordance with a reference price, as well as a ceiling on the non oil deficit. 6-3-3 Towards Stabilization of the Niger Delta The government responded to the Niger Delta crisis through the introduction of the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, through which the government allocates 13% of oil revenue for development of the Delta. To date, little development has taken place and the region continues to be unstable with cases of oil theft, kidnapping oil mining company employees and the declarations of ‘Oil War’ in September 2008. The Nigerian Government also has a Seven (plus two) Point Agenda to succeed NEEDs, as Nigeria’s Fifth Development Plan, spearheaded by the President Yar’ Adua. The Agenda seeks to address seven points which are power and energy; food and agriculture; wealth creation and employment; mass transportation; land reform; security; qualitative and functional education, and two special interest issues, the Niger Delta and Disadvantaged groups. Aiming to achieve adequate power supply for the development of a modern economy by 2015, a 5-10 fold increase in food production by optimising the use of land, as well as putting more focus on security, environmental and infrastructure development issues in the Niger Delta (nigeriaembassyvienna.com). 6-4 What the International Community is doing to make Nigeria less Fragile According to Collier (2007), aid becomes effective if reforms are politically backed, and that is when technical assistance needs to be afforded quickly to help implement the reform, eventually followed by financial assistance for government spending. The adoption of the home grown Poverty Reduction Strategy, the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) in 2004, has seen some development partners directing their assistance in line with NEEDS, or assisting the country to realise NEEDs by 135 providing technical, loan and grant assistance. Figure 2 shows the top ten largest OECD-DAC donors in 2006, led by UK, followed by France, Germany, Japan and US, and this is followed by a description of each of the donor’s activity in Nigeria., Figure 2 㪥㪦㪩㪮㪘㪰 㪪㪮㪜㪛㪜㪥 㪚㪘㪥㪘㪛㪘 㪥㪜㪫㪟㪜㪩㪣㪘㪥㪛㪪 The largest Ten 㪬㪪 㪜㪬 Donors to Nigeria 㪦㪫㪟㪜㪩 in 2006 㪞㪜㪩㪤㪘㪥㪰 㪬㪢 Total Net Aid: USD 10969.60 million 㪡㪘㪧㪘㪥 㪝㪩㪘㪥㪚㪜 Source: OECD-DAC (2007) 6-4-1 UK - DFID Country Assistance Plans for Nigeria 2004-2008 Since 2004, DFID has fashioned its Country Assistance Plan using Nigeria’s NEEDS prescription as a framework and following an analysis on Nigeria’s political economy through the Drivers of Change Initiative that identified three constraints on Nigeria’s MDG achievement. The identified constraints correspond closely with the Nigerian government’s analysis as shown; Towards Improving Public Fund management and service delivery: Specializing on 5 lead states selected on the basis of commitment to development, DFID provides technical assistance to the Nigerian Budget Office to improve budget systems and to link spending more closely to poverty reduction. It assists with capacity building, particularly enabling investigation of high profile corruption cases, and further promotes accountability and civic demand for better governance through civic education, in partnership with the BBC World Service Trust. Furthermore, DFID runs programs aimed at improving health and education of the civil society so that the country can have a healthy workforce that will work towards economic growth. (DFID, 2008) Towards infrastructure and Private Sector development: DFID supports government through various 5 year programs which are; The Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility, the Investment Climate Program, The Nigeria Growth Challenge Fund and The Enhancing Financial Innovation and Access program. Regarding international trade, DFID has helped Nigeria to realize a better understanding of the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements covering trade and development 136 support, as well as to engage more effectively in regional discussions and negotiations with the EC, although Nigeria’s trade policy still remains protective. Figure 3 DFID UK Assistance Plans - Building on Needs and SEEDS (2004) Key Objectives in the Key Constraints to Progress Mismanagement of public revenue Strategies in NEEDS DFID Country Assistance Plan Involving public Changing the way government expenditure management does its work and service delivery Empowering people – the Weak accountability Empowering people to social charter demand reform and building a social contract Poor non-oil growth Promoting sustainable pro Promoting private enterprise poor growth Source: DFID UK Assistance Plans - Building on Needs and SEEDS (2004) 6-4-2 FRANCE French assistance to Nigeria is directed towards promoting transparency in Nigeria so as to develop a friendly business environment that attracts more private sector development and promotes economic activity in Nigeria. Through the European Development Fund, France contributes 24% of its USD 24.7 million assistance, towards the 3 year funding of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Other than promotion of transparency, French Co-operation to Nigeria involves capacity building through support towards the Nigerian educational system, scholarships for training in France, cultural exchange to facilitate further association, as well as community development micro projects. Bilateral technical assistance focuses on agriculture and water resources management. 6-4-3 JAPAN Since 1999 when President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected, Japan and Nigeria have had a special diplomatic relationship that allows for regular constructive consultations between Japan and Nigeria. Japan’s total aid to Nigeria, comprising loan, grant and technical assistance amounted to 137 1.263 billion Yen, approximately US$12.6 million by 2007 according to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA,2008) Technical Cooperation in Supporting NEEDS and SEEDS initiative: Japan has assisted Nigeria especially in providing support aligned to NEEDS and SEEDS through technical cooperation.Support is provided through rural water supply, basic education, health, rural electrification and cross-cutting issues (in particular, gender empowerment) in close collaboration with other donors. Further assistance involves technical assistance towards development of environmental preservation technology particularly under the Cool Earth initiative. Towards Private Sector Development,5 a 50 member delegation that included Japanese members of parliament, representatives from JBIC and leading Japanese companies visited Nigeria and other African countries in 2008, with JBIC intending to provide low interest soft loans to improve capital access, indicating Japan’s interest in Nigeria’s economic development. JICA maintains close control of its development projects to mitigate corruption and improper use of funds by providing consultants and contractors, as well as spreading payment to contractors over the duration of the project. Japan also provides direct assistance to the community, through the Grant aid for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP), for which Japan is reputed to have comparative advantage. 6-4-4 GERMANY Germany demonstrates a particular interest in transparency, having worked closely with Transparency International since it was founded in 1993, supporting the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which Nigeria has adopted as Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI). Germany uses policy dialogue with partner governments including Nigeria, on corruption and transparency initiatives. Since 1997, all of its protocols of government negotiations with partner countries have included anti-corruption agreements, and loans and finance agreements have also included pertinent clauses. Aid is directed towards public service reform projects that work to develop efficient personnel, transparent and effective procurement and public finance systems. This particularly involves creation of audit offices and customs and tax administration bodies, civil society empowerment and alerting, to tackle corruption. In promoting good governance and transparency, Germany also hopes to profit from improved economic activity in Nigeria given that Nigeria is an oil-rich nation. The German Economic & Technical Cooperation (GTZ) promotes economic activity by improving electricity supply, as well as promoting trades, crafts and private sector development. Foundations such as the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufban (KfW) in Nigeria provide finance for investments. 5 Interviewed JICA officers specializing on Nigeria on 26 February, 2009 138 Germany has also made significant contributions in the form of military equipment and maintenance to complement Nigeria’s peace keeping initiative as well as additional contributions through the European Commission. 6-4-5 US - USAID Capacity Building for government, judiciary and civil society The US Agency for International Development (USAID) pays particular attention on the Niger Delta, an area reportedly neglected by other key donors. The USAID has identified poverty and unemployment as yielding dissatisfaction and Islamic extremism, corruption and social instability. Thus USAID sponsors interfaith dialogue through civic organisations that are faith based or political, as well as creative youth programs, towards promoting peace and stability. Capacity building for Niger Delta and Northern Region inhabitants involves enhanced access to family planning, reproductive health services and education and teacher training as well as higher education opportunities to counter the illiteracy problem (USAID, 2009). In support of transparent and accountable governance, aid is also directed at capacity building of civil society organisations so that they can engage with government on fiscal accountability, monitor budgets and transparency within extractive industries. In addition, capacity building initiatives are provided for judicial independence at federal level, at local and national government level towards improved responsiveness to public needs, budget management and fiscal oversight, as well as promotion of electoral and constitutional reform dialogue that involves civil society. The US supports Nigeria through trade and investment; Nigeria supplies about 10% of U. S. crude oil requirements, and is the US’ second-largest trading partner in Africa. As such, it promotes a more market-led economy that enhances Nigeria's capacity as a responsible regional and trade partner. 6-4-6 European Commission The European Commission and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime collaborated to financially assist the National Judicial Institute in conducting a training course on judicial ethics. Since 2006 about 400 judicial officers have been trained. The EC Facilitates the Support to Reforming Institutions Program (SRIP) for Nigeria. The Small Town Water Supply and Sanitation Program (STWSSP) and the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Program are also funded by the EC, with additional funding towards health and clean water supply via UNICEF. 6-4-7 Chinese Development Cooperation Chinese aid is typically known for its ‘no strings attached’ approach to Africa. Nigeria is China’s second largest trading partner, providing China with gas and petroleum. China has encouraged strong bilateral relations with Nigeria, leading to the formation of the Nigeria-China Economic and Trade Joint Commission. Given its interest in Nigeria’s petroleum sector, China has also demonstrated generosity and a human approach to development such that its development assistance attempts to strengthen infrastructure and revive the agricultural sector. In 2003, a tripartite 139 agreement involving China, Nigeria, and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), pledged the deployment of 500 Chinese experts to help with food production and water conservancy in arid regions of the country. Furthermore several Chinese companies, from both the public and private sectors, actively engaged in rehabilitation and expansion in such areas as electricity, road and rail transportation, and telecommunications. Such companies include ZTE Company, Alcatel-Shangai-Bell, and China Putian. However; the Nigerian government is yet to take advantage of this opportunity to expand development outside of the petroleum sector to reduce oil dependence. 6-5 Missing GAPS in Aid Delivery A visible trend among donors in Nigeria seems to be lack of preference for direct budget support. Official development assistance is either in the form of project intervention or technical assistance such as indirect project implementation through local nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), capacity building for civil society organisations (CSOs), or directed towards funding anticorruption and transparency organisations. With the exception of DFID-UK and Japan (JICA), development assistance appears to focus on capacity building, and rebuilding and strengthening institutions related to justice, transparency and accountability to civil society, but without particular regard to NEEDS, Nigeria’s poverty reduction strategy. The non provision of budget support could possibly be explained by the fact that Nigeria is an oil rich country whose challenges have more to do with managing resource revenues than lack of resources for budget financing as is often the case in other developing countries for instance, Zimbabwe. This observation is supported as well by evidence provided by Nigeria’s aid coordinating agency as shown in figure 5. Figure 4 Population Control Trade and investment Poverty Alleviation 0% 18% 5% Human Rights 0% Agriculture Health 1% 54% Women's Empowerment 4% Education 12% Energy and Environment 1% Governance Finance 5% 0% Source: National Planning Commission 2008 140 The chart illustrates the distribution of aid allocation according to the NPC report. The largest proportion has been allocated to health, followed by poverty alleviation, education, population control, governance and women’s empowerment. Energy and environment has been allocated 1%, agriculture 1%, while finance, trade and investment are not being supported. This suggests the international community’s emphasis on the necessity of an empowered civil society, good governance and institutional development for growth. These estimates do not include Chinese aid. 6-5-1 Information Asymmetry between Development Partners and Recipient Government The problem of information asymmetry between Nigeria and her development partners has also been highlighted in an ODA review conducted by the International Cooperation Division of Nigeria’s Aid Coordinating Agency, the National Planning Commission (NPC), over 8 years from 1999-2007. Information asymmetry and lack of mutual accountability between the government and donors has impeded aid effectiveness in the country. Bluntly stated in an ODA review report prepared by the Nigerian aid coordinating agency NPC, ‘...CIDA, DFID and UNICEF did not specify the focus of their activities in the health sector. Thus we do not know exactly what the money was spent on’ NPC-A Review of Official Development Assistance to Nigeria 1999-2007, pp20). From the NPC review, most, if not all donors, contend that there is corruption and lack of transparency within government, thus directly disburse project funds, effectively bypassing the government, as it also does not receive budget support. The NPC also claimed to have faced challenges of non cooperation from development partners when trying to collect information on aid allocation. Having sent out templates to development partners for completion on sectoral and regional distribution of aid, no cooperation came particularly from JICA despite numerous calls for cooperation. 6-5-2 Improper Alignment Another challenge is that of donor activities that are not properly aligned to the recipient country’s priorities, not derived from existing strategy frameworks, and in some cases activities being directed at ‘disposable aid’, unsustainable projects and an example of motorized boreholes in communities incapable of sustaining them. According to the NPC, there is no clear criteria for donors choice of aid intervention, thus they recommend that the government of Nigeria offers clearer, more effective leadership to her development partners both in terms of how and where to operate if benefits are to be sustainable as well as better dialogue and coordination among donors, which should lead to effective application of the principle for division of labour (A Review of Official Development Assistance in Nigeria 1999-2007, NPC 2008) Results from the OECD-DAC survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration for 2007 also supported NPC findings on alignment and donor coordination among other lacking factors, as shown in figure 5 below; 141 Figure 5 DIMENSIONS 2007 CHALLENGES PRIORITY ACTIONS Ownership Moderate Limited Institutionalise reforms implementation of through legislation and medium term extend reforms to the sub expenditure national level framework and excessive reliance on oil sector Alignment Low Donor Ensure full reluctance to use implementation of the Fiscal country systems and Responsibility Act and lack of government introduce Aid information capacity to accurately Management System record aid disbursement Harmonisation Low Patchy Ensure that Country Coordination between Partnership Strategy is given aid partners a more central place in donor policy and practice Managing for Moderate Results Relatively weak Establish a systems for monitoring co-ordinated country –level and evaluation monitoring and evaluation system Mutual Low Accountability Absence of a Take opportunity to framework for mutual implement country-led assessment of progress framework for mutual on aid effectiveness assessment Source: OECD-DAC Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration and Making Aid Effective by 2010 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/61/42243379.pdf) Taking these challenges into consideration, the NPC in Nigeria has since been working on a web based Assistance Information Management System (AIMS) that it hopes will reduce the information asymmetry problem. The Web-based AIMS is hoped to promote transparency and enable development partners to immediately access other development partners’ information thereby promoting donor coordination. 142 6-6 Conclusion: What Japan can do Japan’s approach to aid delivery to Africa assumes two roles, as a national strategy as well as an assistance strategy. Where viewed as an assistance strategy, it has to contribute towards development by way of poverty reduction, growth promotion, peace building and environmental conservation according to the needs of its partner countries. Underlying Japan’s aid delivery pattern is the philosophy of helping people to help themselves, as can be observed in the capacity building efforts made by JICA. Where ODA serves as a national strategy, it should serve towards promoting foreign diplomacy. However, the problem of accountability and transparency blocks opportunities for budget support, leaving room for mainly project type support. Security issues tend to deter Japan from assisting the neediest areas in Nigeria, where people need assistance to help themselves, given the high HIV/AIDS cases, poverty levels, poor education, and the continuously deteriorating environment they are subjected to, making the area a breeding ground for criminal activities. Even in cases where consultations with the Nigerian government indicate some areas that might need assistance, JICA still exercises some discretion in aid allocation, depending on the perceived risk involved in assisting particular areas. For example, JICA projects tend to circumvent the Niger Delta area on the grounds that the region is risky due to political instability, leaving this responsibility to the Nigerian government, which has neglected the Delta area for some time, much to the agitation of the inhabitants. However, this is one area where human security continues to be threatened as long as the government and development partners apart from USAID choose to neglect the area. In my opinion, if the agenda is to reduce poverty and improve human security, then, neglecting the neediest areas because they are risky, or sensitive areas, when the government has not done much towards their welfare, becomes counterproductive and only makes the areas riskier as the inhabitants remain trapped in poverty. This further deters investment and growth and widens the already large gap between the rich and the poor. Some form of action may be taken either by way of dialogue with the government or direct intervention as is the case with USAID. Regarding such a situation, I would propose that JICA does more for the Delta through combined efforts with the USAID, or UN, towards assisting and reducing the instability in the Delta. Another way would be to have Nigerian nationals to take the lead in areas with security concerns, after careful vetting, so more assistance can be rendered, since at the moment it is the instability that deters donors. Other ways to mitigate this risk can be devised. Regarding issues such as corruption JICA has put in place mechanisms to ensure that its leakages due to corruption are eliminated, but the bigger problem of corruption within government and society remains. Aid effectiveness is realized when there is donor coordination and division of labour according to comparative advantage as outlined in the Paris Declaration. Japan’s passive stance regarding corruption can be justified in this regard if it has no comparative advantage. 143 Moreover, a number of development partners have taken to curbing corruption in Nigeria, therefore intervening in this area would only contribute to duplication of tasks as well as ineffective allocation of resources. In delivering development assistance to African countries, A Japan’s ODA manifesto, 2007 prepared by the GRIPS Development Forum highlights the need for Japan to make use of its strengths in agricultural and industrial production, public-private collaboration as well as field based activities in assisting Africa. According to NPC ODA review (2008), over the period 1999-2007, agriculture received 1% of assistance, and trade and investment received nil, compared to 54% in health, indicating that more needs to be done in these areas, taking advantage of Japan’s strengths. Lessons learnt from JICA’s assistance to other areas can be applied to the case of Nigeria as well, by applying the Growth Diagnostics theory to assessing Nigeria’s strongest points and improving on them, as was the case of El Salvador where JICA helped to develop the country’s port facilities, given that this was El Salvador’s area of comparative advantage, thereby creating its avenue for growth. For instance, regarding investment, Nigeria’s vast population provides a huge human resource supply that, as the resource endowment makes it attractive economy for investors, as well as a big market for Japanese manufactured commodities (especially electronics and motor vehicles) and other projects. Nigeria could be used as a production base similar to China because of its huge population, and work towards creating a middle class in Nigeria. The business environment could also be made friendlier by improving electricity supply and enabling Nigeria to adapt technology for that purpose and more. It appears, Japan‘s comparative advantage lies less in improving or rebuilding institutions in Nigeria or any other country, than in provision of technical assistance and empowerment to citizens. Thus, since good institutions are realized with growth and they are also required for growth, Japanese aid should sharpen its approach and become BOLDER in capacity building and empowerment and come up with ways to mitigate risk that deters it from assisting the neediest areas. Furthermore, Japan’s bottom-up approach in aid provision is a commendable one that can be applied by other development partners as well. This, I believe, would work towards improving effectiveness of Japanese assistance. Meanwhile, the Nigerian government needs to complement the efforts of development partners towards institution rebuilding and development in general, as development partners simultaneously complement Nigeria’s home-grown development efforts. 144 References Budina, N; Pang, G; and van Wijnbergen, S. (2006) Nigeria’s Growth Record: Dutch Disease or Debt Overhang: Diagnosis of the past, Lessons for the Future. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4256. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/20061012_06.pdf (accessed March 5, 2009) Collier, P.(2007) The Bottom Billion – Why The Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford University Press Inc. New York Collier, P.(2008) Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Implications of Changed International Conditions for EITI Devarajan, S; Dollar, D; Holmgren, T. (2001) Aid and Reform in Africa (World Bank) DFID Nigeria. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/nigeria.asp (accessed February 8, 2009) DW-World .De.2008. President Koehler Heads to Nigeria for African Partnership Forum. 7 November, Africa Section. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3771457,00.htm (accessed March 3, 2009) Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Nigeria. (2009) http://www.efccnigeria.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=25&Itemid= 59&limit=6&limitstart=6 (accessed March 16, 2009) European Commission Nigeria. http://www.delnga.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_country/cooperation.htm (accessed 10 March, 2009) Hayami, Y and Godo, Y. (2005) Development Economics. Oxford University Press. Kapoor, S. (2007) Haemorrhaging Money: A Christian Aid Briefing on the Problem of Capital Flight http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/launder/haven/2007/2007capitalflights.pdf JICA Nigeria. http://www.jica.go.jp/Nigeria/English/activities/index.html (accessed 10 February, 2009) Mail and Guardian Africa. (2007) Germany Donates Trucks to Nigeria’s Peacekeeping Troops November 14. Dpa- Deusche Presse-Agentur http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1373746.php/Germany_donates_tru cks_to_Nigerias_peacekeeping_troops (accessed March 12, 2009) Nasidi Adamu Yahaya.(2009) Nigeria: Japan’s Aid to Country Hits N600 Billion. Daily Trust. All Africa.com, 28 January. http://allafrica.com/stories/200901280472.html (accessed 28 January, 2009) National Planning Commission. (2008) A Review of Official Development Assistance to Nigeria 1999-2007. 145 Niger Delta Congress. Declaration of the Niger Delta Bill of Rights, 2000. http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/darticles/declaration_of_niger_delta_bill_.htm (accessed March 16, 2009) OECD (2008) Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: making Aid More Effective By 2010 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/61/42243379.pdf Okonjo-Iweala, N. (2008) Point of View: Nigeria’s Shot at Redemption. Turning Nigeria’s Oil Windfall into a Blessing.IMF Finance and Development Quarterly. December 2008 Volume 45, Number 4 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/12/okonjo.htm (accessed January 8, 2009) Omoh, G.; Usigbe, L.; Ahiuma-Young, V (2008) Power Probe opens a can of worms, gov officials sing discordant tones. Financial Vanguard Online. 30 March. http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/5667/116/ The Fund for Peace- Nigeria. (2006) http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=217&Itemi d=347 (accessed 21 March 2009) The Guardian. (2007) Nigeria Ahead South Africa as France’s Trading Partner, April 8 http://www.ambafrance-ng.org/article.php3?id_article=534 (accessed February,3 2009) The News. (2008). ‘Nigeria Too Dependent on Oil’ - Interview between Oluokun Ayorinde and Toshitsugu Uesawa, Japanese Ambassador to Nigeria. Sept 08,2008. http://thenewsng.com/business/nigeria-too-dependent-on-oil/2008/09 (accessed February, 7, 2009) Urhobo Historical Society ‘Towards Peace and Security in the Niger Delta’, (2006) [http://www.waado.org/Organizations/UNANA/statements/peace_niger_delta.html] USAID Nigeria – Country Strategic Plan 2004-2009 http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/pdabz265.pdf Utomi, P ‘China and Nigeria’ http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080603_utomi_nigeriachina.pdf WHO African Region ‘Donor Community Pledges Continued Assistance to Nigeria’ (February 2007)[http://www.who.int/countries/nga/mediacentre/releases/2007/19_feb/en/index.html [www.stopnato.org.uk] ‘Nigeria gets German assistance on military equipment’ (1 May 2002) [http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg06210.html] World Bank Independent Evaluation Group http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/licus04_map.html 146
© Copyright 2024 Paperzz
