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グローバリゼーションと国際開発研究 「脆弱国家の開発戦略 II」 研究報告書
目次 1
はしがき 3
アフリカ大陸地図 4
序章 5
第 1 部:テーマ別研究
第 1 章 サハラ以南アフリカにおける経済発展の展望:脆弱国家に着目して 8
秋山孝允(日本大学教授、FASID国際開発研究センター 参与)
第 2 章 東アフリカにおける民主化と分権化 26
笹岡雄一(JICA研究所 上席研究員)
第 3 章 コンディショナリティと政策対話―脆弱・紛争国家へのインプリケーション 53
小野真依(FASID国際開発研究センター 研究助手)
第 2 部:国別研究
第 4 章 スーダン:平和の定着と復興の追求 71
渡邉恵子(FASID国際開発研究センター 主任)
第 5 章 ジンバブエ:急速な衰退からの復興への展望 104
キャサリン・マチンガウタ(政策研究大学院大学)
第 6 章 ナイジェリア:豊かさと貧困の逆説 キャサリン・マチンガウタ(政策研究大学院大学)
1
126
Globalization and International Development Study
“Development Strategy for Fragile States II”
Contents 1
Preface 3
Map of Africa 4
Introduction 5
Part I: Thematic Studies Chapter 1:Economic Development Prospects for Sub-Saharan Africa:
Focus on Fragile States 8
Takamasa Akiyama (Professor, Nihon University / Senior Advisor, IDRI, FASID)
Chapter 2:Democratization and Decentralization in East Africa 26
Yuichi Sasaoka (Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute)
Chapter 3:Conditionality and Policy Dialogue: Implications for Fragile
and Conflict-Affected States 53
Mai Ono(Research Assistant, IDRI, FASID)
Part II: Country Studies
Chapter 4:Sudan: Pursuit of Consolidation for Peace and Reconstruction 71
Keiko Watanabe (Program Officer, IDRI, FASID)
Chapter 5:Zimbabwe -Prospects for Restoration After Rapid Decline 104
Catherine Machingauta (GRIPS)
Chapter 6:Nigeria - So Rich, Yet So Poor - Looking Behind the Paradox Catherine Machingauta (GRIPS)
2
126
ߪߒ߇߈
ᤓᐕᐲ‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ㐿⊒ᚢ⇛‫ߣޠ‬㗴ߒߡ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߣ㐿⊒េഥߩࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߦ㑐ߔࠆ⎇ⓥ
ႎ๔ࠍ಴ ߒߚ‫ޟߪߢߎߎޕ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ‫ߩޠ‬ቯ⟵߿ಽ㘃ߣ⸒ߞߚ᭎ⷐ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍኻ⽎ߣߒ
ߚਥⷐេഥᯏ㑐ߦࠃࠆ㐿⊒េഥߩࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߩታ㓙‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߩ‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ‫ࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟߩ߳ޠ‬
ᡰេ߿ᐔ๺᭴▽ᡰេ╬ߩኻᔕ‫ޔ‬
‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ‫ᦨࠆߋ߼ࠍޠ‬ㄭߩ⎇ⓥേะ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ߇‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ‫ޠ‬
ࠍᡰេߔࠆ਄ߢߩ໧㗴ὐ߿⺖㗴ࠍ⼏⺰ߒߚ‫ߩߎޕ‬ႎ๔ᦠߪ‫ޔ‬਎⇇㌁ⴕ╬ߢ߽෻㗀߇ᄢ߈ߊ‫ޔ‬
⧷⸶ߐࠇ‫ޔ‬Globalization and International Development Research: Study Report on
“Development Strategy of Fragile States”ߣߒߡ FASID ߩ࠙ࠚࡉߦ߽ឝタߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
(http://www.fasid.or.jp/english/publication/research/pdf/development_strategy_of_fragil
e_state.pdf)
੹࿁ߩ⎇ⓥႎ๔ߪ‫ޔ‬ᤓᐕߩᚑᨐࠍ〯߹߃‫ౕߦᦝޔ‬૕⊛ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ㐿⊒ᚢ⇛ߣេഥߩࠕࡊ
ࡠ࡯࠴ࠍࠨࡂ࡜એධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߦὶὐࠍᒰߡ⼏⺰ߔࠆߚ߼ߦ‫╙ޔ‬㧝ㇱߩ࠹࡯ࡑ೎⎇ⓥߣ╙㧞
ㇱߩ࿖೎⎇ⓥ߆ࠄ᭴ᚑߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
࠹࡯ࡑ೎⎇ⓥߢߪ‫࡜ࡂࠨޟ‬એධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩᣣᧄߩ⽸₂‫ޠ‬
‫ࠞ࡝ࡈࠕ᧲ޟޔ‬
ߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻ‫ޠ‬
‫ߣࠖ࠹࡝࠽࡚ࠪࠖ࠺ࡦࠦޟޔ‬ኻ⹤㧦⣀ᒙ࡮⚗੎࿖ኅߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄ‫ޠ‬
ߣ‫ࠇߙࠇߘޔ‬ᚲᓧಽᏓߦ⌕⋡ߒߚ⚻ᷣ⊛ⷞὐ‫ޔ‬᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻࠍᛒߞߚ᡽ᴦ⊛ⷞὐ‫ޔ‬㐿⊒
េഥࠍㅢߓߚ࿖㓙㑐ଥߩⷞὐ߆ࠄಽᨆࠍⴕߞߚ‫ޕ‬࿖೎⎇ⓥߢߪࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ‫ࡦࠫޔ‬
ࡃࡉࠛ‫ߩࠕ࡝ࠚࠫࠗ࠽ޔ‬㧟ࠞ࿖ࠍ੐଀ߣߒߡขࠅ਄ߍ‫ޔ‬ฦ࿖ߩ⁁ᴫࠍౕ૕⊛ߦಽᨆߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᧄᦠߩ✬㓸ߪᤓᐕߦᒁ߈⛯߈⑺ጊቁమ㧔ᣣᧄᄢቇᢎ᝼‫ޔ‬FASID ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ෳ
ਈ㧕߇ᜂᒰߒߚ‫ޕ‬ᄖㇱ߆ࠄ‫╣ޔ‬ጟ㓶৻᳁㧔࿖㓙දജᯏ᭴ JICA ⎇ⓥᚲ਄Ꮸ⎇ⓥຬ㧕ߩၫ╩ߩ
ߏදജࠍᓧߚߎߣߦᔃ߆ࠄᗵ⻢ߒߚ޿‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬FASID ߣߩㅪ៤ߢᄢቇ㒮ߢࡊࡠࠣ࡜ࡓࠍㆇ
༡ߒߡ޿ࠆ᡽╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㧔GRIPS㧕ߩᄢቇ㒮↢‫࠲࠙ࠟࡦ࠴ࡑ࡮ࡦ࡝ࠨࡖࠠޔ‬᳁ߪ⥄
りߩ಴り࿖ߢ޽ࠆࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔ߽ߡ޿ߟߦࠕ࡝ࠚࠫࠗ࠽ߚ߹ޔ‬ห࿖಴りߩ GRIPS
ߩᄢቇ㒮↢ߢ޽ࠆ࡛ࠞ࠺࡮M࡮ࠝ࡜࠾ࡗࡦ᳁ߩදജࠍᓧߡၫ╩ࠍᜂᒰߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ౝㇱ߆ࠄߪ
⑺ጊቁమߦട߃ߡ‫ߢࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬㐿⊒េഥߩᬺോ⚻㛎߽޽ࠆᷰㆺᕺሶ㧔ਥછ㧕
‫ޔ‬ᤓᐕߦᒁ߈⛯
߈‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ‫⎇ޠ‬ⓥࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆዊ㊁⌀ଐ㧔⎇ⓥഥᚻ㧕߇ၫ╩ࠍᜂᒰߒߚ‫ޕ‬
ᧄᦠߩฦ┨ߩౝኈߪ㑐ଥᯏ㑐ߩ⷗⸃ࠍ␜ߔ߽ߩߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬ၫ╩⠪ߩ⷗⸃ߦၮߠ޿ߡᦠ߆
ࠇߚ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ᚲዻߪၫ╩ᒰᤨߩ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᧄᦠ߇‫ࠆࠁࠊ޿ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩេഥᚢ⇛ߦ㑐ߒߡߩ⼏⺰ࠍᷓ߼‫ߩࠄࠇߘߪߡ޿߭ޔ‬࿖‫ޘ‬
ߩᐔ๺ߣ቟ቯ߳ߩᣣᧄߩ⽸₂ߦᓎ┙ߡࠇ߫ᐘ޿ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
⽷࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙㐿⊒㜞╬ᢎ⢒ᯏ᭴
࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ᚲ㐳ઍⴕ
Ḋ ⋥ା
3
Medi
t
Algiers
Tunis
Madeira Is.
er
TUNISIA
Rabat
ra
ne
an
Sea
(PORTUGAL)
MOROCCO
Tripoli
Canary Is.
(SPAIN)
Cairo
ALGERIA
LIBYAN
ARAB JAMAHIRIYA
Laayoun
EGYPT
Western
Sahara
Re
d
Se
a
MAURITANIA
Nouakchott
NIGER
MALI
CHAD
Dakar
Bamako
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA
SIERRA
LEONE
Monrovia
A
AN
H
CÔTED'IVOIRE
BENIN
TOGO
G
Conakry
Freetown
Yamoussoukro Accra
LIBERIA
Abidjan
of A
de n
Socotra
(YEMEN)
Djibouti
NIGERIA
Addis Ababa
CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Porto
Novo
L
ETHIOPIA
Abuja
Bangui
CAMEROON
Malabo
A
GUINEA-BISSAU
lf
DJIBOUTI Gu
N'Djamena
Ouagadougou
Yaoundé
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Annobón
NG
(EQUATORIAL GUINEA)
Brazzaville
Cabinda
A T L A N T I C
Ascension
Lake
Albert
O
GABON
O
Libreville
C
Principe
Sao
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
Tome
Sao Tome
SO
Lake
Turkana
UGANDA
Kampala
DEMOCRATIC RWANDA
REPUBLIC
Kigali
OF THE
Bujumbura
Mogadishu
KENYA
Nairobi
INDIAN OCEAN
Lake
Victoria
CONGO
BURUNDI
Kinshasa
Lake
Tanganyika
(ANGOLA)
Pemba
Dodoma
Amirante Is.
Zanzibar
TANZANIA
Providence Is.
Aldabra Is.
O C E A N
Lake
Nyasa
Moroni
COMOROS
ANGOLA
Victoria
SEYCHELLES
UNITED REPUBLIC OF
Luanda
(UK)
A
Bissau
Asmara
SUDAN
M
Banjul
ERITREA
Khartoum
Lake
Chad
Niamey
e
GAMBIA
SENEGAL
om
Praia
LI
CAPE VERDE
Farquhar Is.
Agalega Is.
(MAURITIUS)
Lilongwe
ZAMBIA
MALAWI
ZA
Kariba
NAMIBIA
Windhoek
MO
ZIMBABWE
BOTSWANA
Gaborone
UE
A
IQ
Tromelin
R
(FRANCE)
Cargados
Carajos
C
B
AS
M
Lake Harare
AG
(UK)
Antananarivo
MAURITIUS
Port Louis
MAD
Lusaka
St. Helena
Réunion
(FRANCE)
Pretoria
Maputo
AFRICA
Mbabane
SWAZILAND
Bloemfontein
SOUTH
AFRICA
Maseru
LESOTHO
Cape Town
0
0
500
1000 km
500
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used
on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance
by the United Nations.
1000 mi
Map No. 4045 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section
4
ᐨ┨
Introduction
FASID ߦ߅ߌࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ㑐ߔࠆᧄ⎇ⓥߪ‫ޔ‬ᤓᐕᐲߦ⛯߈‫ࠍ⺰⼏ߡ޿ߟߦࡑ࡯࠹ᧄޔ‬ᷓ߼
ࠆߎߣߣ࿖೎⎇ⓥࠍㅢߒߡౕ૕⊛ߦࠨࡂ࡜એධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ㧔SSA㧕ߩ 3 ࠞ࿖ߩታᖱࠍᬌ⸽ߔࠆ
ߎߣࠍ⁓ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
߹ߚ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ⃻࿷࿖㓙េഥࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖ߇ᦨ߽ὶὐࠍᒰߡߡ޿ࠆ SSA
ߦ⼏⺰ࠍ⛉ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
ᦨೋߩ 2 ߟߩ┨ߪ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍ⚻ᷣ㕙‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ㕙߆ࠄಽᨆߒߚ‫ ╙ޕ‬3 ┨ߪ࠼࠽࡯߇ߎࠇࠄߩ
࿖߳េഥࠍⴕ߁㓙ߦᄢ߈ߥ໧㗴ߦߥࠆࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࡝࠹ࠖߣ᡽╷ኻ⹤ߩታᖱߣ⺖㗴ࠍㅀ
ߴߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬࿖೎⎇ⓥߢߪ 20 ᐕએ਄ߦਗ਼ࠆධർߩౝᚢࠍ 2005 ᐕߦࠃ߁߿ߊ⚳⚿ߐߖߚࠬ࡯
࠳ࡦ‫⃻ޔ‬࿷ෂᯏ⊛ߥ⁁ᘒߦ޽ࠆࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ‫ ߡߒߘޔ‬SSA ߢੱญ߇ᦨ߽ᄙߊ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ⊛ߦ߽㊀
ⷐߥ࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕࠍขࠅ਄ߍߚ‫⎇ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬ⓥ߆ࠄ߹ߕ᣿⊕ߦߥߞߚߎߣߪ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߣ
⸒ߞߡ߽࿖ߦࠃࠅ⁁ᴫߪᄢ߈ߊ⇣ߥࠅ‫ࠅ߹޽ߪ⺰⥸৻ޔ‬ᓎߦߚߚߥ޿ߣ޿߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠈ߁‫ޕ‬
ߘߩᗧ๧ߢߪ‫ࠆࠁࠊ޿ޔ‬េഥߩ“ࡌࠬ࠻࡮ࡊ࡜ࠢ࠹ࠖࠬ”ࠍᔕ↪ߔࠆߣ޿߁ᣇᑼߦߪ㒢⇇߇޽
ࠅ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩេഥ߇޿߆ߦ㔍ߒ޿߆߇ℂ⸃ߢ߈ࠆ‫ޕ‬࿖㓙េഥࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߦߣߞߡᱷ
ߐࠇߚᦨ߽㔍ߒ޿ߎߩ⺖㗴ࠍ⋥ⷞߒߥߌࠇ߫‫ޔ‬࿖㓙ᴦ቟‫ੱߚ߹ޔ‬㆏໧㗴ߪ⸃᳿ߐࠇߥ޿ߢ
޽ࠈ߁‫ޕ‬
╙ 1 ┨ߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄᄢቇ࿖㓙㑐ଥቇㇱᢎ᝼ߢ‫ޔ‬FASID 㐿⊒⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ෳਈࠍോ߼ࠆ⑺ጊቁమ
ߩ“Economic Development Prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa: Focus on Fragile States”㧔‫࡜ࡂࠨޟ‬એ
ධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߩ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߩዷᦸ㧦⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ⌕⋡ߒߡ‫ޠ‬
㧕ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ໧㗴ߪ‫ޔ‬㐳ᦼ⊛
ߦߺࠇ߫⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߩ㆐ᚑࠍᛮ߈ߦ⸃᳿ߢ߈ߥ޿‫੹ޕ‬ᣣ߹ߢߩ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ㑐ߔࠆ⼏⺰ߪ᡽ᴦ
⊛ⷞὐࠍಾࠅญߣߒߚ߽ߩ߇ᄙ޿߇‫ᧄޔ‬Ⓜߢߪߘߩ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߦὶὐࠍᒰߡߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬21 ਎♿
ߦ౉ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᄙߊߩ SSA ⻉࿖ߪ৻ᰴ↥ຠߩ࿖㓙Ꮢ႐ߦ߅ߌࠆଔᩰ਄᣹߽޽ࠅ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣᚑ㐳₸߇㜞
߹ߞߚ‫ ߒ߆ߒޕ‬2008 ᐕ⑺߆ࠄߩ਎⇇หᤨਇᴫߦࠃࠅ‫ߩߎޔ‬ᢙᐕߩᚑᨐ߇Ꮽᶖߒߦߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ᚑ
㐳߇ㅒᚯࠅߔࠆน⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆ‫ᧄޕ‬Ⓜߢߪ SSA43 ࠞ࿖ߩ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯೎ಽᨆࠍⴕ޿‫ੱޔ‬ญ߇ᄢ߈
ߊჇ߃⛯ߌࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍᄙߊᛴ߃ࠆ SSA ߢᄢ᏷ߥ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳߇㆐ᚑߢ߈ߥߌࠇ߫ᄙߊߩ࿖‫ޔ‬
․ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ߅ߌࠆ⽺࿎ߪᷓ߹ࠅ‫␠ޔ‬ળ᡽ᴦਇ቟߇Ⴧᄢߔࠆߣ੍᷹ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬
⻉࿖ߢ᳓ߣㄘᬺߦㆡߒߚ࿯࿾ߩᄢ᏷ߥଏ⛎Ⴧട߇޽߹ࠅᦸ߼ߥ޿ߎߣࠍ⠨ᘦߔࠆߣ‫ߒ⪺ޔ‬
޿࿯࿾↢↥ᕈߩჇᄢ߇㆐ᚑߢ߈ߚߣߒߡ߽ㄘᬺ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߢߎࠇࠄߩ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣࠍᒁߞᒛߞߡ
ⴕߊߩߪ߶ߣࠎߤਇน⢻ߢ޽ࠆ‫ઁޕ‬ᣇ‫ੱ৻ޔ‬ᒰߚࠅߩ㕖ㄘᬺ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯GDP ߪᄙߊߩ SSA ߢ
ᷫዋߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ߩߎޔ‬௑ะߪ․ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ߅޿ߡ㗼⪺ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬SSA ⻉࿖‫ߦ․ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ
⽺࿎ࠍ೥ᷫߔࠆߦߪഭ௛㓸⚂ဳߩ⵾ㅧᬺ߿ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߩ⊒ዷߒ߆ߥ޿‫ޕ‬ஜోߥ㕖ㄘ
ᬺ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߩᚑ㐳ߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߇ᛴ߃ࠆ᡽ᴦ⊛ߥ໧㗴ߩシᷫߦ߽⽸₂ߔࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ
ߩߎࠇࠄߩ࿖߳ߩេഥߪ‫ޔ‬Ყセఝ૏ߩὐ߆ࠄ⷗ߡ‫⵾ޔ‬ㅧᬺߩ⊒ዷࠍ⁓ߞߚ߽ߩߦߔߴ߈ߢ
5
޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
╙ 2 ┨‫ࠆߌ߅ߦࠞ࡝ࡈࠕ᧲ޟ‬᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻ‫ ߪޠ‬JICA ⎇ⓥᚲ਄Ꮸ⎇ⓥຬߩ╣ጟ㓶৻ߩၫ╩
ߦࠃࠆ߽ߩߢ‫౒ࠞ࡝ࡈࠕ᧲ޔ‬ห૕ 3 ࠞ࿖ߩ᡽ᴦᒻᘒߦߟ޿ߡ᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻࠍਛᔃߦᬌ⸛
ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ ߩࠕ࠾ࠩࡦ࠲ޔ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࠕ࠾ࠤޕ‬3 ࠞ࿖ߪ࿾ℂ⊛ߦߪ࿖Ⴚ߇ធߒߡ޿ߡ‫ޔ‬ᣥ⧷
࿖ᬀ᳃࿾ߢ޽ߞߚߣ޿߁౒ㅢὐ߇޽ࠆ߇‫ߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ‬ᱧผ⊛ߥ⢛᥊‫┙⁛ߦ․ޔ‬ᓟߩ᡽ᴦ⊛
⊒ዷߪᄢ߈ߊ⇣ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫⊒ߚߞߥ⇣ߩߎޕ‬ዷߦߪࠛࠬ࠾ࠪ࠹ࠖ߇㊀ⷐߦ⛊ࠎߢ޿ࠆߎߣ
߇ࠊ߆ࠆ‫ޕ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ᳃ਥൻߪ㕖Ᏹߦ㊀ⷐߥ⺖㗴ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ߪࠇߎޔ‬ಽᮭൻߣ㑐ㅪߒߚᚢ⇛
⊛ߥኻᔕࠍ⠨ᘦߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ࠖ࠹ࠖ࠹ࡦ࠺ࠗࠕߩߤߥࠖ࠹ࠪ࠾ࠬࠛޔߚ߹ޕ‬㓸࿅㑆ߩਇᐔ
╬ࠍᗧ๧ߔࠆ‫ޟ‬᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬(HI)‫ޠ‬઒⺑߇࠙ࠟࡦ࠳ߣࠤ࠾ࠕߩ᡽ᴦㆊ⒟ߩ⋧㆑‫࠾ࠬࠛߦ․ޔ‬
ࠪ࠹ࠖߣ᳃ਥൻߩ㑐ଥࠍ⺑᣿ߔࠆ᦭ലᕈࠍ߽ߟߎߣ߽᣿ࠄ߆ߦߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬េഥ߳ߩࠗࡦࡊ
࡝ࠤ࡯࡚ࠪࡦߪ‫⴫ޔ‬㕙਄ߪૃ߆ࠃߞߚ࿖ߢ߽‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ⊛ߥ⺖㗴‫ࠍࠄࠇߘޔ‬ᡷༀߔࠆᚻ┙ߡߪ
࿖ߦࠃߞߡ⋧ᒰ㆑߁ߎߣࠍ⹺⼂ߒߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿ߣ޿߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠈ߁‫ޕ‬
╙ 3 ┨ “Conditionality and Policy Dialogue: Implications for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States”
㧔
‫ߣࠖ࠹࡝࠽࡚ࠪࠖ࠺ࡦࠦޟ‬᡽╷ኻ⹤㧦⣀ᒙ࡮⚗੎࿖ኅ߳ߩࠗࡦࡊ࡝ࠤ࡯࡚ࠪࡦ‫ޠ‬
㧕ߪ FASID
㐿⊒⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ഥᚻዊ㊁⌀ଐ߇ၫ╩ߒߚ‫ޕ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߪቯ⟵਄‫ࠍࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔ‬฽߻᡽ᴦ⊛
ߥ࿎㔍ߥ⺖㗴ࠍᛴ߃ߡ޿ࠆ࿖ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬េഥߩലᨐ‫ޔ‬ല₸ߩᒝൻߦߪࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࡝࠹ࠖ
ߥࠅ‫ޔ‬᡽╷ኻ⹤߇ᔅⷐߣߥࠆ႐ว߇ᄙ޿‫ޕ‬2005 ᐕߩ‫࡝ࡄޟ‬ት⸒‫߇ࡊ࠶ࠪ࡯࠽࠻࡯ࡄߪߢޠ‬
ᒝ⺞ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ߣ࡯࠽࠼ߪࡊ࠶ࠪ࡯࠽࠻࡯ࡄޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ᡽ᐭ㑆ߢߪߘ߽ߘ߽ᚑࠅ┙ߜ
ߦߊ޿‫࡯࠽࠼ߪߦߎߘޕ‬஥ߩᩮᧄ⊛ߥ⋧ᚻ࿖ߦኻߔࠆਇାᗵ߇޽ࠆ߆ࠄߢ޽ࠆ‫ߢ┨ߩߎޕ‬
ߪ‫ߩࡊ࠶ࠪ࡯࠽࠻࡯ࡄޔ‬ේೣߦၮߠ޿ߚ᭽‫ߥޘ‬࿖㓙េഥࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴߇‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࡮⚗੎࿖ኅ‫ޠ‬
ߦ߅ߌࠆ࿖ኅᑪ⸳߿ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕ߦ߽ߚࠄߒᓧࠆน⢻ᕈߣ㒢⇇ߣࠍ᭎⺑ߒ‫ߩߘޔ‬㒢⇇ߩ࠼࠽
࡯஥ߩ↢ᚑⷐ࿃ࠍᬌ⸛ߒ‫ޔ‬ਥⷐߥ㐿⊒េഥ࠼࠽࡯㧔☨‫ޔ⧷ޔ‬EU㧕ߦࠃࠆࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࡝
࠹ࠖߣⵍេഥ࿖ߣߩኻ⹤ߦ㑐ߔࠆ᡽╷ᣇ㊎‫ޔ‬෸߮ߘࠇࠍណ↪ߔࠆߦ⥋ߞߚ࿖ౝߩ᡽ᴦ⊛ⷐ
࿃ߣࠍ⼏⺰ߔࠆ‫ߩߎߚ߹ޕ‬ಽᨆ߆ࠄᣣᧄ߳ߩࠗࡦࡊ࡝ࠤ࡯࡚ࠪࡦࠍតߞߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ࠅࠃޔ‬ല
ᨐ⊛ߥ᡽╷ኻ⹤ࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߩታ⃻ߦߪ‫ޔ‬
‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࡮⚗੎࿖ኅ‫ޠ‬໧㗴ߦኻߔࠆᣣᧄߣߒߡߩ᡽╷ࠬ
࠲ࡦࠬߩ᣿⏕ൻ߇ᔅⷐߢ޽ࠆߣߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
࿖೎⎇ⓥߩᦨೋߩ┨ߢ޽ࠆ╙ 4 ┨‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޟ‬㧦ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕ߣᓳ⥝ߩㅊ᳞‫ޔߪޠ‬FASID 㐿⊒
⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ਥછᷰㆺᕺሶߦࠃࠆ߽ߩߢ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬੎ߥߤߢ਎⇇߆ࠄᵈ⋡ࠍ㓸߼ߡ޿
ࠆࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦ㑐ߒߡߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
‫ޟ‬൮᜝๺ᐔวᗧ㧔CPA㧕
‫ޠ‬ᓟ 4 ᐕ߇⚻ߜ޽ࠆ⒟ᐲߩᚑᨐ߽಴ߡ޿
ࠆ߇‫ߛ߹޿ޔ‬ධർߩႺ⇇✢߇วᗧߐࠇߕ‫ᧄޔ‬ᐕ੍ቯߩ✚ㆬ᜼߽࠮ࡦࠨࠬߩ⚿ᨐ߇಴ߥ޿ߚ
߼ㆃࠇ߇੍ᗐߐࠇࠆߥߤਇ቟ቯⷐ࿃ࠍᛴ߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᱧผ⊛⢛᥊߇⋧ᒰ⹦ߒߊㅀߴࠄࠇߡ޿
ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ਥᣦߪ‫ޔ‬㐳޿ᱧผ⊛⚻ㆊࠍᛠីߒߥߌࠇ߫ߎߩ࿖ߩ⃻࿷ߩ⁁ᴫࠍℂ⸃ߔࠆߎߣߪߢ
߈ߥ޿ߣ޿߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬⣀ᒙᕈߪ‫ޔ‬㐳ᦼൻߒߚౝᚢߦߺࠆⶄᢙߩⷐ࿃߆ࠄ᧪
ࠆ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ߽ߩߣ‫ޔ‬ᴦ቟‫ੱޔ‬ᮭ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭߩ⢻ജߥߤ⃻࿷⋥㕙ߒߡ޿ࠆ⺖㗴߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࿖㓙␠ળ
6
߽ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈߩᡷༀ‫ޔ‬ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕ߩଦㅴߦᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ᩮᧄ⊛ߥ໧㗴ߩ⸃
᳿߳ะ߆ߞߡ޿ࠆ߆⇼໧ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖ߩᄢⷙᮨߥេഥ߽߆߃ߞߡ໧㗴ࠍ৻ጀⶄ㔀ൻߔࠆน
⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ߇ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩࠃ߁ߥ࿖߳ߤߩࠃ߁ߥេഥࠍⴕ߁߆㔍ߒ޿໧㗴ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬
ߎߩ┨ߢ᦭ലߥࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ࠍតߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
╙ 5 ┨ “Zimbabwe-Prospects of Restoration After Rapid Decline”㧔
‫ࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޟ‬㧦ᕆㅦߥ⴮ㅌ߆
ࠄߩᓳ⥝߳ߩዷᦸ‫ޠ‬㧕ߪ‫ޔ‬FASID㧛᡽╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㧔GRIPS㧕ㅪ៤ᢎ⢒ࡊࡠࠣ࡜ࡓߢ޽
ࠆ IDS㧔࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥ㧕ୃ჻⺖⒟ୃੌ↢ߢࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ಴りߩᄢቇ㒮↢ Catherine Machingauta
ߦࠃࠆ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ‫⚻ߩࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޕ‬ᷣ⁁ᴫߪߎߩᢙᐕᖡൻࠍߚߤࠅ‫࡯࡟ࡈࡦࠗ࡯ࡄࠗࡂޔ‬
࡚ࠪࡦߩߚ߼ߦ⥄࿖ㅢ⽻߇ᱴߤㅢ↪ߒߥߊߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ᄢ㊂ߩ㙈ᱫ⠪ࠍ಴ߔน⢻ᕈ߇಴ߡ߈ߡ޿
ࠆ‫⁁ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕ‬ᴫߩਅ‫ޔ‬࿖㓙េഥࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߪㆡಾߥኻಣᴺࠍ⻠ߓࠆߎߣ߇಴᧪ߕ‫ޔ‬
⚿ᨐߣߒߡ㐿⊒េഥߪ೥ᷫߐࠇ‫ੱޔ‬㆏⊛ߥ⋡⊛ߩ߽ߩߦ㒢ࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ߦ⁁⃻ޕ‬㒱ߞߚᦨᄢ
ߩⷐ࿃ߪ‫߇ࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޔ‬ஜోߥ᡽ᴦ૕೙ࠍ▽ߊߎߣ߇ߢ߈ߥ߆ߞߚߎߣߦࠃࠆ‫ޕ‬ห࿖ߪ⁛
┙એ᧪৻ౄ⁛ⵙ૕೙ࠍណߞߡ߈ߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬㊁ౄࠍ᥸ജߢᛥ࿶ߒߡ߈ߚ‫ߚ߹ޕ‬᡽ᐭߪ⧷࿖ࠍߪ
ߓ߼ߣߔࠆ࠼࠽࡯ߦኻߒ‫ޔ‬ᑪ⸳⊛ߥࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ࠍߣߞߡ߈ߚߣߪ᳿ߒߡ޿߃ߥ޿‫ޕ‬೙ⵙភ
⟎ߩ✭๺ߩዷᦸ߇⷗ࠄࠇߥ޿ਛߢ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭߪ᡽ᴦᡷ㕟ߩታᣉߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߣߩㅪ៤ࠍᒝ߼
ࠆേ߈㧔”Look East”᡽╷㧕߽⷗ߖߡ޿ࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷‫ޔ‬េഥߪ‫ޔ‬NGO ߥߤࠍㅢߓߚੱ㆏⊛ᡰេߩ
ታᣉએᄖߦߥ޿ߣᕁࠊࠇࠆ߇‫ࠆߚᦨߪࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ଀ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬໧㗴ߪ࿖㓙␠ળ
߇૗߽ߒߥߌࠇ߫ᭂ┵ߦᖤᗌߥ⁁ᴫ߇↢ߕࠆน⢻ᕈ߇ᒝ޿ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
╙ 6 ┨̌Nigeria - So Rich, Yet So Poor - Looking Behind the Paradox”㧔
‫ࠕ࡝ࠚࠫࠗ࠽ޟ‬㧦⼾߆ߐ
ߣ⽺࿎ߩࡄ࡜࠼࠶ࠢࠬ‫ޠ‬
㧕߽ Catherine Machingauta ߦࠃࠆ߽ߩߢ‫ࠍࠬ࡯ࠤߩࠕ࡝ࠚࠫࠗ࠽ޔ‬
ᛒߞߡ޿ࠆ‫⼾ߪࠕ࡝ࠚࠫࠗ࠽ޕ‬ንߥ⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߣੱ⊛⾗Ḯߦᕺ߹ࠇ‫ޔ‬චಽߥ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߩẜ࿷
ᕈࠍ஻߃ߡ޿ߥ߇ࠄ‫ޔ‬ਥߦࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ໧㗴߇ේ࿃ߢ⽺࿎ߦ⧰ߒ߻ੱ߇ᄙߊ޿ࠆ࿖ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕߪౖဳ⊛ߥ‫ޟ‬ᄤὼ⾗Ḯߩ⟂‫ߚࠇࠊࠄߣߦޠ‬࿖ߢ޽ࠈ߁‫ޕ‬Machingauta ߪ‫ࠗ࠽ޔ‬
ࠫࠚ࡝ࠕߩ㐿⊒໧㗴ߩ৻ߟߪ࠼࠽࡯㑆ߩਇචಽߥද⺞ߦ޽ࠆߎߣ‫ߣ࡯࠽࠼ߚ߹ޔ‬᡽ᐭ㑆ߦ
ሽ࿷ߔࠆᖱႎߩ㕖ኻ⒓ᕈ߿‫ߩ࡯࠽࠼ޔ‬េഥ᡽╷߇࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕߩ᡽╷ߦᔅߕߒ߽ᢛวߐࠇ
ߡ޿ߥ޿ὐߥߤࠍ᜼ߍߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
੹࿁ߩ⎇ⓥࠍㅢߒߡ⹺⼂ࠍᡷ߼ߡᷓ߼ߚߎߣߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩេഥߩ㔍ߒߐߢ޽ࠆ‫ߦߎߎޕ‬
᜼ߍߚ 6 ߟߩ⺰ᢥ߇‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ᡽ᐭࠍ฽߻࿖㓙េഥࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖ߇ߎߩ㊀ⷐ⺖㗴߳ขࠅ⚵߻ߦ
㓙ߒ‫ޔ‬ෳ⠨ߦߥࠆߎߣࠍ㗿߁‫ޕ‬
7
╙ 1 ┨ ࠨࡂ࡜એධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߩዷᦸ㧦⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ⌕⋡ߒߡ
Chapter 1: Economic Development Prospects for sub-Saharan Africa: Focus on Fragile States
⑺ጊቁమ㧔ᣣᧄᄢቇ࿖㓙㑐ଥቇㇱ ᢎ᝼㧛
FASID ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ ෳਈ㧕
Takamasa Akiyama (Professor, Department of International Relations,
Nihon Univeristy / Senior Advisor, IDRI, FASID㧕
㧔ⷐ⚂㧕
⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍᄙߊ฽߻ࠨࡂ࡜એධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ⻉࿖㧔SSA㧕ߦኻߒߡߩㄭᐕߩេഥᚢ⇛ߩ࡟ࡆࡘ࡯
߆ࠄ௑ะߣߒߡߪࠃࠅౕ૕⊛ߥេഥ╷߇ߣࠄࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥߞߡ߈ߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬㐳ᦼᚢ⇛⊛ߥ
ᣇ㊎ߪ಴ߡ߈ߡ޿ߥ޿‫࡯࠲ࠢ࠮ޕ‬೎ߦ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳௑ะࠍ 43 ߩ SSA ⻉࿖ߦߟ޿ߡⴕ޿‫◲ޔ‬නߥ
ࡕ࠺࡞ࠍၮߦㄘᬺ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߩ੍᷹ࠍⴕߞߚ‫ޕ‬ಽᨆߩ⚿ᨐ‫ੱޔ‬ญ߇ᄢ߈ߊჇ߃⛯ߌࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖
ኅࠍᄙߊᛴ߃ࠆ SSA ߢ⋧ᒰߥ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳߇㆐ᚑߢ߈ߥߌࠇ߫ᄙߊߩ࿖‫ߦ․ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߢߪ⽺
࿎ߪᷓ߹ࠅ‫␠ޔ‬ળ‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦਇ቟ߪჇᄢߔࠆߎߣ߇್᣿ߒߚ‫ߚ߹ޕ‬᳓ߣㄘᬺߦㆡߒߚ࿯࿾ߩᄢ
᏷ߥଏ⛎Ⴧട߇޽߹ࠅᦸ߼ߥ޿ߎߣࠍ⠨ᘦߔࠆߣ⋧ᒰߥ࿯࿾ߩ↢↥ᕈߩჇᄢ߇㆐ᚑߢ߈ߚ
ߣߒߡ߽ㄘᬺ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߢߎࠇࠄߩ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣࠍᒁߞᒛߞߡⴕߊߩߪ߶ߣࠎߤਇน⢻ߢ޽ࠆߣ
޿߁ߎߣ߇⸒߃ࠆ‫ޕ‬዁᧪ߩഭ௛ੱญჇടಽ߇⃻࿷ߩ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯೎ഭ௛ੱญ㈩ಽࠍ⛽ᜬߒߡㅴ
ࠎߛ႐ว‫ޔ‬ㄘᬺዞᬺੱญ৻ੱᒰߚࠅߩㄘᬺ GDP ߪᕆỗߦᷫዋߔࠆߣ੍ᗐߐࠇࠆ‫৻ޕ‬ᣇ‫ߎޔ‬
ߩ 15 ᐕ㑆߶ߤߩዞᬺੱญ৻ੱᒰߚࠅߩ㕖ㄘᬺ GDP ߪ߶ߣࠎߤߩ SSA ߩ࿖ߢᷫዋߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ߎߩ௑ะߪ․ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ߅޿ߡ㗼⪺ߢ޽ࠆ‫ ޕ‬ᄙߊߩ SSA ⻉࿖‫ߦ․ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ⽺࿎ࠍ೥
ᷫߔࠆߦߪഭ௛㓸⚂ဳߩ⵾ㅧᬺ߿ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߩ⊒ዷ߇ߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬ஜోߥ㕖
ㄘᬺ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߩᚑ㐳ߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߇ᛴ߃ࠆ᡽ᴦ⊛ߥ໧㗴ߩシᷫߦ߽⽸₂ߒ߁ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߪߎࠇ
ࠄߩಽ㊁ߢߩេഥ⽸₂ߦߪᲧセఝ૏߇޽ࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬
1-1 Introduction
Over the past few decades the there has been a bipolarization of development performance
among developing countries. At one pole are a number of developing countries with dynamic
emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil.
These have been experiencing high
economic growth and have as a result become important players in global politics and economics.
At the other pole are countries often described as fragile states (FS), many of which are situated in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These fragile states, as was discussed in a previous FASID report
(FASID 2008), have governments that are either incapable or unwilling – or both – to provide
essential services to their people. They suffer from governance problems, having policies and
institutions too weak to support healthy development.
The problems of sub-Saharan Africa have attracted the interest of many researchers and
8
organizations since at least 1980 when the Bretton Woods Institutions launched Structural
Adjustment Loans (SALs).
A multitude of papers, reports and books have been published on SSA
since that time. Occasionally optimism is expressed, most recently when high economic growth
rates were recorded by a number of sub-Saharan countries in the mid-2000s. But the development
community is not fully convinced that a viable and sustainable development path has taken hold in
these countries and optimism may be fading as the current serious global economic slowdown, with
its accompanying sharp fall in commodity prices, continues its course1.
The argument of this paper is that in many cases, past attempts to analyze, propose and
implement development assistance for SSA countries have lacked sufficiently long-term vision and
strategy. The paper analyzes sectoral economic performance of the SSA region and of the fragile
countries within it. Based on these analyses, simple forecasts for the SSA economies are made by
sector, with a particular focus on agriculture, to identify why development does not take hold in
SSA’s fragile states what is required for this to happen.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses recent trends in development
thinking with special attention to SSA. Section 3 analyzes the sectoral economic performance of
SSA countries with a focus on agriculture, the largest sector in terms of GDP and employment, and
based on the analysis makes simple projections.
Section 4 proposes the direction that the
international development community, including the new JICA, might go in with their assistance
programs for SSA countries.
1-2 Trends of Development Assistance Thinking on SSA
Development assistance strategies, concepts and implementation for SSA have evolved over
time; from large infrastructure projects closely coordinated with recipient governments until the late
1970s, to addressing “government failures” and policy issues under the Structural Adjustment Loans
(SALs) in the 1980s and early 1990s, and then on to poverty reduction through strengthening health
and education systems and governance institutions from the late 1990s (Akiyama et al 2003).
These strategies and concepts and their implementation were often proposed and championed by
“experts” who had only limited knowledge of the region, with the result that frequent changes in
emphasis often confused aid practitioners and recipient country governments.
Examining various ideas about development of recent years and critical evaluations of them,
the following seem to be gaining currency:
-
It is important to strengthen the factors that contribute to economic growth. Since the late
1990s, the international development community has emphasized a concept of poverty
1
See, for example, Financial Times (2009)
9
reduction which entails assistance to human capital formation activities such as health and
education .
At this time, however, some analysts seem to recognize that this emphasis
has gone a too far at the cost of economic growth (Ndulu 2007: 8). In the absence of
economic growth, infrastructure that supports human capital cannot be maintained.
-
Government is important.
The government-led development strategies followed until
around 1980 were criticized because there was “government failure” in sub-Saharan Africa.
This situation led to Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) which embodied a strategy of
reducing the government’s role in economic activities, the main element of SAL
conditionalities. Subsequently, however, evaluation of market reforms has shown that the
existence of politically-powerful champions of reform in recipient countries is a condition
for successful policy reform (World Bank 1995, Ndulu 2007). This conclusion effectively
establishes the importance to economic development of the government.
-
There is a need for increasingly detailed and concrete suggestions. The basic tone of the
SAL conditionalities was libertarian. It assumed that reducing the role of government and
creating a development-enabling environment would automatically persuade the private
sector to participate and prosper.
Having recognized that things do not necessarily work
this way in SSA, studies on more concrete impediments to economic growth have been
carried out (World Bank 2004, Broadman 2007).
-
There are difficulties with policy and institutional reforms. There was optimism about
policy reform when SALs were launched in the 1980s, but actual implementation proved
disappointing. It became increasingly understood that meaningful policy reform is deeply
connected to social and political institutions developed over a long period of time and that
changing them requires a profound knowledge of the recipient countries which the donors
lacked (Lancaster 1999).
-
There are difficulties in promoting agricultural sector growth in SSA. The developing
assistance community appears to have shied away from assistance to non-agricultural
sectors, preferring to concentrate on agriculture in SSA following the traumatizing failed
industrialization policies of the 1960s, soon after SSA countries gained independence.
The failure of post-independence industrialization policy in Ghana has become a symbol of
this failure. Another reason for attention to agriculture was that it has been the main
source of employment. But in spite of tremendous efforts by the international community
over several decades to strengthen agriculture, the results have not been satisfactory. The
difficulty of the agricultural sector has been recognized for some time (Lele 1991) and a
recent World Bank evaluation report provides detailed reasons for the unsatisfactory results
(World Bank 2007), including institutional and incentive system problems at the Bank,
10
itself. As the analysis below suggests, it is doubtful whether most SSA countries will be
able to increase their per-capita income in the future. These difficulties are compounded
by the fact that agriculture is a land- and water-intensive industry and by the fact that the
rate of population growth in the SSA region is the world’s highest. This means that most
SSA countries are fast losing comparative advantage in agriculture.
-
There are considerable political, economic and social differences among SSA countries.
This implies that a “one size fits all” approach should not be pursued. Although there
should be no argument about this statement, the reality is that the cookie-cutter approach
has been popular and aid practitioners have always looked for “best practices.” Probably
the reasons for this are related to institutional problems in the aid organizations.
Prominent experts, usually economists, do not have in-depth knowledge of many
developing countries but love to make sweeping statements on how development assistance
should be provided. This often leads to some popular theme, which once adopted by an
influential organizations like the World Bank will inspire many studies to support it.
When this happens, it becomes very difficult for anyone to voice opposition.
Aid
practitioners on the ground, conversely, are not well enough equipped theoretically or
hierarchically to question the prevailing theme. Many of them lack deep knowledge of
the country they are working on and confidence about what path to follow.
Slogans also
are attractive because they play a role in raising general public awareness; the MDGs are a
recently example of this.
- Active participation by the private sector is indispensable for economic growth. Possibly
the most important lesson from East Asia’s miraculous economic growth experience is that
fostering the private sector is essential.
In spite of the clarity of this lesson, the
international community has been hesitant to attend to private sector development.
This
attitude is due mainly to the nature of ODA, which is government-to-government (G-to-G)
assistance.
There have been efforts to create environments friendly to private sector
development, but given the slow growth of the private sector in SSA, innovative measures
aimed at assisting private sector growth more directly should be studied.
1-3 Overview of the Economies and Prospects of SSA Countries
This section examines the economic performance in SSA by sector over the last several
years and makes simple projections. The economic analyses focus on value-added and working
population in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors2. The agricultural sector is analyzed in
2
These data are from the World Bank website
11
more depth using data on agricultural land, agricultural labor and agricultural sector value-added 3.
Table 1 shows statistics of average annual growth rates (% p. a.) of GDP4 by sector and per
working population, and total and sectoral working populations for the period 1990-2002. The
countries covered are 43 SSA countries further divided into two sub-groups of 17 fragile states and
26 non- fragile states5. Selection of the countries was based on data availability. For the period
covered, GDP for the total 43 countries increased by 2.7 % p.a., but on a per working population
basis there was a complete stagnation. Breaking the data down into the two sub-groups of fragile
and non-fragile states, the GDP growth rates were 2.1% p.a. and 2.9% p.a. respectively. These
figures on a per capita basis are -0.4% p.a. and 0.3% p.a. respectively. Among the three groups
considered – the total 43 countries and the two sub-groups of non-fragile states (26) and fragile
states (17) – the total countries and the non-fragile states both show relatively balanced sectoral
growth; sectoral growth rates for these groups range between 2.1% p.a. and 3.1% p.a. Conversely,
in the fragile states group, agriculture shows the highest growth rate (3.8% p.a.), but growth rates for
other sectors are very low, 1.8% p.a. for industry and only 1.2% p.a. for services.
㪫㪸㪹㫃㪼㩷㪈㪑㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㪸㫃㩷㪞㪛㪧㩷㪸㫅㪻㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿㩷㪩㪸㫋㪼㫊㪒㩷㪈㪐㪐㪇㪄㪉㪇㪇㪉㩷㩿㩼㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀
㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㪋㪊㩷㪚㫆㫌㫅㫋㫉㫀㪼㫊
㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊
㩷㩷㪥㫆㫅㪄㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊
㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃
㪧㪼㫉㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㪼㫉
㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃
㪧㪼㫉㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㪼㫉
㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃
㪧㪼㫉㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㪼㫉
㪞㪛㪧
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷
㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐㩷
㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺
㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃㩷
㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼
㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐
㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺
㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃
㪊㪅㪋
㪉㪅㪈
㪉㪅㪏
㪉㪅㪎
㪈㪅㪍
㪄㪈㪅㪍
㪇㪅㪇
㪊㪅㪏
㪈㪅㪍
㪇㪅㪐
㪉㪅㪈
4
5
㪄㪇㪅㪋
㪊㪅㪈
㪉㪅㪌
㪊㪅㪉
㪉㪅㪐
㪈㪅㪏
㪋㪅㪉
㪈㪅㪈
㪋㪅㪊
㪉㪅㪇
㪋㪅㪈
㪉㪅㪎
㪉㪅㪎
㪉㪅㪎
Source: Author
3
㪉㪅㪎
㪄㪉㪅㪐
These data re from FAO website
In 2000 constant US$
See Annex I for countries analyzed.
12
㪈㪅㪇
㪄㪈㪅㪈
㪇㪅㪊
㪫㪸㪹㫃㪼㩷㪉㪑㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㪸㫃㩷㪞㪛㪧㩷㪸㫅㪻㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪪㪿㪸㫉㪼㫊㩷㪸㫅㪻㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿㩷㪹㫐㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㪒㩷㪈㪐㪐㪇㪄㪉㪇㪇㪉
㪞㪛㪧
㪮㫆㫉㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㪁
㪘㫍㪼㫉㪸㪾㪼
㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿
㩿㩼㪀
㩿㩼㩷㫇㫆㫀㫅㫋㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀
㪘㫍㪼㫉㪸㪾㪼
㩿㩼㪀
㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿
㩿㩼㩷㫇㫆㫀㫅㫋㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀
㪋㪊㩷㪺㫆㫌㫅㫋㫉㫀㪼㫊
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼
㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐
㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺
㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃
㪈㪏㪅㪇
㪊㪊㪅㪍
㪋㪏㪅㪋
㪈㪇㪇㪅㪇
㪇㪅㪈㪊
㪄㪇㪅㪈㪏
㪇㪅㪇㪋
㪍㪋㪅㪋
㪊㪌㪅㪍
㪄㪇㪅㪌㪋
㪇㪅㪌㪋
㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㫊㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼
㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐
㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺
㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃
㪉㪋㪅㪐
㪋㪉㪅㪏
㪊㪉㪅㪊
㪈㪇㪇㪅㪇
㪇㪅㪋㪉
㪄㪇㪅㪉㪇
㪄㪇㪅㪊㪋
㪌㪌㪅㪏
㪋㪋㪅㪉
㪄㪇㪅㪎㪌
㪇㪅㪎㪌
㪥㫆㫅㪄㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼
㪠㫅㪻㫌㫊㫋㫉㫐
㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㫊㪃㩷㪼㫋㪺
㪫㫆㫋㪸㫃
㪈㪋㪅㪏
㪉㪐㪅㪊
㪌㪍㪅㪇
㪈㪇㪇㪅㪇
㪇㪅㪇㪊
㪄㪇㪅㪈㪋
㪇㪅㪈㪌
㪎㪇㪅㪍
㪉㪐㪅㪋
㪄㪇㪅㪋㪇
㪇㪅㪋㪇
㩷
* Industry includes Services, etc
Source: Author
13
On a per working person basis, the agricultural sector in fragile states shows higher growth
rates than the agricultural sector in non-fragile states, 2.7% p.a. versus 1.0% p.a. The reason
behind this seems mainly to be the slow rate of growth of the agricultural working population, 1.1%
p.a. for fragile states and 2.0% p.a. for non-fragile states.
Because a breakdown of working
population data between industry and services is unavailable, growth rates per working person for
non-agriculture GDP were calculated (This is shown as “Industry” in Table 1). These figures are
negative for all three country groups, but the figure for fragile states (-2.6% p.a.) is considerably
lower than that for the non-fragile states (-1.1% p.a.).
Working population growth rates by sector given in the lower portion of Table 1 show that
non-agricultural sectors had considerably higher rates of population growth than the agricultural
sectors for all three groups. Some countries such as South Africa and Mauritius have recorded
absolute decline inn agricultural working population in recent years. These differences in sectoral
population growth rates are the main reason why per working person agricultural GDP growth rates
are higher than those for non-agricultural sectors. This is also evident in Table 2 which shows
sectoral shares of GDP and working population and their changes over time.
Agriculture
contributed 18% to total GDP on average for the period in the 43 countries and has increased by
0.13% points on average each year. Corresponding figures for the fragile states are 24.9% and
0.42% points p.a. For the non-fragile states these figures are 14.8% and 0.03% points p.a.
These statistics show that for the period 1990-2002, GDP per working person for SSA
countries has stagnated. The breakdown shows that the agricultural sector has shown positive
growth but non-agricultural sectors have recorded significant declines. This is especially true for
fragile states which show a 2.9% p.a. decline in non-agricultural GDP per working person. Despite
this decline, and as reflected in GDP per working person, the level of income in non-agricultural
sectors is still considerably higher than in agriculture. This is probably the main reason why the
share of the non-agricultural working population is increasing.
The analysis above shows that agricultural sectors performed considerably better than
non-agricultural sectors. The question is, can this continue or even accelerate to become the engine
of SSA economic growth?. To examine this question some statistics on the agricultural sector are
given in Table 3. Table 3 shows that agricultural GDP per working person has been increasing for
the three groups of countries, helped by increases in land productivity (Agriculture GDP/Agriculture
Land) and land expansion. It also shows that agricultural land per working population (Agriculture
Land/AG. WP) has been declining at 0.87% p.a., 0.57% p.a., and 0.98% p.a. for the 43 countries, FS
and non-FS respectively. Given the significant population increases expected in the SSA countries,
land productivity and expansion have to increase dramatically for the agricultural sector to serve as
an engine of growth.
14
Simple exercises were performed to make projections for the agricultural GDP per
agricultural working population up to 2030 for the 43 SSA countries individually and as a group, and
for the 17 FS and 26 non-FS states. Such projections should provide good indications of how much
the agricultural sector can contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction in these countries.
To conduct this exercise the variable was broken down to the following three components:
Ag. GDP/Ag. WP = Ag. Production Index/Ag. Land *Ag. Price Index* Ag. Land / Ag. WP
where Ag. Price Index = Agricultural price index;
Ag. GDP/Ag. Production Index
Ag.WP
= Agricultural working population
Ag.Land = Agricultural land (Arable land and permanent crops)
Ag. WP
= Working population in agriculture
Ag. GDP was broken down to the product of Ag. Production Index and Ag. Price Index, which was
derived by dividing Ag. GDP by Ag. Production Index, to enable projections of the physical
productivity of land (Ag. Production Index/Ag. Land). In addition to this variable, projections were
made for Ag. Price Index, Ag. Land and Ag. WP.
Projections for these variables were carried out in the following ways:
Ag. GDP/Ag. Land and Ag. Land Three time-series regressions (linear, log linear and double log)
were performed to identify the best fit for these variables for each of the 43 countries.
These equations were used for projections.
Agricultural Working Population Two sets of projections were conducted; one using the same
growth rates as the UN projections for the total population and the other one adjusted for the
fact that the growth rate of agricultural working population is considerably smaller than that
of total population.6
Agricultural Price Index This variable is assumed to stay constant throughout the projection period
at the average value of the period 2001-2005.
Ag. GDP per Ag. Working Population was projected also for the three aggregates; 43 SSA countries,
17 FSs and 26 non-FSs. These were calculated using the weighted average of relevant
countries with Ag. GDP average for the period 2001-2005 as weights.
Projection results are given in Table 4 and Figures 1-4. This exercise clearly indicates that
the prospects for agricultural GDP and land per working agricultural population critically depend on
where the incremental population over the next few decades will work. Prospects for agricultural
GDP per working person is positive only if a large portion of the incremental population goes to
6
See Annex II for more detailed explanation.
15
non-agricultural sectors. This implies that it is very difficult if not impossible for the agricultural
sector to absorb the expected population increase, especially in the fragile states of SSA. This is
the case considering the limited expansion of land suitable for agriculture (As Figures 3 and 4 show,
this is especially the case with FS.), the declining availability of water, the possible detrimental
effects of global warming7 and the expected high population growth. The conclusion is that the
non-agricultural sector must grow to accommodate the growing population.
Unfortunately,
however, industry and service sector GDP per working population has been declining sharply since
1990.
Most SSA countries will not achieve meaningful overall economic growth without
significant growth in these sectors, especially the fragile states.
㪫㪸㪹㫃㪼㩷㪊㪑㩷㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿㩷㪩㪸㫋㪼㫊㩷㫆㪽㩷㪢㪼㫐㩷㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪸㫃㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㩷㪭㪸㫉㫀㪸㪹㫃㪼㫊㪒㩷㪈㪐㪐㪇㪄㪉㪇㪇㪉㩷㩿㩼㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀
㪋㪊㩷㪚㫆㫌㫅㫋㫉㫀㪼㫊
㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊
㪥㫆㫅㪄㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪞㪛㪧㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪮㪧
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪞㪛㪧㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪣㪸㫅㪻
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪣㪸㫅㪻
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪸㫃㩷㪮㪧
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㫃㪸㫅㪻㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪮㪧
㪈㪅㪍㪋
㪈㪅㪉㪎
㪇㪅㪏㪎
㪈㪅㪎㪍
㪄㪇㪅㪏㪎
㪉㪅㪍㪉
㪈㪅㪇㪉
㪇㪅㪍㪈
㪈㪅㪈㪐
㪄㪇㪅㪌㪎
㪈㪅㪇㪈
㪈㪅㪊㪎
㪈㪅㪇㪎
㪉㪅㪇㪎
㪄㪇㪅㪐㪏
Source: Author
㪫㪸㪹㫃㪼㩷㪋㪑㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㪼㪻㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿㩷㪩㪸㫋㪼㫊㩷㫆㪽㩷㪢㪼㫐㩷㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪸㫃㩷㪪㪼㪺㫋㫆㫉㩷㪭㪸㫉㫀㪸㪹㫃㪼㫊㪒㩷㪉㪇㪇㪍㪄㪉㪇㪊㪇㩷㩿㩼㩷㫇㪅㪸㪅㪀
㪋㪊㩷㪚㫆㫌㫅㫋㫉㫀㪼㫊
㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊 㪥㫆㫅㪄㪝㫉㪸㪾㫀㫃㪼㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪞㪛㪧㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪮㪧㪁
㩷㪑㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅
㩷㪑㩷㪘㪻㫁㫌㫊㫋㪼㪻㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅
㪄㪇㪅㪇㪋
㪉㪅㪌㪐
㪄㪇㪅㪉㪏
㪈㪅㪎㪐
㪇㪅㪈㪏
㪊㪅㪉㪍
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪞㪛㪧㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪣㪸㫅㪻
㪇㪅㪐㪇
㪈㪅㪍㪈
㪇㪅㪌㪋
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪣㪸㫅㪻
㪈㪅㪇㪐
㪇㪅㪏㪋
㪈㪅㪉㪎
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪸㫃㩷㪮㫆㫉㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅
㩷㪑㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅
㩷㪑㩷㪘㪻㫁㫌㫊㫋㪼㪻㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅
㪉㪅㪈㪋
㪈㪅㪋㪎
㪉㪅㪈㪋
㪈㪅㪇㪍
㪉㪅㪈㪋
㪈㪅㪍㪍
㪘㪾㫉㫀㪺㫌㫃㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㫃㪸㫅㪻㪆㪘㪾㪅㩷㪮㪧
㩷㪑㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅
㩷㪑㩷㪘㪻㫁㫌㫊㫋㪼㪻㩷㪬㪥㩷㪧㫆㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅
㪄㪈㪅㪇㪋
㪈㪅㪇㪏
㪄㪈㪅㪇㪈
㪇㪅㪉㪊
㪄㪈㪅㪇㪌
㪈㪅㪋㪋
* Agricultural Working Population
Source: Author
7
See, for example, Dinar et al (2008)
16
Figure 1: Actual and Projected Agricultural GDP per Agricultural Working Population; 1981-2030
(Assuming Agricultural Working Population Increasing less than the Total Population)
㪊㪃㪇㪇㪇
㪉㪃㪌㪇㪇
㪉㪃㪇㪇㪇
㪈㪃㪌㪇㪇
㪈㪃㪇㪇㪇
㪌㪇㪇
㪉㪇㪉㪐
㪉㪇㪉㪍
㪉㪇㪉㪊
㪉㪇㪉㪇
㪉㪇㪈㪎
㪉㪇㪈㪋
㪉㪇㪈㪈
㪉㪇㪇㪏
㪉㪇㪇㪌
㪉㪇㪇㪉
㪈㪐㪐㪐
㪈㪐㪐㪍
㪈㪐㪐㪊
㪈㪐㪐㪇
㪈㪐㪏㪎
㪈㪐㪏㪋
㪈㪐㪏㪈
㪇
Source: Author
Figure 2: Actual and Projected Agricultural GDP per Agricultural Working Population; 1981-2030
(Assuming Agricultural Working Population Increasing the same as the Total Population)
㪈㪃㪍㪇㪇
㪈㪃㪋㪇㪇
㪈㪃㪉㪇㪇
㪈㪃㪇㪇㪇
㪏㪇㪇
㪍㪇㪇
㪋㪇㪇
㪉㪇㪇
Source: Author
17
㪉㪇㪉㪐
㪉㪇㪉㪍
㪉㪇㪉㪊
㪉㪇㪉㪇
㪉㪇㪈㪎
㪉㪇㪈㪋
㪉㪇㪈㪈
㪉㪇㪇㪏
㪉㪇㪇㪌
㪉㪇㪇㪉
㪈㪐㪐㪐
㪈㪐㪐㪍
㪈㪐㪐㪊
㪈㪐㪐㪇
㪈㪐㪏㪎
㪈㪐㪏㪋
㪈㪐㪏㪈
㪇
Figure 3: Actual and Projected Agricultural Land per Agricultural Working Population; 1981-2030
(Assuming Agricultural Working Population Increasing less than the Total Population)
㪐㪇㪅㪇
㪏㪇㪅㪇
㪎㪇㪅㪇
㪍㪇㪅㪇
㪌㪇㪅㪇
㪋㪇㪅㪇
㪊㪇㪅㪇
㪉㪇㪅㪇
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪉㪇㪉㪐
㪉㪇㪉㪍
㪉㪇㪉㪊
㪉㪇㪉㪇
㪉㪇㪈㪎
㪉㪇㪈㪋
㪉㪇㪈㪈
㪉㪇㪇㪏
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㪈㪐㪐㪊
㪈㪐㪐㪇
㪈㪐㪏㪎
㪈㪐㪏㪋
㪈㪐㪏㪈
㪇㪅㪇
Source: Author
Figure 4: Actual and Projected Agricultural Land per Agricultural Working Population; 1981-2030
(Assuming Agricultural Working Population Increasing the same as the Total Population)
㪎㪇㪅㪇
㪍㪇㪅㪇
㪌㪇㪅㪇
㪋㪇㪅㪇
㪊㪇㪅㪇
㪉㪇㪅㪇
㪈㪇㪅㪇
Source: Author
18
㪉㪇㪉㪐
㪉㪇㪉㪍
㪉㪇㪉㪊
㪉㪇㪉㪇
㪉㪇㪈㪎
㪉㪇㪈㪋
㪉㪇㪈㪈
㪉㪇㪇㪏
㪉㪇㪇㪌
㪉㪇㪇㪉
㪈㪐㪐㪐
㪈㪐㪐㪍
㪈㪐㪐㪊
㪈㪐㪐㪇
㪈㪐㪏㪎
㪈㪐㪏㪋
㪈㪐㪏㪈
㪇㪅㪇
1-4 Importance of Development and Labor-Intensive Manufacturing and Services Sectors
The sectoral analyses and projections above suggest that the major issue SSA countries,
especially fragile ones, will face in the coming decades is employment, and this is mainly due to
increasing population.
Most SSA countries will face wide-spread unemployment or declining
income per capita or both unless major steps are taken. Analyses shows that these steps should be
in the area of labor-intensive manufacturing and services sectors
Development of the
labor-intensive manufacturing and services sectors will not only create jobs and make income grow,
but will also have an important impact on the main political institutional issue faced by SSA
countries; neopatrimonialism.
As Ishikawa argues, the major political problem for SSA is neopatrimonialism. This is the
issue Bates (1981) noted and that the international community has been addressing since the late
1970s. According to Ishikawa, it can be “overcome in the way that the Japanese advocate, by
actively incorporating modernization elements supported by a growing middle class, or in the way
that British analysts advocate, through early realization of democracy by strengthening competition
among political parties.”
(Ishikawa 2008: 2)
Recent experience suggests that the “British
approach” has not worked in many SSA countries, especially in the fragile ones.
Various
carrot-and-stick approaches have been tried but political institutions die hard. While some SSA
countries are touted as “successes,” including Uganda and Tanzania, attempts to apply these
countries’ “best practices” to other countries has met difficulty.
Rural populations possess weak political power because they lack information and have low
educational levels. Traditional rural ways of living do not provide sufficient incentives for rural
populations to acquire information or attain high levels of education. As pointed out by Easterly
(2006), incentive is the key to getting things accomplished.
Development of these sectors and accompanying urbanization is likely to affect information
flows efficiently and quickly8. This in turn would have a positive impact on political institutions,
as note by World Bank (2005: 313): “In political markets, the information that voters have about the
characteristics of political competitors and government performance is crucial.”
Placing emphasis on the manufacturing and services sectors in urban areas is unlikely to
weaken the agricultural sector. Not only does an emerging manufacturing and services sectors offer a
market for agricultural products, as Japanese experience suggest most urbanites with roots in rural
areas are supportive of a healthy rural agricultural sector.
Probably the major obstacle to this proposed strategy will come from recipient governments
Several chapters, especially 3 and 4 in Spence et al (2009) argue the relationship between
urbanization and development.
8
19
characterized by neopatrimonialism because they are aware of the threat the middle-class can pose.
As Ndulu argues “…what some governments still seem to fear the most is a private sector that
generates wealth independent of government controls and that makes its own unfettered decision.”
(Ndulu 2007:181)
1-5 Suggestions for JICA’s Strategies for SSA and Fragile States
Our analyses in this paper suggest that prospects for the economies of most SSA countries,
especially fragile ones, are rather grim. An important factor in this grim outlook is expected large
population increases. Even under an optimistic scenario, per capita income of most SSA countries
will barely increase or increase not at all. As discussed above, with little prospects for large
increases in land suitable for agriculture, the long-term strategy for JICA in SSA should be to
strengthen labor-intensive manufacturing and services sectors.
The new JICA which can now utilize grants, loans and technical assistance in a coordinated
manner is in an excellent position to implement an innovative multifaceted strategy toward assisting
SSA countries. JICA seems to have a comparative advantage in relation to other major donors in
pursuing such a strategy; more specifically:
(1)
Compared with many other donor aid organizations, the new JICA has the potential of
adopting a long-term and hence in-depth approach to development. Staff evaluations are conducted
over a longer term. Strategic thinking and strong leadership may have been lacking, but the new
JICA is in a better position now to fill these lacunae.
(2)
Japanese experts are aware of the importance of the manufacturing sector from Japan’s own
economic development experience and that of other East Asian countries.
(3)
With many competent private sector baby-boomers retiring, JICA can usefully obtain
cooperation from these experienced people to assist in the development of private manufacturing
sectors in SSA.
(4)
Japan’s strength in assistance has been on building and strengthening economic
infrastructure. This activity is indispensable for the suggested strategy.
(5)
Japan is eager to assist SSA; this is clearly reflected in its sponsorship of the TICADs. A
recent paper by Watanabe (2008) emphasizes the importance of a strategy focused on economic
growth, government-private sector cooperation, and the role of government in the context of
industrial policy.
In this context, recently Japanese development researchers have conducted several
interesting studies that could contribute to forming the needed strategy.
20
Below are some suggested directions the new JICA might consider in formulating strategies
toward SSA countries, especially the fragile ones.
In pursuing a strategy, recent lessons of
development discussed in Section 2 above should be taken into consideration.
-
Developing and strengthening private manufacturing and services sectors. It is clear
that the main reason behind East Asian economic development was the rapid growth of the
private sector. The international development community is well aware of this but has
limited its activities in this area because its mandate is to deal with the governments of
recipient countries. What activities there have been have been mainly about creating an
environment for private sector growth. Private firms in most SSA countries critically
need information and expertise on conducting international business.
Japan’s own
development experiences would be very valuable to the private sectors in SSA countries
and more direct technical assistance to private firms would be desirable. In Vietnam, for
example, Japan has valuable experience in assisting with the design of a long-term
development plan; and in Kenya there has been a detailed study of industrial sector
development9.
-
Designing comprehensive multifaceted development strategies. It has become clear
that the fundamental problem in most SSA countries is the weakness of their institutions;
and as North (1990) notes, building or strengthening institutions requires a long time as
they are intrinsically related with history and culture. The world developing assistance
community has not yet figured out how to tackle this issue effectively.
situation, an integrated and long-term approach is necessary.
approach is the Ishikawa project.
Given this
One example of such
It would be worthwhile for JICA to review this
approach and assess whether such an approach can be applied to SSA.
-
Infrastructure building. Japanese assistance has been characterized by an emphasis on
infrastructure building and this approach has met success in helping East Asia’s economies
to grow.
Applying this approach in SSA has been much discussed and somewhat
implemented; this effort should be strengthened and expanded.
-
Strengthening agriculture and rural organizations.
There are several promising
approaches being studied and/or implemented by Japan in this area. These include the
REPEAT project by FASID/GRIPS and a number of projects carried out by the Sasakawa
Foundations. In addition Japan’s own agricultural producers’ organizations should be
See
http://lvzopac.jica.go.jp/external/library?func=function.opacsch.mmindex&view=view.op
acsch.toshoshozodsp&shoshisbt=1&shoshino=0000173976&volno=0
9
21
studied with a view toward application in SSA. The importance of such organizations is
argued by Hayami.
1-6 Concluding Remarks
This paper briefly reviewed the strategies that have been applied by the international
development assistance community to SSA over the past few decades and identified lessons that
have been learned. These lessons suggest that development of SSA, especially the fragile states, is
an extremely complex issue. Consequently, as the recent cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan show, the
world community seems at a loss on what direction to take.
Over the last decade the aid
community has focused its development efforts on achieving the MDGs. However it is becoming
unpleasantly clear that most SSA countries will not be able to reach them10. Such failure after
putting tremendous human and financial resources toward the effort will definitely drive the
development community to some serious soul searching as to what did not go right.
Japan should
participate in such an exercise.
This paper recommends more concerted and detailed efforts to foster labor-intensive
manufacturing and service sectors. If SSA countries are to achieve a decent level of income given
their rapidly increasing populations, fostering manufacturing and services sectors appears to be the
only recourse. There are reasons why this approach has not been adopted and there are difficulties
that it poses. However, this issue demands a long term perspective. We have to start somewhere
sometime, and this is as good a time as any.
10
Better start late than never.
See latest on MDGs in SSA, Easterly (2009)
22
References
Akiyama, Takamasa, S. Akiyama and N. Minato (2003), International Development Assistance: Evolution
and Prospects with specific reference to the World Bank and Japan, FASID and also
Chisenshokan (in Japanese)
Bates, Robert H. (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural
Policies, Berkeley University of California Press
Broadman, Harry G. (2007) Africa’s Silk Road, World Bank
Dinar, Ariel, Rashid Hassan, Robert Mendelsohn, and others (2008) Climate Change and Agriculture in
Africa, Earthscan
Easterly‫ޔ‬William (2006) The White Man’s Burden, Penguin Books
___________ (2009) “How the Millennium Goals are Unfair to Africa” World Development Vol. 37, No.1
FASID (2009) Study on “Development Strategy of Fragile States, Globalization and International
Development Research, FASID
Financial Times (2009) “Africa’s Aid Plea as ‘Development Crisis’ Looms,” March 17 2009
Ishikawa, Shigeru (2008) “Comparison of African and Asian Development Models: For Mutual
Understanding of International Development Policies Between Japan and the United Kingdom”
FASID Discussion Paper No. 14, FASID
Lancaster, Carol (1999) Aid to Africa; So Much to Do So Little Done, University of Chicago Press
Lele, Uma (1991) ed. Aid to African Agriculture: Lesson from Two Decades of Donors’ Experience, Johns
University Press for the World Bank
North, Douglass (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance Cambridge
University Press
Ndulu, Benno J. (2007) Challenges of African Growth, The World Bank
Spence, Michael, Patricia Clarke Annez and Robert M. Buckley ed. (2009) Urbanization and Growth,
Commission on Growth and Development, World Bank
Watanabe, Matsuo (2008) “Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy in Transition: An Interpretation of TICAD IV”,
Japan Aktuell 3/2008, Global and Area Studies
World Bank (2004) Doing Business, World Bank
___________ (2005) Economic Growth in the 1990s; Learning from a Decade of Reform, World Bank
___________ (2007) World Bank Assistance to Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa; An IEG Review, IEG
World Bank
23
Annex I: 43 SSA Countries Analyzed
Fragile states are those with “FS” in brackets. They have World Bank CPIA below 3.2
Angola (FS)
Benin
Burkina Fasso
Burundi
Cape Verde
Central African Rep. (FS)
Chad (FS)
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep. (FS)
Comoros
(FS)
Botswana
(FS)
Cameroon
(FS)
Cote d’Ivoire (FS)
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Gambia, the (FS)
Guinea (FS)
Guinea Bissau (FS)
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania (FS)
Mauritius
Mozambique
Nambia
Niger
Nigeria (FS)
Rwanda
S. Tome&Principe (FS)
Senegal
Seychelles
South Africa
Sudan (FS)
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo (FS)
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe (FS)
24
Annex II: Description of Methodology used in Projecting
Agricultural Working Population
Two sets of calculations were made to project agricultural working population for the 43 SSA
countries:
(1)
In the first set of projections, the agricultural working population for each country was
assumed to increase at the rate of increase of the total country population as projected by the UN
(see .http://esa.un.org/unpp/).
(2)
In the second set of projections, it was assumed that the past trend would continue of the
growth rate of the agricultural working population being considerably lower than that of the
population overall.
More specifically the following formula was used for each country.
AGWPGR = UNPRGR x AGWPGR01-05/UNGR01-05
Where AGWPGR = projected growth rate of agricultural working population
UNPRGR
= UN projected growth rate of total population
AGWPGR = average actual agricultural working population growth rate
for the period 2001-2005
UNGR
= average actual total population growth rate for the
period 2001-2005
25
╙ 2 ┨ ᧲ࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ਥൻߣಽᮭൻ
Chapter 2 Democratization and Decentralization in East Africa
JICA ⎇ⓥᚲ਄Ꮸ⎇ⓥຬ㩷 ╣ጟ㓶৻
Yuichi Sasaoka (Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute)
<Abstract>
Ethnicity-driven politics is a major cause of fragility in many Sub-Saharan Africa countries today.
This paper examines political conditions in East African community (EAC) with a focus on
democratization and decentralization. Tanzania has attained some level of democratization and
political stability due to inclusive policies created in the Nyerere's time, even though there are
governance issues. However, Kenya and Uganda have not attained political stability yet. A part of
the problem could be probably alleviated by the introduction and facilitation of democratic
decentralization policy and its related strategic measures, although there are other critical issues such
as those related to the government budget and wide-spread of poverty. An emerging task for Uganda
is the facilitation of multi-party system, and the new challenge for Kenya is democratic
decentralization. Democratization and decentralization complement each other, while they are
closely related to the history of state formation. In order to make sound assessment on these two
important political principles, we need to examine the pre-colonial social structure, colonial legacy
and the political process after independence driven by ethno-politics. This paper attempts to show
that the Horizontal Inequality (HI) hypothesis is quite relevant in explaining the difference of the
political processes in Uganda and Kenya, especially the relationship between ethnicity and
democratization. This paper also evaluates the importance of new regional organization (EAC) and
extracts some policy implications for future development assistance.
2-1 ߪߓ߼ߦ
䉰䊑䉰䊊䊤䉝䊐䊥䉦䋨એਅ䇸䉝䊐䊥䉦䇹䋩䈱࿖ኅ䈲䇮⁛┙એ㒠㐳ᦼ㑆䈮䉒䈢䈦䈩㐿⊒䈱஗ṛ䈫ᘟᕈ⊛
䈭⚗੎䈮䉂䉁䉒䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ㄭઍ࿖ኅ䈱ᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈲 1960 ᐕઍ䈱ᄙ䈒䈱࿖ኅ䈱⁛┙䈏␜
䈜䉋䈉䈮䇮ઁ䈱㐿⊒ㅜ਄࿾ၞ䈫Ყ䈼䈩㕖Ᏹ䈮ㆃ䉏䈩㐿ᆎ䈘䉏䈢䇯࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈱ㆊ⒟䈲ᬀ᳃࿾ᦼ䈱
ੱᎿ⊛䈭䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ᓇ㗀䉕ฃ䈔䇮㑆ធ⛔ᴦ(indirect rule)䈱ㇺว䈎䉌䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ု⋥⊛䈭㑐
ଥ䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈢䇯ᰴ䈮䇮⁛┙ᓟ䇮ᄙ䈒䈱ᒻᑼ⊛䈮᳃ਥ⊛䈭૕೙䈲䈜䈓䈮ᮭᆭਥ⟵⊛૕೙䉇৻ౄ
೙䈮ᄌᦝ䈘䉏䈢䈏䇮᧲⷏಄ᚢ䈫䈇䈉࿖㓙ⅣႺ䈲䈖䈱⁁ᘒ䉕⛽ᜬ䈜䉎ᣇะ䈮௛䈇䈢䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢⚻ㆊ䉕
⚻䈩䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱Ꮢ᳃䈲࿖ኅ䈮ኻ䈚䈩㕖Ᏹ䈮⼊ᚓ⊛䈎䇮ዋ䈭䈒䈫䉅ᶖᭂ⊛䈭ᗧ⼂䉕䉅䈧䉋䈉䈮䈭䈦
䈢䇯
᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱䉬䊆䉝䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱 3 䉦࿖䋨એਅ䇸3 䉦࿖䇹䋩䈲䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈪䉅Ყセ⊛䈮቟ቯ䈚䇮
26
ᚑ㐳䈚䈩䈇䉎࿖䈫䉂䈭䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮᡽ᴦ⊛䈭቟ቯᕈ䉕੨ฃ䈚䈩䈇䉎䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯2007 ᐕ 12 ᦬
䋭08 ᐕ 2 ᦬䈱䉬䊆䉝䈪䈱ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ᜼ᓟ䈱᥸േ䈲䈠䉏䉕‛⺆䉎䋨ᱫ੢⠪ 1000 ฬએ਄䇮࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃
30 ਁੱ䋩1䇯䉁䈢䇮1970䋭80 ᐕઍ䈱䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲䉝䊚䊮⁛ⵙ᡽ᮭ䈱⯦Ვ䋨ᱫ⠪ 30 ਁੱએ਄䋩䉇 1980
ᐕઍ೨ඨ䈱ౝᚢ䋨ᱫ⠪ 30䋭50 ਁੱ䋩䈪ᄙ䈒䈱‶†䉕䉂䈢2䇯䈖䉏䉌䈲ᮭജ䉕䉄䈓䉎䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞㓸
࿅䈱ኻ┙䈮䉋䉍ᒁ䈐⿠䈖䈘䉏䈢䈫䈖䉐䈏䈅䉎䇯1986 ᐕ䈮ᚑ┙䈚䈢䊛䉶䊔䊆᡽ᮭ䈲቟ቯ䈚䈢᡽ᴦ䉕ታ
⃻䈚䈢䈏䇮ർㇱ࿾ၞ䈪䈲 LRA(Lord Resistance Army)䈫䈇䈉․ᱶ䈭᥸ജ㓸࿅䈱ᵴേ䈏የ䉕ᒁ䈇䈢䇯
䉝䊐䊥䉦䈪ᦨ䉅቟ቯ䈚䈢࿖䈱৻䈧䈪䈅䉎䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈪䈜䉌䉅䇮2000 ᐕ 11 ᦬䈱ㆬ᜼ᓟ䈱䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦
䈱੐ઙ䈪䈲 50 ฬએ਄䈱ᱫ⠪䇮600 ฬ䈱㔍᳃䈏⊒↢䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯
3 䉦࿖䈲ૐᚲᓧ࿖䈪䈅䉍䇮䉬䊆䉝䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱 2 䉦࿖䈲䇸⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ䇹䈮ಽ㘃䈘䉏䉎䈖䈫䉅ᄙ䈇3䇯ᐔဋ
⊛䈭Ꮢ᳃䈲⽺䈚䈇ㄘ᳃䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮ㇺᏒ䈫ㄘ᧛䇮࿯࿾䈱⢈ᴅᐲ䈭䈬࿖ౝ䈱␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈲ዊ
䈘䈒䈭䈇䇯3 䉦࿖䈲⁛┙ᤨὐ䈪䈲䈎䈭䉍㘃ૃ䈚䈢᡽ᴦ᭴ㅧ䇮ᄙ᳃ᣖᕈ䇮㐿⊒᡽╷䉕᦭䈚䈩䈇䈢䈏䇮
䈠䈱ᓟ⋧ᒰ䈮⇣䈭䉎᡽ᴦㆊ⒟䉇⚗੎䉕⚻䈢䇯䈠䈱⋧㆑䈱⸃᣿䈲䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦⻉࿖䈮䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡷ㕟
䉕௛䈐䈎䈔䉎వㅴ࿖஥䈮䈫䈦䈩ᄢ䈐䈭⺖㗴䈪䈅䉎䇯ᧄⓂ䈪䈲䈖䉏䉕 3 䉦࿖䈱᳃ਥൻ䇮ಽᮭൻ䇮࿖ኅ
ᒻᚑ䈱 3 ⠪䈱㑐ଥ䋨એਅ䇸3 ⠪䈱㑐ଥ䇹䋩䇮․䈮᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱ⷰὐ䈎䉌⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯䈖䉏䉌䈲䉧䊋
䊅䊮䉴䈱ਛᔃ⊛䈭⺖㗴䈪䈅䉍䇮᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯᕈ䉇㐿⊒䈱᦭ലᕈ(effectiveness)䈮䉅ᷓ䈒㑐ଥ䈚䈩䈇
䉎䇯
ᧄⓂ䈱⿰ᣦ䈲䇮䇸⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ䇹䈱᡽ᴦ䈱⣀ᒙᕈ䈱ᄢ䈐䈭ℂ↱䈫䈚䈩䇮᡽ᴦ䈏䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮ᡰ㈩䈘䉏
䈩䈐䈢ὐ䉕⠨⸽䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈅䉎䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲⺖㗴䈲䈅䉎䉅䈱䈱䇮䊆䉣䊧䊧䈱ഞ❣䉅䈅䈦䈩᳃ਥൻ䈫
᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯᕈ䉕㆐ᚑ䈪䈐䈢䈫䈖䉐䈏䈅䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲ਇ቟ቯⷐ⚛䈏䉁䈣ᄢ䈐䈒ሽ
࿷䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䉏䈲ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈱ផㅴ䈪ㇱಽ⊛䈮⸃᳿䈪䈐䉎䈫䈖䉐䈏䈅䉎䇯੹ᓟ䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ⶄᢙ᡽
ౄ೙䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈉ᣂ䈚䈇⺖㗴䈏೔᧪䈜䉎䈭䈎䈪䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱⋧੕ଦㅴ⊛
䈭㑐ଥ䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯
䋼3 䉦࿖䈱㑐ଥ䋾
3 䉦࿖䈲ᣥ⧷࿖ᬀ᳃࿾䈫䈚䈩 1960 ᐕઍ䈱ᱴ䈬หᤨᦼ䈮⁛┙䈚䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮10 ᐕ䉅䈜䉎䈫䉬䊆䉝䈲⾗
ᧄਥ⟵䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲䉝䊐䊥䉦␠ળਥ⟵䈫⇣䈭䉎᡽╷䈏ዷ㐿䈘䉏䈢䇯1970 ᐕઍᧃ䈮䈲䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈫
䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲⚗੎䉕⚻㛎䈚䈢䇯3 䉦࿖䈲䊎䉪䊃䊥䉝ḓ䉕᜽䉖䈪㓞ធ䈚䇮1918 ᐕ䈎䉌⁛┙䉁䈪⧷࿖䈱㑆
ធ⛔ᴦਅ䈮䈅䉍䇮⁛┙⋥ᓟ䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ታ૕ൻ䈚䈭䈎䈦䈢䈏ㅪ㇌೙(federation)䉕ណ↪䈚䈢䇯
䈘䉌䈮䇮3 䉦࿖䈲 1967 ᐕ䈎䉌 70 ᐕઍᧃ䉁䈪᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦౒ห૕(EAC: East African Community)䉕⚿
1
Dague(2008)ߦࠃࠆ‫ޕ‬
Klugman, et al.,(1999) ߦࠃࠆ‫ޔߒߛߚޕ‬ฦ⒳⾗ᢱߦࠃࠆផቯੱᢙߩᏅߪᄢ߈޿‫ޕ‬
3 ࠤ࠾ࠕߪ DfID(2005)ߩ fragile states ߩಽ㘃ߦ⹥ᒰߒ‫ޔ‬
Brookings Institution ߩ Rice and Patrick(2006)
ߩ Index of State Weakness ߢߪ࠙ࠟࡦ࠳߇ bottom quintile‫ ߇ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ‬second quintile ߦ‫ޔ‬Fund for
Peace(2007)ߩ Failed State Index ߢߪ࠙ࠟࡦ࠳߇ critical‫ ߇ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ‬in danger ߦ⹥ᒰߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
2
27
ᚑ䈚䈩⚻ᷣ⛔ว䉕⋡ᜰ䈚䈢4䇯䈖䉏䈲 2001 ᐕ䈮ౣ⚿ᚑ䈘䉏䇮2005 ᐕ䈮㑐⒢ห⋖䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏5䇮2007
ᐕ䈮ౝ㒽ㇱ䈱䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈱ട⋖䉕䉂䈩䈇䉎䇯ᣂ䈚䈇 EAC 䈲 2010 ᐕ䈱න৻ㅢ⽻䇮⛔৻
Ꮢ႐෸䈶ㅪ㇌೙䉕᭴ᗐ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯3 䉦࿖䈲 40 ᐕએ਄䈱ಽⵚ䉕⚻䈩䇮ౣ䈶⛔ว䈮ะ䈎䈦䈩ᱠ䉂ᆎ
䉄䈩䈇䉎䇯
䋼3 ⠪䈱㑐ଥ䋾
࿖ኅᒻᚑ䊶᳃ਥൻ䊶ಽᮭൻ䈱㑐ଥ䈲Ყセ⊛䈮᣿⸃䈪䈅䉎䇯᳃ਥਥ⟵䈮䈲䇮᡽ᐭ䉕૞䉍䈣䈜ᚻ⛯䈐
䈮㑐䈜䉎㗔ၞౝᏒ᳃䈱วᗧ䈏฽䉁䉏䉎(Linz 䋧Stepan1996)䇯䈧䉁䉍䇮࿖ኅ䈱ᚑ┙䈭䈚䈮䈲Ꮢ᳃ᮭ
䈲ሽ࿷䈞䈝䇮Ꮢ᳃ᮭ䈭䈚䈮䈲᳃ਥਥ⟵䈲ሽ࿷䈚䈭䈇䇯ㆬ᜼䈻䈱ෳട䈮వ┙䈦䈩䇮࿖ኅ䈱Ⴚ⇇䉇
⺕䈏Ꮢ᳃䈭䈱䈎䈲੍䉄᳿ቯ䈘䉏䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈏䈇䈎䈭䉎᳃ਥਥ⟵⺰䈮┙䈧႐ว䈪䉅䇮࿖ኅ
䈫᳃ਥൻ䈱ၮᧄ⊛䈭㑐ଥ䈪䈅䉎䇯ઁᣇ䇮࿖ኅ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱㑐ଥ䈲ㅢᏱਛᄩ᡽ᐭ䈎䉌䈅䉎⚵❱䈻䈱ᮭ
㒢䈱ᆔ⼑䉇ᆔછ䇮ᧄㇱᯏ㑐䈱⣕㓸ਛൻ䈫䈚䈩ℂ⸃䈘䉏䉎䈏䇮ᧄⓂ䈪⠨ኤ䈜䉎䈱䈲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈪৻⥸
⊛䈭ᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅ䈮䈍䈔䉎᡽ᴦ⊛⺖㗴䈫䈚䈩䈱ಽᮭൻ䈪䈅䉎䇯
᳃ਥਥ⟵䈫ಽᮭൻ䈮䈧䈇䈩᭎ᔨⷙቯ䉕䈚䈩䈍䈐䈢䈇䇯೨⠪䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䉻䊷䊦(Dahl㩷 1971)䈱䇸䊘䊥
䉝䊷䉨䊷䇹䇮䈧䉁䉍ㆬ᜼ᮭ䉇᡽ᴦ⊛ᮭ೑䈏଻㓚䈘䉏䈢૕೙䉕ᗐቯ䈜䉎䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮᡽ᐭ䈱Ꮢ᳃䈮ኻ䈜
䉎䉝䉦䉡䊮䉺䊎䊥䊁䉞䉇䇮᡽ᴦ䈮ෳട䈜䉎Ꮢ᳃䈱৻ቯ䈱䇸ᯏળ䈱ᐔ╬䇹䉅ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎䋨ᕡᎹ 2006䋩䇯ઁ
ᣇ䇮ಽᮭൻ(decentralization)䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䇸ਛᄩ᡽ᐭ䈎䉌ਅ૏䉁䈢䈲ඨ⁛┙⊛䈭᡽ᐭ⚵❱䇮ᚗ䈇䈲
᳃㑆䉶䉪䉺䊷䈻䈱౏౒⊛ᯏ⢻䈱ᮭᆭ䈫⽿છ䈱⒖ォ(Rondinelli, 1998)䇹䈫⠨䈋䉎䇯ಽᮭൻ䈮䈲⺰⠪
䈮䉋䈦䈩㗔ၞ⊛(territorial)䊶㕖㗔ၞ⊛(non-territorial)䈭ᐞ䈧䈎䈱ᰴర䉇䉺䉟䊒䈏䈅䉍䇮ᓟ⠪䈪䈲
Rondinelli 䈲᳃༡ൻ䉇⚵❱䊧䊔䊦䇮Ꮢ႐䋨୘ੱ䋩䈻䈱ಽᮭൻ䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎6䇯᳃ਥ⊛䋨᡽ᴦ⊛䋩ಽᮭ
ൻ䈲೨⠪䈱ㅴൻ䈚䈢ᒻᘒ䈪䇮Ꮢ᳃䈏࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱⼏ຬ䉇㚂㐳䉕᥉ㅢㆬ᜼䈮䈍䈇䈩ㆬ಴䈚䇮౏౒⊛
ᗧᕁ᳿ቯ䉕ⴕ䈉䈖䈫䉕ᗧ๧䈜䉎7䇯
ᧄⓂ䈱᭴ᚑ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮╙ 2 ▵䈪᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱⋧੕㑐ଥ䉕⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯ਔ⠪䈲࿖ኅ᭴ㅧ(state
structure)䈱ਥⷐ䈭ේℂ䈪䈅䉎䇯⁛┙એ㒠䇮᡽ᴦ㓸࿅䈱ᄙ᭽ᕈ䉇ല₸⊛䈭⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈱ᔅⷐᕈ䈭䈬
䈎䉌 2 䈧䈱ේℂ䈲᭽䇱䈭ᒻ䈪⹜䈘䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈲䇮ਔ⠪䈱㊀ⶄ㗔ၞ䈮䈅䈢䉎䇯⁛┙એ
㒠䈱 3 䉦࿖䈱᡽ᴦㆊ⒟䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈪䈲ਔ⠪䈲⋧੕ଦㅴ⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮
䉻䈪䈲ਔ⠪䈲⋧੕ឃ㒰⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯ਔ⠪䈱ᄙ䈒䈱ⷰᔨ䉇ଔ୯ⷰ䈲࿖㓙䊜䊂䉞䉝䈫ᄖ࿖េഥᯏ㑐
4
ᐕએ೨ߦ‫ ߩࠞ࡯࠾ࠟࡦ࠲ޔ‬ᐕߩ⁛┙ᤨ߆ࠄ East African Services Organisation ߇ሽ࿷‫ޕ‬න৻ㅢ
⽻‫౒ޔ‬หᓽ⒢ᯏ᭴‫ޔ‬㋕㆏‫ޔ‬᷼ḧ‫⥶ޔ‬ⓨળ␠ߩ౒หᚲ᦭߇ߥߐࠇߡ޿ߚ‫ ޔߪࠇߎޕ‬ᐕߦ᧲ࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ౒ห
૕ߦߥߞߚᓟ‫ ޔ‬ᐕߦ޿ߞߚࠎ⸃૕‫ޕ‬
5 㑐⒢ห⋖ߪ౒ㅢၞᄖ㑐⒢‫ޔ‬㕖㑐⒢㓚ოߩ᠗ᑄ‫ޔ‬ၞౝߩ࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕ‫ߩ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ‬ャ಴ຠ࠯ࡠ㑐⒢‫ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ‬
߆ࠄ࠙ࠟࡦ࠳‫ߩ߳ࠕ࠾ࠩࡦ࠲ޔ‬ャ಴ߩ 5 ᐕએౝߩ࠯ࡠ㑐⒢ߩታ⃻ࠍ⋡ᜰߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
6 㗔ၞ⊛ಽᮭൻߦߪ⒟ᐲߩᒝ޿߽ߩ߆ࠄᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑(devolution)‫ޔ‬ᮭ㒢ᆔછ(delegation)‫ޔ‬⣕ਛᔃൻ(deconcentration)ߩ 3 Ბ㓏߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬Bray(1994)ߪ㗔ၞ⊛ߥ㧔࿾ᣇ㧕ಽᮭൻߪု⋥⊛ಽᮭൻߣ߽⸒޿‫ޔ‬᳃༡ൻ߿Ꮢ႐ൻߪᯏ
⢻⊛ಽᮭൻߥ޿ߒ᳓ᐔ⊛ಽᮭൻߣ๭߱‫ޕ‬
7 ᳃ਥ⊛‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ⊛ಽᮭൻߩࠞ࠹ࠧ࡝࡯ߪ㗔ၞ⊛ಽᮭൻߩߥ߆ߩᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑ߣ޿߁Ბ㓏ߦኻᔕߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
28
䋨䊄䊅䊷䋩䈏ᜬ䈤ㄟ䉖䈣䉅䈱䈪䇮․䈮 1990 ᐕઍ䈱ᕆㅦ䈭᳃ਥൻ䈲䊄䊅䊷䈏᡽ᴦ⊛䉮䊮䊂䉞䉲䊢䊅䊥
䊁䉞䈫䈚䈩ⷐ᳞䈚䈢ⷐ⚛䈏ᄢ䈐䈇(Selbervik 1999; Adar 2000)䇯ઁᣇ䇮ฦ䇱䈱᡽ᐭ䈮䈫䈦䈩䉅࿖ኅᒻ
ᚑ䈱ㆊ⒟䈪ਔ⠪䈱⺖㗴䈲ਇนㆱ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯
╙ 3 ▵ߢߪ╙ 2 ▵ߢ␜ߐࠇߚ 3 ࠞ࿖ߩ᡽ᴦ␠ળ⁁ᴫࠍ⸃᣿ߔࠆℂ⺰⊛ߥ⠨ኤᨒ⚵ߺࠍᲧセ
ᬌ⸛ߔࠆ‫ౕޕ‬૕⊛ߦߪ‫ⷰߩࠖ࠹ࠪ࠾ࠬࠛޔ‬ὐ߆ࠄߺߚ᳃ਥൻߣ᡽ᴦ⊛ਇ቟ቯᕈߩ㑐ଥࠍ␠
ળ⚻ᷣ᭴ㅧ߿ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ․ᓽ߆ࠄಽᨆߒ‫ޔ‬ᰴ޿ߢߎࠇࠄߦኻᔕߔࠆಽᮭൻߩ⺰ὐࠍᢛℂ
ߔࠆߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ᦨޕ‬ᓟߦ‫ ╙ޔ‬4 ▵ߢߪో૕ߩಽᨆࠍ〯߹߃ߚ✚᜝ߣ᡽╷⊛␜ໂࠍ␜ߔ‫ޕ‬
2-2
᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱⋧੕㑐ଥ
᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱ᗧ⟵䈲࿖ኅᒻᚑ(state formation)䈭䈇䈚࿖ኅᕈ(stateness)䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈎䉌⠨ኤ䈜䉎
ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈲䇮㗔ၞ䉕↹䈜䉎䇸Ⴚ⇇(boundaries)䇹䇮䈠䈱▸࿐䈮෸䈹䇸ᮭᆭ(authority)䇹䇮
䈠䈖䈮Ꮻዻ䈜䉎࿖᳃䈱䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞(identity)䇹䈎䉌᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䉎䋨દ⮮ 2007䋩8䇯䈖䉏䉌䈲ੱ䇱䈱
⹺⼂ᨒ⚵䉂䉕ㅢ䈛䈩䇸␠ળ⊛䈮᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䈢೙ᐲ䇹䈪䈅䉍(p.49)䇮ẜ࿷⊛䈮ੱ䇱䉕േ䈎䈜ᄢ䈐䈭䉣䊈
䊦䉩䊷䉕ᜬ䈦䈩䈇䉎䈫౒䈮ᱧผ⊛䈮ᄌ䉒䉎䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯
䋼Ⴚ⇇䋾
3 䉦࿖䈱䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈲 1885 ᐕ䈱䊔䊦䊥䊮ળ⼏䈏⿠Ḯ䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮⃻࿷䈱䉬䊆䉝䈲⧷࿖㗔᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦
䋨1902 ᐕ䈮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱৻ㇱ䈏ᆔ⼑䋩䇮⃻࿷䈱䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䇮䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈲䊄䉟䉿㗔᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦
䈮Ꮻዻ䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯1918 ᐕ䈮䊄䉟䉿䈲╙৻ᰴᄢᚢ䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦䈮䈍䈔䉎ዪ࿾ᚢ䈮䉅ᢌർ䈚䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝
䈲⧷࿖㗔䇮ઁ䈱 2 䉦࿖䈲䊔䊦䉩䊷㗔䈫䈘䉏䈢䇯1917 ᐕ䈮䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫䉬䊆䉝䈮⒢㑐ㅪว䈏ᒻᚑ䈘
䉏䈢䈏䇮䈖䉏䈏 EAC 䈱⿠Ḯ䈪䈅䉎䇯3 䉦࿖䈲 1948 ᐕ䈎䉌⁛┙䈱⋥೨䉁䈪⧷࿖䈱᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦㜞╬ᑯ
ോᐭ䈮䉋䈦䈩⛔ᴦ䈘䉏䇮15 ᐕ㑆⒟ᐲ䈲᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦䊶䉲䊥䊮䉫䈫䈇䈉౒ㅢ䈱⽻ᐊ䉕૶↪䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯⁛┙
એ㒠䈱䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈲⃻࿷䈱䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈫╬䈚䈇䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮1961 ᐕ䈮⁛┙䈚䈢䉺䊮䉧䊆䊷䉦䈏䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈫
౒䈮 1964 ᐕ䈮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈫䈚䈩ౣ⁛┙䈚䈢⚻✲䈲䈅䉎䇯㗔ၞ⊛䈭䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈫䈚䈩䈲࿖Ⴚ䇮ਅ૏䈱න
૏䈱࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䊶ⴕ᡽䈱Ⴚ⇇䇮਄૏䈱න૏䈱 EAC 䈏䈅䉎䇯ઁᣇ䇮㕖㗔ၞ⊛䈭䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈫䈚䈩࿖ኅ䈫ઁ
䈱⚵❱䈱ᓎഀ䈱Ⴚ⇇䈏䈅䉎䋨⴫ 1 ෳᾖ䋩䇯
⴫ 1㩷 ᳃ਥൻ䊶ಽᮭൻ䈫࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈱ኻᔕ
㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷
Ⴚ⇇㩷 㩷
ᮭᆭ
䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞
᳃ਥൻ㩷 㩷
࿖ኅ䋨ోᏒ᳃䈏ᛩ␿䈜䉎ⓨ㑆䋩
࿖᳃ઍ⴫
䈱⛔ᴦ
Ꮢ᳃䋨ᮭ䋩
ಽᮭൻ
࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䋨࿾ၞ૑᳃䈏ᛩ␿䈜䉎ⓨ㑆䇮
䈭䈇䈚䈲Ꮢ᳃䈏ಽ㔌䈘䉏䉎ⓨ㑆䋩
⻉㓸࿅䈮
䉋䉎⥄ᴦ
࿾ၞ૑᳃䉁䈢䈲䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞
䊁䉞䋨䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪䋩䉫䊦䊷䊒
಴ౖ㩷 ╩⠪૞ᚑ
8
દ⮮᳁ߪߎࠇࠄߩ 3 ⠪߆ࠄ᭴ᚑߐࠇࠆ߽ߩࠍ‫ޟ‬㗔ၞᕈ(territoriality)‫ߣޠ‬๭߱‫ޕ‬
29
䋼ᮭᆭ䋾
䇸ᮭᆭ䇹䈫䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈲䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱વ⛔⊛䈭౒ห૕䈱ౝㇱ䈪䈲ಽ䈎䈤䈏䈢䈒⚿䈶䈧䈇䈩䈇
䈢䇯೨ᬀ᳃࿾ᦼ䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦␠ળ䈲ಽᢔ⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮⦟⾰䈭࿯ფ䈫᳓Ḯ䈱䈅䉎࿾ၞ䈮䈲ੱญ
䈏ኒ㓸䈚䉇䈜䈒䇮䈖䉏䉕⛔೙䈜䉎਄૏ᮭജ䈏⸳ቯ䈘䉏䈢䇯ච਻਎♿䈮䉡䉧䊮䉻ධㇱ䈮ഺ⥝䈚䈢䊑
䉧䊮䉻₺࿖䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲₺(Kabaka)䈏෼⒢䉕ᜂᒰ䈜䉎㚂㐳(chief)䈱਄䈮ำ⥃䈜䉎䊊䉟䉝䊤䊷䉨䊷᭴
ㅧ䈏ሽ࿷䈚䈢䇯⧷࿖䈲䈖䈱೙ᐲ䉕೑↪䈚䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ઁ࿾ၞ䈮䉅ห䈛᭴ㅧ䉕᜛ᒛ䈚䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䉇䉺
䊮䉱䊆䉝䈮䉅㚂㐳೙䈲䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱䉋䈉䈭ਛ㑆៦ขጀ䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ᬀ᳃࿾ᦼએ
㒠䈱࿖ኅᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈮䈍䈇䈩ਔ⠪䈲ਵ㔌䉕ᆎ䉄䉎䇯䊑䉧䊮䉻䈮䈍䈇䈩ฃኈ䈘䉏䈢䉅䈱䈲䇮ઁ࿾ၞ䈮
䈍䈇䈩䈲䇸ᮭᆭ䇹䈱ᒝⷐ䈫⷗䈭䈘䉏䈢䇯
䋼䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䋾
䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈲䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䇮ੱ⒳䇮ቬᢎ䇮␠ળ䉦䊷䉴䊃䈭䈬䉕฽䉄䉎䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䇮ේೋ⊛䈭૗
䉌䈎䈱䊔䊷䉴䉇᡽ᴦᠲ૞䉕฽䉃䈫౒䈮䇮นᄌ⊛䈪䇮ᱧผ⊛䈮᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䈢ⷐ⚛䈏䈅䉎(Stewart 2008,
p.7-14) 9䇯䈖䉏䈮౒ㅢ⸒⺆䉇౒ㅢ࿾ၞዬ૑䉕฽䉄䉎⠨䈋ᣇ䉅䈅䉐䈉䇯䈭䈍䇮3 䉦࿖䈱䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁
䉞䉕᭴ᚑ䈚䈩䈇䉎ਥⷐ䈭䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈫ቬᢎ䉕೎⴫ 1 䈮⸥䈜䇯
3 䉦࿖䈲ᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅ(multi-ethnic state)䈪䈅䉎䇯ᧄⓂ䈪䈲䈖䈱↪଀એᄖ䈲᳃ᣖ䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲
䊁䉞䈫䈇䈉↪⺆䉕↪䈇䉎10䇯ᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅ䈮䈲䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈫䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈏ว⥌䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇⺖㗴䈏䈅
䉎䇯䉝䊐䊥䉦⻉࿖䈲 1960 ᐕઍએ㒠䈮⁛┙䈚䈩䈎䉌࿖ኅᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈪䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭᡽ᴦᄌേ䉕⚻䈢䈏䇮
䊊䊮䉼䊮䊃䊮䈱䇸╙ਃ䈱ᵄ䇹䈱᳃ਥൻ䈮ㆣㆄ䈚䈢11䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢䈭䈎䈪䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱㑐ଥ䉕ද⺞⊛䈮
ᒻᚑ䈚䈢䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䉕䈅䉎⒟ᐲ㗅⺞䈮ㅴዷ䈘䈞䈢䈱䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱㑐ଥ
䈏ኻ┙⊛䈣䈦䈢䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲ᄢ䈐䈭᡽ᴦ⊛ਇ቟ቯ䈏䈉䉁䉏䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲㐳ᦼ㑆䈱ᛥ࿶⊛
ᡰ㈩䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲㕖ੱ㆏⊛䈭⁛ⵙ䉇ౝᚢ䈏➅䉍㄰䈘䉏䈢䇯䈭䈍䇮⴫ 2 䈲䇮ฦ࿖䈱⁛┙ᓟ䈱᳃ਥ
ൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈮㑐䈜䉎◲න䈭ᴪ㕟䈪䈅䉎䇯
࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈫᳃ਥൻ䈏ᅢᓴⅣ䈜䉎႐ว䈲䇮Ꮢ᳃䈲࿖ኅ䈱ਛ䈪⋧ᒰห⾰䈭䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䈫䈭䉍䇮
䇸ᮭᆭ䇹䈫䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈱䈅䈇䈣䈮ᷓೞ䈭ಽⵚ䈲䈭䈇䇯໧㗴䈲ਔ⠪䈏ኻ᛫⊛䈭႐ว䈪䈅䉍䇮․
䈮ᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅ䈱႐ว䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈱⁁ᘒ䈪䈲ᄙᢙઍ⴫ဳ(majoritarian)᳃ਥਥ⟵䈲䈉䉁䈒ᯏ⢻䈞䈝䇮
䊧䉟䊒䊊䊦䊃(Liphart 1977)䈏ឭ໒䈚䈢ᄙᭂ౒ሽဳ(consociational)᳃ਥਥ⟵䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎ᔅⷐᕈ䈏
䈅䉎䇯᳃ਥൻ䈫䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹䈱㑐ଥ䈮㑐䈚䇮䉻䊷䊦䈱䇸䊘䊥䉝䊷䉨䊷䇹䈲࿖ኅ䈱วᗧᒻᚑ䈮࿖
9
䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䇮Stewart 䈫ห᭽䈮 3 䈧䈱┙႐䉕⏕⹺䈜䉎䇯䈠䉏䉌䈲ේೋ⊛䇮ታ࿷⊛䈭᭎ᔨ䇮ᠲ૞⊛䈭᭎
ᔨ䇮␠ળ᭴ᚑਥ⟵⊛䈭᭎ᔨ䈪䈅䉎䇯
10 ࠛࠬ࠾ࠪ࠹ࠖߣ᳃ᣖߦߪ᭽‫ߥޘ‬ቯ⟵߇޽ࠆ߇‫ࠢ࠶࠾ࠬࠛޔ‬㓸࿅ߪઁߩ㘃ૃ㓸࿅ߣ౒ߦ‫ࠍࠇߘޔ‬൮᜝ߔࠆ
਄૏ߩ␠ળ㧔ㄭઍ࿖ኅ‫₺ޔ‬࿖‫ޔ‬ㇺᏒ࿖ኅ‫ޔ‬㚂㐳࿖‫ޔ‬ᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭ㧕ߦ฽߹ࠇࠆ‫ઁޕ‬ᣇ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖߪߘߩ਄ߦ൮᜝
⊛␠ળ߇޽ࠆߎߣࠍᔅߕߒ߽᧦ઙߣߒߡ޿ߥ޿㧔㕍ᩉ 1996㧕‫ޕ‬
11 ╙ਃߩᵄߪ 1974 ᐕߩࡐ࡞࠻ࠟ࡞߆ࠄᆎ߹ࠅ‫ޔ‬1980 ᐕઍ߆ࠄ 90 ᐕઍߦ߆ߌߡ᧲᰷⻉࿖߿ㅜ਄࿖ߦᐢ߇
ߞߚ᳃ਥൻࠍߐߔ‫ޕ‬
30
⴫ 2㩷 3 䉦࿖䈱ᐕ⴫
䉬䊆䉝
䉡䉧䊮䉻
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝
1963㩷 ⁛┙
1962㩷 ⁛┙
1961 䉺䊮䉧䊆䊷䉦⁛┙
1963 䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺ᄢ⛔㗔
1967 䉥䊗䊁䈱⁛ⵙ
1963㩷 䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦⁛┙
1978 䊝䉟᡽ᮭ
1971 䉝䊚䊮䈱䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷
1964㩷 ㅪว౒๺࿖䈫䈚䈩⁛┙
1982 䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷ᧂㆀ䇮৻ౄ೙
1981 ╙ੑᰴ䉥䊗䊁᡽ᮭ䇮ౝᚢ
1965㩷 ৻ౄ೙䋨䊆䉣䊧䊧䋩
1983 ಽᮭൻ䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛
1986㩷 䊛䉶䊔䊆(NRM)᡽ᮭ
1967
1992 ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙ㆬ᜼䋨ᒻᑼ䋩
1995㩷 ᙗᴺ೙ቯ
1972 㓸ᮭൻ䋨20 Ꮊ䈻䈱ಽᮭ䋩
1995㩷 ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭᡷ㕟䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛
1996 ᦨೋ䈱ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ᜼
1982㩷 ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱ᓳᵴ
2002㩷 NARC ㆬ᜼ൎ೑
1997 ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭᴺ
1995㩷 ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙ㆬ᜼
2005 ᙗᴺᡷᱜ࿖᳃ᛩ␿
1998 䉱䉟䊷䊦䋨DRC䋩䈻䈱಴౓
1996 ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭᡷ㕟䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛
2007䋭08㩷 ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ᜼ᓟ᥸േ
2006㩷 ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙ㆬ᜼
2005 ᄢ⛔㗔䈱ᐔ๺⵰䈱੤ઍ
䉝䊦䊷䉲䊞ት⸒
಴ౖ㩷 ╩⠪૞ᚑ
᳃䈱ห⾰ᕈ䉕೨ឭ䈫䈚䈢䋨Dahl 1966䋩䇯䊧䉟䊒䊊䊦䊃䈲ᔅ䈝䈚䉅ห⾰ᕈ䈲೨ឭ䈪䈲䈭䈇䈫䈚䈢䇯䈠䈚
䈩䇮ᄙᭂ౒ሽဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱⻉ᣇ╷䈫䈚䈩⻉㓸࿅䈱ᄢㅪว䇮⋧੕ᜎุᮭ䇮Ყ଀ᕈේℂ䇮඙↹䈱⥄
ᓞᕈ䈫ㅪ㇌೙䉕⺰䈛䈢䇯䈖䈱䊝䊂䊦䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦䈻䈱ㆡ↪น⢻ᕈ䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲᭽䇱䈭⼏⺰䈏䈅䉎䈏12䇮
╩⠪䈲ಽᨆ᭎ᔨ䊶᡽╷ಣᣇ▐䈫䈚䈩䇮ಽᮭൻ䈫䉅㑐ㅪ䈚䈢᦭ᗧᕈ䈏䈅䉎䈫⠨䈋䉎䇯
1䋩᳃ਥൻ
1980 ᐕઍᧃએ㒠䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈲䊘䉴䊃಄ᚢ䈱᳃ਥൻ䈱േ䈐䈮⠡ᑲ䈘䉏䈢䇯䈠䈱ౖဳ䈏ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈱
ᵄ෸䈪䈅䉎13䇯ᄙ䈒䈱᡽ᐭ䈲ౝᄖ䈱࿶ജ䈮᛼䈘䉏䈩ห೙ᐲ䉕ฃ䈔౉䉏䈢䇯ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ᜼䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅
┹੎⊛䈭ㆬ᜼䈏ዉ౉䈘䉏䈢14䇯3 䉦࿖䉅䈖䈱⿲൓䈮ᄌ䉒䉍䈲䈭䈇䇯1991 ᐕ䇮䉬䊆䉝䈏ᦨೋ䈮৻ౄ೙
䈎䉌ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈻䈱⒖ⴕ䉕น⢻䈫䈜䉎ᙗᴺᡷᱜ᩺䉕ណᛯ䈚䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮᭽䇱䈭ᚻ⛯䈐⊛䈭ᅹኂ䈮
䉋䉍䊝䉟᡽ᮭ䈲䈠䈱ᓟ 10 ᐕ㑆ᮭജ䉕᝿ី䈚䈢䇯2002 ᐕ䈮ਈౄ KANU(Kenya African National
Union)䈱䊝䉟䈱ᓟ⛮୥⵬䈲 NARC(National Alliance for Rainbow Coalition)䈱⛔৻୥⵬䉨䊋䉨䈮
ᢌർ䈚䈢䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ౝᚢᓟ䈱 1986 ᐕ䈎䉌ή᡽ౄ᡽ᴦ(Non-Party Politics)䈫䈇䈉⁛․䈱᡽૕䉕ណ
↪ 䈚 䈩 䈇 䈢 䈏 䇮 2006 ᐕ 䈮 䈭 䈦 䈩 ⶄ ᢙ ᡽ ౄ ೙ ㆬ ᜼ 䉕 ታ ᣉ 䈚 䈢 䇯 ౝ ᚢ 䈮 ൎ ೑ 䈚 䈢 ᡽ ᴦ ൓ ജ
12
Mphai(1999)ߪ‫߇࡞࠺ࡕߩߎޔ‬ධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߢᯏ⢻ߒߚߩߪ‫ޔ‬㓸࿅㑆ߩᢜᘇᔃ߇ᣢߦᷫߞߡ޿ߚ߆ࠄߛߣ
ㅀߴߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬Horowitz(2000)ߪ‫ߩߎޔ‬᰷Ꮊࡕ࠺࡞ߩ቟ᤃߥㅜ਄࿖߳ߩㆡ↪ࠍᛕ್ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
13 1989 ᐕએ೨ߦᙗᴺߦ߅޿ߡᄙౄ೙ࠍ⹺߼ߡ޿ߚ࿖ߪ‫ޔ‬ၞౝ 48 ࠞ࿖ߩ߁ߜࠟࡦࡆࠕ‫ࠟࡀ࠮ޔࠕ࡝ࡌ࡝ޔ‬
࡞‫ޔࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޔ࠽ࡢ࠷ࡏޔࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߩ 7 ࠞ࿖ߢ޽ߞߚ‫ᤨ⃻ޕ‬ὐߢߪ৻ౄ೙ࠍណ↪ߒߡ޿ࠆ
ߩߪࠛ࡝࠻࡝ࠕߩߺߢ‫ޔ‬ή࿖ኅ⁁ᘒߩ࠰ࡑ࡝ࠕࠍ㒰ߌ߫‫ޔ‬ᒻᑼ⊛ߦߪߔߴߡߩ࿖߇ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙ࠍណ↪ߒߡ
޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
14 1960 ᐕઍ䈮䈲ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ᜼ 26 ઙ䈱䈉䈤⃻⡯䈏┹੎⋧ᚻ䈫ᚢ䈦䈢䈱䈲䈢䈦䈢䈱 2 ઙ䈪䈅䉍䇮ㆬ᜼䈲੐ታ਄䈱ାછ
ᛩ␿䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮1990 ᐕઍ䈮䈲 90䋦䈏┹੎䈚䈩ⴕ䉒䉏䇮䈖䈱䉲䉢䉝䈲 2000䋭2005 ᐕ䈮䈲 98䋦䈮਄᣹䈚䈢(Posner
and Young, 2007)䇯1960䋭90 ᐕ䈮ㆬ᜼䈪ᢌർ䈚䈢ᄢ⛔㗔䈲䊔䊆䊮䈱 1 ฬ䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮1990 ᐕએ㒠䇮⃻⡯ᄢ⛔㗔䈱
ᢌർ₸䈲 14䋦䈮Ⴧട䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯
31
NRM(National Revolutionary Movement)䈫䊛䉶䊔䊆ᄢ⛔㗔䈲 22 ᐕ䉕⿥䈋䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲৻ౄ೙
␠ળਥ⟵䉕ណ↪䈚䈩䈐䈢䈏䇮1995 ᐕ䈮ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙ㆬ᜼䉕ታᣉ䈚䈢䇯CCM䋨Chama Cha Mapinduzi:
Revolutionary Party of Tanzania䋩䈲࿶ୟ⊛䈮ఝ૏䈭᡽ᴦ૕೙䉕⛮⛯䈚䇮㊁ౄ䈲ᱴ䈬䈏 CCM 䈎䉌
ಽ㔌䈚䈢ౄ䈪䈅䉍䇮2005 ᐕ䈮ᄢ⛔㗔䈲 2 ᦼോ䉄䈢䊛䉦䊌䈎䉌䉨䉪䉡䉢䊁䈮੤ઍ䈚䈢䇯
ᓥ᧪䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦䈮䈍䈔䉎᳃ਥൻ䈲䇮ᄙᢙઍ⴫ဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱ዉ౉䈱䈘䉏ᣇ䈫ㅦᐲ䈮໧㗴䈏䈅䉍䇮㗫
❥䈮ዋᢙᵷ䈱ᗧ⷗䈏ឃ㒰䈘䉏ᄙᢙᵷ䈱ኾ೙䈏⿠䈐䈢䇯䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞㓸࿅䈗䈫䈮␠ળ䈱೑ኂ䈏
᭴ㅧൻ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䋨䈫⹺⼂䈘䉏䉎䋩႐ว䇮ᄙᢙઍ⴫ဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈪䈲ᄙᢙᵷ䈏䈜䈼䈩䈱᳿ቯᮭ䉕᝿
ី䈚䈩䈚䉁䈉䊥䉴䉪䈏䈅䉎䇯䈖䈱䉳䊧䊮䊙䈏⃻䉏䈢䈱䈏䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈫䊦䊪䊮䉻䈪䈅䈦䈢15䇯1993 ᐕ䈮
䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈪䈲ᄙᢙᵷ䊐䉿♽䈱䊮䉻䉻䉣ᄢ⛔㗔䈏ೋ䉄䈩ㆬ಴䈘䉏䈢䈏䇮ዞછ 5 䉦᦬ᓟ䈮䉿䉼♽ァ
ㇱ䈱৻ᵷ䈮ᥧᲕ䈘䉏䈢䇯⠉ᐕ䇮䊐䉿♽䈏ᄙᢙᵷᡰ㈩䉕䈚䈩䈇䈢䊦䊪䊮䉻䈪䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈎䉌ଚ᡹䈚䈢
䉿䉼♽䈱ᱞⵝ൓ജ RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front)䈮ਇ቟䉕ᛴ䈇䈢䊐䉿♽ㆊỗᵷ䈏䊊䊎䊞䊥䊙䊅ᄢ⛔
㗔䈱ᥧᲕ䉕ᄾᯏ䈮 50䋭80 ਁੱ೨ᓟ䈱䉿䉼♽૑᳃෸䈶㕖දജ⊛䈭䊐䉿♽૑᳃䉕⯦Ვ䈜䉎੐ઙ䈏
⿠䈐䈢䋨UN 1999䇮Human Rights Watch 1999䋩䇯
䊦䊪䊮䉻䈪䈲ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈱ᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈪บ㗡䈚䈢䊐䉿ㆊỗᵷ䈱᡽ᴦ൓ജ䈏࿖㓙␠ળ䈎䉌ⷐ᳞䈘䉏
䈢 RPF 䈫䈱๺ᐔวᗧ䉕ㅴ䉄䉎䊊䊎䊞䊥䊙䊅᡽ᮭ䉕ᒙ⣶䈫䉂䈭䈚䇮෻䉿䉼ትવ䉕ᧄᩰൻ䈘䈞䈢䇯᳃ਥ
ൻ䇮᭴ㅧ⺞ᢛ䇮๺ᐔวᗧ䈫䈇䈉ᄖ䈎䉌ട䈋䉌䉏䈢࿶ജ䈏⚵䉂ว䉒䈘䈦䈢䈖䈫䈪ห᡽ᮭ䈲ਇ቟ቯൻ䈚
䈢(Andersen, 2000)䇯䈖䈱ㆊ⒟䈱ᢎ⸠䈲䇮Ꮑᅱ䈎䈧ᆭ࿶⊛䈭ᖱႎᠲ૞䈏䈅䈦䈢䉅䈱䈱䇮᳃ਥൻㆊ
⒟䈏ੱ䇱䉕⥄↱䈮䈚䇮䉣䊮䊌䊪䊷䈜䉎ㆊ⒟䈮䈲䈭䉌䈝䇮ළ䈦䈩䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮┙⣉䈚䈢᡽ᴦ㓸࿅䈏
㕖Ᏹ䈮ឃઁ⊛䈭ᵴേ䉕ⴕ䈦䈢䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎16䇯ᐢ⟵䈱ಽᮭൻ䉇ਅ૏ᢥൻ㑆䈱ද⺞䈏ቯ⌕䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇
␠ળ䈮䈍䈔䉎ᄙᢙઍ⴫ဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱ᕆỗ䈭ዉ౉䈏ਛᄩ䈮䈍䈔䉎䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪᡽ౄ䈱ⴣ⓭䉕ᒝ䉄䈢
䈱䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯
3 䉦࿖䈱ᮭജ䉣䊥䊷䊃䈲䊦䊪䊮䉻䈫䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈱⚗੎ㆊ⒟䉕⋡䈱ᒰ䈢䉍䈮䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯ኻ┙䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁
䉞䈏⯦Ვ䈱ᔕ㈽䉕䈚䈢䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈲䇸ಽᮭൻ䈭䈐ᕆㅦ䈭᳃ਥൻ䇹䈱଀䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈖䉏䈮ኻ
䈚䇮3 䉦࿖䈱ข䈦䈢ኻᔕ䈲䈠䉏䈡䉏⇣䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯1980 ᐕઍ䉁䈪䈮ᄢⷙᮨ䈭⚗੎䉇⯦Ვ䉕ᣢ䈮⚻
㛎䈚䈢䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈫෻ኻ䈱䇸ᛥ೙䈘䉏䈢᳃ਥൻ䈫ᕆㅦ䈭ಽᮭൻ䇹䉕ㆬ䉖䈣䇯䉬
䊆䉝䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫䈲ኻᾖ⊛䈭䇸䋨ਈౄ䈏ൎ೑䉕⛯䈔䉎䋩ẋㅴ⊛᳃ਥൻ䈫㓸ᮭ೙䈱⛽ᜬ䇹䉕ㆬᛯ䈚䇮໑
৻䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈏䇸᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䇹䉕䈅䉎⒟ᐲਗⴕ䈚䈩ㅴ䉄䈢䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䋨䈠䈱䉟䊜䊷䉳䈲࿑ 1䋩䇯
䈭䈍䇮⴫ 3 䈲 3 䉦࿖䈱⁛┙ᓟ䈫⃻࿷䈱᡽ᮭ䈪䈅䉎䇯
15
EAC ߩᣂⷙട⋖࿖ߢ޽ࠆ࡞ࡢࡦ࠳‫ޔߪࠖ࠺ࡦ࡞ࡉޔ‬1991 ᐕߦ࡞ࡢࡦ࠳‫ޔ‬1992 ᐕߦࡉ࡞ࡦ࠺ࠖ߇ⶄᢙ᡽
ౄ೙߳ߩᙗᴺᡷᱜ᩺ࠍណᛯߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
16 ࡞ࡢࡦ࠳ߣࡉ࡞ࡦ࠺ࠖߪ 1990 ᐕઍߦ᳃ਥൻㆬ᜼ࠍⴕ߁߹ߢߪ‫ޔ‬ァㇱ৻ౄ೙߿ァ੐⹏⼏ળߩᡰ㈩ߩ߽ߣ
ߦ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬᳃ਥൻ߿ಽᮭൻ߇ᧄᩰ⊛ߦផㅴߐࠇߚᤨᦼߪߥ߆ߞߚ‫ޕ‬1980 ᐕઍᓟඨߦࡉ࡞ࡦ࠺ࠖߢࡈ࠷♽ߦኻ
ߔࠆ᡽ᐭߩ㊀ⷐࡐࠬ࠻⊓↪ߥߤߩⲢ๺╷߇޽ߞߚ߇‫଀ߪࠇߘޔ‬ᄖ⊛ߥ੐଀ߢ޽ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
32
⴫ 3㩷 3 䉦࿖䈱᡽ᮭ䋨⁛┙ᓟ䈫⃻࿷䋩
䉬䊆䉝
䉡䉧䊮䉻
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝
⁛┙ᓟ䈱
᡽ౄ䋺KANU
᡽ౄ䋺UPC/KY
᡽ౄ䋺TANU(CCM:1977-)
᡽ᮭ
ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺
ᄢ⛔㗔䋺1962䋭64 䊛䊁䉰䇮64䋭䉥䊗䊁
ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䊆䉣䊧䊧
ᦼ㑆䋺1962-2002
ᦼ㑆䋺1962-1971
ᦼ㑆䋺1964䋭 ⃻࿷
⃻࿷䈱
᡽ౄ䋺PNU/ODM
᡽ౄ䋺NRM
᡽ౄ䋺CCM
᡽ᮭ
ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䉨䊋䉨
ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䊛䉶䊔䊆
ᄢ⛔㗔䋺䉨䉪䉡䉢䊁
ᦼ㑆䋺2006䋭
ᦼ㑆䋺1986䋭
ᦼ㑆䋺2005䋭
಴ౖ㩷 ╩⠪૞ᚑ
䋨䉡䉧䊮䉻䋩
䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲 2006 ᐕ䉁䈪ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈏ዉ౉䈘䉏䈝䇮NRM 䈏৻ౄ⁛ⵙ䈮ㄭ䈇⛔ᴦ䉕䈚䈢䇯䊛䉶䊔
䊆ᄢ⛔㗔䈲ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䉕ౄᵷਥ⟵(sectarianism)䈱ᓳᵴ䈫ᝒ䈋䇮䈖䉏䈮䉋䈦䈩ਛᄩ䈪䈱ቬᢎ䊶䉣䉴
䊆䉲䊁䉞ኻ┙䉕ౣΆ䈘䈞䉎䉋䉍䉅ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅴ䉄䈩ਛᄩ䈪䈱ኻ┙䉕ᒙ䉄䉎ᣇㅜ䉕ᮨ⚝䈚䈢(Museveni㩷
1997)䇯䊛䉶䊔䊆䈭䈇䈚 NRM 䈲 1990 ᐕઍ䈮ᾲᔃ䈮ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䉕ផㅴ䈚䇮⨲䈱ᩮ䈱૑᳃䈱᡽ᴦ䊶
ⴕ᡽ㆊ⒟䈻䈱ෳട䉕ᅑബ䈚䈢䈏䇮ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈲 1995 ᐕ䈮ᚑ┙䈚䈢ᙗᴺ䈪⛔ᴦ਄䈱ㆬᛯ⢇䈫䈘䉏
䈩䈇䈢䈏䇮ዉ౉䈲䈘䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯
䊛䉶䊔䊆䉇 NRM 䈏ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䉕ផㅴ䈚䈢ᤨᦼ䈲 1996 ᐕ䈱ೋ䉄䈩䈱୘ੱ⾗ᩰ䈱ᄢ⛔㗔ㆬ᜼䈱
೨ᓟ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯NRM એ೨䈲䉥䊗䊁䇮䉝䊚䊮䇮╙ੑᰴ䉥䊗䊁䈫ർㇱ಴り⠪䈱᡽ᮭ䈏⛯䈇䈢䇯╙৻ᰴ
䉥䊗䊁᡽ᮭ䈲᳃ਥㆬ᜼䉕⚻䈩ධㇱ䈱䊑䉧䊮䉻₺䈫䈱ㅪ┙᡽ᮭ䈫䈚䈩ᆎ䉁䈦䈢䈏䇮䉇䈏䈩⁛ⵙൻ䈚䇮
ァㇱ䉕᡽ᴦㆊ⒟䈮ᛩ౉䈚䈢䇯䉝䊚䊮዁ァ䈏䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷䈮䉋䉍᡽ᮭ䉕ᅓข䈚䈢䈫䈐䈮䈲⻉ᄖ࿖䈲䈖䉏
䉕᱑ㄫ䈚䈢䇯䉝䊚䊮䉅⁛ⵙൻ䉕ᒝ䉄䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䇮᡽ౄ෸䈶⼏ળ䉕ᑄᱛ䈚䈢䇯NRM 䈱೨り⚵❱䈲䉝䊚
䊮᡽ᮭᛂୟᤨ䈮䈲䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝᡽ᐭ䉇䉥䊗䊁ᵷ䈫౒䈮಴౓䈚䈢䈏䇮╙ੑᰴ䉥䊗䊁᡽ᮭ䈱ㆬ᜼ਇᱜ
䈮᛫⼏䈚䈩ౝᚢ䉕㐿ᆎ䈚䈢䇯䊛䉶䊔䊆䉇 NRM ᐙㇱ䈲⷏ㇱ䈱䉝䊮䉮䊷䊧(Ankole)಴り䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮
䉥䊗䊁䈮෻ᗵ䉕䉅䈧䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱൓ജ䈫ឭ៤䈚䈢䇯
䋨䉬䊆䉝䋩
䉬䊆䉝䈲䊝䉟᡽ᮭ䈱䉅䈫䈪 1992 ᐕ䈎䉌 2002 ᐕ䉁䈪᳃ਥൻ䈱ᢛ஻䉕䈚䈢䈏䇮ታ⾰⊛䈭ㆊ⒟䈮䈲〯
䉂಴䈘䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈐䉒䉄䈩㓸ᮭ⊛䈭䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱᭴ㅧ䈏⁛┙ᢙᐕᓟ䈎䉌⃻࿷䉁䈪⛯䈇䈩䈇䉎䇯䉣䉴
䊆䉲䊁䉞䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䉨䉪䊡(Kikuyu)䈫䈇䈉ᦨ䉅ఝ൓䈭㓸࿅䈫䇮䊦䉥(Luo)䈭䈬䈱┹ว䈜䉎㓸࿅䈱䈅䈇䈣
䈪ᭂ䉄䈩ኻ᛫⊛䈭㑐ଥ䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯㓸ᮭ⊛䈭᭴ㅧ䈲䇮ᮭജ䉕᝿ី䈚䈢㓸࿅䈱೑⋉䈱⁛භ䉕
଻⸽䈜䉎䇯䈠䉏䈲⢈ᴅ䈭࿯࿾䈏ᱴ䈬䉨䉪䊡䊤䊮䊄䈫䊥䊐䊃䊋䊧䊷䈮㒢ቯ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎੐ታ䈮ኻᔕ䈚䈩䈇
䉎䇯䊝䉟᡽ᮭ䈪䈲䊝䉟䈏ዋᢙᵷ䈱䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮(Kalenjin)಴り䈪䈅䈦䈢䈖䈫䈎䉌䇮䉨䉪䊡䈲␠ળ⚻ᷣ㕙
䈪䈱ታᮭ᝿ី䈮⇐䉁䈦䈢䇯2002 ᐕ䈮䉨䊋䉨᡽ᮭ䈲 NARC 䈫䈇䈉ᡷ㕟ᵷ൓ജ䈱ㅪ┙䉕ઍ⴫䈚䈢䈏䇮
䈖䉏䈲ㆬ᜼↪䈱⋴᧼䈪䈚䈎䈭䈒䇮ౝ⚗䉕⚻䈩䉨䉪䊡ਛᔃ䈱᡽ᮭ䈮䈭䉍䇮䉨䉪䊡䈲᡽ᴦ⚻ᷣਔ㕙䈪䈱
33
ᡰ㈩ᮭ䉕ី䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䈦䈢䇯
䉬䊆䉝䈱․ᓽ䈲ᬀ᳃࿾ᦼ䈱㓸ᮭ᭴ㅧ䈱⛽ᜬ䈮䈅䉎䇯⺕䈏ᮭജ䉕᝿ី䈜䉎䈱䈎䈏᡽ᴦ൓ജ䈮䈫䈦
䈩ὶ⋲䈱⊛䈫䈭䉍䇮࿖᡽䈪䉅ౄౝ䈪䉅ᄙᢙᵷ䈫䈭䉎䈢䉄䈱วᓥㅪⴧ╷䈏➅䉍㄰䈘䉏䈢䇯᳃ਥൻ䈲
2002 ᐕએ㒠ታ૕ൻ䈚䈢䈏䇮᡽ᴦ൓ജ䈱⚿㓸䈫ಽⵚ䈲➅䉍㄰䈘䉏䈢䇯䉨䊋䉨䉅䊝䉟ห᭽㓸ᮭ᭴ㅧ䈮
ਸ਼䈦䈎䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉍䇮2007 ᐕᧃ䈱ㆬ᜼⚿ᨐ䉅౏ᱜᕈ䈮⇼໧䈏䈅䈦䈢䈫䈇䉒䉏䉎(Dagne㩷 2008)䇯㗔
ၞ⊛䈭ಽᮭൻ䈲Ꮊⴕ᡽᭴ㅧ䈱䈭䈎䈪ᛥ࿶䈘䉏䇮ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈲Ꮢ↸᧛⥄ᴦ૕䈮ᒻᑼ⊛䈮ਈ䈋䉌䉏䈢
䈏䇮ਥⷐ䈭䉶䉪䉺䊷ⴕ᡽䈲ᄖ䈘䉏䈢䇯ಽᮭൻ䈱ᰳᅤ䈮䉋䉎᡽ᴦ⊛ਇ቟ቯ䈲䇮2008 ᐕ䈱᥸േᓟ䈱䉨
䊋䉨䇮䉥䊂䉞䊮䉧䈮䉋䉎ᄢ⛔㗔䊶㚂⋧䊘䉴䊃䈱ᮭജಽ᦭䋨power sharing䋩䉁䈪⛯䈇䈢17䇯
䋨䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䋩
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ᄢⷙᮨ䈭⚗੎䉕⚻䈩䈇䈭䈇䇯䈠䈱ⷐ࿃䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞ኻ┙䈱ዋ䈭䈘䋨䈢䈣䈚䇮
ፉᎩㇱ䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈮䈲ᄢ㒽䉺䊮䉧䊆䊷䉦䈫䈱䈅䈇䈣䈮ᢥൻ⊛䈭ኻ┙䉇⥄┙ᜰะ䈏ሽ࿷䋩䇮䉱䊮䉳
䊋䊦䈎䉌೽ᄢ⛔㗔䉕ㆬ಴䈜䉎ᮭജಽ᦭䇮␠ળਥ⟵ᤨઍ䈱䉴䊪䊍䊥⺆䈱౏↪⺆䈫䈚䈩䈱ᶐㅘ䈭䈬䈏
㊀ⷐ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢᦭೑䈭ⅣႺ䉕ᵴ䈎䈚䈩䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱ਈౄ CCM䋨⁛┙ᤨὐ䈲 TANU
[Tanganyika African National Union]䇮1977 ᐕ䈮䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈫䊕䊮䊋䈱 ASP 䈫⛔ว䈚䈩ᡷ⒓䋩䈲᳃
ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䉕ਗⴕ䈚䈩ផㅴ䈚䈢䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮2000 ᐕ 11 ᦬䈱ㆬ᜼ᓟ䇮䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈪㐿␿䈱ਇᱜ䉕
䉄䈓䉎㊁ౄ(CUF)䈱᛫⼏䊂䊝䈮⼊ቭ㓌䈏ⴣ⓭䈚䇮ኻ┙䈎䉌 50 ฬએ਄䈱ᱫ⠪䉕䈣䈚䇮600 ฬ䉕⿧䈋
䉎᡽ᴦ㔍᳃䈏䉬䊆䉝䈮ᷰ䈦䈢䇯
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱␠ળਥ⟵᡽╷䈲⚻ᷣ⊛䈮䈲ᄬᢌ䈚䈢䈏䇮䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭൮៨⊛䈭(inclusive)᡽╷䉕ዉ౉
䈚䈢䇯CCM 䈱ౝㇱ䈮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ᵷ㑓䈲䈭䈒䇮౏ോຬ䈱ណ↪䉅ਛ┙⊛䈮ⴕ䉒䉏䇮ฦ࿾ၞ䈻䈱ォ
ൕ䈏ᅑബ䈘䉏䈢䇯৻ౄ೙䈫䈇䈉೙⚂䈲䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮ᮭജಽ┙䈮㑐䈚䈩䈲ᄢ⛔㗔䊶㚂⋧೙䈏ዉ౉䈘䉏䇮
⃻࿷䉁䈪⛮ᛚ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎18䇯䉁䈢䇮৻ౄ೙ਅ䈪䈲䉬䊆䉝䈱 KANU ห᭽䇮ㆬ᜼඙䈱࿖ળ⼏ຬ䈲 2 ฬ
એ਄䈏┙୥⵬䈜䉎䉋䈉䈮ቯ䉄䉌䉏䇮┹੎䈏ᅑബ䈘䉏䈢䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫ห᭽䈮ᅚᕈ䉇⧯⠪䈱⼏
ຬㆬ಴ᨒ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱㑐ଥ䈪䈲䇮1965 ᐕ䈱ㆬ᜼ᴺ䈪ੱ⒳⊛䇮࿾ၞ⊛䈭ಽ㔌䈱ଦㅴ䈏⑌
䈛䉌䉏䇮䈘䉌䈮ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䉕วᴺൻ䈚䈢 1992 ᐕ䈱ᡷᱜᙗᴺ䈪䈲࿖ኅ⛔৻䉕቞䉎䈢䉄䈮ㇱᣖ⊛䇮ቬ
ᢎ⊛෸䈶ੱ⒳⊛䈭䊋䉟䉝䉴䉕ᡷ䉄䈩⑌ᱛ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯
䋨3 䉦࿖䋩
಄ᚢᦼ䈮ᡰ䈋䉌䉏䈩䈐䈢㓸ᮭ⊛૕೙䈲䇮1980 ᐕઍ䈎䉌䈱⚻ᷣෂᯏ䉇ౝᚢ䈪⴮ㅌ䈚䇮1990 ᐕઍ䈱
᳃ਥൻ䈱ᯏㆇ䈱ਛ䈪࿖㓙⊛䇮࿖ౝ⊛䈭ᡰᜬၮ⋚䉕ᄬ䈦䈢䇯䉫䊨䊷䊋䊦䈮ዷ㐿䈚䈢᳃ਥൻ䈲䇮ㅜ
਄࿖䈱᡽ᴦ૕೙䈮䉅᡽ᴦ⊛⥄↱䉕ᶐㅘ䈘䈞䇮㊁ౄ䈏ᧄᩰ⊛䈮ᵴേ䉕㐿ᆎ䈚䈢䈏䇮᡽ᮭ஥䈲ᔅ䈝
17
䈖䈱ᮭജಽ᦭䈲䇮2002 ᐕ䈱 NARC ᡽ᮭᚑ┙䈱䈫䈐䈮දജ㑐ଥ䈮䈅䈦䈢ਔ൓ജ䈱䈅䈇䈣䈪৻ᐲ䈲ᢥᦠ䈪วᗧ䈘
䉏䈩䈇䈢䈫⸒䉒䉏䇮5 ᐕ䉕⚻䈩ౣ⃻䈘䉏䈢(Kadima and Owuor 2006)䇯
18㩷 䉡䉧䊮䉻䉅ห䈛೙ᐲ䈪಴⊒䈚䈢䈏䇮䉥䊗䊁ᄢ⛔㗔ᤨઍ䈮৻రൻ䈘䉏 NRM 䈱䉅䈫䈪ᓳᵴ䇯
34
䈚䉅⥄↱䈪౏ᱜ䈭ㆬ᜼䈮Ⓧᭂ⊛䈪䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉇࿾ၞ䉕ၮ⋚䈫䈜䉎᡽ౄ
䈏ਛᄩ䈪วᓥㅪⴧ╷䉕➅䉍㄰䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲᡽ౄ䈏⢒䈦䈩䈇䈭䈇䈏䇮ᣥ᧪䈱㊁ౄ䈏಑⪭
䈜䉎䈭䈎䈪 FDC(The Forum for Democratic Change)䈏િᒛ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱ᐞ䈧䈎䈱ㇺᏒ
ㇱ䈱㊁ౄ䈲᡽╷ᜰะ䈣䈏൓ജ䈏ዊ䈘䈇䇯᳃ਥൻ䈲Ꮢ᳃䈱ᮭ೑ᗧ⼂䉕⋡ⷡ䉄䈘䈞䇮ਛᄩ䈎䉌䈱੤
ઃ㊄䊔䊷䉴䈱⽷᡽⊛ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅴⴕ䈘䈞䈢䈏䇮หᤨ䈮᡽ౄ᡽ᴦ䉕ㅢ䈛䈩䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞㓸࿅䈱೑
ኂ䈱ኻ┙䉕ᜬ䈤ㄟ䉖䈣䇯
2㧕ಽᮭൻ
䉝䊐䊥䉦䈮䈍䈔䉎ಽᮭൻ䈱േ䈐䈮䉅ᐞ䈧䈎䈱ᤨᦼ䈏䈅䉎䈏䇮1990 ᐕઍએ㒠䈲᳃ਥൻ䈫౒䈮ᵄ෸䈚
䈢19䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮ᄙ䈒䈱ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈲ਛᄩ᡽ᐭ䈱ᮭജ䉕቟ቯൻ䈜䉎㆏ౕ䈫䈚䈩䊃䉾䊒䉻䉡䊮ᣇᑼ䈪ⴕ
䉒䉏䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈏ᧄᒰ䈮ታലᕈ䈱䈅䉎⸘↹䉕૞ᚑ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈲⒘䈪䈅䉎(United Cities and Local
Governments 2007)䇯⁛┙ᒰೋ䈮䉬䊆䉝䉇䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈲ㅪ㇌೙䈱ⷙቯ䈏䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䈠䉏䉌䈲ᯏ⢻䈚
䈭䈇䈉䈤䈮㓸ᮭ೙䈮ᄌᦝ䈘䉏䈢䇯䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺䇮䉥䊗䊁䇮䊆䉣䊧䊧᡽ᮭ䈲㓸ᮭൻ䉕ㅴ䉄䇮㊁ౄ䈲ਈౄ
䈮ๆ෼䈘䉏䉎䈎⑌ᱛ䈘䉏䈩৻ౄ೙䈱᡽ᴦᒻᘒ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯1980 ᐕઍ䈮䈲Ꮢ႐⚻ᷣൻ᡽╷䈏ᒝൻ䈘
䉏20䇮ਛᄩ᡽ᐭ䈱ⷙᮨ䈏೥ᷫ䈘䉏䇮ಽᮭൻ䈱৻ᒻᘒ䈫䈚䈩䈱᳃༡ൻ䈏ㅴዷ䈚䈢䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮1990 ᐕ
ઍ䈮䈲⷏஥㒯༡䉕េഥ⾗㊄䈪⛽ᜬ䈜䉎േᯏ䈏ᶖ䈋䇮䈎䈧េഥ䈮᡽ᴦ⊛䉮䊮䊂䉞䉲䊢䊅䊥䊁䉞䋨᡽╷
ઃᏪ᧦ઙ䋩䈏⺖䈘䉏䈢䈖䈫䈪䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ᡷༀ䈏 3 䉦࿖䈮䈫䈦䈩ਇนㆱ䈱ㆬᛯ⢇䈫䈭䈦
䈢䇯
䋨䉡䉧䊮䉻䋩
1990 ᐕઍ䈮ᦨ䉅↹ᦼ⊛䈭ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅴ䉄䈢䇯LC(Local Council)䈫䈇䉒䉏䉎᧛䈎䉌⋵䉁䈪䈱࿾ᣇ⼏
ળ䈱䊊䉟䉝䊤䊷䉨䊷䉕ਛᩭ䈮ᝪ䈋䇮NRM 䈱੐ታ਄䈱৻ౄ೙䈫䈇䈉㒢⇇䉕࿾ᣇ䊧䊔䊦䈱૑᳃䈱ෳ
ട䈮䉋䈦䈩⵬䈍䈉䈫䈚䈢䇯䈧䉁䉍䇮᳃ਥൻ䈏Ꮢ᳃ෳട䉕ㅢ䈚䈩ಽᮭൻ䉕ផㅴ䈜䉎ㅢᏱ䈱䉶䉥䊥䊷䈫
䈲⇣䈭䉍(Crook and Manor 1998)䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲᳃ਥൻ䈱ઍᦧᚻᲑ䈫䈚䈩ಽᮭൻ䉕⊒㆐䈘䈞䈢䋨╣ጟ
2005䋩䇯䈖䈱േ䈐䈲䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ㅪ㇌೙ᜰะ䉕ኽᲕ䈜䉎േ䈐䈪䉅䈅䈦䈢䇯䉁䈢䇮1991 ᐕ䈮䉬䊆䉝䈮ኻ
䈜䉎䊄䊅䊷䈱᳃ਥൻ࿶ജ䈏ട䈋䉌䉏䈢੐ઙ䉅ᓇ㗀䈚䈢21䇯1980 ᐕઍ䈮ỗ䈚䈇ౝᚢ䉕⚻ㆊ䈚䈢䉡䉧
䊮䉻䈲䉬䊆䉝䉇䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈾䈬䊄䊅䊷䈎䉌䈱᳃ਥൻ࿶ജ䉕ฃ䈔䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮1996 ᐕ䈱ᄢ⛔㗔
ㆬ᜼䈱ታᣉ䈲࿾ᣇ䈮ኻ䈜䉎౏౒䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱ឭଏ䈱ᔅⷐᕈ䉕 NRM 䈮ౣ⹺⼂䈘䈞䉎ᄾᯏ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯
LC ߩ⿠Ḯߪ 1980 ᐕઍߩౝᚢᤨߩ RC(Resistance Council)ߢ޽ࠅ‫߇❱⚵ߩߎޔ‬ァ㓌ߣ࿾ၞ૑᳃
ߣߩ㑐ଥࠍ᭴▽ߒߚ‫ޕ‬NRA(National Resistance Army)ߪߘࠇ߹ߢߩァ㓌ߣߪ⇣ߥࠅ‫ޔ‬૑᳃ࠍ
⇛ᅓߖߕ‫ޔ‬㘩ᢱߦ߽ኻଔࠍᛄߞߚߩߢᒝ޿ᡰᜬࠍᓧߚ‫ޕ‬RC ߪ NRA ߇ᚢ㑵᜚ὐߣߒߚධㇱ
19
2008 ᐕᤨὐ䈪䇮䉣䉼䉥䊏䉝䇮䉧䊷䊅䇮䊙䊥䇮䉦䊜䊦䊷䊮䇮䉬䊷䊒䊶䊔䊦䊂䇮䊅䊚䊎䉝䇮䊅䉟䉳䉢䊥䉝䇮䉶䊈䉧䊦䇮ධ䉝
䊐䊥䉦䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䇮䉧䊷䊅䈭䈬䈏࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱ሽ࿷䉕ᙗᴺ䈪ⷙቯ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯
20
࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕߦ߅޿ߡ߽ 1986 ᐕએ㒠᭴ㅧ⺞ᢛ᡽╷߇ዉ౉ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
1991 ᐕ 11 ᦬䈮ኻ䉬䊆䉝េഥ࿖ળ⼏䈏৻ౄᡰ㈩䉕፣䈠䈉䈫䈚䈭䈇䊝䉟᡽ᮭ䈮ኻ䈚䈩ᣂⷙេഥ䈱஗ᱛ䉕᳿ቯ䈚䇮
䈠䈱⋥ᓟ䈮䉬䊆䉝䊶䉝䊐䊥䉦᳃ᣖห⋖(KANU)䈏৻ౄ೙䈱ᑄᱛ䉕ฃ䈔౉䉏䈢䇯
21
35
߿⷏ㇱ࿾ၞߦ߅޿ߡ⊒㆐ߒߚ‫ޕ‬
1995 ᐕߦ RC ߪ࿾ᣇߩ┙ᴺ࡮ⴕ᡽ࠍᡰ߃ࠆ LC ߦᡷ⒓ߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
ࠤ࠾ࠕߢߪ㚂㐳߇࿾ᣇⴕ᡽ࠍᡰ߃ࠆࠪࠬ࠹ࡓ߇⁛┙ᓟ߽⛮⛯ߒߚ߇‫ࡦࡒࠕߪߢ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ‬
᡽ᮭ߇ߘࠇࠍ፣უߐߖ㧔ో࿖ߩ 9 Ꮊߦァߩ⍮੐߇ዞછ[Golloba-Mutebi 2008:142]㧕‫ࠩࡦ࠲ޔ‬
࠾ࠕߢߪ 1961 ᐕߩ⁛┙એᓟᑄᱛߐࠇߚߩߢ‫ޔ‬
⛮⛯ᕈߪ⷗ࠄࠇߥ߆ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
ߎߩߚ߼ߦ․ߦ LC1
ߣ޿߁᧛(Village)࡟ࡌ࡞ߦ߅޿ߡߪ NRM ⁛ⵙߣ޿߁೙⚂ߪ޽ߞߡ߽૑᳃߇⥄↱ኻ╬ߦ⼏⺰
ߒ߿ߔ޿ⓨ㑆߇ឭଏߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
㧔࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕ㧕
1990 ᐕઍ䈱䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ಽᮭൻᚢ⇛䉕〯ⷅ䈚䈢䇯㑐ਈ䈚䈢䊄䊅䊷䉅䊂䊮䊙䊷䉪䇮䉝䉟䊦
䊤䊮䊄䇮䉴䉦䊮䊂䉞䊅䊎䉝⻉࿖䈭䈬౒ㅢ䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲 1972 ᐕ䈮䊆䉣䊧䊧䈏䇸ಽᮭൻት⸒䇹
䉕ⴕ䈇ਛᄩ䈎䉌 20 Ꮊ䈱⍮੐䈮ᒝജ䈭ⴕ᡽ᮭ㒢䉕ਈ䈋䈢䇯䈠䈱㓙䈮⋵᡽ᐭ䈲ᑄᱛ䈘䉏䇮ౄ䈱࿾ᣇ
ᯏ㑐䈮ๆ෼䈘䉏䈢䇯䈖䈱ᤨᦼ䉁䈪㓸ᮭൻ䉕ᒝ䉄䈢䈏䇮␠ળਥ⟵〝✢䈱ૐㅅ䈎䉌᡽ᐭ䈲 1980 ᐕઍ
ᓟඨ䈮䈲᡽╷ో⥸䉕⷗⋥䈜䉋䈉䈮䈭䉎䇯1985 ᐕ䈮ᡷᱜ䈘䉏䈢ᙗᴺ䈮࿾ᣇ⥄ᴦ૕䈏᣿⸥䈘䉏䇮
1990 ᐕઍ䈎䉌ᧄᩰ⊛䈭ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈏Ḱ஻䈘䉏䈢䈏䇮1998 ᐕ䈱࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭᡷ㕟᡽╷ᢥᦠ䈪䈲ห᡽
╷䈏䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫ห᭽䈮ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䇮䈧䉁䉍”Decentralization by Devolution(D by D)”䈪䈅䉎䈖䈫䉕ቯᑼ
ൻ䈚䈢䇯Ꮊ䈱ᓎഀ䉕ᄢ᏷䈮ᒙ䉄䈩䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱᭴ᚑ䈲⋵䈫᧛䈱䋲ጀ䈏ਛᔃ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯
ห࿖䈱ಽᮭൻᡷ㕟䈲䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈾䈬䈱ౝ⊛േᯏ䈏ਲ䈚䈒䇮౏౒䉶䉪䉺䊷ᡷ㕟䈱ᑧ㐳਄䈱ᕈᩰ䈪
(Fjeldstad 2001 p.2)䇮 䊄䊅䊷䈱㑐ਈ䈏ᒝ䈇䈖䈫䈲ุ䉄䈭䈇䇯ὼ䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮ਛᄩ㓸ᮭ૕೙䈱ᝂ᛬䈎䉌
1980 ᐕઍᓟඨ䇮․䈮⚻ᷣ䈏࿁ᓳ䈚䈩䈐䈢 1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈎䉌᡽ᐭ䈲⌀೶䈮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱⢻ജ䉕ะ
਄䈘䈞䈩ല₸䈱䉋䈇౏౒䉰䊷䊎䉴䉕⋡ᜰ䈚䈢22䇯ർ᰷⻉࿖䈲౏ോຬᡷ㕟䈱▸࿐䉕䈖䈋䈢ⴕ⽷᡽ᡷ
㕟䉕᡽ᐭ䈮௛䈐䈎䈔䈢(Prime Minster’s Office 1996)䇯㐿⊒⸘↹䈲 1972 ᐕ䈱䊃䉾䊒䉻䉡䊮ဳ䈎䉌࿾
ᣇ䈱૑᳃ෳട䈮䉋䉎䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒ဳ䈮ಾ䉍ᦧ䉒䉎ᣇะ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱േᯏ䈫䈚䈩䈲㗔
࿯䈱ᐢ䈘䇮ㄘ᧛ㇱ䈏࿶ୟ⊛䈭 CCM 䈱ᡰᜬၮ⋚(Munkandala 1998)䇮ਛᄩ䈫࿾ᣇ䈏ౄੱ⣂䊈䉾䊃䊪
䊷䉪䈪❬䈏䈦䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈏᜼䈕䉌䉏䉎䇯ౄੱ⣂䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䉅ห᭽䈪䈅䉍䇮ਈౄ䈏࿶ୟ⊛䈮ᒝ䈎䈦䈢
䈢䉄䇮ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈲ਛᄩ䈫࿾ᣇ䈱ౄౝ䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱䈅䈇䈣䈱⾗Ḯౣ㈩ಽ᡽╷䈪䉅䈅䈦䈢䋨╣ጟ
2005䋩䇯
䋨䉬䊆䉝䋩
䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲ઁ 2 䉦࿖䈱䉋䈉䈭ో⥸⊛䈭ಽᮭൻᡷ㕟䈲ⴕ䉒䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯㓸ᮭဳ䈱᡽ᴦ䈏࿕⌕䈚䈩䈍
䉍䇮䉁䈢࿾ᣇ䈱㐿⊒ⴕ᡽䈮ⶄᢙ䈱䉼䊞䊮䊈䊦䈏䈅䉍䇮䈠䉏䉌䈏⺞ᢛ䈘䉏䉎ዷᦸ䉅䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮
1995 ᐕ䈮਎⇇㌁ⴕ䈏ᡰេ䉕㐿ᆎ䈚䈢䉬䊆䉝࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭᡷ㕟䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛(KLGRP:Kenya Local
Government Reform Program)䈲Ꮢ᳃ෳട䈱᜛ᄢ䈮䉋䉎䉰䊷䊎䉴䊶䊂䊥䊋䊥䊷䈱ᡷༀ䉕ⷞ㊁䈮౉䉏
䈢⽷᡽⊛ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䉕ዉ౉䈚䈢䇯䈠䈱⚿ᨐ䇮ㅢᏱ䈱㐿⊒⾗㊄䈱੤ઃ㊄䊦䊷䊃䈫䈲⇣䈭䉎ⶄᢙ䈱䊐
22 ࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕߪ Local Government Reform Team ߣ޿߁⚵❱ࠍ㚂ㇺ࠼࠼ࡑߦ޽ࠆ࿾ᣇ⥄ᴦ⋭ߣߪ㔌ߒߡ
ฦ࿖ᄢ૶㙚ߩ޽ࠆ࠳࡞ࠛࠬࠨ࡜࡯ࡓߦ⸳┙ߒ‫ޔ‬ಽᮭൻផㅴߩḰ஻ࠍⴕߞߚ‫ޕ‬
36
䉜䊮䊄䈏⸳┙䈘䉏䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮ో⥸⊛䈭ಽᮭൻᡷ㕟䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲 NARC 䈏ᄢ⛔㗔䋭㚂⋧೙䈭䈬䈫౒䈮
ᙗᴺᡷᱜ䈱ㆬ᜼౏⚂䈫䈚䈢䈏䇮〝✢㑵੎䈪䉨䊋䉨᡽ᮭ䈱 NARC-KENYA 䈫䉥䊂䉞䊮䉧䈱 LDP 䈭䈬
䈮ಽⵚ䈚䈩⷗ㅍ䉌䉏䈢䇯2005 ᐕ䈮䉨䊋䉨᡽ᮭ䈲ಽᮭൻ䉕฽䉄ᮭജಽᢔ䈮䉋䉍ᶖᭂ⊛䈭⨲᩺䉕࿖
᳃ᛩ␿䈮䈎䈔䈢䈏䇮ุ᳿䈘䉏䈢䇯
ೋᦼ᧦ઙ䈫䈚䈩䇮䉬䊆䉝䈏ಽᮭൻ䈚䈭䈎䈦䈢ℂ↱䈲䇮KANU 䉇䉨䉪䊡䈲ᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭ䈻䈱෻⊒䈏ᒝ
䈒䇮ㅪ㇌೙䉕ᣥᬀ᳃࿾൓ജ䈱ᣂ᡽ᐭ䉕ᒙ૕䈮䈜䉎⟂䈫䈚䈩ℂ⸃䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯KADU 䈲䊙䉟䊉䊥䊁䉞䈏
ᄙ䈒䈩ಽᮭൻᜰะ䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䉇䈏䈩 KANU 䈮ๆ෼䈘䉏䈢䇯䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺᡽ᮭ᮸┙䈱䈫䈐䈮ฦ㓸࿅
䈲දജ䈚䈢䈏䇮䉇䈏䈩᡽ᮭ䈏㒢䉌䉏䈢㓸࿅䈮䉋䉎㓸ᮭ᭴ㅧ䈮⒖ⴕ䈚䇮㐳ᦼ⊛䈭ᛥ࿶૕೙䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯
䉬䊆䉝䈱᡽ౄ䈲࿾ၞ䊶䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪᡽ౄ䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮౏ᐔ䈭࿾ၞ㈩ಽ䉕᡽ᮭ䈮ⷐ᳞䈜䉎䈖䈫䈲䈪䈐䈝䇮
ઍ䉒䉍䈮ᮭജ䈮㑐ਈ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎ᯏળਥ⟵⊛䈭᡽ᴦ⁁ᴫ䈏䈉䉁䉏䈢䇯
䋨3 䉦࿖䋩
䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲⧷࿖䈫ද⺞䈚䈩࿖ౝ䈱ઁ࿾ၞ䉕ᒝ࿶⊛䈮ᡰ㈩䈚䈢䊑䉧䊮䉻䈏䈠䉏⥄りㅪ㇌೙䉕ᜰ
ะ䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯4 䈧䈱₺࿖䈫 1 䈧䈱Ḱ₺࿖䇮ઁ䈱࿾ၞ䈮䈲㚂㐳㗔䈏ሽ࿷䈚䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕⠨ᘦ䈜䉎૛࿾
䈲⁛┙ᒰೋ䈎䉌ሽ࿷䈚䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䉅䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈫䈱ㅪว౒๺࿖䈫䈭䈦䈢⚻✲䈎䉌䇮ಽᮭൻ䈲ㆬ
ᛯ⢇䈫䈚䈩䈲ೋ䉄䈎䉌ሽ࿷䈚䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮䊆䉣䊧䊧ᤨઍ䈲␠ળਥ⟵䈱ਛᄩ㓸ᮭ೙䈏ᡰ㈩⊛䈭㐿⊒
䊝䊂䊦䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯1980 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈎䉌䈖䈱䊝䊂䊦䈱ᄬᢌ䈏⹺⼂䈘䉏ᆎ䉄䇮CCM 䈲ᣂ䈚䈇䊝䊂䊦䉕
㐿⊒䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈮ㄼ䉌䉏䈢䇯
⃻ᤨὐ䈪䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䇮䉬䊆䉝䈲⣕ਛᔃൻ䈭䈇䈚৻ㇱ䈮ኻ䈜䉎ᒻᑼ⊛ᮭ㒢
ᆔ⼑(formal devolution)䈱Ბ㓏䈪䈅䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈲ಽᮭൻ䉕ផㅴ䈜䉎േᯏ䇮䉬䊆䉝䈮䈲䈠䈱ㅒ䈱
㓸ᮭൻ䉕⛽ᜬ䈜䉎േᯏ䈏䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䈖䈱⢛᥊䈮䈲䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ಽ㔌ᜰะ䇮䉨䉪䊡䈱⛔೙ᜰะ䈏䈅䈦
䈢䇯ਔ㓸࿅౒䈮␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮䈲ථ⿧䈚䈢ᒝ䈘䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䈢䈏䇮᡽ᴦ䈏ઁ㓸࿅䈮ᛥ䈋䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䈫
੺౉䈚䈢䇯NRM 䈮䈲䊑䉧䊮䉻䉅ട䉒䈦䈢䈏䇮৻ㇱ䈱䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ᕆㅴ⊛ಽ㔌ਥ⟵䋨ㅪ㇌ਥ⟵䋩䉕ᙬ
ᨵ䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䉅䈅䉍䇮䈖䉏䈏⋵ਛᔃ䈱ಽᮭൻ䉕ផㅴ䈜䉎ೋᦼ䈱േᯏ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯KANU 䈲㓸ᮭ⊛䈪䈅
䈦䈢䈏䇮䉨䉪䊡䈲 1980 ᐕઍ䈮᡽ᴦᮭജ䈎䉌ᓟㅌ䈚䈢䇯䈠䈱෻૞↪䈫䈚䈩䇮2003-04 ᐕ䈎䉌䉨䊋䉨᡽
ᮭ䈏䉨䉪䊡ਛᔃ䈮ㅴ䉄䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎䈫䇮ઁ㓸࿅䈏෻⊒䈚䈢䇯
ᮭജಽ᦭᡽╷ߣಽᮭൻߪ੤੕ߦ⃻ࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩࠗࡕޕ‬ೋᦼߦߪ Stewart ߇൮៨ᕈߣ๭ࠎߛ⻉㓸
࿅ߩ㑑௥ෳട߇ታ⃻ߒߡ޿ߚ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬ᮭജಽ᦭᡽╷ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ߩࠗࡕޔ‬ᓟᦼߦߪ㑑ౝ߇ࠞ࡟
ࡦࠫࡦਥዉߦߥࠆ৻ᣇ‫ޔ‬㗔ၞ⊛ಽᮭൻ߇㒢ቯ⊛ߦផㅴߐࠇߚ㧔㓸ᮭ೙ߩၮᧄ⊛ߥᨒ⚵ߺߪ
፣ࠇߥ߆ߞߚ㧕‫ߩߘޕ‬ᓟ‫ߩࠟࡦࠖ࠺ࠝߣࠠࡃࠠޔ‬㑐ଥߢߪ‫߇ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ‬㓸ᮭ⊛ߥᄢ⛔㗔೙ᐲ
ߢ޽ࠆߚ߼ߦ㚂⋧ࡐࠬ࠻ߩᣂ⸳ࠍࠝ࠺ࠖࡦࠟ߇ᦸߺ‫ޔ‬2007-08 ᐕߩ᥸േᓟߩ⺞஗ࠍ⚻ߡታ⃻
ߔࠆ‫ߩߎޕ‬ㆊ⒟߽ᮭജಽ᦭ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬NRM ߽ೋᦼߦߪ㑑௥ߦߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ㓸࿅ࠍ౉ࠇߡ൮៨ᕈ
߇㜞߆ߞߚ‫ޕ‬1990 ᐕઍᓟඨߩಽᮭൻߩផㅴߣ౒ߦ‫ߩߘޔ‬൮៨ᕈߪᷫዋߒߚ‫ࠟ࠙ޔߒߛߚޕ‬
37
ࡦ࠳߽࠲ࡦࠩ࠾ࠕ߽ᅚᕈ‫⧯ޔ‬⠪߇⼏ຬߦߥࠆෳടᨒ߇޽ࠅ‫߽ࠇߎޔ‬ᄙᭂ౒ሽဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵ߩ
ᕈᩰߢ޽ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
2-2 ℂ⺰⊛䈭⠨ኤ
䈖䈖䈪䈲᡽ᴦ䊒䊨䉶䉴䈱⢛᥊䈮䈅䉎᭴ㅧ⊛䈭ⷐ࿃䈮䈧䈇䈩ᬌ⸛䈚䈢ℂ⺰⊛䈭઒⺑䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎䇯䉁
䈝䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈪䈲࿖ኅౝㇱ䈱ኻ┙᭴ㅧ䉕⺑᣿䈜䉎䊝䊂䊦䈫䈚䈩 Stewart 䈱᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䉕
⚫੺䈚䇮ᰴ䈮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ⷰὐ䈎䉌ᄙᢙઍ⴫ဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱ෂ㒾ᕈ䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎䇯ᰴ䈮䇮࿖ኅᄖㇱ
䈮᡽ᴦ⊛ਇ቟ቯᕈ䈱ⷐ࿃䉕⷗಴䈜⠨䈋ᣇ䉕⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱⺑᣿䉕ฃ䈔౉䉏
䈢႐ว䈮䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ኻ┙✭๺䈱ⷰὐ䈎䉌䈱ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈉ⷞὐ䈏䈉䉁䉏䉎䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮ಽᮭൻ䈮ኻ
䈜䉎᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ᱧผ␠ળ⊛䈭ᗧ๧⺰䈮䈧䈇䈩䉅⸒෸䈜䉎䇯
1) ࿖ኅᒻᚑߣ᳃ਥൻ‫ߩࠖ࠹ࠪ࠾ࠬࠛޔ‬㑐ଥ
Stewart 䉌䈲␠ળ⚻ᷣ䊶᡽ᴦ᭴ㅧ䈮䈍䈔䉎䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞㓸࿅㑆䈱ਇᐔ╬䇮䈧䉁䉍䇸᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬
(HI: Holizontal Inequality)䇹䈎䉌⚗੎䈱⊒↢䊶࿁ㆱ䊜䉦䊆䉵䊛䉕⺑᣿䈚䈢䋨Stewart 2008䋩23䇯ౖဳ⊛
䈭ᚑഞ䊝䊂䊦䈲䊙䊧䉟䉲䉝䈱䊑䊚䊒䊃䊤᡽╷䈪䇮⪇௟♽䉋䉍䉅␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮ഠ૏䈮䈅䉎䊙䊧䊷♽䉕
᡽ᴦ⊛䈮ఝㆄ䈚䈢᡽╷䈮䉋䉍䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞㓸࿅㑆䈱ਇᐔ╬䈏ᡷༀ䈘䉏䇮⚗੎䈏࿁ㆱ䈘䉏䈢䈫⠨ኤ
䈜䉎䋨Brown 2007䋩䇯䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱Ყセ⎇ⓥ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮䉬䊆䉝䈲 Central Ꮊ䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ධ
ㇱ࿾ၞ䈮ఝ൓䈭䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱䉨䉪䊡䈫䊑䉧䊮䉻䈏䈇䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮䉬䊆䉝䈲ർㇱ䈫䊆䊞䊮䉱Ꮊ䋨63䋦䊦
䉥䋩䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ർㇱ࿾ၞ䈏⋧ኻ⊛䈭⽺࿎⁁ᘒ䈮䈅䉍䇮䈖䉏䉌䈱䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮䈲ਇḩ䈏⬧ᑧ䈚䈩
䈇䈢(Klugman et al.,1999,Stewart & O’Sullivan 1998)䇯䈖䈱᭴࿑䈎䉌䈲䊑䉧䊮䉻䉇䉨䉪䊡䈲࿶ୟ⊛
䈮ఝ૏䈭䈱䈪䇮⽺࿎࿾ၞ䈱᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈏ᷫዋ䈜䉏䈳ਔ࿖䈲቟ቯൻ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䇯䈭䈍䇮䉺䊮
䉱䊆䉝䈲ఝ൓䈭㓸࿅䈏䈭䈒䇮ฦ࿾ၞ䈮൮៨⊛䈪ᐔ╬䈭౏౒᡽╷䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈢䈫⺑᣿䈜䉎䇯
Stewart & O’Sullivan 䋨1998䋩䈲䇮䊑䉧䊮䉻䇮䉨䉪䊡䈏ఝ૏䈫䈇䈉᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱ၮᧄ᭴ㅧ䈲㘃ૃ
䈚䈩䈇䈢䉅䈱䈱䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲 1960㵥80 ᐕઍ䈮᳃ਥ⊛᡽ౄ೙ᐲ䈏䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕ㅢ䈛䈩ౄᵷ⊛䈭
ᡰ㈩䉕䈉䉂䇮⚗੎䉕ഥ㐳䈜䉎ᣇะ䈮௛䈇䈢䈱䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲䊝䉟᡽ᮭ䈪᳃ਥਥ⟵䈏ᛥ䈋䉌䉏
䈢䉅䈱䈱䇮൮៨⊛䈭㐿⊒䈏ో࿖䈪ⴕ䉒䉏䇮␠ળᜰᮡ䈱ᡷༀ䈏䈅䈦䈢䈖䈫䈪ᄢⷙᮨ䈭⚗੎䈏࿁ㆱ䈘
䉏䈢䈫⺑᣿䈜䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䈲␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮ఝ૏䈭䊑䉧䊮䉻䈮ኻ䈜䉎ർㇱ䈱⻉㓸࿅䈏᡽ᴦ⊛䈭
ਇḩ䉕Ⴧ䈚䈩᥸ജ䈏䈉䉁䉏䈢䈫⺑᣿䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮ఝ૏䈭䉨䉪䊡䈏䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮䈱䊝䉟
᡽ᮭ䈪䈲᡽ᴦ⊛䈮ఝㆄ䈘䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䈱䈪ో⥸⊛䈭᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱᜛ᄢ䈏㒐䈏䉏䈢䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯
᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱䊝䊂䊦䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈪䉥䊗䊁᡽ᮭ䈏ᚑ┙䈚䈢ㆊ⒟䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䊝䉟᡽ᮭ䈏⚗੎䉕࿁ㆱ
䈚䈢ㆊ⒟䇮NARC 䈱ಽⵚ䈮䉋䈦䈩䉨䉪䊡䈏ో⥸⊛䈮ఝㆄ䈘䉏䇮䈠䉏䈏 2007-08 ᐕ䈱᥸േ䈱৻䈧䈱
⊒↢ේ࿃䈮䈭䈦䈢ㆊ⒟䈮䈧䈇䈩⺑᣿䈪䈐䉎(Stewart 2008)䇯వ䈝䇮䉥䊗䊁䈱᡹᠄䈲᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬
23 ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬ߣߪ㓸࿅㑆ߩਇᐔ╬ߩߎߣߢ޽ࠅ‫ߦࠇߎޔ‬ኻߒ୘ੱ㑆ߩਇᐔ╬ࠍု⋥⊛ਇᐔ╬(vertical
inequality)ߣ๭߱‫ޕ‬
38
䈱ⷞὐ䈎䉌䈲⁛┙ᤨὐ䈱䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱ఝㆄ䈘䉏䈢᡽ᴦ⊛૏⟎ઃ䈔䈮ኻ䈜䉎䉅䈱䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䊑䉧䊮䉻
䈲ᙗᴺ਄ઁ䈱࿾ၞ䈮䈲䈭䈇৻ቯ䈱⥄ᴦᮭ䉕ઃਈ䈘䉏䈭䈏䉌䇮₺䈏䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ᄢ⛔㗔䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯䉥
䊗䊁䈲䉅䈫䉅䈫෻䊑䉧䊮䉻൓ജ䉕⚿㓸䈚䈢 UPC(Uganda People’s Congress)䈱ઍ⴫䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮䊑䉧
䊮䉻䈏䉦䉸䊥䉾䉪♽䈱 DP(Democratic Party)䈫䊒䊨䊁䉴䉺䊮䊃♽䈱 KY㩷 (Kabaka Yekka-King Alone)
䈮ಽⵚ䈚䇮UPC 䉅䊒䊨䊁䉴䉺䊮䊃♽䈱ᡰᜬ䈏ᒝ䈎䈦䈢䈢䉄䈮 UPC-KY 䈫䈇䈉ଢቱ⊛䈭ㅪ┙䉕ᒻᚑ䈚
䈩ㆬ᜼䈪㚂⋧䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ᮭജ₪ᓧᓟ䈮 UPC 䈫 KY 䈱ኻ┙䈏ᾷὓ䈮䈭䉍䇮䉥䊗䊁䈲 1966 ᐕ
䈮ᙗᴺ䇮ㅪ㇌೙䇮㚂⋧⡯䉕ᑄᱛ䈚䈩ᄢ⛔㗔೙䈱䉂䈱ᣂᙗᴺ䉕೙ቯ䈚䇮⥄䉌䈏ዞછ䈚䈢䇯
ᰴ䈮䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱ೋઍ䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺ᄢ⛔㗔䈲䉨䉪䊡஍㊀䈱᡽╷䉕ⴕ䈦䈢䈏䇮⁛┙೨䈮ᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭ䈮ᦨ
䉅ᨐᢓ䈮ᛶ᛫䈚䈢䉨䉪䊡䈲৻ቯᦼ㑆ఝㆄ䈘䉏䉎ᱜ⛔ᕈ䉕᦭䈚䈩䈇䈢䋨Klugman, et al. p.17䋩䇯2 ઍ⋡
䈱䊝䉟䈲䉬䊆䊟䉾䉺䈱ᱫ੢䈮䉋䉍ዋᢙᵷ䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮䈱ᄢ⛔㗔䈫䈭䉍䇮ᓢ䇱䈮ห㓸࿅䈱᡽ᴦ⊛ఝㆄ᡽
╷䉕ⴕ䈦䈢䈏䇮␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮ఝ૏䈭䉨䉪䊡䈫䈱䊋䊤䊮䉴䈲ข䉏䈩䈇䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮2002 ᐕ䈱䉨䊋䉨᡽
ᮭ䈪䈲ㅜਛ䈎䉌䉨䉪䊡ᡰ㈩⦡䈏ᒝ䉁䉍䇮2007 ᐕᧃ䈱ㆬ᜼䈲䉨䊋䉨䉕ᡰᜬ䈜䉎䉨䉪䊡♽䈱᡽ౄ
(Party of National Unity) 䈫 䉥 䊂 䉞 䊮 䉧 䉕 ᡰ ᜬ 䈜 䉎 䊦 䉥 ♽ 䈭 䈬 䈱 ᡽ ౄ (Orange Democratic
Movement)䈱ኻ┙䈫䈭䉍䇮ㆬ᜼⚿ᨐ䈱㐿␿䈏ᕆ䈮㐽䈛䉌䉏䈩䉨䊋䉨䈱ൎ೑䈏๔䈕䉌䉏䉎䈫䇮ⴝ㗡䈪
⚿ᨐ䉕⇼໧ⷞ䈜䉎᛫⼏ⴕേ䈏⿠䈐䈢(Stewart, 2008)䇯
䈖䉏䉌䈱⺑᣿䈲䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱Ყセ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲৻⽾ᕈ䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮⇣䈭䉎⸃㉼䈲䈭䈇䈱䈣
䉐䈉䈎䇯╙৻䈮䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈮᡽ᴦᠲ૞⊛䈭䉟䊂䉥䊨䉩䊷ᕈ䈲䈭䈇䈱䈣䉐䈉䈎䇯᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱
⺑᣿䈲䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪㓸࿅㑆䈱ਇᐔ╬䈮┙⣉䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕䊔䊷䉴䈫䈚䈢ᙍᙴ(grievance)
䈲᡽ᴦኅ䈏᡽ᴦᠲ૞䈱䉲䊮䊗䊦䈫䈚䈩೑↪䈜䉎஥㕙䈏䈅䉎䇯ਇᐔ╬䈱⹺⼂䉅ᒰ੐⠪䈮䈫䈦䈩䈲ቴ
ⷰ⊛䈮᷹ቯ䈘䉏䈢䉅䈱䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮↢ᵴታᗵ䈮ᩮ䈙䈚䈢౒หਥⷰ⊛䈭䉅䈱䈪䈅䉐䈉䇯䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱
㓸ว⊛⴫⽎䈲᭴ᚑຬ䈮ᔘ⺈䉕ⷐ᳞䈚䇮ᓐ䉌䉕⛔ᓮ䈜䉎䈖䈫䉕น⢻䈮䈜䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮৻⒳䈱ౝᘷᄖ
ᖚ᡽╷䈫䈚䈩䇮㓸࿅ౝㇱ䈱ਇᐔ╬䉕㓝⭁䈪䈐䉎䇯䇸䉨䉪䊡䈲ห⢩䈪䇮䊦䉥䈎䉌⢿ᆭ䉕ฃ䈔䉎ኋ๮䈫
䈇䈉⺋⸃䈮┙⣉䈚䈩䇮䉨䉪䊡䈱⾗↥ኅ䈲䉴䊤䊛ዬ૑⠪䈱䉨䉪䊡䈱䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪䈭ᗵᖱ䉕ᚸേ䈚䈩䊦䉥
ዬ૑⠪䈫ᚢ䉒䈞䉎(Kibara 2005)䇹䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮䈖䈱䉟䊂䉥䊨䉩䊷ᕈ䉅᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈫ਔ┙䈚ᓧ䈭䈇⼏
⺰䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯
╙ੑ䈮⠨ᘦ䈜䈼䈐䈲䇮ᬀ᳃࿾ᦼ䈱䊙䉟䊅䉴䈱ㆮ↥(colonial legacy)䈪䈅䉎䇯䊑䉧䊮䉻䈏ᬀ᳃࿾ᦼ䈮
⧷࿖䈎䉌ᡰ䈋䉌䉏䈢ਛ㑆៦ขጀ䈫䈭䈦䈩䈇䈢ὐ䈲䉬䊆䉝䈱䉨䉪䊡䈫䈲⇣䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎24䇯䉁䈢䇮ఝ൓⠪
䈪䈅䉍䈭䈏䉌䈱ಽ㔌ᜰะ⠪䈲․ᓽ⊛䈪䈅䉎䇯ઁ㓸࿅䈎䉌䉂䉏䈳␠ળ⚻ᷣ⊛䈮⼾䈎䈭㓸࿅䈏㔌⣕䈘
䉏䈩䈲࿎䉎䇯䈘䉌䈮ౝ㒽࿖䈫䈇䈉ⅣႺ䈲᡽ᴦ㓸࿅䈱࿖ኅᮭജ䈻䈱䉝䉪䉶䉴䉕ᒝ䉄䉎䇯䉁䈢䇮ർㇱ൓
ജ䈲⽺࿎ᐲ䈏㜞䈒䇮ᯏળ⾌↪䈏ૐ䈒䇮⚗੎䈮ෳട䈚䈩䉅ᄬ䈉䉅䈱䈏ዋ䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯ᓟㅀ䈜䉎ァㇱ䈱䉣
䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞᭴ᚑ䉅ᬀ᳃࿾ᦼ⿠Ḯ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䉌䈱ⷰὐ䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱․ᓽ䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮᳓ᐔ⊛ਇ
ᐔ╬䈱⼏⺰䈫ਔ┙䈚䈋䈭䈇䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯
24
࡙ࠠࠢߪ⊕ੱ౉ᬀ⠪߇ᚻ᡼ߒߚ⢈ᴅߥ White Highland ߩ࿯࿾ߩ㈩ಽߢࠤ࠾ࠕࡗ࠶࠲ᤨઍߦఝㆄߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
39
╙ਃ䈮䇮Elischer㩷 (2008)䈲䊝䉟᡽ᮭᓟᦼ䈱ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䉅䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪䈭ᘾᖡ䉕ហ䈐䈢䈩䈩䈐䈢䈫⺑᣿
䈜䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮1998 ᐕ䈎䉌᡽ౄ䈲䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ᮮᢿ⊛䈮ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈩䉅䇮ᮭജ䉕᝿ី䈜䉎ㆊ⒟䈮䈍䈇䈩
ឃ㒰䈘䉏䈢䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪㓸࿅䈏⣕ㅌ䈚䇮ᓢ䇱䈮䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪᡽ౄ䈱᭽⋧䉕Ꮺ䈶䈩䈐䈢䈫⺑᣿䈜䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮
᡽ౄ䈱ಽ㘃䈮䈍䈇䈩䉬䊆䉝䈲 Horowitz㩷 (2000)䈱䈇䈉䇸ଢቱ⊛䈭䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ㅪ┙(Ethnic Coalition
of Convenience)䇹䉕⛯䈔䈩䈇䉎䈫⹏ଔ䈜䉎䇯Elischer 䈲䊝䉟䈱ᡰ㈩䉕ోᦼ㑆৻ቯ䈮⷗䈢 Stewart 䈮
ኻ䈚䇮䊝䉟䈱ᓟᦼ䈮ὶὐ䉕䈅䈩䈩䈇䉎䇯䊝䉟䈱ᓟᦼ䈮䈲䇮1991 ᐕ䈎䉌䈱᳃ਥൻ䈱ᓇ㗀䈏䈅䉍䇮ᧃᦼ
䈮䈭䉎䈫ᓟ⛮⠪䈲⺕䈎䈫䈇䈉䉭䊷䊛䈏ട䉒䈦䈢䇯䈘䉌䈮㆚䉍䇮䊝䉟䈲 1982 ᐕ䈱䉨䉪䊡ਥዉ䈱ⓨァ䈱
䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷ᧂㆀ੐ઙ䈱ᓟ(Klugman et al.,:28)䇮䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮䈫ዋᢙᵷ䈱䊜䊮䊋䊷䈏ᄢᄙᢙ䉕භ䉄䉎䉋
䈉䈮ౝ㑑䈱᭴ᚑ䉕ᄢ᏷䈮ᄌ䈋(Widner 1992:165-166)䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱൮៨ᕈ䈲㑑௥䊧䊔䊦䈪䈲⴮ㅌ䈚
䈢䇯
䊝䉟ᓟᦼ䈱᡽ᴦ⊛䈭൮៨ᕈ䉕⵬ቢ䈚䈢䈱䈲䇮䈅䉎⒟ᐲ䈱ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈱ㅴዷ䈪䈅䉎䇯1983 ᐕ䈮䇸⋵
᜚ὐ࿾ᣇ㐿⊒᡽╷(DFRD:District Focus for Rural Development)䇹䈏㐿ᆎ䈘䉏䇮⋵⍮੐䈫⋵㐿⊒ᆔ
ຬળ䈮ᄢ䈐䈭ᮭ㒢䈏ਈ䈋䉌䉏䇮䈠䈱ਅ૏ᯏ᭴䈏⸘↹䊒䊨䉶䉴䉕ታᣉ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䈦䈢䇯䈖䈱䊒䊨䉶
䉴䈲ᦨ⚳⊛䈮ਛᄩ⋭ᐡ䈱ᮭ㒢᝿ី䈏ᒝ䈒䈩ᯏ⢻䈚䈭䈎䈦䈢䈏䇮䈠䈱ᓟ䉅ᡷ㕟䈏ข䉍⚵䉁䉏䈢䇯䈢
䈣䈚䇮䈖䉏䈲ㇺᏒ䈱⾗Ḯ䉕࿾ᣇ䈮ዬ૑䈜䉎䉦䊧䊮䉳䊮䈮࿁䈠䈉䈫䈜䉎᡽╷䈫䈚䈩䉅ᝒ䈋䉌䉏䉎
䋨Barkan 1992, p.184䋩䇯䉁䈢䇮䉪䊷䊂䉺䊷੐ઙᓟァ㓌䉕 KANU 䈱䉮䊮䊃䊨䊷䊦䈱䉅䈫䈮⟎䈐䇮․ቯ䉣
䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ᓇ㗀䉕ឃ㒰䈚䈩൮៨⊛䈭⚵❱䈫䈚䈢䇯
╙྾䈮䇮᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䉇 Elischer 䈱ㅪ┙᡽ౄ⺰䈲䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ᡰ㈩䈏ᒝ䈇࿖䈱᳃ਥൻ䈮ኻ䈚
䈩⼊ᚓ⊛䈭⺰⺞䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮Okuku(2002)䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈍䈇䈩⁛ⵙ૕೙䉇᡽ౄ䉕⑌ᱛ䈚䈢ᦼ㑆䈮䈍
䈇䈩䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱੉ⵚ䈏ᷓ䉁䉍䇮᥸ജ⚗੎䈮䈭䈦䈢䈫䈇䈉⚻✲䉕ᒝ⺞䈚䇮᳃ਥൻ䈏䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪㓸࿅
䈱ኻ┙䉕ਸ਼䉍⿧䈋䉎䈢䉄䈮㊀ⷐ䈫ㅀ䈼䉎䇯1964-66 ᐕ䉥䊗䊁䈲᳃ਥਥ⟵⊛䈭⸃᳿╷䉕᡼᫈䈚䈩ァ
࿖ਥ⟵䉕ᜰะ䈚䇮1962 ᐕ䈎䉌⊒ዷ䈚䈩䈐䈢᳃ਥਥ⟵䈫ᄙరਥ⟵䉕⴮ㅌ䈘䈞䈢䇯䉁䈢䇮╙ੑ䈱⺰ὐ
䈮䈅䉎ァㇱ䈏ᬀ᳃࿾ㆮ೙䈮䉋䈦䈩ർㇱ䈫᧲ㇱ಴り⠪䉕ਛᔃ䈮᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䈩䈇䈢䈖䈫䈏ౄᵷਥ⟵䈱ኻ
┙䉕ᒝ䉄䈢䈏䇮䈖䉏䉌䈱ೋᦼ᧦ઙ䈲᳃ਥൻ䈫䈲ή㑐ଥ䈣䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈣䈔䈪䈲
䈭䈒䇮৻ౄ೙䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞ኻ┙䈲ଦㅴ䈘䉏䉎䈫ㅀ䈼䇮৻ౄ೙䈲ῳⷫ⊛䉟䊜䊷䉳䈱䉅䈫䈪ౄ
ౝ෸䈶࿖ౝ䈪᡽ᴦᮭജ䉕⁛භ䈜䉎␠ળၮ⋚䈱৻䈧䈫䈚䈩䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕ᡰ䈋䉎䈫ᜰ៰䈜䉎䇯
╙੖䈮䇮⋧ኻ⊛䈮ᄖㇱⷐ࿃䈱㊀ⷐᕈ䉕ᒝ⺞䈚䈢䈱䈏 Golooba-Mutebi (2008)䈪䈅䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱ౝ
ᚢ䊌䉺䊷䊮䈲ၮᧄ⊛䈮㓞࿖䈱⚗੎䉇࿖ኅ䈫෻ੂ㓸࿅䈱⿧Ⴚᵴേ䈮ᓇ㗀䈘䉏䈩䈐䈢䈫ᜰ៰䈜䉎䇯䉡
䉧䊮䉻䈱ᱧઍ䈱᡽ᮭ䈱ઁ䈱䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪㓸࿅䈮ኻ䈜䉎ឃઁ⊛䈭᡽╷䈲䇮䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹ౝ䈮࿖ኅ䈱䇸ᮭᆭ䇹
䉕චಽ䈮ᶐㅘ䈘䈞䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈖䈱䈖䈫䈲࿾ၞ⊛䈭᡽ᴦ䉣䊥䊷䊃䉇ᛶ᛫ㆇേ䈮෻ੂ䉕ડ↹䈘䈞䇮᡽ᐭ
䈱ᱦ౉ၮ⋚䈱෼ᅓ䉕น⢻䈮䈜䉎ⓨ㑆䉕ឭଏ䈚䇮౏ᑼ䈭⚻ᷣᵴേ䉕⛔ว䈜䉎น⢻ᕈ䉕ᅹ䈕䈢䈫䈇䈉䇯
䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮DRC䇮䉴䊷䉻䊮䈫䈇䈉䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪ਥዉ䈱⚗੎࿖䈮㓞ធ䈚䇮䉥䊗䊁䇮䉝䊚䊮䇮䊛䉶
䊔䊆᡽ᮭ䈏ᚑ┙䈚䈢㓙䈮ౝᚢ䈪ᢌർ䈚䈢൓ജ䈲Ᏹ䈮㓞࿖䈮ㅏ䉏䇮෻᠄䈱ᯏળ䉕┍䈦䈢䇯䉁䈢䇮䉡
40
䉧䊮䉻䈮ㅏ䉏䈩䈇䈢䉿䉼♽㔍᳃䈫䈠䈱ሶቊ䈏 RPF 䈫䈚䈩䊦䊪䊮䉻䈮ଚ᡹䈚䇮䉴䊷䉻䊮䈲䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮
ଚ᡹䈜䉎 LRA 䉕ᡰេ䈚䇮NRM 䈲ධㇱ䉴䊷䉻䊮䈪ᵴേ䈜䉎 SPLA(Sudan People’s Liberation Army)
䉕ᡰេ䈚䈢䇯
એ਄䈱ಽᨆ䈲䇮䉬䊆䉝䈫䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱⚗੎䈱ౝㇱⷐ࿃䈮㑐䈚䈩䈲᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱⼏⺰䈮৻ቯ䈱᦭
ലᕈ䈏䈅䉎䈖䈫䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯Okuku 䈱⼏⺰䉅ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈱ᦼ㑆䈱䉂䈭䉌䈝䇮৻ౄ೙ᡰ㈩䈱ᦼ㑆
䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞ኻ┙䈏Ⴧ㐳䈜䉎䈫䈇䈉⵬ቢ⊛䈭⼏⺰䈮䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯቟ቯൻ╷䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䉬䊆
䉝䈱䊝䉟᡽ᮭ೨ඨᦼ䉁䈪䈱᳃ਥൻ䉕ᛥ䈋䈭䈏䉌൮៨ᕈ䉕㊀ⷞ䈚䈢䉝䊒䊨䊷䉼䈏ഞ䉕ᄼ䈚䈢䈎䈮䉂
䈋䉎䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕฽䉃᭴ㅧ⊛ⷐ࿃䈏ᄌൻ䈚䈢䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䈱䈪䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁
䉞䊁䉞䇹㑆䈱ኻ┙䈲෼ᜪ䈞䈝䇮2000 ᐕઍ䈱࿯࿾䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪⚗੎䉕⚻䈩25䇮᳃ਥ⊛ㆬ᜼ᓟ䈱 2007-08
ᐕ䈱᥸േ䈮⊒ዷ䈚䈢䇯ᰴ䈮䇮ౝㇱⷐ࿃䈮㑐䈚䈩䉅᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬એᄖ䈱ⷐ࿃䈏ሽ࿷䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉡䉧
䊮䉻䈱႐ว䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ኻ┙᭴ㅧ䈲⁛ⵙ䉇ౝᚢ䈱⢛᥊䈮䈅䉎䈏䇮ർㇱ࿾ၞ಴り⠪䈪࿕䉄䉌䉏
䈢䊝䊤䊦䈱ૐ䈇ァ㓌䇮ㄭ㓞࿖䈫䈱䈅䈇䈣䈱䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䉕ኈᤃ䈮⿧Ⴚ䈜䉎ァ੐⚵❱䋨ᄖㇱⷐ࿃䋩䈏⚗੎
䈱㐳ᦼൻ䉕ଦ䈚䈢䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䇯
2䋩 ࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱⎇ⓥ
ᧄ▵䈪䈲᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈏᳃ਥൻ䈫⚿ว䈚䈩᡽ᴦ⊛ਇ቟ቯᕈ䉕䉅䈢䉌䈜႐ว䇮᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ኻ
᛫ജ䉕䉅䈧䈱䈎䇮䈠䈱႐ว䈱᧦ઙ䈫䈲૗䈎䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎䇯1990 ᐕઍ䈱䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ಽᮭൻ䈲᳃ਥ⊛䈭
ಽᮭൻ䇮ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑(devolution)䈏ᦨ䉅㗼⪺䈭േะ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈠䉏䈮䈲ਛᄩ᡽ᐭ䈱㕖ല₸䈭ⴕ᡽䇮
Ꮢ᳃␠ળ䈎䉌䈱ⷐ᳞䇮ᄖ࿖䊄䊅䊷䉇䊜䊂䉞䉝䈱ჿ䈭䈬䈏ᓇ㗀䈚䈢䇯1990 ᐕઍᧃએ㒠䈮ฦ࿖䈮ട䉒
䈦䈢ᄖㇱ᧦ઙ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䊄䊅䊷䈱េഥ᜛ᄢ䈫䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡷ㕟䈱ⷐ᳞䈏䈅䉍䇮េഥଐሽᐲ䈱㜞䈇䉡䉧
䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ಽᮭൻ䈮ᾲᔃ䈭䊋䉟䇮䊙䊦䉼䈱䊄䊅䊷䈱ᓇ㗀䉅ฃ䈔䇮⻉ᡷ㕟䈫䈱ㅪേ䈱ਛ䈪䈖
䉏䉕ㅴ䉄䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲൮᜝⊛䈭ಽᮭൻᡷ㕟䈲ⴕ䉒䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䈏䇮1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈎䉌࿾
ᣇ䈱㐿⊒䉕ડ࿑䈚䈢⽷᡽⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯
ኻ᛫ജ䈮㑐䈚䈩䈲䇮3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈇䈩ㆊ෰䈱᡽ᴦ⊛䈭ਇ቟ቯᕈ䈲㓸ᮭൻ䈮ะ䈎䈉ㆊ⒟䈪⿠䈐䈢䈱䈎䇮
ಽᮭൻ䈮ะ䈎䈉ㆊ⒟䈪⿠䈐䈢䈱䈎䉕໧䈉ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉥䊗䊁䉇䉝䊚䊮䈲㓸ᮭൻ䈮ะ䈎䈉ㆊ⒟䈱᥸ജ
䈪䈅䉍䇮䊛䉶䊔䊆䈲᥸ജᓟ䈱ಽᮭൻ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈱 2000 ᐕઍ䈱࿯࿾䉣䉴䊆䉾䉪⚗੎䉅 2007-08
ᐕ䈱᥸േ䉅㓸ᮭ೙ਅ䈪⿠䈐䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱␠ળਥ⟵䈱㓸ᮭ೙䈲ㄘ᳃䉕ᒝ೙⒖ォ䈘䈞䈢䈏䇮᥸ജ
䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯ಽᮭൻ䈪⿠䈐䉎᥸ജ䈲䇮࿾ᣇ䈮䈍䈔䉎ᄙᢙᵷᒻᚑ䈱੎䈇䈫㑐ଥ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮ㅢᏱ䈲
ᄢⷙᮨ䈭䉅䈱䉇ಽ㔌ㆇേ䈮䈲䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯ᓥ䈦䈩䇮㓸ᮭൻ䈱ㆊ⒟䈪᥸ജ䈏⿠䈖䉎㗫ᐲ䈱ᣇ䈏㜞䈇䇯
ታ㓙䈮䇮䊛䉶䊔䊆᡽ᮭ䈲ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䉕ዉ౉䈚䈭䈇ᦼ㑆䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅢ䈚䈩ਛᄩ䋭࿾ᣇ䈱㑐ଥ䉕ౣ
᭴▽䈚䇮⽺࿎೥ᷫ䉕㊀ⷞ䈜䉎ᆫ൓䉕␜䈚䈩ෂᯏ䉕ਸ਼䉍⿧䈋䈢஥㕙䈏䈅䉎䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䉅䉬䊆䉝䉅ಽ
25 Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005)ߪ 2000 ᐕઍߩࠤ࠾ࠕߩ࿯࿾ࠛࠬ࠾࠶ࠢ⚗੎ߦߟ޿ߡ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬߆ࠄߩ⷗
ᣇࠍㅌߌ‫ޔ‬᡽ᮭߩㆬ᜼↪ߩ╷⻎ߣߔࠆ‫⚗ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬੎ࠍ Stewart ߪ᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬߆ࠄ⸃㉼ߒߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޕ‬200708 ᐕߩ᥸േߩ⢛᥊ߪⶄ㔀ߢ‫ޔ‬᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬‫ޔ‬2000 ᐕઍߩ࿯࿾⚗੎‫ޔ‬᡽ᮭߩ࠺ࡕ㎾࿶ߩㆊ೾෻ᔕߥߤߩⶄ
วߣߒߡᝒ߃ࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬
41
ᮭൻ᡽╷䉇ෳട䈱ଦㅴ䈱⹜䉂䈏ᒙ૕䈪䈲䈅䈦䈩䉅䇮䈖䉏䈏᥸ജ䉕䉅䈢䉌䈚䈢䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈲䈭䈇26䇯
ᰴ䈮䇮䉅䈉৻䈧䈱ኻ᛫ജ䈫䈚䈩᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ᬀ᳃࿾⿠Ḯ䈱෼ᅓ⊛䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䉕ォ឵䈜䉎䈫䈇䈉
ᗧ๧䈪䇮ੱ䇱䈮ᣂ䈢䈭᡽ᮭ䈱ᱜ⛔ᕈ䉕ᗵ䈛䈘䈞䉎ലᨐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉝䊐䊥䉦䈲࿖ኅ䈏㓸ᮭ⊛䈪䉅␠ળ
䈏㜞ᐲ䈮ಽᮭ⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䈫䈱⹺⼂䈏䈅䉎27䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ᬀ᳃࿾䈲㓸ᮭ⊛䈭䊃䉾䊒䉻䉡䊮䈱ᗧᕁ᳿ቯ᭴
ㅧ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱␠ળ䈏⁛┙ᓟ䉅䈖䈱᭴ㅧ䉕ㇱಽ⊛䈮⛽ᜬ䈚䈩䈚䉁䈇䇮ዋᢙ䈱᡽ᴦ䉣䊥䊷䊃
䈏࿖ኅ䈱ን䉕⁛භ䈚䈢⚻✲䈎䉌䇮䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱⍮⼂ੱ䈮䈲㓸ᮭ೙䈏ᬀ᳃࿾ㆮ೙䈱ᡰ㈩ⵝ⟎䈪䈅䉎䈫
䈱⹺⼂䈏ᒝ䈇(Mamdani 1993)䇯․䈮䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱䉋䈉䈮䈖䉏䉁䈪ᄢ䈐䈭䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡷ㕟䉕ⴕ䈦䈩䈇䈭
䈇࿖䈪䈲Ꮊⴕ᡽䉲䉴䊁䊛䈱ᬀ᳃࿾ᯏ᭴䈫䈱㘃ૃᕈ䈏ᜰ៰䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯ᓥ䈦䈩䇮ᬀ᳃࿾ㆮ೙䉕৻᝹
䈚䈩䇮᡽ᐭ䈮ኻ䈜䉎ੱᔃ䉕ᄌ䈋䉎䈮䈲ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䉕ዉ౉䈚䈭䈇䈫ᆎ䉁䉌䈭䈇䈫䈇䈉⠨䈋ᣇ䈏䈅䉎
(Kibara 2005)28䇯
⁛┙ᓟ䈱ฦ࿖䈱㓸ᮭൻㆊ⒟䈮䈍䈇䈩⣕ਛᔃൻ(deconcentration)䈫䈇䈉ಽᮭൻ䈲ਛᄩ䈱ᮭജ䈱ᶐ
ㅘ䉕ᗧ๧䈚䈢(Gaventa 2002, p,5)䇯䈢䈫䈋䈳䇮1972 ᐕ䈱䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈲Ꮊ䉕㊀ⷞ䈚䇮⋵
⼏ળ䉕⸃ᢔ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲 1966 ᐕ䈎䉌ᡷ⦟䉕㊀䈰䈭䈏䉌⋵㐿⊒⸘↹(DDP)䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈢䈏䇮
૗ᐲᡷᱜ䈘䉏䈩䉅䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䈱ᗧ⷗䉕ๆ෼䈞䈝䈮ฦ⋭ᐡ䈱䊃䉾䊒䉻䉡䊮䈱⸘↹䉕᧤䈰䈩䈇䈢䇯㓸
ᮭ⊛䈭ⴕ᡽䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮䊊䊤䊮䊔䊷(Harambee)䈱䉋䈉䈭࿾ᣇ䈱䉟䊆䉲䉝䊁䉞䊑䉅࿾ᣇ䉕ข䉍ㄟ䉃ਛ
ᄩ䈱↹╷䈫䈭䈦䈩䈚䉁䈉29䇯৻⥸Ꮢ᳃䈲౏౒䉰䊷䊎䉴䉕᡽ᐭ䈮ᦼᓙ䈪䈐䈭䈇䈱䈪䇮ਛᄩ䈎䉌ⷐ᳞䈘
䉏䉎⒢䈎䉌䈲ㅏㆱ䈜䉎௑ะ䉕䉅䈦䈢䇯ಽᮭൻ䈏䇸䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䇹䈭ᗧᕁ᳿ቯ䈱ᗧ๧䉕઻䈉䉋䈉䈮ℂ⸃
䈘䉏ᆎ䉄䈢䈱䈲䇮3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈇䈩 1980 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌䈱᳃ਥൻ䈱ầᵹએ㒠䈪䈅䉍䇮䈠䈱೙ᐲᒻᚑ䈲
1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈮䈭䈦䈩䈎䉌䈪䈅䉎䇯
䈖䉏䉌䈱ኻ᛫ജ䈏᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱⸃ᶖ䈮⽸₂䈜䉎ẜ࿷ᕈ䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䉎䈫઒ቯ䈚䈢႐ว䈱ઃᏪ᧦
ઙ䈫䈲૗䈪䈅䉐䈉䈎䇯╙৻䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈮䈍䈔䉎᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈲⽺࿎೥ᷫᚢ⇛
(PRS: Poverty Reduction Strategy)䈫ኒធ䈮⚿䈶䈧䈇䈩ടㅦ䈚䈢䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䇯ಽᮭൻ䈲Ꮢ᳃䈱ෳ
ട䈫᡽ᴦ䉇ⴕ᡽䈱䉝䉦䉡䊮䉺䊎䊥䊁䉞䈱ᒻᚑ䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪᳃ਥൻ䈮㑐䉒䉍䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䉇࿾ᣇ䈱䉰䊷䊎
䉴ឭଏᯏ㑐䈱⢻ജᒝൻ䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪 PRS 䈱䉰䊷䊎䉴䊶䊂䊥䊋䊥䊷䈫㑐ଥ䈜䉎䇯䈖䈱৻ㅪ䈱⺰ℂዷ㐿䈲
䊄䊅䊷䈎䉌䈱េഥଐሽᐲ䈏㜞䈒䇮ᄢⷙᮨ䈭ௌോ೥ᷫ䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈢䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝᡽ᐭ䈏 1990
ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌ਥᒛ䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝᡽ᐭ䉅 2003 ᐕ䈮䉬䊆䉝 PRS 䉕૞ᚑ䈚䈩ห⺞䈚䈢䇯3 䉦࿖䈫䉅⽺࿎ጀ䈲
ㄘ᧛ㇱ䈮ᄙ䈒䇮࿾ᣇ䈮⾗Ḯ䉕ౣ㈩ಽ䈜䉎ಽᮭൻ䈲 PRS 䈫䈱৻⥌ᐲ䈏㜞䈎䈦䈢䇯
26
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅢ䈛䈢⽺࿎೥ᷫ䉇࿾ᣇ䈮䈍䈔䉎ෳടဳ⸘↹૞ᚑ䈫䈇䈉⹜䉂䉕ⴕ䈦䈢䇯᡽ౄ䈫䈚䈩䈲
CCM 䈏⼏Ꮸ䈱 9 ഀ䉕භ䉄䇮㊁ౄ䈏ൎ೑䈜䉎น⢻ᕈ䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䉬䊆䉝䈲䊝䉟᡽ᮭᦼ䈱࿾ᣇ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲 NGO 䉇
CBO 䈏ᵴべ䈜䉎௑ะ䈏ᒝ䉁䉍䇮䈖䉏䉌䈏᳃ਥൻ䉕੐ታ਄‧ᒁ䈚䈢䇯
27 Olow (2003)䈲䇸䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ㄘ᳃␠ળ䈲࿖ኅ䈮䉋䈦䈩᝝ᝒ䈘䉏䈭䈇(Hyden 1983)䇹䉕ᩮ᜚䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯
28 Mamdani(1996)ߩ‫ޟ‬ಽᮭൻߐࠇߚኾ೙(decentralized despotism)‫ߩޠ‬᭎ᔨߪ⧷࿖ߩ㑆ធ⛔ᴦߩ࿾ᣇߦ߅ߌࠆ
ᣉⴕታᘒࠍ␜ߒ‫ޔ‬ฦ࿾ၞߢ㚂㐳߇┙ᴺ‫ޔ‬มᴺ‫ⴕޔ‬᡽ߩਃᮭࠍ᝿ីߒ‫ޔ‬ኾᮮ⊛ߦᮭ㒢ࠍⴕ૶ߒߚ⁁ᘒࠍᗧ๧
ߔࠆ‫⤿ߪޘੱޕ‬᳃ߣߒߡ࿾ᣇߩ㚂㐳ߩන૏ߦኽශߐࠇ‫ߥ⊛ⵙ⁛ޔ‬ᡰ㈩ࠍฃߌߚ‫ޕ‬
29 ߽ߣ߽ߣߪ pull together ߩᗧ๧ߢ‫␠ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ‬ળߩ⥄⊒⊛ߥ⚻ᷣᡰេⴕὑࠍᗧ๧ߒߚ‫ޕ‬
42
1990 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌䈱 3 䉦࿖䈱ಽᮭൻ䈲䇮⒟ᐲ䈱Ꮕ䈖䈠䈅䉎䉅䈱䈱 PRS 䉕઻䈦䈩㓸࿅䉇࿾ၞ䈱ኻ┙
䉕✭๺䈚䇮࿖᡽䊧䊔䊦䈱ዋᢙᵷ㓸࿅䈏࿾ᣇ䈪ᄙᢙᵷ䈫䈭䉎੤ᷤജ䉕ឭଏ䈚䈢䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮࿾ᣇ䈱ᱦ
౉⢻ജ䈲㒢䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䈱䈪䇮⾗Ḯ䉕ౣ㈩ಽ䈜䉎䈮䈲ਛᄩ᡽ᐭ䈏䉰䊷䊎䉴䉕䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹ౝ䈮᥉෸䈜䉎
ᗧᕁ䈫⢻ജ䉕䉅䈧ᔅⷐᕈ䈏䈅䈦䈢䇯ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈉࿾ᣇ䈱ᰴర䈫⾗Ḯ䈱ౣ㈩ಽ᡽╷䈫䈇䈉ਛᄩ䈱ᰴ
ర䉕หᤨ䈮⏕┙䈘䈞䉎ᔅⷐᕈ䈮㑐䈚䈩䇮․䈮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱᡽ᐭ䈱䈭䈎䈪䉅⋧ኻ⊛䈮㜞䈇
⢻ജ䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ䈎䉌Ყセ⊛䈮቟ቯ䈚䈢ૐᚲᓧ࿖䈫䈚䈩䊄䊅䊷䈎䉌䊝䊂䊦䈫䈘䉏䈢
䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲ㅊട⊛䈭⾗Ḯ䈱ᄙ䈒䉕េഥ䈫ௌോ೥ᷫ䈎䉌ฃ䈔䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈲䉋䉍⥄࿖䈱ᱦ
౉䈮㗬䉎⽷᡽᭴ㅧ䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮ㄭᐕ䈲䈎䈧䈩䈭䈇ⷙᮨ䈪䇮࿾ၞ㑆䈪੤ઃ▚ቯၮḰ䈏ᐔ╬䈭࿾ᣇ੤
ઃ㊄䉕ᚑ┙䈘䈞䈩䈇䉎䇯
╙ੑ䈱ⷰኤ䈘䉏䈢᧦ઙ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕ផㅴ䈚䈢䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈲 CCM䇮NRM 䈫䈇䈉࿶
ୟ⊛䈭ਈౄ䈏ሽ࿷䈚䇮ਛᄩ䈪䉅࿾ᣇ䈪䉅ⴕ᡽ᯏ᭴䈱䊃䉾䊒䈮䈭䉎䈮䈲ਈౄ䈮ᚲዻ䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䈦
䈢䇯ਛᄩ䈎䉌䈱⾗㊄䈱⒖ォ䈲䇮ਈౄ䈱࿾ᣇ䈪䈱ᮭᆭ䉕㜞䉄䉎૞↪䉕઻䈦䈩䈇䉎30䇯䈖䉏䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉬
䊆䉝䈲 1990 ᐕઍᧃ䉁䈪㓸ᮭ೙䉕⛯䈔䉎䈖䈫䈪࿾ᣇ䈮⾗Ḯ䉕࿁䈘䈭䈎䈦䈢䈱䈪䇮ਇḩ⸃ᶖ╷䈫䈚䈩
ᄙ䈒䈱࿾ᣇ䉴䉺䉾䊐䈱ណ↪䉕ⴕ䈇䇮ௌോ䈱ᡰᛄ䈇䈫⋧଼䈦䈩䇮⚻Ᏹ੍▚䈱Ყ₸䈏ᩰᲑ䈮㜞䈒䈭䈦䈢
31
䇯1990 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌䈲⽷᡽⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ㅴ䉂䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䉇࿖ળ⼏ຬㆬ᜼඙䈻䈱੤ઃ㊄䈏૞䉌䉏䈢䇯
䈖䉏䉌䈲㐿⊒੍▚䈪䈅䉍䇮⚻Ᏹ੍▚䈫䈱䊋䊤䊮䉴ᡷༀ䈱ദജ䈱৻Ⅳ䈫䉂䉌䉏䉎䇯
╙ਃ䈮䇮ᄖㇱ᧦ઙ䈮㑐䈚䈩੹ᓟ䈱ᅢ᧚ᢱ䈫䈚䈩ᜰ៰䈪䈐䉎䈱䈏 EAC 䈱ㅴዷ䈪䈅䉎䇯ಽᮭൻ䈮䈧䈇
䈩䈲䇮࿖ౝ⚗੎䈏੍㒐䈪䈐䈢䈫䈚䈩䉅䇮࿖ౝ䈱ᮭജᡰ㈩䈏วᗧ䈱ᡰ㈩䈮ォ឵䈜䉎ಽ䈣䈔ᒙ૕ൻ䈜
䉎䈖䈫䈪࿖ኅ㑆⚗੎䈮ኻ䈜䉎⣀ᒙᕈ䈏Ⴧട䈜䉎ਇ቟䈏䈅䉎䇯䉬䊆䉝䈲䉸䊙䊥䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲ർㇱ䈱䉣
䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈏࿖Ⴚ䉕᜽䉖䈪ሽ࿷䈚䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈎䉌䇮䈖䈱ਇ቟䈲ᛄ᜞䈚䈐䉏䈭䈇䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮EAC 䈱ㅴዷ
䈏䈖䈱ਇ቟䉕ᛄ᜞䈚䈉䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯ㄭ䈇዁᧪䈮䇮࿾ၞᯏ᭴䋭࿖ኅ䋭࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈫䈇䈉ਃጀ䉲䉴䊁
䊛䈱ዷ㐿䈏䈅䉎䈖䈫䈲䇮࿖㓙㑐ଥ䈱䈉䈋䈎䉌䉅ಽᮭൻ䈱᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯᕈ䈱ᯏ⢻䉕Ⴧട䈘䈞䈩䈇䉎䇯
એ਄䈱ಽᨆ䈎䉌䇮᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱ᢥ⣂䈪䈲᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈲㓸ᮭൻએ਄䈮᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯᕈ䈮⽸₂䈚䇮
᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䉕✭๺䈜䉎൮៨ᕈ䉕᭴ᚑ䈜䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈔䉎ਥ䈢䉎ઃᏪ᧦
ઙ䈫䈚䈩ಽᮭൻ䈫৻૕⊛䈮ㅪ៤䈚䈢 PRS 䈏᜼䈕䉌䉏䇮䉁䈢੹ᓟ䈱 EAC 䈱ㅴዷ䉅䈠䈱䉋䈉䈮䈭䉎น
⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯
30㩷 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱႐ว䇮Ꮊⴕ᡽㐳ቭ(RAS)䈲 CCM 䉇ㅌᓎァੱ䈏ᄙ䈇䇯⋵⼏ળ䈱੐ോዪ㐳䋨DED䋩䈲ⴕ᡽⊛䊃䉾䊒
䈪䈅䉎䈏䋨䉬䊆䉝䈱 Town Clerk 䉅ห᭽䋩䇮ᄙ䈒䈲 CCM ౄຬ䈪䈅䉎䋨ᣣᧄ䈪䈲ഥᓎ⡯䈮⋧ᒰ䋩䇯࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭᡷ㕟(LGR)
᡽╷䈱ℂᗐ䈫䈚䈩䈲⼏ળ䈏છ఺䈪䈐䉎䈏䇮ታᖱ䈲࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭᄢ⤿䈏ᥳቯ⊛䈮છ๮䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯ᱴ䈬䈱 DED 䈲⃻⡯䊘䉴
䊃䉕⒖േ䋨ੱ੐⇣േ䋩䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱⋵㚢࿷⍮੐(RDC)䈲 NRM 䈫❬䈏䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯
31 IMF ߩ Statistical Abstract ߦࠃࠇ߫‫ޔ‬
1997/98-2001/02 ᐕߩ 5 ᐕ㑆ᐔဋߩ⚻Ᏹ੍▚ߩ㐿⊒੍▚ߦኻߔࠆᲧ₸
ߪ‫ ࠕ࠾ࠩࡦ࠲ޔ‬3.1 ୚‫ ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ‬1.4 ୚‫ ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ‬6.3 ୚ߢ޽ࠆ‫ߪߢ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔߒߛߚޕ‬ඨ⥄ᴦ⊛⚵❱(Semiautonomous Agencies)ߩ੍▚ߪ฽߹ࠇߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޕ‬
43
3䋩 ᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ
೨▵䈪䈲ઃᏪ᧦ઙ䈫౒䈮䇮ಽᮭൻ䈏᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈱䉅䈢䉌䈜໧㗴䉕࿁ㆱ䈪䈐䉎㆏╭䉕⏕⹺䈚䈢䇯
䈚䈎䈚䇮ಽᮭൻ䈲䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱⚿⸤(elite collusion)䈏࿁ㆱ䈪䈐䈭䈔䉏䈳᦭ല䈭ᚻᲑ䈪䈲䈭䈇32䇯䈖䈱
໧㗴䈏䈅䉎႐ว䈮䈲䇮౏౒᡽╷䈱ᚑᨐ䈏ਲ䈚䈒䈭䉎䈣䈔䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯᕈ䉅㐳ᦼ⊛䈮䈲଻
⸽䈘䉏䈭䈇䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䇯⸃᳿╷䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮ಽᮭൻ䈏ታ૕ൻ䈜䉎䈮䈲᳃ਥൻ䈱ታ૕䉕઻䉒䈭䈔䉏䈳
䈭䉌䈭䈇䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯
ታ㓙䈱䈫䈖䉐䇮࿾ᣇ䈮⾗Ḯ䉕㈩ಽ䈜䉎ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈲䇮৻ౄ೙䈏ታ૕䈮ㄭ䈇䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝
䈮䈍䈇䈩 PRS 䈱ᚻᲑ䈪䈅䉎䈫౒䈮䇮䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱⚿⸤䉕ᗧ๧䈜䉎⾗㊄䈱ᵹ䉏䈪䉅䈅䈦䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈪ㅴ
ⴕ䈜䉎ઍ⴫⊛䈭㐿⊒੤ઃ㊄䉅࿖ળ⼏ຬ䉇࿾ᣇ⼏ຬ䈏㑐ਈ䈚䈩䈍䉍䇮✚䈛䈩ౄຬ䉇⼏ຬ䉕ਛᔃ䈫䈚
䈢䉪䊤䉟䉝䊮䊁䉞䊥䉵䊛䈏ᒻᚑ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䈧䉁䉍䇮3 䉦࿖䈪䈲ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈦䈩䉅᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈫䈇䈉
䊗䊃䊛䈎䉌䈱ჿ(voice)䈱Ⴧᄢ䈫䈇䈉䉋䉍䈲ਛᄩ䈎䉌䈱⾗Ḯ䈮❬䈏䉎䉪䊤䉟䉝䊮䊃䈱ⷐ᳞䈫䈠䈱ᙬᨵ╷
䉇੤ᷤขᒁ䈮ㄭ䈎䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ೋ䉄䈩⾗Ḯ䈏ᄢⷙᮨ䈮࿾ᣇ䈮ᵹ䉏䉎䉋䈉䈮䈭䈦䈩䇮䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈏
ᣥ᧪䈱㓸ᮭ⊛᭴ㅧ䈮䈍䈔䉎䉪䊤䉟䉝䊮䊁䉞䊥䉵䊛䈎䉌ᄌൻ䈜䉎䈱䈎䈬䈉䈎䈱ᬌ⸽䈲ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎䇯
᳃ਥ⊛䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈮䈍䈔䉎Ꮢ᳃ෳട䈲䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕ᠩ⼔䈜䉎ઍ⴫⊛䈭⼏⺰䈪䈅䉎(Crook and
Sverisson 2002)䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱 NRM 䈲ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈮䈍䈔䉎Ꮢ᳃ෳട䉕ᒝ⺞䈚䇮ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈱ෳട
䈲䈖䉏䈪ઍᦧ䈘䉏䉎䈫䈱┙႐䉕ណ䈦䈩䈇䈢䇯䈖䉏䈲 2003 ᐕ䈮ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈻䈱⒖ⴕ䉕᳿䉄䉎䉁䈪⛯
䈇䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈲䊝䉟᡽ᮭᓟᦼ䈮ಽᮭൻ䉕㒢ቯ⊛䈮ዉ౉䈜䉎䉅ᄬᢌ䈚䇮᳃ਥൻ䉅ᡷ㕟䉕ㆃᑧ䈘䈞䈢䇯
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲 1995 ᐕએ㒠ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䈮䈭䉍䇮ಽᮭൻ䉅ਗⴕ䈚䈩ㅴ䉄䉌䉏䈢䇯3 䉦࿖䈱᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽ
ᮭൻ䈮ᓇ㗀䈜䉎౒ㅢ䈱ജቇ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮Ꮢ᳃䈱ήⷞ䈪䈐䈭䈇⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈻䈱ⷐ᳞䈏䈅䉎䇯᳃ਥൻ䈲䈖
䈱ⷐ᳞䉕ᒝ䉄䇮ಽᮭൻ䈲䈠䉏䈮ኻᔕ䈜䉎ᚻᲑ䈫䈭䉎䇯䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞㓸࿅䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈪䈲䇮㓸࿅ౝ
䈱㈩ಽ䈏Ყセ⊛䈮౏ᱜ䈭␠ળ䈪䈲ಽᮭൻ䈲᳃ਥ⊛䈮૞↪䈜䉎䈚䇮ਇ౏ᱜ䈭␠ળ䈪䈲ᔅ䈝䈚䉅䈠
䈉䈲䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯
౏ᱜᕈ䉕್ቯ䈘䉏䉎㓸࿅䈲䇮䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈪䈅䈦䈩䉅䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈮䉋䈦䈩඙ಾ䉌䉏䈢࿾ၞ૑᳃䈪䈅
䈦䈩䉅䉋䈇䇯䈢䈣䈚䇮᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯᕈ䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈮䈍䈇䈩ಽᮭൻ䈏䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ኻ┙䉕ᒙ䉄䉎䈫䈇䈉
ᗧ๧䈮⌕⋡䈜䉏䈳䇮ዋ䈭䈒䈫䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈗䈫䈮ਛ┙⊛䈭⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈏䈭䈘䉏䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮
᡽ౄ䈏․ቯ䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䉕ઍ⴫䈜䉎႐ว䈲䇮ᄙᭂ౒ሽဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈏ᦼᓙ䈘䉏䉎ᚻᲑ䈮䈭䉎䇯ᰴ䈮䇮
࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈮ኻ䈜䉎౏ᱜ䈭⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈪䈅䉏䈳䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ㑆䈪ਇ౏ᐔᗵ䈱䈭䈇⽷᡽⊛ಽᮭൻ䉕ⴕ䈉
ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯ታ㓙䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲࿖ኅ⊛ᦨૐၮḰ(NMS: National Minimum Standard)
䈫䈇䈉䉶䉪䉺䊷㈩ಽ䈱⠨䈋ᣇ䉕䉅䈤䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䊧䊔䊦䈱౏ᐔ䈭㈩ಽ䈮ദ䉄䈩䈇䉎䇯
32 ಽᮭൻ䈮䉋䈦䈩࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈮䈲ᣂⷙ䈱⾗Ḯ䈏ᵹ౉䈜䉎䈏䇮䈖䈱⾗Ḯ䈲ਛᄩ䈫࿾ᣇ䈱ᮭജ䉣䊥䊷䊃㑆䈱⚿⸤䈮䉋䈦
䈩๭䈶ㄟ䉁䉏䈩䈇䉎ⷐ⚛䈏䈅䉎䇯Crook(2003)䈲䊌䊃䊨䊈䊷䉳᡽ᴦ䈫ᒙ䈇䉝䉦䉡䊮䉺䊎䊥䊁䉞䈏ේ࿃䈫䈭䈦䈩䇮䈖䈱䉋䈉
䈭േ䈐䈏䈉䉁䉏䉎䈫⸃⺑䈜䉎䇯⾗Ḯ䈏ᦨ⚳⊛䈭䉰䊷䊎䉴䊘䉟䊮䊃䈮䈅䉁䉍ዯ䈇䈩䈇䈭䈇䈫䈇䈉ฦ⒳䈱⺞ᩏ⚿ᨐ䉅䈖䈱
⼏⺰䉕ⵣઃ䈔䉎৻䈧䈪䈅䉎(Reinnikka Svensson 2004)䇯
44
᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈏㓸࿅㑆䈱ታᘒ䉕෻ᤋ䈚䇮䈎䈧㓸࿅䈏࿾ၞ䈗䈫䈮ಽ䈎䉏䈩䈇䉏䈳䇮ಽᮭൻ䈲ᙍᙴ
䈱⸃ᶖ䈮ᓎ┙䈧น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉐䈉䇯ㅒ䈮䇮㓸࿅ౝ䈱ਇᐔ╬䈏ᄢ䈐䈇႐ว䈲䇮ᙍᙴ䈲㓸࿅ౝ䉣䊥䊷䊃
䈱䉟䊂䉥䊨䉩䊷ᕈ䉕ᒝ䉄䇮ಽᮭൻ䈚䈩䉅ᙍᙴ⸃ᶖ䈱ലᨐ䈲㒢ቯ䈘䉏䉎䇯䈖䈱႐ว䈲᳃ਥൻ䈏࿾ၞ
␠ળ䈮䈘䉌䈮ᶐㅘ䈚䇮㓸࿅ౝ䈱໧㗴䈏ᡷༀ䈚䈭䈇䈫⁁ᴫ䈲ᅢォ䈚䈭䈇䇯ห᭽䈮䇮᳓ᐔ⊛ਇᐔ╬䈏
ᄢ䈐䈒䈩䉅䇮⻉㓸࿅䈏ᷙ૑䈚䈩䈇䉎႐ว䈲䇮න⚐䈭ಽᮭൻ䈏䉲䊮䊗䊥䉦䊦䈭ലᨐ䉕䈅䈕䉎䈖䈫䈲䈭䈇
䈣䉐䈉䇯
䉨䉪䊡䈱ᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭ䈻䈱ᒝ䈇෻⊒䈫 1990 ᐕઍᧃ䈎䉌䈱䊄䊅䊷䈎䉌䈱ᒝ䈇ᓇ㗀䋨䉡䉧䊮䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱
䊆䉝䋩䈫䈇䈉ੑ䈧䈱᧦ઙ䉕㒰䈔䈳䇮3 䉦࿖䈱ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈱⋧㆑䈲ਥ䈫䈚䈩ᱧผ⊛䈭᡽ᴦ␠ળ೙ᐲ
䈮⿠࿃䈚䈩䈇䈢䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䇯䈖䉏䈫᳃ਥൻ䈫䈱㑐䉒䉍䉕⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯
╙৻䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈪 1990 ᐕઍ䈎䉌ಽᮭൻ䈏ផㅴ䈘䉏䈢ᄢ䈐䈭ⷐ࿃䈲 NRM 䉇 CCM
䈏᦭䈚䈩䈇䈢␠ળਥ⟵⊛䈭᡽╷䈫৻ౄᡰ㈩௑ะ䈏䈅䈦䈢33䇯䈖䉏䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉬䊆䉝䈲 1970䋭80 ᐕઍ
䈮䈲⽎‎ᶏጯ䈫ਗ䉖䈪䉝䊐䊥䉦䈱⾗ᧄਥ⟵䈱ઍ⴫⊛䈭⊒ዷ䊝䊂䊦䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈲 90 ᐕઍ䈮
౉䉍ૐᚑ㐳䈮⒖ⴕ䈚䈢䈏䇮⾗ᧄਥ⟵૕೙䈮ᄌᦝ䈲䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮ᣥ␠ળਥ⟵࿖䉇
ήౄ೙࿖䈱ᣇ䈏ਈౄ䈏ᒝ䈒䇮ಽᮭൻ䉕ㅴ䉄䉎ၮ⋚䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇䈢䇯ઁᣇ䇮᳃ਥൻ䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䇮䈬䈤䉌
䈱૕೙䈱ᣇ䈏ㅴ䉂䉇䈜䈎䈦䈢䈫䈇䈉ⷰኤ䈲䈭䈇䇯
╙ੑ䈮䇮3 䉦࿖䈮䈍䈔䉎㚂㐳(chief)䉕䊔䊷䉴䈫䈚䈢㑆ធ⛔ᴦ䈱⋧㆑䈏䈅䉎䇯䈖䈱ᒻᘒ䈲ᬀ᳃࿾൓ജ
䈏࿾ᣇ䈮ᮭജ䉕ᐢ䈕䉎䈢䉄䈱䇸⣕㓸ਛൻ(de-concentrated)䇹䉲䉴䊁䊛䈪䈅䈦䈢(Gaventa 2002)䇯䈖䈱
೙ᐲ䉕ᦨᓟ䉁䈪⛽ᜬ䈚䈢䈱䈲䉬䊆䉝䈪䇮CCM 䈫䉝䊚䊮䈲䈖䉏䉕ุቯ䈚䈢䇯䉬䊆䉝䈱Ꮊⴕ᡽䉲䉴䊁䊛
䈲䊗䊃䊛䈮㚂㐳೙䉕᦭䈚䇮ᦨ䉅ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈎䉌㆙䈇䇯ઁᣇ䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱೨ᬀ᳃࿾ᦼ䈱㚂㐳䈲ା↪
䈏ᄬ჈䈜䉎䈫੤ᦧ䈜䉎ᓎഀ䉲䉴䊁䊛䈪䈅䈦䈢(Shivji and Peter 1999)䇯䈖䈱વ⛔䉕ฃ䈔䇮䇸ኅᣖ⊛
(Ujamaa)␠ળਥ⟵䇹䈱ਅ䈪䉅ోᏒ᳃䈱᧛㓸ળ(Village Assembly)䈏ሽ࿷䈚䈢䇯䈖䈱೙ᐲ䈲 NRM 䉅
ᆎ䉄䈢䈏䇮䉬䊆䉝䈪䈲࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱⼏㐳䈏⹺䉄䈭䈇㒢䉍㐿௅䈘䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢(Bazaara p.17)䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢䊗
䊃䊛䈫䈱ធὐ䈱⋧㆑䈲䉬䊆䉝䈱㚂㐳೙䈏ᓇ㗀䈚䈩䈍䉍䇮ಽᮭൻ䈣䈔䈪䈭䈒䇮᳃ਥൻ䉇䉰䊷䊎䉴䊶䊂䊥
䊋䊥䊷䈮䈫䈦䈩䉅㓚ኂ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯
2-4
ో૕䈱ಽᨆ
೨▵䉁䈪䈱ಽᨆ䈎䉌 3 䉦࿖䈱࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈮㑐䈚䈩ᓧ䉌䉏䈢ⷰኤ䈲એਅ䈱ㅢ䉍䈪䈅䉎䇯
Ԙ Ⴚ⇇䋺䉬䊆䉝䈫䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲䈅䉎⒟ᐲ䉁䈫䉁䈦䈩⁛┙䈚䈢䈱䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱Ⴚ⇇䈲
⧷࿖䈏ផㅴ䈚䈢න૏䈪䈅䉍䇮䊑䉧䊮䉻䈫ઁ࿾ၞ䈫䈱㑆䈮ਵ㔌䈏䈅䈦䈢䇯
33
䉡䉧䊮䉻䉅 NRM 䈱⠨䈋ᣇ䈮䈲ᒰೋ␠ળਥ⟵ᜰะ䈏䈅䉍䇮䈜䈼䈩䈱ᚑੱ䋨↵ᕈ䈫ൕഭᅚᕈ䋩䈏ౄຬ䈪䈅䉍䇮㊁ౄ
䈱᦭ജ⠪䉅୘ੱ䈱⾗ᩰ䈫䈚䈩㑑௥䈮ᜰฬ䈜䉎䈭䈬൮៨ᕈ䈱᡽╷䉕ข䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䈦䈢䇯䈘䉌䈮䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲
⁛┙೨䈎䉌䊑䉧䊮䉻䈱࿾ᣇⴕ᡽೙ᐲ䈏⊒㆐䈚䇮✚〈䈱ઍℂ䈫䈚䈩⋵⍮੐(District Commissioner)䈏ሽ࿷䈚䇮㚂㐳䈎
䉌᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䉎࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈏ሽ࿷䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯
45
ԙ ᮭᆭ䋺䉨䉪䊡䈲⁛┙ㆇേ䉕ਥዉ䈚䈢䈱䈪䇮৻ቯᦼ㑆䇮䊝䉟ೋᦼ䉁䈪䈲ᡰᜬ䈘䉏䈢䇯䊑䉧䊮
䉻䈲ౝㇱ䈪䈲₺೙䈱ᮭᆭ䈏䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮ઁ㓸࿅䈎䉌䈲෻⊒䉕ฃ䈔䈢䇯䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈪䈲਄૏ᮭജ
䈲ਇ࿷䈪䈅䈦䈢䈏䇮♖␹⊛䈮䈲䊆䉣䊧䊧䈏உᄢ䈭ῳⷫ䈱䉟䊜䊷䉳䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯
Ԛ 䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䋺䉬䊆䉝䉅䉡䉧䊮䉻䉅䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞㑆䈱ኻ┙┹੎䈏䈅䉍䇮䈖䉏䈏ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ
೙䈫䊥䊮䉪䈚䈢䇯䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈏ᒝ䈒᡽ౄ䈱᭴ㅧ䉕ⷙቯ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䉏䈮ኻ䈚䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈲㕖Ᏹ
䈮⛔ว䈘䉏䈢䊅䉲䊢䊅䊦䊶䉟䊜䊷䉳䈱ᒻᚑ䈮ᚑഞ䈚䈢䇯
᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈱㑐ଥ䈪ᓧ䉌䉏䈢ⷰኤ䈲 3 ὐ䈪䈅䉎䇯╙৻䈮䇮ᄙᢙઍ⴫ဳ䈱᳃ਥਥ⟵䈲䉣䉴䊆䉲
䊁䉞㑆䈱ਇᐔ╬䉇ኻ┙䈫ㅪ㑐䈜䉎䈫䇮㜞ᐲ䈱᡽ᴦ⊛ਇ቟ቯᕈ䈮❬䈏䉍䉇䈜䈇䇯ಽᮭൻ䈲㓸ᮭൻ䉋
䉍䉅᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯᕈ䈮ነਈ䈜䉎䈏䇮⾗Ḯ㈩ಽ䈫䈇䈉ᗧ๧䈪䈲䇮৻ౄ೙␠ળ䈱䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱⚿⸤䈱⃻⽎䈫
䈚䈩䉅ᝒ䈋䉌䉏䉎䇯᳃ਥൻ䈏ㅴዷ䈜䉎೨䈎䇮หᤨ䈮ಽᮭൻ䉇ᮭജಽ᦭䈏䈅䉎⒟ᐲㅴⴕ䈚䈩䈇䈢ᣇ
䈏ਛᄩ䈪䈱ㆊᾲ䈚䈢ኻ┙䉕ㆱ䈔䉎䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䇯ᧄ᧪䈲䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䈏หᤨㅴⴕ䈚䈩䉧䊋䊅䊮
䉴䈏᭴▽䈘䉏䉎䈖䈫䈏ᦸ䉁䈚䈇䇯ᦨ䉅ෂ㒾䈭䈱䈲ᐢ⟵䈱ಽᮭൻ䈏䈭䈇䈫䈖䉐䈪ᕆỗ䈭ᄙᢙઍ⴫ဳ䈱
᳃ਥਥ⟵䈏ㅴⴕ䈜䉎႐ว䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈲䇮䉥䊗䊁᡽ᮭ䉇䊦䊪䊮䉻䇮䊑䊦䊮䊂䉞䈭䈬䈪ⷰኤ䈘䉏䈢䇯
෻ኻ䈮䇮᳃ਥൻ䈭䈐ಽᮭൻ䈲⚗੎䈮䈲䈭䉍䈮䈒䈇䈏䇮ㆊ෰䈱 NRM 䈱䉋䈉䈮ᛥ࿶⊛ᡰ㈩䈮䈲䈭䉍ᓧ
䉎䇯
╙ੑ䈮䇮ᬀ᳃࿾ㆮ೙䈱ᛂ⎕䈫䈇䈉ᗧ๧䈎䉌䈲 3 䉦࿖䈪䈲ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈏ᔅⷐ䈫䈘䉏䇮䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䈱ᗧ
ᕁ᳿ቯ䉇ⷐ᳞䈏಴䈘䉏䇮ಽᮭൻ䈏᳃ਥൻ䈫ㅪേ䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯Ꮢ᳃䈏᡽ᐭ䉕Ⓧᭂ⊛䈮⷗⋥䈜
䈢䉄䈮䈲ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈏ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎䈚䇮᳃ਥൻ䈲䈠䈱ၮ␆⊛䈭䉻䉟䊅䊚䉪䉴䉕ឭଏ䈜䉎䇯䉡䉧䊮䉻䈫䉺
䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈲␠ળਥ⟵ᜰะ䈱᡽╷䋨᡽╷䈫䈚䈩䈱㜞ᐲ䈭൮៨ᕈ䋩䈫੐ታ਄䈱৻ౄᡰ㈩䈮
↱᧪䈜䉎䈏䇮㚂㐳೙䈱ᡷᑄ䉕ᄾᯏ䈮䊗䊃䊛䈎䉌䈱ᗧᕁ᳿ቯ䈱ᒻᚑ䉕ᮨ⚝䈚䈩䈐䈢䈫䈖䉐䈏䈅䈦䈢䇯
䈖䉏䈲䉁䈣ᒙ૕䈪䈅䈦䈩䉅䇮዁᧪䈱Ꮧᦸ䈮䈭䉎䇯䉬䊆䉝䈱Ꮊⴕ᡽䉲䉴䊁䊛䈲ᬀ᳃࿾ㆮ೙䈪䈅䉍䇮㚂
㐳೙䈏ᡰ䈋䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䉏䉕䉋䉍ෳടਥ૕䈱䊨䊷䉦䊦䊶䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈮ᄌᦝ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䇮ᛮᧄ⊛䈭␠ળ
䈱ᄌ㕟䈲ⴕ䈋䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯䉁䈢䇮䉬䊆䉝䈱㓸ᮭ೙䈏੹ᓟ EAC 䈱᡽ᴦ⊛䈭࿾ၞ⛔ว䈮䊑䊧䊷䉨䉕ਈ
䈋䉎น⢻ᕈ䉅䈅䉎䇯
╙ਃ䈮䇮᳃ਥൻ䈫ಽᮭൻ䇮ァ㓌䈱൮៨ᕈ䋨᭴ᚑ䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈱ਛ┙ᕈ䋩䉇ᄖ࿖䈱੺౉䈫䈇䈦䈢ⷰὐ
䈎䉌 3 䉦࿖䈱ㆊ෰䈱ᄌൻ䉕ⷰኤ䈜䉎䈫䇮䈅䉌䉉䉎ⷐ⚛䈲ᡷༀ௑ะ䈮䈅䉍䋨ᖡൻ䈲䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇䋩䇮䈖䈱
ⷰὐ䈎䉌 3 䉦࿖䈪䈲ᄢⷙᮨ䈭᡽ᴦ⊛ਇ቟ቯᕈ䈲ᷫዋ䈚䈢䉋䈉䈪䈅䉎䇯ㆊ෰䈱䉋䈉䈭ᄢⷙᮨ䈭ౝᚢ
䉇⯦Ვ䈲⿠䈖䉌䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯ઁᣇ䇮㒢ቯⷙᮨ䈱⚗੎䇮㐳ᦼ⊛䈭ᷙੂ䉇ੱᮭᛥ࿶䇮㓞࿖䈫䈱⚗੎䈏
⊒↢䈜䉎น⢻ᕈ䈲ឃ㒰䈘䉏䈩䈇䈭䈇䇯䈖䈱ᗧ๧䈪䇮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈲৻ᔕ䈱᳃ਥൻ䉕㆐ᚑ䈚䈢䈏䇮䉁䈣
೙ᐲ䉇᡽ᴦᢥൻ䈱㕙䈪᳿䈚䈩቟ቯ䈚䈢Ბ㓏䈮౉䈦䈩䈍䉌䈝䇮ਇ቟ቯ䈭㓞࿖䈮࿐䉁䉏䈩䈇䉎ὐ䈮䉅
⇐ᗧ䈏ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎34䇯
34 䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䉅㐳ᦼ㑆䈱㓸ᮭ೙䈱ᓇ㗀䉕ฃ䈔䈩䇮᡽ᴦ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈲䉁䈣┵✜䈮䈧䈇䈢䈳䈎䉍䈪䈅䉍䇮䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䈱
೙ᐲ䉇⠨䈋ᣇ䇮␠ળ⊛䈭䊐䉤䊷䊤䊛䈱ᒻᚑ䈏ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉐䈉䇯
46
᣿䉎䈇ዷᦸ䈲 EAC 䈱ㅴዷ䈪䈅䉎䇯ᓥ᧪䈱࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈱ផ⒖䈫䈲⇣䈭䉍䇮䋼EAC䋭࿖ኅ䋭࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ
䋾䈫䈇䈉ਃጀ䈱䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ㅴዷ䈏ታ⃻䈜䉏䈳੐ᘒ䈲ᄢ䈐䈒ᄌ䉒䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯EAC 䈱⚻ᷣ⛔ว䈮䈲
ᖡᓇ㗀䈏䈭䈇䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇35䇯ὼ䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮࿖ኅ䉋䉍਄૏䈱ᰴర䈪䈱࿾ၞ⛔ว䈫ਅ૏䈱ᰴర䈪䈱
ಽᮭൻ䈏หᤨㅴⴕ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈪䇮᳃ਥൻ䈏⚗੎䉕ᗖ⿠䈜䉎࿖ኅᒻᚑ䈱✕ᒛ䈲䈅䉎⒟ᐲ⸃ᶖ䈜䉎น
⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䈱႐ว䇮⴫ 1 䈮䈲䍀⛔วൻ䍁䈫䈇䈉㗄⋡䈏౉䉍䇮䇸Ⴚ⇇䇹䈮䈲 EAC䇮䇸䉝䉟䊂䊮䊁䉞䊁䉞䇹
䈮䈲᧲䉝䊐䊥䉦ੱ䈫䈇䈉᭎ᔨ䈏౉䈦䈩䈒䉎䈱䈎䉅䈚䉏䈭䈇36䇯
ᦨᓟ䈮䇮࿖㓙␠ળ䈫䊄䊅䊷䈱ᓎഀ䈮䈧䈇䈩⠨ኤ䈜䉎䇯࿖㓙␠ળ䈲㘃ૃ䈚䈩䈇䉎䉋䈉䈮⷗䈋䉎 3 䉦࿖
䈱⇣䈭䉎䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱⢛᥊䈫⃻ᴫ䉕ᱜ⏕䈮ᛠី䈚䇮ᒰ੐࿖᡽ᐭ䈱䉥䊷䊅䊷䉲䉾䊒䉕ዅ㊀䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮
ᣂ䈢䈭䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ᒻᚑ䈮⾗䈜䉎ᡰេ䉕ⴕ䈉䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯3 䉦࿖䈲䈅䉎ᗧ๧䈪䉋䈇┹੎⋧ᚻ䈪䈅䉎
䈏䇮㓞࿖䈪䈅䈦䈩䉅⋧ᒰ䈮⇣䈭䈦䈩䈍䉍䇮ห৻䈱ᡰេ䉕ⴕ䈋䈳ᷣ䉃䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯┙ᙗ⊛䈭೙ᐲ
䉇ᤨ䈮⁁ᴫ⊛䈭ᮭജಽ᦭䈏᡽ᴦ⊛䈭቟ቯᕈ䈮ਈ䈋䉎ᓇ㗀䉕Ᏹ䈮⠨ᘦ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䈚䇮౏
౒䉰䊷䊎䉴䈏৻ㇱ䈱ੱ䇱䈪䈲䈭䈒ᧄᒰ䈮ᐢ䈏䈦䈩䈇䉎䈱䈎䉕⛘䈋䈝⏕⹺䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯䉁䈢䇮
ᣥᑷ䈮ᨴ䉁䈦䈢䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䉕ᡰេ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈲⺰ᄖ䈪䈅䉍䇮EAC 䈱ᒻᚑ䈫䈇䈉ᄢዪ⊛䈭ᵹ䉏䉅ᛠី䈚
䈭䈏䉌䇮ฦ࿖䈮ኻ䈚䈩䉋䉍Ⓧᭂ⊛䈭දജ䉕ⴕ䈉䈼䈐䈣䉐䈉䇯
ᓥ᧪䈱䊄䊅䊷䈱ᵴേ䈮䈲䇮1990 ᐕઍ೨ඨ䈮ᄙᢙઍ⴫ဳ᳃ਥਥ⟵䈱ዉ౉䉕ᒝ⺞䈚ㆊ䈑䈢䉍䇮䈖䉏
䉕᡽ᴦ⊛䉮䊮䊂䉞䉲䊢䊅䊥䊁䉞䈫䈚䈢㕙䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲⺋⻪䈏䈅䈦䈢䈫⸒䈋䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡷ㕟䈲
ᘕ㊀䈮䇮ᒰ੐࿖䈱ੱ䇱䈱⊒᩺䉕ၮ␆䈫䈚䈩ⴕ䈉ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯ฦ࿖䈱េഥ䈱ಣᣇ▐䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲ฦ⺰
䈪ᣇะᕈ䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮3 ὐ䈣䈔ઃ⸥䈜䉎䇯
╙৻䈮䇮EAC 䈮䈍䈔䉎᡽ᴦ⛔ว䈲䉅䈫䉋䉍⚻ᷣ⛔ว䈱ᓟ䈱Ბ㓏䈮૏⟎䈨䈔䉌䉏䈩䈇䈢䈏䇮2004 ᐕ
䈮䊛䉶䊔䊆ᄢ⛔㗔䉋䉍䊐䉜䊷䉴䊃䊶䊃䊤䉾䉪䈪ㅪ㇌೙䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎᩺䈏ᛂ⸻䈘䉏䈢䇯ട⋖࿖䈲䈖䈱ᬌ⸛
䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲วᗧ䈚䈢䇯䈖䈱໧㗴䈮䈲ฦ࿖䈏䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭ᯏળ䈫䊥䉴䉪䉕ᛴ䈋䈩䈇䉎(ODI 2007)䇯⋡ᮡ
ᐕᰴ䈲⋡೨䈮ㄼ䈦䈩䈍䉍䇮੹ᓟ䈱䊄䊅䊷䈱䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ᡰេ䈲䈜䈼䈩䈖䈱᭴ᗐ䉕ᗧ⼂䈚䈩ⴕ䈉ᔅⷐ
䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䉏䈡䉏䈱䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䉕ᱷ䈚䈢䉁䉁⛔ว䈜䉎䈖䈫䈲䈪䈐䈭䈇䈚䇮ో䈒ᣂⷙ䈱⸳⸘䉕ో૕䈮䈜
䉎䈖䈫䉅䈪䈐䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯ฦ࿖䈮ᒙὐ䈏䈅䉎䈏䇮․䈮䉬䊆䉝䈲᳃ਥ⊛ಽᮭൻ䈏ㆃᑧ䈚䇮䈎䈧㕖Ᏹ䈮
ⶄ㔀䈭࿾ᣇⴕ᡽ᯏ᭴䈮䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䈱䈪䇮PNU-ODM ㅪ┙᡽ᮭ䈱䉅䈫䈪䈱ᕆㅦ䈭ᡷ㕟䉕ᡰេ䈜䉎ᔅ
ⷐ䈏䈅䉐䈉䇯
╙ੑ䈮䇮䈖䈉䈚䈢਄૏䈱േ䈐䈫䉅㑐ଥ䈚䈩䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈮ኻ䈜䉎ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈲ᡷ㕟䈏ㅴ䉖䈪䈇䉎䉡䉧䊮
䉻䇮䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅ಾታ䈭䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒䈱᳃ਥൻ䈫䉺䉟䉝䉾䊒䈚䈢䉅䈱䈮䈲䈭䈦䈩䈇䈭䈇䇯ᤓ
੹䈱䊄䊅䊷䈱េഥ㗵䈱Ⴧട䈲䇮࿾ᣇ䈱䊆䊷䉵䈮ᔕ䈋䉎䈫䈇䈉ᗧ๧䈪䈲᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯᕈ䈮⽸₂䈚䈢น
35
䉬䊆䉝⚻ᷣ䈱ᶐㅘ䈮䉋䈦䈩ઁ࿖䈱࿾႐↥ᬺ䈏ଚ㘩䈘䉏䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䈚䇮ㅒ䈮䉬䊆䉝䈱ㄘ↥ຠ䈱┹੎ജ䈏䈭䈒
䈭䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮⴮ㅌ䈜䉎↥ᬺ䈮ᓥ੐䈚䈩䈇䉎㓸࿅䈏⚗੎䉕⿠䈖䈜น⢻ᕈ䉅䈅䉐䈉䇯
36 ಽᮭൻ߇ㅴࠎߢ޿ࠆ߶ߤ࿾ၞ⛔ว߇ㅴ߻ߩ߆ߣ޿ߞߚਔ⠪ߩ⋧㑐ߪ‫⥝ޔ‬๧ᷓ޿⎇ⓥ࠹࡯ࡑߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
47
⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䈦䈢䉅䈱䈱䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱ਛᄩ䊶䊄䊅䊷ଐሽ䈱௑ะ䉕ᒝ䉄䈢䇯࿾ᣇ䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅ᱦ౉ၮ⋚䉕
࿕䉄䇮⚻Ᏹ੍▚䈱ㆊඨ䉕ᜂ䈉䉋䈉䈭૕೙䈱᭴▽䈏᳞䉄䉌䉏䉎䇯䈖䈱੍▚䈱⥄┙ൻ䈲䇮䊗䊃䊛䉝䉾䊒
䈱ᗧᕁᒻᚑㆊ⒟䈫๭ᔕ䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱ਅ૏䈮ኻ䈜䉎⽿છ(downward accountability)䉕ᒝൻ
䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮⾗䈜䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯䊄䊅䊷䈲ታ㓙䈮࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䈱ᱦ౉䉕ะ਄䈘䈞䉎䉋䈉䈭䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛䈮ข䉍⚵䉃
䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯
╙ਃ䈮䇮ಽᮭൻ᡽╷䈮䉋䈦䈩ᧄᒰ䈮࿾ᣇ䈱⽺࿎䈏೥ᷫ䈘䉏䉎䈢䉄䈮䈲䇮䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱භ᦭䉇⚿⸤䈏
᜛ᄢ䈚䈭䈇ᒻ䈪䈱⾗Ḯ䈱⒖ォ䉕࿑䉌䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯໧㗴䈲䇮ᔅⷐ䈫䈘䉏䉎႐ᚲ䈮⾗Ḯ䈏ዯ䈐䇮
᦭ല䈮૶䉒䉏䉎䉋䈉䈮⁁ᴫ䈏ᡷༀ䈚⛯䈔䈩䈇䈔䉎䈎䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪䈅䉎䇯ಽᮭൻ䈫᳃ਥൻ䈏⋧੕ଦㅴ⊛
䈮ㅴⴕ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䇮䈖䈱䉋䈉䈭ᡷༀ䈲㔍䈚䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯䈖䈱ⷰὐ䈎䉌䈱࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ䉇ಽᮭൻ䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛
䈱᦭ലᕈ䈱⹏ଔ䈮㑐䈚䈩䈲ઁ䈱䊄䊅䊷䈫౒䈮ข䉍⚵䉃䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯⸘↹䉇䊝䊆䉺䊥䊮䉫⹏ଔ䉕᡽ᐭ
䈫䊄䊅䊷㑆䈪౒᦭䈚䈢䈉䈋䈪䇮ታᣉᲑ㓏䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲୘ᕈ䈱䈅䉎ᡰេ䉕ⴕ䈋䈳䉋䈇䈫ᕁ䉒䉏䉎䇯
ෳ⠨ᢥ₂
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㕍ᩉ߹ߜߎ✬࡮⋙⸶ (1996)‫ߪߣޢࠢ࠶࠾ࠬࠛޡޟ‬૗߆㧙ࠛࠬ࠾ࠪ࠹ࠖၮᧄ⺰ᢥㆬ‫ ޠ‬ᣂᴰ␠
દ⮮ᱞ 2007 ‫ޡޟ‬㗔ၞᕈ(territoriality)‫ޢ‬᭎ᔨߩౣᬌ⸛‫ ޔޠ‬ችፉ༜‫᧻⧯ޔ‬㇌ᒄ‫ޔ‬ዊ᫪ብ⟤
✬‫ޟ‬࿾ၞߩ࡛࡯ࡠ࠶ࡄ㧙ᄙጀൻ࡮ౣ✬࡮ౣ↢‫ޠ‬ᚲ෼ ੱᢥᦠ㒮 44-68 㗁
╣ጟ㓶৻ (2005) ‫ࠆߌ߅ߦࠞ࡝ࡈࠕ᧲ޟ‬࿾ᣇಽᮭൻߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޠ‬Discussion Paper on Development
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ᕡᎹᗆᏒ (2006) ‫ޟ‬᳃ਥਥ⟵૕೙ߩ㐳ᦼ⊛ᜬ⛯ߩ᧦ઙ‫ޔޠ‬ᕡᎹ✬‫ޟ‬᳃ਥਥ⟵ࠕࠗ࠺ࡦ࠹ࠖ࠹ࠖ㧙
ᣂ⥝࠺ࡕࠢ࡜ࠪ࡯ߩᒻᚑ‫ޠ‬Ყセ᡽ᴦฌᦠ 1 ᣧⒷ↰ᄢቇ಴ ㇱ
ศ↰᣽ᄦ (2008) ‫⎇ࠞ࡝ࡈࠕޟ‬ⓥߣ⁛┙ᓟ 50 ᐕߩࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ‫ޠ‬㦖⼱ᄢቇ␠ળ⑼ቇ⎇ⓥᚲ
೎⴫㧝㩷 㪊 ࠞ࿖ߩਥⷐࠛࠬ࠾ࠪ࠹ࠖߣቬᢎ㩷
䉣䉴䊆䉲
䉬䊆䉝(40)
Kikuyu(22 䋦 ) 䇮 Luyha(14 䋦 ) 䇮 Luo(13 䋦 ) 䇮 Kalenjin(12 䋦 ) 䇮 Kamba(11 䋦 ) 䇮
Kisii(6䋦)䇮Meru(6䋦)
䊁䉞㩷
䉡䉧䊮䉻(21)
Ganda(16.9 䋦 ) 䇮 Ankole(9.5 䋦 ) 䇮 Soga(8.4 䋦 ) 䇮 Kiga(6.9 䋦 ) 䇮 Iteso(6.4 䋦 ) 䇮
Langi(6.1䋦)䇮Acholi(4.7䋦)
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝
Sukuma䋨12.4䋦䋩䇮Makonde(3.9䋦)䇮Chagga(3.6%)䇮Haya(3.3%)䇮Nyamwazi(3.3%)
(126)
ቬᢎ㩷
䉬䊆䉝
䊒䊨䊁䉴䉺䊮䊃 45䋦䇮䉦䉸䊥䉾䉪 35䋦䇮䊛䉴䊥䊛 10䋦䇮વ⛔⊛ቬᢎ 10䋦㩷
䉡䉧䊮䉻
䊒䊨䊁䉴䉺䊮䊃 42䋦䇮䉦䉸䊥䉾䉪 41.9䋦䇮䊛䉴䊥䊛 12.1䋦䇮䈠䈱ઁ 3.1䋦
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝
䉺䊮䉧䊆䊷䉦䈏䉪䊥䉴䉼䊞䊮 30䋦䇮䊛䉴䊥䊛 35䋦䇮વ⛔⊛ቬᢎ 35䋦䇮䉱䊮䉳䊋䊦䈏䊛
䉴䊥䊛 99䋦
಴ౖ䈲 CIA-The World Factbook 䈮᜚䉎, ૉ䈚䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝䈱䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈲 Nyang’oro㩷 (2004)䈮䉋䉎 1967 ᐕ䉶䊮䉰
䉴䇯ฦ⒳⛔⸘䈮䉋䉎ᢙሼ䈲䇮․䈮䉡䉧䊮䉻䈱䉣䉴䊆䉲䊁䉞䈫䉬䊆䉝䈱䊛䉴䊥䊛䈮䈍䈇䈩ᄢ䈐䈒⇣䈭䉎䇯
51
࿑䋱䋮᳃ਥൻ䋨ⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙䋩䈫ಽᮭൻ䉕䉄䈓䉎᡽ᴦㆊ⒟䈱䉟䊜䊷䉳㩿㪈㪐㪐㪇㪄㪉㪇㪇㪏 ᐕ㪀㩷
ಽᮭൻ
ᒝ
Ԙ
㪲⊒ዷ⚻〝㪴㩷
ԙ
Ԛ
㽲
䉡䉧䊮䉻㩷
㽳
䉺䊮䉱䊆䉝㩷
㽴
䉬䊆䉝㩷
㽵
䊦䊪䊮䉻㩷
᳃ਥൻ
⚻〝䈲න⚐ൻ䈚䈩⋥
ᒙ
ᒝ
✢䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷
ԛ
಴⊒ὐ
ᒙ
ᵈ㧦Ԙߪ 1990 ᐕઍߦ NRM ߩ߽ߣߢ㨅ゲ㧔❑㧕ᣇะߦะ߆ߞߚ߇‫ޔ‬2003 ᐕߩⶄᢙ᡽ౄ೙ߩ
ዉ౉ࠍᄾᯏߦ㨅ゲࠍ⿧ߒߡ╙৻⽎㒢ߦ౉ߞߚ‫ޕ‬ԙߪ 1990 ᐕઍ߆ࠄᦨ߽ 45 ᐲ✢ߦㄭ޿ᣇะ
ߢㅴࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬Ԛߪ 1990 ᐕઍో⥸⊛ߦ✭ᘟߥേ߈ߢ޽ߞߚ߇‫ޔ‬ฦ⒳ߩ⽷᡽⊛ಽᮭൻࠍㅴ߼
ߚ 2000 ᐕઍೋ߼ߦಽᮭൻ߇㨄ゲߦ೔㆐ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ԛߩߺ 1994 ᐕߩ⚗੎ߦ⥋ࠆㆊ⒟߹ߢࠍ⴫ߒ
ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
52
╙ 3 ┨ ࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࡝࠹ࠖߣ᡽╷ኻ⹤ʊ⣀ᒙ࡮⚗੎࿖ኅ߳ߩࠗࡦࡊ࡝ࠤ࡯࡚ࠪࡦ
Chapter 3 Conditionality and Policy Dialogue: Implications for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
ዊ㊁⌀ଐ㧔FASID ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ ⎇ⓥഥᚻ㧕
Mai Ono (Research Assistant, IDRI, FASID)
㧔ⷐ⚂㧕
࿖㓙េഥ␠ળߪ 80-90 ᐕઍߩ⚻㛎߿㜞߹ࠆេഥലᨐะ਄߳ߩ ᔨ߆ࠄ‫ⵍޔ‬េഥ࿖ߦኻߔࠆេ
ഥ⾉ઃ࡮ଏਈ᧦ઙ㧔ࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࡝࠹ࠖ㧕ߩ⷗⋥ߒࠍㅴ߼ߡ߈ߚ‫ߩߟ৻ߩߘޕ‬Ꮻ⚿ߪ 2005
ᐕߩ‫࡝ࡄޟ‬ት⸒‫ߦޠ‬㓸⚂ߐࠇࠆ‫ߦࡊ࠶ࠪ࡯࠽࠻࡯ࡄޔ‬ၮߠ޿ߚ࠼࠽࡯࡮ⵍេഥ࿖㑐ଥߩ⏕
┙ߦะߌߚ࿖㓙⊛ࠦࡒ࠶࠻ࡔࡦ࠻ߢ޽ࠆ‫ߒ߆ߒޕ‬ቯ⟵਄‫ޔ‬㐿⊒េഥߩࡄ࡯࠻࠽࡯ࠪ࠶ࡊߩ
ၮ⋚ߣߥࠆ᡽ᐭ೙ᐲߩ⛔ᴦ⢻ജ߹ߚߪ㧔෸߮㧕᡽ᴦᗧᕁߩᒙߐ߇⪺ߒ޿‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࡮⚗੎࿖ኅ‫ޠ‬
ߦ߅޿ߡ‫ߚߒ߁ߎޔ‬េഥലᨐะ਄߳ߩ ᔨ߇ߤߩ⒟ᐲᔕ↪ߐࠇᓧࠆߩ߆ߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔ‬࿖㓙េ
ഥ␠ળߩ⚻㛎ߪᧂߛචಽߢߥߊ‫ޔ‬ᄙߊߩ⺖㗴߇ᜰ៰ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ᧄޕ‬Ⓜߢߪ‫ޔ‬వߕ㧔1㧕ࡄ࡯
࠻࠽࡯ࠪ࠶ࡊߩේೣߦၮߠ޿ߚ᭽‫ߥޘ‬࿖㓙េഥࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴߇‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࡮⚗੎࿖ኅ‫ࠆߌ߅ߦޠ‬
࿖ኅᑪ⸳߿ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕ߦ߽ߚࠄߒᓧࠆน⢻ᕈߣ㒢⇇ߣࠍ᭎⺑ߒ‫ޔ‬㧔2㧕․ߦߘߩ㒢⇇ߩ↢ᚑ
ⷐ࿃ߣߒߡߩេഥ࠼࠽࡯஥ߩ໧㗴ߦశࠍᒰߡ‫ޔ‬ਥⷐߥ㐿⊒េഥ࠼࠽࡯㧔☨‫ޔ⧷ޔ‬EU㧕ߦࠃ
ࠆࠦࡦ࠺࡚ࠖࠪ࠽࡝࠹ࠖߣⵍេഥ࿖ߣߩኻ⹤ߦ㑐ߔࠆ᡽╷ᣇ㊎ߣ‫ࠍࠇߘޔ‬ណ↪ߔࠆߦ⥋ߞ
ߚ࿖ౝߩ᡽ᴦ⊛ⷐ࿃ߣࠍ⼏⺰ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬㧔3㧕ᦨᓟߦ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߩ㐿⊒េഥ߳ߩ฽ᗧࠍᬌ⸛ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣ
ᧄߪ‫ޟ‬ODA ᄢ✁‫߽ߡ޿߅ߦޠ‬᡽╷ኻ⹤ߩ㊀ⷐᕈࠍឝߍߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ࠅࠃޔ‬ലᨐ⊛ߥ᡽╷ኻ⹤ࡊ
ࡠ࠮ࠬߩታ⃻ߦߪ‫ޟޔ‬⣀ᒙ࡮⚗੎࿖ኅ‫ޠ‬໧㗴ߦኻߔࠆᣣᧄߣߒߡߩ᡽╷ࠬ࠲ࡦࠬߩ᣿⏕ൻ
ߣ‫⵬ࠍࠇߎޔ‬ᒝߔࠆ߽ߩߣߒߡᣣᧄ߇ߎࠇ߹ߢ߽ᄖ੤ಽ㊁ࠍㅢߓߡᵈജߒߡ߈ߚᐔ๺᭴▽
ಽ㊁߳ߩ࿖㓙⊛⽸₂ߩ৻ጀߩᒝൻ߇ᔅⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
3-1 Introduction
3-1-1 Context and objectives of the paper
Fragile and conflict-affected states by definition are marked by fractured governance. A
development scenario propounded by donors to address this challenge revolves around the use of
nuanced forms of conditionality including policy dialogue, “a mechanism to leverage political
reform …(that) firmly rooted in persuasion (Morrissey 2005:237, in Koeberle 2005)”. The
underlying premise reflects the lesson learned from past international experience that imposing
external conditionality works well only when there is strong political support for the reform within
the recipient country.
To what extent is concern about aid effectiveness and partnership useful in fragile and
conflict-affected situations? The record is mixed. Previous studies suggest that in fragile states
progress in addressing the fundamental political problems varies, and while the development
53
partnership model based on the Paris Declaration may be applicable in “hopeful partnerships,” it
may not be so in “problematic partnerships,” where social conditions are deteriorating and the basis
for a dialogue is very weak (OPM/IDL 2008).
Still, the need to identify opportunities for interaction with fragile and conflict-affected
states on political issues is immense. The recent focus on state-building in these situations reflects
also the growing international recognition of the importance of going beyond technocratic
approaches, or one-size-fits-all approaches, to find a ‘new development paradigm’ that “orients
itself at the model of an embedded and effective state and sees the role of external actors… in
facilitating and supporting indigenous processes as long as they meet certain normative minimum
criteria (Tobias 2007)”.
This study focuses on the strategies by which major bilateral donors ensure the
commitment of partner countries, while supporting the partners’ efforts to enhance their capacity to
use aid effectively. Taking stock of past experiences, the paper aims to identify key challenges in
employing various forms of conditionality. It then examines implications for Japanese development
aid in strengthening the process of policy dialogue with fragile and conflict-affected states.
3-1-2 Structure of the paper
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a brief overview of the paper as a
whole. Section 2 highlights how international debate on the donor-recipient relationship has evolved
over past decades by examining the shift in the use of conditionality. It also discusses findings from
recent studies on the application of the development partnership model in fragile and
conflict-affected situations. Section 3 considers specific policy stances and approaches taken by
some bilateral donors, namely the US, the UK, and the EU, with regard to the issues of
conditionality and dialogue. Building on discussions presented in previous chapters, Section 4
examines implications for Japanese development aid.
3-2 Literature review
3-2-1 Aid, Conditionality and Dialogue
Economists have often discussed donor-recipient relationships in terms of the
principal-agent theoretical model, wherein recipients (the agents) implement the conditions desired
by donors (the principals) (Killick 1996,1997, in Nissanke 2008). However, in reality, this is rarely
a straightforward calculation. Aid is typically provided for mixed purposes - diplomacy, commerce,
the expansion of cultural hegemony, concern for security, natural resources acquisition, and
development. Also, aid relations are often characterized by asymmetric power structures, resulting
in weakened commitments by recipients to take political risks and adjustment costs to attain the
54
development objectives that are intended by donors (Nissanke 2008:31). This is especially the case
with regard to aid in fragile and conflict-affected situations.
The issue of conditionality has always been central to the practice of aid-giving. In its
origins, aid was based essentially on the idea that there should be a bargain between donor and
recipient. Both sides have their own respective objectives on the basis of which they make deals
such that each gets some of what it wants in return for giving the other some of what it wants. In
contrast to this pattern, a partnership approach presumes shared objectives. The problem with
applying the partnership concept to fragile and conflict-affected states is that there are insufficient
shared objectives. (Collier 2005:113, in Koebeler et al 2005). Thus, various tools for persuasion
have developed - such as policy dialogue.
In theory, conditionality can help to strengthen the legitimacy of the state in countries
emerging from conflict or at the risk of conflict, and if used carefully, can even contribute to the
consolidation of peace in countries under ongoing conflict. Hence the question to be addressed is
not whether conditionality is needed, but what conditionality is appropriate and why. (USAID 1982)
3-2-2
From Conditionality to Dialogue: In Theory
Incorporating the “right” approaches for improved donor-recipient relationships has always
been at the top of the agenda for international development discourse. But the prescriptions have
changed, one after another, from the 'capital shortage' diagnosis in the 1960’-70’s to the 'policy
failures' diagnosis in the 1980’s and then on to the 'institutional failures' diagnosis in the 1990’s
(Nissanke 2008). From the mid-90s, a broad consensus was formed around the importance of good
governance and on the role of democratic participation. This was in recognition that traditional
approaches to conditionality did not work because political conditionalities yield positive results
only when strong social groups in a recipient country called for such measures. In 1998, the World
Bank published a well-cited report on this issue1 which claimed that the chances for successful
external engagement were limited without recipient countries’ commitment to the principles of good
governance (i.e. ownership).
In response, the Bretton Woods Institutions moved to review the scope and content of
conditionality; what was called incentive-based, ex-ante conditionality (such as in the Structural
Adjustment Lending of the ‘80s) was replaced by selectivity-based, ex-post conditionality (such as
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Country Policy Institutional Assessments (CPIA) in the
‘90s). The number of macroeconomic conditionalities attached to lending was also reduced and
streamlined on average by 40% (Gould and Ojanen 2003:23).
Since the latter half of the 1990s, the rhetoric of partnership has increasingly been
World Bank (1998) Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t Work and Why. Washington DC, The
World Bank.
1
55
discussed under the banner of harmonization and alignment and has been translated into concrete
development practices and procedures, such as SWAps and budget support, which contain fewer
conditions and are agreed and revised annually based on the recipient country’s performance in the
previous year. (Box 1) The major exception to such ex-post approach is the use of “variable
tranches” by the EU and some other bilateral donors, which is based on within-year performance
measured in terms of policy and outcome indicators.2
The shift in donor thinking on conditionality and a general move toward the principle of
partnership reflected an international consensus that there should be greater focus on aid
effectiveness and results orientation. Long-term engagement based on fixed “fundamental
understandings” or framework conditions meant reduction in transaction costs. In 2005, the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness consolidated the international donor community’s commitment to
provide aid through a partnership-based development model framed by 5 principles3 and established
an agreed set of joint indicators for measuring aid effectiveness. The idea was to stimulate
competition for aid between developing countries by promising to reward ‘good performers. To
supplement this, donors have come to use more nuanced and informal forms of donor engagement
tools (such as policy dialogue) to increase focus on capacity development and listening. There is,
however, some criticism on the superficiality of donor approaches toward ownership. (For example,
see OECD-DAC 2008, Action Aid 2006, Wilks and Lefrancios 20024).
These types of tranches are designed to encourage the development of local policy solutions (and
hence the ownership of recipient countries) by linking some part of the funding to outcome indicators
rather than prior policy actions, while ensuring aid predictability by providing the large and
remaining part of the funding through fixed tranches. However, there are also some concerns among
partner governments who fear they may be penalized for falling short in meeting goals as a result of
factors beyond their control, such as a collapse in international commodity price, etc., that might push
the government to cut budget allocations for social sector spending.
2
3
Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results, and Mutual accountability.
Available at:http://www.accrahlf.net/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ACCRAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21740505~
pagePK: 64861884~piPK:64860737~theSitePK:4700791,00.html
4
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Box 1: Donor thinking on conditionality
The World Bank and IMF
The new guidelines on conditionality published in 2002 (IMF) and 2005 (World Bank) claim
that disbursement conditions should (1) derive from government plans (notably Poverty
Reduction Strategies), (2) be limited in number, and (3) be interpreted flexibly.
DFID
The UK government outlines three conditionality principles for UK engagement with
developing countries in a policy paper published in 2005; (1) Reducing poverty and
achieving MDGs, (2) Respecting human rights and other international obligations, and (3)
Strengthening financial management and accountability, and reducing the risk of funds being
misused through weak administration or corruption. (DFID 2005)
3-2-3 Experiences from Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: In Practice
The development partnership model based on the Paris Declaration principle would not be
straightforwardly applicable to fragile and conflict-affected situations because the basis for
donor-recipient partnership is often fractured. One donor effort to address this challenge is the
Fragile States Principles (OECD-DAC 2007) which highlights the importance of supplementing
international engagement with these countries t by the principle of state-building and “Do No
Harm.”
A study by OPM/IDL (2008) identifies opportunities and challenges in applying the Paris
Declaration development partnership model to these countries depending on the degree of progress
in addressing the political issues that underscore state fragility (“hopeful partnerships” and
“problematic partnerships”(Table 1)).
57
Table 1: Classification of fragile and conflict affected situations and issues and challenges that
donors face in building partnerships
“hopeful partnerships”
Transition or
Peace, national reconciliation or agreed transition process supported by the
post-conflict settings
international community. Government priorities generally expressed through
a transitional results framework, based on a joint national-international needs
assessment.
Gradually improving
State capacity improving and reform efforts have made some progress, but
situations
situation remains fragile and capacity-constrained. Includes many
“post-conflict countries” where reform progress has been positive but gradual.
What are the challenges?
(i)The capacity constraints of the state (and civil society), resulting in poor quality and availability of
baseline data and indicators of progress on which development partners align. (ii) Dominance of
international community in many transitional context.
“problematic partnerships”
increasing risk of
Deterioration in governance, rising conflict risk and increased diversion
conflict
between government and the international community in development
strategy.
prolonged crisis or
No consensus between government and the international community on
impasse
development strategy.
situations of ongoing
Ongoing conflict between key national stakeholders, undermining the
conflict
stability, reach, capacity and the legitimacy of the state.
What are the challenges?
(i) Highly politicized context; (ii) Tightly restricted space for assistance; (iii) Atmosphere of secrecy and
self-censorship; (iv) Limited financial and human resources, including weak capacity; and (v) Lack of
reliable data.
Source: Oxford Policy Management (OPM) /the IDL Group (2008)
(1) Opportunities
In transitional or post-conflict settings and gradually improving situations there is a
greater scope for harnessing a development model based on the principle of donor-recipient
partnership to help increase the stability of the situation, albeit the distinction between post-conflict
and in-conflict is often a blurred one. Donor efforts to establish a strategic planning and
coordination framework through improved international dialogue include Consolidated Action Plans
58
(CAP) and the Transitional CAP by OCHA, PRSPs and Interim-PRSPs (I-PRSPs) 5 , the
development of Transitional Result Matrices (TRMs)6 to support the PRS process, and overarching
monitoring frameworks for national budget management. Many expectations are also placed on the
potential role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the development of Strategic
Peace-building Framework (Box X), for the Commission’s ‘convening’ power and also for its
unique ability to exert silent pressure on the government by having UN Security Council (UNSC)
applying pressure, although the PBC, itself, does not has executive authority nor enforcement
capacity.
Box 2: Liberia GEMAP
At the Liberia Partner’s Forum held in Feb 2007, donors (UNSC, World Bank, IMF, EU and
US) committed to coordinate and harmonized their programs and track disbursements and
projections of resources to allow for more coherent government planning. This resulted in
the development of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
(GEMAP) which has provided robust oversight of and conditionality for public financial
management functions through positioning international experts in key public finance
positions (The Institute for State Effectiveness 2008:13). Regular review of GEMAP by the
UNSC has also provided another, indirect, oversight mechanism. While emphasizing the
necessity of continued monitoring on the overall impact of the GEMAP, Dwan and Bailey
(2006) observe that the presence of strong oversight mechanism was especially crucial
because the national leadership was initially identified as a key source for corruption.
Still, as of 2004, only 7 of 34 countries identified as Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) by
the World Bank have developed PRSPs while 8 have developed I-PRSPs (Interim-PRSPs) (Thornton
and Cox 2005).
5
The TRM is a planning, coordination, and management tool aimed at improved prioritization of
actions necessary to achieve a successful transition in fragile states. The TRM helps launch PRS
approaches in these environments, either by acting as an early framework to lay the groundwork for a
PRS or later as a way to operationalize poverty reduction strategies in low capacity countries. See:
UNDG and the World Bank (2005)
6
59
Box 3: The Role of PBC in Fostering International Dialogue
Two episodes underscore the PBC’s unique advantages in fostering international dialogue: In
Burundi, the PBC facilitated a government-IMF negotiation process, both at headquarters
and at the field level, when IMF hinted its intention to delay completion of its Sixth Burundi
Review, a decision which was regarded as potential threat to stabilization of the country. In
Sierra Leone, the PBC created an arena for dialogue among relevant stakeholders to mobilize
political support for the incorporation of energy, which is usually considered a medium-to
long-term development agenda, into the strategic framework for peace consolidation.
(CIC/IPI 2008)
There is international consensus on the importance of aid “on budget” instead of “off
budget” to ensure that donors work is compatible with national systems and to improve the
government’s public financial management capacity while not unjustly legitimizing the government
by subjugating aid to government priorities or policies (what is called by the UK as
“shadow-alignment”). Pooled funds (e.g. Multi-Donor Trust Funds and joint programmes), which
are also thought to provide a number of advantages7, should be limited in its use to avoid generating
aid dependency. High macroeconomic and fungibility risks are compensated by intensive inputs of
technical assistance, such as the case of Liberia GEMAP and also other fragile and conflict-affected
situations receiving budget support (e.g. Sierra Leone, Rwanda). A survey on the impact of budget
support on the donor-recipient relationship by the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA)8 finds
that among 15 African States surveyed “[t]hree-quarters of respondents indicated that the MoU or
joint performance assessment matrix had significantly improved the quality of the dialogue between
government and donors (SPA 2006),” qualified with a remainder that it was not for a definitive
conclusion.
Even in conflict-affected settings, conditionality may help to build a durable peace – the
role of conditionality discussed under the term “peace conditionality (Boyce 2004).” The conclusion
of peace agreements and the use of needs assessments (e.g. Post Conflict Needs Assessments
(PCNA) and Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs)), joint planning and prioritization tools (TRMs and
Multi-Donor Trust Funds), and joint donor offices may serve as benchmarks on which donors can
decide whether to continue or to suspend aid provision while ensuring room for partnership as
envisaged by the principle of alignment and harmonization. As Boyce (2003:3) notes, however, it is
The benefits of using pooled funds include (1) promoting a more programmatic and long-term
approach to service delivery etc, (2) reducing the tendency to projectisation, and (3) promoting
harmonization and alignment. (Leader and Colenso 2005:7)
7
The Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) is the forum of multilateral and bilateral development
agencies, now with rotating African country membership, on assistance to low-income Africa.
8
60
critical that the designing of “[p]eace conditionality moves beyond these all-or-nothing choices, in
which the aid tap is either ‘on’ or ‘off’. .. Instead it seeks to calibrate the flow of support more
closely to the peace process, by tying specific aid agreements to specific steps to build peace.”
With regard to resource-rich fragile states, conditionality may also contribute to the three
broader development challenges they face (Boyce 2003:5): (1) ensuring distributional equity of the
resource, (2) ensuring that resource revenues be used for peaceful development purposes, and (3)
promoting transparency and accountability. International campaigns against the illegal flow of such
natural resources to international markets, as well as international arrangements such as the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) and the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme (KPCS) can help curtail the use of natural resources to further conflict. In Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), the UN Expert Panel for DRC has proposed sanctions against all related
parties (individuals and private corporations) involved in the illicit exploitation of the DRC’s natural
resources by urging international donors to reduce development aid to the neighboring governments
that host them. Diplomatic efforts also play a key role in promoting the adoption of international
codes that aim to improve natural resources transparency (e.g. Liberia).㩷 㩷
(2) Limits and Challenges
In principle conditionality can be used to support the objectives of enhancing state
legitimacy and consolidating peace. In practice, such efforts have been rather the exception than the
rule, and where intended the outcomes have been mixed. Boyce (2003) identifies three restraining
factors for this: (1) governmental lack of legitimacy and authority over the national territory (e.g.
Somalia as a whole) or situations where such control has existed but not backed by international
recognition (e.g. Somaliland, Puntland), (2) the measures on offer is insufficient to attract the targets
to adopt peace- and state-building policies (e.g. Angola), and (3) donors themselves may not accord
peace- and state-building priority over other geopolitical, commercial, and institutional interests.
Besides, the level of field representation by donor governments and agencies is still limited, which
may have also hampered dialogue and consensus-building process on development agenda (e.g.
Somalia and Zimbabwe).
Experience highlights the limited extent to which conditionality, especially that related to
political issues, can assert influence on the recipient government. In Rwanda, the World Bank’s
prior action and the EU’s outcome-oriented variable tranche approaches seemed to be more
intrusive than the UK and Sweden’s “broad performance assessment” approach, because of
government sensitivity to “policy interference.” However, under the more specific WB/EU
approach, the definition of performance gains clarity. More critically, government officials clearly
state that political conditionality, even when garnished with ‘carrots,’ will not work, especially those
on issues that the government considers as non-negotiable, such as national security matters (Purcell
61
et al. 2006:23-24). Leader and Conlenso note that “[t]he choice of instrument needs a sophisticated
political economy analysis, donors need to examine how different aid instruments are likely to
influence the bargaining process between actors in the country rather than seeing recipient
governments as unitary agents to be manipulated with carrots and sticks.”(2005:43)
Box 4: Burundi case study
In Burundi there have been high levels of government involvement in the development of the
country’s PRSP (CSLP1) and the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding (SFPB), providing
it with increased power at the negotiating table and in facilitating the aid allocation process.
Officials recognize, however, that the SFPB contains many aspects of the country’s CSLP
and admit that if “effective planning been in place upon the initiation of the CSLP, elements
of the SFPB could easily have been included within it, negating the need for two documents
(OPM/IDL 2008:57)”. Confused donor-recipient alignment processes and harmonization
efforts are also attributable to the recent deterioration in the country’s political and security
conditions, which has resulted in frequent turnover of officials (e.g. changes twice in the
Ministry of Finance during the budget support negotiations), and ineffective coordination
among relevant ministries, which is partly owing to the factional conflict within the
Burundian government.
The challenge in engaging with these states is topped by the difficulties in orchestrating
“3D” actors, i.e. Diplomacy, Defense, and Development. For example, the Joint Assessment Mission
(JAM) in Southern Sudan exemplifies problems in coordinating donor policies on diplomacy and
defense agenda. In Liberia, diplomatic-development planning and cooperation played a critical role
in the successful sequencing of international interventions, but such international diplomatic support
was not extended on the country’s debt negotiation. Often desirable objectives identified at the
diplomatic level are not met with the provision of adequate resources at the development level that
would make those objectives feasible or movement towards them credible.
3-2-4 Analysis and Lessons Learned
Broad lessons of past donor experiences in promoting interaction with governments on
political issues include, but are not limited to the following:
(1)
External actors have limited influence in the process of political reform. While the principle
of ownership and policy dialogue (carrot-and-stick approach) may have some scope for
fostering improved budget and resource management as well strengthening the
government’s commitment to economic development, too often it merely sketches an ideal
62
model without providing the road-map and resources needed to reach this end-state.
(2)
When donor’s attempt efforts to positively influence domestic political reforms, allocation
of adequate amounts of resources (financial, personnel, material) is required. This means
that a greater ‘selectivity’ of donor commitment may be needed.
(3)
Aid to support key service sectors as well as humanitarian assistances must be based on
what the UK terms “shadow-alignment,” and hence should ensure room for local service
sectors to decide their own service delivery structure and enhance their own accountability.
(4)
Under circumstances in which donors are forced to take coercive attitude toward the
recipient country, diplomatic engagement can play a critical role. It is also important to
strengthen the appreciation of diplomats for the importance of longer-term engagement;
because their principle task is to represent the interests of their countries, their orientation is
more toward current events and short-term concerns. UN agencies may play a key role in
bridging the 3Ds.
(5)
There are many problems on the donor side that must be addressed. Too often changes in
donor policy serve only to confuse the government side. Easterly explains this issue in
terms of the donors’ own incentive systems to improve their performance indicators, which
are assessed in terms of aid disbursements (Easterly 2003, in Nissanke 2008:25). Even
when aid delivery is genuinely for development purposes, donors find themselves in a
double bind of ownership and the need for quick, tangible results on one hand and policy
implementation acceptable to donor nations and their citizens on the other. This is all the
more the case in fragile and conflict-affected situations, in which a greater intrusion of aid
becomes evident (and in part explicit).
Institutional gaps among the way 3D actors do business are still widely seen. Parallel
structures of coordination frameworks, especially those of the UN and the Bretton Woods
Institutions, also remain a critical challenge. To ensure the effectiveness of conditionalities,
it is critical that donors redefine their political stance toward the recipient country while
ensuring that their own agenda do not contradict with stabilization of local condition.
3-3 Donor Approaches to Conditionality and Dialogue
The last point highlighted in the previous section is recognized among development
officials themselves. One major reason why donor aid agencies cannot always do the ‘right thing’
relates to their accountability to their Parliament or Congress. As Killick notes,
The long-term course of the policies of any institution is the result of interplay between
inertial forces tending to perpetuate the status quo, and active forces for change.
Policy-makers are constrained by history, by special interests which benefit from existing
policies, by settled ways of viewing problems and by the perceived dangers or
63
uncertainties of changing course. (Killick 2005:672)
The following section examines how major donors, in spite of difficulties highlighted in the previous
section, try to manage the challenges with regard to the issue of conditionality and dialogue. The
discussion is based on three case studies from the US, the UK, and the EU.
3-3-1
US
US foreign aid underwent dramatic changes in the early years of the twenty-first century. In
response to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration announced the elevation of foreign aid to one
of three pillars to US foreign strategy in National Security Strategy for the United States of America
(2002), an apparent reflection of the gravitation of the US toward “anti-terrorism” under the rubric
of ‘freedom agenda.’ The budget for US aid increased by roughly 40% between 2001 and 2005
(Lancaster 2005:91), presenting a stark contrast with the downward trend in overall aid volume
during mid-1990s under the Clinton administration. The US is often viewed as being the donor that
most explicitly links foreign state fragility with domestic concerns, especially its own security9.
There were, however, also several other elements that helped to revitalize the strategic use
of foreign aid: (1) the Bush administration’s intent to “balance … assertive military posture and
tendency toward US unilateralism10 (Lancaster 2005:92)”, and (2) the growing pressure from
NGOs, especially faith-based organizations, to focus foreign aid on objectives such as humanitarian
relief, debt reduction, and fighting HIV/AIDS. Lancaster notes that ideas framing US foreign aid
can be characterized by an enduring dualism between libertarians, or classical liberals, on the right,
who favor a limited role for government including expenditure on foreign aid, and humanitarians on
the left, who support increased use of US public resources for development-purpose (both at home
and abroad). The humanitarians have become increasingly involved in the sphere of foreign aid
since the 1990s. The reason why the US domestic argument is so robust on the rightness of aid is
due also to a fragmentation in US political power and a resulting weak political constituency for
foreign aid. This in part is generated by the structure of US political institutions: (1) a presidential
political system, (2) election based on the winner-take-all, and (3) the power of the Congress to
oversee the content as well as use of the federal budget.
Bipartisan support for democracy promotion as a prerequisite to effective state-building11
A temporary exception was when President George H.W. Bush announced a “new world order” policy
following the fall of the Berlin wall. During the 1990s US foreign aid experienced a period depicted by
a former USAID administrator as a “vacation from history (Andrew Natsios, in Cammack et al
2006:31),” albeit some developing regions remained top priority for US ODA, such as Cuba and those
in the Horn of Africa.
9
10 E.g. Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, opposing a treaty banning small arms transfers.
Note that the term “state-building” used by Bush administration is not the same as is meant by the
same term in OECD-DAC discussions; the former conflates state building and a democracy-promotion
agenda.
11
64
strongly underpins US engagement with the developing world, which seems to remain a prominent
feature of the US global agenda. Whilst the US does not explicitly articulate a policy on
conditionality, some of the main instruments for US democracy assistance can be understood as
indirectly approaching conditionality and dialogue; such as building people-to-people networks at
all levels of society (e.g. exchanges of students, scholars and other citizens); providing technical
training programs; directly assisting democratic-minded forces within recipient countries; granting
new democracies with admission to existing multilateral institutions (the means also used by the EU
and NATO) (Stanley Foundation 2007).
Reflecting the lessons learned from its operation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US
government is now moving toward a rebalancing between defense and development. In Nov 2007,
the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed a “dramatic increase in spending on the civilian
instruments of natural security.12” The extents and ways in which future US development policy
will employ a dialogue-based approach toward countries that face the most critical challenges on the
globe remain to be seen.㩷 㩷
3-3-2
UK
The UK’s aid strategy toward fragile and conflict-affected states is marked by high
selectivity in terms of target countries, concentrating mostly on Commonwealth countries. Being
relatively decentralized,13 each DFID country offices play a central role in the process of policy
dialogue with the recipient country on its development agenda; although in situations where firm
coherence between 3D actors is particularly required (i.e. countries emerging from armed conflict
and where UK defense missions are in operation, such as Darfur in Sudan), the UK extends its
support for peacebuilding mainly through its Stabilisation Unit in the form of dispatching and
management of experienced civilian personnel as well as targeted and rapid assistance to ensure a
regular and inclusive dialogue process under the supervision of the Cabinet Office-based Board of
Directors. The Stabilisaton Unit is jointly-owned by DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD)14.
The extent of UK commitment (both in terms of budget allocation and length of
12
USAID Frontlines November 2008, excerpted from Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2008
In contrast to the greater emphasis in aid allocation on political, industrial and commercial
considerations during the Conservative administration (1979-97), the successor Labour government
introduced substantial change in British aid thinking by (1) emphasizing a poverty reduction agenda,
as epitomized by the enactment of International Development Act of 2002 which ruled out “British aid
[being] used for any purpose other than the furtherance of sustainable development or improving the
welfare of the populations of assisted territories” (Killick 2005:675), (2) ending the tying of aid and the
mixed-credit ATP scheme, and (3) decentralizing DFID’s operational structure.
13
14 For example in Darfur, the Unit supports the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC)
process by dispatching American negotiation specialists as well as internationalized Sudanese.
65
engagement) is decided on the basis of the degree of trust established between the UK and recipient
government. Other key criteria for UK engagement with fragile and conflict-affected recipient
countries relate to (1) its poverty reduction agenda, (2) respect for international obligations, and (3)
improved public financial management (see 3-2-2 box 1). Policy dialogue is a means for reaching
agreement on shared objectives. But even in cases where the UK resorts to suspensions of aid (e.g.
Ethiopia, where in response to the election-related violence and detention of the opposition, DFID
withheld budget support aid delivery), it continues to channel aid through safety net programmes for
the most vulnerable and to support service delivery by local governments in order to ensure that the
neediest people do not suffer as a consequence of the actions of their Government. Indeed, the
importance attached to the “right mixture” of various aid delivery channels is a notion commonly
shared among UK development officers (DFID 2008).
Backed by broad Parliamentary concern with the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty
the UK is also widely seen to be a leading donor promoting a partnership-based approach to
development (epitomized by a preference for the use of programme-based aid, including budget
support15). However, challenges remain. A recent study by the National Audit Office (2008) points
out that its formal monitoring frameworks for tracking the progress of aid delivery, especially on the
human rights issue, is often not systematic. Setting consciously high-level but less detailed
arrangements in Memoranda of Understanding also risks delaying response (quickly and firmly) to
the need for resolving disputes that arise (National Audit Office 2008:33). UK is trying to address
this issue by providing technical assistance16 and also by harmonizing efforts with other donors.㩷 㩷
3-3-3
EU
The EU’s development cooperation is framed by its political and historical relations with
developing countries, among others the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The Cotonou
Agreement (2003) spells out the EU’s emphasis on an ownership agenda by viewing signatory
countries as more equal partners and seeking their development through a process of economic
liberalization (e.g. bilateral EPA negotiations), while explicitly setting (1) human rights, (2)
democracy and (3) the quality of governance as prerequisites to European development cooperation
(article 8&917). In case concerns arise over these three principles of engagement, the EU will
15 DFID policy on budget support is set out in the 2000 White Paper “Eliminating World Poverty:
Making Globalisation Work for the Poor,” and the subsequent “Poverty Reduction Budget Support, A
DFID policy paper,” published in 2004 and revised in 2008.
16 Killick (2005) notes that British development aid to Africa “has always been highly concessional” as
significant part of it has been provided in the form of grants, which goes counter to the UK's strong
preference for budgetary support yet is consistent with the UK’s commitment to a poverty reduction
agenda.
17 Proposed Guidelines for ACP-EU Political Dialogue (Article 8) ACP-CE 2153/1/02 REV 1. Brussels,
25 February 2003
66
conduct policy dialogue among the parties (Act no.8) prior to considering the suspension of aid (Act
no.96). Past cases of EC aid suspension include Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau and Chad.
On practical level, the EU approach to dialogue is largely built on a general agreement that
the weak government ownership is substitutable to some extent by increased civil society
participation. As such, the EU facilitates a dialogue process with multiple stakeholders, such as
local governments, civil society and diaspora. Also, the EU now requires governments seeking EU
membership to engage in dialogue with their civil society organizations about how to enhance
respect for human rights and other democratic principles. This signals a clear precondition that
adherence to liberal democratic values is an prerequisite to membership in multilateral institutions
that officer concrete benefits. Reflecting a strong political imperative in the European Parliament
and among the public to link development cooperation to governance and human rights standards,
the EU is also increasingly committed to the improved use of financing instruments that are linked
to development outcomes (e.g. in its budget support agreements the EU typically makes provision
for variable tranches).
The greatest challenge the EU faces in advancing its engagement with fragile and
conflict-affected states is the issue of coherence, both in terms of coherence among EU Member
states and with 3D actors.18 The geographical scope of and political climate for EU development
cooperation policy historically has been influenced largely by changes in membership occurring over
time. The divergence between the Member countries’ interests and their motivations has been
regarded as a fundamental challenge. This was further fueled by the recent admission to the EU of
10 relatively poor countries which are less interested in engaging with fragile- and conflict affected
states than are the traditionalists member countries such as France.19 It is also the case that the EU
must take care in effectively asserting its influence over the domestic policies of recipient states
because it is easily criticized as being neo-colonial (e.g. Zimbabwe).㩷 㩷
3-4 Concluding Remarks and Implications for Japan
Conditionality can serve as a means for enhanced government ownership, improved state
legitimacy and consolidation of peace. The experiences suggest, however, that productive results are
more likely to be sucured when recipient governments are aware of the potential enforcement
measures that donors may take but such potential in effect is not put in action. To address the
question of what conditionality is appropriate and why (not whether conditionality is needed),
18Concrete improvements are thought in the following 3 areas; (1) EU speaking with one voice, (2)
coherence between 3Ds and other related divisions (WGA), (3) aid effectiveness.
19 For example in 2003, France, out of consideration for many African leaders, invited President
Mugabe to the Franco African Summit and then put pressure on the other EU member states to lift
travel ban measures on him by issuing veto threat on the continuation of sanctions. (Jon Henley,
‘France flexes its muscles in Africa’, The Guardian, 29 January 2003.)
67
donors should understand their political positions toward the recipient government because all
development aid involves political effect whether delivered conditionally or unconditionally.
Donors then needs to pay a greater effort to re-evaluate the effects of such aid directed for other
purposes than development, while they secure a venue for continuous international dialogue with
recipient governments on peace- and dtate-building agenda.
Japan articulates its emphasis on the process of policy dialogue in its ODA Charter (MOFA
2003), but the way it implements this in practice is largely framed and driven by the principle of
“request-based aid.” Underlying this concept is skepticism of the uncriticized premise that
development policies propounded by donors are always more appropriate than those designed by
recipient government, particularly when the latter is equipped with an appropriate institutional
framework that builds on the principle of good governance. This principle underlies Japan’s strong
preference for non-intervention in the domestic policies of recipient governments. Japan has
maintained a highly cautious stance in the use of aid for economic and political sanctions and has
even avoided officially adopting the concept of “fragile state.”
However, as highlighted in the previous section, the practice of aid-provision can never
really be understood separately from political factors. In light of the fragile states agenda, the
absence of a clear political stance on the issue and a defined rationale for engagement become quite
problematic. The state-building process in such settings requires a long-term, whole-government
commitment as well as adequate allocation of financial and human resources. This means that
Japanese policy toward these states should be pursued with a greater selectivity (such as is done by
the UK) as to which countries it works with based on Japan’s own comparative advantage in
development aid (e.g. Japan-Vietnam policy dialogue on the country development plan).
The leveraging for diplomatic initiatives in the area of peace-building through support of
multilateral agencies (notably the UN-PBC), an arena in which there has been increasing Japanese
government commitment, can supplement efforts to redefine a political stance on the agenda.
Enhancing linkages between diplomacy and development for a peace-building agenda is one arena in
which Japan can seek a way to enhance its response to fragile and conflict-affected countries. The
Ambassador from Japan to the UN, Yukio Takasu (2008) notes Japan’s strength as a nonpermanent
member country for SCPC as (1) its past experiences serving as a coordinating country (e.g. in
Afghanistan and Timor Leste) and -role as a consensus-maker, (2) its commitment to promoting
nonproliferation and disarmament, (3) its own experience with peace- and state-building, and (4)
Japan’s holistic approach to security, namely the concept of human security. This once again
highlights the need for the government, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to take a leading
role in articulating an explicit Japanese development policy on the fragile states agenda, and hence to
establish a focal point for Japan’s aid strategy on this issue.
68
References
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2005
______(2008) Poverty Reduction Budget Support: A DFID policy paper
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70
╙ 4 ┨ ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ㧦ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕ߣᓳ⥝ߩㅊ᳞
Chapter 4: Sudan: Persuit of Consolidation of Peace and Reconstruction
FASID ࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ਥછ ᷰㆺᕺሶ
Keiko Watanabe (Program Officer, IDRI, FASID)
<Abstract>
Sudan is a post conflict country. After 22 years of conflict, the longest lasted civil war in Africa,
the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A (Southern Sudan) has finally reached an agreement and
signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. After four years of CPA, several
achievements have been recognized, however, the implementation of CPA is now facing the serious
instability factors including unresolved issue on demarcation of boarder between North and South,
interrupted preparation for forthcoming election by the delay of census results.
Furthermore,
Darfur issue including ICC’s arrest warrant to the President shadows the future implementation of
CPA. This paper examines the effective ways and approaches for international community to assist
such post-conflict fragile states like Sudan in nation building and consolidation of peace. The paper
first identifies the fragilities of Sudan by reviewing historical background and using index of fragile
states. The underlining fragile factor includes the legacy of colonialism, concentration of resources
by a handful elites, weak capacity of the government and governance, lack of human resources,
devastated economic and social infrastructure, heavily dependence of oil resources, etc. The
international community including Japan is making efforts to reduce these fragilities of Sudan, while
the paper finds that China’s economic and political influence is becoming very considerable. Finally,
this paper explores some implications for Japan to intervene in post conflict country for
implementation of more effective ODA.
4-1
ߪߓ߼ߦ
2005 ᐕ 1 ᦬‫ޔ‬22 ᐕ㑆ߣ޿߁㐳ᦼߦ෸ࠎߛࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩධർߩ⚗੎ߦࠃ߁߿ߊ⚳ᱛ╓߇ᛂߚ
ࠇ ‫ ࡦ ࠳ ࡯ ࠬ ޔ‬᡽ ᐭ ߣ ࠬ ࡯ ࠳ ࡦ ੱ ᳃ ⸃ ᡼ ㆇ േ ࡮ ⸃ ᡼ ァ 㧔 SPLM/A 㧕 ߇ ‫ ޟ‬൮ ᜝ ๺ ᐔ ว ᗧ
㧔Comprehensive Peace Agreement: CPA㧕‫⟑ߦޠ‬ฬߒߚ‫ ߩߎࠆߌ߅ߦࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬20 ᐕ૛ࠅߩ
ౝᚢߪ‫†‶ޔ‬⠪ 200 ਁએ਄‫ޔ‬㔍᳃ 55 ਁੱ‫ޔ‬࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃㧔IDP㧕400 ਁੱ1ࠍ಴ߒߚߣ޿ࠊࠇ‫ޔ‬
ධㇱ߿ධർ࿖Ⴚઃㄭߥߤ⋥ធᚢ᷵ߦߥߞߚ࿾ၞߢߪ㆏〝‫ޔ‬᳓‫ޔ‬ቇᩞ‫∛ޔ‬㒮ߥߤੱ㑆ߩ቟ో
଻㓚ࠍ⏕଻ߔࠆၮ␆⊛࠾࡯࠭ࠍឭଏߔࠆ⚻ᷣ␠ળࠗࡦࡈ࡜߇უṌ⊛ߥ⁁ᘒߣߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ
ࠍߪߓ߼࿖㓙␠ળߪ CPA ⺞ශࠍᯏߦ‫ޔ‬4 ᦬ߦᡰេ࿖ળว㧔ࠝࠬࡠળว㧕ࠍ㐿௅ߒ‫࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬
1
࿖ㅪផቯ
71
ࡦ߳ߩᓳ⥝ᡰេ߇ᆎ߹ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬㐳ᐕߩ⚗੎ߦࠃࠅࠗࡦࡈ࡜ਇ⿷ߩߺߥࠄߕ‫ޔ‬᡽
ᐭߩ⢻ജਇ⿷‫᧚ੱޔ‬ਇ⿷2ߥߤߦࠃࠅ‫ߩࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔ‬໧㗴‫ޔ‬೙ᐲᒝൻ‫᧚ੱޔ‬⢒ᚑߩ໧㗴ߥߤ
ᷓೞߥ⺖㗴ߦ⋥㕙ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬๺ᐔวᗧᓟ‫ޟޔ‬ᮭജಽ᦭‫ޟ߿ޠ‬ንߩಽ᦭‫ߤߥޠ‬ਔ⠪ߢߩၮ␆
⊛ߥᨒ⚵ߺߪᢛߞߚ߇‫ޔ‬๺ᐔวᗧᓟ 4 ᐕ߇⚻ߞߚ੹ߢ߽ᄙߊߩ࿖᳃߇‫ޟ‬ᐔ๺ߩ㈩ᒰ‫ࠍޠ‬ታ
ᗵߔࠆ߹ߢߦߪ⥋ߞߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޕ‬
ᧄⓂߢߪ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽ࡐࠬ࠻ࠦࡦࡈ࡝ࠢ࠻࿖ߢ޽ࠆࠬ࡯࠳ࡦࠍขࠅ਄ߍ‫ߩߘޔ‬⣀
ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽࠍ᣿ࠄ߆ߦߒߚ਄ߢ‫ޟߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬࿖ㅧࠅ‫ޟ߿ޠ‬ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕‫ߦ߼ߚߩޠ‬࿖㓙␠
ળ߇ߤߩࠃ߁ߥ੺౉ࠍⴕߞߡ޿ߌ߫ࠃ޿߆ឭ⸒ߔࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫⃻ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬࿷߽⚗੎ਛ
ߢ޽ࠆ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞࿾ၞࠍᛴ߃‫ޔ‬2009 ᐕߦ✚ㆬ᜼‫ޔ‬2011 ᐕߦߪධㇱߩಽ㔌⁛┙ࠍ໧߁૑᳃ᛩ
␿ࠍប߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫ᦨޕ‬ㄭߢߪ࿖㓙ೃ੐ⵙ್ᚲ㧔ICC㧕ࠃࠅࡃࠪ࡯࡞ᄢ⛔㗔ߦኻߒߡ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞
⚗੎ߦ㑐ߔࠆᚢ੎‽⟋ߣੱ㆏ߦ㑐ߔࠆ⟋ߢㅱ᝝⁁߇಴ߐࠇߡ߅ࠅ3‫ߛ߹޿ޔ‬ධർߩႺ⇇࿾ၞ
ߢߩⴣ⓭߇㗫⊒ߔࠆߥߤ‫ޔ‬ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕ߦߪ߹ߛᄙߊߩਇ቟ቯⷐ࿃ࠍౝ൮ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᐔ๺ߩ
ቯ⌕ߦߪ‫ޔ‬CPA ߩጁⴕ߳ߩਔ᡽ᐭߩᒝ޿ࠦࡒ࠶࠻ࡔࡦ࠻߇ᔅⷐߢ޽ࠅ‫ࠍࠇߘޔ‬ᡰ߃ࠆ࿖㓙
␠ળߩ੺౉ߩ޽ࠅᣇ߇໧ࠊࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᧄⓂߩࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߣߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬ᮮゲߢߪࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩᱧผ⊛࡟ࡆࡘ࡯‫❑ޔ‬ゲߢߪ⃻࿷ߩࠬ࡯
࠳ࡦߩ࿖ኅߩ․ᓽࠍᢙ୯ൻߒߡ␜ߒߚ⹏ଔࠍวࠊߖߥ߇ࠄ⠨⸽ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬ੑᐲߦࠊߚࠆ㐳ᦼౝ
ᚢࠍ➅ࠅ㄰ߒ‫⃻ߡߒߦ߁ࠃߩߤ߇ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬࿷ߩ⁁ᴫߦߥߞߚߩ߆‫ޔ‬ᩮᷓ޿᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ໧㗴
߇ߤߎߦ޽ࠆߩ߆ࠍតࠆߚ߼ߦߪᱧผ⊛ߥ࡟ࡆࡘ࡯߇ᔅⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫࠶࡚ࠪࡊ࠶࠽ࠬޔߚ߹ޕ‬
࠻⊛߅ࠃ߮㒢ቯ⊛ߢߪ޽ࠆߦߖࠃ࿖ኅߩ․ᓽࠍᢙ୯ൻߒߡ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ਎㌁ߩ࿖೎᡽╷೙ᐲ
ࠕ࠮ࠬࡔࡦ࠻㧔CPIA㧕‫ޔ‬Brooking Institute ߦࠃࠆ‫ޟ‬࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡ‫⹏ߩߤߥޠ‬ଔ߆ࠄ‫ࠬޔ‬
࡯࠳ࡦߩ⃻࿷ߩ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽࠍᶋ߈ᓂࠅߦߔࠆ45‫ߩߘޕ‬਄ߢ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄࠍ฽߻࿖㓙␠ળ߇ࠬ࡯࠳
ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᤚᱜߔࠆߚ߼ߦߤߩࠃ߁ߥኻᔕࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ߆‫ޟߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬߦ․ޔ‬࿖ㅧࠅ‫ޠ‬
ࠍᡰេߒ‫ޔ‬࿖ߩࠠࡖࡄࠪ࠹ࠖࠍ਄ߍࠆߚ߼ߩេഥേะࠍ᭎ⷰߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᱞౝ㧔2008㧕߇ᜰ៰ߒߡ޿ࠆࠃ߁ߦ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽․ߦࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩࠃ߁ߥ⚗੎ᓟ࿖
ኅࠍᡰេߔࠆ਄ߢᦨ߽㊀ⷐߥߎߣߪ‫ޔ‬ౣ߮⚗੎⁁ᘒߦ㒱ࠄߖߥ޿ߎߣߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᐢߊ࿖᳃߆
ࠄᡰᜬߐࠇࠆ቟ቯ⊛ߥ࿖ኅߦߔࠆߚ߼ߩᡰេ߇࿖㓙␠ળߦ᳞߼ࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫߹ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬
ߐߦ⚗੎ߦౣ߮㒱ࠆෂ㒾ࠍሺࠎߢ޿ࠆ࿖ߢ޽ࠅ‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬⣀ᒙᕈࠍᤚᱜߐߖࠆ࿖㓙␠ળ
ߩ᦭ലߥ੺౉ߩᚻᲑ߇Ꮧ᳞ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ᧄޕ‬Ⓜߢߪᦨᓟߦ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ߳ߩ᦭ലߥ ODA ߩࠕࡊ
ࡠ࡯࠴ࠍᬌ⸛ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߩᓎഀߦߟ޿ߡ⠨ኤߒߚ޿‫ޕ‬
2
3
4
5
ධㇱ᡽ᐭߪ CPA એ㒠ᱜᑼߥ᡽ᐭߣߒߡ಴⊒ߒߚߚ߼‫ޔ‬ᓎᚲߩᣉ⸳߽฽߼࠯ࡠ߆ࠄߩࠬ࠲࡯࠻ߣߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬
2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ 4 ᣣ⊒಴‫ޕ‬
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪ਎㌁ߩ CPIA ᜰᮡߢߪ 2.5 ߢ৻⇟࡜ࡦࠢ߇ૐ޿”Severe” Countries ߦಽ㘃ߐࠇ(2007)‫ޔ‬ᐔ๺ၮ
㊄ߦࠃࠆ‫ޟ‬ᄬᢌ࿖ኅ‫ޔߪߢࠣࡦࠠࡦ࡜ޠ‬਎⇇ 2 ૏㧔2008㧕ߩ૏⟎ࠍභ߼ࠆ‫ ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔઁߩߘޕ‬UNDP
ߢߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽”top”ߦᰴߋ”high”㧔ᡰេఝవ࿖ኅ㧕ߦಽ㘃ߐࠇ‫ޔ‬DFID ߩ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ࡝ࠬ࠻ߦ߽౉
ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᓟㅀߔࠆ߇‫ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬ᢙ୯ൻߐࠇߚ࿖ኅߩ⹏ଔ߳ߩᛕ್ߩਛߦ‫ޔ‬ᛒ߁࠺࡯࠲ߩᐕߢ್ᢿߐࠇࠆߚ߼‫ߘޔ‬
ࠇએ೨ߩᱧผ⊛ߥⷐ⚛߇ട๧ߐࠇߥ޿‫⹏ߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ‬ଔߩ⋡⊛߇㆑߁ߚ߼ᜰᮡߦ஍ࠅ߇޽ࠆߥߤߩᜰ៰
߽޽ࠆ߇‫ᦨߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ㄭߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᝒ߃‫ઁޔ‬࿖ߣᲧセߒߚ⋧ኻ⊛ߥ᭽⋧ࠍ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ߽ߩߣߒߡ᦭ല
ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
72
4-2
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᭎ⷐ
㧔㧝㧕࿾ℂ࡮ੱญ
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪ‫ࡉ࡜ࠕޔ‬࿤ߩᦨ⷏┵‫ᦨߩࠞ࡝ࡈࠕ࡮ࠢ࠶࡜ࡉޔ‬ർ┵ߦ૏⟎ߒ‫ࡈࠕߣࡉ࡜ࠕޔ‬
࡝ࠞ࿤ߩਔᣇߩᓇ㗀ࠍฃߌߡ޿ࠆ‫ࠞ࡝ࡈࠕޕ‬ᄢ㒽ߦ߅޿ߡᦨᄢߩ࿖࿯㕙Ⓧ⚂ 250 ঠࠍ᦭ߒ
㧔ᣣᧄߩ⚂ 7 ୚㧕‫ޔ‬࿖Ⴚߪ 9 ࠞ࿖㧔ࠛࠫࡊ࠻‫ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࠕ࠾ࠤޔࠕࡇࠝ࠴ࠛޔࠕ࡝࠻࡝ࠛޔ‬
࠳‫ࠧࡦࠦޔ‬᳃‫ޔ‬ਛᄩࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ‫ࠕࡆ࡝ޔ࠼ࡖ࠴ޔ‬㧕ߣធߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬࿾᡽ቇ⊛ߦ߽ⶄ㔀ߥ૏⟎
㑐ଥߦ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬㚂ㇺࡂ࡞࠷࡯ࡓߪ㕍࠽ࠗ࡞ߣ⊕࠽ࠗ࡞ߩวᵹὐߦ޽ࠅ‫ੱޔ‬ญߪ 3,860 ਁੱ
㧔2007㧕‫ߜ߁ޔ‬ධㇱߦߪߘߩ 1/3 ߦ޽ߚࠆ 1,100 ਁੱ߇޿ࠆߣផቯߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬
ࠕ࡜ࡆࠕ⺆ߢ‫ޟ‬㤥ੱߩ࿖‫ࠍޠ‬ᗧ๧ߔࠆ߇‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ⊛ߦߪੱญߩ⚂ 4 ಽߩ 3 ߇ࠕ࡜ࡉ♽‫ޔ‬4 ಽߩ
㧝߇㤥ੱ♽ߢ޽ࠆ‫⚦ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ಽൻߔࠇ߫‫ޔ‬400 એ਄ߩ⇣ߥࠆ᳃ᣖ߇ሽ࿷ߔࠆߣ⸒ࠊࠇ7‫ޔ‬
ߘߩඨಽએ਄ߪ࿖࿯ߩ 4 ಽߩ㧝ࠍභ߼ࠆධㇱߦዻߒߡ޿ࠆߥߤᄙ᳃ᣖ࿖ኅࠍᒻᚑߒߡ޿ࠆ8‫ޕ‬
1956 ᐕߦ⁛┙ߒߡએ᧪‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ᜰะࠍᒝߊᛂߜ಴ߒߚァ੐᡽ᮭߦࠃࠆ࿖ౝ᡽ᴦ߇ᡰ㈩
ߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᮭജ߿ንߪᏱߦർߩࠕ࡜ࡉੱࠛ࡝࡯࠻ߦ㓸ਛߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧞㧕⚻ᷣ␠ળ⁁ᴫ㧔⴫㧝ෳᾖ㧕
⃻࿷ 50 ਁ B/D ⷙᮨߩේᴤ↢↥ߣේᴤଔᩰߩ਄᣹ߦࠃࠆ⍹ᴤ෼౉ࠍਥߥⷐ࿃ߣߒߡ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ
ᚑ㐳߇⋡ⷡߒ޿‫ ࠅߚ޽ੱ৻ޕ‬GDP ߽ 790 ࠼࡞㧔2005㧕‫ޔ‬1,034 ࠼࡞(2006)‫ޔ‬1,257 ࠼࡞㧔2007㧕
ߣિ߮ߡ߅ࠅ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣᚑ㐳₸ߪ‫ޔ‬6.3%(2005)‫ޔ‬11.3%(2006)‫ޔ‬10.5%(2007)ߣㄭᐕߢߪੑᩴᚑ㐳
ࠍ⸥㍳ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫৻ߩߘޕ‬ᣇ‫ޔ‬࿾ᣇߦ߅޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬᳓‫ޔ‬㔚᳇‫଻ޔ‬ஜක≮‫ޔ‬ㅢା‫ޔ‬੤ㅢߥߤߩၮ
␆ࠗࡦࡈ࡜ߩᢛ஻߇ⴕ߈ᷰߞߡ߅ࠄߕ‫ߦ․ޔ‬ධㇱߦ⥋ߞߡߪ 22 ᐕ㑆ߦ෸߱ౝᚢߩᓇ㗀ߢ߶
ߣࠎߤ⎕უߐࠇߚ߹߹ߩ࿾ᣇ߽ᄙ޿‫⽺ޕ‬࿎࡜ࠗࡦએਅߩੱญߪർㇱߢ 50-60%‫ޔ‬ධㇱߢߪ 90%
ߣ⸒ࠊࠇߡ޿ࠆߥߤ‫⽺ޔ‬࿎߇⬧ᑧߒߡ޿ࠆ‫⚗ߦ․ޕ‬੎ⵍἴ࿾߿ㄘ᧛ߦ߅ߌࠆ⽺࿎⁁ᴫߪᖡ
ߊ‫ޔ‬ㇺᏒߣㄘ᧛ߣߩᩰᏅ߿࿾ၞᩰᏅ߇ᄢ߈޿‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬࿖ኅ੍▚ߩ⍹ᴤ෼౉ߦභ߼ࠆഀวߪ‫ޔ‬
ർㇱߢߪ⚂ 60%‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦ߅޿ߡߪ 99%ߣ㕖Ᏹߦ⍹ᴤଐሽᐲ߇㜞ߊ‫ޔ‬⍹ᴤ෼౉એᄖߩ෼౉ߩ
ᵴ〝ࠍ⷗಴ߔߎߣ߇ᕆോߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ9‫ޕ‬
␠ળ㐿⊒⁁ᴫ߆ࠄ߽࿾ၞᩰᏅ߇ᢙሼߦߥߞߡ⴫ࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬UNDP ߦࠃࠆੱ㑆㐿⊒ᜰᮡߪ‫ޔ‬
177 ߆࿖ਛ 141 ૏(2008)ߣਅ૏ߦㄭߊ‫␠ޔ‬ળᜰᮡో⥸ߦ߅޿ߡૐ޿୯ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫࠳ߦ․ޕ‬
࡞ࡈ࡯࡞‫ޔ‬ධㇱ‫ޔ‬ධർ࿖Ⴚઃㄭߦ޽ࠆ 3 ࿾ၞ㧔ධࠦ࡞࠼ࡈࠔࡦ‫ޔࠗࠛࡆࠕޔ‬㕍࠽ࠗ࡞㧕‫ޔ‬
᧲ㇱߥߤᚢ੎ⵍἴ࿾ߦ߅ߌࠆ଻ஜ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒ᜰᮡߪ਎⇇ో૕ߩਛߢ߽ૐ޿ᜰᮡ߇ᄙߊ‫ޔ‬㚂ㇺࡂ
࡞࠷࡯ࡓ๟ㄝߣߩ࿾ၞᩰᏅ߇ᱧὼߣߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ోࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ߫߃଀ޕ‬૕ߩ੃ᐜఽᱫ੢₸㧔಴
↢ 1,000 ੱ޽ߚࠅ㧕‫ޔ‬5 ᱦએਅᐜఽᱫ੢₸㧔಴↢ 1,000 ੱ޽ߚࠅ㧕ߪ‫ ࠇߙࠇߘޔ‬89‫ޔ‬162 ߢ‫ޔ‬
ࠨࡂ࡜એධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ࿾ၞߩᐔဋ୯ 91‫ޔ‬162 ߣᲧߴࠆߣ߿߿ૐ޿⒟ᐲߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ධㇱ࿾ၞߢ
6
7
8
9
Sudan at a glance, World Bank (24/09/08)‫ޕ‬2008 ᐕ 4 ᦬‫ోࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬࿯ࠍኻ⽎ߣߒߚೋ߼ߡߩੱญ⺞ᩏ
߇ታᣉߐࠇߚ߇‫⚿ޔ‬ᨐߪ 2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ 10 ᣣ⃻࿷߹ߛ⊒⴫ߐࠇߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޕ‬
ᩙᧄ
Johnson (2004)
2007 ᐕ੍▚‫ޕ‬ർㇱ᡽ᐭߩᱦ౉ߪ 89 ం࠼࡞‫ޔ‬ධㇱ᡽ᐭߪ 14 ం࠼࡞‫ޕ‬
73
ߩᜰᮡߪ 150‫ޔ‬250 ߣᷓೞߥ⁁ᴫߦ޽ࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ‫ߦ․ޕ‬ᅧ↥ᇚᱫ੢₸ߪ‫ోࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬૕
ߢ߽ 1,107 ੱ㧔10 ਁੱ಴↢޽ߚࠅ㧕‫ޔ‬ർㇱᐔဋߢ 509 ੱ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߢߪ਎⇇ᦨૐߩ 2,030 ੱߣߥ
ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ೋ╬ᢎ⢒ߦ߅ߌࠆ⚐ዞቇ₸ߪ‫ోࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬૕ߢ↵ሶ 50%‫ޔ‬ᅚሶ 42%ߣૐ
ߊ‫ߦࠄߐޔ‬ㆆ’᳃ᣖߢߪ 29.2%‫ޔ‬ධㇱߢߪߎࠇ߽਎⇇ᦨૐ࡟ࡌ࡞ߩ 20%ߣផቯߐࠇ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ߿
࿾ၞߦࠃࠆᩰᏅ߇⷗ࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬቟ోߥ᳓߅ࠃ߮ⴡ↢ᣉ⸳߳ߩࠕࠢ࠮ࠬ߳ߩᜰᮡ߽ᖡߊ‫ޔ‬ၮ␆
ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬㇱ㐷ߩᢛ஻߇ਇචಽߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬࿖ㅪࡒ࡟࠾ࠕࡓ⋡ᮡ㧔MDGs㧕ߩߤߩᜰᮡࠍߺߡ߽ 2015
ᐕ߹ߢߦ㆐ᚑߢ߈ࠆ⷗ㄟߺߪߥ޿⁁ᴫߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
⴫㧝㧦 ਥߥ⚻ᷣ␠ળᜰᮡ
৻⥸ᜰᮡ
ੱญ
㕙Ⓧ
⽺࿎࡜ࠗࡦએਅߩੱญᲧ
ᐔဋ૛๮
⚻ᷣᜰᮡ
GDP
৻ੱᒰߚࠅ GDP
⚻ᷣᚑ㐳₸
ࠗࡦࡈ࡟₸
⾏ᤃ㗵࡮⾏ᤃຠ⋡
㧔2006 ᐕ㧕
ὑᦧ࡟࡯࠻
ᄬᬺ₸
⽶ௌ㧔GDP Ყ㧕
␠ળᜰᮡ
੃ᐜఽᱫ੢₸㧔IMR㧕
(2006)
ᅧ↥ᇚᱫ੢₸㧔MMR㧕
(2006)
HIV ᗵᨴ₸
✚ዞቇ₸㧔GER㧕
(2000-2004)
⚐ዞቇ₸㧔NER㧕
ᚑੱ⼂ሼ₸(15 ᱦએ਄)
቟ోߥ᳓߳ߩࠕࠢ࠮ࠬ
ⴡ↢ᣉ⸳߳ߩࠕࠢ࠮ࠬ
3,860 ਁੱ㧔ᣣᧄߩ⚂ 27%㧕‫ޔ‬
ർㇱ 600 ਁੱ(ផቯ)‫ޔ‬ධㇱ 1,100 ਁੱ(ផቯ)‫ੱ ޔ‬ญჇട₸ 2.0㧔00-06)
250 ਁঠ(ᣣᧄߩ⚂ 7 ୚)
50-60%‫ޔ‬ධㇱ 90%એ਄㧔ផቯ㧕
56.5 ᱦ(2004)
216.85 ం࠼࡞(2004)‫ޔ‬279.04 ం࠼࡞㧔2005㧕‫ޔ‬374.42 ం࠼࡞㧔2006㧕‫ޔ‬
467.08 ం࠼࡞(2007 ផቯ)
629 ࠼࡞㧔2004㧕‫ޔ‬790 ࠼࡞㧔2005㧕‫ޔ‬1,034 ࠼࡞㧔2006㧕‫ޔ‬1,257 ࠼
࡞㧔2007 ផቯ㧕
6.3%(2005)‫ޔ‬11.3%(2006)‫ޔ‬10.5%(2007)
8.5%(2005)‫ޔ‬7.2%(2006)‫ޔ‬8.0%(2007)
㧔㧝㧕 ャ಴ 57 ం࠼࡞㧦 ේᴤ㧛⍹ᴤ⵾ຠ(90%)‫ޔ߹ߏޔ‬㘩⡺‫✎ޔ‬
⧎‫ࡓࠧࠕࡆ࡜ࠕޔ‬㧔ኻᣣャ಴㧦5.2 ం࠼࡞(2006) ╙ 2 ૏㧕
㧔㧞㧕 ャ౉ 81 ం࠼࡞㧦 ᯏ᪾‫⵾ޔ‬ㅧ‛‫ޔ‬੤ㅢゞਔ㧔ኻᣣャ౉㧦5.4
ం࠼࡞ ╙ 5 ૏㧕
㧔㧟㧕 ਥⷐ⾏ᤃ࿖㧦ਛ࿖‫࠼ࡦࠗޔࠕࡆ࡜ࠕࠫ࠙ࠨޔ‬
1 ☨࠼࡞㧩2.3 ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦࡐࡦ࠼㧔2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬㧕
17%㧔2006 ផቯ㧕
113.0%(2005)‫ޔ‬80.0%(2006)
89 ੱ 㧔಴↢ 1,000 ੱ޽ߚࠅ㧕
1,107 ੱ㧔ో૕㧕‫ޔ‬ർㇱ 509‫ޔ‬ධㇱ 2,030㧔಴↥ 10 ਁੱ޽ߚࠅ㧕
1.6 (2002)
59.6%(ో૕)‫ޔ‬ർㇱ 62㧑(↵ሶ 73%‫ޔ‬ᅚሶ 57%)‫ޔ‬ධㇱ 22-23%㧔ᅚሶߪ
↵ሶߩ 1/3㧕
43% (2004)
60.9% (2004)
59.3%(ో૕)‫ޔ‬78%㧔ㇺᏒ㧕‫ޔ‬64%(ㄘ᧛)
31.2%(ో૕)‫ޔ‬50%(ㇺᏒ)‫ޔ‬24%(ㄘ᧛)
(಴ᚲ) Sudan at a glance, WB (28 September 2008), Sudan Health Household Survey (SHHS) (2006)‫ޔ‬Human
Development Report 2006, UNDP, World Economic Outlook, IMF (Apr 2008), Bank of Sudan
(http://www.bankofsudan.org/ )
74
㧔㧟㧕ౝᚢߩ᭽⋧
⁛┙એ᧪ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪ㧞ᐲߦਗ਼ࠆ㐳ᦼߩ⚗੎ࠍ➅ࠅ㄰ߒߡ߅ࠅ10‫ⶄߩߘޔ‬㔀ߥⷐ࿃߆ࠄࠬ࡯
࠳ࡦߩ⚗੎ߪ⸃᳿࿎㔍ߢ޽ࠆߣ⸒ࠊࠇߡ߈ߚ‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔߚ߹ޕ‬ౝᚢߪ‫ޔ‬࿑㧝ߦ␜ߒߚࠃ
߁ߦධർߩ⚗੎ߛߌߢߪߥߊ‫᧲ޔ‬ㇱߦ߅ߌࠆ⚗੎‫⷏ޔ‬ㇱ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ߦ߅ߌࠆ⚗੎ߣⶄᢙߩ
⚗੎߇ᷙ࿷ߒߡ޿ߚ‫ޕ‬2005 ᐕߦධർ⚗੎ߦ⚳ᱛ╓߇ᛂߚࠇࠆߣ‫ޔ‬CPA ߩขࠅ⚵ߺߪࠬ࡯࠳
ࡦ࿖ౝߩઁߩ࿾ၞ߳ߩ๺ᐔ߳ߩ␆ߣߥࠅ‫ޔ‬2006 ᐕ 5 ᦬ߦߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞๺ᐔวᗧ㧔DPA㧕11‫ޔ‬
2006 ᐕ 10 ᦬ߦߪ᧲ㇱ๺ᐔวᗧ㧔ESPA)߇ߘࠇߙࠇ⚿߫ࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
ධർߩౝᚢߩⷐ࿃ߪ‫ޔ‬ၮᧄ⊛ߦർㇱߩ৻ីࠅߩࠛ࡝࡯࠻ߦࠃࠆධㇱߩ㕖ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓᢎ߆
ߟ㕖ࠕ࡜ࡉ૑᳃ߦኻߔࠆ⚻ᷣ⊛‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ⊛߅ࠃ߮␠ળ⊛ᡰ㈩߇ේ࿃ߩ৻ߟߢ޽ࠆߣߐࠇߡ޿
ࠆ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ᢙ‫⎇ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬߩޘ‬ⓥ⠪߇ᜰ៰ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦ‫ޔ‬ධർ⚗੎ߩⷐ࿃ߪ‫ޟ‬ർߩࠕ࡜ࡉੱ‫ޠ‬
ኻ‫ޟ‬ධߩ㕖ࠕ࡜ࡉߩࠕࡈ࡝ࠞੱ‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޟޔޠ‬ᢎኻࠠ࡝ࠬ࠻ᢎ‫ޟޔޠ‬㤥ੱኻ㕖㤥ੱ‫ߣޠ‬
޿ߞߚੑర⺰ߢߪ⺆ࠇߥ޿ⶄ㔀ߥⷐ⚛߇ౝ࿃ߒߡ޿ࠆ12‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬᳃ᣖߪ 400 એ਄ߦ߽඙
ಽߐࠇࠆߣ޿߁߶ߤᄙ᳃ᣖߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ߿⸒⺆᭴ᚑ߆ࠄߺߡ߽‫ޔ‬ධർߩ㑐ଥߪ‫ޔ‬නߦᢥൻ
߿᳃ᣖߩኻ┙ߣ޿߁ߎߣߪ⸒߃ߥ޿‫ޕ‬Johnson㧔2004㧕߇ᜰ៰ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦ‫⚗ޔ‬੎ߩⷐ࿃ߪ‫ޔ‬
ቬᢎ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖߦኻߔࠆ஍⷗‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ៦ข‫ޔ‬ᬀ᳃࿾ᡰ㈩ߣࡐࠬ࠻ᬀ᳃࿾ߦ߅ߌࠆ੺౉ߥߤේ࿃ߪ
ⶄᢙ޽ࠆߣߐࠇ㧔Root Causes ߣⶄᢙᒻߢᮡ⸥㧕‫ⷐߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬࿃߇ⶄ㔀ߦ⛊ߺวߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
৻ᣇ‫ޔ‬ᩙᧄ㧔2005㧕ߪ‫ޟޔ‬ቬᢎ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ࡮ੱ⒳⊛ኻ┙ߣ޿߁ⷐ࿃ߪౝᚢߩේ࿃ߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬ౝ
ᚢߩㆊ⒟ߢߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ┙႐ߩᒰ੐⠪ߦࠃߞߡᠲ૞࡮೑↪ߐࠇࠆࠪࡦࡏ࡞ߢ޽ࠆߣ⠨߃ߚ߶
߁߇ㆡಾߢ޽ࠆ‫ޠ‬13ߣߩ⷗⸃ࠍ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫߽ߢ߆ߥޕ‬ᓟㅀߔࠆ 1920 ᐕઍߩ⧷࿖ᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭ
߇ߣߞߚ‫ޟ‬ධㇱ᡽╷‫ࠆࠃߦޠ‬࿾ၞಽᢿ᡽╷ߩᓇ㗀߇᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ␠ળਇᐔ╬߿ᩰᏅࠍ↢ߺ಴ߒ
ߚߣ⸒߃ࠆ‫⚗ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔߦ߁ࠃߩߎޕ‬੎ߩේ࿃ࠍℂ⸃ߔࠆߦߪ‫ߡߒߦ߁ࠃߩߤޔ‬࿾ၞ⊛
ߥᩰᏅ߇᜛ᄢߒ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ߅ࠃ߮ᢥൻ⊛ߥኻ┙ࠍ↢ߺߥ߇ࠄ⃻࿷ߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ߇޽ࠆߩ߆‫ߕ߹ޔ‬
50 ᐕߦ߅ࠃ߱⚗੎ߩᱧผࠍℂ⸃ߔࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
╙৻ᰴౝᚢߪ 1955 ᐕ߆ࠄ 17 ᐕ㑆߽⛯߈‫╙ޔ‬ੑᰴౝᚢ߹ߢߩ 9 ᐕ㑆ߒ߆ᐔ๺ߥᤨᦼ߇ߥ߆ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞๺ᐔวᗧߦ㑐ߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬෻᡽ᐭ൓ജߩ৻ㇱ߇⟑ฬߒߚߩߺߢታലᕈ߇ߥߊ‫⃻ޔ‬࿷ߢ߽⚗੎ߪ⛯
߈࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞࿾ၞߩੱ㆏⁁ᴫߪᡷༀ߇⷗ࠄࠇߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޕ‬
12 ଀߃߫ Johnson(2004)‫ޔ‬ᩙᧄ(1998, 2005)‫ޔ‬Iyob(2006)ߥߤߦ⹦ߒ޿‫ޕ‬
13 ᩙᧄ(2005) ᶏᄖ੐ᖱ ᐔᚑ 17 ᐕ(2005)4 ᦬ภ
10
11
75
࿑㧝㧦 ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩⶄᢙߩౝᚢ
Darfur Conflict
Reconstruction
East Conflict
䅃Actor䋺Gov䇮Anti Gov
䋨JEM, SLA/M)
䅃Actor: Gov Vs Eastern
Front
䅃Period䋺2003-present
䅃Period: 2005-2006
䅃Peace Agreement :DPA
(May 2006)
(ineffective, though)
䅃Peace Agreement:
ESPA (Oct 2006)
Emergency/
Humanitarian Asst
North-South Conflict
䅃Actor: Gov Vs
SPLM/A
䅃Period: 1983-2005
䅃Peace Agreement:
CPA (Jan 2005)
Early Recovery/
Reconstruction
಴ᚲ㧦╩⠪૞ᚑ
4-3
࿾࿑㧔UN㧕
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩౝᚢߩᱧผߣߘߩⷐ࿃
㧔㧝㧕ࠝࠬࡑࡦ࡮࠻࡞ࠦᤨઍ
1821 ᐕߩࠛࠫࡊ࠻ߦࠃࠆଚ᡹એ೨ߩᱧผߪ޽߹ࠅᦠ߆ࠇߚ߽ߩߪߥ޿߇‫࡞ࠗ࠽ޔ‬Ꮉߦᴪ
ߞߚ࠿ࡆࠕੱߩዊߐߥ₺࿖ߩ㓸߹ࠅߢ޽ߞߚߣߐࠇࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷ߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦ޽ߚࠆ࿾ၞ߇㗔
ၞߣߒߡߩ߹ߣ߹ࠅࠍߥߔࠃ߁ߦߥߞߚߩߪ‫ࠆࠃߦ࠻ࡊࠫࠛޔ‬ᡰ㈩ߩ߽ߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ࡊࠫࠛޕ‬
࠻ߪᒰᤨࠝࠬࡑࡦ࡮࠻࡞ࠦᏢ࿖ߩᡰ㈩ਅߦ޽ߞߚ߇‫ޔ‬ㄭઍ࿖ኅᑪ⸳ࠍ߼ߑߔࠛࠫࡊ࠻ߪᅛ
㓮‫⽎ޔ‬‎‫ޔ‬㊄ߥߤߩ⽷Ḯ߿⾗Ḯߩଏ⛎ࠍ᳞߼ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ߳ߩଚ᡹ࠍⴕߞߚ‫ߪ࠻ࡊࠫࠛޕ‬ർㇱ
ࠍᡰ㈩ߒߡ޿ߚࡈࡦࠫ₺࿖㧔1504 ᐕ㨪㧕‫⷏ޔ‬ㇱߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞₺࿖㧔17 ਎♿㨪㧕ࠍ߽೙࿶ߒ‫ޔ‬
ߘߒߡᓢ‫߇⺆ࠕࡆ࡜ࠕ߿ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗߦޘ‬ᶐㅘߒߡ޿ߥ߆ߞߚධㇱ╬ߩ࿾ၞ߽ᓕ᦯࡮૬วߒ
㗔࿯ࠍ᜛ᄢߒߡ޿ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧞㧕‫ߩޠ࡯ࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޟ‬಴⃻
ࠛࠫࡊ࠻ߦࠃࠆࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ⛔ᴦߪ⚂ 60 ᐕ㑆⛯ߊ߇‫ޔ‬1880 ᐕઍߦߥࠆߣ‫ޔ‬ർㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߢ⡛
⡯⠪ߢ޽ߞߚࡕࡂࡔ࠶࠼࡮ࠕࡈࡑ࠶࠼߇␹ߦዉ߆ࠇߚ⠪‫ޠ࡯ࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޟ‬㧔ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓᢎߩ
ᢇ਎ਥ㧕ߣ⥄ࠄฬਸ਼ࠅ‫ޟޔ‬⡛ᚢ‫ߡߒߣޠ‬෻ࠛࠫࡊ࠻ㆇേࠍ⿠ߎߔ‫࡯ࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޕ‬ㆇേߪࠛࠫ
ࡊ࠻ᡰ㈩ߦਇḩࠍᜬߟ᳃ⴐ߆ࠄߩᄢ߈ߥᡰᜬࠍᓧ‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ർㇱ‫ޔ‬ਛᄩㇱ‫⷏ޔ‬ㇱߩㇱᣖࠍ
⛔৻‫ޔ‬1885 ᐕߦߪߟ޿ߦ✚〈ߣߒߡ⿞છߒߡ޿ߚࠗࠡ࡝ࠬੱߩࠧ࡯࠼ࡦ✚〈ࠍࡂ࡞࠷࡯ࡓ
ߢ㒱⪭ߒ‫࡯ࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޟޔ‬࿖ኅ‫߇ޠ‬᮸┙ߐࠇߚ‫࡯ࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޕ‬࿖ኅߪ 13 ᐕ㑆⛯ߊ߇‫ޔ‬1898 ᐕ‫ޔ‬
76
੹ᐲߪࠗࠡ࡝ࠬߩଚ⇛ߦࠃࠅṌ߷ߐࠇࠆ‫࡯ࠖ࠺ࡈࡑޕ‬ㆇേߪᄖ࿖ᡰ㈩ߦኻߔࠆ᳃ⴐ߆ࠄߩ
㑵޿ߦࠃࠅ⁛┙࿖ኅࠍൎߜขࠅ‫ޔ‬13 ᐕ㑆ߦਗ਼ࠅ⁛ജߢ࿖ኅࠍ⛽ᜬߒߡ޿ߞߚߣ޿߁ᗧ๧ߢ
ㄭઍผ਄ᵈ⋡ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆㆇേߢ޽ࠆ‫ߩߘޕ‬ᓟࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪ‫౒࠻ࡊࠫࠛ࡮⧷ޟ‬ห⛔ᴦ‫ޠ‬ਅߦ⟎
߆ࠇࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ᒰᤨࠛࠫࡊ࠻⥄૕߇⧷࿖⛔ᴦਅߦ⟎߆ࠇߡ޿ߚߚ߼‫⧷ޔ‬࿖ߦࠃࠆ᡽╷ߩᣉⴕ‫ޔ‬
᡽ᐭ㜞ቭߦߪ⧷࿖ੱࠍ㈩⟎ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ධㇱߦ޿ߚࠛࠫࡊ࠻ァ߿ࠛࠫࡊ࠻ੱߩⴕ᡽ቭࠍ࿖ᄖㅌ෰
ߐߖࠆ㧔1924 ᐕ㧕ߥߤ‫ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ታ⾰⧷࿖ᬀ᳃࿾ᡰ㈩ߣߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧟㧕ᬀ᳃࿾⛔ᴦߩ᡽╷㧦ධㇱ᡽╷ߩዉ౉㧔Divide and Rule:ಽഀ⛔ᴦ㧕
⧷࿖ߦࠃࠆᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭ14߇ណߞߚ․ᓽ⊛ߥᣉ╷ߪ‫ޟ‬Divide and Rule‫ߣޠ‬๭߫ࠇࠆಽഀ⛔ᴦ
᡽╷ࠍၫࠆ‫⧷ޕ‬࿖ߪઁߩࠕࡈ࡝ࠞᬀ᳃࿾ߦ߅޿ߡ߽ߎߩ᡽╷ࠍ↪޿‫ޔ‬વ⛔⊛ߥ᳃ᣖߩ⚵❱
㧔㈧㐳೙ߥߤ㧕߿ᘠ⠌ࠍᵴ↪ߒߡ޿ߚߎߣ߆ࠄ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߩࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓ␠ળߣධㇱߩㇱᣖ⊛ߥ
␠ળࠍಾࠅ㔌ߒߡ⛔ᴦߔࠆ᡽╷ࠍⴕߞߚ‫ޕ‬ർㇱߩࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓߦኻߒߡߪⓍᭂ⊛ߥ଻⼔᡽╷
ࠍߣࠅ‫࠻ࠬ࡝ࠠޔ‬ᢎߩᏓᢎ࿅૕ߩᵴേߦߪ೙㒢ࠍട߃ࠆߥߤߒߚ‫৻ޕ‬ᣇ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦኻߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬
ධㇱߩ‫ᧂޟ‬㐿‫⻉ߥޠ‬ㇱᣖߦኻߒߡ⁛⥄ߩᢥൻࠍ଻⼔ߒࠃ߁ߣߔࠆ‫ޟ‬ධㇱ᡽╷‫ࠍޠ‬ᛂߜ಴ߒ
ߚ15‫ౕޕ‬૕⊛ߦߪ‫ޔ‬ධർߘࠇߙࠇ೎‫ⴕߩޘ‬᡽ߣมᴺ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߣධㇱߩੱߩ⒖േߩ೙㒢16‫↪౏ޔ‬
⺆ࠍർㇱߪࠕ࡜ࡆࠕ⺆‫ޔ‬ධㇱߪ⧷⺆‫ޔ‬ධㇱߪᣣᦐᣣࠍભᣣߦߔࠆߥߤ‫ޔ‬ධർߪ߶ߣࠎߤ㆑
߁࿖ߣߒߡ⛔ᴦ߇ⴕࠊࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
․ߦߎߩධㇱ᡽╷ߢ․ᓽ⊛ߥߩߪᢎ⢒೙ᐲߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ධㇱߩੱߦኻߒߡߪᢎ⢒ߩ㔛ⷐ߇ߥ
ߊਛ╬ᢎ⢒એ਄ߩᢎ⢒ߪᔅⷐߥߒߣߩ஍⷗߆ࠄ‫ޔ‬ೋ╬ᢎ⢒ߪਥⷐ᳃ᣖ⸒⺆ߢᢎ߃‫ޔ‬Ꮣᢎ࿅
૕ࠍⓍᭂ⊛ߦฃߌ౉ࠇࠆߥߤߢኻಣߒ‫ޔ‬㜞╬ᢎ⢒ߩᢛ஻ࠍ߶ߣࠎߤⴕࠊߥ߆ߞߚ17‫ߦࠄߐޕ‬
ධㇱߩㆆ’᳃߿ࠕࠢ࠮ࠬ߇ᖡ޿࿾ၞߥߤߢߪೋ╬ᢎ⢒ߩᯏળ߽㒢ࠄࠇࠆߥߤ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩਛߢ
߽ㇱᣖߦࠃࠅᢎ⢒ߩᏅ߇಴ࠆࠃ߁ߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒ࠍฃߌߡߥ޿ㇱᣖࠍ‫ޟ‬ᓟㅴ⊛‫ޟޔޠ‬વ⛔⊛‫ޠ‬
ߢ޽ࠆߣߩ࡟࠶࠹࡞߇⾍ࠄࠇ‫⚿ߩߘޔ‬ᨐ‫ޔ‬㊀ⷐߥ᡽╷᳿ቯߦ౉ࠇߥ޿ㇱᣖ߇಴ࠆࠃ߁ߦߥ
ߞߚ‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕ‬ධㇱߩ᳃ᣖ㑆ߩᩰᏅߪ੹ᣣߩධㇱ᡽ᴦߦ߽ᓇ㗀ࠍ෸߷ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
⚻ᷣ߿㐿⊒ᵴേߦ߅޿ߡ߽‫ޔ‬ർㇱߢߪᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭߢ޽ࠆ⧷࿖ߩ㔛ⷐߦᔕ߃ࠆߚ߼‫࡜ࠕޔ‬
ࡆࠕ࡮ࠟࡓ‫ߤߥ⧎✎ޔ‬ャ಴↪ߣߒߡ৻ᰴ↥ຠߩ㐿⊒߇ㅴߺ‫ߣࡓ࡯ࠠࠬ࡜ࠫࠥޔ‬๭߫ࠇࠆᄢ
ⷙᮨἠṴ㧔✎⧎㧕㐿⊒߿㋕㆏ᢛ஻߇ㅴࠎߛ৻ᣇ18‫ޔ‬ධㇱ᡽╷ߪධㇱߩ⚻ᷣ㐿⊒ࠍ⋡⊛ߣߔࠆ
1898 ᐕࠃࠅ⧷࡮ࠛࠫࡊ࠻౒ห⛔ᴦ߇ᆎ߹ࠆ߇‫⷏ޔ‬ㇱߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞࿾ၞ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߢߪ࠺ࠖࡦࠞ‫ߤߥ࡞ࠛ࠿ޔ‬
⻉᳃ᣖߩᱞജᛶ᛫߇⛯߈‫ోࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬૕ߣߒߡᬀ᳃࿾⛔ᴦߐࠇࠆ߹ߢߦታ㓙ߪ⚂ 30 ᐕࠍⷐߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
15 ⢛᥊ߦߪධㇱߪ‫ߡߒߣޠࠞ࡝ࡈࠕޟߊߥߪߢޠࡉ࡜ࠕޟ‬㐿⊒ߒ‫⧷ޔ‬࿖㗔ߢ޽ߞߚ᧲ࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ߳ߩ૬ว߽
⷗ㄟࠎߢ޿ߚߣ߽ߐࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬Gadir Ali et al. (2005)
16 ർㇱੱߩධㇱ߳ߩ⒖േ߿ධർߩႺ⇇ᴪ޿ߩવ⛔⊛ߥ␠ળ߇ሽ࿷ߒߚ࠿ࡃጊ࿾߳ߩ⥄↱ߥ⒖േࠍ⑌ᱛ
17 ᢎ⢒ߦࠃࠆ⣕ㇱᣖൻߩ⧯⠪߿ᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭ߳ߩ෻ኻㆇേߩෂ㒾ࠍ⠨ᘦߒ‫ޔ‬ේ૑᳃ߦࠃࠆⴕ᡽ࠍᜂ߁ਅ⚖ߩ
੐ോቭࠍ↥಴ߔࠇ߫ࠃ޿‫ߩߣޔ‬⠨߃߇ᩮᧄߦ޽ߞߚ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬એ೨ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ߆ࠄߩᅛ㓮߇ධㇱ߿࠿ࡃ಴り
ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩੱ‫ߦޘ‬ኻߔࠆ஍⷗߇޽ࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆ‫ߚ߹ޕ‬ೋ╬ᢎ⢒ߢ૶߁ਥⷐ᳃ᣖ⸒⺆߇ㆬ߫ࠇߚ߇‫ޔ‬
ߘߩ⚿ᨐㆬ߫ࠇߚ⸒⺆ߩ᳃ᣖߪධㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ᡽ᴦࠍᜂ߁㓸࿅ߣߒߡߩ࿾૏ࠍ₪ᓧߒ‫ߩઁޔ‬᳃ᣖ㓸࿅ߣ
ߩᩰᏅࠍ↢߻⚿ᨐߣ߽ߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬
18 ߎߩࠃ߁ߥ੤ᤃߢንࠍᓧߚߩߪࠡ࡝ࠪࡖ‫ߩࠕ࠾ࡔ࡞ࠕޔࡦࡁࡃ࡟ޔࠕ࡝ࠪޔ‬໡ੱߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ߩߘޔ‬ਛߦߪ
ർㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ໡ੱ߽฽߹ࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆ੤ᤃߪ೙㒢ࠍฃߌߡ޿ߚߚ߼‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩ੤ᤃߪߎࠇࠄߩᄖ
࿖ੱ߹ߚߪࠬ࡯࠳ࡦർㇱߩ໡ੱߦីࠄࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
14
77
ߎߣߪ⸒෸ߐࠇߡ޿ߥ߆ߞߚ19‫ޕ‬ධㇱߦߪታ⾰⊛ߥ⚻ᷣ㐿⊒ᵴേߪⴕࠊࠇߕ‫ޔ‬㐿⊒ߩᩰᏅߪ
߹ߔ߹ߔᐢ߇ߞߡ޿ߞߚ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ർㇱߦ߅޿ߡ߽㐿⊒ߪࡂ࡞࠷࡯ࡓ๟ㄝ߿એ೨߆ࠄ㐿⊒
߇ㅴࠎߢ޿ߚ࿾ၞ߳ᛩ⾗߇ਛᔃߣߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߩਛߢߩ࿾ၞᩰᏅ߇᜛ᄢߔࠆߥߤ৻ីࠅߩࠛ
࡝࡯࠻߇ᡰ㈩ߒ‫ޔ‬ਥⷐㇺᏒߩߺࠍ㐿⊒ߒߡ޿ߊߣ޿߁ో૕⊛ߦᱡࠎߛ⚻ᷣ᭴ㅧ߇⏕┙ߒߡ
޿ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
ධㇱ᡽╷ߩ⢛᥊ߦߪ‫ޔ‬ේ૑᳃ߦࠃࠆⴕ᡽㧔Native Administration㧕ࠍଦㅴߒ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߩࠕ࡜ࡉ
໡ੱߦࠃࠆ‫ࡉ࡜ࠕޟ‬ൻ‫ߩޠ‬ᓇ㗀߿ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓߩᓇ㗀߆ࠄධㇱࠍ଻⼔ߔࠆߎߣߦ޽ߞߚ߇‫ޔ‬
ᬀ᳃࿾᡽╷߇߽ߚࠄߒߚ߽ߩߪ‫ޔ‬ධർߩᢎ⢒ߩᩰᏅߛߌߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩਛߢߩ᳃ᣖኻ┙‫ޔ‬
ߘߒߡᱡࠎߛ⚻ᷣ᭴ㅧࠍ↢ߺ಴ߒ‫ޔ‬ධർߩ⚻ᷣᩰᏅࠍ᜛ᄢߐߖߡ޿ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
ߎߩࠃ߁ߦ‫ࠍ┙⁛߇ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ᨐߚߔ೨ߦߔߢߦᢎ⢒‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ㐿⊒‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭ߿ⴕ᡽߳ߩෳട
ߩᐲว޿ߢධർߩᩰᏅ߇ߢ߈޽߇ߞߡ޿ߚ‫ޔߪߦࠄߐޕ‬ධㇱౝ߅ࠃ߮ർㇱౝߢߩ࿾ၞᩰᏅ
߇᜛ᄢߒߚߎߣ߇᭴ㅧ⊛ߥᩰᏅࠍᐢߍߚේ࿃ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕ‬ᬀ᳃࿾ᡰ㈩ߩ⽶ߩ
ㆮ↥ߣ߽⸒߃ࠆ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ໧㗴ߦࠃࠅ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߩ৻ㇱߩࠛ࡝࡯࠻߇ን߿ᮭജࠍᡰ㈩ߔࠆߎߣߦ
ߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩੱ‫߇ޘ‬࿖ኅᑪ⸳ߩㆊ⒟ߦෳടߔࠆ૛࿾ࠍߥߊߒߡ޿ߚ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧠㧕ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ⁛┙ߣ╙৻ᰴౝᚢߩഺ⊒
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪ 1956 ᐕߦ⁛┙ࠍᨐߚߔ߇‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬࿖ౝߢߩ౒ㅢߩℂ⸃ߩਅߢⴕࠊࠇߚ߽ߩ
ߢߪߥ߆ߞߚ‫ߦ․ޕ‬ධㇱߢߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱಽ㔌⁛┙߿᧲ࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ(ࠤ࠾ࠕ‫ߩ߳)࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ‬૬วߥߤ
ߩ⼏⺰߽޽ߞߚਛߢ‫ߪ┙⁛ޔ‬ർㇱߩਥዉᮭߩਅߢⴕࠊࠇߚ20‫┙⁛ޕ‬ᓟ‫⧷ޔ‬࿖ੱ߇භ߼ߡ޿ߚ
ධㇱߩ㊀ⷐࡐࠬ࠻㧔᡽ᐭߩᓎ⡯‫⼊ޔ‬ኤቭ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭᚲ▤ߩቇᩞᢎຬߥߤ㧕ߪ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒ߩᏅߥߤ߆
ࠄർㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦੱߦขߞߡઍࠊࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ౝㇱߩ⼏ຬㆬ᜼ߦ߅޿ߡ߽‫ޔ‬࿖ో૕ߣߒߡᄙᢙࠍභ
߼ࠆർㇱ᡽ᮭ߇ධㇱߩ᦭ജࡐࠬ࠻ࠍභ߼ࠆߎߣߣߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦߣߞߡ⁛┙ߪ‫⧷ޔ‬࿖ᡰ㈩߆
ࠄർㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦᡰ㈩ߦઍࠊߞߚߛߌߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ታ⾰‫ޟ‬ർㇱߦࠃࠆᬀ᳃࿾ൻ‫ߩޠ‬ᆎ߹ࠅߣߥߞ
ߚ‫ޕ‬
ߎߩࠃ߁ߥർㇱੱ߇࿶ୟߔࠆ‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޟ‬ൻ‫ࠅࠃߦࠬ࠮ࡠࡊߩޠ‬ෂᯏᗵߣਇḩࠍᜬߞߚධ
ㇱߩ౓჻ߚߜ߇‫ ߩ┙⁛ޔ‬1 ᐕ೨‫ޔ‬1955 ᐕߦ࠻࡝࠶࠻ߦߡ෻ੂࠍ⿠ߎߒߚߩ߇ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩౝ
ᚢߩᆎ߹ࠅߣߐࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬෻ੂߪߔߋߦ㎾㕒ൻߐࠇߚ߇‫ߩߎޔ‬෻ੂ߇߈ߞ߆ߌߣߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ᒰᤨർ
ㇱァ੐᡽ᮭ߇ㅴ߼ߡ޿ߚࠕ࡜ࡉൻ‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ൻߦ෻ኻߒ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩಽ㔌⁛┙ࠍ⋡ᜰߔ‫ࠕޟ‬
࠾ࡖ࠾ࡖ‫ޠ‬㧔ⰬߩᲥ㧕ߣ๭߫ࠇࠆࠥ࡝࡜ㆇേ߇ᵴ⊒ൻߒౝᚢ߳ߣ⊒ዷߔࠆ‫ޕ‬ౝᚢߪධㇱో
૕ߦᐢ߇ࠅ㐳ᦼൻߒߚ‫ޕ‬
1969 ᐕߦァ੐ࠢ࡯࠺࠲ߢ᡽ᮭࠍ᝿ីߒߚ࠿ࡔࠗ࡝᡽ᮭߪ‫ޔ‬1972 ᐕߦධㇱߣߩ‫ࠬࠖ࠺ࠕޟ‬
ࠕࡌࡃදቯ‫ ߮⚿ࠍޠ‬17 ᐕ㑆⛯޿ߚ╙৻ᰴౝᚢࠍ⚳⚿ߐߖࠆߣหᤨߦ‫ޔ‬ኻᄖ⊛ߦ߽ߎࠇ߹ߢ
੕޿ߩ෻᡽ᐭ⚵❱ࠍᡰេߒ㑐ଥ߇ᖡൻߒߡ޿ߚㄭ㓞࿖ߩࠛ࠴ࠝࡇࠕ߿࠙ࠟࡦ࠳ߣ‫ޔ‬෻᡽ᐭ
߳ߩᡰេࠍᱛ߼ࠆදቯࠍ⚿߱ߥߤ㑐ଥߩౣ᭴▽ࠍ࿑ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
19
20
Gadir Ali et al (2005)
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ⁛┙ߪ᳃ᣖਥ⟵⊛ߥേᯏߦࠃࠆ↥‛ߣ޿߁ࠃࠅ߽‫ޔ‬ᬀ᳃࿾᡽ᐭߢ޽ߞߚ⧷࿖ߣࠛࠫࡊ࠻ਔ࿖ߩ
ᄖ੤⊛ߥᓇ㗀߇ᒝ޿ߣᜰ៰ߔࠆ(Johnson (2004), ᩙᧄ(1998))‫ޕ‬
78
ࠕ࠺ࠖࠬࠕࡌࡃදቯߩ․ᓽߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩ‫ޟ‬࿾ᣇ⥄ᴦ‫ޔ߼⹺ࠍޠ‬ධㇱߪೋ߼ߡ⥄ಽߚߜߩ᡽
ᐭߣߒߡߩ‫ޟ‬ධㇱ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ‫ࠍޠ‬ᚑ┙ߐߖߚߎߣߢ޽ࠆ21‫ޕ‬๺ᐔวᗧᓟߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߪർㇱߩ࠿ࡔ
ࠗ࡝᡽ᮭߦኻߒౝᚢߢ∋ᑷߒߚ࿾ၞߩ㐿⊒ଦㅴߦᦼᓙࠍነߖߚ߇‫ᦼߩߘޔ‬ᓙߪⵣಾࠄࠇࠆ
ߎߣߦߥࠅ‫╙ߡߒߘޔ‬ੑᰴౝᚢ߳ߣ⊒ዷߒߡ޿ߊߎߣߣߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧡㧕╙ੑᰴౝᚢ߳ߩㆊ⒟ߣⷐ࿃
Ԙ ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓൻߩᵄߣ SPLM/A ߩ⊒⿷
࠿ࡔࠗ࡝᡽ᮭߪ‫ࡃࡌࠕࠬࠖ࠺ࠕޔ‬දቯߢධㇱߩ⥄ᴦࠍ⹺߼ࠆߎߣߢ‫ޔ‬ධㇱ߆ࠄߩᡰᜬࠍ
₪ᓧߒߡ޿ߚ߇‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩࡌࡦ࠹ࠖ࠙ߢ 1978 ᐕߦ⍹ᴤ߇⊒⷗ߐࠇࠆߣ‫ޔ‬⍹ᴤߩ೑ᮭࠍർㇱߩ
߽ߩߣߔߴߊേ޿ߚ‫ߢ߹ࠇߘޕ‬᡽ᢜߢ޽ߞߚ㊁ౄߢ޽ࠆ࠙ࡦࡑౄ㧔ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓቬᢎኅࡑࡈ
࠺ࠖߩሶቊ߇ౄ㚂㧕߿᳃ᣖࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓᚢ✢㧔ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓේℂਥ⟵᡽ౄ㧔NIF㧕㧕ࠍᆎ߼‫ޔ‬࿖
᳃ߩᄙᢙࠍභ߼ࠆࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓᢎᓤߩᡰᜬࠍߣࠅߟߌࠆߚ߼‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ൻߩࠠࡖࡦࡍ࡯ࡦ
ࠍታᣉߒ‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ᴺ㧔ࠪࡖ࡯࡝ࠕ㧕ࠍ࿖ߩᴺᓞߣߒߡቯ߼ߚ22‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ධㇱࠍ 3 ߟߩ࿾
ၞߦౣ✬ᚑߒ23‫ޔ‬ධㇱ࿾ၞߦኻߒߡ߽ࠕ࡜ࡆࠕ⺆ࠍ౏↪⺆ߣߒ‫ޔ‬ධㇱァࠍਛᄩァߩ▤ℂਅߦ
⟎޿ߚ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬ታ⾰ࠕ࠺ࠖࠬࠕࡌࡃදቯߦ෻ߒ‫ޔ‬ᒝᒁߦධㇱࠍർㇱߦ⛔วߐߖࠃ߁ߣߒߚ‫ޕ‬
ߎࠇߦ෻ኻߔࠆㆇേ߇৻᳇ߦ㜞߹ࠅ‫ޔ‬1983 ᐕ‫ߩࡖ࠾ࡖ࠾ࠕޔ‬ర౓჻߇ࡏ࡞ߢർㇱァ߳ߩౣ
✬ߦ෻ኻߒ෻ੂ߇⿠ߎࠅ‫ࠍࠇߎޔ‬ᄾᯏߦ╙ੑᰴౝᚢ߇ᆎ߹ߞߚ‫ߩߎޕ‬ਛᔃߦ޿ߚߩ߇ධㇱ
಴りߩ࡚ࠫࡦ࡮ࠟ࡜ࡦ዁ᩞ24ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᓐࠍ⼏㐳౗ᦨ㜞ม઎ቭߦߒߚ‫ੱࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޟ‬᳃⸃᡼ㆇേ࡮
⸃᡼ァ㧔SPLM/SPLA㧕‫⚿߇ޠ‬ᚑߐࠇ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߢ෻᡽ᐭㆇേ߇ౣ߮㐿ᆎߐࠇࠆ25‫ޕ‬
ԙ 㗐ᝂߒߚධㇱ߳ߩੑᄢᄢⷙᮨ㐿⊒
࠿ࡔࠗ࡝᡽ᮭߪ 1980 ᐕએ㒠ࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߥߤ⷏஥⻉࿖߆ࠄߩᄖ⾗ߩዉ౉ࠍଦㅴߒ⾗ᧄਥ⟵⊛
ߥ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷࠍ⋡ᜰߒ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆᄢⷙᮨ㐿⊒ࠍផㅴߒࠃ߁ߣߒߚ߇‫߇ࠇߎޔ‬ᄬᢌߒ࿖᳃
⚻ᷣߪ∋ᑷߒ࿖ኅ߇୫㊄ẃߌߦߥߞߡߒ߹߁‫ߩߎޕ‬ᄢⷙᮨࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻߇⍹ᴤ㐿⊒ߣ࡚ࠫ
21
ධㇱ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭߪ┙ᴺᮭࠍᜬߟ‫ޟ‬࿾ᣇ⼏ળ‫ⴕߣޠ‬᡽ᮭࠍᜬߟ‫ᦨޟ‬㜞⹏⼏ળ‫ޔࠇࠄ߼⹺߇⟎⸳ߩޠ‬ධㇱ᡽ᐭ
ߩᄢ⛔㗔߇ਛᄩ᡽ᐭߩ೽ᄢ⛔㗔ߩ࿾૏ࠍභ߼ߚ‫ޕ‬
22 ᧄ᧪ࡕࠬ࡝ࡓߩߺߦㆡ↪ߔࠆߪߕߩࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓᴺ߽ධㇱࠍߪߓ߼ർㇱߩ㕖ࡕࠬ࡝ࡓᢎᓤࠍ฽߻࿖᳃ߔߴ
ߡ߇ኻ⽎ߣߐࠇ‫ޔ‬㘶㈬ߩ⑌ᱛ‫ޔ‬㖊ᛂߜೃߥߤ߇ታᣉߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ౝᚢਛߩධㇱߢߪታ㓙ߦߪㆡ↪ߐࠇߥ߆ߞ
ߚ߇‫ޔ‬ർㇱߦ޿ࠆධㇱੱߦኻߒߡߪࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓᴺߢⵙ߆ࠇߚೃ⟏߇ਈ߃ࠄࠇߚ‫ޕ‬CPA ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓᴺߪධ
ㇱߦߪㆡ↪ߐࠇߥ޿ߎߣ߇ᱜᑼߦ᳿߹ߞߚ߇‫ߢ߹ࠇߘޔ‬ർㇱߩ᡽ᮭ߇ᄌࠊߞߡ߽࿖ో૕ߩᴺᓞߣߒߡᣉ
ⴕߐࠇߡ޿ߚ‫ޕ‬
23 ධㇱߩ᳃ᣖಽᢿࠍ೙ᐲ⊛ߦ଻㓚ߔࠆߚ߼ߦⴕࠊࠇߚ߽ߩ‫ࠍࠞࡦࠖ࠺ޕ‬ਛᔃߣߔࠆ࠽ࠗ࡞♽᳃ᣖߣ࠿ࠛ࡞
ࠍਛᔃߣߔࠆࠛࠢࠕ࠻࡝ࠕ♽᳃ᣖߩኻ┙ࠍ߁߹ߊ೑↪ߒࠃ߁ߣߒߚ߽ߩ‫ޕ‬
24 ධㇱ SPLA ߩࠞ࡝ࠬࡑ⊛ሽ࿷‫ޕ‬SPLA ߩ⊒⿷⠪ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬SPLA ⼏㐳౗ᦨ㜞ม઎ቭ‫ޕ‬ධർ๺ᐔߩ SPLA ஥
੤ᷤઍ⴫ߣߥࠅ๺ᐔวᗧࠍ㆐ᚑߐߖߚ߇‫ ߩߘޔ‬6 ࡩ᦬ᓟ‫ߩ߳࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ‬ೋߩᄖㆆߩᏫࠅߦࡋ࡝ࠦࡊ࠲࡯
߇჈⪭ߒᱫ੢‫ޕ‬
25 ╙৻ᰴౝᚢߣ╙ੑᰴౝᚢߩ⇣ߥࠆὐߪߘߩౝᚢߩࠗ࠺ࠝࡠࠡ࡯⊛ߥ⋡⊛ߢ޽ࠆ‫৻╙ޕ‬ᰴౝᚢ߇⋡ᜰߒߚ
ߩߪ‫ޟ‬ධㇱߩ⁛┙‫╙ޔ߇ߚߞ޽ߢޠ‬ੑᰴౝᚢߢ SPLA/M ߇⋡ᜰߒߚߩߪ‫␠ߚࠇߐ৻⛔ޔ‬ળਥ⟵࿖ߣߒߡ
ߩ‫ޟ‬ᣂࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ㧔New Sudan㧕‫ࠍޠ‬ᑪ⸳ߔࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠅ‫ߩߎޔ‬ὐߢᏅ⇣߇޽ࠆ‫ޔߪࡦ࡜ࠟޕ‬ർㇱ᡽ᐭ߆
ࠄᏅ೎ࠍฃߌߡ޿ࠆߩߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߛߌߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߦ૏⟎ߔࠆ࠿ࡃጊ࿾‫ޔ‬㕍࠽ࠗ࡞‫᧲ޔ‬ㇱ‫࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬
ߥߤߩ᳃ᣖ߽߅ࠅ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬ർㇱ᡽ᮭ߆ࠄ៦ขߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ᳃ᣖࠍ฽߼ߡ‫ޟ‬ᣂࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ‫⋡ࠍޠ‬ᜰߒߚߚ߼‫ޔ‬
ධㇱ߅ࠃ߮৻ㇱߩർㇱ߆ࠄߩᡰᜬࠍൎߜขߞߚ‫ޕ‬
79
ࡦࠣ࡟ࠗㆇᴡߩੑᄢ㐿⊒ߢ޽ࠆ‫߽ࠄߜߤޕ‬ධㇱ࿾ၞߢߩ㐿⊒ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩ᡽ᴦ⊛ߥኻ
┙ࠍ↢ߺ‫╙ޔ‬ੑᰴౝᚢߩᄢ߈ߥේ࿃ߣߥࠆ໧㗴ߦ⊒ዷߒߚ‫ޕ‬
߹ߕ⍹ᴤ㐿⊒ߦ߅޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬⍹ᴤ߇⊒⷗ߐࠇߚߩ߇ධർႺ⇇✢ㄭߊߢ޽ߞߚߚ߼‫ࠗࡔ࠿ޔ‬
࡝ᄢ⛔㗔ߪ‫ޔ‬⍹ᴤ෼౉⏕଻ߩߚ߼ߦධർߩႺ⇇✢ࠍᄌᦝߔࠆߎߣࠍ⋡⺰ߺධㇱ߆ࠄߩ෻⊒
ࠍ⾈߁‫⵾♖ޕ‬႐ࠍධർߤߎߦᑪ⸳ߔࠆ߆ࠍ߼ߋࠅධർߩ᡽ᴦ⊛ߥ໧㗴߳ߣ⊒ዷߒߡ޿ߞߚ
߇‫⚿ޔ‬ዪ‫ߩ࠙ࠖ࠹ࡦࡌޔ‬ណជᮭߪධㇱ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭߣߩද⼏߽ߥߒߦࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߩࠪࠚࡉࡠࡦ␠
ߦଏਈߒ‫ߚ߹ޔ‬㓞ធߒߚᴤ↰ߩណជᮭߪࡈ࡜ࡦࠬߩ࠻࠲࡯࡞␠ߦଏਈߒߚ26‫ޔࠅࠃߦࠇߎޕ‬
ධㇱߩ⍹ᴤ೑⋉߇ỗᷫߔࠆߎߣߣߥࠅ‫ޔ‬SPLA ߇ࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߩࠪࠚࡉࡠࡦ␠ࠍ᡹᠄‫ࡠࡉࠚࠪޔ‬
ࡦ␠ࠍ᠗ㅌߦㅊ޿߿ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
߽߁৻ߟߩᄢⷙᮨࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱ࡚ࠫࡦࠣ࡟ࠗᎺߩㆇᴡᑪ⸳ߢ޽ࠆ‫߇࡞ࠗ࠽⊕ޕ‬
ᵹࠇࠆ࡚ࠫࡦࠣ࡟ࠗߪḨ࿾Ꮺߢ‫ޔ‬ᴡᎹ੤ㅢߩᢛ஻߅ࠃ߮ਅᵹߦ޽ߚࠆർㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ߳ߩ᳓
ߩଏ⛎ࠍ⋡⊛ߣߒߚᄢⷙᮨࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߢ޽ࠅ‫߽࠻ࡊࠫࠛޔ‬ᄢ߈ߥ㑐ᔃࠍᛴ޿ߡ޿ߚ‫ࡊޕ‬
ࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ࠨࠗ࠻ߪ⢈ᴅߥ࿾ၞߢ߽޽ߞߚߚ߼‫ޔ‬ㄘᬺ㐿⊒߽⸘↹ߐࠇߡ޿ߚ‫ࡊޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬
ࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ࠨࠗ࠻ߦዬ૑ߒߡ޿ߚ૑᳃ߩ࠾࡯࠭ࠍήⷞߒߚࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߢ޽ߞߚߎߣ‫ޔ‬ᄢ
ⷙᮨߥ↢ᘒ♽ߩ⎕უ߇੍ᗐߐࠇ‫ޔ‬ධㇱ૑᳃߆ࠄߩ෻ኻㆇേ߇⿠ߎߞߚ‫ޕ‬ᩙᧄ㧔1998㧕ߦࠃ
ࠆߣ‫߿࠻ࡊࠫࠛߌࠊࠅߣޔ‬ർㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ߆ࠄߩᄢ㊂ߩㄘ᳃ߩ౉ᬀ߽⸘↹ߐࠇߡ޿ߚߎߣ߇‫ޔ‬
ࠕ࡜ࡉߦࠃࠆ‫ޟ‬ᬀ᳃࿾ൻ‫ࠍޠ‬ᗧ๧ߒ‫ޔ‬ධㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦੱߩ෻᡽ᐭᗵᖱࠍᾜߞߚߣߐࠇࠆ‫ࡊޕ‬
ࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߪߘࠇߦ߽߆߆ࠊࠄߕㅴⴕߒߡ޿ߚ߇‫ޔ‬1984 ᐕߦߪ SPLA ߩㇱ㓌߇Ꮏ੐⃻႐ࠍ
භ᜚ߒࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߪਛᢿߦ⥋ߞߚ‫ޕ‬
ߎߩ 2 ߟߩᄢⷙᮨࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߪධർኻ┙ߩ੎ὐߣߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ਔࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߣ߽ᱞജ੺౉
ߦࠃࠅਛᢿߒߡߒ߹߁ߥߤ‫╙ޔ‬ੑᰴౝᚢߦ⊒ዷߒߡ޿ߞߚᄢ߈ߥⷐ࿃ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
Ԛ ╙ੑᰴౝᚢਛߩർㇱ᡽ᮭߣࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓේℂਥ⟵ൻ㧔ࡃࠪ࡯࡞᡽ᮭߩ⺀↢㧕
࠿ࡔࠗ࡝᡽ᮭߪ‫╙ޔ‬ੑᰴౝᚢ߳ߩഺ⊒‫ޔ‬ᄢⷙᮨ㐿⊒ߩᄬᢌߦࠃࠆ⚻ᷣߩ∋ᑷߥߤ߆ࠄ 1985
ᐕ᳃ⴐⱎ⿠ߦࠃࠅᄬ⣉ߔࠆ‫ߩߘޕ‬ᓟ࠙ࡦࡑౄߦࠃࠆᢥ᳃᡽ᮭ߇᮸┙ߔࠆ߇‫ޔ‬1989 ᐕ‫ࠬࠗޔ‬
࡜࡯ࡓේℂਥ⟵᡽ౄߢ޽ࠆ NIF ߣ⚿⸤ߒߚࡃࠪ࡯࡞ಎ዁㧔⃻ᄢ⛔㗔㧕ࠍਛᔃߣߒߚァㇱߦ
ࠃࠆࠢ࡯࠺࠲߇⿠ߎࠅ‫ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ౣ߮⁛ⵙ᡽ᮭਅߦ⟎߆ࠇߚ‫࡞࡯ࠪࡃޕ‬᡽ᮭߩ⢛ᓟߦߪ
ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓේℂਥ⟵ߩ NIF ౄ㚂ߩ࠻࠘࡜ࡆ߇ሽ࿷ߒ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒ߪዊቇᩞ߆ࠄᄢቇߦ⥋ࠆ߹ߢ࿖
ో૕ߢࠕ࡜ࡆࠕ⺆ᢎ⢒߇⟵ോઃߌࠄࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ንߣᮭജ߽ NIF ᡰᜬ⠪ߩࠛ࡝࡯࠻ߦ㓸ਛߒ‫ߘޔ‬
ࠇએᄖࠍឃ㒰ߔࠆ᡽╷߇ⴕࠊࠇߚ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ᮭജၮ⋚ࠍ࿕߼ࠆߚ߼ߦ‫ޔ‬෻૕೙ࠍ໒߃ࠆ᡽ౄ‫ޔ‬
ᄢቇᢎቭ‫ޔ‬ක⠪‫ޔ‬ᑯ⼔჻ߥߤߩࠛ࡝࡯࠻ጀߥߤߩᒢ࿶߽ⴕߞߚ27‫ޕ‬
26
ᦨ⚳⊛ߦߪ࠿ࡔࠗ࡝ߪ࿖ౝߢߩ♖⵾ࠍ޽߈ࠄ߼‫ࠍࡦࠗ࡜ࡊࠗࡄޔ‬ᑪ⸳ߒේᴤߩ߹߹ർㇱߩ಴ญߢ޽ࠆࡐ
࡯࠻ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦャㅍߔࠆߎߣߣߒߚ‫ޕ‬
27 ߎߩᤨᦼ‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ේℂਥ⟵࿖ኅߣߥߞߚࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪ‫ߩࠕ࡝ࠚࠫ࡞ࠕޔ‬ේℂਥ⟵⠪߿ࠗ࡜ࠢߩࠢ࠙ࠚ
࡯࠻ଚ᡹ࠍᡰᜬߒ‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗߪࡓ࡯࠷࡞ࡂޔ‬ㆊỗᵷ߿࠹ࡠ⚵❱ߩ᷷ᐥߦߥߞߡ޿ߚߣߐࠇࠆ‫ࠗࠞ࡞ࠕޕ‬
࡯࠳ߩࠝࠨࡑ࡮ࡆࡦ࡮࡜࠺ࠖࡦࠍ 1991 ᐕ߆ࠄ 1996 ᐕ߹ߢṛ࿷ߐߖ‫⷗ޔ‬㄰ࠅߣߒߡࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭߪ⼾ን
ߥ⾗㊄ࠍ᦭ߒߚࡆࡦ࡮࡜࠺ࠖࡦ߆ࠄࠗࡦࡈ࡜ᛩ⾗߿⾗㊄⊛ଏਈࠍฃߌߚ‫ޕ‬1995 ᐕߦࠛࠫࡊ࠻ߩࡓࡃ࡜ࠢ
ᄢ⛔㗔ߩᥧᲕᧂㆀߦࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ߇㑐ࠊߞߡ޿ߚߣ޿߁ᖱႎ߽޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬1996 ᐕ‫ޔ‬࿖ㅪߪࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦኻߔࠆ೙ⵙ
80
ԛ ධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆಽⵚ
ㅢᏱౝᚢߩਥ૕ߪ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭኻ෻᡽ᐭߣ޿߁ 2 ߟߦಽ߆ࠇࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ㄭᐕߩࠨࡂ࡜એධߩࠕࡈ࡝
ࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ⚗੎ߩ․ᓽߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬ౝᚢߩਥ૕߇ಽⵚߒᄙ᭽ൻߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬෻᡽ᐭߩ㑆ߢߩ⛔৻
ߒߚ⷗⸃ࠍ⷗಴ߖߕߦ๺ᐔ੤ᷤ߇ⶄ㔀ൻߒ‫ޔ‬ౝᚢ߇㐳ᦼൻߔࠆ௑ะߦ޽ࠆ28‫ޕ‬
╙ੑᰴౝᚢߩਥ૕ߪၮᧄ⊛ߦࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭߣ SPLM/A ߩੑ⠪ߢ޽ߞߚ߇‫ޔ‬ౝᚢਛߪ
SPLM/A ౝߢߩಽⵚ‫ޔ‬ർㇱ᡽ᮭߩਃᐲߦࠊߚࠆ᡽ᮭ੤ઍ‫ޔ‬㓞࿖߆ࠄߩᓇ㗀ߥߤࠍฃߌ‫ޔ‬ਥ૕
ߪᄙ᭽ൻߒߚ‫ߚߞ޿߁ߎޕ‬ਛߢ‫ޔ‬SPLM/A ߩㆇേߦห⺞ߔࠆർ஥ߩࠕ࡜ࡉੱ߇޿ࠆ৻ᣇ‫ޔ‬ධ
ㇱߩࠕ࡜ࡉ♽ࠛ࡝࡯࠻߇ർ஥ߩᡰᜬࠍߔࠆߥߤ‫ޔ‬ධർߩኻ┙ߣ⷗߃ߡ߽ౝᚢߩਥ૕ߪⶄ㔀
ߐࠍౝ൮ߒߡ޿ߚ‫ޕ‬
4-4
ౝᚢߩ⚳⚿ߣ๺ᐔวᗧ߳ߩࡊࡠ࠮ࠬ
๺ᐔࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߪ‫ޔ‬1990 ᐕೋ㗡ࠃࠅ๟ㄝ⻉࿖߿ࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߥߤ⷏஥⻉࿖‫ޔ‬࿖ㅪߥߤߢ⺞ᢛࠍ
ⴕߞߡ޿ߚ߇‫ޔ‬๺ᐔ੤ᷤ߇ᕆㅦߦㅴዷߒߚߩߪ‫ޔ‬2002 ᐕߦ౉ߞߡ߆ࠄߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬๺ᐔࡊࡠ࠮
ࠬ ߢ ᄢ ߈ ߥ ᓎ ഀ ࠍ ᜂ ߞ ߚ ߩ ߇ ‫ ޔ‬࿾ ၞ ⊛ ߥ ᨒ ⚵ ߺ ߢ ޽ ࠆ IGAD 㧔 ᡽ ᐭ 㑆 㐿 ⊒ ᯏ ᭴ 㧦
Intergovernmental Authority for Development㧕29ߢ޽ࠆ‫ ߦ․ޕ‬IGAD ߩᨒ⚵ߺࠍ૶޿㓞࿖ߩࠛ
࡝࠻࡝ࠕ‫ ࠕ࠾ࠤޔ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࠕࡇࠝ࠴ࠛޔ‬4 ࠞ࿖߇๺ᐔ⺞஗ߩขࠅ⚵ߺࠍᆎ߼‫ޔ‬1994 ᐕߦ
ߪ㧢ߟߩ‫ޟ‬ේೣት⸒㧔DOP㧕‫ࠍޠ‬೙ቯߒߚ‫ޕ‬DOP ߢߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱ⥄᳿ᮭߩᛚ⹺‫ޔ‬᡽ᢎಽ㔌‫ⶄޔ‬
ᢙ᡽ౄߩዉ౉‫ੱޔ‬ᮭߩዅ㊀‫ޔ‬ㅪ㇌೙߆࿖ኅㅪวߦࠃࠆಽᮭൻ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߢಽ㔌⁛┙ߩㆬᛯ⢇߽
฽߼ߚ૑᳃ᛩ␿ߩታᣉ߇⋓ࠅㄟ߹ࠇߡ߅ࠅ‫ߩߘޔ‬ᓟߩ๺ᐔ߳ߩ㆏╭ࠍ┙ߡߚߎߣߢ㊀ⷐߥ
ᓎഀࠍᨐߚߒߚ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬6 ේೣߩਛߦߪ᡽ᢎಽ㔌߇౉ߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ർㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭߪධㇱ
ߦ⥄ᴦᮭࠍ⹺߼ࠆߎߣߣ᡽ᢎಽ㔌ߦߟ޿ߡ⹺߼ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ߕ‫ޔ‬ᒰᤨߩ੤ᷤߪ᳿ⵚߒߚ30‫ޕ‬
߹ߚ‫ ߪࠞ࡝ࡔࠕޔ‬GW ࡉ࠶ࠪࡘ᡽ᮭߦߥࠆߣࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ໧㗴․૶ࠍછ๮ߒ‫ࡈࠕޔࠢ࡜ࠗޔ‬
ࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦߣߪ⇣ߥࠅᐔ๺⊛੤ᷤߦࠃࠅ࿖ౝ໧㗴ࠍ⸃᳿ߐߖࠆᣇᴺࠍㆬ߮31‫⷏ߢ߹ࠇߎޔ‬஥
߆ࠄ௛߈߆ߌߡ޿ߚࠗ࠲࡝ࠕ‫⧷ޔ࡯ࠚ࠙࡞ࡁޔ࠳ࡦ࡜ࠝޔ‬࿖ߦടࠊࠅ‫ޔ‬๺ᐔ⺞஗ࠍ࡝࡯࠼
ߒߚ‫ޕ‬
2002 ᐕߦ‫⼏ࠬࠦࡖ࠴ࡑޟ‬ቯᦠ‫⺞߇ޠ‬ශߐࠇࠃ߁߿ߊ๺ᐔ੤ᷤߪㅴዷߔࠆ‫⼏ࠬࠦࡖ࠴ࡑޕ‬
ቯᦠߢߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦ 6 ᐕ㑆ߩᥳቯ⥄ᴦᮭࠍਈ߃‫ߩߘޔ‬ᓟߩಽ㔌⁛┙ߦߟ޿ߡߪ૑᳃ᛩ␿ߦߡ
Ꮻዻࠍ᳿ቯߔࠆߎߣ‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ᴺࠍධㇱߦㆡ↪ߒߥ޿ߎߣ߇วᗧߐࠇߚὐߢ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭ‫ޔ‬
SPLM/A ஥ਔᣇߩ⼑ᱠ߇⷗ࠄࠇߚ‫ߩߘޕ‬ᓟ 2003 ᐕߦߪ‫ޔ‬቟ో଻㓚૕೙ߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧ‫ޔ‬ንߩ
᳿⼏ࠍណᛯ‫ޕ‬1998 ᐕ‫߇࠳࡯ࠗࠞ࡞ࠕޔ‬㑐ਈߒߚߣߐࠇࠆࠕࡔ࡝ࠞᄢ૶㙚หᤨ῜⎕੐ઙ߇⿠ߎࠆߣ‫ࡔࠕޔ‬
࡝ࠞߪႎᓳភ⟎ߣߒߡࠕ࡞ࠞࠗ࡯࠳߇᜚ὐߣߒߡ޿ߚࡂ࡞࠷࡯ࡓߩ⮎ຠᎿ႐ࠍⓨ῜ߒߚ‫ޕ‬
28 ㄭᐕߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞߿࠰ࡑ࡝ࠕߥߤ‫ޕ‬
29 IGAD ߪࠫࡉ࠴‫ ࠞ࡝ࡈࠕ᧲ߩ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔࠕ࡝ࡑ࠰ޔࠕ࠾ࠤޔࠕࡍࠝ࠴ࠛޔࠕ࡝࠻࡝ࠛޔ‬7 ࠞ
࿖߇ട⋖ߒߡ޿ࠆ࿾ၞᯏ᭴‫ޕ‬1986 ᐕߦᐓ߫ߟኻ╷࡮㐿⊒᡽ᐭ㑆ᯏ᭴ߣߒߡഃ⸳ߐࠇߚ߽ߩ߇‫ޔ‬1996 ᐕ
ߦᡷ⚵ߐࠇ⊒⿷‫ޕ‬1991 ᐕએ᧪‫ޔߢߤߥࡦ࠳࡯ࠬ߿ࠕ࡝ࡑ࠰ޔ‬ᱞⵝฦᵷߣߩ⺞஗߿๺ᐔ੤ᷤߢ㊀ⷐߥ⺞஗
ᓎߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
30 ᩙᧄ(2004a)‫ޔ‬Iyob (2006)
31 ᩙᧄ(2005)
81
ಽ᦭‫ޔ‬ᮭജߩಽ᦭ߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧᦠ߇ᰴ‫ޔࠇ߫⚿ߣޘ‬2005 ᐕ 1 ᦬ CPA ⺞ශߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬
4-5
൮᜝๺ᐔวᗧ㧔CPA㧕
CPA ߪࡑ࠴ࡖࠦࠬߢߩ੤ᷤએ᧪ᚑ┙ߒߚ৻ㅪߩ 4 ߟߩ⼏ቯᦠ‫ޔ‬2 ߟߩᨒ⚵ߺวᗧ‫ޔ‬2 ߟߩ
ઃዻᢥᦠ߆ࠄ᭴ᚑߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ㧔⴫㧞ෳᾖ㧕‫ޕ‬CPA ߩ⌕ታߥታᣉ߇ᐔ๺߳ߩ㆏╭ߣߥߞߡ߅
ࠅ‫ޔ‬࿑ 2 ߦ␜ߒߚࠃ߁ߦ CPA ߩታᣉㆊ⒟ߦ߅޿ߡ‫ޔࠬࠨࡦ࠮ޔ‬ㆬ᜼‫ޔ‬૑᳃ᛩ␿ߥߤ߇㊀ⷐ
ߥታᣉ੐㗄ߦߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔ߅ߥޕ‬CPA ߩࡕ࠾࠲࡝ࡦࠣߪ‫ޔ‬ክᩏ࡮⹏ଔᆔຬળ㧔Assessment and
Evaluation Committee㧔AEC㧕㧕߇ታᣉߔࠆߎߣߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ32‫ޕ‬
ߎߎߢࠬ࡯࠳ࡦో૕ߩ๺ᐔߩቯ⌕߆ࠄ⇐ᗧߔߴ߈ὐߪ‫ޔ‬CPA ߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱ SPLM ߣർㇱ NCP
ߣߩ㑆ߩ๺ᐔวᗧߢ޽ࠅ‫᧲߿࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬ㇱࠍ฽߼ઁߩ࿾ၞ߿ࠕࠢ࠲࡯ߪ㒰ᄖߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
߹ߕ‫ޔ‬ਥ૕߇ߪߞ߈ࠅߣߒߡ޿ࠆධർ⚗੎ߦ㑐ߒ๺ᐔࠍᚑ┙ߐߖߚ߽ߩߢ‫ޔ‬࿖㓙␠ળ߽ߘ
ࠇࠍᓟ᛼ߒߒߚ‫ޔߜࠊߥߔޕ‬CPA ᥳቯᦼ㑆ߩਛߢߪ࿖㓙␠ળߪධㇱߩ SPLM ߣർㇱ NCP ߦ
ᱜ⛔ᕈ߇޽ࠆߎߣࠍ⹺߼‫࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬໧㗴ࠍᓟ࿁ߒߦߒߚߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬
⴫㧞 CPA ߦ฽߹ࠇࠆ㧢ߟߩਥⷐวᗧᢥᦠ
CPA ߩ᭴ᚑ
ࡑ࠴ࡖࠦࠬ⼏ቯᦠ (2002.7)
቟ో଻㓚໧㗴ߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧᦠ
(Security Arrangement) (2003.9)
ਥⷐߥౝኈ
࡮
࡮
࡮
࡮
࡮
࡮
ንߩಽ᦭ߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧᦠ
㧔Wealth Sharing㧕(2004.1)
ᮭജߩಽ᦭ߦ㑐ߔࠆวᗧᦠ
㧔Power Sharing㧕(2004.5)
࡮
࡮
࡮
࡮
࡮
࡮
ࠕࡆࠛࠗ⚗੎ߩ⸃᳿ߦ㑐ߔࠆ
᳿⼏ (2004.5)
32
࡮
࡮
ධㇱߦ 6 ᐕ㑆ߩᥳቯ⥄ᴦᮭߩઃਈ㧔2011 ᐕ 7 ᦬ 8 ᣣ߹ߢ㧕
૑᳃ᛩ␿ߦࠃࠆධㇱߩᏫዻߩ᳿ቯ
ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓᴺߪർㇱߛߌߦㆡ↪ߣߒ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦߪㆡ↪ߒߥ޿
⚗੎஗ᱛ߅ࠃ߮໧㗴ߦኻߒߡߪኻ⹤߅ࠃ߮᡽ᴦ⊛੤ᷤߦࠃࠆ⸃᳿
ߩㆩ቞
᡽ᐭァ(SAF)ߣ SPLA ߩਔᣇߩァߩ⛽ᜬߣ⛔วㇱ㓌㧔JIU㧕ߩ 3 ⒳㘃
ࠍァ㓌ߣߒߡ✬ᚑ㧔SAF ߣ SPLA ߪᥳቯᦼ㑆ਛߪ೎‫ߦޘ‬ᛒࠊࠇࠆ㧕
SAF ߩධㇱ߆ࠄߩ᠗ㅌ߅ࠃ߮ SPLA ߩർㇱ߆ࠄߩ᠗ㅌ㧔ᤨ㑆⊛ᨒ⚵
ߺߩ⸳ቯ㧕
⍹ᴤ෼౉ࠍ 50:50 ߢධർߦ㈩ಽߔࠆ
㐿⊒ߦኻߔࠆဋ╬ߥᯏળߩ଻ᜬ
ᓳ⥝㐿⊒ၮ㊄ߩ⸳┙
࿖᳃⛔৻᡽ᐭ㧔GONU㧕ਥⷐࡐࠬ࠻ߪർㇱਈౄ NCP52%‫ޔ‬SPLM28%‫ޔ‬
NCP એᄖߩർㇱ൓ജ 14%‫ޔ‬SPLM એᄖߩධㇱ൓ജ 6%ߩ㈩ಽߣߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
ධㇱ᡽ᐭ㧔GOSS㧕ߩਥⷐࡐࠬ࠻ߪ SPLM70%‫ޔ‬NCP15%‫ޔ‬SPLM એ
ᄖߩධㇱ൓ജ 15%ߣߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
ࡃࠪ࡯࡞ᄢ⛔㗔ߪ࿖ኅర㚂ߣߥࠅ‫ޔ‬೽ᄢ⛔㗔ߩ࿾૏ߪධㇱ᡽ᐭᄢ⛔
㗔߇౗ߨࠆߎߣߣߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
․೎ߥⴕ᡽਄ߩ࿾૏ߩઃਈ
ࠕࡆࠛࠗ߆ࠄߩ⍹ᴤ෼౉ߪർㇱ᡽ᐭ 50%‫ޔ‬ධㇱ᡽ᐭ 42%‫࠼࡞ࠦ⷏ޔ‬
ࡈࠔࡦᎺ 2%‫࡞࠯ࠟ࡞ࠕ࡞ࡂࡃޔ‬Ꮊ 2%‫ ੱࠞࡦࠖ࠺࡮ࠢ࠶ࠧࡦޔ‬2%‫ޔ‬
ࡒ࠮࡝ࠕ࡮ࠕ࡜ࡉੱ 2%ߩഀวߢ㈩ಽ
AEC ߩࡔࡦࡃ࡯ߪ‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬᡽ᐭ஥߆ࠄ NCP‫ޔ‬SPLA ߩઍ⴫‫ޔ‬CPA ߦ⟑ฬߒߚ⷏஥ 5 ࠞ࿖㧔ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ
࡯‫⧷ޔ‬࿖‫࠳ࡦ࡜ࠝޔࠞ࡝ࡔࠕޔࠕ࡝࠲ࠗޔ‬㧕
‫ޔ‬IGAD ઍ⴫ߣߒߡࠤ࠾ࠕ‫ߩࠕࡇࠝ࠴ࠛޔ‬ᄖ੤࿅ߥߤ 13 ߩ
ࡔࡦࡃ࡯ߣ‫ޔ‬࿖ㅪ‫ޔ‬EU‫ࠞ࡝ࡈࠕޔ‬ㅪว㧔AU㧕‫ ߩࠣ࡯࡝ࡉ࡜ࠕޔ‬4 ᯏ㑐߇ࠝࡉࠩ࡯ࡃ࡯ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣ
ᧄߪ⃻࿷ࠝࡉࠩ࡯ࡃ࡯ߢ߽౉ߞߡ޿ߥ޿‫⼏ޕ‬㐳ߪ⃻࿷⧷࿖‫ోޕ‬૕⊛ߥળวߪ᦬ 1 ࿁㐿௅‫ޔ‬቟ో଻㓚㧔ࡁ㧕
‫ޔ‬
ንߩಽ㈩㧔☨㧕
‫ޔ‬ᮭജߩಽ㈩㧔દ㧕
‫ޔ‬⒖ⴕ㧟࿾ၞߩ໧㗴㧔⯗㧕
㧕ߦߟ޿ߡߩಽ⑼ળ߇޽ࠅ‫ߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ‬㧔 㧕
ౝߩ࠼࠽࡯߇ಽ⑼ળߩ⼏㐳ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
82
࡮ ධㇱߩ૑᳃ᛩ␿ߣߪ೎ߦหᤨᦼߦࠕࡆࠛࠗߩᏫዻߦ㑐ߒ૑᳃ᛩ␿
ࠍⴕ߁‫ޕ‬
࡮ ࠕࡆࠛࠗߩႺ⇇✢ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ࠗࠛࡆࠕޔ‬Ⴚ⇇✢ᆔຬળ㧔ABC㧕ࠍ⸳
┙ߒද⼏ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
ධࠦ࡞࠼ࡈࠔࡦᎺ㧔࠿ࡃጊ࿾㧕 ࡮ ૑᳃߇ㆬ᜼ߢㆬ߱⍮੐ߦࠃߞߡ⛔ᴦ‫ޕ‬
ߣ㕍࠽ࠗ࡞Ꮊߦ߅ߌࠆ⚗੎ߩ ࡮ ࿖ኅᓳ⥝㐿⊒ၮ㊄㧔NRDF㧕ߪ‫ޔ‬ਔᎺࠍ฽߼ 75%ࠍᚢ੎ⵍἴ࿾߳ᝄ
ࠅะߌࠆ
⸃᳿ߦ߅ߌࠆ᳿⼏ (2004.5)
࡮ ਔᎺߩ⍮੐ߪߘࠇߙࠇ NCP ߣ SPLM ߣߢ੤ઍߦൕ߼ࠆ
಴ᚲ㧦CPA ࠃࠅ╩⠪૞ᚑ
࿑㧞 ᐔ๺߳ߩ㆏ߩࠅ
ᥳቯᦼ㑆䋨㪍ᐕ㑆䋩
䋨㪉㪇㪇㪌㪅㪎㪄㪉㪇㪇㪈㪈㪅㪎㪀
ᥳቯᦼ㑆એ೨㩿㪍䊱᦬䋩
䋨㪉㪇㪇㪌㪅㪈㪄㪉㪇㪇㪌㪅㪎㪀
ᓳ⥝䊶㐿⊒
䋲䋰䋰䋵
㪡㪘㪤╙䋱䊐䉢䊷䉵
䋲䋰䋰䋶
䋲䋰䋰䋷
㪉㪇㪇㪌ᐕ㪈᦬
㪚㪧㪘⟑ฬ
㪡㪘㪤╙䋲䊐䉢䊷䉵
䋲䋰䋰䋸
䋲䋰䋰䋹
㪉㪇㪇㪏ᐕ㪋᦬
䉶䊮䉰䉴ታᣉ
䋲䋰䋱䋰
㪉㪇㪇㪐ᐕ㪎᦬䉁䈪䈮
✚ㆬ᜼䋨੍ቯ䋩
䋲䋰䋱䋱
㪉㪇㪈㪈ᐕ㪎᦬㩿੍ቯ䋩
䊶ධㇱ⥄᳿䉕໧䈉
䇭૑᳃ᛩ␿
䊶䉝䊎䉣䉟䈱Ꮻዻ䉕
䇭໧䈉૑᳃ᛩ␿
䇭䇭䇭⃻࿷⋥㕙䈚䈩䈇䉎ਇ቟ቯൻⷐ⚛
䋪㪡㪘㪤䋺᡽ᐭ䇮࿖ㅪ䇮਎㌁䈏౒ห䈪⹏ଔ䈚䈢䉅䈱䈪䇮㪉㪇㪈㪈ᐕ䉕䉺䊷
䉭䉾䊃䈫䈚䇮ఝవ⺖㗴䈗䈫䈮ᔅⷐ䈭ᓳ⥝㐿⊒ᡰេ䉕䉁䈫䉄䈢ႎ๔ᦠ䇯
㪉䈧䈱䊐䉢䊷䉵䈮೎䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯
䊶㪠㪚㪚䈮䉋䉎䊋䉲䊷䊦ᄢ⛔㗔ㅱ᝝⁁⺧
᳞
䊶ධർႺ⇇✢䈱໧㗴
䊶䉝䊎䉣䉟䈱Ⴚ⇇✢䈱໧㗴
䊶䉶䊮䉰䉴䈱⚿ᨐ䈏ᧂ౏⴫
䇭䇭䋨ධㇱ䈏ᛚ⹺䈚䈭䈇น⢻ᕈᄢ䋩
಴ᚲ㧦╩⠪૞ᚑ
4-6
ᜰᮡߦߺࠆࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈ
㧔㧝㧕ᜰᮡ߆ࠄߺࠆ⣀ᒙᕈ
ᧄ⎇ⓥߩਥ㗴ߢ޽ࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦߟ޿ߡ᥉ㆉ⊛ߥቯ⟵ઃߌߪᧂߛߐࠇߡ޿ߥ޿߇‫߹ࠇߎޔ‬
ߢઁߩ┨ߢ߽⸒෸ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߣ߅ࠅ‫⎇ᧄޔ‬ⓥߢߪ OECD/DAC ߩቯ⟵ߦᴪ޿‫ޟ‬ၮ␆⊛ߥࠨ࡯
ࡆࠬࠍ࿖᳃ߦឭଏߔࠆ⢻ജ߇ߥ޿‫ߪ޿ࠆ޽ޔ‬ឭଏߔࠆᗧᕁ߇ߥ޿࿖ኅ‫ࠍߣߎߩޠ‬ᜰߔ‫ޕ‬⣀
ᒙ࿖ኅߣߐࠇࠆ࿖‫⁁ߩޘ‬ᴫߪᄙ᭽ߢ޽ࠅ‫ߩߘޔ‬⣀ᒙᕈߦߟ޿ߡ߽᣿⏕ߥቯ⟵ߪߐࠇߡ޿ߥ
޿߇‫౒߷߶ޔ‬ㅢߩ․ᓽߣߒߡߪ‫ ࠅߚ޽ੱ৻ޔ‬GNI ߇ૐ޿⽺࿎࿖‫߇ࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔ‬ᒙ޿‫ޔ‬᳃ਥ
ൻ߇ㅴࠎߢ޿ߥ޿‫ޔ‬ᚲᓧಽ㈩߇ਇဋ╬‫ޔ‬ၮ␆⊛ߥࠨ࡯ࡆࠬឭଏ߇ߢ߈ߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޔ‬េഥߩๆ
෼⢻ജ߇ૐ޿ߥߤ߇᜼ߍࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ㅒߦ⣀ᒙᕈ߇޽߹ࠅߥ޿࿖ߩ․ᓽߣߒߡ Carment
㧔2008㧕ߪ‫ޔ‬ᚑ㐳߇ᣧ޿‫ޔ‬᳃ਥ࿖ኅߢ޽ࠆ‫⸃ޔ‬᡼⊛ߥ⾏ᤃ೙ᐲࠍᜬߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ੱ޿⦟ޔ‬ᮭ೙
ᐲ߇޽ࠆ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖߩᄙ᭽ᕈ߇ૐߊ᳃ᣖ⚗੎ߩ࡝ࠬࠢ߇ૐ޿․ᓽࠍᜬߞߡ޿ࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆ‫ߎޕ‬
83
ߩࠃ߁ߥ․ᓽࠍᜰᮡൻߒ‫⋧ޔ‬ኻ⊛ߦઁߩ࿖ߣᲧセߔࠆᣇᴺߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬਎⇇㌁ⴕ㧔WB㧕‫ޔ‬ᐔ๺
ၮ㊄ߥߤេഥᯏ㑐߿‫⎇ޔ‬ⓥᯏ㑐ߪ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ࡝ࠬ࠻߿࡜ࡦࠠࡦࠣࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ33‫ޔ߫߃଀ޕ‬
Steven and Brown ߪ‫ࠬࡆ࡯ࠨޔ‬ឭଏߩ⦟ߒᖡߒ߇⣀ᒙᕈࠍ᳿߼ࠆਥߥⷐ⚛ߢ޽ࠆߣߒ‫ߩߘޔ‬
ᜰᮡߣߒߡ‫੃ޔ‬ᐜఽᱫ੢₸㧔IMR㧕‫ޔ‬቟ోߥ᳓ߩଏ⛎₸ߥߤࠍ᜼ߍߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬Collier(2007)
ߪ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ߩᦨᐩㄝߦ޿ࠆ 10 ਁੱ߇޿ࠆࠃ߁ߥ⣀ᒙߥ࿖ኅߪ㧠ߟߩ⟂㧔Ԙ⚗੎ߩ⟂㧔Conflict
Trap㧕‫ޔ‬ԙᄤὼ⾗Ḯߩ⟂㧔Natural Resource Trap㧕‫ޔ‬Ԛ㑐ଥߩᖡ޿ㄭ㓞⻉࿖ߦ࿐߹ࠇߚౝ㒽࿖
ߢ޽ࠆ⟂㧔Landlocked with Bad Neighbors㧕‫ޔ‬ԛᖡ޿ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ⟂㧔Bad Governance in a Small
Country㧕ߩ㧝ߟ߹ߚߪ 2 ߟએ਄ߦ㒱ߞߡ޿ࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆ34‫ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬ᜰᮡߦኻߔࠆᛕ್ߣߒ
ߡ‫⹏ޔ‬ଔ߇⃻ᤨὐߢߩ‫ޟ‬ὐ‫್ߢ⁁⃻ߩߡߒߣޠ‬ᢿࠍߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ߩߘޔ‬࿖ߩᱧผ߿ầᵹߦߪὶ
ὐࠍᒰߡߕ‫ޔ‬ᜰᮡߦࠃߞߡߪᭂ┵ߥ଀ࠍᒁ߈ว޿ߦ಴ߒߚࠅ‫ޔ‬቟ో଻㓚߿᡽ᴦ⊛ᱜ⛔ᕈߩ
ߺߢ್ᢿߒߡ޿ࠆ႐ว߇ᄙ޿ߥߤ߇ᜰ៰ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ35‫ޔ߼ߚߩߘޕ‬࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈ߿ᒙߺࠍ൮
᜝⊛߆ߟ⸘᷹น⢻ߢቴⷰ⊛ߥ್ᢿ߇ߢ߈ࠆᜰᮡࠍᔅⷐߣߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔߡߒߣߺ⹜ߩߘޔ‬Rice
and Patrick ߪԘ⚻ᷣ‫ޔ‬ԙ᡽ᴦ‫ޔ‬Ԛ቟ో଻㓚‫ޔ‬ԛ␠ળ଻㓚ߩ㧠ߟߩಽ㊁ߦ߅޿ߡ 20 ߩᣢሽߩ
ᜰᮡࠍ↪޿ߡ‫ޔ‬ฦ࿖ߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᢙ୯ൻߒߡ޿ࠆ߽ߩ߽޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ߎߩࠃ߁ߥᜰᮡൻߩ⋡⊛ߪ‫ߩߘߦߎߤޔ‬࿖ߩ⣀ᒙᕈ߇޽ࠆߩ߆᣿⏕ൻߒ‫ޔ‬េഥߩ㈩ಽࠍ
᳿߼ࠆ㓙ߩ㊀ⷐߥ␜ໂߣߔࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠅ‫ࠆ߃⷗ߦ⋡ޔ‬ᚻᴺߣߒߡ߭ߣߟߩ᦭ലߥಽᨆᴺߣ
ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᧄⓂߢߪߘࠇߙࠇߩ⹏ଔߩ㒢⇇ߪ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬਎㌁ߩ CPIA‫”ޔ‬Governance matters”ߩᜰᮡࠍ↪
޿ࠃࠅᐢߊಽᨆߒߡ޿ࠆ Index of State of Weakness‫ࠄࠇߎޔ‬ᜰᮡߦࠃࠆಽᨆߩ਄ߦ‫ޟ‬࿖ኅ‫ޠ‬
ࠍᒻ૞ࠆ‫ޟ‬ᮭᆭ‫ޔޠ‬
‫ޟ‬ᱜ⛔ᕈ‫ޔޠ‬
‫ޟ‬⢻ജ‫ ߁޿ߣޠ‬3 ߟߩዪ㕙߆ࠄ߽ಽᨆࠍ⹜ߺߚ Country Indicators
for Fragility Project (CIFP)߆ࠄߩಽᨆ߆ࠄࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽࠍᵞ޿಴ߒ‫ޔ‬೨㗄ߢߺߚᱧ
ผ⊛ߥ⢛᥊ࠍ⚵ߺ౉ࠇߚ਄ߢࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᦨ⚳⊛ߦ್ᢿߔࠆ‫ߩࠇߙࠇߘޕ‬ಽᨆߢ↪
޿ࠆᜰᮡߦߟ޿ߡߪ⴫㧟ߩߣ߅ࠅߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
⴫㧟 ࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᜰᮡൻߒߚಽᨆ
ಽᨆ
Country Policy and
Institutional
Assessment (CPIA)
਎㌁
⣀ᒙᕈࠍ್ᢿߔࠆᜰᮡ
Ԙ
ԙ
Ԛ
ԛ
Governance Matters
਎㌁
33
34
35
Ԙ
ԙ
Ԛ
ԛ
⚻ᷣㆇ༡㧔ࡑࠢࡠ⚻ᷣㆇ༡‫⽷ޔ‬᡽᡽╷‫ޔ‬ௌോ᡽╷㧕
᭴ㅧ᡽╷㧔⾏ᤃ‫ޔ‬㊄Ⲣ‫ࠬࡀࠫࡆޔ‬ⅣႺ㧕
␠ળෳ౉ᐲ㧔ࠫࠚࡦ࠳࡯ᐔ╬‫౏ߩࠬ࡯࠰࡝౒౏ޔ‬ᱜߥ㈩ಽ‫᧚ੱޔ‬⢒ᚑ‫␠ޔ‬ળ଻
⼔ߣഭ௛ᮭ‫ޔ‬ᜬ⛯น⢻ߥⅣႺ᡽╷㧕
౏౒࠮ࠢ࠲࡯▤ℂ㧔⽷↥ᮭ߅ࠃ߮ⷙೣߦၮߠߊࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ⏕଻‫⽷߮ࠃ߅▚੍ޔ‬
᡽▤ℂߩ⾰‫ޔ‬ᱦ౉േຬߩല₸ᕈ‫ⴕޔ‬᡽ߩ⾰‫ࠆߌ߅ߦ࡯࠲ࠢ࠮౒౏ޔ‬ㅘ᣿ᕈ࡮ࠕ
ࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࡝࠹ࠖ࡮ᳪ⡯㧕
᳃ⴐߩჿߣࠕࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࡝࠹ࠖ㧔Voice & Accountability㧕
᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯ㧔Political Stability㧕
᡽ᐭߩ᦭ലᕈ㧔Government Effectiveness㧕
ⷙ೙ߩ⾰㧔Regulatory Quality㧕
ਥⷐߥᯏ㑐ߩ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍಽ㘃ߔࠆᚻᴺ߿⣀ᒙ࿖ኅ࡝ࠬ࠻ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬FASID(2008)ߦ⹦ߒ޿‫ޕ‬
4 ߟߩ⟂ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬ዊ㊁㧔2007㧕߇߹ߣ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
Rice and Patrick (2008)
84
Ԝ ᴺߩᡰ㈩㧔Rule of Law㧕
ԝ ᳪ⡯ߩ▤ℂ㧔Control of Corruption㧕
⚻ᷣ㧔৻ੱ޽ߚࠅ GNI*1‫ޔ‬GDP ᚑ㐳₸*1‫ޔ‬ᚲᓧਇᐔ╬ᜰᮡ*1‫*₸࡟ࡈࡦࠗޔ‬2‫ޔ‬
ⷙ೙ߩ⾰*3 ԙ ᡽ᴦ㧔᡽ᐭߩ᦭ലᕈ*3‫ޔ‬ᴺߩᡰ㈩*3‫ޔ‬᳃ⴐߩჿߣࠕࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࡝࠹ࠖ*3‫ޔ‬ᳪ⡯
ߩ▤ℂ*3‫↱⥄ޔ‬ᜰᮡ*4㧕
Ԛ ᴦ቟㧔⚗੎ߩỗߒߐ*5‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ⊛቟ቯߣ᥸ജߩਇ࿷*3‫*₸࠲࠺࡯ࠢޔ‬6‫ੱޔ‬ᮭଚኂ
₸*7‫⚗ޔ‬੎ߦࠃࠅᓇ㗀ࠍฃߌߚ㗔࿯*8㧕
ԛ ␠ળ⑔␩㧔ሶଏߩᱫ੢₸*9‫ޔ‬ೋ╬ᢎ⢒ቢੌ₸*1‫ޔ‬ᩕ㙃ᄬ⺞₸*10‫ޔ‬቟ోߥ᳓ߣ቟
ోߥⴡ↢ᣉ⸳߳ߩࠕࠢ࠮ࠬ*1‫ޔ‬ኼ๮*1㧕
1
* : World Development Indicators, WB, *2: International Financial Statistics, IMF
*3: Governance Matters, WB, *4: Freedom House *5: Major Episodes of Political Violence,
Center for Systemic Peace, *6: Archigos 2.8 and Economist Intelligence Unit, *7: Political
Terror Scale, *8: Political Instability Task Force, *9: State of the World’s Children,
UNICEF, *10: FAO
Country Indicators for Ԙ ⚻ᷣ‫ޔ‬ԙ ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ‫ޔ‬Ԛ ᴦ቟ߣ‽⟋‫ޔ‬ԛ ੱ㑆㐿⊒‫ޔ‬Ԝ ੱญേᘒ‫ޔ‬ԝ ⅣႺ
Fragility
Project ߩ 6 ࠢ࡜ࠬ࠲࡯߅ࠃ߮ᮮᢿ⊛ⷞὐߣߒߡࠫࠚࡦ࠳࡯ߩᜰᮡࠍᵴ↪ߒ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡࠍ
㧔CIFP㧕
಴ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߦᦝޕ‬1. Authority㧔ᮭᆭ㧕 2. Legitimacy㧔ᱜ⛔ᕈ㧕‫ޔ‬3. Capacity㧔⢻
(Carment et al.)
ജ㧕ߣ޿߁‫ޟ‬࿖ኅ‫ࠍޠ‬ᒻ૞ࠆ 3 ߟߩၮᧄ⊛ߥⷐ⚛ߦ߅ߌࠆᒝߺ‫ޔ‬ᒙߺࠍಽᨆߒ⣀ᒙ
ᕈࠍ⸘ࠆ‫ޕ‬
Failed State Index
㧝㧚␠ળ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯㧔Ԙੱญേᘒ࿶ജ‫ޔ‬ԙ㔍᳃࡮࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃ߩᄢ⒖േߦ઻߁ੱ㆏✕ᕆ
(Fund for Peace)
੐ᘒ‫ޔ‬Ԛ㓸࿅ߩਇḩ‫ޔ‬ԛᘟᕈ⊛ߥ㗡⣖ᵹ಴ߥߤߩੱญᵹ಴㧕
㧞㧚⚻ᷣ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯㧔Ԝਇဋ╬ߥ⚻ᷣ㐿⊒‫ޔ‬ԝ⚻ᷣߩᕆỗߥਅ㒠㧕
㧟㧚᡽ᴦ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯㧔Ԟ࿖ኅߩ㕖ᱜ⛔ᕈ‫ޔ‬ԟ౏౒ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬߩᖡൻ‫ޔ‬Ԡᴺߩᡰ㈩ߣੱᮭ
ଚኂ‫ޔ‬ԡᴦ቟ᯏ᭴㧔᳃౓‫ߩ࡜࡝ࠥޔ‬಴⃻‫ޔ‬Ԣᵷ㑓ߩࠛ࡝࡯࠻ߩบ㗡‫ޔ‬ԣᄖ⊛੺
౉㧕
Index
of
State
Weakness
(Rice and Patrick,
Brookings Institution
& Center for Global
Development㧕
Ԙ
಴ᚲ㧦ฦ⹏ଔࠃࠅ╩⠪૞ᚑ
㧔㧞㧕਎㌁ߩ CPIA
CPIA ߪߘߩ࿖ߩ೙ᐲ߿᡽╷ࠍᜰᮡߢ⴫ߒ‫ޔ‬਎⇇㐿⊒දળ㧔IDA㧕ߩⲢ⾗ࠍ᳿ቯߔࠆ㓙ߩ
ਥⷐෳ⠨ᜰᮡߢ޽ࠆ‫⹏ޕ‬ቯ୯ߪ‫ޔ‬Ԙ⚻ᷣㆇ༡‫ޔ‬ԙ೙ᐲ᡽╷‫ޔ‬Ԛ␠ળෳ౉ᐲ‫ޔ‬ԛ౏౒࠮ࠢ࠲࡯
▤ℂߩ㧠ߟߩࠢ࡜ࠬ࠲࡯߆ࠄᬌ⸛ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᧄ⎇ⓥߢขࠅ਄ߍߡ޿ࠆ੐଀࿖߅ࠃ߮⚗੎ᓟ
ߩ࿖╬ࠍ⴫ 4 ߦ␜ߒߚ߇‫ޔ‬2007 ᐕߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ✚ว⹏ቯ୯ߪ 2.5 ߢ‫ޔ‬IDA ୫౉࿖ 75 ߆࿖ਛ
70 ૏ߩ severe countries ߩಽ㘃ߢ޽ࠆ36‫ޕ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽ߎߩ୯ߪ‫߿ࡦ࠲ࠬ࠾ࠟࡈࠕޔ‬ਛᄩ
ࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߣห࡟ࡌ࡞ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬IDA ୫౉࿖ᐔဋߩ 3.2 ࠍᄢ߈ߊਅ࿁ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬㧠ߟߩࠢ࡜ࠬ࠲
࡯Ფߩᜰᮡߢߪ‫ ࠇߙࠇߘߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬2.7‫ޔ‬2.7‫ޔ‬2.4‫ޔ‬2.3 ߢ޽ࠅ‫⚻ߦ․ޔ‬ᷣㆇ༡ߩਛߢௌ
ௌോ
᡽╷(1.5)ߣࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ‫ޔ‬ㅘ᣿ᕈ‫ⴕޔ‬᡽ߩ⾰ߥߤߩ౏
౏౒࠮ࠢ࠲࡯▤ℂߦ߅ߌࠆ୯߇ૐ޿ߎߣ߇
ࠊ߆ࠆ‫ޔߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬㊀ௌോ࿖㧔HIPC㧕ࠗ࠾ࠪࠕ࠹ࠖࡉ߇ㆡ↪ߐࠇࠆน⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆ࿖ߛ߇‫ޔ‬
2006 ᐕᤨὐߢ 270 ం࠼࡞߽ߩኻᄖௌോࠍᛴ߃ߡ߅ࠅ㧔GDP ߩ 96.7%㧕‫ ߩߘޔ‬80%߇ṛ⚊㊄
ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬HIPC ࠗ࠾ࠪࠕ࠹ࠖࡉㆡ↪ߩ᧦ઙߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ⽺࿎೥ᷫࡍ࡯ࡄ࡯ߪቢᚑߐߖ
36
⹏ቯ୯߇ 3.2 એਅߩ࿖ࠍ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߣߒ‫ޔ‬2.5 એਅࠍ”severe countries”‫ޔ‬2.6 એ਄ 3.0 એਅߩ࿖ࠍ”core
countries”‫ޔ‬3.1 એ਄ 3.2 એਅߩ࿖ࠍ”marginal countries”ߣߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔ߅ߥޕ‬2007 ᐕߩᜰᮡߢߪ‫ޔࠕ࡝ࡌ࡝ޔ‬
ࡒࡖࡦࡑ࡯‫ ߩࠕ࡝ࡑ࠰ޔ‬3 ࠞ࿖ߦߟ޿ߡ⹏ቯߒߥ߆ߞߚߚ߼㒰ᄖߒߡ޿ࠆ‫⹏ޕ‬ቯ୯ߪ‫ޔ‬1 ߇ᦨዊ‫ޔ‬6 ߇ᦨ㜞
ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫⹏ޔ߅ߥޕ‬ቯ୯ߪ‫ޔ‬਎㌁ߩࠞࡦ࠻࡝࡯࠴࡯ࡓߩⵙ㊂ߦၮߠߊ‫ ߪ⚦⹦ޕ‬FASID(2008)ߦ⹦ߒ޿‫ޕ‬
85
ߡ߅ࠄߕ37‫⃻ޔ‬Ბ㓏ߢṛ⚊㊄ࠍᷫࠄߔࠃ߁ߥ᡽╷߇ᰳߌߡ޿ࠆߚ߼ߣ⠨߃ࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬ㅒߦᲧセ
⊛⹏ቯ୯߇㜞޿ߩߪ‫ࠬࡀࠫࡆޔ‬ⅣႺߣᱦ౉േຬ⢻ജߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᱦ౉േຬ⢻ജߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬⍹ᴤ
෼౉ࠍേຬߢ߈ࠆߣ޿߁ᗧ๧ߢ㜞޿ߣ⠨߃ࠄࠇࠆ‫৻ޕ‬ᣇ‫ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ᄖ⾗ߩዉ౉ࠍⓍᭂ⊛ߦ
ⴕߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᄖ⾗ߦኻߔࠆఝㆄភ⟎ߥߤ೙ᐲ⊛ߥⅣႺߪᢛߞߡ޿ࠆ‫⻉ࡉ࡜ࠕߦ․ޕ‬࿖߿ਛ࿖
߇ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ߳ߩᛩ⾗ࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫␠ߩઁߩߘޕ‬ળ৻૕ᕈߢ߽ᐔဋ 2.4 ߣඨಽએਅߩૐ޿ὐᢙ
ߦ⇐߹ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
⴫㧠 IDA ⾗㊄㈩ಽߩߚ߼ߩ⹏ቯ୯㧔2007㧕
䋱䋮⚻ᷣㆇ༡
㪠㪛㪘⾗
㊄㈩ಽ
㩿㩷㩷㪀ౝ䈲㪎㪌䈎࿖ਛ
ᜰᮡ
䈱㗅૏
䊙䉪䊨
⚻ᷣ
⽷᡽
᡽╷
ௌോ
᡽╷
䋲䋮᭴ㅧ᡽╷
ᐔဋ
⾏ᤃ
㊄Ⲣ
䊎䉳䊈
䉴ⅣႺ
䋳䋮␠ળ৻૕ᕈ
ᐔဋ
䉳䉢䊮
䉻䊷
ᐔ╬
౏౒䊥
䉸䊷䉴
䈱౏ᱜ
䈭㈩ಽ
ੱ᧚
⢒ᚑ
䋴䋮౏౒䉶䉪䉺䊷▤ℂ
ᜬ⛯
␠ળ଻
น⢻䈭
⼔䈫
ⅣႺ
ഭ௛ᮭ
᡽╷
ᐔဋ
⽷↥ᮭ
ㅘ᣿ᕈ䊶
䈍䉋䈶 ੍▚䈍
䉝䉦䉡䊮
ᱦ౉േ
ⴕ᡽䈱
ⷙೣ䈮 䉋䈶⽷
䉺䊎䊥
ຬ䈱ല
⾰
ၮ䈨䈒䉧 ᡽▤ℂ
䊁䉞䊶
₸ᕈ
䊋䊅䊮 䈱⾰
ᳪ⡯
䉴
ᐔဋ
䉴䊷䉻䊮㩷㩿㪎㪇㪀
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㪉㪅㪐
㪊 㪅㪈
䊶䊶䊶䊶䊶
㪠㪛㪘୫౉࿖ᐔဋ
಴ᚲ㧦਎⇇㌁ⴕ 㧔http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/IRAI/2007/IRAI2007table1.pdf㧕
㧔㧟㧕Index of State Weakness㧔࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡ㧕Brooking Institute & Center for Global Development
Rice ߣ Patrick ߪ਎㌁߿ Freedom House ߥߤ 20 ߩᣢሽߩᦨᣂ࠺࡯࠲ࠍၮߦ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ‫ޔ‬
ᴦ቟‫␠ޔ‬ળ⑔␩ߩ 4 ߟߩࠞ࠹ࠧ࡝࡯ߦಽߌߡ࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈߦߟ޿ߡᜰᮡൻࠍ⹜ߺߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
਎㌁ߩቯ⟵ߔࠆૐᚲᓧ࿖‫ޔ‬ૐਛᚲᓧ࿖߅ࠃ߮਄ਛᚲᓧ࿖ߦർᦺ㞲ࠍട߃ߚ 141 ࠞ࿖ࠍኻ⽎
ߣߒ‫⋧ޔ‬ኻ⊛ߥ࿖ߩᒙߐߩ࡜ࡦࠢઃߌࠍߒ‫ޔ‬᡽╷┙᩺⠪ߩߚ߼ߩ✚ว⊛߆ߟ᣿⏕ߥෳ⠨࠷
࡯࡞ߦߥࠆߎߣࠍᗧ࿑ߒߡ޿ࠆ38‫ߩߎޕ‬ಽᨆߦࠃࠆߣ‫ޔ‬࿾ၞ⊛ߦߪࠨࡂ࡜એධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ⻉࿖
߇਄૏ 30 ૏ਛ 23 ࠞ࿖߽౉ߞߡ߅ࠅ‫࡜ࡂࠨޔ‬એධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߦ․ߦ⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞޿࿖߇㓸ਛߒ
ߡ޿ࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ39‫ޕ‬
⴫ 5 ߦᧄ⎇ⓥߢขࠅᛒߞߚ੐଀࿖ߩ㗅૏ࠍ␜ߒߚ߇‫߽ᦨޔߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ᒙ޿࿖߆ࠄᢙ߃
ߡ 141 ૏ਛ 6 ૏ߩ‫ޟ‬ᭂ߼ߡᒙ૕ߥ࿖㧔critically weak states㧕‫ޠ‬40ߦ૏⟎ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬࿑ 3
ߦࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ⋧ኻ⊛ߥᒙߐࠍ␜ߒߚ‫ߩߎޕ‬࿑߆ࠄ‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬⣀ᒙᕈ߇․ߦᴦ
ᴦ቟ߩࠞ࠹ࠧ
ਛ㑆 I-PRSP ᩺ࠍ 2006 ᐕߦ╷ቯߒߚ߇‫ޔ‬ർㇱߩߺࠍኻ⽎ߣߒߡ޿ߚߚ߼ᛚ⹺ߐࠇߕ‫⃻ޔ‬࿷ߪߘߩ߹߹
ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬CPA ᓟ㧢ᐕ㑆ߪᥳቯᦼ㑆ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆߚ߼‫ޔ‬਎㌁ࠍᆎ߼࿖㓙␠ળ߽ PRSP ߩ╷ቯࠍᒝⷐ
ߖߕߦ‫ޔ‬਎㌁࡮࿖ㅪ࡮᡽ᐭ߇૞ߞߚ࡚ࠫࠗࡦ࠻ࠕ࠮ࠬࡔࡦ࠻ႎ๔㧔JAM㧕߿⽺࿎೥ᷫࠍᦨ਄૏⋡ᮡߣߒ
ߡ޿ࠆࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ࿖ኅ㧡ࠞᐕ⸘↹㧔2007-2011㧕ࠍ‫⽺ޟ‬࿎೥ᷫ⸘↹‫ߡߒߣޠ‬ណ↪ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
38 FASID (2008)
39 ߘߩઁߩ਄૏ 30 ߆࿖ౝߩ 7 ࠞ࿖ߪࠕࡈࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦ‫ޔ࠴ࠗࡂޔࠢ࡜ࠗޔ‬ർᦺ㞲‫ޔ࡞࡯ࡄࡀޔ࡯ࡑࡦࡖࡒޔ‬
ࠗࠛࡔࡦ‫ޕ‬
40 ⣀ᒙ࿖ 1-3 ૏㧔࠰ࡑ࡝ࠕ‫ࠧࡦࠦޔࡦ࠲ࠬ࠾ࠟࡈࠕޔ‬᳃ਥ౒๺࿖㧕߇‫ޟ‬ᄬᢌ࿖ኅ㧔Failed States㧕
‫ޠ‬
‫ޔ‬4-28
૏߇‫ޟ‬ᭂ߼ߡᒙ૕ߥ࿖㧔critically weak states㧕
‫ޠ‬
‫ޔ‬29-56 ૏ࠍ‫ޟ‬ᒙ૕࿖ኅ㧔Weak States㧕
‫ߣޠ‬ಽ㘃ߒߡ
޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
37
86
࡝࡯㧔4 ૏㧕ߢᭂࠊߛߞߡ޿ࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ‫ߩߘޕ‬ਛߢ߽⚗
⚗੎ߩỗߒߐ㧔Conflict Intensity㧕
ߣੱ
ੱᮭଚኂ㧔Gross human rights abuse㧕ߩᜰᮡߦ߅޿ߡ 141 ࠞ࿖ਛᦨ߽ૐ޿୯ߦߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ߎࠇߪ‫ޔ‬2003 ᐕࠃࠅ⛯޿ߡ޿ࠆ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞⚗੎߇ 2008 ᐕ߹ߢߦᱫ⠪ 30 ਁੱ‫ޔ‬㔍᳃߿࿖ౝ
ㆱ㔍᳃ߦߥߞߚੱ߇ 200 ਁੱ߽߅ࠅ㧔޿ߕࠇ߽࿖ㅪផቯ㧕‫⃻ޔ‬࿷߽ᱫ⠪߿᥸ജ߇⛘߃ߥ޿
⁁ᘒߢ޽ࠅߥ߇ࠄ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭߦ⚗੎஗ᱛ⢻ജ߇ਲߒ޿ߎߣࠍ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ੱޕ‬ᮭᜰᮡߦ߅޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬
ࡃࠪ࡯࡞ᄢ⛔㗔ߦㅱ᝝⁁߇಴ߐࠇࠆߥߤ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ߦ߅ߌࠆੱ㆏⊛ߥ໧㗴߇ᄢ߈ߊ⿠࿃ߒ
ߡ޿ࠆ߆ࠄߢ޽ࠆߣ್ᢿߢ߈ࠆ‫࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔߚ߹ޕ‬એᄖߢ߽ 2007 ᐕߦߪࠕࡆࠛࠗߥߤධർ
Ⴚ⇇࿾ၞߦ߅޿ߡᱫ⠪ࠍ઻߁ኻ┙߇⿠ߎߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ධർ๺ᐔวᗧߩᓟߢ߽ኻ┙ߩἫ⒳߇ߊ
ߔ߱ߞߡ޿ࠆߎߣ߇᜼ߍࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬
ߘߩઁ‫ޔ‬᡽
᡽ᴦ⊛஥㕙ߦ߅޿ߡ߽ߔߴߡߩᜰᮡ߇ૐ޿୯ࠍ␜ߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ోޔ‬૕ߢਅ૏ 10 ૏ߦ
૏⟎ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ౝᚢ⚳⚿߆ࠄ߹ߛ 4 ᐕߒ߆⚻ߞߡ߅ࠄߕ‫ޔ‬ᣂ᡽ᐭߩਅߢ౏౒ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬࠍឭ
ଏߔࠆ⢻ജ߇ᒙ޿‫ߦ․ޕ‬࿾ᣇ߳ߩ౏౒ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬ߇ᒙ޿߇‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦ߅޿ߡߪᚢ੎ⵍἴ࿾ߦߥ
ࠅၮ␆⊛ߥ␠ળ⚻ᷣࠗࡦࡈ࡜߇⎕უߐࠇߚ਄‫ޔ‬2005 ᐕએ೨ߦᱜᑼߥ᡽ᐭ߇ሽ࿷ߒߡ޿ߥ߆
ߞߚߎߣ߆ࠄ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒‫଻ޔ‬ஜ‫ޔ‬᳓ߥߤၮᧄ⊛ߥ౏౒ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬࠍឭଏߔࠆ⢻ജ߇㕖Ᏹߦૐ޿‫ޕ‬
߹ߚ‫ޔ‬ධർ᡽ᐭߣ߽ߘࠇߙࠇታ⾰৻ౄ⁛ⵙߩァ੐᡽ᮭߢ޽ࠅ‫ߩઁޔ‬㊁ౄ߇ឃ㒰ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ41‫ޕ‬
᡽ᴦ⊛஥㕙ߦ߅޿ߡ Freedom ߿ Voice and Accountability ߩᜰᮡ߇ૐߊ‫ޔ‬Ꮢ᳃ߩ᡽ᴦෳട߇㒢
ࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆߎߣ߇ુ߃ࠆ‫ޕ‬ౝᚢߩᓇ㗀ߢᏒ᳃␠ળ߇⢒ߞߡ޿ߥ޿ߎߣ߽޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ർㇱߢߪ
NGO ߳ߩⷙ೙߇෩ߒ޿42‫৻ޕ‬ᣇ‫⚻ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ᷣߪ⍹ᴤ෼౉ࠍਥߥⷐ࿃ߣߒߡ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳₸
ߪ㜞ߊ‫ޔ‬10.5%(2007)ߣㄭᐕੑᩴᚑ㐳ࠍㆀߍߡ߅ࠅ‫ ߽₸࡟ࡈࡦࠗޔ‬7-8%บߣ቟ቯߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ߥ߅‫ᧄޔ‬ಽᨆ߆ࠄ⺒ߺขࠇߥ޿ὐߣߒߡߪ 2 ὐࠍ᜼ߍߚ޿‫ޔߕ߹ޕ‬ᜰᮡࠍขࠅᛒ߁ᐕߩ
ᤨὐߢ್ᢿߒߡ޿ࠆߚ߼‫߫߃଀ޔ‬ᜰᮡ߇▸࿐ߣߒߡ޿ࠆᐕߦࠢ࡯࠺࠲߇⿠ߎࠄߥߌࠇ߫
‫ޟ‬Incidence of Coup‫ߩޠ‬ᜰᮡߪ 10 ὐḩὐߣߥࠅ‫ᦨޔ‬ㄭߩ᡽ዪേะ߿ᱧผ⊛ߥ⚻✲ߥߤ߇౉ࠄ
ߕ‫ޟޔ‬ὐ‫ߩߡߒߣޠ‬ಽᨆߦ⇐߹ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫␠ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔߚ߹ޕ‬ળ⑔␩ߩᜰᮡߪ⋧ኻ⊛ߦᖡ
ߊߪߥ޿߇‫ޔ‬࿾ၞߦࠃߞߡߪ਎⇇ߢ߽㕖Ᏹߦᖡ޿ሶଏߩᱫ੢₸‫ޔ‬ᩕ㙃ᄬ⺞₸ߥߤ߇ࠬ࡯࠳
ࡦో૕ߣߒߡߩᜰᮡߣߒߡಽᨆߐࠇߡ߅ࠅ43‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޔ‬࿾ၞᩰᏅߩ໧㗴߇ߎߎߢߪขࠅᛒ
ࠊࠄࠇߡ޿ߥ޿ߎߣߦ⇐ᗧߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ߎߩಽᨆߦࠃࠅ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬੎ࠍ⿠࿃ߣߒߚੱᮭଚኂ߿ CPA ⟑ฬᓟߩᥳቯᦼ㑆ਛߢ޽
ࠅධർߩኻ┙߇߹ߛ⷗ࠄࠇࠆ44ߣ޿߁᡽ᴦ⊛ߥਇ቟ቯߐߥߤߩ‫ޟ‬ᴦ቟⊛ߥⷐ࿃‫࡯ࠨ౒౏ߣޠ‬
ࡆࠬߩ⾰ߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆ᡽ᐭߩ⢻ജ‫ޔ‬ᴺߩᡰ㈩‫ޔ‬ᳪ⡯ߩ໧㗴‫ޔ‬Ꮢ᳃ߩ᡽ᴦ߳ߩෳ౉ᐲߥߤ‫ޟ‬᡽
ᴦ⊛ⷐ࿃‫ߦ․߇ޠ‬⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞޿ߣߎࠈߢ޽ࠆߎߣ߇ᶋ߈ᓂࠅߦߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬
଀߃߫ CPA ⨲᩺૞ᚑߦ㊁ౄߪ㒰ᄖߐࠇߡ޿ߚ‫ޕ‬
ICC ߩ್᳿ᓟ‫࡞࡯ࠪࡃޔ‬ᄢ⛔㗔ߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ߢᵴേߔࠆ⷏஥ߩ 13 ߩ NGO ࠍ࿖ᄖㅌ෰ࠍ๮઎‫ޕ‬
43 ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦో૕ߩೋ╬ᢎ⢒✚ዞቇ₸㧔UNICEF ᜰᮡ㧕ߪ⚂ 60%ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ධㇱߢߪ 22-23%‫ߜ߁ߩߘޔ‬ᅚ
ሶߪ 7-8%ߣૐ޿୯ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
44 2007 ᐕ 12 ᦬‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩ SPLM ߪ⍹ᴤ෼౉ߦ㑐ߔࠆਇㅘ᣿ᕈ‫ߦࠬࠨࡦ࠮ޔ‬㑐ߔࠆ⾰໧⴫ߦ౉ࠇࠆ㗄⋡ߥߤ
ߩኻ┙‫ߤߥࠗࠛࡆࠕޔ‬ධർႺ⇇✢ߩද⼏ߩㆃṛߥߤ‫ޔ‬ർㇱ߇ CPA ጁⴕߦ෻ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔ‬ㆃᑧࠍ⿠ߎߒߡ޿
ࠆ‫ߩߣޔ‬ℂ↱ߢർㇱߦ޿ࠆ SPLM ߩ᡽ᐭ㑐ଥ⠪ࠍධㇱߦᒁ߈਄ߍߐߖ᡽ᴦ⊛ߥࡏࠗࠦ࠶࠻ࠍ⿠ߎߒߚ‫ޕ‬
᭽‫ߥޘ‬ද⼏‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭⷐੱߩ㈩⟎឵߃ߥߤද⼏ߩ⚿ᨐ‫ޔ‬SPLM ஥߇ 3 ࡩ᦬ᓟߦᓳᏫߒ࠮ࡦࠨ੍߽ࠬቯࠃࠅߪ
ㆃࠇߡታᣉߐࠇߚ߇‫ߦߛᧂޔ‬᡽ᴦ⊛ߥ቟ቯߪ⷗ࠄࠇߥ޿‫ޕ‬
41
42
87
⴫㧡 ࿖ኅߩᒙߐߩᜰᮡ୯ߣ㗅૏㧔141 ߆࿖ਛ㧕
࿖ฬ
ో૕ࠬࠦࠕ
⚻ᷣ
᡽ᴦ
ᴦ቟
␠ળ⑔␩
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ
3.29㧔6 ૏㧕
5.05㧔29 ૏㧕
2.06㧔10 ૏㧕
1.46㧔4 ૏㧕
4.59㧔38 ૏㧕
ࠕࡦࠧ࡜
3.72㧔11 ૏㧕
5.42㧔44 ૏㧕
2.67㧔19 ૏㧕
5.32㧔21 ૏㧕
1.45㧔10 ૏㧕
ࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ
3.44㧔8 ૏㧕
1.56㧔3 ૏㧕
1.56㧔5 ૏㧕
6.81㧔41 ૏㧕
3.84㧔26 ૏㧕
࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕ
4.88㧔28 ૏㧕
5.39㧔45 ૏㧕
3.51㧔32 ૏㧕
5.37㧔22 ૏㧕
5.24㧔44 ૏㧕
ࠕࡈࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦ
1.65㧔2 ૏㧕
4.51㧔14 ૏㧕
2.08㧔11 ૏㧕
0.00㧔1 ૏㧕
0.00㧔1 ૏㧕
಴ᚲ㧦Index of State Weakness (2008)
ࠬࠦࠕߪ‫ޔ‬0-10 ߢ‫ޔ‬10 ߇ᦨ㜞ὐ‫߇ࠕࠦࠬޕ‬ૐߊ㗅૏߇㜞޿߶ߤ⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞޿ߎߣࠍ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
࿑㧟 ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦ߅ߌࠆฦᜰᮡߩ⋧ኻ⊛ߥᒙߐ
㪜㪺㫆㫅㫆㫄㫀㪺
㪧㫆㫃㫀㫋㫀㪺㪸㫃
㪪㪼㪺㫌㫉㫀㫋㫐
㪪㫆㪺㫀㪸㫃㩷㪮㪼㫃㪽㪸㫉㪼
㪌㫋㪿㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼
㩿㪏㪈㪄㪈㪇㪇㩼㪀
㪋㫋㪿㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼
㩿㪍㪈㪄㪏㪇㩼㪀
㪊㫉㪻㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼
㩿㪋㪈㪄㪍㪇㩼㪀
㪉㫅㪻㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼
㩿㪉㪈㪄㪋㪇㩼㪀
㪥㪆㪘
㪈㫊㫋㩷㪨㫌㫀㫅㫋㫀㫃㪼
㩿㪇㪄㪉㪇㩼㪀
㪸
㫇㫀㫋
㩷㪺
㪸
㪞
㪛㪧
㩷㪞
㪠㫅㪺
㫉㫆
㫆㫄
㫎㫋
㪿
㪼㩷
㪠㫅
㪼㫈
㫌㪸
㫃㫀㫋
㫐
㪠㫅
㪩㪼
㪽㫃㪸
㪾㫌
㪞㫆
㫋㫀㫆
㫃㪸
㫍㪼
㫅
㫋㫆
㫉㫅
㫉㫐
㫄
㩷㪨
㪼㫅
㫌㪸
㫋㩷㪜
㫃㫀㫋
㪽㪽㪼
㫐
㪺㫋
㫀㫍
㪼㫅
㪭㫆
㪼㫊
㪩㫌
㫀㪺
㫊
㪼㩷
㫃㪼
㪸㫅
㩷㫆
㪻㩷
㪽㩷㪣
㪘㪺
㪸㫎
㪺㫆
㪚㫆
㫌㫅
㫅㫋
㫋㪸
㫉㫆
㪹㫀
㫃㩷 㫆
㫃㫀㫋㫐
㪽㩷㪚
㫆㫉
㫉㫌
㫇㫋
㫀㫆
㫅
㪝㫉
㪞㫉
㪚㫆
㪼㪼
㫆㫊
㪻㫆
㫅㪽
㫊㩷
㫃㫀㪺
㫄
㪟㫌
㫋㩷㪠
㪫㪼
㫄㪸
㫅㫋
㪼㫅
㫉㫉
㫅㩷
㫀㫋㫆
㫊㫀㫋
㪩㫀
㫉㫐
㪾㪿
㫐
㩷㪘
㫋㫊
㪽㪽㪼
㩷㪘
㪹㫌
㪺㫋
㪼㪻
㫊㪼
㪧㫆
㩷㪹
㫊
㫐㩷
㫃㪅㩷㪪
㪠㫅㪺
㪚㫆
㫋㪸
㫀㪻㪼
㫅㪽
㪹㪅
㫃
㫅
㪺
㩷㩽
㪺㪼
㫀㫋
㩷㪘
㩷㫆
㪹㫊
㪽㩷㪚
㪼㫅
㫆㫌
㪺㪼
㫇㫊
㩷㫆
㪽㩷 㪭
㪠㫄
㫇㫉
㫀㫆
㫆㫍
㫃㪼㫅
㪚㪿
㪼㪻
㪺
㫀㫃㪻
㪼
㩷㪮
㩷㪤
㪸㫋
㫆㫉
㪼㫉
㫋㪸
㩷㪸
㫃㫀㫋
㫅㪻
㫐
㩷㪪
㪸㫅
㪬㫅
㫀㫋㪸
㪧㫉
㪻㪼
㫋㫀㫆
㫀㫄
㫉
㫅㫆
㪸㫉
㫅
㫐㩷
㫌㫉
㪪㪺
㫀㫊㪿
㪿㫆
㫄
㫆㫃㩷
㪼㫅
㪚㫆
㫋
㫄㫇
㫃㪼
㪣㫀
㫋㫀㫆
㪽㪼
㩷㪜
㫅
㫏㫇
㪼㪺
㫋㪸
㫅㪺
㫐
6/141
㪥㪠
㩷㫇
㪼㫉
㪞
Overall
Rank
಴ᚲ㧦Index of State Weakness (2008)ࠃࠅ╩⠪૞ᚑ
㧔㧠㧕࿖ߩ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻㧦Country Index for Fragility Project (CIFP)
CIFP ߪ‫ޔ‬2005 ᐕࠃࠅࠞ࠽࠳េഥᐡ㧔CIDA㧕߇಴⾗ߒ‫ޔ‬Carment ઁ߇࿖ㅪᄢቇ㐿⊒⚻ᷣ⎇
ⓥᚲ㧔UNU-WIDER㧕ߢ⎇ⓥߒߡ޿ࠆࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߢ޽ࠆ‫ߪ⊛⋡ߩߘޕ‬࿖ኅߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᜰᮡ
ൻߒߡ᣿ࠄ߆ߦߒ‫ޔ‬េഥࠍ㈩ಽߔࠆ㓙ߩෳ⠨⾗ᢱߣߔࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬᡽╷᳿ቯ⠪ߦߣߞߡ‫ޔ‬
េഥๆ෼⢻ജ߇ૐ޿ߣߐࠇࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦኻߒߡ‫ߩߤޔ‬ಽ㊁ߦߤߩࠃ߁ߥᒻߢេഥ⾗㊄ࠍ㈩
ಽߔࠆߩ߇ലᨐ⊛ߢ޽ࠆ߆⷗ᭂ߼ࠆߎߣ߇㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠅ‫ߩߘޔ‬࿖․᦭ߩ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽࠍ᣿ࠄ
߆ߦߒេഥ᡽╷ߦ෻ᤋߐߖࠆߎߣࠍ⋡⊛ߣߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬೨ㅀߩ਎㌁ߦࠃࠆ CPIA‫ޔ‬Brooking
Institution ߩ Index of State Weakness ߩࠃ߁ߦ࿖ߩ⁁ᘒࠍ␜ߔ⚻ᷣ‫ޔ‬
ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ‫ޔ‬ᴦ቟ߣ‽⟋‫ޔ‬
ੱ㑆㐿⊒‫ੱޔ‬ญേᘒ‫ޔ‬ⅣႺߩ㧢ߟߩࠢ࡜ࠬ࠲࡯ߦ߅ߌࠆᜰᮡࠍ૶޿ߥ߇ࠄಽᨆߔࠆ߇‫ߎޔ‬
ߩ⎇ⓥߩ․ᓽߪ‫ޟࠄ߆ߎߘޔ‬࿖ኅ‫ߡߒߣޠ‬ᔅⷐߥⷐ⚛ߣߒߡ‫ޟޔ‬ᮭᆭ(Authority)‫ޟޔޠ‬ᱜ⛔
88
ᕈ(Legitimacy)‫ޟޔޠ‬⢻ജ(Capacity‫ߩޠ‬㧟ߟߩⷐ⚛㧔ALC㧕45ߦ⌕⋡ߒᦝߦಽᨆߒߚ਄ߢ⣀ᒙ
ᕈᜰᮡࠍ಴ߒߡ޿ࠆߣߎࠈߢ޽ࠆ46‫ޕ‬
ᦨᣂߩ⚿ᨐ(2007)ߦࠃࠆߣ㧔⴫㧢㧕‫ ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬186 ߆࿖ਛᦨ߽⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞޿࿖ߣߥߞߡ
޿ࠆ‫ ߦ․ޕ‬Authority ߣ Capacity ߩᜰᮡ߇ᖡ޿‫ޕ‬2007 ᐕᤨὐߩ 6 ࠞ࠹ࠧ࡝࡯ߩ⹦⚦ߥᜰᮡ
߇ߥ޿߇‫ޔ‬2006 ᐕߢߺࠆߣ‫ޔ‬ⅣႺᜰᮡࠍ㒰ߊߔߴߡߩᜰᮡ߇ 6.5 એ਄ߣߥߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ઁޔ‬࿖
ߦᲧߴߡࡄࡈࠜ࡯ࡑࡦࠬ߇ᖡ޿‫ߡߴߔߚ߹ޕ‬ਅ߆ࠄ 40 ૏એౝߩ࡜ࡦࠢߢ޽ࠅਅ૏ 20%ߩࠢ
࡜ࠬߦዻߒߡ޿ࠆߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ߦ․ޕ‬ᴦ
ᴦ቟ㇱ㐷ߪࠕࡈࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦߦᰴ޿ߢ 2 ⇟⋡ߦᖡ޿୯ߢ
޽ࠅ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬੎ߩㅴዷ߇ߥ޿ߎߣ߿ 20 ᐕએ਄⛯޿ߚධർߩౝᚢߦࠃࠅ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭ߇ࠬ࡯
࠳ࡦߩ㗔࿯ౝߩࠦࡦ࠻ࡠ࡯࡞⢻ജ߇ᒙ޿ߎߣ‫ߤߥ࠼ࡖ࠴ޔ‬㓞ធ࿖ߣߩ㑐ଥ߇ᖡൻߒߡ޿ࠆ
ߎߣߦࠃࠅ Authority ߩᜰᮡߦᓇ㗀ߒߡ޿ࠆߣ⸒߃ࠆ‫ޕ‬Capacity ߦ㑐ߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬਄⸥ Index of
State Weakness ห᭽‫ޔ‬㐳ᦼౝᚢߩ⚿ᨐ‫ߩࠬࡆ࡯ࠨ౒౏ޔ‬ឭଏ⢻ജ߇ᒙ޿ߎߣ߇⿠࿃ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ߘߩ⚿ᨐ‫⴫ߪߢࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬㧝ߢ␜ߒߚࠃ߁ߦᄙߊߩ␠ળᜰᮡ߇ૐ޿⁁ᘒߦ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
⴫㧢 ⣀ᒙᕈᜰᮡ
Fragility
Authority
Legitimacy
Capacity
2007
6.79 䋨1 ૏䋩
7.20 䋨1 ૏䋩
6.3㩷 䋨29 ૏䋩
6.69 䋨8 ૏䋩
2006
7.48㧔18 ૏㧕
7.83㧔5 ૏㧕
7.58㧔14 ૏㧕
7.21㧔34 ૏㧕
Fragility
Governance
Economics
Security
Human
Demography
Environment
6.95(33 ૏)
6.00(20 ૏)
development
2006
7.48
7.13(23 ૏)
6.38(33 ૏)
9.22(2 ૏)
8.22(24 ૏)
㧔ὐᢙ㧕1-3.5: ઁߩ࿖ߣᲧセߒߡࡄࡈࠜ࡯ࡑࡦࠬ߇޿޿࿖‫ޔ‬3.5-6.5: ᐔဋὐߩ࿖‫ޔ‬6.5+: ઁߩ࿖ࠃࠅ߽ࡄࡈ
ࠜ࡯ࡑࡦࠬ߇ᖡ޿࿖
಴ᚲ㧦CIFP (2008)
㧔㧡㧕ᄬᢌ࿖ኅᜰᮡ㧦Failed State Index㧔FSI㧕
ᐔ๺ၮ㊄㧔The Fund for Peace: FP㧕ߪ 2005 ᐕࠃࠅ‫ޟ‬Failed State㧔ᄬᢌ࿖ኅ㧕‫ࠣࡦࠠࡦ࡜ޠ‬
ࠍ⊒⴫ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬FSI ߪ‫౏ޔ‬㐿ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ⸥੐߿ႎ๔ࠍ߽ߣߦ࿖ኅߩ࡝ࠬࠢಽᨆࠍⴕߞߡ߅
ࠅ‫␠ޔ‬ળ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߩ 3 ߟߩಽ㊁߆ࠄ 12 ߩᜰᮡࠍၮߦ࿖ኅߩ
቟ቯᐲࠍᜰᮡߢ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
2008 ᐕᤨߩᜰᮡࠍ⷗ࠆߣ㧔⴫ 7㧕‫ߦࠕ࡝ࡑ࠰ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ᰴ޿ߢਅ૏ 2 ૏ߢ޽ࠅ‫ߣ߶ޔ‬
ࠎߤߩᜰᮡߢᖡ޿ࡄࡈࠜ࡯ࡑࡦࠬࠍ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ㧔9.5 એ਄ࠍᄥሼߢ⴫␜㧕‫ᤨޕ‬
Authority㧔ᮭᆭ㧕㧦࿖᳃ߦኻߒᴺᓞߢⷙ೙ߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ࿖ߩ⢻ജ‫ޔ‬Legitimacy㧔ᱜ⛔ᕈ㧕㧦᡽ᮭߦ
ኻߔࠆ࿖᳃ߩᔘ⺈ᔃࠍᏁߺߦ㚟૶ߢ߈ࠆ⢻ജ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭᴺ᩺ߦ࿖᳃߆ࠄߩᡰᜬࠍ㓸߼ࠄࠇࠆ⢻ജ‫ޔ‬Capacity
㧔⢻ജ㧕㧦↢↥ᕈߩ޽ࠆ߽ߩߦ࿖᳃ߩ⾗Ḯࠍേຬߢ߈ࠆ⢻ജ㧔౏౒ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬࠍឭଏߢ߈ࠆ⢻ജߦㄭ޿㧕
Carment et al. (2008), pp.5.
46 Carment et al (2008)ߦࠃࠆߣ‫ޔ߫߃଀ޔ‬ർᦺ㞲ߪ 6 ߟߩࠢ࡜ࠬ࠲࡯ߩᜰᮡ߆ࠄഀࠅ಴ߒߚ‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙᕈᜰ
ᮡ‫ߩޠ‬㗅૏ߢߪ 186 ߆࿖ਛ 35 ૏ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ALC ಽᨆߢߪ‫ޔ‬ᱜ⛔ᕈ߇ਅ૏ 3 ૏ߦ࡜ࡦࠢߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߎߣ
߇ࠊ߆ࠅ‫ߩߎޔ‬ಽᨆߢߤߎߦ㜞޿⣀ᒙᕈ߇޽ࠆߩ߆߇᣿⏕ߦߐࠇࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
45
89
♽೉⊛ߦ⷗ߡ߽‫ޔ‬⍹ᴤ෼౉ߦᡰ߃ࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ࠍ㒰޿ߡߪ߶ߣࠎߤᜰᮡ߇ࡄࡈࠜ࡯
ࡑࡦࠬߩᖡߐࠍ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ߦ․ޕ‬㐳ᦼߦ෸߱ౝᚢ෸߮࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞⚗੎ߦࠃࠆᄢ㊂ߩ㔍᳃࡮
࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃ߩ⊒↢ߣߘߩᏫㆶߩㆃࠇ‫ޔ‬਎⇇⊛ߦ߽㕖㔍ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞⚗੎ߦ߅ߌࠆ
ੱᮭଚኂߩታᖱ߅ࠃ߮ᴦ቟ߩᖡൻ‫ߡߒߘޔ‬ਇဋⴧߥ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߥߤ߇ᜰᮡߦᓇ㗀ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
଀߃߫‫ޔ‬ਛᄩ᡽ᐭ߆ࠄ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭ߳ߩ੤ઃ㊄ߪ‫ޔ‬CPA એ೨ߩ 2000 ᐕߢ 8%ߩߺ㧔ർㇱᎺߩߺ
ߦ౏Ꮣ㧕ߢ޽ߞߚ‫ޕ‬CPA એ㒠ߩ 2006 ᐕߢߪ 35%㧔ർㇱߩ࿾ᣇߦ 19%‫ޔ‬ධㇱᎺߦ 16%㧕ߣ਄
᣹ߪߒߡ޿ࠆ߇‫⊒ޔ‬Ꮣߦߟ޿ߡߪㅘ᣿ᕈߥߤߩ໧㗴߇ᱷߞߡ޿ࠆ47‫ޕ‬㓸࿅ߩਇḩ߇ 2007 ᐕ
ࠃࠅ 10 ὐߣ㜞޿ߩߪࡎ࡞ࡓ࠭࿖ㅪੱ㆏⺞ᢛቭ߇࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ߦ߅޿ߡ᳃౓ߦࠃࠅ 30 ਁੱߩ
‶†⠪ࠍ಴ߒߡ޿ࠆߣ⊒⴫ߒߡ޿ࠆߎߣ߆ࠄߢ޽ࠆ(FSI 2008)‫ޕ‬
⴫㧣 FSI ߦࠃࠆ‫ޟ‬ᄬᢌ࿖ኅ‫ࠣࡦࠠࡦ࡜ޠ‬
␠ળ
⚻ᷣ
᡽ᴦ
࿖ኅ ౏౒
ᵷ㑓䉣
ਇဋ
ᕆỗ䈭
䈱㕖 䉰䊷䊎 ੱᮭ ᴦ቟ 䊥䊷䊃 ᄖ⊛
ੱญ ⴧ䈭⚻
⚻ᷣ
ᱜ⛔ 䉴䈱ᖡ ଚኂ ᖡൻ 䈱บ ੺౉
ᵹ಴ ᷣ⊒
ૐਅ
ᕈ
ൻ
㗡
ዷ
㗅૏
ੱญ
േᘒ
࿶ജ
㔍᳃䊶
㪠㪛㪧
㓸࿅
䈱ਇ
ḩ
䉴䊷䉻䊮
㪉૏
㪐㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪍
㪈㪇㪅㪇
䉝䊮䉯䊤
㪌㪍૏
㪏㪅㪍
㪍㪅㪐
㪌㪅㪐
㪌㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪇
㪋㪅㪇
㪏㪅㪋
㪎㪅㪍
䉳䊮䊋䊑䉡䉣
㪊૏
㪐㪅㪎
㪐㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪌
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪍
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪍
䊅䉟䉳䉢䊥䉝
㪈㪍૏
㪍㪅㪉
㪌㪅㪈
㪐㪅㪋
㪏㪅㪉
㪐㪅㪉
㪌㪅㪐
㪏㪅㪐
㪏㪅㪎
䉝䊐䉧䊆䉴䉺䊮
㪎૏
㪐㪅㪊
㪏㪅㪐
㪐㪅㪌
㪎㪅㪇
㪏㪅㪈
㪏㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪉
㪏㪅㪊
㪉㪇㪇㪏ᐕ
㪏㪅㪏
㪐㪅㪊
㪎㪅㪊
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪐
㪐㪅㪏
㪐㪅㪐
㪐㪅㪐
㪎㪅㪌
㪍㪅㪉
㪎㪅㪌
㪎㪅㪉
㪐㪅㪏
㪐㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪊
㪎㪅㪇
㪎㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪉
㪐㪅㪊
㪍㪅㪈
㪏㪅㪋
㪐㪅㪍
㪏㪅㪏
㪈㪇㪅㪇
䉴䊷䉻䊮ᤨ♽೉
␠ળ
㗅૏
ੱญ
േᘒ
࿶ജ
㔍᳃䊶
㪠㪛㪧
㓸࿅
䈱ਇ
ḩ
⚻ᷣ
᡽ᴦ
ਇဋ
ᵷ㑓䉣
࿖ኅ ౏౒
ᕆỗ䈭
ੱญ ⴧ䈭⚻
䈱㕖 䉰䊷䊎 ੱᮭ ᴦ቟ 䊥䊷䊃 ᄖ⊛
⚻ᷣ
ᵹ಴ ᷣ⊒
ᱜ⛔ 䉴䈱ᖡ ଚኂ ᖡൻ 䈱บ ੺౉
ૐਅ
ዷ
ᕈ
ൻ
㗡
㪐㪅㪈
㪐㪅㪇
㪏㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪉
㪏㪅㪎
㪏㪅㪇
㪐 㪅㪏
㪏㪅㪎
㪎㪅㪊
㪉㪇㪇㪌
㪊૏
㪏㪅㪍
㪐㪅㪋
㪎㪅㪏
㪉㪇㪇㪍
㪈૏
㪐㪅㪍
㪐㪅㪎
㪐㪅㪎
㪐㪅㪈
㪉㪇㪇㪎
㪈૏
㪐㪅㪉
㪐㪅㪏
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪉㪇㪇㪏
㪉૏
㪐㪅㪇
䋪㪐㪅㪌એ਄䉕ᄥሼ䈪␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯
㪐㪅㪍
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪉
㪎㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪏
㪐㪅㪏
㪐㪅㪈
㪐㪅㪏
㪐㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪈
㪎㪅㪎
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪌
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪐
㪐㪅㪎
㪐㪅㪏
㪏㪅㪏
㪐㪅㪊
㪎㪅㪊
㪈㪇㪅㪇
㪐㪅㪌
㪐㪅㪐
㪐㪅㪏
㪐㪅㪐
㪐㪅㪐
಴ᚲ㧦Failed State Index (2008) ᜰᮡߪ 0㨪10‫ޕ‬ὐᢙ߇㜞޿߶ߤᖡ޿୯‫ޕ‬
4-7
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩౝᚢߩⷐ࿃ߣ⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽ
ߎࠇ߹ߢᱧผ⊛ߥㆊ⒟߅ࠃ߮⃻࿷ߩࠬ࠽࠶ࡊ࡚ࠪ࠶࠻⊛ߥ․ᓽ߆ࠄࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ᭽⋧ࠍ࡟
ࡆࡘ࡯ߒߡ߈ߚ߇‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬߡ߃߹〯ࠍࠄࠇߎޔ‬⣀ᒙᕈߩ․ᓽߦߟ޿ߡ߹ߣ߼ߚ޿‫ޕ‬
㧔㧝㧕࿾ၞಽᢿ᡽╷ߣ᭴ㅧൻߐࠇߚ␠ળ⊛ਇᐔ╬
ᬀ᳃࿾ߦߥࠆએ೨ࠃࠅࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߢߪධㇱߪᅛ㓮ߩଏ⛎࿾ߣߒߡߩᛒ޿ࠍฃߌߡ޿ߚ߇‫ޔ‬
47
Thomas (2009)
90
ᬀ᳃࿾ᤨઍߢߪߘࠇ߇⽶ߩㆮ↥ߣ߽⸒߃ࠆಽഀ⛔ᴦߦࠃࠅ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ߽ߩߣߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ධㇱࠍߪ
ߓ߼๟ㄝൻߐࠇߚੱ‫ߪޘ‬ᢎ⢒ߩᯏળ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ㐿⊒ߩᯏળ‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦෳട߳ߩᯏળ߇ߎߣߏߣߊᅓ
ࠊࠇ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߩ৻ㇱߩࠛ࡝࡯࠻ߦࠃࠆን߿ᮭജ߇㓸ਛߒߚ‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕ‬ਇᐔ╬ࠍ↢߻⛔ᴦ૕
೙ߪ⁛┙ᓟ߽ᒁ߈⛮߇ࠇ‫⚻ߔ߹ߔ߹ޔ‬ᷣ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ‫ޔ‬ᔃℂ⊛ߥࠕࠗ࠺ࡦ࠹ࠖ࠹ࠖߩಽᢿ߇᜛ᄢ
ߔࠆߎߣߦߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ධㇱ߆ࠄߩਇḩ߇൐ࠅౣ߮ౝᚢ߳ߣ⊒ዷߒߡ޿ߞߚߩߢ޽ࠆ‫⃻ޔߚ߹ޕ‬
ᄢ⛔㗔ߩࡃࠪ࡯࡞᡽ᮭ߽ಽഀ⛔ᴦࠍታᣉߒ‫ޔ‬Ꮑߺߦ᳃ᣖ⊛ߥኻ┙ࠍ೑↪ߒߚ‫ޕ‬᳃ᣖ㓸࿅ࠍ
න૏ߣߔࠆ᳃౓ࠍ⚵❱ߒ‫ޔ‬SPLM/A ߣߩᚢ㑵߿ SPLM/A ࠍᡰᜬߒߡ޿ࠆᏒ᳃߿᧛ࠍ᡹᠄ߩߚ
߼േຬࠍ࿑ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆਥᵹ᳃ᣖߢ SPLM/A ߩਛᩭࠍߥߔ࠺ࠖࡦࠞ48ߣኻ┙㑐ଥ
ߦ޽ߞߚ࠿ࠛ࡞ߩ᳃౓ࠍ⚵❱ߒߚߩ߽ߘߩౖဳߢ޽ࠆ49‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕ‬᳃ᣖߩኻ┙ࠍ೑↪ߒߚ
ࡃࠪ࡯࡞᡽ᮭߩ╷⇛ߪ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩ SPLM/A ߦኻߒߡߛߌߢߪߥߊ‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ൻ‫ࡉ࡜ࠕޔ‬ൻ
ࠍឝߍߚ᡽ᐭߪ‫ޠ࠼࡯ࡂࠫޟޔ‬㧔⡛ᚢ㧕ߣ⒓ߒ‫ޔ‬᳃౓ࠍ૶ߞߚ‫ޟ‬ᄢⴐ㒐ⴡァ‫ޔߒ❱⚵ࠍޠ‬
࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞࿾ᣇ߿㕖ࠕ࡜ࡉੱ߇ᄙߊ૑߻࠿ࡃጊ࿾50ߢ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖᵺൻߣ߽⸒߃ࠆ㕖ࠕ࡜ࡉੱ࡮᧛
߳ߩ⇛ᅓ߿ⷅ᠄ࠍ➅ࠅ㄰ߒߚ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷ධർ⚗੎ߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆ᳃౓ߩ DDR ࠍㅴ߼ߡ޿ࠆ߇‫࡞࠳ޔ‬
ࡈ࡯࡞ߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃౓‫ߩޠ࠼࡯ࠖ࠙ࡖࠫࡦࡖࠫޟ‬ሽ࿷߿᳃ᣖኻ┙ࠍഥ㐳ߔࠆࠃ߁ߥᚢ⇛ߪ⃻
࿷ߢ߽⚗੎ࠍⶄ㔀ൻߔࠆ⢿ᆭߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧞㧕⾗Ḯߩ㓸ਛൻߣਇᐔ╬ߥ㐿⊒
਄⸥ߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆ߇‫ߢ߹ࠇߎޔ‬㐿⊒߿ᛩ⾗߇ⴕࠊࠇߡ߈ߚߩߪ㚂ㇺㄭ㇠ߦ㒢ࠄࠇ‫ޔ‬ධർߩ
ᩰᏅߛߌߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬ർㇱ߿ධㇱߩਛߦ߅޿ߡ߽࿾ၞᩰᏅ߇↢߹ࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ਛᄩ᡽ᐭ߆ࠄ࿾
ᣇ߳ߩ੤ઃ㊄ߩᵹࠇ߆ࠄ߽ㇺᏒ߳ߩ⾗ᧄߩ㓸ਛൻ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ർㇱߦ߅޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬ධർ
Ⴚ⇇࿾ၞߢ޽ߞߚ࠿ࡃጊ࿾‫⷏ޔ‬ㇱߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞‫᧲ޔ‬ㇱߦ߅޿ߡධㇱߩ⃻⁁ߣห᭽ߦ‫ੱޔ‬㆏
ᡰេએᄖߩ㐿⊒េഥ߇ਈ߃ࠄࠇߥ߆ߞߚ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ർㇱߩਛߢ⋥ធᚢ⑒ߪ఺ࠇߡ޿ࠆ࿾ᣇߦ
߅޿ߡ߽‫╙ޔ‬ੑᰴౝᚢਛߩ 20 ᐕ㑆ߪ૗߽㐿⊒߇ⴕࠊࠇߡ޿ߥ޿⁁ᴫߢ޽ࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷‫ޔ‬ධㇱߢ
ߩᓳᣥ࡮ᓳ⥝ᡰេ߇ㅴࠎߢ޿ࠆ߇‫޿ߔ߿ߒࠬ࠮ࠢࠕޔ‬ㇺᏒߦ㓸ਛߒߡ޿ࠆ௑ะߦ޽ࠆ‫ࠬޕ‬
࡯࠳ࡦߦ߅޿ߡ‫ޟ‬࿾ၞᩰᏅ‫߇ޠ‬᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ⚗੎ߩⷐ࿃ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧟㧕⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߩ੎޿ߣㆊᐲߥଐሽ
Collier(2007)߇ᜰ៰ߔࠆ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ㒱ߞߡߒ߹߁㧠ߟߩ⟂ߩ߁ߜߩ৻ߟߦ‫ޟ‬ᄤὼ⾗Ḯߩ⟂
48
ධㇱ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭᤨઍߦ߽࠺ࠖࡦࠞᣖ߇ਥⷐ࿾ᣇ᡽ᐭࡐࠬ࠻ࠍ⁛භߒߡ޿ߚߚ߼‫ߩઁޔ‬᳃ᣖ‫ੱ࡞ࠛ࠿ߦ․ޔ‬
ߣߩኻ┙߇޽ߞߚ‫ߔ⹤ࠍ⺆ࠞࡦࠖ࠺ޕ‬᳃ᣖߪධㇱߩੱญߩ⚂ 3 ಽߩ㧝ࠍභ߼ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ⊛ߦߪⶄᢙ߆ࠄ
ߥࠆ‫ޕ‬
49 ᩙᧄ㧔2005㧕
50 ࠿ࡃੱߪ‫࠻ࡊࠫࠛ࡮ࠦ࡞࠻ޔ‬㗔ᤨઍߦߪ‫ޔ‬ᅛ㓮ߩଏ⛎࿾ߣߒߡ᦭ฬ‫ࡃ࠿ޕ‬ጊ࿾ߪධࠦ࡞࠼ࡈࠔࡦᎺߦዻ
ߒ‫ⴕޔ‬᡽਄ߪർㇱߦዻߔࠆ߇‫ޔ‬૑᳃ߪ㕖ࠕ࡜ࡉ♽ߢㄘ⠹᳃ߩ࠿ࡃੱ߇ਥᵹ‫ߢ♽ࡉ࡜ࠕޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ㆆ’᳃
ߩࡃࠞ࡜ੱߣߩ࿯࿾ࠍᎼࠆ੎޿߇વ⛔⊛ߦ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬SPLM/A ߇࠿ࡃੱࠍ౓჻ߣߒߡ⊓↪ߔࠆߣ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭァߪ
ࡃࠞ࡜ੱࠍ᳃౓ߣߒߡ㓹޿‫ࠍ࠻࡯࡝ࠛߩੱࡃ࠿ޔߚ߹ޕ᠄ⷅࠍޘ᧛ߩੱࡃ࠿ޔ‬ㅱ᝝‫ޔ‬ᜧ໧ߒߚࠅ‫ࡃ࠿ޔ‬
ੱߩ᧛ࠍᒝ೙⊛ߦ⒖૑ߐߖߚࠅߒߚ‫ࡃ࠿ޕ‬ጊ࿾ߪ‫߳ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬ࠻࡯ࡐޔ‬ᑧ߮ࠆ⍹ᴤࡄࠗࡊ࡜ࠗࡦ߇ㅢࠅ㆏
ߦ߽ߥߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߦߣߞߡߪ㊀ⷐߥ࿾ၞߢ޽ࠆߩߦኻߒ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦߣߞߡ߽࠿ࡃ࿾ၞࠍᛥ߃ࠆߎߣ߇
ർㇱߩ࿶ജࠍᛥ߃ࠄࠇࠆߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬ධർਔᣇߦߣߞߡ㊀ⷐߥ࿾ၞߣߒߡ⷗ࠄࠇߡ޿ߚ‫ޕ‬
91
㧔The Natural Resource Trap㧕‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ߇ࠆ޽߇ޠ‬⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߩ੎޿ߪ߹ߐߦߎߩ⟂ߦ㒱ߞ
ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߩ੎޿߇╙ੑᰴౝᚢߩᒁ߈㊄ߩ৻ߟߦߥߞߡ߅ࠅ‫⃻ߡߒߘޔ‬࿷߽߹ߛ⍹
ᴤ⾗ḮࠍᎼࠅධർߩႺ⇇✢໧㗴߇ ઃ޿ߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޕ‬Collier ߪ‫⾗ޔ‬Ḯߦ㑐ࠊࠆࠣ࡞࡯ࡊߩߺ
߇ଢ⋉ࠍฃߌ‫⾗ޔ‬Ḯߩല₸⊛૶↪߇៊ߥࠊࠇ‫ޔ‬ㆊᐲߥ⾗Ḯ߳ߩଐሽ߆ࠄ৻⥸ߩ↢↥ᵴേ߇
ਇᵴ⊒ߦߥࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆ‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅࠍ⴫ߔᜰᮡߢߪ‫ޔ‬⍹ᴤ෼౉ߦࠃࠆ⚻ᷣࡄࡈ
ࠜ࡯ࡑࡦࠬ߇㜞޿߇㧔଀߃߫ GDP ᚑ㐳₸㧕‫ޔ‬ධർߣ߽⍹ᴤ෼౉ߦㆊᐲߦଐሽߒߡ߅ࠅ‫⚻ޔ‬
ᷣᵴേ߳ߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍሺࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷⍹ᴤଔᩰߩਅ⪭‫ޔ‬਎⇇⊛ߥ㊄Ⲣෂᯏߦ⷗⥰ࠊࠇߡ߅
ࠅ‫ޔ‬ධㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦ⥋ߞߡߪ⍹ᴤ෼౉߇೨ᐕᲧ 30%ᷫߦߥࠅ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩ⽷᡽ߦᄢ߈ߊᓇ㗀ߒ
ߡ޿ࠆ51‫ޔߦࠄߐޕ‬ർㇱߪࠕࡔ࡝ࠞ߆ࠄߩ⚻ᷣ೙ⵙࠍฃߌߡ߅ࠅ‫⷏ޔ‬஥⻉࿖߆ࠄߩᛩ⾗߇㒢
ࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧠㧕ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ࿾ℂ⊛ߥ૏⟎
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪ 9 ߟߩ࿖ߣ㓞ធߒ‫ޔ࠼ࡖ࠴ޔ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔࠕ࡝࠻࡝ࠛޔࠕࡇࠝ࠴߽ࠛࠇߘޔ‬DRC
ࠦࡦࠧߥߤ߶ߣࠎߤߩ࿖߇⚗੎⚻㛎࿖ߢ޽ࠆ‫ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬ߼ߚߩߘޕ‬㔍᳃ߩឃ಴࿖ߢ޽ࠆߣ
หᤨߦ㔍᳃ߩฃ౉ࠇ࿖ߦ߽ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ ࠍࠕࡇࠝ࠴ࠛޔߚ߹ޕ‬SPLA ߩ᜚ὐߣߒߡ޿ߚᤨߦ‫ޔ‬
෻ኻߦࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭߪࠛ࠴ࠝࡇࠕߩ෻᡽ᐭࠍᡰេߒߚࠅ‫߽ߢ࠼ࡖ࠴ޔ࠳ࡦࠟ࠙ޔ‬ห᭽ߦ੕
޿ߩ෻᡽ᐭ⚵❱ࠍᡰេߒߡ޿ࠆᤨᦼ߇޽ߞߚߥߤ‫ޔ‬ㄭ㓞࿖ߣߩ㑐ଥߪᏱߦ✕ᒛߒߚ㑐ଥߦ
޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬Collier ߩ㧠ߟߩ⟂ߩਛߦ߽‫ޟ‬ᖡ޿㓞࿖㧔Bad Neighbors㧕ߩ⟂‫ޔࠅ޽߇ޠ‬㓞ੱߣߩ㑐
ଥ߇Ᏹߦࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ᡽ᴦ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ⊛ߥᓇ㗀ࠍ߽ߚࠄߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧡㧕ࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓේℂਥ⟵ߩบ㗡
ߎࠇ߹ߢߺߡ߈ߚࠃ߁ߦ‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ේℂਥ⟵߇᡽ᮭߣ⚿߮ߟ޿ߡࠪࡖ࡯࡝ࠕᴺࠍో࿖
ߦㆡ↪‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒ߩࠕ࡜ࡆࠕ⺆ൻߥߤᄢ߈ߥᓇ㗀ࠍਈ߃ߡ߈ߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦኻߔࠆ᛼ߒઃߌ߇
⚗੎ߩ৻ߟߩⷐ࿃ߦ߽ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ේℂਥ⟵᡽ౄߩ NIF ߽㊁ౄߣߒߡᓇ㗀ജ߇޽ࠅ‫߫ߒޔ‬
ߒ߫᡽ᴦߩᷙੂࠍ᜗޿ߡ޿ࠆ‫ߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬ᛩ⾗ߩ⷗㄰ࠅߣߒߡࠕ࡞ࠞࠗ࡯࠳ߩࠝࠨࡑ࡮ࡆ
ࡦ࡮࡜࠺ࠖࡦࠍṛ࿷ߐߖߚࠅ52‫ࡓ࡯࡜ࠬࠗޔ‬ㆊỗᵷ߿࠹ࡠ⚵❱ߣߩߟߥ߇ࠅ߇޽ߞߚߎߣ߽
޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ㆊỗߥࠗࠬ࡜࡯ࡓߩേ߈߇ᵈⷞߐࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧢㧕ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ‫ⴕޔ‬᡽ߦ߅ߌࠆ⢻ജߣᏒ᳃ෳട
ᜰᮡߦ⃻ࠇߡ޿ࠆߣ߅ࠅ‫ⴕޔࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔ‬᡽⢻ജ߇ૐ޿‫ߦ․ޕ‬ධㇱ᡽ᐭߪౝᚢߢ᦭⢻ߥ
ੱ᧚ࠍᄬߞߚߎߣ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒ᯏળ߇㒢ࠄࠇߡ޿ߚߎߣ‫ࡉ࡜ࠕޔ‬ൻߩᓇ㗀ߢ౏↪⺆ߣߥߞߚ⧷⺆
ߩ⢻ജ߇ૐ޿ߎߣߥߤ‫ޔ‬ၮ␆⊛ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬࠍឭଏߔࠆⴕ᡽⢻ജߪᭂ߼ߡૐ޿⁁ᘒߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᳪ
⡯໧㗴ߢධㇱ⽷ോᄢ⤿߇ᄬ⡯ߔࠆߥߤߩ੐ઙ߽⿠߈ߡ߅ࠅ‫ߩࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔ‬ᒝൻ‫ޔ‬ᴺߩ⛔ᴦ
߇ᕆോߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ධㇱߪ SPLM‫ޔ‬ർㇱߪ NCP ߩァ੐᡽ᮭ߇ីߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ߩઁޔ‬㊁
ᄖോ⋭ਥ௅‫ޟ‬TICAD IV ࡈࠜࡠ࡯ࠕ࠶ࡊࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓ‫৻╙࡞࡯ࠠࡃ࡞ࠨޔߩߢޠ‬೽ᄢ⛔㗔ၮ⺞Ṷ⺑߆ࠄ
㧔2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ 11 ᣣ‫ޔ‬ᣈ㧦࿖ㅪᄢቇ㧕
‫ޕ‬
52 1991-1996 ᐕ‫᧲ߪࡦࠖ࠺࡜ࡦࡆޕ‬ㇱߩ㐿⊒㧔㆏〝ߥߤ㧕ࠍታᣉ‫ޕ‬
51
92
ౄߪឃ㒰ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬Index of State Weakness ߢ߽ Freedom ߿ Voice and Accountability ߩᜰᮡ
߇ૐߊ‫ޔ‬Ꮢ᳃ߩ᡽ᴦෳട߇㒢ࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧣㧕ධㇱౝߩ⣀ᒙⷐ⚛
CPA ߦ߅޿ߡᦨ⚳⊛ߦߪ SPLA/M ߇໑৻ߩ᡽ᐭߩ੤ᷤ⋧ᚻߣߥߞߚ߇‫ޔ‬ౝᚢਛߦߪ
SPLA/M ߇૗ᐲ߽ಽⵚ‫ޔ‬૬วࠍ➅ࠅ㄰ߒߚ‫ߩߘޕ‬⢛᥊ߦ޽ࠆධㇱߩ᳃ᣖ⊛ߥኻ┙ߪᧂߛየࠍ
ᒁ޿ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬CPA ߩᐨᢥߢ‫ޟ‬Make Unity Attractive‫ߣޠ‬ධർ⛔৻ࠍ㝯ജ⊛ߥ߽ߩߦߔࠆߎߣ
߇ឝߍࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ߪߕ߹ޔ‬ධㇱౝߢߩ⛔৻㧔Unity㧕ࠍ⏕ታߥ߽ߩߣߒߚ਄ߢ 2011 ᐕߩ૑
᳃ᛩ␿ߦะߌ⼏⺰ࠍᚑᾫൻߒർㇱߣߩ Unity ࠍ⠨߃ࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧤㧕࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞⚗੎ߦ⿠࿃ߔࠆ⣀ᒙᕈ
⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩᜰᮡߩ߶ߣࠎߤోߡߦ߅޿ߡ‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞޿ಽ㊁߇‫ޟ‬ᴦ቟⛽ᜬ‫ޔޠ‬
‫ੱޟ‬ᮭଚኂ‫ޟޔޠ‬㔍᳃࡮࿖ౝㆱ㔍᳃ߩ⊒↢‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔࠅ߅ߡߞߥߦޠ‬੎ߦ⿠࿃ߔࠆ⣀
ᒙᕈ߇㜞޿ߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ‫ޕ‬ධർᴦ቟⛽ᜬߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ࠆ޽ޔ‬⒟ᐲߩㅴዷ߇⷗ࠄࠇࠆ߇‫ޔ‬CIFP
߇ಽᨆߒߡ޿ࠆࠃ߁ߦ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬੎ࠍࠦࡦ࠻ࡠ࡯࡞ߔࠆ᡽ᐭߩ⢻ജ߇ૐ޿ߎߣߢ࿖ߩ
ᮭᆭ㧔Authority㧕߇ૐߊߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩߎޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬ᜰᮡߪ⃻࿷ߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭ߇࿖᳃߆ࠄߩ
ା㗬ᐲ߇ૐߊ‫ޔ‬ᴺߩ⛔ᴦ߇ᒙ޿ߎߣࠍ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬2003 ᐕࠃࠅỗൻߒߡ޿ࠆࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ⷏ㇱ
ߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞⚗੎ߪ‫ߛ߹޿ޔ‬ᐔ๺߳ߩ಴ญ߇⷗߃ߥ޿⁁ᘒߢ޽ࠆ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޕ‬੎ߪ࿖㓙
␠ળ߆ࠄߩ CPA ᡰេ߳ߩ㑐ᔃࠍ೥ߋⷐ࿃ߦ߽ߥߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ታ㓙࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞⚗੎ߩ⸃᳿ࠍ᣿
⏕ߥ᧦ઙߣߒߡർㇱ߳ߩេഥࠍ஗ᱛߔࠆ᡽╷ࠍߣࠆవㅴ࠼࠽࡯߽޿ࠆ53ߥߤ‫࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬໧
㗴߇ኻᄖ⊛ߥ໧㗴ߦ߽⊒ዷߒߡ޿ࠆߎߣ߇┍ࠊࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬ᄢ⛔㗔ߩㅱ᝝⁁߇ᱜᑼߦ ICC ࠃࠅ಴
ߐࠇ‫੹ޔ‬ᓟ⷏஥⻉࿖߆ࠄߩᓳ⥝㐿⊒ᡰេ߇ߤ߁ᄌൻߔࠆߩ߆߽ਇㅘ᣿ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧥㧕CPA ታᣉߦ߆߆ࠆਇ቟ቯⷐ࿃
࿑ 2 ߦ␜ߒߚߣ߅ࠅ CPA ࠍጁⴕߒߡ޿ߊ਄ߢ‫੹ޔ‬ᓟ㊀ⷐߥࡑࠗ࡞ࠬ࠻࡯ࡦߣߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬2009
ᐕ 7 ᦬߹ߢߦ੍ቯߐࠇࠆ✚ㆬ᜼ߩታᣉ54‫ޔ‬2011 ᐕ 7 ᦬ߦධㇱ⥄᳿ࠍ໧߁૑᳃ᛩ␿߅ࠃ߮ࠕࡆ
ࠛࠗߩᏫዻࠍ໧߁૑᳃ᛩ␿߇ប߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬CPA ታᣉߦ㑐ߒ⃻࿷ᄢ߈ߥ⺖㗴ߦ⋥㕙
ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
߹ߕ‫ޔ‬2009 ᐕ 7 ᦬߹ߢߦ੍ቯߐࠇߡ޿ߚㆬ᜼ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ᤓᐕ 4 ᦬ߦታᣉߐࠇߚ࠮ࡦࠨࠬ
ߩ⚿ᨐ߇ 2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ᤨὐߢ߽಴ߐࠇߡ޿ߥ޿⁁ᴫ߆ࠄߺߡ‫ޔ‬ㆬ᜼⊓㍳߇ߢ߈ߕㆬ᜼ߩᑧᦼ
߇੍ᗐߐࠇࠆ‫⚿ߩࠬࠨࡦ࠮ޕ‬ᨐ߇ߢߥ޿ⷐ࿃ߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭ㑐ଥ⠪ߪᛛⴚ⊛ߥ໧㗴ߢ޽ࠆߣ
࿁╵ߒߡ޿ߚ߇55‫ޔ‬ታ㓙ධㇱߩੱญ߇࿖᳃ో૕ߩ 25%ࠍഀࠆ⷗ㄟߺߣߥࠅ56‫ޔ‬ධㇱ߇⚿ᨐࠍ
53
଀߃߫࠼ࠗ࠷‫ޕߤߥࠞ࡝ࡔࠕޔ‬
✚ㆬ᜼ߪ 7 ߟߩ࡟ࡌ࡞㧔ᄢ⛔㗔‫ޔ‬࿖᳃⼏ળ⼏ຬ㧔਄㒮/ਅ㒮㧕
‫ޔ‬Ꮊ⍮੐‫ޔ‬Ꮊ⼏ળ⼏ຬ‫ޔ࡯࠽࡚ࠪ࠶ࡒࠦ⟲ޔ‬
ࡄࡗࡓⴕ᡽ቭ‫ޔ‬Ꮢᓎᚲⴕ᡽ቭ㧕ߢታᣉ‫ޔߦࠄߐޕ‬ධㇱߦ߅޿ߡߪධㇱᄢ⛔㗔‫ޔ‬ධㇱ࿖᳃⼏ળ⼏ຬߩㆬ᜼
߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
55 ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ⛔৻᡽ᐭ࿖㓙දജ⋭߳ߩࠗࡦ࠲ࡆࡘ࡯㧔2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ 2 ᣣ㧕
‫ޕ‬
54
93
⹺߼ߥ޿น⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬࿖᳃⼏ળߢධㇱ⥄᳿ᮭࠍ฽߼ᙗᴺᡷᱜߥߤࠍᜎุߢ߈ࠆ⼏
ຬഀࠅᒰߡᢙࠍᄬ߁ߎߣࠍᗧ๧ߔࠆ‫ߛ߹ޕ‬ർㇱߣߩା㗬㑐ଥ߇㉯ᚑߐࠇߡ޿ߥ޿ਛߢ‫ޔ‬ධ
ㇱߦߣߞߡߪ࠮ࡦࠨࠬߩ⚿ᨐ߇㊀ⷐߥᗧ๧ࠍᜬߟߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᄢ⛔㗔ߩㅱ᝝⁁໧㗴߽ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕ߦᵄ⚉ࠍᛩߍߡ޿ࠆ‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬஥ߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ߢᵴേ
ߒߡ޿ࠆ 13 ߩ⷏஥ NGO ߦኻߒࠬࡄࠗኈ⇼ߢ࿖ᄖㅌ෰ࠍㅢ㆐ߔࠆߥߤߔߢߦႎᓳភ⟎ࠍᆎ
߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩߎޔߚ߹ޕ‬໧㗴ߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ߩ๺ᐔ੤ᷤߦ߅޿ߡ‫ޔ‬෻᡽ᐭ൓ജ߇‫⟋‽ޟ‬⠪‫ߩޠ‬
ᄢ⛔㗔ࠍ⋧ᚻߦหߓ࠹࡯ࡉ࡞ߦߟ߆ߥߊߥࠆน⢻ᕈ߽޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬๺ᐔ੤ᷤ߇ౣ߮ᥧ␂ߦਸ਼ࠅ਄
ߍࠆᕟࠇ߽޽ࠆ‫ઁߩߘޕ‬ධർႺ⇇✢ߩ໧㗴‫ߩࠗࠛࡆࠕޔ‬Ⴚ⇇✢ߩ໧㗴ߥߤౣ߮ᐔ๺ࠍ⢿߆
ߔⷐ࿃߇߹ߛᱷߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
4-8
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ߳ߩ࿖㓙␠ળߩᡰេ
CPA ⺞ශᓟ‫ޔ‬3 ࡩ᦬ᓟߦߪࠝࠬࡠߢ╙ 1 ࿁ᡰេ࿖ળว߇㐿߆ࠇ‫ޔ‬2005-2007 ᐕߩ 3 ᐕ㑆ߩ
ᡰេⷐ⺧㗵⚂ 41 ం࠼࡞ߦኻߒ‫ޔ‬45 ం࠼࡞ߩᡰេ߇⴫᣿ߐࠇ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ߽ᒰ㕙 1 ం࠼࡞ߩᡰេ⴫
᣿ࠍⴕߞߚ‫ޕ‬ታ㓙‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߪߎߩ 3 ᐕ㑆ߢ୚ߩ⚂ 2 ం 1 ජਁ࠼࡞ࠍ᜚಴ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩ࡯࠽࠼ޕ‬
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦᡰេߩၮᧄ⊛ߥᣇ㊎ߪ CPA ታᣉଦㅴߣ‫ޔ‬࿖ㅪ࡮਎⇇㌁ⴕ࡮ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭ߇౒หߢ
⺞ᩏߒߚ Joint Mission Assessment㧔JAM㧕57‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬᡽ᐭ㧡ࡨᐕ⸘↹ߦၮߠ޿ߚᡰេߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦኻߔࠆਥⷐ࠼࠽࡯ߪ‫ ⴫ޔ‬8 ߩߣ߅ࠅ☨࿖ࠍ╩㗡ߦ‫ޔ‬EC‫⧷ޔ‬࿖‫ࡁޔ࠳ࡦ࡜ࠝޔ‬
࡞࠙ࠚ࡯ߥߤߢ޽ࠆ‫☨ޕ‬࿖એᄖߩ᰷☨⻉࿖ߪ߶ߣࠎߤࠦࡕࡦࡈࠔࡦ࠼߿࿖㓙ᯏ㑐ࠍㅢߓߚ
ᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩ࠼ࡦࠔࡈࡦࡕࠦޕ‬ઍ⴫⊛ߥ߽ߩ߇ Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)ߢ‫ࠬޔ‬
࡯ ࠳ ࡦ ో ૕ ࠍ ࠞ ࡃ ࡯ ߔ ࠆ MDTF-National ߣ ධ ㇱ ߦ ኻ ߔ ࠆ 㐳 ᦼ ⊛ ߥ ᓳ ⥝ ࡮ 㐿 ⊒ ↪ ߩ
MDTF-South ߩ 2 ߟ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬MDTF ߪ਎⇇㌁ⴕ߇▤ℂߒ‫ޔ‬ၮᧄ⊛ߦߪࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭ஥߽ 2/3
ࠍ᜚಴ߔࠆߎߣߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ੱઁߩߘޕ‬㆏ᡰេ↪ߩ Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)‫ޔ‬ධㇱ
ߩᣧᦼᓳ⥝ߩߚ߼ߩ Sudan Recovery Fund for the Southern Sudan (SRF-SS)߇޽ࠆ‫࠽࠼ߤߥ⁛ޕ‬
࡯ߦࠃߞߡߪ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬੎⸃᳿ࠍ᧦ઙߦߒ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩ MDTF-S ߩߺߦ᜚಴ߔࠆ࠼࠽࡯߽
޿ࠆ‫ޔߦࠄߐޕ‬ㄭᐕ⍹ᴤ೑ᮭߣߩ㑐ଥ߆ࠄਛ࿖ߩᡰេ߇⋡┙ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬࿑ 4 ߩߣ߅
ࠅ‫⚗ޔ‬੎⚳⚿⋥ᓟߣ޿߁ߎߣ߽޽ࠅ‫ ⚂ޔ‬70%ߩᡰេ߇ੱ㆏ᡰេะߌߦߥߞߡ޿ࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ
߆ࠆ‫ޕ‬
2008 ᐕ 5 ᦬ߦ╙ 2 ᦼߩࡊ࡟࠶ࠫ࠮࠶࡚ࠪࡦߢ߽޽ߞߚ╙ 3 ࿁ᡰេ࿖ળวߢߪ‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬
᡽ᐭߪ 2011 ᐕ߹ߢߦᔅⷐߥ㗵ߣߒߡ 61 ం࠼࡞ࠍⷐ⺧ߒߚߩߦኻߒ‫࡯࠽࠼ޔ‬ฦ࿖ࠃࠅ⚂ 48
ం࠼࡞߇ࡊ࡟࠶ࠫߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
ᣣᧄߪߘߩ߁ߜ 2 ం࠼࡞ࠍᒰ㕙ߩᡰេߣߒߡࡊ࡟࠶ࠫߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
Thomas (2009)‫ޕ‬ධㇱ᡽ᐭߪධㇱߩੱญߪ 12-500 ਁੱߣផቯߒߡ޿ࠆ߇㧔TICAD IV ࡈࠜࡠ࡯ࠕ࠶ࡊ࠮
ࡒ࠽࡯(2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ 11 ᣣ)ߢߩ⊒⸒㧕
‫ޔ‬800 ਁੱߒ߆޿ߥ޿ߣߔࠆ⚿ᨐ߇ߢߡ޿ࠆߣߩ⹤߽޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
57 JAM ߪᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕‫ޔ‬MDG ㆐ᚑߦะߌߚ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳࡮⽺࿎೥ᷫ‫ੱޔ‬㑆㐿⊒ߚ߼ߩ᧦ઙࠍ␜ߒ‫ ╙ޔ‬1 ࡈࠚ࡯
࠭㧔2005-2007㧕ߢߪᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕‫ޔ‬⢻ജᒝൻ‫ࠆ߃⷗ߦ⋡ޔ‬ᡷༀߦ㊀ὐࠍ⟎߈‫ ╙ޔ‬2 ࡈࠚ࡯࠭㧔2008-2011㧕
ߢߪ‫ޔ‬MDGs ߦะߌߡߎࠇࠄߩ⺖㗴ࠍଦㅴߐߖࠆߎߣ߇ㅀߴࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
56
94
⴫㧤 ODA ᜚಴࠻࠶ࡊ 10 ࠼࠽࡯㧔2006-2007 ᐔဋ㧕 (න૏㧦⊖ਁ☨࠼࡞)
1૏
2૏
3૏
4૏
5૏
6૏
7૏
8૏
9૏
10 ૏
☨࿖
EC
⧷࿖
㨿㩡㩧㩊㩨
㩓㩣㨽㨴㨺
㨻㩡㩖㩨⻉࿖
ࠞ࠽࠳
㩇㨽㨴㨺㩍㩨㩧
ᣣᧄ
࠼ࠗ࠷
725
277
211
149
113
78
75
58
47
44
಴ᚲ㧦OECD/DAC
࿑ 4 ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯೎ੑ࿖㑆 ODA㧔2006-2007㧕
㧔㧝㧕ࠕࡔ࡝ࠞ
ࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߪ‫ࡠ࠹߇ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬᤨ৻ޔ‬ᡰេ࿖ኅߢ޽ߞߚߎߣ߆ࠄࡂ࡞࠷࡯ࡓ߆ࠄᄢ૶㙚ᬺോ
ࠍ஗ᱛߒߚࠅ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ೙ⵙࠍታᣉߒߡ޿ࠆ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔߚ߹ޕ‬੎ࠍ‫(࠼ࠗࠨࡁࠚࠫޟ‬ᄢ㊂⯦
Ვ)‫ߣޠ‬ᛕ್ߔࠆߥߤർߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭߦኻߒߡ෩ߒ޿ᘒᐲࠍߣߞߡ޿ࠆ‫৻ޕ‬ᣇ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦኻ
ߒߡߪ⚻ᷣ೙ⵙࠍ⸃߈‫ޔ‬ౝᚢਛ߆ࠄᢎ⢒ᡰេߥߤߢ㐿⊒ᡰេࠍⴕߞߚ໑৻ߩࡃࠗߩ࠼࠽࡯
ߢ޽ࠅ‫ߦࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ኻߒߡߪ‫ ⷫޟ‬SPLM/A ෻ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭ‫߁޿ߣޠ‬ੑ㊀ߩ┙႐ࠍߣߞߡ޿
ࠆ‫ޕ‬ർㇱߦኻߒߡߪੱ㆏ᡰេߩߺ㧔࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ਛᔃ㧕ߢ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߩ㐿⊒ᡰេߪⴕߞߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޕ‬
ධㇱߦኻߒߡߪ‫଻ޔ‬ஜ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒߳ߩᡰេࠍਛᔃߦኾ㐷ኅߩᵷ㆜‫ ♽ࠞ࡝ࡔࠕޔ‬NGO ࠍㅢߓߚᡰ
េࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ߦ․ޕ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦᔅⷐߥࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ߿᳃ਥൻᡰេߣߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬෻ᳪ⡯ᆔຬળ
ᡰេ‫ࠝࠫ࡜ޔ‬ዪ‫ޔ‬ᣂ⡞ߥߤࡑࠬࠦࡒ߳ߩᛛⴚᡰេߥߤ߽ⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
߹ߚ‫ ߪࠞ࡝ࡔࠕޔ‬25 ᐕએ਄೨ࠃࠅᦨᄢߩੱ㆏ᡰេ࿖ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬1989 ᐕߦߪ࿖ㅪ‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޟ‬
↢๮✢ᵴേ㧔OLS㧕‫ᦨߡ޿߅ߦޠ‬ᄢߩ࠼࠽࡯࿖ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬㘩♳េഥࠍਛᔃߦ㘫㙈߳ߩኻᔕࠍⴕ
ߞߡ߈ߚ‫ޕ‬CPA એ㒠 3 ᐕ㑆ߢ‫ੱޔ‬㆏ᡰេ‫ޔ‬PKO ᡰេ߅ࠃ߮ධㇱ߿ᚢ⑒ߦ޽ߞߚ࿾ၞߩᓳ⥝
ߩߚ߼ߦ᜚಴ߐࠇߚᡰេ㗵ߪ⚂ 40 ం࠼࡞ߦ਄ࠅ‫ޔ‬WFP ߩ㘩♳េഥߩ⚂ 80%ߪࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߦࠃ
ࠆᡰេߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬2007 ᐕᐲߦߪ 10 ం࠼࡞ߩᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬PKO ᵴേᡰេߢߪ‫ޔ‬
࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ߢዷ㐿ߔࠆ࿖ㅪ࡮AU วหࡒ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ㧔UNAMID㧕ߦኻߒ‫ޔ✵⸠ޔ‬ᯏ᧚‫ࡦࡖࠠޔ‬
ࡊ⸳༡ߥߤ‫ޔ‬UNAMID ߩ੍▚ߩ 25%ࠍᡰេߒߡ޿ࠆ㧔US Department of State (2008)㧕‫ޕ‬
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߦߣߞߡ㧠ߟߩ㊀ὐᡰេ࿖58ߩ৻ߟߣߥߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ ╙ޔ‬3 ࿁ᡰេ࿖ળว
58
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩઁߩ㊀ὐᡰេ࿖ߪ‫ޕࡦ࠲ࠬࠠࡄޔࡦ࠲ࠬ࠾ࠟࡈࠕޔࠢ࡜ࠗޔ‬
㧔USAID ࡝࡯࠼᧲੩ࠫࡓᚲ㐳ߣ
ߩࠗࡦ࠲ࡆࡘ࡯‫ޕ‬2008 ᐕ 10 ᦬ 10 ᣣ㧕
95
ߩ႐ߢ‫ޔ‬2008 ᐕᐲߩ 1 ᐕ㑆ߩ੍▚ߩߺߢੱ㆏࡮㐿⊒ᡰេߣߒߡ 16 ం࠼࡞㧔ੱ㆏ᡰេ߅ࠃ߮
ᣧᦼᓳ⥝ᡰេߦ 9 ం 6 ජਁ࠼࡞‫ޔ‬㐿⊒ߦ 6 ం 4 ජਁ࠼࡞㧕‫ ߦࠄߐޔ‬PKO ᡰេߣߒߡ 19 ం
࠼࡞ߩࡊ࡟࠶ࠫࠍⴕ޿‫ޔ‬᜚಴㗵ߢ⟲ࠍᛮ޿ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧞㧕EC
EC ߪ‫ޔ‬2005-2007 ᐕ߹ߢߦੱ㆏ᡰេ߽฽߼ 12 ం࡙࡯ࡠࠍ᜚಴‫ޕ‬DAC ⛔⸘ߢߪࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߦ
ᰴ޿ߢ 2 ⇟⋡ߩ᜚಴࠼࠽࡯ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬㊀ὐಽ㊁ߪ㘩♳቟ోߣᢎ⢒‫ౕޕ‬૕⊛ߦߪࠢࠗ࠶ࠢࠗࡦ
ࡄࠢ࠻ࠍ߽ߚࠄߔㄘ᧛㐿⊒‫ޔ‬ㄘ᧛ߢߩቇᩞᑪ⸳‫ޔ‬ᚢ੎ⵍἴ࿾ၞߩᓳ⥝ᡰេ‫ޔ‬᳃ਥൻ‫ࡃࠟޔ‬
࠽ࡦࠬᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬㐿⊒ะߌߩᡰេᣇᴺߪ‫ޔ‬ർㇱߦ 54%‫ޔ‬ධㇱߦ 46%ࠍ㈩ಽߒ‫߶ޔ‬
ߣࠎߤ 2 ߟߩ MDTF ࠍㅢߓߡ᜚಴ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬2008-2013 ᐕߩᡰេߦኻߒ‫ ╙ޔ‬3 ࿁ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦࠦ
ࡦ࠰࡯ࠪࠕࡓߢ㐿⊒ะߌߦ 300 ਁ࡙࡯ࡠࠍࡊ࡟࠶ࠫߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧟㧕⧷࿖㧛DFID59
ኻࠬ࡯࠳ࡦᡰេߪࠦࡕࡦࡈࠔࡦ࠼ࠍㅢߓߚᡰេࠍၮᧄߣߒߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ᛛⴚᡰេߣߒߡߪ
ධㇱߩ⽷ോ⋭ߦ UNDP ࠍㅢߓߡኾ㐷ኅࠍᵷ㆜ߒ‫⽷౒౏ޔ‬᡽▤ℂߥߤⴕ᡽߿ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬଦㅴ
߳ߩᡰេߦ㊀ὐࠍ⟎޿ߡ޿ࠆ‫⧷ޕ‬࿖ߪධㇱ߳ߩᡰេߪ‫࡯ࠚ࠙ࠬޔ࡯ࠚ࠙࡞ࡁޔ࠳ࡦ࡜ࠝޔ‬
࠺ࡦ‫࠳࠽ࠞޔࠢ࡯ࡑࡦ࠺ޔ‬㧔2008 ᐕߦട⋖㧕ߩ޿ࠊࠁࠆ Like Minded Group ߣ౒ห࠼࠽࡯࠴
࡯ࡓ㧔JDT㧕ࠍ⚵❱ߒ‫ޔ‬੐ോᚲࠍ౒᦭ߔࠆߛߌߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬MDTF ߿ઁߩࠦࡕࡦࡈࠔࡦ࠼‫߹ޔ‬
ߚߪࡃࠗߩេഥද⺞ࠍផㅴߔࠆߚ߼౒ห੐ോᚲࠍ⸳┙ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷ JDT ߩᚲ㐳ߪ DFID
ߦߥߞߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ᢙᐕߏߣߩᜬߜ࿁ࠅߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬ฦ࿖ࠃࠅ⡯ຬ߇Ᏹ㚢ߒ‫⥄ޔ‬࿖ߩេഥߣ޿߁
ࠃࠅߪ‫ߦߣߏ࡯࠲ࠢ࠮ޔ‬ᜂᒰߒࠦࡕࡦࡈࠔࡦ࠼ߩ▤ℂࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
৻ᣇ‫ޔ‬
ർㇱߩ DFID ੐ോᚲߦߪ‫ޔ‬
DFID‫ޔ‬ᄖോ⋭‫ޔ‬
㒐ⴡ⋭ߩ㧟D ߩද⺞ Unit ߢ޽ࠆ Stabilisation
Unit60߆ࠄੱ߇ᵷ㆜ߐࠇߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߥࠄߢߪߩ૕೙ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬Stabilisation Unit ߩ
ᓎഀߪ‫ޔ‬ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕ߩߚ߼‫ޔ‬ᐔ๺᭴▽ߦ㑐ߔࠆᢥ᳃ኾ㐷ኅߩᵷ㆜߿ߘߩ⺞ᢛߢ‫࡞࠳ߦ․ޔ‬
ࡈ࡯࡞⚗੎ߦะߌߚᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷ 4 ฬߩࠦࡒࡘ࠾ࠤ࡯࡚ࠪࡦኾ㐷ኅࠍᵷ㆜ߒ61‫ޔ‬
࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞෻᡽ᐭߤ߁ߒߩ‫࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳࡮࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޟ‬ኻ⹤ଦㅴ㧔DDDC㧕‫ࠍޠ‬ㅴ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ߘߩઁ‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬⣀ᒙᕈߦኻߔࠆ⧷࿖ߩᚢ⇛ߣߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬CPA ࠍࡕ࠾࠲࡝ࡦࠣߔࠆ AEC ߩ
⼏㐳‫ޔ‬ㆬ᜼ᡰេ‫ޔ‬UNDP ࠍㅢߓߚࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬᡰេ‫⼊ޔ‬ኤ⸠✵ߥߤᴦ቟ಽ㊁ᡷ㕟㧔SSR㧕‫ޔ‬DDR‫ޔ‬
េഥ᭴ㅧ߿ࡕ࠳࡝࠹ࠖ㧔aid architecture㧕߳ߩᡰេ‫ޔ‬ධㇱ᡽ᐭᡰេࠍታᣉߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
⧷࿖ߪ‫ޟ‬Whole-of-Government approach‫ࠍޠ‬ታ〣ߒ‫ࠆ޿ߡߒࠍ࠼࡯࡝ߩ⺰⼏ޔ‬࿖ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦ߅޿ߡ߽ Stabilisation Unit ࠍㅢߓߡ 3 ⋭ᐡߩ❑࡮ᮮߩදജࠍታ〣ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬႐
࡟ࡌ࡞ߢߪ‫ޔ‬ㅳ 1 ࿁ߩળวࠍᜬߜ Stabilisation Unit ߇ᜬߟ⚗੎੍㒐ၮ㊄ߩ૶޿ᣇߥߤߦߟ޿
DFID ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ੐ോᚲߦ Stabilization Unit ߆ࠄᵷ㆜ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ Ms. Pankhurst ߆ࠄ⡞ขࠅ㧔2009 ᐕ 3
᦬ 1 ᣣ㧕
‫ޕ‬
60 ᣥ Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit‫ޕ‬2004 ᐕߦࠕࡈࠟ࠾ࠬ࠲ࡦኻ╷ߣߒߡ DFID ౝߦ⸳┙ߒߚ߽ߩ‫ޕ‬
⃻࿷ߪࠕࡈ࡝ࠞࠍߪߓ߼ઁߩ࿾ၞ߽ኻ⽎ߣߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
61 1 ฬߪࠕࡔ࡝ࠞੱ‫ޔ‬ᱷࠅ 3 ฬߪࠬ࡯࠳ࡦੱߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ߤߥ࡜ࡐࠬࠕࠖ࠺ޔ‬ᶏᄖߦ㐳ߊ⒖૑ߒߚੱࠍណ↪‫ޕ‬
59
96
ߡද⼏ࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧠㧕ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ࡯62
ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ࡯ߪ๺ᐔ⺞஗ߦⓍᭂ⊛ߦ㑐ਈߒ‫ߦ․ޔ‬ධㇱߦ߅޿ߡߪౝᚢਛࠃࠅࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ࡯ߩ
ᢎળ♽ NGO ߇౉ߞߡᡰេߒߡ޿ߚ‫ᦨޕ‬ೋߩᡰេ࿖ળวࠍࠝࠬࡠߢࡎࠬ࠻ߔࠆߥߤࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ
ߦߪᷓߊ㑐ࠊߞߡ޿ࠆ‫࠴ࠬ࡟ࡄޔࡦ࠲ࠬ࠾ࠟࡈࠕߪࡦ࠳࡯ࠬߡߞߣߦ࡯ࠚ࠙࡞ࡁޔߚ߹ޕ‬
࠽ߦᰴ޿ߢ╙ 3 ૏ߩᡰេ࿖ߢ߽޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
᡽╷⊛ߦ‫ޟ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅᚢ⇛‫⚗ߤߥࠞࡦ࡜࡝ࠬ߼ߓߪࠍࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ߇޿ߥߪߩ߽߁޿ߣޠ‬੎
ᓟߩ࿖ߩᐔ๺᭴▽߳ߩᡰេߦⓍᭂ⊛ߢ޽ࠆ‫ ߚ߹ޕ‬OECD/DAC ߩ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߦ㑐ߔࠆ⼏⺰ߦ߽
Ⓧᭂ⊛ߦෳടߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ࡯ߩ㐿⊒ᚢ⇛ߪ᡽ᴦ⊛⺖㗴ߣኒធߦ࡝ࡦࠢߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ࡁޔ‬࿖࿖㓙㐿⊒දജ⋭ߩ᡽
╷ߪᄖോ⋭ߩ᡽╷ߣว⥌ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫‛ޕ‬ℂ⊛ߦ߽㧞ߟߩ⋭ᐡ߇ߟߥ߇ߞߡ߅ࠅኒធߥㅪ៤ࠍ
ⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ߚ߹ޕ‬េഥታᣉᯏ㑐ߩ NORAD ߪ⚵❱ౣ✬ᚑࠍⴕ޿‫ޔ‬࿷ᄖߦ߅޿ߡᄢ૶㙚ߣ೎‫ޘ‬
ߦ⸳⟎ߖߕ‫ޔ‬ᄢ૶㙚ౝߦ NORAD ⡯ຬࠍ⟎ߊࠃ߁ߦߥࠅ߹ߔ߹ߔㅪ៤߇ᒝൻߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㒐ⴡ⋭ߣ߽࡝ࡦࠢߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ᄢ૶㙚ߩਛߦߪ㒐ⴡ⋭߆ࠄ಴ะߒߡ޿ࠆ⡯ຬ߇߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬
AEC ߩ቟ో଻㓚ಽ⑼ળߩ⼏㐳߽ോ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ࡯ߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦᡰេߪ߶ߣࠎߤ MDTF ࠍㅢߓߚេഥߢ޽ࠅ‫ઁߩߘޔ‬࿖ㅪ߹ߚߪࡁ
࡞࠙ࠚ࡯♽ NGO ࠍㅢߓߡ᜚಴ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ධർ߳ߩᡰេഀวߪ߅߅ࠃߘ 60㧦40 ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬
MDTF ߳ߩ╙ 2 ࡈࠚ࡯࠭߳ߩᡰេ߇ ICC ໧㗴ߩߚ߼ᧄ࿖ߢᬌ⸛ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ⁁ᘒߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬㊀
ὐᡰេಽ㊁ߪࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬᡰេߣ᡽ᐭ⢻ജߩะ਄ߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ߦ․ߪ࡯ࠚ࠙࡞ࡁޔ‬⍹ᴤ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯
߳ߩᡰេࠍ㊀ⷞߒ‫৻⛔߫߃଀ޔ‬᡽ᐭ㋶‛ࠛࡀ࡞ࠡ࡯⋭߿ධㇱ⽷ോ⋭߅ࠃ߮㋶‛⾗Ḯ⋭߳ߩ
ࠠࡖࡄࡆ࡞ࠍታᣉߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ධㇱߩ⍹ᴤ᡽╷╷ቯ߳ߩᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ߅ࠅ‫⥄ޔ‬࿖ߩ᡽
ᴦ⊛ߥ⺖㗴ࠍផߒㅴ߼ࠆ৻ᣇ‫⚻ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ‬ᷣ⊛ߥ⣀ᒙᕈ߳ߩኻᔕࠍⴕߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ઁߩߘޕ‬
ㆬ᜼ᡰេ‫ࠗࠛࡆࠕޔ‬ᓳᣥᓳ⥝ᡰេ‫ޔ‬෻ᳪ⡯ᆔຬળ߳ߩᡰេ‫ޔ‬DDR ᡰេߥߤࠍታᣉߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧡㧕ਛ࿖
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦ߅ߌࠆਛ࿖ߩࡊ࡟࠯ࡦࠬߪᐕ‫ޘ‬Ⴧߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖ߩᄤὼ⾗Ḯ₪ᓧᚢ⇛ߦၮߠ
ߊ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ICC ߩㅱ᝝⁁⺧᳞ᣣߩ೨ᣣߦߪ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߩో㕙⊛ᡰេߢߢ߈ߚࠕࡈ࡝ࠞᦨᄢ
ⷙᮨߣߥࠆࠬ࡯࠳ࡦർㇱߩࡔࡠࠛ࠳ࡓߩቢᚑᑼࠍⴕߞߚ‫✚ޕ‬㗵⚂ 1,300 ం౞ߩࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻
ߩ߁ߜ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߪ⚂ 250 ం౞ࠍ᜚಴63ߒߚઁ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߩᑪ⸳ળ␠߇Ꮏ੐ࠍታᣉߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᑼౖߢ
ࡃࠪ࡯࡞ᄢ⛔㗔ߪ‫ࠍࡦ࠳࡯ࠬߪࠞ࡝ࡔࠕޟ‬ᢜⷞߒߡ޿ࠆ߇ਛ࿖߇ᡰេߒߡߊࠇࠆߩߢ‫ޔ‬࿖
ߩ⊒ዷߦߪ૗߽ᔃ㈩ߪߥ޿‫ޠ‬64ߣࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߣਛ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣ⊛ߦ⦟ᅢߥ෹ᅢ㑐ଥࠍࠕࡇ࡯࡞ߒߚ‫ޕ‬
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩャ಴෼౉ߩ 2/3 ߇ਛ࿖߆ࠄߣ৻⇟ߩ⾏ᤃ⋧ᚻ࿖ߢ޽ࠅ⚻ᷣ⊛ߥᒝ޿㑐ଥࠍ␜ߒ
ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
62
63
64
࿷ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ࡯ᄢ૶㙚ࠃࠅ⡞ขࠅ㧔2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ 2 ᣣ㧕‫ޕ‬
ਛ࿖ャ಴౉㌁ⴕ߆ࠄߩⲢ⾗‫ޕ‬
NHK ࠾ࡘ࡯ࠬ㧔http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/k10014532721000.html, 2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ 5 ᣣ㧕
97
ᱜ⏕ߥᢙሼߪቯ߆ߢߪߥ޿߇‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖߆ࠄߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦᡰេߪ 2005 ᐕߦߪ⚂ 4.1 ం࠼࡞‫ޔ‬2006
ᐕߦߪ⚂ 2 ం࠼࡞‫ޔ‬2007 ᐕߦߪ 6.87 ం࠼࡞ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ65‫߽ࠇߕ޿ޕ‬ർㇱ߳ߩࠗࡦࡈ࡜ᡰ
េ߇ਛᔃߢ޽ࠅ㔚ജ‫ޔ‬᳓ଏ⛎‫ޔ‬ᯅ‫ޔ‬ᄢ⛔㗔ᐭᑪ⸳ߥߤ߳ߩⲢ⾗߹ߚߪήఘ᩺ઙߣߥߞߡ޿
ࠆ‫⾗ߩߘޕ‬㊄ߩᄢඨߪਛ࿖ャ಴౉㌁ⴕߢ޽ࠆߣᕁࠊࠇ‫ޔ‬ᑪ⸳ߪߔߴߡਛ࿖ߩળ␠ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
2008 ᐕߦߪ‫ޔ‬ㄘᬺ⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯‫ޔ‬㕍࠽ࠗ࡞Ꮊߩ∛㒮ᑪ⸳‫ࡓ࠳࡯࡝࠯ࡠޔ‬ᑪ⸳‫ޔ‬ㄘᬺᡰេߥ
ߤઁߩ࠼࠽࡯߇૛ࠅᡰេߒߡ޿ߥ޿࿾ၞ߳ߩᡰេࠍ⊒⴫ߒ᱑ㄫߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ઁߩߘޕ‬ᛛⴚᡰ
េߣߒߡਛ࿖ߦ᡽ᐭ⡯ຬࠍ᜗⡜ߔࠆ⎇ୃ੐ᬺ߽ታᣉߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬⍹ᴤߩ೑ᮭ߇⛊ߺർㇱࠬ࡯
࠳ࡦߣߩ㑐ଥ߇એ೨ࠃࠅᒝ޿߇‫ޔ‬2007 ᐕߦߪධㇱᄢ⛔㗔߇ਛ࿖ߦ᜗⡜ߐࠇ‫ޔ‬ධㇱߣߩ㑐ଥ
߽ᒝൻߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬2008 ᐕߦߪධㇱ㚂ㇺߦ✚㗔੐㙚߽㐿⸳ߒ‫∛ޔ‬㒮ᑪ⸳ߥߤᡰេࠍᆎ߼ߡ޿
ࠆ‫ޕ‬
߹ߚ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞․૶ࠍછ๮ߒ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞⚗੎⸃᳿ߦ৻ᓎᜂߞߡ޿ࠆ‫⷏ޕ‬஥⻉࿖
ߪࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ໑৻ߩ෹ᅢ࿖ߣ޿߃ࠆਛ࿖߆ࠄࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭߦኻߒ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞໧㗴ߩ⸃᳿ࠍ
ᦼᓙߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߩ᡽ᴦ⊛ߥᓎഀ߇ᦼᓙߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ࠆߌ߅ߦࡦ࠳࡯ࠬ߿੹ޕ‬ਛ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣ
߅ࠃ߮᡽ᴦ⊛ᓇ㗀ജߪήⷞߢ߈ߥ޿߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖ߪ࿖ㅪ࡮AU ߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞วหࡒ࠶ࠪ
࡚ࡦ㧔UNAMID㧕߽߳ 300 ੱߩࠛࡦࠫ࠾ࠕࠍᵷ㆜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧢㧕࿖ㅪ
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߪ਎⇇ߢ߽໑৻ 2 ߟߩ PKO ࡒ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ߇౒ሽߔࠆ࿖ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ධർ๺ᐔࡊࡠ࠮ࠬ
ߩଦㅴᡰេߔࠆ࿖ㅪࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ࡮ࡒ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ㧔UNMIS㧕ߣ‫ߩ࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬ᴦ቟⛽ᜬࠍᜂ߁
UNAMID ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬UNMIS ߪ CPA ታᣉଦㅴߩઁ‫ޔ‬ᴦ቟⛽ᜬ‫ޔ‬ᴺߩ⛔ᴦ‫ੱޔ‬㆏ᡰេࠍᜂߞߡ
޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
PKO એᄖߢߪ UNDP‫ޔ‬UNICEF‫ޔ‬WFP‫ޔ‬UNHCR‫ޔ‬WHO‫ޔ‬FAO‫ޔ‬UNIDO ߥߤਥⷐߥ࿖ㅪ
ᯏ㑐߇౉ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬ᯏ㑐ߪ⃻࿷ 2009-2012 ᐕߩ 4 ᐕ㑆ߩ UNDAF㧔࿖ㅪ㐿⊒ᡰេᨒ
⚵ߺ㧕ߦᴪߞߡេഥࠍታᣉߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬㊀ὐಽ㊁ߪ CPA ታᣉᡰេ‫ޔ‬JAM ߩఝవಽ㊁‫ޔ‬5 ࡨᐕ
㐿⊒⸘↹‫ޔ‬ධㇱࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ੍▚೎࠮ࠢ࠲࡯⸘↹ߦၮߠ߈‫ޔ‬Ԙࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ‫ޔ‬ᴺߩ⛔ᴦ‫ޔ‬⢻ജᒝ
ൻ‫ޔ‬ԙၮ␆⊛ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬ߅ࠃ߮↢⸘ะ਄㧔଻ஜ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒‫ޔ‬ㄘ᧛㐿⊒㧕‫ޔ‬Ԛᐔ๺ߣᴦ቟⛽ᜬ㧔DDR‫ޔ‬
࿖᳃Ⲣ๺ᡰេ㧕‫ ߩޔ‬3 ᧄᩇߢᡰេߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧣㧕ᣣᧄߩᡰេ
ᣣᧄߪ‫ޟ‬ᐔ๺ߩቯ⌕‫ࠍޠ‬ၮᧄ⊛ߥេഥᣇ㊎ߣߒ‫ޔ‬ᚢ⇛⊛ߦߪԘ⚗੎ⵍἴ᳃࡮␠ળౣ⛔ว
ᡰេ㧔㔍᳃Ꮻㆶଦㅴ‫ޔ‬Ꮻㆶ㔍᳃ߩౣቯ૑࡮ౣ⛔วଦㅴ‫ޔ‬࿾㔗ኻ╷‫ޔ‬DDR ଦㅴ‫࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔ‬
ੱ㆏ᡰេ㧕‫ޔ‬ԙၮ␆⊛࠾࡯࠭㧔଻ஜ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒࡮⡯ᬺ⸠✵‫ޔ‬᳓࡮ⴡ↢ಽ㊁㧕߳ߩᡰេࠍⴕߞߡ
޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬⣀ᒙᕈ߳ߩኻᔕߣ޿߁ᗧ๧ߢߪ‫ߦ․ޔ‬ධㇱߦ߅ߌࠆ᡽ᐭߩ⢻ജᒝൻࠍ㊀ⷞߒ‫ୃ⎇ޔ‬
ࠍᄙ↪ߒ‫᧚ੱޔ‬⢒ᚑ‫ޔ‬Ꮻㆶ㔍᳃ᡰេ‫ޔ‬ਇ቟ቯⷐ࿃ߩ৻ߟߢ޽ࠆరァੱ߿᳃౓ߩ DDR66߳ߩ
65
66
⛔৻᡽ᐭ࿖㓙දജ⋭߆ࠄߩ⡞ขࠅ㧔2009 ᐕ 3 ᦬ 1 ᣣ㧕
‫ޕ‬
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߢߪ 18 ਁੱߩర౓჻ߩേຬ⸃㒰ࠍߒߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߕ‫ޔ‬࿖ㅪߪ 430 ⊖ਁ࠼࡞ߩ⾌↪߇ᔅⷐߢ޽
98
ᡰេࠍታᣉߒߡ޿ࠆ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޔߚ߹ޕ‬੎⸃᳿ߩߚ߼ߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞࡮࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ኻ⹤ଦ
ㅴ㧔DDDC㧕ߦኻߒ AU ࠍㅢߓߡᡰេߒ‫ᦨޔ‬ㄭߢߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞๺ᐔ⺞ᢛળ⼏ߦᣣᧄઍ⴫ߣߒ
ߡᱜᑼߦෳടߒ‫⚗ޔ‬੎⸃᳿ߦ߽੺౉ߒᆎ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
2005-2007 ᐕߩេഥ㗵ߩផ⒖߅ࠃ߮௑ะ߿․ᓽߦߟ޿ߡߪ࿑ 5 ߦ␜ߒߚߣ߅ࠅߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬
CPA ⺞ශᓟೋᦼߩ 3 ᐕ㑆ߪ⚂ 80%߇✕ᕆ࡮ੱ㆏ᡰេะߌߢ޽ࠅ‫߇ߤࠎߣ߶ߩࠄࠇߘߚ߹ޔ‬
࿖ㅪ⚻↱ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬JICA ߇ታᣉߔࠆੑ࿖㑆ᡰេߪ๺ᐔวᗧ⋥ᓟߦ✕ᕆ㐿⊒⺞ᩏߣߒߡධㇱࠫ
ࡘࡃߩㇺᏒࡑࠬ࠲࡯⸘↹ࠍ╷ቯߒ‫ࡃࡘࠫߡߒߣ࠻ࠢࠚࠫࡠࡊ࠻࠶ࡠࠗࡄޔ‬ᴡᎹ᷼ࠍᑪ⸳ߒ
ߚ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬ධㇱߢઁߩᡰេ߇ㆃࠇߡ޿ࠆਛߢ‫ᦨ⇟৻ޔ‬ೋߦ⋡ߦ⷗߃ࠆᚑᨐࠍ޽ߍߚ᩺ઙߣ
ߒߡධㇱ᡽ᐭ߅ࠃ߮ઁ࠼࠽࡯߆ࠄ߽㜞޿⹏ଔࠍᓧߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬JICA ੐ോᚲߪ 2007 ᐕ 7 ᦬ߦ㚂ㇺ
ࡂ࡞࠷࡯ࡓߣࠫࡘࡃ㧔ࡈࠖ࡯࡞࠼੐ോᚲ㧕ߦ㐿⸳ߒ‫ޔ‬ർㇱᡰេ߽ᆎ߹ࠅੑ࿖㑆ᡰេ߇ᓢ‫ޘ‬
ߦߢߪ޽ࠆ߇Ⴧ߃ߟߟ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ධർߩਔ᡽ᐭߣ߽ᣣᧄߦኻߔࠆᦼᓙߪᄢ߈ߊ‫ޔ‬࿖ㅪ⚻↱ߢߪ
ߥߊੑ࿖㑆දജ߳ߩᒝ޿ⷐ⺧߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ੑ࿖㑆දജߢታᣉߒߚਥߥ᩺ઙߪ⴫ 9 ߩߣ߅ࠅߢ޽
ࠆ‫ޕ‬
࿑㧡 ᣣᧄߩኻࠬ࡯࠳ࡦᡰេ(2005-2007)
Japan's Contribution to Sudan by Category
Trends of Proportion
㪇㪅㪋㩼
㪈㪇㪇㩼
㪍㪅㪏㩼
Japan's Assitance to Sudan (2005-2007)
by Assistance
㪏㪅㪐㩼
㪋㪅㪌㩼
㪌㪅㪊㩼
㪐㪇㩼
㪛㪼㫍㪼㫃㫆㫇㫄㪼㫅㫋
㪈㪍㪅㪐㩼
㪐㪅㪈㩼
㪏㪇㩼
㪎㪇㩼
㪙㫀㫃㪸㫋㪼㫉㪸㫃
㪍㪇㩼
㪌㪇㩼
㪐㪌㪅㪈㩼
㪏㪎㪅㪐㩼
㪏㪈㪅㪐㩼
㪥㪞㪦
㪋㪇㩼
㪬㪥㪆㪘㪬
㪊㪇㩼
㪉㪇㩼
㪈㪇㩼
㪇㩼
㪙㫀㫃㪸㫋㪼㫉㪸㫃
㪥㪞㪦
㪬㪥㪆㪘㪬
㪉㪇㪇㪌
㪉㪇㪇㪍
㪉㪇㪇㪎
㪇㪅㪉㪍㩷
㪊㪅㪈㪇㩷
㪍㪌㪅㪏㪐㩷
㪌㪅㪐㪏㩷
㪋㪅㪍㪉㩷
㪎㪍㪅㪎㪎㩷
㪋㪅㪎㪏㩷
㪋㪅㪐㪇㩷
㪋㪊㪅㪐㪈㩷
㪟㫌㫄㪸㫅㫀㫋㪸㫉㫀㪸㫅
㪏㪊㪅㪈㩼
㪬㪪㩻㩷㫄㫀㫃㫃㫀㫆㫅
಴ᚲ㧦࿷ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦᣣᧄᄢ૶㙚߆ࠄߩ࠺࡯࠲ࠍ߽ߣߦ╩⠪૞ᚑ
߹ߚ‫੹ޔ‬ᓟ TICAD IV ߩࡈࠜࡠ࡯ࠕ࠶ࡊ߿㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ㐿⊒߳ߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦ᡽ᐭ߆ࠄߩᦼᓙ߽㜞
޿ߎߣ߆ࠄ‫ޔ‬ㄘᬺ‫ޔ‬᳇୥ᄌേಽ㊁߳ߩᡰេߦߟ޿ߡ߽ᬌ⸛ਛߢ޽ࠆ‫⚗ޕ‬੎ਛߩ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞
ߦ߅ߌࠆᛛⴚᡰេߢߪ⃻࿷ߩ㊀ὐಽ㊁ߦᴪߞߚಽ㊁ߦ߅ߌࠆੱ᧚⢒ᚑࠍᣢሽ᩺ઙ߿╙ਃ࿖
⎇ୃߥߤࠍㅢߓߡⴕ߁੍ቯߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᣣᧄߩ PKO ᡰេߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬2008 ᐕߦ UNMIS ߦ 2 ฬߩ⥄ⴡ㓌ࠍᵷ㆜‫ޕ‬ᄢ૶㙚ߦ㒐ⴡ⋭߆ࠄ
ߩ⡯ຬ߇಴ะߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
ࠆߣ⷗Ⓧ߽ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬DDR ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߪ UNDP ߣ౒ห⼏㐳ࠍോ߼ࠆߥߤⓍᭂ⊛ߦ⽸₂ߒߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬
2009 ᐕ 2 ᦬‫ ߩߢࡉ࡯ࡀࡘࠫޔ‬DDR ળวߢᣣᧄߪ 17 ⊖ਁ࠼࡞ߩ᜚಴ࠍࡊ࡟࠶ࠫ‫✚ޕ‬㗵 88.3 ⊖ਁ࠼࡞ࡊ
࡟࠶ࠫߐࠇߚ㗵ߩਛߢᦨᄢߩ᜚಴࠼࠽࡯‫ޕ‬
99
⴫㧥 ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߦ߅ߌࠆਥߥੑ࿖㑆දജ
᩺ઙฬ
࿾ၞ
ታᣉᦼ㑆
ࠫࡘࡃᏒౝ࡮ㄭ㇠࿾ၞ✕ᕆ↢ᵴၮ⋚ᢛ஻⸘↹⺞ᩏ㧔✕ᕆ㐿⊒⺞ᩏ㧕
ၮ␆⊛ᛛ⢻࡮⡯ᬺ⸠✵ᒝൻ㧔SAVOT㧕(ᛛࡊࡠ)
଻ஜੱ᧚⢒ᚑ㧔ᛛࡊࡠ㧕
ࠫࡘࡃ߅ࠃ߮ㄭ㇠ߦ߅ߌࠆ↢⸘ะ਄㧔ᛛࡊࡠ㧕
ℂᢙ⑼ᢎຬ㙃ᚑᡰេ㧔⍴ᦼኾ㐷ኅ㧕
ࠫࡘࡃ∛㒮▤ℂ㧔⍴ᦼኾ㐷ኅ㧕
ࠫࡘࡃㇺᏒㆇャࠗࡦࡈ࡜߅ࠃ߮⢻ജᒝൻ㧔㐿⊒⺞ᩏ㧕
ࠫࡘࡃㇺᏒㄭ㇠ߦ߅ߌࠆ⛎᳓ᢛ஻߅ࠃ߮⢻ജᒝൻ㧔㐿⊒⺞ᩏ㧕
េഥ⺞ᢛ㧔ኾ㐷ኅ㧕
Უሶ଻ஜࡈࡠࡦ࠻࡜ࠗࡦᒝൻ㧔ᛛࡊࡠ㧕
⛎᳓ੱ᧚⢒ᚑ㧔ᛛࡊࡠ㧕
⡯ᬺ⸠✵⸘↹ࡑࠬ࠲࡯ࡊ࡜ࡦ╷ቯ㧔㐿⊒⺞ᩏ㧕
ධㇱ
ධㇱ
ධㇱ
ධㇱ
ධㇱ
ධㇱ
ධㇱ
ධㇱ
ർㇱ
ർㇱ
ർㇱ
ർㇱ
2005-200㧣
2006-2009
2008-2011
2008-2011
2008
2007‫ޔ‬2008
2008-2010
2008-2010
2005-2008
2008-2011
2008-2011
2008-2011
4-9
߹ߣ߼
CPA ߩጁⴕߪ੍ቯࠃࠅ߽ㆃࠇߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ ߩߎޔ‬4 ᐕ㑆ߢධㇱ᡽ᐭߩᚑ┙‫ޔ‬࿾ᣇ⥄ᴦߩᢛ஻‫ޔ‬
㆏〝‫ޔ‬ㅢା‫ޔ‬ᓎᚲߩᑪ‛ߥߤࠗࡦࡈ࡜ᢛ஻‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒߿ක≮‫ޔ‬㔍᳃࡮IDP ߩᏫㆶ‫ޔ‬Security Agreement
ߦၮߠ޿ߚฦァߩ㈩⟎឵߃ߥߤ‫ߡߴߔޔ‬චಽߢߪߥ޿߇޽ࠆ⒟ᐲߩᚑᨐߪ޽ߍߡ޿ࠆ‫ߒޕ‬
߆ߒ‫⚗࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ߦ߁ࠃߚ߈ߡߺߢ߹ࠇߎޔ‬੎ߩⴕᣇࠍ฽߼ CPA ߩጁⴕࠍ⢿߆ߔᄢ߈ߥਇ
቟ቯⷐ࿃߇ⶄᢙ޽ࠅ‫⃻ޔ‬Ბ㓏ߢߪ CPA ᥳቯᦼ㑆߇⚳ੌߔࠆ 2011 ᐕߩࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ዁᧪௝߇ߪ
ߞ߈ࠅߣߪ⷗߃ߥ޿⁁ᘒߢ޽ࠆ‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬࠎࠈߜ߽ޕ‬዁᧪ߪࠬ࡯࠳ࡦੱ⥄り߇᳿߼ߡ޿ߊ
ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ߡߒߘޕ‬዁᧪௝ߪ CPA ߩ࠲ࠗࡓ࠹࡯ࡉ࡞ࠍㅊߞߡ޿ߊߛߌߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬࿖ౝߩ᭽‫ޘ‬
ߥ࡟ࡌ࡞ߢߩ⼏⺰ߩᚑᾫ߇ᔅⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ᧄޕ‬Ⓜߢߪ‫ޔ‬࿖ߩࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ໧㗴‫ޔ‬Ꮢ᳃߳ߩࠨ࡯
ࡆࠬឭଏ⢻ജߩ໧㗴‫ޔ‬Ꮢ᳃␠ળߩෳടߩ໧㗴ߥߤࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ⣀ᒙᕈ߇㜞޿ಽ㊁ߣ‫ޔ‬࿾ၞᩰ
Ꮕࠍ↢ࠎߛ᭴ㅧ⊛ߥ૕೙ࠍᡷ߼ߥ޿㒢ࠅౣ߮⚗੎ߦ㒱ࠆෂ㒾ᕈ߽ሺࠎߢ޿ࠆߎߣ߇ౣ⏕⹺
ߐࠇߚ‫ᦨޕ‬ᓟߦࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ੐଀ࠍㅢߓߡ․ߦ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩਛߢ߽ࡐࠬ࠻ࠦࡦࡈ࡝ࠢ࠻࿖߳ߩ
ᣣᧄߩኻᔕߦߟ޿ߡ޿ߊߟ߆ߩ␜ໂࠍឭ␜ߒߚ޿‫ޕ‬
㧔㧝㧕 ⚗੎⸃᳿Ბ㓏߆ࠄߩ੺౉
ߎࠇ߹ߢᣣᧄߪ⚗੎⸃᳿ࡊࡠ࠮ࠬ߳ߩ੺౉ߪ߶ߣࠎߤⴕߞߡ޿ߥ޿‫ᧄޕ‬ᩰ⊛ߥᡰេ߿੺
౉ߪၮᧄ⊛ߦߪ⚗੎ᓟ๺ᐔ߇ᚑ┙ߒߡ߆ࠄߢ޽ࠆ‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎࠎࠈߜ߽ޕ‬ᡰេߪ ODA ࠍㅢߓ
ߚេഥߣ޿߁ࠃࠅߪ‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ⊛࡮ᄖ੤⊛ߥࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߢⴕߞߡ޿ߊߴ߈߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬
⚗੎⸃᳿ࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߥߤ߹ߛ๺ᐔ߇ᚑ┙ߒߡ޿ߥ޿Ბ㓏߆ࠄߩ੺౉߇‫⚿ޔ‬ᨐ⊛ߦߪ᦭ലߥᓳ
⥝ᡰេ߿㐿⊒߳ߣߟߥߍߡࠁߌࠆߩߢ޽ࠅ‫ߩߎޔ‬Ბ㓏߆ࠄߩ JICA ߥߤ㐿⊒ታᣉᯏ㑐ߣߩല
ᨐ⊛ߥㅪ៤߇ᔅⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ ߪߢࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޔ߫߃଀ޕ‬CPA ࠍࡕ࠾࠲࡝ࡦࠣߔࠆ AEC ߦߪ‫ޔ‬CPA
ᚑ┙ࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߦᷓߊ㑐ࠊࠅ CPA ߦ⟑ฬࠍߒߚࡁ࡞࠙ࠚ࡯‫⧷ޔ‬࿖‫ࠝޔࠞ࡝ࡔࠕޔࠕ࡝࠲ࠗޔ‬
࡜ࡦ࠳ߩߺ߇⷏஥߆ࠄࡔࡦࡃ࡯ߣߥߞߡ߅ࠅ‫߇ࠬࡦ࠯࡟ࡊߩ࡯࠽࠼ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬ᄢ߈޿‫ߎޕ‬
ߩࠃ߁ߥળ⼏ߦෳടߔࠆߎߣߪេഥߦ᦭ലߥᖱႎ߇޿ߜᣧߊ౉ࠅ‫⋧ߚ߹ޔ‬ᚻ࿖ߣߩା㗬㉯
100
ᚑߥߤߢ߽ലᨐ⊛ߢ޽ࠆ‫⚗ޔߚ߹ޕ‬੎⸃᳿ࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߦෳടࠍߔࠆߎߣߢ‫ߩߘޔ‬ᓟߦᆎ߹ࠆ
ᓳ⥝ᡰេߩߚ߼ߩ⹏ଔ⺞ᩏ࿅ߥߤߦⓍᭂ⊛ߦෳടߔࠆḰ஻߽චಽߦߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᣣᧄߪ࠳࡞ࡈ࡯࡞ߩ๺ᐔ੤ᷤߩળ⼏ߦࠝࡉࠩ࡯ࡃ࡯ߣߒߡෳടߒߡ޿ߚ߇‫ᦨޔ‬ㄭߢߪᱜ
ᑼߦࡔࡦࡃ࡯ߣߒߡ᜗⺧ߐࠇࠆߥߤ‫ޔ‬ᓢ‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎߦޘ‬ಽ㊁߳ߩ੺౉ࠍߒߡ޿ࠆߣߣ߽ߦ‫ޔ‬
⋧ᚻ஥߆ࠄߩᣣᧄߩᓎഀ߳ߩᦼᓙ߇㜞߹ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕ‬ೋᦼᲑ㓏߆ࠄ‫ޔ‬ᄖ੤ߩߺߥ
ࠄߕ㐿⊒‫ޔ‬㒐ⴡߥߤ޿ࠊࠁࠆ㧟D㧔Diplomacy‫ޔ‬Development‫ޔ‬Defense㧕ߩ૕೙ߢㅪ៤ߒ੺౉
ߒߡ޿ߊߎߣ߇‫ߩߘޔ‬ᓟߩ᦭ല⊛ߥ㐿⊒߳ߩࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴߳⛯޿ߡ޿ߊߣᕁࠊࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧞㧕 㧟D ࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߩផㅴ㧦⃻႐࡟ࡌ࡞ߢߩផㅴ
਄⸥ߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߪ߹ߛᄖോ⋭‫ޔ‬JICA‫ޔ‬㒐ⴡ⋭ߣ㧟D ߩ᦭ᯏ⊛ߥㅪ៤߇೙ᐲൻߒ
ߡ޿ߥ޿‫ߩࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޕ‬႐ว‫ޔ‬UNMIS ߳ߩ⥄ⴡ㓌ᵷ㆜‫ޔ‬㒐ⴡ⋭⡯ຬ߇ᄢ૶㙚ຬߣߒߡ಴ะߒ
ߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬ᄖ੤ߣ㒐ⴡߩㅪ៤߇ߢ߈ߡ޿ߡ߽‫߇ࠇߘޔ‬㐿⊒ߦߪ⋥ធߟߥ߇ߞߡ޿ߥ޿‫⃻ޕ‬
࿷⋥ធߦߪ㑐ଥߒߥ޿߆߽ߒࠇߥ޿߇‫⃻ޔ‬࿾ ODA ࠲ࠬࠢࡈࠜ࡯ࠬ(Ḱ஻ᆔຬળ)ߦ㒐ⴡ㑐ଥ
⠪߇ෳടߔࠆߎߣߦࠃࠅᖱႎ౒᦭߇ଦㅴߐࠇ‫ࠄ߆ߎߘޔ‬ㅪ៤ࠍ࿑ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ‫ޕ‬ㅢᏱ᭽‫ޘ‬
ߥㅪ៤ߪ⃻႐࡟ࡌ࡞ߢߩᣇ߇ࠕࠢ࠲࡯߽ዋߥߊታᣉߒ߿ߔ޿႐ว߽ᄙ޿ߩߢ‫⃻ߪߕ߹ޔ‬႐
࡟ࡌ࡞ߢߩᣣᧄߩ Whole-of-Government approach ߩᒻࠍᬌ⸛ߢ߈ࠆߩߢߪߥ޿߆‫ޕ‬
㧔㧟㧕 ࿖ߩℂ⸃ଦㅴ
េഥታᣉ⠪ߩਛߦߪ⥄ᚓ߽฽߼ߡ࿖߳ߩℂ⸃߇චಽߢߥ޿႐ว߇ᄙ޿‫ⷺ఻ޕ‬េഥታᣉ⠪
ߪ‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅᜰᮡߩࠃ߁ߥࠬ࠽࠶ࡊ࡚ࠪ࠶࠻⊛ߦᤋࠆ⃻⁁ߩ⺖㗴ߦኻߒߡኻᔕߒ߇ߜߢ޽
ࠆ‫⚗ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬੎ᓟߩ࿖ߦኻߒߡ᦭ലߥេഥࠍታ〣ߒߡ޿ߊߚ߼ߦߪ‫⚗ޔ‬੎ߩⷐ࿃‫ߩߘޔ‬
࿖․᦭ߩᱧผ⊛ߥ⢛᥊‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ⊛ߥേ߈‫ޔ‬ᢥൻ⊛ߥ⢛᥊ߥߤ߽޽ࠊߖߡታᣉ⠪ߩ৻ੱ৻ੱ߇
චಽߦℂ⸃ߒ⠨ᘦߒߚ਄ߢ‫᦭ޔ‬ലߥេഥᚢ⇛߿᩺ઙߩᒻᚑ‫ߡߒߘޔ‬ታᣉߔࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
JICA ߪ⚗੎⚻㛎࿖ߦኻߒߡ‫ޔ‬ᐔ๺᭴▽࠾࡯࠭ࠕ࠮ࠬࡔࡦ࠻㧔PNA㧕ࠍዉ౉ߒߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ߎޔ‬
ߩࠃ߁ߥ૞ᬺࠍ㑐ଥ⠪ߣᐢߊ౒᦭ߒߚࠅ‫ޔ‬ታ㓙ߘߩ࿖ߦⴕߊੱߦኻߒߡ⎇ୃߥߤࠍ੐೨ߦ
ⴕ߁ࠃ߁ߥᯏળ߇޽ࠆߣ᦭ലߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧠㧕 ‫ޟ‬ᐔ๺ߩ㈩ᒰ‫ࠍޠ‬ታᗵߢ߈ࠆេഥ
CPA એ㒠 4 ᐕ߇⚻ߞߚ߇‫ޔ‬Ꮢ᳃ߩ㑆ߢᐔ๺ߩ㈩ᒰࠍታᗵߢ߈ࠆ߹ߢߦߪ⥋ߞߡ޿ߥ޿‫ޕ‬
Ꮢ᳃ߪ㐳ᐕߩ⚗੎߇⚳ࠊࠅᐔ๺߇ࠃ߁߿ߊ⸰ࠇߚߎߣ߳ߩᏗᦸ߇ᄢ߈ߊ߹ߚᦼᓙ߇㜞޿‫ޕ‬
ߎߩࠃ߁ߥਛߢ‫ޟߦߣ߮ੱޔ‬ᐔ๺ߩ㈩ᒰ‫⋥ࠍޠ‬ធ⋡ߦ⷗߃ࠆᒻߢߢ߈ࠆߛߌᣧߊ␜ߔߎߣ
߇ߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߥᡰេࠍⴕࠊߥߌࠇ߫‫ᦼޔ‬ᓙ߇㜞޿ߛߌߦᄬᦸ߅ࠃ߮ਇḩ߽ᄢ߈ߊߥߞߡߒ
߹߁‫ߦ․ޕ‬ㄘ᧛߿ߎࠇ߹ߢ㐿⊒ߩᯏળ߇ਈ߃ࠄࠇߥ߆ߞߚ࿾ᣇ߳ߩᡰេ߇㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ޔ‬
㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ㐿⊒᩺ઙࠍḰ஻ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦ‫ޔ‬1-2 ᐕߢᚑᨐ߇⃻ࠇࠆࠃ߁ߥ⍴ᦼ⊛ߥᣧᦼᓳ⥝᩺ઙ
ߩታᣉ߇㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߩᡰេౝኈ߽฽߼‫ߩ߳ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬߛ߹޿ޔ‬ᡰេߪ✕ᕆ࡮ੱ㆏ᡰេ
ะߌ߇ో૕ߢ 70%ࠍභ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫߿࡞࡯ࡈ࡞࠳ޕ‬ධർႺ⇇࿾ၞߥߤੱ㆏ᡰេ߇ᔅⷐߥ࿾ၞߪ
101
ᄙ޿߇‫✕ޔ‬ᕆ࡮ੱ㆏ᡰេߪ৻ㆊᕈߩ߽ߩߢ㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ㐿⊒ࠍ⠨߃ߚ߽ߩߢߪߥ޿‫ޕ‬CPA ᓟ 4
ᐕ߇⚻ߜ‫੹ޔ‬ᓟេഥߩ㊂ࠍᓢ‫ߦޘ‬ᣧᦼᓳ⥝ᡰេ߿㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ㐿⊒ߦࠪࡈ࠻ߐߖߡ޿߆ߥߌࠇ
߫ߥࠄߥ޿߇‫ߩߘޔ‬㓙ᣧᦼᓳ⥝ᡰេߢ߽㐳ᦼ⊛ߥዷᦸࠍ߽ߞߚᡰេࠍⴕ߁ߎߣߦ⇐ᗧߔߴ
߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㧔㧡㧕 Ꮢ᳃␠ળෳടߣᏒ᳃␠ળߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ᣖⲢ๺࡮ኻ⹤ߩଦㅴ
ᩙᧄ㧔2004b㧕߇ᜰ៰ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦ‫ޔ‬CPA ߩ࠲ࠗࡓ࠹࡯ࡉ࡞ߦᓥߞߡጁⴕߒߡ޿ࠇ߫ᐔ๺߇
ቯ⌕ߔࠆࠊߌߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬Ꮢ᳃࡟ࡌ࡞ߩ‫ޟ‬ਅ߆ࠄߩᐔ๺‫ߩ߳ޠ‬ദജ߽หߓࠃ߁ߦ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
2 ᐲߦਗ਼ࠆ 50 ᐕߩ⚗੎ߩᱧผࠍ➅ࠅ㄰ߒߡ޿ࠆࠬ࡯࠳ࡦᏒ᳃ߦߣߞߡᏒ᳃࡟ࡌ࡞ߢߩኻ⹤
ߦࠃࠆ᳃ᣖⲢ๺ߩദജ߇ᔅⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬᳃ᣖⲢ๺ߢߪ‫ޔ‬ධࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ߇ࠕࡄ࡞࠻ࡋࠗ࠻ᓟߦⴕ
ߞߚ⌀ታ๺⸃ᆔຬળߥߤ␠ળ࡝ࡂࡆ࡝࠹࡯࡚ࠪࡦᵴേ߇᦭ฬߢ޽ࠆ߇‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޔ‬ദജࠍ
ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߢ߽ታᣉߒߡ޿ߊᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ታ㓙‫ޔ‬ධㇱߩ⃻࿾ NGO ߿ᢎળࠍㅢߓߡኻ┙ߒߚ᳃
ᣖ㑆ߩ People㧙People Reconciliation Conference ࠍ⚦‫߁ߎޔ߇ࠆ޽ߪࠈߎߣࠆ޿ߡ߼ߓߪߣޘ‬
ߒߚദജߪ➅ࠅ㄰ߒⴕ߁ᔅⷐ߇޽ࠅ‫ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޔ‬Ꮢ᳃࡟ࡌ࡞ߩⲢ๺ᵴേ߳ߩ⾗㊄㕙‫ޔ‬ᛛⴚ
㕙ߦ߅޿ߡ࿖㓙␠ળ߆ࠄᡰេߒߡ޿ߊߴ߈ߢ޽ࠈ߁‫ޕ‬
ෳ⠨ᢥ₂
ᩙᧄ⧷਎ (1998) ‫ޡ‬᳃ᣖ⚗੎ࠍ↢߈ࠆੱ߮ߣ㧦⃻ઍࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߩ࿖ኅߣࡑࠗࡁ࡝࠹ࠖ‫ ╙ޢ‬2 ਎
⇇ᕁᗐ␠.
㨋㨋㨋㨋 (2004a) ‫ޟ‬IGAD ߦࠃࠆᐔ๺⺞஗ʊ᭎ⷰߣಽᨆ‫ޠ‬ᐔᚑ 15 ᐕᐲ ᄖോ⋭ᆔ⸤⎇ⓥ‫ࡉࠨޡ‬
ࠨࡂ࡜࡮ࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߦ߅ߌࠆ࿾ၞ㑆දജߩน⢻ᕈߣേะ ‫╙ޢ‬ਃ┨ ࿖㓙໧㗴⎇ⓥᚲ.
㨋㨋㨋㨋 (2004b) ‫ޟޟ‬਄߆ࠄߩᐔ๺‫ޟߣޠ‬ਅ߆ࠄߩᐔ๺‫ޠ‬㧙ࠬ࡯࠳ࡦౝᚢߣᐔ๺᭴▽‫ޠ‬ᐔᚑ 15
ᐕᐲ ᄖോ⋭ᆔ⸤⎇ⓥ‫⚗ޡ‬੎੍㒐 ‫╙ޢ‬㧢┨ ࿖㓙໧㗴⎇ⓥᚲ.
㨋㨋㨋㨋 (2005)‫ࡦ࠳࡯ࠬޟ‬ౝᚢߩ⚳⚿ߣᚢᓟᓳ⥝‫ޡޠ‬ᶏᄖ੐ᖱ‫ޢ‬ᜏᱺᄢቇᶏᄖ੐ᖱ⎇ⓥᚲ ╙
54 Ꮞ╙ 4 ภ pp. 2㧙21.
㨋㨋㨋㨋 (2006㧕
‫ޟ‬ᚢᓟࠬ࡯࠳ࡦߩ᡽ᴦ⊛േᘒ㧙൮᜝⊛ᐔ๺දቯߩ⺞஗߆ࠄ৻ᐕਃࡩ᦬ࠍ⚻ߡ㧙‫ޠ‬
‫ޡ‬ᶏᄖ੐ᖱ‫ޢ‬ᜏᱺᄢቇᶏᄖ੐ᖱ⎇ⓥᚲ ╙ 53 Ꮞ╙ 4 ภ pp. 77-92.
ᱞౝㅴ৻㧔2008㧕‫⚗ޟ‬੎⸃᳿‫ޔ‬ᐔ๺᭴▽‫ޔ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅᡰេʊ㐿⊒໧㗴ߣߒߡߩ⻉஥㕙‫ࡢ⎇ࠫࠕޡޠ‬
࡯࡞࠼࡮࠻࡟ࡦ࠼‫ޢ‬No.158 2008 ᐕ 11 ᦬ pp.20-22.
Carment, David, et al. (2008) Determinants of State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An
Assessment Based on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project, Research Paper No.
2008/46, United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research,
April 2008.
Collier, Paul (2007) The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What can be Done
About It, Oxford University Press.
FASID㧔2008㧕‫ޟޡ‬⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߩ㐿⊒ᚢ⇛‫⎇ޠ‬ⓥႎ๔ᦠ‫ߣࡦ࡚ࠪ࡯࠯࡝ࡃ࡯ࡠࠣޔޢ‬࿖㓙㐿⊒⎇ⓥ‫ޔ‬
102
ᐔᚑ 19 ᐕᐲᄖോ⋭ᆔ⸤⎇ⓥ‫⽷ޔ‬࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙㐿⊒㜞╬ᢎ⢒ᯏ᭴.
Gadir Ali, A. A et al. (2005) “Sudan’s Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long?”, Understanding
Civil War, Volume 1: Africa, edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, The World Bank.
Iyob, Ruth and G. M. Khadiagala (2006) Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, International Peace
Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Johnson, Douglas H. (2004)The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Second Impression, The
International African institute in association with James Currey, Indiana University Press,
Fountain Publisher and East African Educational Publishers.
Kevane, Michael (2004) Understanding Sudan: An Introduction, paper prepared for “The Sudan Course”
organized by Rift Valley Institute on 7-12 May 2006.
Khadiagala, Gilbert M. (2008) Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility, Africa Program
Working Paper Series, October 2008, International Peace Institute.
Large, Daniel (2008) Sudan’s Foreign Relations with Asia: China and the Politics of “looking East”,
Paper 158, Institute for Security Studies, February 2008.
OECD/DAC (2007) Fragile States: Policy commitment and Principles for Good International
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.
Patrick, S. and K. Brown (2007) Greater than the Sum of Its parts?: Assessing “Whole of Government”
Approaches to Fragile States, International Peace Academy.
Prendergast, J. and R. Winter (2008) Democracy: A Key to Peace in Sudan, Strategy Briefing Paper #10,
The project to end genocide and crimes against humanity (enough), January 2008.
Rice, Susan E. and S. Patrick (2008) Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, Foreign Policy,
The Brookings Institution.
Stiansen, E and M. Kevane (1998) Kordofan Invaded: Peripheral Incorporation and Social
Transformation in Islamic Africa, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and
Asia, Volume 63, Brill.
Thomas, Edward (2009) Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive peace
Agreement, A Chatham House Report, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.
U.S. Department of State (2008) Background Note: Sudan, Profile, Bureau of African Affairs, July 2008,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm.
UNOCHA (2006) “History of Sudan”, Information uploaded in the UN Sudan Information Gateway,
http://www.unsudanig.org/sudan/index.php?fid=history, February 2006.
USAID (2005) Fragile States Strategy, January 2005.
USAID (2005) Strategy Statement 2006-08, Sudan, December 2005.
103
╙ 5 ┨ ࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ㧦ᕆㅦߥ⴮ㅌ߆ࠄߩᓳ⥝߳ߩዷᦸ
Chapter 5 Zimbabwe - Prospects for Restoration After Rapid Declineࠠࡖࠨ࡝ࡦ㨯ࡑ࠴ࡦࠟ࠙࠲㧔᡽╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㧕
Catherine Machingauta (GRIPS)1
㧔ⷐ⚂㧕
ࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߢߪ 1990 ᐕઍᓟඨ߆ࠄ‫ޔ‬഍⊛ߥ⚻ᷣ␠ળᖱ൓ߩᖡൻ߇ㅴࠎߢ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬ෂᯏ⊛ߥ⁁
ᴫߦἄߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ᧄޕ‬Ⓜߢߪ‫ߩߘޔ‬ਥߥේ࿃ߣߥࠆࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍ᣿ࠄ߆ߦߔࠆߣߣ
߽ߦ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄࠍ฽߼࿖㓙ࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߩኻᔕࠍ࡟ࡆࡘ࡯ߒ‫ᦨޔ‬ᓟߦࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߩ⣀ᒙᕈࠍᤚ
ᱜߔࠆߚ߼ߩᣇ╷ࠍᬌ⸛ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
ᧄⓂߢߪห࿖ߩ⣀ᒙᕈ߇ਥߦ 2 ߟߩⷐ࿃ߦ᜚ࠆߣಽᨆߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ ╙ޕ‬1 ߦ࿖ౝߩ᡽ᴦ⊛࡮
ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ໧㗴‫ ╙ޔ‬2 ߦ೨⠪ߦ⿠࿃ߔࠆ࿖㓙㐿⊒ࡄ࡯࠻࠽࡯ߣߩ㑐ଥᖡൻߢ޽ࠆ‫ࡃࡦࠫޕ‬
ࡉࠛߦ߅ߌࠆ᡽ᴦ㗔ၞߪ⁛┙એ᧪‫ࠞ࡝ࡈࠕ࡮ࠛࡉࡃࡦࠫޔ‬᳃ᣖห⋖ᗲ࿖ᚢ✢㧔ZANU-PF㧕
ߦࠃࠆ৻ౄ⁛ⵙ೙ߦࠃߞߡᡰ㈩ߐࠇߡ߈ߚ‫ޕ‬หౄߪ߹ߚ㊁ౄߦኻߒ‫ޔ‬࿖ァ࡮⼊ኤࠍ↪޿ߚ
᥸ജ⊛࿶ജࠍᐲ‫⚿ߩߘޔ޿ⴕޘ‬ᨐ‫⼏ޔ‬ળ߿ቭ௥ᯏ᭴ߥߤࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛߩ౏⊛ᯏ㑐ߪ⪺ߒߊ᡽
ᴦ⊛೑ᮭߦᏀฝߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬᡽ᐭߩᳪ⡯߿ቭ௥ᯏ᭴ߦ࿖᳃߳ߩ౏⊛ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬࠍឭଏߔࠆ⢻
ജ߇ਲߒ޿ߎߣߦࠃࠅ⚻ᷣߪ⎕✋ߒ‫ޔ‬࿖᳃ߩ↢ᵴ᳓Ḱߪᷓೞߦᖡൻߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
☨࿖ߦࠃࠆ⚻ᷣ೙ⵙភ⟎߿࿖㓙ࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߦࠃࠆេഥߩ೙㒢ߩߚ߼⪺ߒ޿⽷᡽ਇ⿷ߦ
㒱ߞߚ᡽ᐭߪㅢ⽻⊒ⴕᮭߩㆊᐲߥⴕ૶ߦォߓ‫⚻ߔ߹ߔ߹ޔ‬ᷣࠍᖡൻߐߖ‫ࡈࡦࠗ࡯ࡄࠗࡂޔ‬
࡟࡯࡚ࠪࡦࠍ᜗߈‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭ⥄りߩᱜ⛔ᕈ߇ំࠄ޿ߢ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
೙ⵙភ⟎ߩ✭๺ߩዷᦸ߇⷗ࠄࠇߥ޿ਛߢ‫ޔ‬᡽ᐭߪ᡽ᴦᡷ㕟ߩታᣉߢߪߥߊਛ࿖ߣߩㅪ៤
ᒝൻࠍ࿑ࠆേ߈㧔”Look East”᡽╷㧕ߐ߃⷗ߖߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߦࠃࠆኻࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ㐿⊒េഥߪ⃻
࿷‫ޔ‬ᛛⴚදജߣ࿖ㅪࠍㅢߓߚੱ㆏ᡰេࠍਛᔃߦታᣉߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ߇‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ࿁ᓳࠍⷞ㊁ߦ౉ࠇ
ߚࠛࡀ࡞ࠡ࡯߿㋶ᬺ࡮ㄘᬺ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯߳ߩᡰេᒝൻ߇ᅢ߹ߒ޿‫৻ޕ‬ᣇࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ᡽ᐭ⥄り߽
࿖ౝߩฦ᡽ౄ߿Ꮢ᳃ㇱ㐷‫ޔ‬ධㇱࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ㐿⊒౒ห૕㧔SADC㧕ߣߩㅪ៤ࠍㅢߓߡࠫࡦࡃࡉࠛ
ߩಽᮭൻࠍㅴ߼‫ޔ‬࿯࿾㐿ᜏߩផㅴߦࠃߞߡ㘩♳↢↥ߩะ਄ࠍ࿑ࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
5-1 Introduction
Zimbabwe gained full independence from Britain in 1980. The economy was fairly more
advanced than other Sub-Saharan Africa countries, though characterized by racial inequality brought
by colonial rule - a situation that compelled the incoming political leadership to channel expenditure
towards improving education, health and adjusting pay policy to make wealth redistribution more
equitable.
Since 1980, Zimbabwe received ODA from donors including the World Bank, IMF, European
1
Masters Student at the National Graduate Institute For Policy Studies (GRIPS) Aug, 2007-Mar,2009
104
Commission, USAID, DFID and Japan, Sweden (SIDA).ODA increased from 3.8% of GDP in 1990
up to 10.9% GDP in 2005 (US$367m in ODA) but given unsuccessful policy reform and critical
policies that drew international condemnation, aid focus significantly shifted from development
assistance towards humanitarian assistance and human rights & democratic governance, through non
state agents.
Consequentially, the Zimbabwean economy deteriorated, from being a promising Sub-Saharan
economy endowed with abundant land for agriculture, regarded as the bread-basket of Southern Africa,
endowed with minerals including chrome, tin, gold and platinum, and a society with one of the highest
adult literacy rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (98% youth and 89% adult [UNICEF,], to become the fastest
shrinking economy outside a war zone at a rate of -6.1% (UNSD, 2007) barely 20 years after
independence. From 2003 to 2007, per capita GDP declined from USD387 to USD159 and public debt
as of 2007 estimates amounted to 218.2% of GDP. According to World-wide governance indicators,
Zimbabwe has the third largest decline in government effectiveness2, after Ivory Coast and Sierra
Leone, over the period 1996-2004. Following these events, Zimbabwe has been classified by World
Bank as a fragile state, by Fund for Peace, as a failed state, and by the US as one of the six ‘Outposts of
Tyranny3’.
Zimbabwe’s downturn follows strained international relations, difficult dialogue between the
government and donors regarding critical policy decisions, as well as deterioration of internal
governance. This report aims to assess the core issues responsible for Zimbabwe’s current challenges,
actions taken by donors to assist Zimbabwe and how aid can be more effectively applied in addressing
challenged states like Zimbabwe. The report assesses factors determining policy choice and
implementation, beginning with the political structure and system, followed by brief policy analysis
and an analysis of what makes the country fragile, then examines strategies aid agencies have used to
reduce fragility, and necessary ways to improve them.
5-2 Political Structure
Zimbabwe’s political system is a parliamentary democracy, with a bicameral parliament. The
African Elections Database 2007 describes the system as a ‘restricted democracy’, and the Freedom
House country report 2008 rates the society as suppressed.
President Robert, G. Mugabe, formerly Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister, was nominated to take over
from retired President Banana in 1987, and after constitutional amendments incorporated the Prime
Ministerial post into the presidency so that the position of executive president combined roles of head
of state, head of government and commander in chief, authorizing the president to appoint the Police
2
See Appendix 1
As well as Iran, Myanmar, Cuba and Belarus
[http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/powell18.12161.html]
3
105
Commissioner, Defense force commander, Attorney General, Permanent Secretary and their deputies,
as well as cabinet ministers and 30 members of parliament, judges, executive heads of ministries and
ambassadors. The constitutional amendment of 1987 also provided that presidential prerogatives
cannot be challenged in court.4 Thus, directly elected by popular vote for a 6 year term, the President
has been re-elected in 1990, 1996 and 20025. The Government comprises the President, two Vice
Presidents, a 26 ministry cabinet as of 2003, each with a deputy minister and 8 provincial governors, a
House of Assembly comprising 210 constituencies and a sixty member senate.6
Due to political power imbalance in government, the political system has been be labeled a
particracy7, (as opposed to a democracy) i.e. the omnipresence of an all embracing character of a party
in power with no contesters or regulators. In 2005 72% was ZANU Pf in the house of assembly and
89% in Senate. Opposition has generally been weak until the emergence of the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, which became the parliamentary majority in 2008. The
Presidential vote result prompted power sharing talks involving South African President Thabo Mbeki
and Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) which led to a constitutional amendment
introducing the Post of Prime Minister for opposition leader Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai.
Shortcomings of Particracy are that it leaves room for the creation of an environment conducive
for corruption and pork barrel politics, where policies, projects and legislation are designed with
personal benefit in mind, and much less concern towards their impact on economic development and
service delivery. Longstanding political ambitions for a one party have contributed to the firm grasp
on power and patronage politics, channeling public resources more toward vote buying activities
rather than economically beneficial activities.
Beasley and Kudamatsu,(2007) describe the Zimbabwean political system as no longer
democratic, but autocratic, where instead of relying on the electorate to stay in power, the government
now relies on key ally groups referred to as the ‘selectorate’, which could be the defense forces, police
or close allies within the political party (Beasley, 2007; de Mesquita et.al. 2002) Political leadership
may thus find it more attractive to allocate resources towards provision of private goods to the smaller
selectorate group as an incentive to keep the leadership in power, as opposed to allocating resources
towards provision of public goods to the mass electorate. Such institutional political arrangements
affect public administration and the type of policies that leaders pursue.
Lastly, the important role of the judiciary as the cornerstone of a democratic nation has to be
4
Chikuhwa,2004 A Crisis of Governance , Chipungu,L.Governance in Zimbabwe
5
(African Elections Database, 2007).
The Senate is the Upper chamber of the country’s bicameral parliament. Disagreements on the
reintroduction of the senate in 2005 led to the split of the major opposition party MDC, with one party
led by Morgan Tsvangirai and another led by Arthur Mutambara,set to be Prime Minister and deputy
Prime Minister respectively, after successful coalition government talks.
6
7
See Zwizwai et.al (1999)
106
seriously considered. The doctrine of separation of powers between the Judiciary, Legislature and the
State, serves as the primary constitutional guard against the mutation of the State into a dictatorship,
and its applicability in Zimbabwe has of late been compromised.
Unclear as it is, whether the Zimbabwean political system resembles democracy, particracy or
autocracy, the effect on governance, particularly relating to policy direction and implementation,
public service provision and accountability to the electorate in Zimbabwe, has not been favorable for
Zimbabwe and its economy. The main challenges to policy are explained below, with the aid of two
selected policy reforms that made a huge impact on Zimbabwe’s economy, relative to other policies
that followed.
5-3 Economic Policy Design, Implementation and Reform Process
In general, formulation of policies including monetary, fiscal and development related policies
have not always followed a uniform procedure, but the following common challenges exist;
a.
Empirical studies by Zwizwai et.al in 1999 show that selection criteria for beneficiaries of
certain policies were either heavily influenced by political or ethnic considerations.
b. Research work is mostly government initiated, but results are not fully utilized.
c.
Preferential bias towards foreign technocrats/policy consultants to local consultants even in
cases where local consultants are better placed.
d. Policies designed with the policy maker’s personal interests in mind
e.
Insufficient consultation among ministries and stakeholders during policy formulation and
refinement (Policies presented for discussion within short notice of becoming policy),
resulting in lack of commitment to policy implementation and strained working
relationships among ministries and government agencies under their control8.
f.
Limited consensus building among stakeholders to create national ownership of policies and
programs and disparities between policy design and implementation.
The case below describes events surrounding the implementation of the IMF led Economic
Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), focusing on how lack of policy ownership and dedication to
policy implementation, as well as pursuance of political and personal interests contributed to reform
failure.
An example is Operation Sunrise 1(August 2006), a surprise currency reform implemented by the
Central Bank Governor that gave deadlines for the public to deposit their money, set to trap money
launderers including those in other ministries. Relations between the Central Bank and other
ministries have been strained from thereon.
8
107
Case 1: ESAP 1992-1995
ESAP was introduced in 1990 by the Ministry of Economic Development, to improve annual
economic growth from a previous average of 4% to 5% by 1995, and promote foreign investment,
industrial development as well as employment creation. The desired outcome was not realized however.
Numerous job losses resulted and the cost of living increased, as well as poverty rates and HIV/AIDS
infection rates. Adult life expectancy declined from 56yrs to 37yrs from 1990-2004 (IFPRI,).Real GDP
growth rate declined from 4.5% between 1981 and 1990 to 1.1% between 1998 and 1999 (WB OED,
2004).Furthermore, the 1992 drought reduced agricultural output and worsened the outcome.
The reforms required government to liberalize trade and the exchange rate, as well as privatize
parastatals, to reduce government burden and solve the government’s fiscal problems, but Chikuhwa
(2004) describes how top government officials and cabinet ministers scurried to ‘make a killing before
privatization’ as government property was sold at give away prices. Though the privatization was meant to
raise money to solve the government’s fiscal problems, it only raised $7.1 billion of a budgeted $ 22billion.
Zwizwai, Kambudzi and Mauwa (IDRC) attributed the failure to partial implementation of policies
and non formulation of necessary policies. World Bank OED attributed reform failure to inadequate fiscal
reform (the civil service and wage bill had remained high even after being cut from 46% to 39% of GDP
between 1989 and 1994) and the impact external shocks, particularly the 1992 drought(OED,1996).
Case 2 shows how disparity between policy implementation plan, inadequate consideration of
technocrats’ advice and precedence of personal and political interests over national interests
contributed to economic decline.
Case 2: The Land Reform Policy
Following numerous job losses, high cost of living and social discomfort after ESAP, discontentment
towards the government emerged. War veterans demanded financial compensation, and land for taking
part in the liberation war. Land had been unevenly distributed at independence, with the white population
who comprised about 1% of the population owning about 70% of the arable land, and the remaining black
population squeezed on the remaining 30% of the land. The land redistribution process was overdue and
had made little progress since independence, and given the social unrest that was brewing under harsh
economic conditions; the government fast tracked the program, ahead of parliamentary elections in 2000,
gaining political support from smallholder farmers and war veterans in the process. Redistribution plans
were laid out with technical support to the inception from the UNDP (UNDP,1999).Two resettlement
models A1(for 160,000 small holder farmers) and A2 (for 51,000 native Zimbabwean commercial farmers)
were presented, with laid down application procedures. However, the program derailed as ‘war veterans
led a violent land-grabbing spree with unofficial but subtle government support. The most productive
farms became property of elite politicians, and/or war veterans with many becoming underutilized due to
108
lack of farming equipment.
Agricultural output dropped by 51%, real GDP fell by 7.5 % in 2001, and by approximately 6% in
2006 and 2007. Zimbabwe’s balance of payments problem worsened, following closure of most industries,
and became heavily in need of foreign currency. Trade flows with the EU, FDI and ODA sharply declined
with Zimbabwe’s international image.
Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth in 2002 and subsequently withdrew in 2003. In
total, 172 ZANU Pf senior stakeholders to date, including the executive, were slapped with targeted
sanctions and travel bans from Britain and EU countries, on counts of violation of rule of law and declining
good governance. Failure to repay arrears in 2004 led to withdrawal of World Bank and IMF support. With
no access to international capital, the government resorted to local but hyperinflationary sources of capital.
㪈㪇㪇㪇
㪏㪇㪇
㪍㪇㪇
Zimbabwe before and after the Land
㪋㪇㪇
㪙㪼㪽㫆㫉㪼
㪘㪽㫋㪼㫉
㪉㪇㪇
㪇
㪝㪛㪠
Reform
㪝㫆㫉㪼㫏 㪙㪦㪧
㪩㪼㫊㪼㫉㫍㪼㫊 㪧㫆㫊㫀㫋㫀㫆㫅
㩿㪻㪼㪽㫀㪺㫀㫋㪀
Data Source; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
5-4 Causes of Zimbabwe’s fragility
Since the fast tracking of the land reform in the country, relations between Zimbabwe and the
international community have been tense, characterized by mistrust and difficult dialogue between
international development partners and government. This has been compounded by donors’
suspension of development assistance; Zimbabwe’s restricted access to international capital due to
bad credit rating, and domestic abuse of scarce public resources.
Firstly, whilst donors accuse the Zimbabwean government of bad governance and failure to
implement poverty alleviation policies, the government accuses donors of partisanship and
withdrawal of much needed aid to rescue people from the poverty trap. The misunderstanding
intensified after the donors condemned the implementation of the land reform program, for which
government had strong historical and political justifications. The EU delegation to Zimbabwe views
the standard definition of the term fragile as inapplicable to the Zimbabwean situation, citing instead
109
that Zimbabwe fits more under the ‘countries under difficult partnerships’ classification9.
Secondly, internal issues of rapidly deteriorating governance, accountability, democracy and
government effectiveness have compromised the government-people relationship, and these problems
have suffered limited international interest due to restricted local and international media coverage.
Zimbabwe rates poorly in international governance indicators 10 ranking in the bottom 5 when
compared to other developing economies.
Figure 1: Government Relationship with the Public, and International Development Partners
Functional relationship
Strained relationship
5-4-1 Challenges in Zimbabwe’s Governance
The government-people bond has been strained due to public dissatisfaction with the government’s
public administration and economic management. Levy et.al (2004)’s explanation of characteristic
trends in African governance, via ‘The Governance Diamond,’ points out how public administration,
as well as economic performance and quality of governance are part of a much more complex
interdependent system that involves Political Interests
11
, Formal Political Institutions 12 ,
Bureaucracy 13 and The Economy 14 Prevalent characteristics of Zimbabwean governance are
9
EC Draft Progress Report on Principles of Good International Engagement (2005)
10
See Zimbabwe CPIA and Fund for Peace Failed States Index
11
Comprises the social and class structure of civil society
12 Comprises both the constitutional structure of the state (legislative structure and oversight; judicial
independence; structure of decentralized, intergovernmental relationships; rules governing political
representation) and the formal representative political leadership that results from the constitutional
structure
13 The public employees and their associated responsibility (under direction and oversight of formal
political leaders) for formulating policy, regulating economic activity and delivering services
14 Comprises the society’s productive factors and their associated levels of economic activity(Levy et.al.
2004)
110
highlighted in bold below, whilst weak interactions are shown by dashed arrows.
Figure 2
Bureaucracy
3
2
Formal
Political
Interests
7
1
Economy
6
5
Political
Interests
4
The Governance Diamond;
Source: Levy, B. (2004)
Relationship 1:
Political Interests
Formal Political Institutions
How powerful institutions seek to influence formal institutions, not only through legitimate
influence seeking, but also through efforts to reshape to their advantage the structure of
formal institutions themselves
The nature of the political system as explained in the political background bears on policy choice.
The challenge is when political interests are prioritized over developmental projects and policies,
resulting in patronage and manipulation of legislation and institutions to suit political interests and
eliminate opposition.
Electoral laws are subject to executive control; the Electoral Act, Article 15(2)The office of the
Registrar General, is primarily responsible for conducting elections, but Article 158 specifically
empowers the President to suspend or amend any provision of the Electoral Act and to alter any time
period specified by the Electoral Act. (Electoral Act, Chikuhwa, 2004).
Legislation has been manipulated to ban NGOs campaigning for democracy, but viewed as
partisan, as well as media restriction on similar grounds. The voting process in itself faces limitations
and is prone to abuse15 and followed by voter intimidation, as evidenced by a reign of terror known as
Operation Mavhotera Papi ‘where did you vote,’ where urban residents were assaulted by for voting
for opposition after the March 2008 elections, and an extract from a presidential speech , citing
15
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2008/jul/04/election.zimbabwe]
111
unwillingness to respect the election outcome in the event of defeat ‘…we are not going to give up our
country because of a mere X, how can a pen fight a gun?’, and in 2000, ‘...we have degrees in
violence....’ (The Times, June 17, 2008). Public protests and demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction
to these conditions have been minimized by intimidation and legislation that prohibits public
gatherings and allows police to use any means possible to disperse people. (Public Order and Security
Act, 2002 –amended in 2007)
Zimbabwean lawyer, Msipa, L based in London writes, in an article entitled When Politicians
Employ Judges (2004), that ‘Judges, Magistrates and Prosecutors are reminded constantly to tread
carefully as the law, is a product of a political process called legislation,…Judges are ultimately
appointed by politicians and their removal from office is decided by the same politicians’. As such, in
2001, a panel of five judges including the Chief Justice opposed to the land grabs was forced to resign;
to be replaced by a politically biased panel (afrol.com, March, 2001).
These are just a few examples of how governance is influenced by political interests.
Relationships 2 and 5;
Formal Political Institutions
Bureaucracy; Political Interests
Bureaucracy
Agency relationship between political principals and their bureaucratic agents. Politicians have
the authority both to set the policy, regulatory, and service delivery goals of bureaucratic actors
and to monitor their performance in relation to these goals.
Formal political institutions’ failure to constrain politics enabled political interests to influence
bureaucracy directly (relationship 5) and indirectly in some instances, via the formal political
institutions (relationship 2), as evidenced by the use of police and army against political opposition.
Non-merit based hiring and promotion within the civil service, as well as declining retention
ability owing to low salaries in the hyperinflationary environment, has led to low worker morale,
negatively affecting service delivery and performance monitoring and effective implementation of
development related policies. The brain drain of mainly skilled teachers, doctors, accountants and
nurses to provide cheap labor in neighboring countries and abroad. Zimbabwe is currently the number
3 provider of UK’s expatriate health personnel after India and Nigeria (Schubert, 2003). Remaining
workers at both junior and senior level turn to rent seeking activities to supplement income, resulting
in uncontrolled slow and inefficient service delivery, absenteeism, and bottlenecks becoming a regular
feature in civil service.
Relationship 3; Bureaucracy
economy
The effects on the economy if bureaucratic decisions and actions in relation to policies,
regulation and service delivery
The lack of policy appreciation and subsequent partial or non implementation of policies, has had
negative impact on the economy, e.g. policies meant to benefit agriculture by availing diesel for
112
farmers at subsidized prices are taken advantage of by custodians who distribute the benefit among
themselves by selling the diesel at much higher prices, neglecting agriculture. Rent-seeking activities
and weak monitoring mechanisms within the bureaucracy have generally increased the cost of doing
business i.e. transaction costs, creating inefficiencies and an unfavorable business environment.
Inability to retain labor in the hyperinflationary environment has resulted in severe brain drain that has
compromised provision of accounting, health and education services, thus proving to be a major
setback to the economy.
Possible Impact of Seigniorage
Some natural resource endowed countries rely on resource revenue such that they cease to be
accountable to the public regarding tax expenditure. For other countries, aid takes the place of
taxpayer funds and the government ceases to be accountable. In Zimbabwe, the Central Bank prints
money for the government to meet its expenses, in addition to taxpayers’ money. This may also have a
similar impact on accountability.
Ideal Situation –Virtuous Cycle
According to Levy, a virtuous cycle can be realized if formal political institutions constrain
politics, check the extralegal activities by political interests and govern bureaucracies such that
bureaucracies are accountable for service delivery and make the business environment favorable for
investors. A diversified economy provides a variety of business activities such that lobbying efforts by
the dispersed interests offset each other. The economy thus becomes characterized by a strong private
sector and a productive private economy.
The role of a good leadership chosen by the people and accountable to the people, removal of
restrictions on democracy and media, as well as an independent judiciary, can not be undermined in
driving Zimbabwe to a long lasting exit from fragility and sustained development.
These factors will shift Zimbabwe from the current characteristic trend of decline shown below,
to sustainable long term growth.
113
Figure 3
Source: Governance Matters 2008: World Governance Indicators, 1996-2007
Figure 4 - Core Five State Institutions and Their Condition in Zimbabwe
Leadership
Military
Police
Judiciary
Civil Service
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Source: The Fund for Peace, 2007
114
An analysis made by the Fund for Peace for the year 2007 shows that Zimbabwe’s five major
institutions are all rated poor as indicated above, and this is in sync with the governance indicators in
figure 1 above.
5-5 What major Donors Are Doing to Make Zimbabwe Less Fragile
5-5-1 USAID, DFID, DANIDA and EU
Due to the difficulty in dialogue between government and donors, the beginning of the
millennium saw a significant number of donors cut engagements with government, abandon projects
and resort to diverting aid resources to civic nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations so
as to provide humanitarian aid (tackling HIV/AIDS and improving food security), direct support
projects in micro enterprise, health, education, human rights promotion as well as democratization and
anti corruption.
This approach has been taken by major donors like UK Department for International
Development
(DFID),European
Commission(EC),United
States
Agency
for
International
Development (USAID), Swedish International development Agency (SIDA), and Danish
International Development Agency (DANIDA) to name a few.
Civic organizations supported by these donors include the National Constitutional Assembly
(NCA), Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), Zimbabwe Red Cross Society and Center for
Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA) among others.
In addition to that and relating to the governance issue, the European Union, in 2002, took
restrictive measures against the ruling elite in the form of targeted sanctions that consist visa ban and
freeze of assets within the EU. These measures have been extended six times and remain in effect until
February 2009. To date, 172 elites are under targeted EU sanctions. Zimbabwe is ineligible to benefit
from the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) because of weak governance, and the
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, enacted by the US government, restricts
assistance to Zimbabwe ‘until certain conditions are satisfied and to support democratic and economic
transition to Zimbabwe’.
However, the NGO approach has had its limitations because of the challenge it poses to
government legitimacy by excluding the government in donor activities. Beneficiaries from NGO
activities have been victims of political violence for not being government/ruling party loyalists. The
government has taken this approach to be politically biased and as a result government has strictly
controlled donor funded NGO activities, to the extent of banning all NGO activities, particularly those
working to improve governance, and insisting on centralized control of donor resources The ban left
some people vulnerable to hunger as some of the NGOs used to provide food aid and was later
partially lifted for NGOs providing humanitarian aid. Thus donor activities in Zimbabwe have become
limited to humanitarian aid, which, though highly appreciated, does not provide a sustainable solution
115
to Zimbabwe’s woes.
Targeted sanctions may work as far as controlling abuse of state resources, but they have also
created a sense of hostility towards the international development community in the West, such that
chances of reaching a consensus with government are reduced. Instead, the Zimbabwe government
resorted to new development partners, under a new slogan known as the “Look East Policy’. These
include China, Iran, Malaysia and Korea.
Efforts have been made by some donors to engage government, but the difficult relationship
between international donors and government gets in the way. An example is the USAID which, since
2002, worked with the Zimbabwean Parliament in a Democracy and Governance Program, to
strengthen parliament’s capacity to be responsive to the people it serves, enhancing public
participation, empowering Parliament to hold itself and the Executive accountable. The program
aimed to strengthen portfolio committees, by providing needed technical assistance for the analysis of
bills, statutory instruments, and the national budget. The program facilitated the organization of public
hearings and contributed to encouraging public participation. Favorable results from the program were
noted in the form of the heightened assertiveness of committee chairpersons on both sides of the aisle,
and in their increased willingness to challenge bills that transgress the principles of good law.
However, in April 2007, without consulting the Members of Parliament, the Speaker advised USAID
that further cooperation was no longer desired. Since that time, assistance has shifted toward helping
civil society interface with the Parliament (USAID, 2008).
5-5-2 OECD-DAC & EU: The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile
States
In view of the possible harm to ordinary citizens that aid may bring, the OECD-DAC introduced
the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 16 , a set of ten principles
complementing commitments set in the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness, and in general, aiming
to maximize gain and minimize unintended harm that might befall a country due to international
engagement. They aim to help reformed fragile states to build effective and legitimate state institutions,
as well as engage productively with the people to achieve sustained development in the long term
(OECD-DAC, 2007).
Within the Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, the EU funds a section that serves to collect
information on the ground, on behalf of EU. Recommendations are made from that unit to EU,
enabling the EU to make informed decisions that meet the needs of the people in the country.
Zimbabwe is one of the ten pilot countries, selected by donor countries to apply introduced by the
16 OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf
116
OECD-DAC, among other countries; Sudan, Nepal, DRC, Yemen, Somalia, Guinea Bissau, Solomon
Islands and Haiti. Since 2005, the EC has been the facilitator for the Zimbabwe Pilot. The EC aims to
support fragile states in a proactive way, by addressing the root causes and dealing with the negative
outcomes of fragility, and accordingly, the EC Zimbabwe delegation’s major thrust is in going beyond
the impasse by exploiting all available means to improve dialogue, particularly relating to governance
and MDGs, between the Zimbabwean government and the international donor community. The
success depends on the Zimbabwe government’s willingness towards improved relations and donor
coordination.
5-5-3 Japan
The Japanese government takes a government to government approach that is no longer practiced
by afore-mentioned donors. Trough the official implementing agency of Japanese aid -JICA, Japan's
development assistance has focused more on the four priority sectors for development assistance to
Zimbabwe that were agreed on between the Zimbabwean and Japanese governments in 1998. These
are (a) Improvement of business environment conditions for promotion of industry for income
generation to afford every Zimbabwean access to good employment and entrepreneur opportunities,
(b) Improvement of health and medical care, (c) Promotion of agriculture in communal and
resettlement areas and (d) Environmental conservation including water supply.
Under these four sectors, Japan has contributed towards infrastructure development projects
including the Chirundu Bridge construction and rural electrification, made contributions towards
humanitarian assistance, the latest one being donation of resources for water treatment to curb the
cholera crisis. JICA dispatches volunteers and experts in various fields such as health, education, small
business enterprise, energy conservation, telecommunication, rural electrification, agriculture and
construction since 1989.However, most were recalled following election related political instability.
Japan has also deployed of election observers in the 2000 and 2002 Presidential and Parliamentary
elections in support of good governance and democracy. Japanese assistance is also channeled
towards human capacity development by way or training government officials in various fields so as
to improve government performance and effectiveness in provision of public services.
Thus Japan’s approach has been to provide physical infrastructure, capacity building at national
and grassroots level, and support for democratic elections as well as humanitarian assistance
5-5-4 The World Bank and IMF
The World Bank and IMF suspended lending to Zimbabwe following Zimbabwe’s failure to pay
arrears, and wait upon Zimbabwe to organize its governmental challenges before they can assist
Zimbabwe financially.
117
5-6 Actions Taken by the African Community-SADC, AU, AfDB and NEPAD
5-6-1 SADC, AU, AfDB and NEPAD
The Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) and the African Union (AU) have taken a
‘quiet diplomacy’ approach to Zimbabwe, as well as South Africa and Uganda at the UN Security
Council. As such, SADC monitors the political and security situation in Zimbabwe, deploying election
observers during parliamentary and presidential elections. SADC appointed a mediator, then South
African President Thabo Mbeki, in efforts for the two rival political parties in Zimbabwe to form a
unity government, as a possible solution to Zimbabwe’ political crisis. In addition, SADC has also
mobilized resources to provide the Zimbabwean government with humanitarian aid. The Africa
Development Bank (AfDB) has no activity in Zimbabwe because the World Bank suspended loan
assistance for Zimbabwe.
The New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is designed to redress
challenges facing the African continent. It promotes good governance as a fundamental obligation for
‘peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development’, and proposes that good
governance can be attained using 6 ways, namely, Administrative and civil service reform;
Strengthening parliamentary oversight; Promoting participatory decision-making; Adopting effective
measures to combat corruption and embezzlement; Undertaking judicial reforms; and The Peer
Review Mechanism17.
However, with these approaches, Zimbabwe’s governance and economic situation continuously
decline. If successful, the benefits of quiet diplomacy may end political tension, but this may not be a
sufficient solution to guarantee accountability and control of state resources, as well as improved
relations between Zimbabwe and the international donor community.
5-6-2 The Look East Policy- China & Iran and its impact on Governance
Following aid suspension and a weakened relationship between Zimbabwe and the Western
donor community, the Zimbabwean government redirected its foreign policy towards the Asia,
fostering diplomatic ties with new development partners, mainly China and Iran. In 2005, the Iran
government became a promising source of finance for the Zimbabwe government whose access to
international capital was minimal. In 2006, Zimbabwe signed an aid deal with China and adopted a
slogan known as the ‘Look East’ Policy. Zimbabwe holds the world’s second largest platinum deposits
after South Africa, uranium deposits in the Zambezi river valley, diamond deposits, high quality
chrome, gold and other metals that it can exploit to improve power supply and the economic situation.
Iran has interests in uranium enrichment for nuclear power supplies and China has interests in chrome
17 The Peer Review Mechanism is a voluntary, self monitoring mechanism for African States, funded
entirely by African Resources and intended for African States to lever themselves out of the cycle of
poverty and instability by practicing good governance, democracy and human rights, and submitting to
periodic peer reviews (NEPAD Action Plans,2005)
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and platinum. As such, the policy enables some natural resource diplomacy to take place as Zimbabwe
is supplied with loans, electronic equipment from Iran and farm implements from China.
Impact on Governance
The impact of targeted sanctions imposed by Western donor partners, and conditional lending to
squeeze the Zimbabwean government into improving governance is highly reduced and government
has no push to change. Whilst Zimbabwe sympathizers and newly found development partners
provide loans and farm implements, the bulk of the resources, due to limited accountability, remains in
the hands of the elite and fails to trickle down to the neediest. As such, the gap between the rich and the
poor in Zimbabwe grows, and the ruling elite have every incentive to remain in power.
5-7 What Japan can do to reduce fragility in Zimbabwe
In many cases, a bottom-up approach, where recommendations come from the intended
beneficiaries, can work towards improving effectiveness of development projects or other forms of
development assistance.
Given its Japan and Zimbabwe’s 4 priority areas ; (a) Improvement of business environment
conditions for promotion of industry for income generation to afford every Zimbabwean access to
good employment and entrepreneur opportunities, (b) Improvement of health and medical care, (c)
Promotion of agriculture in communal and resettlement areas and (d) Environmental conservation
including water supply, and grassroots advantage and experience in technical cooperation, Japanese
aid can improve its aid effectiveness in a variety of ways.
Figure 5
Humanitarian aid,
Promoting Governance &
democracy awareness
JAPAN
International donors
NGOs
The public
RESTRICTED
Declining governance,
accountability and
public service
provision
B
A
Government
Strong Impact of political interests on government
decisions, actions and democracy
Functional relationship
Source: Author, 2009
Regarding the first cause of fragility, the difficult dialogue between the Zimbabwean
government and international donors, Japan has maintained a government to government assistance
119
strategy, and dialogue may not be as difficult as is the case with most international donors (a situation
EC is trying to address).
Given the current contribution Japan is making to Zimbabwe’s development, Japanese aid can
take a more customized approach to Zimbabwe’s peculiar situation than taking a standard approach,
addressing critical needs so that the country escapes the poverty trap and moves towards sustainable
development. Japan can allocate its aid to physical infrastructure that can assuredly benefit the
intended people, and minimize misappropriation of funds, at the same time, promoting sustainable
growth and development in ways that are environmentally friendly. Possible ways are explained
below.
5-7-1 The Batoka Gorge Hydroelectricity Project
Following aid withdrawal, Zimbabwe has had foreign currency shortages, severely limiting the
government’s capacity to import energy. Japan could make further contribution towards Energy
production.
The Batoka Gorge Hydroelectricity Project is situated in the Zambezi Valley between Zambia
and Zimbabwe. A feasibility study was conducted in 1992, a lot of ground work has been done in
Zimbabwe, and results show that once an RCC Gravity Arch Dam is constructed and the project
completed, among other important factors, the electricity generation efficiency will be 86%, the
expected internal rate of return would be between 10-12%, and CO2 emission savings amounting to 9
million tomes per annum could be credited to the Batoka Project (Zimbabwe Ministry of Energy and
Development, 2007).
Boosting energy availability positively affects commercial business, big and small, right from the
manufacturing to the service sector. It will benefit the agriculture sector, because irrigation requires
electricity for the water pumps to function, greenhouses need electricity for illumination at night for
foreign currency earning products such as horticulture and tobacco. Availability of electricity will also
be of benefit to the mining sector, schools and hospitals, and households.
Food security is improved from the present declining situation. Bread is a significant part of the
Zimbabwean diet, second to maize, but Zimbabweans have had to forego it after wheat harvests failed
due to electric power cuts. In August 2007, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority had to implement
20 hour power cuts as it could not afford to import enough electricity to meet demand, and as a result
the winter wheat crop harvest was much less than expected. The former CEO of the Zimbabwe Grain
Marketing Board mentioned, in August 2008, that Zimbabwe requires 400 000 tonnes of wheat per
annum but forecasted that the country would hardly harvest 80 000 tonnes, due to power shortages and
lack of fertilizers. Other ways to boost energy availability would channel aid towards resuscitation the
Hwange thermal power plant and the Hwange rail system.
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The resulting energy provision is a service that cannot possibly be kept only to a small elite group
once electricity is available, and takes advantage of JICA’s experience in construction project
implementation. Emphasis would be on a Japanese company implementing the project, avoiding cases
where tenders are allocated to inefficient companies belonging to some elite members of society. The
recipient country benefits from the project, and the donor country provides contracts for its people, and
the results benefit the majority. This would also be in line with the first priority area that the Japanese
and Zimbabwean governments agreed on in 1998, on improvement of business environment
conditions, and it paves way for economic growth and development.
5-7-2 Contribution towards urban infrastructure development
To prevent health hazards such as cholera from recurring in future, close attention needs to be
given to the urban planning. High rates of rural-urban migration led to concentration in urban areas
where drainage ground infrastructure was sufficient to contain the population increase. In most cases,
this infrastructure was laid out before independence when urban expansion was not expected to be at
the current levels. As the ground infrastructure grows older, without resources to replace it, pipes
begin to burst and the risk of disease increases particularly in the concentrated urban areas, yielding
disastrous results. Again, a similar approach would have to be taken, one in which a Japanese
company controls the replacement process of old ground infrastructure in urban areas. The benefit
lasts for years and cannot be privatized. By preventing future disease outbreak, this would be in line
with the second priority area on improvement of health and medical care.
5-7-3 Assistance of Small Holder Farmers
Agriculture provides income for 60-70% of the population and the bulk of the people who rely on
agriculture practice communal agriculture. Communal agriculture takes up 2/3 of agricultural land i.e.
21.3m ha of the 33.3m ha total land area. However, as focus goes to promoting commercial agriculture
in the aftermath of the Fast Track Land Reform, communal farming tends to be neglected. Given
Japan’s comparative advantage in grassroots projects, more Japanese assistance could be focused on
the communal farmers, improving their farming techniques and working hand in hand with the
periodical agricultural show organizers, giving incentives to promote good environmentally friendly
farming practices and creativity, but achieving improved food security in the process.
Japan is also working on improving rice production in Africa; the grassroots level could be one
entry point to introduce varieties like Nerica to Zimbabwe, where rice is an accepted alternative to
maize, and it also provides a source of income for communal farmers. Commercial farmers may
choose to adopt rice production as well.
The above described ways all aim to assist the ordinary person to whom aid normally fails to
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infiltrate down to. Other donors have taken the NGO route to achieve the same goal, as previously
explained.
5-7-4 Natural Resource Diplomacy
By taking advantage of Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy, Japan can benefit from Zimbabwe’s
mineral endowment whilst providing the government with financial needs to meet the country’ s
requirements.
5-7-5 Addressing Governance
If the Japanese government so wishes to tackle the critical issue of governance in Zimbabwe,
which is a delicate issue, then once resolved, this would be one way that ensures that development
assistance that goes through government certainly benefits the least individual without being
misappropriated, and also improves the relationship between the government and the people.
Policy dialogue between Japan and Zimbabwe needs to emphasize more strongly on the
importance of good governance for development, and this message can be put across more in courses
given to government officials from developing countries in general, so that a turnaround can be
realized in the governance of developing countries in general.
At the moment, no aid coordinating unit for development assistance exists in Zimbabwe. Only
recently, a humanitarian aid coordination unit was introduced by the incoming Prime Minister. A
development assistance coordinating unit that handles donors is necessary in Zimbabwe to improve
aid effectiveness.
5-8 Conclusion
The issue of fragility in Zimbabwe is a challenging and delicate one that is causing untold
suffering to Zimbabwean citizens under limited international attention. Japan and the rest of the
international community, in providing assistance to Zimbabwe and other fragile states, need to take
customized approaches because no country is the same and no single strategy applies to all countries.
Regarding the case of Zimbabwe, the issue of governance has to be a priority issue in putting an end to
Zimbabwe’s fragility, but at the same time, dialogue with the government is important to enable
donors to provide assistance without bringing further harm to the citizens. Japan has mainly provided
technical assistance, and humanitarian aid through UN, but there is room to further assist in the energy,
mining and agriculture sectors for faster economic recovery, while Zimbabwean political parties,
citizens and the SADC Africa Development Committee (SADC) work on decentralization of power
and improving internal governance and institutions with help from other donors, and bringing more
land under agricultural production to be able to provide food for the nation.
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Appendix
Source: Governance Matters 2008: World Governance Indicators, 1996-2007
125
╙ 6 ┨ ࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕ㧦⼾߆ߐߣ⽺࿎ߩㅒ⺑
Chapter 6 Nigeria – So Rich, Yet So Poor - Looking Behind the Paradox
ࠠࡖࠨ࡝ࡦ㨯ࡑ࠴ࡦࠟ࠙࠲㧔᡽╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㧕
Catherine Machingauta1 (GRIPS)2
㧔ⷐ⚂㧕
࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕߪࠕࡈ࡝ࠞᦨᄢߩੱญࠍᜬߜ‫⼾ߩߘޔ‬ንߥ⍹ᴤ⾗Ḯߣੱ⊛⾗Ḯߣߦⵣߠߌߐ
ࠇߚ⤘ᄢߥ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߩẜ࿷⢻ജࠍ஻߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬࿖ኅ෼౉ߩ 8 ഀࠍ⍹ᴤߦଐሽߒ‫ޔ‬Ꮒ㗵ߩ㐿
⊒េഥߩฃข࿖ߢ߽޽ࠆ߽ߩߩ‫⽺ޔ‬࿎೥ᷫ‫ޔ‬ᢎ⢒‫ޔ‬ஜᐽᡷༀߩಽ㊁ߢࡒ࡟࠾ࠕࡓ㐿⊒⋡ᮡ
(MDGs)ߩ㆐ᚑߪ࿎㔍ߣ⷗ࠄࠇߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬਎⇇㌁ⴕߪ 2004 ᐕࠃࠅห࿖ࠍ⣀ᒙ࿖ኅߣಽ㘃ߒߡ
޿ࠆ‫ᧄޕ‬Ⓜߢߪ࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕߦ߅ߌࠆ⣀ᒙᕈߩⷐ࿃߇‫ޔ‬⍹ᴤ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯߳ߩᒝ޿ଐሽ‫ޔ‬ァ੐
᡽ᮭᤨߩㆊ೾୫౉㊄ߩ㄰ᷣ‫ޔ‬࿖ᐶᱦ౉ߩਇㆡಾߥ▤ℂ‫ࠬࡆ࡯ࠨ౒౏ޔ‬ឭଏߩᯏ⢻ਇో‫ޔ‬ᳪ
⡯‫ߦ․ޔ‬มᴺㇱ㐷ߦ߅ߌࠆ೙ᐲߩᒙߐ෸߮ේᴤ⾗Ḯߩ⼾ንߥ࠺࡞࠲࿾ၞߩᖱ൓ਇ቟ቯߦ޽
ࠆߣ․ቯߒߚ‫ޕ‬᡽ᐭߩᒙ޿ࠝ࡯࠽࡯ࠪ࠶ࡊߣᡷ㕟߳ߩ᡽ᴦ⊛ᗧᕁ߽࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕߩ㐿⊒ߩ
⊒ዷࠍ⪺ߒߊ㒖ኂߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
㐿⊒ࡄ࡯࠻࠽࡯ߦࠃࠆ㐿⊒េഥߪ਄⸥ߩࠃ߁ߥㅘ᣿ᕈߩૐߐ߿ࠕࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࡝࠹ࠖߩૐߐ
߆ࠄ⽷᡽ᡰេߥߤߪⴕߞߡ߅ࠄߕ‫ޔ‬ਥߣߒߡ⋥ធࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߩታᣉߩᒻᘒࠍߣࠆ߽ߩ߇
ᄙ޿‫ޕ‬ᡰេಽ㊁ߪ‫ޔ‬ਛ㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ࿖ߩ⊒ዷߦਇนᰳߥㄘᬺ߿ࠛࡀ࡞ࠡ࡯‫ޔ‬ⅣႺ‫⾏ޔ‬ᤃᛩ⾗ಽ
㊁ࠃࠅ߽‫଻ޔ‬ஜಽ㊁ߦ㓸ਛߔࠆ௑ะ߇⷗ࠄࠇࠆ‫ߣ࡯࠽࠼ޕ‬᡽ᐭ㑆ߩࡄ࡯࠻࠽࡯ࠪ࠶ࡊߩᒙ
ߐߪ‫ޔ‬ਔ⠪㑆ߦሽ࿷ߔࠆᖱႎߩ㕖ኻ⒓ᕈߦ৻ㇱ⿠࿃ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߩኻ࠽ࠗࠫࠚ࡝ࠕ㐿⊒
េഥߪߘߩᲧセఝ૏ࠍᵴ߆ߒ‫ޔ‬ᛛⴚදജ߿Ꮢ᳃␠ળᒝൻ‫ޔ‬೙ᐲᡷༀߦᵈജߔߴ߈ߛ߇‫․ޔ‬
ߦេഥࠍᦨ߽ᔅⷐߣߔࠆ࿾ၞߩᖱ൓ਇ቟ቯᕈࠍ〯߹߃‫ߦࠇߎޔ‬ኻߔࠆኻᔕ╷ࠍ᣿⏕ߦߔࠆ
ᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬
6-1 Introduction
Nigeria is one of the largest African countries both in terms of geography and demography. Its
population of about 140million people makes it the most populous African Nation. A full member of
the OPEC and current holder of the rotating chairmanship of The Economic Commission for West
African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria is also a recognized leader in regional initiatives including the
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and has made contributions to international
peace-keeping missions particularly across Africa. As such, Nigeria's success and stability are
essential to growth and stability in West Africa and the rest of the African continent.
Special Thanks to Mr Kayode. M.Olaniyan (GRIPS) for valuable contributions made during this
study
2 National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) student Sept 2007- Mar 2009
1
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Nigeria was under military dictatorship for nearly three decades, before returning to civilian
democratic rule in 1999, with the election of former Military Head of State, General Olusegun
Obasanjo. President Obasanjo led the country for 2 terms of 4 years each, before handing over power
to the incumbent president Umar Yar’Adua in 2007, who won almost 70% of the votes while
rallying against 17 other candidates from different parties in Nigeria’s first-ever civilian-civilian
democratic transition. The President heads the state and a multi party government comprising 5
political parties, and is also the Army Commander in Chief. The People’s Democratic Party, to
which the president belongs, has more that 50% seats in the National Assembly, made up of the
Senate and House of Representatives. As in a presidential system, the President exercises executive
power, the National Assembly exercises legislative power and the Supreme Court exercises judiciary
power. The country has 36 states, each with a Governor elected by popular vote but subject to
suspension by the Federal Government to be replaced with an administrator, for instance under
emergency rule.
Oil discovery in 1956 and subsequent exploitation in the 1970s made the country the sixth
largest oil producer in the world, and transforming the economy from its dependence on agricultural
exports such as palm oil, cocoa, rubber, cotton and groundnuts, to oil dependency. Since the 1970s’
petroleum boom, about 80% of the government revenue has continuously been derived from the oil
industry, making fiscal stability highly susceptible to price fluctuations on the international oil
market as well as OPEC quotas. However, the Nigerian economy has been perpetually dogged by
poor fiscal and macroeconomic policy, corruption, misallocation of oil revenues as well as conflict
over control of oil resources. These factors have contributed mostly to the poor state and slow
recursive development of the country. For instance, in spite of the resource endowment, Nigeria’s
electricity company only meets about 5% of national demand such that 60% of energy consumption
needs are met from wood and agricultural waste sources (Ministry of Energy 2008). In addition,
54.4% of the population still live below the international poverty line of $1 a day (NPC, 2006) and
65% of population is food insecure according to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture. The country is
heavily dependent on food imports, and forecasts on the world’s sixth largest oil exporting and
global gas supplying economy show a poverty incidence of 70-80% by 2030 in the absence of
effective change in development strategy (NEEDS, 2005). Resource rich as it is, Nigeria is likely to
miss many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, particularly poverty, and health
targets, but according to OECD-DAC data, on track for MDG 2 on universal primary education for
all.
On the other hand, Nigeria’s return to civilian administration also saw a rise in foreign direct
investment (FDI) from an initial 1.02% of GDP in 1986, to 3.93% of GDP in 2002 (CBN Statistical
Bulletin, 2002). Previously taken to be a non reformer, of late, new reforms in Nigeria such as the
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National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 3 , the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
(N-EITI), have responded fairly positively. However, real GDP growth has remained constrained
given the poor physical infrastructure and, overstretched social services and poor public-sector
governance. Nigeria has been designated a fragile state by the World Bank in 2004 (World Bank
IEG, 2004), implying the government is unable or unwilling to deliver public service and security
within its borders. Nigeria presents a unique case as an aid recipient; resource rich, and having an
established financial sector, and at one time even receiving more aid per capita than other developing
countries, but failing to grow. This makes it peculiarly different from other cases of aid recipients
that do not have resources and are ‘clearly’ in need of financial assistance. A different assistance
strategy is therefore necessary for Nigeria’s development.
This case study tries to identify the causes of Nigeria’s fragility, stagnated growth and
government’s non-provision of public services to citizens, despite access to vast oil resources. The
study begins with an insight into the government structure and how it distributes funds for
developmental purposes towards public service delivery and development policy, makes an
assessment of why Nigeria is fragile. It presents a review of actions taken by various international
donors to make Nigeria “less fragile”, and concludes with recommendations.
6-2 What Makes Nigeria a Fragile State?
Nigeria’s slow development has been attributed to the Dutch Disease, also known as the
natural resource curse or the paradox of plenty (Collier, 2007; Hayami and Godo, 2005), and more
recently, to a Debt Overhang, and bad fiscal and macroeconomic policy, rife corruption and poor
governance (Okonjo-Iweala, 2008; Budina, Pang and van Wijnbergen, 2006). The Government, as
well as civil society contribute to the above factors.
6-2-1 The Nigerian Case of the Dutch Disease- over reliance on Oil
A country or region characterised by the Dutch Disease tends to have an abundance of
particularly non-renewable natural resources like minerals and fuels, but achieving slower economic
growth and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources (van
Wijnbergen, 1986; Corden and Neary, 1982). Nigeria became victim to the natural resource curse
after benefiting from oil export booms at high prices during the first and second oil crises (1970s).
Oil contribution became very significant to the Nigerian economy, but was largely mismanaged,
often directed towards military expenditure as well as unsustainable investments nonetheless meant
for national development. All This resulted in excess effective demand that increased inflation. A
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) is aimed at improving the
functioning of government, supporting the private sector and enhancing the quality of life of citizens, in
line with the MDGs targets.
3
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real exchange rate appreciation caused by oil exports made agriculture and other non-oil tradeables
uncompetitive on the export and domestic markets, as imports became relatively cheaper, creating
unemployment. The growth of the petroleum industry and service sector also attracted a huge influx
of migrant job seekers from neglected rural villages to urban slums as they abandoned agriculture, to
the detriment of food security. Unfortunately, the employment capacity created by the capital
intensive oil industry and its supporting industries was inadequate to absorb the mass. Thus, in
addition to unemployment, inflation and non viability of non-oil tradeables, the Dutch disease
phenomenon gave way to a myriad of problems, in the following ways:
6-2-2 Regulation of the Petroleum Industry – Fostering Corruption
In 1973, soon after Nigeria began exporting oil, the Nigerian government, often led by
military dictatorship, regulated the petroleum industry despite institutional challenges, inefficient
checks and balances on public fund management and patronage driven appointments with limited
expertise to cope with the Dutch disease problem. To date, the Nigerian Federal Government,
through the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC)4, owns about 60% shares in the oil
industry, and generally owns majority stake in numerous joint ventures with oil companies
effectively maintaining control and regulating the oil industry.
Consequently, the government’s control and reliance of oil revenues greatly weakened
government’s reliance on taxpayer funds, undermining government accountability to the public.
Political restraints are therefore weakened in resource rich countries (Collier, 2007). According to
Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Nigerian writer, of all the countries that had black gold (oil), Nigeria was the only
country that succeeded in doing absolutely nothing with it (qtd in Meredith ,M,2006). The
government became the most lucrative employer for the mass jobseekers because of its access to oil
revenues. Patronage politics under illegitimate regimes attracted those interested in personal benefit,
to high government positions, while non merit based hiring and contract awarding to those who
could bribe government officials became part of a corrupt culture within the government,
compromising efficiency. Even worse, acts of intimidation, blackmailing and bribing of judiciary,
policy makers, implementers and decision makers, perpetuated institutional decay and impeded
national development and contributed towards reform failures. For instance, Collier (2007) describes
how the head of a legislative committee, had expected to be bribed by the head of the tax authority in
order to pass a tax law. The resultant institutional decay was at the expense of economic
infrastructure development and general public service provision. The corruption culture also spread
even beyond civil service, fostering financial crimes such as the advance-fee fraud scam, and
destroying social capital (trust), essential in sound business practice.
The NNPC was established in 1977 to manage all government interests in the Nigerian oil industry
including involvement in production and marketing petroleum products.
4
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6-2-3 Lack of Transparency in Revenue Distribution within the Federal and State System
In accordance with the nation’s constitution, national revenues are pooled into the
Consolidated Revenue Fund Account operated by the Federal Government, and allocated to the
various government tiers according to a revenue-sharing formula. The challenge for the Nigerian
Federal government has always been the optimal and transparent allocation of these national
resources and oil benefits across the country’s 36 States inhabited by different ethnicities, and 774
local governments. Thus, resource allocation has always been central to Nigerian politics, and the
cause of political mayhem within the country. The Federal Government receives about half of the
total allocation, about a quarter goes to the States and the remainder is shared between the local
governments, statutory bodies and the reserves. Population figures in the north and south are
perceived to be of great practical influence as well in distribution of government revenues, because
the larger populated area may receive more funding. However, cases of inadequate fund transfers,
misallocation of resources by states due to over-reliance on federal transfers hinder efficient supply
of public services across the country (Olowu and Erero, 1995; Ekpo and Ndebbio, 1998; The World
Bank, 2002) see Case 1. Lack of transparency on the political arena also mars election legitimacy.
Allegations of election fraud and election violence characterized by ethnic, religious and political
differences are not new to Nigerian politics.
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CASE 1- Electric Power Crisis in Nigeria
Nigeria faces a grim energy challenge: 70% of urban dwellers have little or no access to electricity. The country’s
electric power sector is dominated by the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), a government parastatal. The
President, Alh. Umar Yar’Adua remarked in early 2008 that about $10billion was spent from proceeds of oil windfall
prices from the Excess Crude Account by his predecessor to alleviate the power supply situation with little results.
The Excess Crude Account is to act as a stabilization fund, closing budget deficits that are a product of oil price
volatility, and to potentially fund domestic infrastructure investments. The Federal House of Representatives Speaker
stated that the amount withdrawn from the Account was actually $16billion, and commenced a series of public
hearings with public testimonies from former and current government officials. The public hearings revealed
significant differences on; the exact amounts involved; the site location of projects, the contracts bidding and award
process and a large number of projects not commenced or partially commenced but fully paid for. Initially, States and
local governments were said to have bought into the National Integrated Power Project (NIPP), but with the
revelations from the public hearings, they demanded for a refund of their share. Government officials attributed the
meagre improvement in the power situation to various reasons including personal differences between the President
and the Vice-president, inadequate diligence of the bureaucracy in ensuring transparency in the contract award
process and under-investment in the sector as a whole. There were also reports of prominent former government
officials having interests in some of the defaulting companies. In the meantime, the electricity situation is worsening
with power generation below 2000MW compared to the target of 10,000MW that NIPP was supposed to generate
once operational (Vanguard; Power probe opens a can of worms, gov officials sing discordant tones;20/2/09)
http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/5667/116/
6-2-4 Low Tax Revenue (and other internally generated revenue)
Although more government revenue derives from oil revenues and less from taxes, when
government fails to provide public services, public distrust for the government contributes in
motivating widespread tax evasion by the individuals and commercial enterprises. The Nigerian
government reportedly loses billions of dollars through tax evasion. Kapoor (2007) also describes
how investors bribe and lose money to accountants and auditors who allegedly sell various schemes
of tax avoidance and other unethical practices like illegal capital flight. In the extreme instance,
government failure to provide public services has resulted in instability in some areas, particularly
the Niger Delta.
6-2-5 Niger Delta – Income inequality and Social Instability
Situated in the southern most part of Nigeria, about 90% of oil extraction is carried out in the
Niger-delta region at the cost of severe environmental degradation. The Niger delta is inhabited by
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31 million people (almost 20% of the total population) constituting 40 ethnic groups. Revenue
allocated for environmental rehabilitation and development through government statutory bodies,
including the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the Niger
Delta Development Commission (NDDC), is often inadequate or misappropriated. Meanwhile, the
majority of oil revenues benefit a few, especially multinationals and elite Nigerians, widening the
gap in income distribution. Using government neglect as a justification, civil groups and militia,
such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Urhoho Historical
Society (formed by Nigerians based in the US), and the Niger Delta Congress have demanded
political autonomy and total control of oil resources on the basis that the region was initially
forcefully amalgamated into Nigeria. Further demands include participation in the oil industry,
increased allocation of oil revenues from the government and development of basic infrastructure.
Constant protest conflicts, kidnappings of employees from foreign oil firms, and oil bunkering (oil
theft) among other actions, take place in the Niger Delta, often reducing oil mining efficiency.
6-2-6 The Problem of Insufficient Statistical Data
One of the factors possibly contributing to the neglect or insufficient provision of public
services is the presence of logistical problems in the form of largely unreliable demographic data
sourced from both irregular and unreliable censuses, as well as poor monitoring of migration
activities. According to UNICEF, about 70% of the 5 million annual births are not registered due to
lack of information, limited centres, limited financial resources and lack of effective registration.
Public service provision based on such statistics is likely to be insufficient.
In explaining these constraints, Okonjo-Iweala (2008) and Budina et.al (2006) suggest that the
Dutch disease was only responsible for Nigeria’s development challenges, only during the period
before 1980. After 1980, they attribute Nigeria’s development challenges to poor public spending of
natural resource revenues, poor macroeconomic policies and debt overhang, noting that widespread
excess capacity and persistent unemployment are features that cannot be reconciled with the Dutch
Disease explanation of low growth. The debt overhang is seen to be even more problematic than the
Dutch disease, as explained below;
6-2-7 External Debt Overhang
Nigeria’s fiscal spending patterns have long been highly correlated to oil revenues. The
economy has been very susceptible to the volatility in the international oil market, previously ranked
by the World Bank as the 3rd most volatile economy (Budina et.al, 2006). Wasteful public spending
yielded low productivity and return on public investment projects. Previous military dictator
authorities had focused on avoiding the Dutch disease and deterioration of the non–traded goods
sector particularly agriculture and manufacturing such that revenues during oil booms were
ironically augmented by additional borrowings collateralised by oil, to finance extravagant
132
expenditure on capital intensive commitments in the name of development. Unfortunately, when oil
prices fell in 1982, they affected collateral value, while debt rescheduling with creditors became
difficult without an IMF supported program (Okonjo-Iweala, 2008). Borrowing to cover old debts
was also difficult under falling oil prices and high interest rates. Inflation rose and foreign exchange
was controlled, resulting in a black market for foreign exchange, as well as incomplete projects and
little done towards poverty reduction. The debts attracted high interest rates and penalties, and the
lack of credibility reduced Nigeria’s attractiveness to Foreign Direct Investment even when returns
to investment were high. Thus a debt overhang problem was created whereby external funds could
not be attracted in times of genuine need. This was a more serious problem than the Dutch disease,
characterized by lack of foreign investment, unemployment, lack of capital to complete projects.
Given these issues, addressing the Nigerian development challenges may require focusing on
strengthening five core institutions as identified by the Fund for Peace in 2006, as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1
Leadership
Military
Police
Judiciary
Civil Service
Moderate
Moderate
Weak
Weak
Weak
Source – The Fund for Peace 2007
The Nigerian leadership, though under democratic rule, is still very delicate and its
development is threatened by chaotic elections. Inefficiencies arise in the military and police, from
use of violence to maintain peace and order in the country. The judiciary has for a long time been
plagued by corruption and the civil service tends to be weak, inefficient and discontented with
remuneration. Human flight is a major occurrence as professionals leave the country for the United
States, the United Kingdom and other parts of the world. These issues need to be addressed along
with ethnic and economic concerns in the oil producing regions.
6-3 What the Nigerian Government is doing to address the situation
Political influence on social and economic reforms, particularly during the period 1970-1998
impeded reform effectiveness, and under collapsed institutions and deep rooted corruption there was
little or no incentive to reform. Furthermore, domestic ownership of reforms has always been
necessary for reform success. External reforms were generally viewed by the average Nigerian with
resentment as they were viewed as imperialist, such that structural adjustment programs were met
with rioting particularly in 1988-89 and had to be relaxed in some cases. But on the other hand, even
133
home grown economic reforms, such as one implemented by General Muhammadu Buhari in 1983,
also caused social discontent and resulted in a coup because of its restrictive measures (see Aid and
Reform in Africa (Nigeria), World Bank 2001). Lack of commitment to reform measures contributed
to reform failure as well. In some cases, reforms were half heartedly adopted, cutting expenditure
when the international oil market was down, only to be abandoned when oil prices rose and spending
patterns returned to their high levels, such as the 1977-78.
6-3-1 Current Reforms towards Corruption and Governance - Changing the way government
works
Regarding corruption, the first anticorruption reform was implemented in 1995, the advent of
civil rule in 1999 strengthened the implementation of anti corruption initiatives, as evidenced by The
Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) founded 2003 and the Nigeria Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (N-EITI) 2003. N-EITI’s agenda is to promote transparency and
optimal spending towards future development, in resource rich economies who are members of the
EITI. Furthermore, following diagnostic studies to identify specific areas in which corruption was
undermining public sector performance, governance and economic growth, measures including The
‘Due Process’ Mechanism, a procurement reform in issuing public contracts, where all government
contracts are vetted for transparency by the department of due process so as to curb public treasury
mismanagement, and part 4 of Nigeria’s National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy
(NEEDS) reform program, have been implemented to reduce corruption, promote accountability and
tighten weak areas. Gradual progress has been realised in the fight against corruption as shown in
figure 1 below.
Figure 2
㪚㫆㫉㫉㫌㫇㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪧㪼㫉㪺㪼㫇㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪠㫅㪻㪼㫏
No corruption
㪈㪐
㪐㪍
㪈㪐
㪐㪎
㪈㪐
㪐㪏
㪈㪐
㪐㪐
㪉㪇
㪇㪇
㪉㪇
㪇㪈
㪉㪇
㪇㪉
㪉㪇
㪇㪊
㪉㪇
㪇㪋
㪉㪇
㪇㪌
㪉㪇
㪇㪍
㪉㪇
㪇㪎
㪉㪇
㪇㪏
Extremely corrupt
㪈㪇
㪐
㪏
㪎
㪍
㪌
㪋
㪊
㪉
㪈
㪇
Data source – Transparency International (www.transparency.org)
Overall, there has been a slight improvement in corruption control since the initial
implementation of corruption controls 1995, and more so after the implementation of the NEEDS
development strategy in 2003. Given the recommendations, donor assistance and ideas ploughed into
the NEEDS reform, successful implementation would require commitment, so the reform does not
134
follow the same direction as past failed reforms.
6-3-2 Towards dependence on oil revenues – Promoting Private Enterprise
Because oil is a non renewable resource, its supplies are projected to run out in the next 44
years according to a Shell survey. The Nigerian economy is also likely to face a fall in oil demand in
the event that new alternative energy sources are discovered by major oil importers such as the US.
Nigeria‘s economy may face collapse if it is unprepared for such occurrences.
The government efforts to discontinue the strong dependence on current oil revenues for
public expenditure so as to insulate against the volatility of the oil industry include promotion of
private enterprise by improving access to capital among other means, as well as a Fiscal
Responsibility Bill passed in 2007 that follows an oil-price based fiscal rule and aims to constrain
spending by transferring oil revenues to the budget in accordance with a reference price, as well as a
ceiling on the non oil deficit.
6-3-3 Towards Stabilization of the Niger Delta
The government responded to the Niger Delta crisis through the introduction of the Oil
Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 and the Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, through which the government allocates 13% of oil
revenue for development of the Delta. To date, little development has taken place and the region
continues to be unstable with cases of oil theft, kidnapping oil mining company employees and the
declarations of ‘Oil War’ in September 2008.
The Nigerian Government also has a Seven (plus two) Point Agenda to succeed NEEDs, as
Nigeria’s Fifth Development Plan, spearheaded by the President Yar’ Adua. The Agenda seeks to
address seven points which are power and energy; food and agriculture; wealth creation and
employment; mass transportation; land reform; security; qualitative and functional education, and
two special interest issues, the Niger Delta and Disadvantaged groups. Aiming to achieve adequate
power supply for the development of a modern economy by 2015, a 5-10 fold increase in food
production by optimising the use of land, as well as putting more focus on security, environmental
and infrastructure development issues in the Niger Delta (nigeriaembassyvienna.com).
6-4 What the International Community is doing to make Nigeria less Fragile
According to Collier (2007), aid becomes effective if reforms are politically backed, and that
is when technical assistance needs to be afforded quickly to help implement the reform, eventually
followed by financial assistance for government spending.
The adoption of the home grown Poverty Reduction Strategy, the National Economic
Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) in 2004, has seen some development partners
directing their assistance in line with NEEDS, or assisting the country to realise NEEDs by
135
providing technical, loan and grant assistance. Figure 2 shows the top ten largest OECD-DAC
donors in 2006, led by UK, followed by France, Germany, Japan and US, and this is followed by a
description of each of the donor’s activity in Nigeria.,
Figure 2
㪥㪦㪩㪮㪘㪰
㪪㪮㪜㪛㪜㪥 㪚㪘㪥㪘㪛㪘
㪥㪜㪫㪟㪜㪩㪣㪘㪥㪛㪪
The largest Ten
㪬㪪
㪜㪬
Donors to Nigeria
㪦㪫㪟㪜㪩
in 2006
㪞㪜㪩㪤㪘㪥㪰
㪬㪢
Total Net Aid:
USD 10969.60
million
㪡㪘㪧㪘㪥
㪝㪩㪘㪥㪚㪜
Source: OECD-DAC (2007)
6-4-1 UK - DFID Country Assistance Plans for Nigeria 2004-2008
Since 2004, DFID has fashioned its Country Assistance Plan using Nigeria’s NEEDS
prescription as a framework and following an analysis on Nigeria’s political economy through the
Drivers of Change Initiative that identified three constraints on Nigeria’s MDG achievement. The
identified constraints correspond closely with the Nigerian government’s analysis as shown;
Towards Improving Public Fund management and service delivery: Specializing on 5 lead
states selected on the basis of commitment to development, DFID provides technical assistance to
the Nigerian Budget Office to improve budget systems and to link spending more closely to poverty
reduction. It assists with capacity building, particularly enabling investigation of high profile
corruption cases, and further promotes accountability and civic demand for better governance
through civic education, in partnership with the BBC World Service Trust. Furthermore, DFID runs
programs aimed at improving health and education of the civil society so that the country can have a
healthy workforce that will work towards economic growth. (DFID, 2008)
Towards infrastructure and Private Sector development: DFID supports government through
various 5 year programs which are; The Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility, the Investment
Climate Program, The Nigeria Growth Challenge Fund and The Enhancing Financial Innovation and
Access program. Regarding international trade, DFID has helped Nigeria to realize a better
understanding of the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements covering trade and development
136
support, as well as to engage more effectively in regional discussions and negotiations with the EC,
although Nigeria’s trade policy still remains protective.
Figure 3 DFID UK Assistance Plans - Building on Needs and SEEDS (2004)
Key Objectives in the
Key Constraints to
Progress
Mismanagement of public
revenue
Strategies in NEEDS
DFID Country Assistance
Plan
Involving public
Changing the way government
expenditure management
does its work
and service delivery
Empowering people – the
Weak accountability
Empowering people to
social charter
demand reform and
building a social contract
Poor non-oil growth
Promoting sustainable pro
Promoting private enterprise
poor growth
Source: DFID UK Assistance Plans - Building on Needs and SEEDS (2004)
6-4-2 FRANCE
French assistance to Nigeria is directed towards promoting transparency in Nigeria so as to
develop a friendly business environment that attracts more private sector development and promotes
economic activity in Nigeria. Through the European Development Fund, France contributes 24% of
its USD 24.7 million assistance, towards the 3 year funding of the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC).
Other than promotion of transparency, French Co-operation to Nigeria involves capacity
building through support towards the Nigerian educational system, scholarships for training in
France, cultural exchange to facilitate further association, as well as community development micro
projects. Bilateral technical assistance focuses on agriculture and water resources management.
6-4-3 JAPAN
Since 1999 when President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected, Japan and Nigeria have had a
special diplomatic relationship that allows for regular constructive consultations between Japan and
Nigeria. Japan’s total aid to Nigeria, comprising loan, grant and technical assistance amounted to
137
1.263 billion Yen, approximately US$12.6 million by 2007 according to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA,2008)
Technical Cooperation in Supporting NEEDS and SEEDS initiative: Japan has assisted
Nigeria especially in providing support aligned to NEEDS and SEEDS through technical
cooperation.Support is provided through rural water supply, basic education, health, rural
electrification and cross-cutting issues (in particular, gender empowerment) in close collaboration
with other donors.
Further assistance involves technical assistance towards development of
environmental preservation technology particularly under the Cool Earth initiative.
Towards Private Sector Development,5 a 50 member delegation that included Japanese
members of parliament, representatives from JBIC and leading Japanese companies visited Nigeria
and other African countries in 2008, with JBIC intending to provide low interest soft loans to
improve capital access, indicating Japan’s interest in Nigeria’s economic development. JICA
maintains close control of its development projects to mitigate corruption and improper use of funds
by providing consultants and contractors, as well as spreading payment to contractors over the
duration of the project.
Japan also provides direct assistance to the community, through the Grant aid for Grassroots
Human Security Projects (GGP), for which Japan is reputed to have comparative advantage.
6-4-4 GERMANY
Germany demonstrates a particular interest in transparency, having worked closely with
Transparency International since it was founded in 1993, supporting the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) which Nigeria has adopted as Nigerian Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative (NEITI).
Germany uses policy dialogue with partner governments including Nigeria, on corruption and
transparency initiatives. Since 1997, all of its protocols of government negotiations with partner
countries have included anti-corruption agreements, and loans and finance agreements have also
included pertinent clauses. Aid is directed towards public service reform projects that work to
develop efficient personnel, transparent and effective procurement and public finance systems. This
particularly involves creation of audit offices and customs and tax administration bodies, civil
society empowerment and alerting, to tackle corruption.
In promoting good governance and transparency, Germany also hopes to profit from improved
economic activity in Nigeria given that Nigeria is an oil-rich nation. The German Economic &
Technical Cooperation (GTZ) promotes economic activity by improving electricity supply, as well
as promoting trades, crafts and private sector development. Foundations such as the Kreditanstalt fur
Wiederaufban (KfW) in Nigeria provide finance for investments.
5
Interviewed JICA officers specializing on Nigeria on 26 February, 2009
138
Germany has also made significant contributions in the form of military equipment and
maintenance to complement Nigeria’s peace keeping initiative as well as additional contributions
through the European Commission.
6-4-5 US - USAID Capacity Building for government, judiciary and civil society
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) pays particular attention on the Niger
Delta, an area reportedly neglected by other key donors. The USAID has identified poverty and
unemployment as yielding dissatisfaction and Islamic extremism, corruption and social instability.
Thus USAID sponsors interfaith dialogue through civic organisations that are faith based or political,
as well as creative youth programs, towards promoting peace and stability. Capacity building for
Niger Delta and Northern Region inhabitants involves enhanced access to family planning,
reproductive health services and education and teacher training as well as higher education
opportunities to counter the illiteracy problem (USAID, 2009).
In support of transparent and accountable governance, aid is also directed at capacity building
of civil society organisations so that they can engage with government on fiscal accountability,
monitor budgets and transparency within extractive industries. In addition, capacity building
initiatives are provided for judicial independence at federal level, at local and national government
level towards improved responsiveness to public needs, budget management and fiscal oversight, as
well as promotion of electoral and constitutional reform dialogue that involves civil society. The US
supports Nigeria through trade and investment; Nigeria supplies about 10% of U. S. crude oil
requirements, and is the US’ second-largest trading partner in Africa. As such, it promotes a more
market-led economy that enhances Nigeria's capacity as a responsible regional and trade partner.
6-4-6 European Commission
The European Commission and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime collaborated to
financially assist the National Judicial Institute in conducting a training course on judicial ethics.
Since 2006 about 400 judicial officers have been trained. The EC Facilitates the Support to
Reforming Institutions Program (SRIP) for Nigeria. The Small Town Water Supply and Sanitation
Program (STWSSP) and the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Program are also funded by
the EC, with additional funding towards health and clean water supply via UNICEF.
6-4-7 Chinese Development Cooperation
Chinese aid is typically known for its ‘no strings attached’ approach to Africa. Nigeria is
China’s second largest trading partner, providing China with gas and petroleum. China has
encouraged strong bilateral relations with Nigeria, leading to the formation of the Nigeria-China
Economic and Trade Joint Commission. Given its interest in Nigeria’s petroleum sector, China has
also demonstrated generosity and a human approach to development such that its development
assistance attempts to strengthen infrastructure and revive the agricultural sector. In 2003, a tripartite
139
agreement involving China, Nigeria, and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), pledged the
deployment of 500 Chinese experts to help with food production and water conservancy in arid
regions of the country. Furthermore several Chinese companies, from both the public and private
sectors, actively engaged in rehabilitation and expansion in such areas as electricity, road and rail
transportation,
and
telecommunications.
Such
companies
include
ZTE
Company,
Alcatel-Shangai-Bell, and China Putian. However; the Nigerian government is yet to take advantage
of this opportunity to expand development outside of the petroleum sector to reduce oil dependence.
6-5 Missing GAPS in Aid Delivery
A visible trend among donors in Nigeria seems to be lack of preference for direct budget
support. Official development assistance is either in the form of project intervention or technical
assistance such as indirect project implementation through local nongovernmental organisations
(NGOs), capacity building for civil society organisations (CSOs), or directed towards funding
anticorruption and transparency organisations. With the exception of DFID-UK and Japan (JICA),
development assistance appears to focus on capacity building, and rebuilding and strengthening
institutions related to justice, transparency and accountability to civil society, but without particular
regard to NEEDS, Nigeria’s poverty reduction strategy.
The non provision of budget support could possibly be explained by the fact that Nigeria is an
oil rich country whose challenges have more to do with managing resource revenues than lack of
resources for budget financing as is often the case in other developing countries for instance,
Zimbabwe. This observation is supported as well by evidence provided by Nigeria’s aid coordinating
agency as shown in figure 5.
Figure 4
Population Control
Trade and investment
Poverty Alleviation
0%
18%
5%
Human Rights
0%
Agriculture
Health
1%
54%
Women's Empowerment
4%
Education
12%
Energy and Environment
1%
Governance
Finance
5%
0%
Source: National Planning Commission 2008
140
The chart illustrates the distribution of aid allocation according to the NPC report. The largest
proportion has been allocated to health, followed by poverty alleviation, education, population
control, governance and women’s empowerment. Energy and environment has been allocated 1%,
agriculture 1%, while finance, trade and investment are not being supported. This suggests the
international community’s emphasis on the necessity of an empowered civil society, good
governance and institutional development for growth. These estimates do not include Chinese aid.
6-5-1 Information Asymmetry between Development Partners and Recipient Government
The problem of information asymmetry between Nigeria and her development partners has
also been highlighted in an ODA review conducted by the International Cooperation Division of
Nigeria’s Aid Coordinating Agency, the National Planning Commission (NPC), over 8 years from
1999-2007. Information asymmetry and lack of mutual accountability between the government and
donors has impeded aid effectiveness in the country. Bluntly stated in an ODA review report
prepared by the Nigerian aid coordinating agency NPC, ‘...CIDA, DFID and UNICEF did not
specify the focus of their activities in the health sector. Thus we do not know exactly what the
money was spent on’ NPC-A Review of Official Development Assistance to Nigeria 1999-2007,
pp20). From the NPC review, most, if not all donors, contend that there is corruption and lack of
transparency within government, thus directly disburse project funds, effectively bypassing the
government, as it also does not receive budget support.
The NPC also claimed to have faced challenges of non cooperation from development partners
when trying to collect information on aid allocation. Having sent out templates to development
partners for completion on sectoral and regional distribution of aid, no cooperation came particularly
from JICA despite numerous calls for cooperation.
6-5-2 Improper Alignment
Another challenge is that of donor activities that are not properly aligned to the recipient
country’s priorities, not derived from existing strategy frameworks, and in some cases activities
being directed at ‘disposable aid’, unsustainable projects and an example of motorized boreholes in
communities incapable of sustaining them. According to the NPC, there is no clear criteria for
donors choice of aid intervention, thus they recommend that the government of Nigeria offers clearer,
more effective leadership to her development partners both in terms of how and where to operate if
benefits are to be sustainable as well as better dialogue and coordination among donors, which
should lead to effective application of the principle for division of labour (A Review of Official
Development Assistance in Nigeria 1999-2007, NPC 2008)
Results from the OECD-DAC survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration for 2007 also
supported NPC findings on alignment and donor coordination among other lacking factors, as shown
in figure 5 below;
141
Figure 5
DIMENSIONS
2007
CHALLENGES
PRIORITY ACTIONS
Ownership
Moderate
Limited
Institutionalise reforms
implementation of
through legislation and
medium term
extend reforms to the sub
expenditure
national level
framework and
excessive reliance on
oil sector
Alignment
Low
Donor
Ensure full
reluctance to use
implementation of the Fiscal
country systems and
Responsibility Act and
lack of government
introduce Aid information
capacity to accurately
Management System
record aid
disbursement
Harmonisation
Low
Patchy
Ensure that Country
Coordination between
Partnership Strategy is given
aid partners
a more central place in donor
policy and practice
Managing
for
Moderate
Results
Relatively weak
Establish a
systems for monitoring
co-ordinated country –level
and evaluation
monitoring and evaluation
system
Mutual
Low
Accountability
Absence of a
Take opportunity to
framework for mutual
implement country-led
assessment of progress
framework for mutual
on aid effectiveness
assessment
Source: OECD-DAC Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration and Making Aid Effective
by 2010 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/61/42243379.pdf)
Taking these challenges into consideration, the NPC in Nigeria has since been working on a
web based Assistance Information Management System (AIMS) that it hopes will reduce the
information asymmetry problem. The Web-based AIMS is hoped to promote transparency and
enable development partners to immediately access other development partners’ information thereby
promoting donor coordination.
142
6-6 Conclusion: What Japan can do
Japan’s approach to aid delivery to Africa assumes two roles, as a national strategy as well as
an assistance strategy. Where viewed as an assistance strategy, it has to contribute towards
development by way of poverty reduction, growth promotion, peace building and environmental
conservation according to the needs of its partner countries. Underlying Japan’s aid delivery pattern
is the philosophy of helping people to help themselves, as can be observed in the capacity building
efforts made by JICA. Where ODA serves as a national strategy, it should serve towards promoting
foreign diplomacy.
However, the problem of accountability and transparency blocks opportunities for budget
support, leaving room for mainly project type support. Security issues tend to deter Japan from
assisting the neediest areas in Nigeria, where people need assistance to help themselves, given the
high HIV/AIDS cases, poverty levels, poor education, and the continuously deteriorating
environment they are subjected to, making the area a breeding ground for criminal activities. Even in
cases where consultations with the Nigerian government indicate some areas that might need
assistance, JICA still exercises some discretion in aid allocation, depending on the perceived risk
involved in assisting particular areas. For example, JICA projects tend to circumvent the Niger Delta
area on the grounds that the region is risky due to political instability, leaving this responsibility to
the Nigerian government, which has neglected the Delta area for some time, much to the agitation of
the inhabitants. However, this is one area where human security continues to be threatened as long as
the government and development partners apart from USAID choose to neglect the area. In my
opinion, if the agenda is to reduce poverty and improve human security, then, neglecting the neediest
areas because they are risky, or sensitive areas, when the government has not done much towards
their welfare, becomes counterproductive and only makes the areas riskier as the inhabitants remain
trapped in poverty. This further deters investment and growth and widens the already large gap
between the rich and the poor. Some form of action may be taken either by way of dialogue with the
government or direct intervention as is the case with USAID.
Regarding such a situation, I would propose that JICA does more for the Delta through
combined efforts with the USAID, or UN, towards assisting and reducing the instability in the Delta.
Another way would be to have Nigerian nationals to take the lead in areas with security concerns,
after careful vetting, so more assistance can be rendered, since at the moment it is the instability that
deters donors. Other ways to mitigate this risk can be devised.
Regarding issues such as corruption JICA has put in place mechanisms to ensure that its
leakages due to corruption are eliminated, but the bigger problem of corruption within government
and society remains. Aid effectiveness is realized when there is donor coordination and division of
labour according to comparative advantage as outlined in the Paris Declaration. Japan’s passive
stance regarding corruption can be justified in this regard if it has no comparative advantage.
143
Moreover, a number of development partners have taken to curbing corruption in Nigeria, therefore
intervening in this area would only contribute to duplication of tasks as well as ineffective allocation
of resources.
In delivering development assistance to African countries, A Japan’s ODA manifesto, 2007
prepared by the GRIPS Development Forum highlights the need for Japan to make use of its
strengths in agricultural and industrial production, public-private collaboration as well as field based
activities in assisting Africa. According to NPC ODA review (2008), over the period 1999-2007,
agriculture received 1% of assistance, and trade and investment received nil, compared to 54% in
health, indicating that more needs to be done in these areas, taking advantage of Japan’s strengths.
Lessons learnt from JICA’s assistance to other areas can be applied to the case of Nigeria as
well, by applying the Growth Diagnostics theory to assessing Nigeria’s strongest points and
improving on them, as was the case of El Salvador where JICA helped to develop the country’s port
facilities, given that this was El Salvador’s area of comparative advantage, thereby creating its
avenue for growth. For instance, regarding investment, Nigeria’s vast population provides a huge
human resource supply that, as the resource endowment makes it attractive economy for investors, as
well as a big market for Japanese manufactured commodities (especially electronics and motor
vehicles) and other projects. Nigeria could be used as a production base similar to China because of
its huge population, and work towards creating a middle class in Nigeria. The business environment
could also be made friendlier by improving electricity supply and enabling Nigeria to adapt
technology for that purpose and more.
It appears, Japan‘s comparative advantage lies less in improving or rebuilding institutions in
Nigeria or any other country, than in provision of technical assistance and empowerment to citizens.
Thus, since good institutions are realized with growth and they are also required for growth,
Japanese aid should sharpen its approach and become BOLDER in capacity building and
empowerment and come up with ways to mitigate risk that deters it from assisting the neediest areas.
Furthermore, Japan’s bottom-up approach in aid provision is a commendable one that can be applied
by other development partners as well. This, I believe, would work towards improving effectiveness
of Japanese assistance.
Meanwhile, the Nigerian government needs to complement the efforts of development
partners towards institution rebuilding and development in general, as development partners
simultaneously complement Nigeria’s home-grown development efforts.
144
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About It. Oxford University Press Inc. New York
Collier, P.(2008) Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Implications of Changed
International Conditions for EITI
Devarajan, S; Dollar, D; Holmgren, T. (2001) Aid and Reform in Africa (World Bank)
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