To:
General Groves.
SUbJ:
History Psychological Warfare, Manhattan ProJect.
At the request of Mrs. O'Leary, information on subject
1.
phase of Manhattan Project's history is herewith submitted.
Since the i'ormat of the history is unknown to the undersigned,
this information is being submitted informally for rewrite
into the proper form.
Delay in submitting this was due to the
necessity of having to send to New Jersey for the enclosed
leaflets, which unfortunately are no longer available in the
number requested.
2.
By a classified cable, General Arnold to General Spaatz,
information copy to General Farrell at Tinian dated 7 August,
1945, (copy available in Manhattan records) General Farrell
was charged with the implementation of a program of psycho logical warfare against the Japanese in connection with the
new weapon .
The Army Air Forces was instructed to lend all
assistance.
An informational copy was sent to CINCPAC .
3.
General Farrell received the cable as he was boarding a
C-54 Green Hornet at Tinian with a group including Rear Admiral
Purnell, Captain Parsons, Colonel Tibbetts
and others.
Purpose
of the trip was to report to Admiral Nimitz on the Hiroshima
strike.
l
4.
General Farrell enlisted the aid of the Advanced Unit of
CIncPac Psychological Warfare which was in the dIrect charge
of Lieutenant Robert Morris, USNR.
Liaison was prompt1l
,,"-,~~ ••1;.bl1."'-4 &1; Salpan. tJSAS1'AP 8e1:1:1D8 up epecial. f'l.lPte ~
raoilitate details.
oharge or
Olil's
At Saipan, Mr. Richard Harris who wae in
Radio Saipan and the printing press at Saipan,
met with Lt. Morris and General Farrell's representative.
Pro-
duotion potentials were estimated and the basic plans, subject
to General Farrell's approval and determined by the media at
hand, were outlined.
Inventory of T-3 leaflet bombs and paper
available was accomplished.
Decision was made to use half-size
leaflets in order to double distribution.
A second conference
followed with Lt. Col. Crocker Snow, A-2 of the 73rd Wing,
based at Saipan which had had in addition to its combat schedule
the function of leaflet distribution over Japan.
the distribution program was formulated.
At that time
The decision was made,
subject to General Farrell's approval, to attempt distribution
of 6,000,000 leaflets.
The question of selecting targets was a
very real problem whi ch demanded lengthy analysis of enelllJ' population concentrations.
The arbitrary conclusion called for 60
per cent saturation of enemy cities with a population exceeding
100,000.
5.
These totaled 47.
Problem of what to tell the enemy was the next order of
business.
Sheehan.
Lt. Morris drew up a draft with an assistant, Ensign
This entire program was of top priority and the time
element was the dominating factor.
Therefore, work on the pro-
ject, which actively began on the evening of the 7th of August,
progressed straight through the night.
In addition to the above,
there was a aidnight conference with Brigadier General O'Donnell'.
operation people.
wine.
General O'Donnell was 1n command of the 7~
This conference developed a certain reluctance te ~
Single 8-28's over the Empine, reluotance arising
that enemy opposition to single flights was expected to be inoreased as the result of the total damage to Hiroshima by one
airp~ane.
At that time knowledge of the two accompanying obser-
Ver
was extremely limited
B-~9's
flS
was all knowledge of the
combllt use of the new weapon except for the barest details.
As
a Sidelight, intense interest was encountered by the few Manhattan
personnel in the theater.
In the course of setting up the psycho-
logical plan this was at times a positive obstruction.
6.
On the morning of 8 August, after a flight from Saipan at
dawn, the entire plan was presented to General Farrell at Tinian
who edited the copy of the proposed message to the enemy and
promptly approved it .
The text was immediately flown to Guam
where it received the Army Air Forces and Navy approval, required
by General LeMay and by Admiral Nimitz.
By interisland telephone
from Guam to Saipan, a difficult method of communciation at that
time, Radio saipan was notified to implement the radio aspects
of the plan which called for broadcast of the message to the
enemy every fifteen minutes.
began is available here.
No record of the actual time this
It is respectfully suggested, however,
that this point of information plus the basic documentation of
the entire psychological warfare plan is available in Manhattan
Project records in the form of several progress cables and a
final report cabled by General Farrell to General Groves.
7.
Three Japanese officers in the prisoners/stookade at Guam
.ere detailed to tho task of making the message oalligraphic
(clear copy attachedY with Japanese
tran8lat1on~.
As a re.ult
the Ja panese captives who held the equivalent
captaIn and first lieutenants, it was decided to attempt
• preaentation new to psychological warfare: an objective,
f'actual report orial piece of the f ate of Hiroshima with a photograph of the bomb burst.
Format of an existing psychological
warfare Japanese language newspaper, a weekly, was utilized.
(Copy attached).
8.
Two problems were met and solved.
By midnight flight from
SBipan to CINCPAC at Guam, priority unloading of T-3 leaflet
bombs which ran low was effected.
Russia's entry caused a second
leaflet edition, combining the atomic bomb use with the Russian
move .
Unfortunately, clear text for this second piece is not
available.
9.
Sequels to the atomic psychological warfare were the fact
that distribution was not coordinated with the Nagasaki strike
causing Nagasaki to receive its quota of leaflets the day after
it was hit and a subsequent analysis of effectiveness of total
Japanese psychological warfare reportedly placed this campaign
second only to the Army Air Forces technique of naming targets
before strikes were accomplished.
10.
(Source unknown).
The above includes basic details, submitted by the under-
signed as material for
~anhattan
Project's history.
Continued
cooperation on this subject, which can be better told by General
Farrell, is assured.
Re
ectfully,
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Lt;.
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Amdrica asks that you take jmmediate heed cf what we say on this
leaflet.
We are in possession of the most destructive explosive eVer devised
by man.
A
single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the
equivalent in e>""P1osi.re pmofer to '''l".a~ 20~O of our giant B-29' s can carry
on a single mission.
'l'his awful faC":t ~s cne for you to ponder and we
solemnly assure you it is grimly
acc~rat~ .
We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland.
If you
still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when
just one atomic bomb fell on that city.
Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by
which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you no .. petition
the ilnperor to end the war.
Our President has outlined for you the
thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender:
We urge that you accept
these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and
peace-loving Japan.
You should take steps now to cease military
resist~~ce.
Otherwise,
we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons
to promptly ahd forcefully end the war.
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